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
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ANNUAL REPORTS

119489

OF THE

WAR DEPARTMENT

FOR THE

FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1899.

REPORT OF THE
MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

IN THREE PARTS.

PART 2.

WASHINGTON:
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.
1899.

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ARRANGEMENT OF THE ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT FOR THE YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1899.

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VOLUME II. Parts 1-6.—Report of the Chief of Engineers.
VOLUME III. Report of the Chief of Ordnance.
-

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SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS CONNECTED WITH MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

- - - - -
- Apr. 21, 1898.—Act of Congress declares a state of war with Spain to exist.
 23, 1898.—President issues proclamation calling for 125,000 volunteers.
 United States consul at Manila is given his passports and leaves for Hongkong.
 25, 1898.—Asiatic Squadron leaves Hongkong for Mirs Bay, China.
 26, 1898.—War with Spain formally declared. Regular Army increased to 63,106 men.
 27, 1898.—United States consul reaches Hongkong from Manila and joins the Asiatic Squadron at Mirs Bay.
 The American squadron sails for the Philippines.
- May 1, 1898.—The Asiatic Squadron, U. S. N., under command of Commodore Dewey, engages and destroys the Spanish squadron under command of Admiral Montojo in the bay of Manila.
 2, 1898.—Landing party of sailors and marines destroys several magazines in the vicinity of Cavite.
 3, 1898.—The Cavite arsenal is abandoned by the Spanish and occupied by forces from the squadron.
 16, 1898.—Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt, U. S. A., assigned to command of the Department of the Pacific.
 25, 1898.—President issues proclamation calling for an additional 75,000 volunteers.
 First expedition sails for Manila from San Francisco, Cal., under command of Brig. Gen. T. M. Anderson, U. S. V. This expedition comprised the First California Volunteer Infantry, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, 5 companies of the Fourteenth U. S. Infantry and a detachment of California Volunteer Artillery.
 30, 1898.—General Merritt arrives at San Francisco and assumes direction of the expeditionary forces.
- June 15, 1898.—Second expedition sails for Manila under command of Brig. Gen. F. V. Greene, U. S. V. This expedition comprised the First Colorado Volunteer Infantry, First Nebraska Volunteer Infantry, Tenth Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry, 4 companies Eighteenth and 4 companies Twenty-third U. S. Infantry, 2 battalions Utah Volunteer Artillery, and detachment of U. S. Engineers.
 18, 1898.—Aguinaldo, by proclamation, establishes an interior civil government at points captured from or abandoned by Spanish authority.
 21, 1898.—Formal surrender of the island of Guam, Ladrone group, to the commanding officer U. S. S. *Charleston*.
 23, 1898.—Aguinaldo proclaims himself military dictator and president of the Philippine revolution and outlines a system of general government.

VI

SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS.

- June** 27, 1898.—Third expedition sails for Manila under command of Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt, U. S. A., and Brig. Gen. Arthur MacArthur, U. S. V. This expedition comprised 4 companies of the Eighteenth and 4 companies of the Twenty-third U. S. Infantry, 4 batteries of the Third U. S. Artillery, 1 company U. S. Engineers, First Idaho Volunteer Infantry, First Wyoming Volunteer Infantry, Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry, Astor Battery, and detachments Hospital and Signal Corps.
- 30, 1898.—First expedition, under command of Brig. Gen. T. M. Anderson, U. S. V., arrives off Manila.
- July** 1, 1898.—Disembarkation of expeditionary forces begun and landing made at Cavite.
- 7, 1898.—The navy takes Isla Grande and garrison of 1,300 without resistance.
- 15, 1898.—Fourth expedition sails for Manila, under command of Maj. Gen. E. S. Otis, U. S. V. This expedition comprised 6 troops Fourth U. S. Cavalry, 2 batteries Sixth U. S. Artillery, 5 companies Fourteenth U. S. Infantry, and a detachment of recruits.
- One battalion of the First California Volunteer Infantry encamps at Malate on the outskirts of the city of Manila.
- 19, 1898.—Fifth expedition sails for Manila with First Montana Volunteer Infantry and detachment of recruits, under command of Col. H. C. Kessler, First Montana Volunteers.
- 23, 1898.—Sixth expedition sails for Manila with 8 companies of the First South Dakota Volunteer Infantry and detachments, under command of Brig. Gen. H. G. Otis, U. S. V.
- 25, 1898.—General Merritt arrives at Manila.
- 29, 1898.—Seventh expedition sails for Manila with 4 companies of the First South Dakota Volunteer Infantry and detachment of recruits, under command of Lieut. Col. Lee Stover, First South Dakota Volunteers.
- 31, 1898.—Night attack on United States forces by Spanish troops in trenches around the city of Manila.
- Aug.** 1, 1898.—Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, organized under command of Brig. Gen. T. M. Anderson, and Brigadier-Generals MacArthur and Greene assigned to command brigades therein.
- During the night Spanish field artillery shelled the trenches occupied by United States troops.
- 2, 1898.—Spanish open fire at 5 a. m. and 9.45 p. m. on the trenches occupied by United States troops, continuing in each instance for a period of less than an hour.
- 5, 1898.—Spanish open vigorous fire with artillery and infantry on the troops in trenches.
- 7, 1898.—Joint demand made by General Merritt and Admiral Dewey on the Captain-General for the removal of noncombatants from the city of Manila, and notice given of intention to bombard the city.
- Camp Dewey established on the outskirts of the city.
- 9, 1898.—In reply to statement of inability on part of Spanish authorities to remove noncombatants from city on account of the presence of insurgent troops, joint formal demand is made for the surrender of the city of Manila and its defenses.
- Foreign war vessels leave their anchorage in front of city and American fleet clears for action.

SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS.

VII

- Aug. 12, 1898.—Protocol with Spain signed at Washington, D. C., by Hon. William Day, Secretary of State, and M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador to the United States.
- 13, 1898.—Spanish intrenchments about the city of Manila bombarded by the Navy and stormed and carried by the troops; the city entered and a commission appointed to draw articles of capitulation.
- 14, 1898.—General Merritt issues his first proclamation to the Filipino people.
- 15, 1898.—Orders issued for the assumption of civil government by the United States military authorities in the city of Manila and district of Cavite and officers assigned to duty thereunder.
- 16, 1898.—General Merritt receives cablegram from the President announcing cessation of hostilities.
- 21, 1898.—Transport *Arizona* sails for Manila with 4 companies of the Eighteenth U. S. Infantry, and detachments First Nebraska Volunteer Infantry, Tenth Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry, and First Colorado Volunteer Infantry, under command of Brig. Gen. Charles King, U. S. V.
- 22, 1898.—Disembarkation of Light Battery D, Sixth U. S. Artillery, headquarters and 5 companies Fourteenth U. S. Infantry, detachments of Twenty-third U. S. Infantry, Third Artillery, First California, First Wyoming, Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry, and 2 batteries Utah Volunteer Light Artillery, from transports *Peru*, *City of Puebla*, and *City of Rio de Janeiro*, begins at Manila.
- 25, 1898.—First division, Eighth Army Corps, organized, Brig. Gen. T. M. Anderson, commanding.
- 28, 1898.—General Merritt assumes duties as military governor and transfers command of the Eighth Army Corps to Maj. Gen. E. S. Otis, U. S. V.
Brig. Gen. Arthur MacArthur relieves General Anderson in command of Second Division.
Disembarkation of Light Battery, Sixth U. S. Artillery, 6 troops Fourth U. S. Cavalry, First Montana and First South Dakota Volunteer Infantry, from transports *Peru*, *Pennsylvania*, and *City of Rio de Janeiro*, begins at Cavite.
- 29, 1898.—Maj. Gen. E. S. Otis, U. S. V., relieves Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt, U. S. A., in command of the Department of the Pacific and as military governor of the Philippine Islands.
- 30, 1898.—Brig. Gen. H. G. Otis, U. S. V., assigned to command of First Brigade, First Division.
- Sept. 2, 1898.—First Battalion First South Dakota Volunteer Infantry disembarks at Manila.
- 8, 1898.—General Otis demands the withdrawal of insurgent forces from the entire city of Manila, its suburbs, and defenses.
- 13, 1898.—Commission appointed by Aguinaldo confers with General Otis in regard to his demand of September 8, 1898.
- 15, 1898.—Insurgents withdraw from limits of the city of Manila, as established by General Otis, with the exception of the districts of Paco and Pandacan, south of the Pasig River.
- Oct. 7, 1898.—Civil courts as constituted by the laws of Spain are allowed to resume their jurisdiction and regular functions, subject to supervision of the military government in its policy of occupation.

VIII

SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS.

- Oct. 9, 1898.—General Anderson and staff while proceeding up the Pasig River in a steam launch are ordered to return to the city by Filipino guard.
- 10, 1898.—General Otis makes formal demand for the retirement of Filipino forces from Paco, Pandacan, and other points established by survey to be within the city limits.
- 14, 1898.—Eighth Army Corps reorganized.
- 17, 1898.—Transport *Senator* sails for Manila with a battalion of Twenty-third U. S. Infantry, battery of California Volunteer Artillery, and detachment of recruits for Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, under command of Maj. G. A. Goodale, Twenty-third U. S. Infantry.
- 19, 1898.—Transport *Valencia* sails for Manila with Companies F, G, I, and L, First Washington Volunteer Infantry, and detachment of battalion California Artillery, under command of Lieut. Col. W. J. Fife, First Washington Volunteer Infantry.
- 25, 1898.—Filipino forces retire from points indicated by General Otis in his demand of October 10.
- 27, 1898.—Transport *Indiana* sails for Manila with headquarters and band, Companies C, D, E, G, H, I, K, and M, Twentieth Kansas Volunteer Infantry, under command of Col. F. Funston, Twentieth Kansas Volunteer Infantry.
- 28, 1898.—Transport *Ohio* sails for Manila with Companies A, B, C, D, E, H, K, and M, First Washington Volunteer Infantry, and detachment California Artillery, under command of Col. J. H. Wholley, First Washington Volunteer Infantry.
- 30, 1898.—Transport *Zealandia* sails for Manila with the headquarters, Companies A, B, C, E, F, L, and M, First Tennessee Volunteer Infantry, under command of Col. W. C. Smith, First Tennessee Volunteer Infantry.
- Nov. 3, 1898.—Transport *Pennsylvania* sails for Manila with the Fifty-first Iowa Volunteer Infantry, under command of Col. J. C. Loper, Fifty-first Iowa Volunteer Infantry.
- 6, 1898.—Transport *City of Puebla* sails for Manila with Companies D, G, H, I, and K, First Tennessee Volunteer Infantry, detachment California Artillery, and First Troop Nevada Volunteer Cavalry, under command of Lieut. Col. Gracey Childers, First Tennessee Volunteer Infantry.
- 9, 1898.—Transport *Newport* sails for Manila with Companies A, B, F, and L, Twentieth Kansas, and Wyoming Battery, under command of Brig. Gen. M. P. Miller, U. S. V.
- 10, 1898.—Transport *Arizona* sails from Honolulu, H. I., for Manila, with battalion of Eighteenth U. S. Infantry, recruits for First Nebraska, Tenth Pennsylvania, and First Colorado Volunteer Infantry, and a detachment of Hospital Corps men.
- 21, 1898.—Expedition under command of Maj. G. A. Goodale, Twenty-third U. S. Infantry, arrives at Manila. Left San Francisco October 17, 1898.
- 22, 1898.—Expedition under command of Lieut. Col. W. J. Fife, First Washington Volunteer Infantry, arrives at Manila. Left San Francisco October 19, 1898.
- 24, 1898.—Expedition under command of Maj. G. A. Goodale, Twenty-third U. S. Infantry, disembarks. Arrived at Manila November 21, 1898.
- Expedition under command of Lieut. Col. W. J. Fife, First Washington Volunteer Infantry, disembarks. Arrived November 22, 1898.

- Nov. 25, 1898.—Transport *Arizona* arrives at Manila from Honolulu with battalion of Eighteenth U. S. Infantry and detachment of recruits and Hospital Corps men. Sailed November 10, 1898.
- 26, 1898.—Expedition under command of Col. J. H. Wholley, First Washington Volunteer Infantry, arrives at Manila. Left San Francisco October 23, 1898.
- Detachment of California Heavy Artillery disembarks at Manila.
- 28, 1898.—Expedition under command of Col. W. C. Smith, First Tennessee Volunteer Infantry, arrives at Manila. Left San Francisco October 30, 1898.
- 30, 1898.—Expedition under command of Col. F. Funston, Twentieth Kansas Volunteer Infantry, arrives at Manila. Left San Francisco October 27, 1898.
- Troops on transport *Arizona* arrived November 25, disembark and join regiments.
- Companies A and B, Tenth Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry, assigned to duty at Corregidor Island.
- Dec. 5, 1898.—Troops of First Tennessee Volunteer Infantry, arriving on transport *Zealandia* November 28, 1898, disembark and are assigned to duty with the provost guard.
- 6, 1898.—Expedition under command of Lieut. Col. Gracey Childers, First Tennessee Volunteer Infantry, arrives at Manila. Left San Francisco November 6, 1898.
- First Washington Volunteer Infantry disembarks from transports *Valencia* and *Ohio*.
- 7, 1898.—Expeditions under command of Brig. Gen. M. P. Miller and Col. J. C. Loper arrive at Manila. Sailed from San Francisco November 9 and 3, respectively.
- 9, 1898.—Troops of Twentieth Kansas Volunteer Infantry, on transport *Indiana*, arrived November 30, 1898, disembark.
- 10, 1898.—Treaty of peace signed at Paris between the United States and Spain.
- Light Battery, Wyoming Volunteer Artillery, and Troop A, Nevada Cavalry, disembark from transports *Newport* and *City of Puebla*, respectively, and join garrison at Cavite.
- 11, 1898.—Battalion of Twentieth Kansas Volunteer Infantry, arriving on transport *Newport* December 7, 1898, disembark and join regiment.
- Detachment of California Heavy Artillery disembarks from transport *City of Puebla* and joins garrison at Cavite.
- 13, 1898.—General Otis receives a petition signed by business men and firms on Iloilo asking for American occupation and protection.
- Troop of First Tennessee Volunteer Infantry, arriving on transport *City of Puebla* December 6, 1898, disembark and join regiment on provost duty.
- 15, 1898.—Astor Battery sails from Manila en route to San Francisco, Cal.
- 23, 1898.—President orders the relief of the Spanish garrison at Iloilo by United States forces.
- 24, 1898.—Spanish garrison at Iloilo evacuate the city and insurgents take possession.
- First separate brigade organized under command of Brig. Gen. M. P. Miller and ordered to proceed to Iloilo.
- 26, 1898.—Expedition sails for Iloilo from Manila.
- 28, 1898.—Expeditionary forces arrive in harbor at Iloilo and open communication with the insurgents in possession of the city with a view to its occupation by United States forces.

- Dec. 29, 1898.—Insurgents ask for time to receive instructions from revolutionary government as to the occupation of Iloilo.
- 30, 1898.—Insurgent leaders at Iloilo refuse consent to the landing of United States troops at that place.
- 31, 1898.—Merchants and foreign residents petition General Miller to postpone landing of troops and avoid firing of the city by the insurgents in occupation.
- Jan. 19, 1899.—Transport *Grant* sails from New York for Manila with the Fourth U. S. Infantry and Companies B, G, I, and M, Seventeenth U. S. Infantry, under command of Maj. Gen. H. W. Lawton, U. S. V.
- 22, 1899.—Company I, First Tennessee Volunteer Infantry, under command of Captain Givens, escorts a battalion of Spanish prisoners to the southern islands of the Archipelago.
- 26, 1899.—Transports *Scandia* and *Morgan City* sail for Manila with Twentieth U. S. Infantry, under command of Brig. Gen. Loyd Wheaton, U. S. V.
- 29, 1899.—Expedition under command of Capt. N. N. Givens left Manila January 22, 1899, on escort duty, returns to station.
Fifty-first Iowa Volunteer Infantry leaves Iloilo for Cavite in order that troops may land for exercise.
- 31, 1899.—Transport *Pennsylvania* arrives at Manila.
- Feb. 1, 1899.—Transports *Ohio* and *Senator* sail for Manila with the Twenty-second U. S. Infantry, under command of Col. H. C. Egbert, Twenty-second U. S. Infantry.
- 2, 1899.—Astor Battery mustered out at New York City.
- 3, 1899.—Transport *Sherman* sails from New York for Manila with Third U. S. Infantry, and Companies D, H, K, and L, Seventeenth U. S. Infantry, under command of Col. J. H. Page, Third U. S. Infantry.
- 4, 1899.—Picket line opposite San Juan del Monte fired on by insurgents, and a general engagement is precipitated.
Street disturbances in the city of Manila controlled by provost guard.
Attack upon United States troops at Manila by insurgent forces under Aguinaldo.
- 5, 1899.—Advance made against insurgent lines results in their retreat to positions beyond the foothills, and the capture of Santa Ana, San Pedro Macati, Pasig, and other villages in the immediate vicinity of the city of Manila.
Provost patrol disperses a party of armed natives within the city.
- 6, 1899.—Earthworks and blockhouses constructed and occupied by insurgents, and the city waterworks, on the Mariquina River, east of Deposito, captured.
- 7, 1899.—Sharp and decisive skirmishes on the Mariquina road.
- 8, 1899.—General Miller directed to take the city of Iloilo.
- 10, 1899.—A general advance is made on the enemy's position in and about Calocan.
First Tennessee Volunteer Infantry arrives in the harbor of Iloilo.
- 11, 1899.—City of Iloilo is fired and abandoned by the insurgents, being immediately occupied by the United States forces.
- 12, 1899.—Line of First Separate Brigade extended toward Jaro and Molo, driving the insurgents before it.
- 13, 1899.—Eighteenth U. S. Infantry encounters insurgents at the main bridge over the Jaro River.

- Feb. 14, 1899.—A detachment of 500 insurgents is defeated in the vicinity of Santa Barbara.
- 15, 1899.—United States troops occupy Molo.
- 19, 1899.—United States troops occupy Aravelo.
Transport *Sheridan* sails from New York for Manila with the Twelfth U. S. Infantry and headquarters and Companies A, C, E, and F, Seventh U. S. Infantry.
- 20, 1899.—East Paco is fired by incendiaries.
- 22, 1899.—Incendiary fires in the city of Manila.
- 23, 1899.—Insurgent outbreak in the Tondo district.
Tenth Pennsylvania and First South Dakota Volunteer Infantry engaged by the enemy.
Twentieth U. S. Infantry arrives at Manila and is assigned to provost duty in the city.
- 24, 1899.—First Nebraska Volunteer Infantry defeats a party of insurgents north of the Mariquina road.
- 25, 1899.—Minor engagement in the vicinity of Mandurriao, in which insurgents are driven off.
- Mar. 1, 1899.—Insurgents make an attack in force on outposts of First and Second Battalions, Eighteenth U. S. Infantry, at Iloilo, Island of Panay. Insurgents shelled from trenches by Battery G, Sixth U. S. Artillery, and attacked and routed by the Eighteenth U. S. Infantry.
Visayan military district established.
- 2, 1899.—Congress authorizes enlistment of 35,000 volunteers and increase of the Regular Army to 65,000 men.
- 3, 1899.—Tennessee Volunteer Infantry and Light Battery G, Sixth U. S. Artillery, make a reconnaissance on the Savannah, southeast of La Paz.
- 4, 1899.—Transport *Senator*, with portion of Twenty-second U. S. Infantry, arrives at Manila. Sailed from San Francisco February 1, 1899.
- 5, 1899.—Transport *Ohio*, with portion of the Twenty-second U. S. Infantry, arrives at Manila. Sailed from San Francisco February 1, 1899.
Insurgents intrenched across Mariquina road, northeast of Deposito, are routed and driven off.
Cable communication with Iloilo established.
- 6, 1899.—First Nebraska Volunteer Infantry engages the enemy on the north and south of pumping station on the Mariquina road, driving them off.
- 7, 1899.—Entire district lying between the Pasig River, the Mariquina River, and the Deposito pumping-station road is cleared of insurgent forces.
- 8, 1899.—The Twelfth U. S. Infantry, en route to Manila, lands at Malta and is received with courtesies by the British garrison at that point.
- 10, 1899.—Expedition under command of Maj. Gen. H. W. Lawton arrives at Manila. Sailed from New York City via Suez Canal.
- 11, 1899.—A provisional brigade for temporary service, composed of the Twentieth and Twenty-second U. S. Infantry; Companies C, D, E, G, H, K, L, and M, First Washington Volunteer Infantry; Companies A, B, D, E, I, L, and M, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry; Troops E, I, and K, Fourth U. S. Cavalry, and one section of Light Battery D, Sixth U. S. Artillery, under command of Maj. Gen. H. W. Lawton, engage the insurgents at Guadalupe, Pasig, Pateros, and Cayenta, March 11 to 17.

XII

SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS.

- Mar.** 16, 1899.—First Separate Brigade engages the insurgents at the Jaro bridge and at Mandariao.
Two companies of the First Colorado Volunteer Infantry attack body of insurgents retreating from Canita and drive them through the town of Mariquina.
- 17, 1899.—Gen. H. W. Lawton relieves Gen. T. M. Anderson in command of the First Division.
- 21, 1899.—Companies F, G, L, and M, First California Volunteer Infantry, sail from Manila en route to Bacolod, island of Negros.
- 22, 1899.—Expedition under command of Col. J. H. Page, Third U. S. Infantry, arrives at Manila. Sailed from New York City February 3, 1899, via Suez Canal.
- 24, 1899.—Transport *City of Puebla* sails for Manila with headquarters and Companies A, F, G, I, L, and M, Ninth U. S. Infantry, under command of Capt. James Regan, Ninth U. S. Infantry.
- 25, 1899.—General engagement at Caloocan, participated in by Twenty-second U. S. Infantry, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, and the Second Battalion Third U. S. Infantry; enemy driven across the river in front of Malinto.
- 26, 1899.—Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry cross the Talishan River east of Malabon and drive the insurgents by successive charges from trenches occupied by them along the line of road leading to Balacon.
Twenty-second U. S. Infantry captures Malinto under heavy insurgent fire.
- 27, 1899.—Brig. Gen. M. P. Miller retires and is succeeded in command of the Visayan military district by Colonel Van Valzah, U. S. A.
- 28, 1899.—Transport *Zealandia* sails for Manila with six companies of the Ninth U. S. Infantry, under command of Capt. C. M. Rockefeller, Ninth U. S. Infantry.
- 31, 1899.—The insurgent capital at Malolos stormed and occupied by United States troops.
Battalion Twenty-third Infantry engages insurgents about 4 miles from Mariquina.
- Apr.** 8, 1899.—Expedition comprising Troops C, G, and L, Fourth Cavalry; Companies A, C, D, E, G, I, K, and L, Fourteenth U. S. Infantry; Companies A, C, D, and F, First Idaho Volunteer Infantry; Companies C, D, I, and K, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry; 2 mountain guns from the separate mountain battery, and 4 companies of sharpshooters concentrate at San Pedro Macati and embark on cascos up the Pasig River for Laguna de Bay.
- 9, 1899.—Attack on and occupation of the city of Santa Cruz by the Laguna de Bay expedition.
- 10, 1899.—Towns of Pagsayjan, Longos, and Paete occupied by the expeditionary forces.
- 12, 1899.—Treaty of peace signed by the President.
- 13, 1899.—Outposts at Malolos attacked by insurgents, who are driven off.
- 14, 1899.—Expedition under command of Lieut. Col. J. H. Smith, Twelfth U. S. Infantry, arrives at Manila. Sailed from New York via Suez Canal February 19, 1899.
- 15, 1899.—Engagement with insurgents near Quingua.
- 17, 1899.—Expeditionary forces return to San Pedro Macati.
- 18, 1899.—Transport *Hancock* sails for Manila with Twenty-first U. S. Infantry and Light Battery E, First U. S. Artillery, under command of Col. J. Kline, Twenty-first U. S. Infantry.

- Apr.** 20, 1899.—Transport *Newport* sails for Manila with Light Battery F, Fourth, and Light Battery F, Fifth U. S. Artillery, under command of Maj. J. L. Tiernon, First U. S. Artillery.
 Transport *Warren* sails for Manila with headquarters and eight batteries of the Sixth U. S. Artillery and detachment of recruits, under command of Brig. Gen. E. B. Williston.
 Insurgent forces repulsed in the vicinity of Taguig.
- 21, 1899.—First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry; Twenty-second U. S. Infantry; Companies A, C, F, G, H, K, L, and M, Third U. S. Infantry; Troops C, G, and L, Fourth U. S. Cavalry; Hawthorne's Separate Mountain Battery; Second Platoon Light Artillery D, Sixth U. S. Artillery; section Utah Light Artillery, and detachment Nineteenth Company Volunteer Signal Corps, concentrate at La Loma Church and move northward.
- 22, 1899.—Troops of the northern expedition successfully assault and occupy the city of Novaliches.
- 23, 1899.—Expedition under command of Capt. James Regan, Ninth U. S. Infantry, arrives at Manila. Sailed from San Francisco March 24, 1899.
- 24, 1899.—San Jose occupied by the main column of the northern expedition and the city of Narzagaray is assaulted and captured by the Bocaue column of the expedition.
 Troops of the Second Division force passage of the Quingua River and advance on Pulilan.
- 25, 1899.—The main column of the northern expedition joins the Bocaue column at Narzagaray.
 Troops of the Second Division advance along the north bank of the Quingua River toward Calumpit, where they ford the Calumpit River and clear the town of insurgents.
 First Montana Volunteer Infantry and Twentieth Kansas Volunteer Infantry move against insurgents on the Bag Bag River and capture their position on the banks of that river.
- 26, 1899.—The northern expedition encamps at Angat and Marunco.
- 27, 1899.—Expedition under command of Capt. C. M. Rockefeller, Ninth U. S. Infantry, arrived at Manila. Sailed from San Francisco March 28, 1899.
- 28, 1899.—Transport *Ohio* sails for Manila with six companies of Thirteenth U. S. Infantry, under command of Capt. J. H. H. Peshine, Thirteenth U. S. Infantry.
 Transport *Senator* sails for Manila with headquarters and six companies Thirteenth U. S. Infantry, under command of Col. A. T. Smith, Thirteenth U. S. Infantry.
 Troops of the Second Division force the passage of the Calumpit River and defeat the insurgent forces under the personal command of General Luna.
- 29, 1899.—The northern expedition moves along both banks of the Rio Grande de la Bulacan, and after engaging the enemy and driving them down the river, take the town of San Rafael and then returns to Angat.
- May** 3, 1899.—Brig. Gen. J. F. Smith assumes command of the Visayan military district.
- 4, 1899.—A brigade of the northern expedition engages the insurgents near Maasin and occupies that town.
 Sharp engagement at the Santo Tomas River.

- May 7, 1899.—River gunboats, under command of Captain Grant, Utah Volunteer Artillery, shell insurgents from their trenches along the Guagua River.
- 10, 1899.—Gunboats engage the enemy at San Luis.
- 11, 1899.—Insurgents driven out of San Yldefonso.
- 13, 1899.—Commissioners from the insurgents ask for conference with General Lawton at Baliuag.
Northern expedition takes the city of San Miguel de Mayumo.
- 15, 1899.—General Lawton routs the enemy near San Isidro and marches from thence on San Miguel.
- 16, 1899.—San Isidro, the third city occupied by the insurgents as a capital, is seized by the forces under General Lawton.
- 17, 1899.—Aguinaldo and his revolutionary government retire to Cabanatuan.
- 19, 1899.—Spanish garrison at Jolo relieved by United States troops.
- 22, 1899.—Transport *Sherman* sails for Manila with Sixth U. S. Infantry and recruits, under command of Brig. Gen. J. C. Bates.
- 24, 1899.—Insurgents engaged in harassing outposts at San Fernando are driven off with heavy loss.
- 27, 1899.—Northern expedition returns to Manila.
- 30, 1899.—Transport *Grant* sails for Manila with Sixteenth U. S. Infantry and recruits, under command of Lieut. Col. W. F. Spurgin, Sixteenth U. S. Infantry.
A detachment Twenty-third U. S. Infantry engages and defeats outlaw band on the island of Negros.
- June 3, 1899.—Advance is made upon Antipolo against insurgent forces under General Pilar.
- 4, 1899.—Brig. Gen. R. P. Hughes assumes command of the Visayan military district.
- 5, 1899.—Morong occupied by United States troops after a decisive engagement.
- 10, 1899.—Generals Owenshine and Wheaton's columns defeat insurgents at Paranaque and Los Pinas.
- 13, 1899.—Insurgents intrenched along the Zapote in the vicinity of Los Pinas are defeated with considerable loss.
- 14, 1899.—Transports *Ohio* and *Senator* sail from Manila with Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, under command of Col. Owen Summers.
- 15, 1899.—Imus voluntarily surrenders to General Lawton and invites occupation of the city by his command.
- 16, 1899.—Town of San Nicholas occupied by United States troops.
Demonstration made against San Fernando by the insurgents.
- 19, 1899.—Insurgents ambush reconnoitering party on the Dasmariñas road and are routed by the main column.
- 22, 1899.—Transport *Zealandia* sails for Manila with Companies C, E, G, and I, Twenty-fourth U. S. Infantry, under command of Maj. J. M. Thompson, Twenty-fourth U. S. Infantry.
- 24, 1899.—Transport *Sheridan* sails for Manila with Troops A and F, Fourth U. S. Cavalry, Companies B and H, Fourteenth U. S. Infantry, and detachment of recruits, under command of Brig. Gen. S. B. M. Young.
- 26, 1899.—Town of El Pardo occupied by United States troops.
- 28, 1899.—Transport *Valencia* sails for Manila with headquarters and Troops B and M, Fourth U. S. Cavalry, and Companies E and H, Twenty-fifth U. S. Infantry, under command of Maj. Charles Morton, Fourth U. S. Cavalry.

- July 1, 1899.—Transport *Pennsylvania* sails for Manila with headquarters and six companies Twenty-fifth U. S. Infantry, under command of Col. A. S. Burt, Twenty-fifth U. S. Infantry.
 Transport *Hancock* sails from Manila with First Nebraska Volunteer Infantry and Batteries A and B, Utah Volunteer Artillery, under command of Col. H. B. Mulford.
 Transport *Senator* sails from Manila with Tenth Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry, under command of Lieut. Col. J. E. Barnett.
 Mayors for the cities of Paranaque, Los Pinas, Bacoar, and Imus elected by natives under military protection.
- 2, 1899.—Transport *Sherman* arrives at Bacolod with Sixth U. S. Infantry.
- 5, 1899.—The President authorizes organization of ten volunteer regiments authorized under act of March 2, 1899 (Twenty-sixth to Thirty-fifth, inclusive).
- 11, 1899.—Transport *Conemaugh* sails for Manila with detachment of Fourth U. S. Cavalry and 275 horses, under command of First Lieut. E. B. Winans, jr., Fourth U. S. Cavalry.
- 13, 1899.—Transport *City of Para* sails for Manila with Troops D and H, Fourth U. S. Cavalry, headquarters, and Companies A, F, H, and K, Twenty-fourth U. S. Infantry, and Company B, Engineer Battalion, under command of Brig. Gen. Theodore Schwan, U. S. V.
- 17, 1899.—Transport *Warren* sails for Manila with First Colorado Volunteer Infantry, under command of Col. H. B. McCoy.
- 18, 1899.—President authorizes organization of two additional regiments of volunteers (Thirty-sixth and Thirty-seventh), to be recruited in the Philippine Islands.
- 19, 1899.—Capt. B. A. Byrne and Lieutenant Nesbitt, with a force of 70 men, surprised a superior force of the enemy, and in a hand-to-hand engagement killed 150 insurgents, with a loss of 1 killed and 1 wounded.
- 20, 1899.—Detachment of Sixth U. S. Infantry defeats a robber band near Tolon.
- 22, 1899.—Civil government established at Negros.
- 24, 1899.—Company K, Twenty-third Infantry, defeats insurgents in the Acan Valley, Cebu.
- 25, 1899.—Transport *Tartar* sails for Manila with headquarters and Companies B, D, F, G, H, I, K, and M, Nineteenth U. S. Infantry, under command of Col. S. Snyder, Nineteenth U. S. Infantry.
- 26, 1899.—Transport *Ohio* sails for Manila with two companies Nineteenth U. S. Infantry and detachment of recruits, under command of Maj. O. J. Sweet, Twenty-third U. S. Infantry.
 Transport *Newport* sails for Manila with two companies Nineteenth U. S. Infantry and detachment of recruits, under command of Capt. F. H. French, Nineteenth U. S. Infantry.
 Transport *Tacoma* sails for Manila with detachment of Fourth U. S. Cavalry and 200 horses, under command of Capt. G. O. Cress, Fourth U. S. Cavalry.
 Transport *Sheridan* sails from Manila with First California Volunteer Infantry and Batteries A and D, California Volunteer Light Artillery, under command of Col. V. D. Duboce.
 Calamba captured after a sharp skirmish.
- 28, 1899.—Detachment Sixth Infantry encounters insurgent force near Valdez, in the Visayan district.

- July 29, 1899.—Company L, Twenty-third Infantry, takes station at Kolo, P. I.
 31, 1899.—Transport *Grant* sails from Manila with First Wyoming Volunteer Infantry, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry, First Idaho Volunteer Infantry, and Wyoming Battery Volunteer Light Artillery, under command of Lieut. Col. M. C. Trenmann.
 Los Banos occupied by United States troops.
- Aug. 2, 1899.—Transport *Indiana* sails for Manila with detachment of recruits and casals, under command of Col. C. C. Hood, Sixteenth U. S. Infantry.
 Company H, Twenty-first Infantry, and platoon of Battery E, First U. S. Artillery, proceed in cascoes from Calamba to Los Banos.
 Insurgents make feint on Calamba during night.
- 7, 1899.—Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry mustered out at San Francisco, Cal.
- 9, 1899.—Troops of the Second Division make a general advance toward the north and west and capture towns of Bacolor, Calulut, and Suidalon.
- 10, 1899.—Transport *Morgan City* sails for Manila with detachment of recruits under command of Maj. W. Wittich, Twenty-first U. S. Infantry.
 Expedition under command of Brig. Gen. Theodore Schwan arrives at Manila. Sailed from San Francisco, July 13, 1899.
 President authorizes organization of a volunteer cavalry regiment to be known as the Eleventh Regiment of Cavalry, U. S. V.
- 11, 1899.—Transport *Sheridan* sails from Manila with the Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry and First South Dakota Volunteer Infantry, under command of Col. A. S. Frost.
- 12, 1899.—Troops Second Division occupy towns of Angeles and Dolores. A reconnoissance in force up the San Mateo Valley disperses the insurgents and occupies the town of San Mateo.
- 15, 1899.—Transport *Senator* sails for Manila with detachment of recruits, under command of Lieut. Col. E. M. Hayes, Fourth U. S. Cavalry.
- 16, 1899.—Batteries A and B, Utah Volunteer Light Artillery, mustered out at San Francisco, Cal.
- 17, 1899.—President authorizes organization of ten additional regiments of volunteers, Thirty-eighth to Forty-seventh, inclusive.
- 18, 1899.—Transport *Conemaugh* arrives at Manila. Sailed from San Francisco July 11, 1899.
 Transport *City of Sydney* sails for Manila with a detachment of recruits, under command of Capt. F. H. Albright, Twenty-fifth U. S. Infantry.
- 20, 1899.—Transport *Garrone* sails for Manila with detachment of Third U. S. Cavalry and 389 horses, under command of First Lieut. E. M. Suplee, Third U. S. Cavalry.
- 21, 1899.—Expedition under command of Col. S. Snyder, Nineteenth U. S. Infantry, arrives at Manila. Sailed from San Francisco July 25, 1899.
- 22, 1899.—Tenth Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry mustered out at San Francisco, Cal.
- 23, 1899.—First Nebraska Volunteer Infantry mustered out at San Francisco, Cal.

SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS.

XVII

- Aug. 23, 1899.—Transports *Valencia* and *Zealandia* sail from Manila with First Montana Volunteer Infantry, under command of Col. H. C. Kessler.
- 24, 1899.—Command of Maj. O. J. Sweet arrives at Manila. Sailed from San Francisco July 26, 1899.
- 25, 1899.—Transport *Athenian* sails for Manila with Troop D, Third U. S. Cavalry, under command of Capt. G. F. Chase, Third U. S. Cavalry.
- Transport *St. Paul* sails for Manila with Troops A, C, E, F, K, L, and M, Third U. S. Cavalry, under command of Lieut. Col. H. W. Wessells, jr., Third U. S. Cavalry.
- 29, 1899.—Transport *City of Puebla* sails for Manila with detachment of recruits, under command of Capt. B. D. Devore, Twenty-third U. S. Infantry.



Capt. C. H. Murray, Lieut. Fred W. Sladen, Lieut. Louis P. Sanders,
Gen. R. P. Hughes, Gen. E. S. Otis, Lieut. Col. T. H. Barry.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS, MANILA.

**ANNUAL REPORT OF MAJ. GEN. E. S. OTIS, U. S. V., COMMANDING
DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.**

HQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
AND OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., August 31, 1899.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL UNITED STATES ARMY,
Washington, D. C.

SIR: I have received instructions from the Major-General Commanding the Army to submit an annual report of the military operations of the troops of this command, also from the War Department to furnish a report of the affairs of this military government. The matters connected with each of these subjects are so closely related as to make the rendition of separate and independent reports very difficult without producing in each much which the other must contain. I have, therefore, concluded to embrace in a single narration with comment, as necessary explanation may appear to me to demand, the conditions which have presented themselves, both military, civil, or political, and the means which have been adopted to meet them. In doing this only the general features of the more important events can be touched upon, as an attempt to detail causes, effects, and the action which has been applied by the military authorities would involve a very extended recounting of facts and a lengthy discussion of theories.

The time which I am directed to cover in these reports may properly be divided into two periods—the first extending from June 30, 1898, to February 4, 1899, the date upon which the then rebellious subjects of Spain attacked at Manila, without cause, the forces of the United States, which, under the protocol of August 12, 1898, and likewise the articles of capitulation of the following day, were lawfully in possession of the city, bay, and harbor of Manila. The second period extends from February 4, 1899 (when these open and declared hostilities were inaugurated), to the present date. The events of a portion of the first period, in so far as the concentration of troops at San Francisco and the transportation of those sent out to the Philippines, to and including July 15, 1898, are concerned, together with all action of troops preliminary to, and attendant upon, the capture of Manila on August 13, 1898, and thereafter to the end of that month, have been ably reported by my predecessor, Major-General Merritt. But a brief reference to the preparations made by the Government, as solely affecting the Army, in its efforts to meet existing or anticipated conditions in the Philippines resulting from, or likely to arise in, the war with Spain, is pertinent here in order to present intelligently the services of troops in these islands.

The Philippine problem, so unexpectedly and suddenly thrown upon the Government for solution by the destruction of the Spanish fleet in the harbor of Manila on May 1, 1898, when the concentration of all its troops and military stores was being hastily made on the southern

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Atlantic coast, received the prompt attention which its importance demanded. At once the enlistment of volunteers in the Pacific Slope and adjacent States was accelerated and their places of assembling changed to San Francisco. Under War Department instructions to proceed to that point for duty, I arrived there on May 17, where already Major-General Merriam, commanding the Department of California, had placed in camp an infantry regiment and a heavy artillery detachment of California volunteers, an infantry battalion of Oregon troops, and five companies of the Fourteenth United States Infantry. Within the next ten days the Nebraska, Colorado, Minnesota, Wyoming, Idaho, Utah, North Dakota, and Montana volunteers arrived, also the two remaining battalions of the Oregon regiment and a volunteer regiment from Pennsylvania. On May 29 the Eighteenth and Twenty-third United States Infantry and a company of the United States Engineers reported, and during the month of June the volunteer organizations of South Dakota, Iowa, Tennessee, the Astor Battery, of New York, 4 foot batteries of the Third and 2 light batteries of the Sixth U. S. Artillery, and 6 troops of the Fourth Cavalry were placed in camp, also 2 volunteer signal companies and large Hospital Corps detachments. On May 30 General Merritt arrived from New York and relieved me from command of all these so-called expeditionary forces, remaining there until the 29th of the following month, when he departed for the Philippines.

The proper equipment of these troops was attended with great difficulty. Suddenly called to meet an expected emergency in a far distant portion of the world, no preparations had been made to receive them. The supply departments, not anticipating any concentration of forces on the Pacific coast, had made no provisions for furnishing arms, ammunition, clothing, subsistence, or other war material with which an army about to operate 7,000 miles from its base must necessarily be supplied. Indeed, at the time these troops arrived at San Francisco such property, usually kept in moderate quantities on the Pacific coast, had been sent to the East for the army destined to invade Cuba and Porto Rico. The volunteer organizations were supposed to report equipped and uniformed, but a large majority of the arms they presented were worthless, and in some instances entire organizations had to be rearmed. Their clothing had evidently been in use for a long time in State service, was worn out, and many of the men were dressed as civilians. In spite of all of these embarrassments, the celerity with which these troops were equipped and made ready for the field, and with which great quantities of necessary supplies and war materials were placed in San Francisco and loaded on transports, furnishes very satisfactory evidence of the efficiency of the staff departments of the Army. Fortunately, San Francisco is a great market, and much that was needed could be obtained there through contract and purchase. The facilities thus offered were taken advantage of, and assisted very materially in the work of preparation. The shipping on the Pacific coast was found to be very limited, and vessels in anywise suited (even after they were overhauled and repaired) to transport troops to the Tropics were few, and most of them were at the time absent, engaged in foreign or domestic trade. This want was the principal cause of delay in dispatching troops, but the persistent efforts of the War Department, assisted by the army supply officers in San Francisco, accomplished the desired results very quickly, considering the embarrassments with which it had to contend. The time required for these preparations, however, was most advantageously

employed. General officers, as soon as they reported for duty, were placed in charge of brigade organizations and labored assiduously in giving proper instructions to their commands, so that when these troops sailed for the Philippines they could be considered moderately efficient for service.

Upon reporting at San Francisco on May 17, I learned that General Merriam had received orders to ship to Manila Bay the California regiment and a battalion of the Fourteenth U. S. Infantry by a transport that was then being loaded in the harbor with naval stores for Admiral Dewey's squadron. Thereafter being instructed to obtain sufficient transportation to forward also the Oregon regiment, two small transports were secured, and on May 25 the three vessels sailed in company, carrying the troops above mentioned, under the command of Brig. Gen. T. M. Anderson, U. S. V., and entered the harbor of Manila on the 30th day of June. Pursuant to the instructions of General Merritt 4 companies of the Eighteenth and 4 of the Twenty-third U. S. Infantry, a detachment of engineers, the Colorado, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, and Utah Volunteers, and a detachment of the Hospital Corps—all under the command of Brig. Gen. F. V. Greene, U. S. V.—sailed for Manila on June 15. On June 27, under instructions from the same source, 4 companies of the Eighteenth and 4 of the Twenty-third U. S. Infantry, detachments of Engineer and Signal Corps, the Idaho, Minnesota, North Dakota, and Wyoming Volunteers, departed on five transports, and on June 29 General Merritt, in person, accompanied by his staff, sailed on steamer *Newport* for the same destination, having on board 2 foot batteries of the Third U. S. Artillery and the Astor Light Battery. The troops of which these three expeditionary forces were composed numbered 470 officers and 10,437 enlisted men. Subsequently, and between the 15th and 25th days of July, the fourth expedition left San Francisco, transported by five vessels, and made up of 2 batteries of the Third U. S. Artillery, 5 companies of the Fourteenth U. S. Infantry, 6 troops of the Fourth U. S. Cavalry, the Montana and South Dakota Volunteers, with Signal and Hospital Corps detachments, numbering in all, 172 officers and 4,610 enlisted men. Before this last expedition reached Manila that city had capitulated, and the United States troops were in possession. No additional troops were dispatched from the United States until the latter part of October. Then, and in the following month, were sent the Washington, Kansas, Tennessee, and Iowa regiments of volunteers, the Nevada troop of cavalry, the Wyoming Light Artillery, and 2 foot batteries of California troops, numbering, collectively, 186 officers and 4,466 enlisted men. There were no further arrivals during the first of the two periods which it is intended that this report shall cover, and subsequent troop additions will not be mentioned until later.

With the officers of my staff I accompanied the fourth expedition and arrived in the harbor of Manila on August 21, where we first learned of the operations of the 10,000 men who had preceded or accompanied Major-General Merritt, and which had resulted in the surrender of Manila and its occupation by the United States forces on the 13th of that month. Reporting to General Merritt, I was placed in command of the Eighth Army Corps by General Orders, No. 10, Headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, of August 23, 1898, which were issued under War Department General Orders, No. 73, of that year. Upon August 29, 1898, in accordance with General Orders, No. 3, Headquarters Department of the Pacific, of that date, I relieved Major-General Merritt of the command of the

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Department of the Pacific and as Military Governor of the Philippine Islands. At this time the military situation was as follows:

Under the articles of capitulation, United States occupation was confined to the harbor, city, and bay of Manila. Admiral Dewey, with his fleet, held the bay, also the naval establishment at Cavite, which had been captured in May. The insurgent forces, commanded by General Aguinaldo, entered the city with our troops on August 13, and actively held joint occupation with them over a considerable part of the southern portion of the same, declining to vacate on the plea, first, that they had served as allies with our troops, during the operations which had preceded the taking of the city, and therefore had the right to participate in the victory; and, secondly, that they wished to maintain all advantageous positions secured in order to resist successfully the troops of Spain, should that Government be permitted to resume its former power in the islands. Brigadier-Generals Anderson and MacArthur were exercising immediate command of the troops—the former at Cavite and vicinity, where a small contingent was stationed, and the latter at Manila, where the great majority had been judiciously placed in barracks and other available buildings. General MacArthur, also, as provost-marshal-general, had charge of the police of that city and supervision of about 13,000 prisoners—Spanish and native—who had been surrendered by the Spanish authorities. These had been collected in the walled portion of the city and occupied, for the most part, its churches and convents. Outwardly peace reigned, but the insurgents, disappointed because not permitted to enjoy the spoils of war, in accordance with medieval customs, and to exercise with the United States authorities joint control of municipal affairs, were not friendly disposed and endeavored to obtain their asserted rights and privileges through controversy and negotiations and a stubborn holding of the positions taken by their troops. This manifestation caused General Merritt to cable the authorities at Washington, on August 14, as follows:

Since occupation of town and suburbs the insurgents on outside are pressing demand for joint occupation of the city. Inform me at once how far I shall proceed in enforcing obedience of insurgents in this matter and others that may arise, etc.

To which he received reply—dated August 18—that there must be no joint occupation of the city, bay, and harbor with the insurgents; that they and all others must recognize the military occupation and authority of the United States and the cessation of hostilities proclaimed by the President. Some correspondence between General Merritt and Aguinaldo preceded and followed this dispatch, and I believe also two or three discussions of the subject between the representatives of Aguinaldo and General Merritt's subordinate officers, all of which have been reported. Upon leaving the island, General Merritt's chief of staff turned over to me a communication from General Aguinaldo, and in letter transmitting it said:

Enclosed you will find a letter from General Aguinaldo and a blue print of Manila. The letter was brought by his aid two days ago, and was informed that a reply would be sent within four days. The matter should have immediate attention, as General Merritt has not been able to take it up, owing to his hurried departure. The letters referred to by Aguinaldo, by General Merritt, will be found in the press copy-book at the Department Headquarters and here.

The demand now made by Aguinaldo is to retain his people just outside of the interior black pencil mark on the map. The outside pencil marks indicate the position that General Merritt desired to have the insurgents withdraw to. I

inferred from what the aid said that what Aguinaldo particularly desires is that in case his requests are not granted that reasons are to be given which he can use to satisfy his people. The trouble with him seems to be that he does not think it prudent to give positive orders for his people to withdraw from the city.

The communication turned over read as follows:

REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES.

Presidencia Bakoar, August 27, 1898.

Gen. WESLEY MERRITT, *Manila.*

MY DEAR SIR: Knowing the contents of your letter of the 24th instant, I can not do less than manifest my surprise at knowing that you had formed the idea that my commissioners compromised themselves, in the conference of the 15th, to retire my troops outside of the line that you would designate.

I understood, and still understand, as well as the commissioners, that the evacuation by my troops of the posts that they occupy to-day on the outskirts of the city, would take place when the proposed conditions were accepted by you, among which figured the condition that the agreement (treaty) should be in writing to be valid; for which reason, not having yet accepted some of the propositions made at that time, nor those that were substituted in my previous communication, I do not think that up to the present time I have contracted said obligation.

If I have permitted the use of the waters before the promulgation of the treaty it was more to demonstrate that I am disposed to sacrifice to friendship everything that does not prejudice too much the rights of the Philippines. I comprehend, as well as yourself, the inconvenience of a dual occupation of the city of Manila and its suburbs, given in the conditions stipulated in the capitulation with the Spaniards; but you ought to understand that without the long siege sustained by my forces you might have obtained possession of the ruins of the city, but never the rendition of the Spanish forces, who could have retired to the interior towns.

I do not complain of the disowning of our help in the mentioned capitulation, although justice resents it greatly and I have to bear the well-founded blame of my people. I do not insist on the retention of all the positions conquered by my forces within the city limits, at the cost of much blood, of indescribable fatigues, and much money. I promise to retire, then, to the following line:

In Malate, the continuation of the calzada of Singalon to the bridge that joins said road; from this bridge in straight line to that of Paco; from this last bridge, following the creek Paco, and leaving outside the suburb Tandue, to the river Pasig; following this river and entering by the creek that goes to the bridge of Aviles; from this bridge, following the road (calzada) of the same name and that of Santa Mesa, that are the dividing lines between Sampaloc and the village of Pandacan, to the jurisdictional limit of the suburbs of Sampaloc, Trozo, and Tondo.

But before I retire to this line, I pray you to reclaim from Admiral Dewey the protection of our ships for free navigation, and permit me to insist, if you will, upon the restitution of the positions that we now are going to leave, if in the treaty of peace to be celebrated between Spain and the United States they acknowledge the dominion of Spain in the Philippines. I expect as well that you order the American forces outside of above line to retire within the city, as already agreed to.

I do not believe that the acceptance of the conditions proposed will prejudice the smallest right of your people, as it signifies nothing more than the acknowledgment of a part of the rights of a friendly people.

I am compelled to insist on the said conditions to quiet the complaints of my chiefs and soldiers, who have exposed their lives and abandoned their interests during the siege of Manila.

I hope that this time you will manifest the spirit of justice that pertains to such a free and admirably constituted Government as that of the United States of America.

Yours, very respectfully,

EMILIO AGUINALDO.

Aguinaldo's letter was considered the following day, when it became evident that time would be required to prepare an answer, as prior to doing so it was important to gain a knowledge of the contents of past communications on the subject, and to ascertain what other steps had been taken to adjust the difficulty, of which I was ignorant. I there-

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upon telegraphed to General Aguinaldo at Bacoar, Cavite province, his then headquarters, as follows:

MANILA, August 31, 1898.

General AGUINALDO, Bacoar:

Referring to promise made by General Merritt to reply to your letter of August 27 within four days, I desire to state that he was unexpectedly ordered away and had not opportunity to reply. Being unacquainted with the situation, I must take time to inform myself before answering, which I will do at the earliest opportunity.

OTIS.

To this telegram he replied on the same day as follows:

General OTIS,

Commanding United States Forces, Manila.

GENERAL: By your telegram of this date I understood that your excellency substitutes General Merritt in his absence, for which I beg you will kindly accept my cordial salutation and my most sincere congratulations.

I shall have much pleasure in continuing with your excellency the friendly relations which ought to exist between us.

The bearer is one of my aids, who will acquaint you of some reserved affairs.

Hoping you will give your attention as the welfare of both countries require,

Very respectfully, yours,

EMILIO AGUINALDO.

BACOR, August 31, 1898.

A communication, of which the following is a copy, was thereupon prepared and sent to General Aguinaldo, at Malolos, Luzon, to which point he had removed his headquarters and established his so-called capital, viz:

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., September 8, 1898.

THE COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE FORCES.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 27th ultimo, addressed to General Merritt, my predecessor, and by him transferred to me on the eve of his departure from Manila. By telegram of the 31st ultimo I informed you of General Merritt's hurried departure, in obedience to the orders of my Government; that his necessarily hurried preparations did not permit him to make reply to your communication; that such duty devolved upon me, and that I would perform it at the earliest opportunity and as soon as I could acquaint myself with the condition of affairs, of which I, having but recently arrived, had slight knowledge. To my telegram you made a most courteous response, and now, having carefully considered the situation, I have the honor to make reply as follows:

And first, in your note of the 27th ultimo you are pleased to manifest surprise that the late United States military governor should have reached an erroneous conclusion as to the result of a conference with your commissioners on August 15, as apparently manifested by his letter to you of August 24. I do not know the extent of any conversation which may have been indulged in at that conference, nor the nature of the impression which may have been conveyed. Referring to written memoranda in my possession which purport to contain the substance of propositions discussed, I find that certain concessions were made by the commissioners in expected return for specific privileges to be conferred, and, as there has not been a mutual agreement in these matters between the interested parties, I do not understand that any obligations have arisen by reason of that conference.

Second. I note with pleasure your allusion to your very friendly disposition toward my Government, as manifested by your prompt attendance to our request for a supply of water; also your expression as to the inconvenience of the dual occupation of the city of Manila, and I do not forget that the revolutionary forces under your command have made many sacrifices in the interests of civil liberty and for the welfare of your people, and to this I will be pleased to allude hereafter.

Third. In connection with your remark as to the injustice of the United States in not properly appreciating your assistance in the capture of Manila, I beg a full consideration, on your part, of the mandatory conditions which accompany occupation, which I am sure you fully appreciate, but to which I will respectfully invite your attention in a subsequent portion of this reply.

Fourth. You designate certain lines within the suburbs of the city of Manila,



HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS, MANILA.

to which you promise to retire your troops, and name as conditions precedent: First, protection to your shipping by the United States Navy, and the free navigation of your vessels within the waters in United States occupation; second, restitution to your forces of all positions which are now occupied by your troops, in the event that treaty stipulations between the United States and Spain surrender to the last-named Government the territory occupied by the former; and thirdly, that United States troops now occupying positions beyond the lines you name shall retire within the same.

A discussion of your proposition to hold, jointly, with the United States Government, the city of Manila, involves consideration of some of the other concessions you desired to be made, and to that I will at once refer. I wish to present the matter, in the first instance, in its legal aspect, although, from remarks contained in former correspondence, I am of the opinion that you are fully aware how untenable the proposition is. The United States and Spain were and are belligerent parties to a war, and were so recognized by the civilized world. In the course of events the entire city of Manila, then in full possession of Spanish forces, was surrendered to the first-named belligerent power. The articles of agreement and capitulation gave the United States Government full occupancy of the city and defenses of Manila, and that Government obligated itself to insure the safety of the lives and property of the inhabitants of the city to the best of its ability. By all the laws of war and all international precedents, United States authority over Manila and its defenses is full and supreme, and it can not escape the obligations which it has assumed.

By the able representatives who have charge of the Philippine revolutionary forces this conclusion will be admitted to be incontrovertible, and argument on the point is unnecessary. Can they who seek civil and religious liberty and invite the approval and assistance of the civilized world afford to enter upon a course of action which the law of nations must condemn?

But conceding, as you do, the strictly legal right of my Government to hold and administer the affairs of the city of Manila and its suburbs (I thus conclude from expressions contained in former correspondence and from my appreciation of your intellectual attainments), you base your proposition—a joint occupation—upon supposed equitable grounds, referring to the sacrifices your troops have made and the assistance they have rendered the American forces in the capture of Manila. It is well known they have made personal sacrifices, endured great hardships, and have rendered aid. But is it forgotten that my Government has swept the Spanish navy from the seas of both hemispheres; sent back to Spain the Spanish army and navy forces, recently embarked for your destruction, and the secure holding of the Philippine possessions; that since May 1 last its navy has held the city of Manila at its mercy, but out of consideration of humanity refused to bombard it, preferring to send troops to demand surrender, and thereby preserve the lives and property of the inhabitants? Is it forgotten that the destruction of the Spanish navy and the retention of Spanish armed men in its European possessions has opened up to you the ports of the island of Luzon and held Spain helpless to meet its refractory subjects?

As between my Government and the revolutionary forces of the Philippines, I fail to discover on what principle of common justice a joint occupation of Manila can be maintained. Equity, in a legal acceptance of the term, would most assuredly condemn it. A sense of justice should, in my opinion, have prompted the revolutionary forces to aid those of my country in every way possible in return for the great assistance they have received. You remark, in substance, that had you not prevented the Spanish forces from retreating from the city the United States would have received naught but its ruined streets and buildings. Possibly; but had all Spanish subjects, elsewhere and here, been the contented subjects of Spain war between it and my Government would not have been waged. It was undertaken by the United States for humanity's sake, and not for its aggrandizement or for any national profit it expected to receive, and it has expended millions of treasure and hundreds of the lives of its citizens in the interests of the Spanish suffering colonists.

Apart from all legal and equitable considerations, and those having their origin in personally conceived ideas of justice, I wish respectfully to call your attention to the impracticability of maintaining a joint occupation of Manila and its suburbs, and in this I know that I shall have the approval of your excellent judgment. It would be extremely difficult to prevent friction between our respective forces, which might result in unfortunate consequences, labor as we may for continued harmonious relations. Located in close proximity, irresponsible members of our organizations, by careless or impertinent action, might be the means of inciting grave disturbances; and in this connection I call to your attention the recent shoot-

ing affair at Cavite, which still requires investigation. There might also arise conflict of authority between our subordinate officers. Even now, within precincts in entire actual possession of our troops, I find that permits are given to citizens, who are styled local presidents, to make arrests, to carry arms, etc., in violation of our instructions and authority, and that several cases of kidnaping have taken place. In pursuance of our obligations to maintain, in so far as we can, domestic tranquillity, our officers have arrested suspected parties, and they have asserted (with what element of truth I know not) that the insurgent forces are the offenders. I have declined to accept their statements, as I prefer to believe the contrary, although it would appear that officers connected with those forces have issued the permits to which I allude. Such interference with our administration of civil affairs must eventually result in conflict.

Again (reverting to a legal aspect of the subject), the affairs of the entire city corporation must be administered from a common center. The trust accepted by my Government from those who surrendered actual possession confers a *discretionary* power, which can neither be shared nor delegated. The validity of this conclusion will be readily understood by yourself and associates as a well-established legal proposition, and does not require argument. And here permit me to remark upon a view of the subject you have advocated in support of the plea for dual occupation of the city's suburbs. Your forces, you say in substance, should have a share in the *booty* resulting from the conquest of the city, on account of hardships endured and assistance rendered. The facts on which you base your conclusion granted, your conclusion, under the rules of war which are binding on my Government, does not follow, for it has never recognized the existence of spoils of war, denominated "booty," as have many European governments. No enemy's property of any kind, public or private, can be seized, claimed by, or awarded to, any of its officers or men, and should they attempt to appropriate any of it for their individual benefit, they would be very severely punished through military tribunals, on which have been conferred by law very sweeping jurisdiction. The enemy's money and property (all that is not necessary to be expended in administering local affairs in the enemy's territory) must be preserved for final arbitrament or settlement by and between the supreme authorities of the nations concerned. My troops can not acquire booty nor any individual benefit by reason of the capture of an enemy's territory. I make this comment, believing that you hold erroneous opinions in respect to individual advantages which occupation bestows.

I request your indulgence while I briefly consider the concessions you ask us to make as conditions precedent to the retirement of your forces to the lines indicated by your note of the 27th ultimo.

The first is: Protection to your shipping and free navigation to your vessels. Neither the extent of protection nor the limit of free navigation you request is understood. Certainly you could not mean protection on the high seas, or in the ports not in the rightful possession of the United States. That, as you are fully aware, could only be effected by treaty, or guarantee, following international recognition of the belligerent rights of the Philippine revolutionary government. While the existing armistice continues, the United States are in rightful possession, in so far as the navigable waters of the Philippine Islands are concerned, only of the bay of Manila and its navigable tributaries. Within the same all vessels of trade and commerce and the war vessels of recognized national powers sail freely as long as the sovereignty of my Government is not assailed nor the peace of the locality threatened. In this respect, whatever concessions are extended by way of relaxation of trade restrictions, incident to war, to the citizens of these islands will be extended to all alike, and discrimination in this regard is neither intended nor permitted. Admiral Dewey exercises supervision over all naval matters, and they are in no way related to the duties conferred upon me by law. Nor would it avail should I seek his consent for greater latitude of action, for even if disposed to grant special concessions he could not do so, and I doubt if the supreme authority of my Government could now, under the prevailing truce with Spain, invest him with the requisite powers to do so and at the same time preserve its international obligations.

The second concession named by you is restitution of positions in the city of Manila to your forces, in case the treaty of peace remands to Spain the territory surrendered under the late capitulatory articles; and the third and last is a promise to retire our troops within the lines indicated by you, as the lines on which you desire your troops to remain permanently. These propositions having a kindred nature, may be considered together, and, indeed, have already been impliedly answered. From previous statements of facts and logical conclusions made and stated in this communication, concerning the nature of the obligations resting on the United States with regard to the territory to which they have the legal right of possession under contracting articles with Spain, it is evident that neither in

law or morals can the concessions be made. I would be powerless to grant them in any aspect of the case, being nothing more than an agent to carry out the instructions of the executive head of my Government and not being vested with discretionary power to determine matters of such moment. In the present instance I am not only powerless to accede to your request, but have been strictly enjoined by my Government, mindful of its international promises and national honor, which it has never broken nor sacrificed, not to accede joint occupation of the city and suburbs of Manila, and am directed specially to preserve the peace and protect persons and property within the territory surrendered under the terms of the Spanish capitulation. These mandates must be obeyed.

Thus have I endeavored with all candor and sincerity, holding nothing in reserve, to place before you the situation as understood by me, and I doubt not by the Republic which I represent. I have not been instructed as to what policy the United States intends to pursue in regard to its legitimate holdings here, and hence I am unable to give you any information on the subject. That it will have a care and labor conscientiously for the welfare of your people I sincerely believe. It remains for you, beneficiaries of its sacrifices, to adopt a course of action which will manifest your good intentions and show to the world the principles which actuate your proceedings.

You and your associates could not regret more than I any conflict between our forces, which would tend to excite the citizens of my country, who are always a unit in action whenever its sovereignty is attacked or its rights to fulfill its international obligations is called into question. Then they never count cost, and, as you are fully aware, its resources are abundant. Rather than see the ships of the navy of the United States controlling the navigable waters of these islands and its army devastating their territory, I would greatly prefer to advise my Government that there is no longer need to send more of its troops to this section of the country, and that those whom its holds waiting on its Pacific slope can be remanded to their homes or employed elsewhere, as it may determine.

It only remains for me to respectfully notify you that I am compelled by my instructions to direct that your armed forces evacuate the entire city of Manila, including its suburbs and defenses, and that I shall be obliged to take action with that end in view within a very short space of time should you decline to comply with my Government's demands; and I hereby serve notice on you that unless your troops are withdrawn beyond the line of the city's defenses before Thursday, the 15th instant, I shall be obliged to resort to forcible action, and that my Government will hold you responsible for any unfortunate consequences which may ensue.

Permit me to believe that my confidence in the sound judgment and patriotism of yourself and associates is not misplaced.

You will please pardon me for my apparent unnecessary delay in replying to your communication of the 27th ultimo, but press of the duties connected with the administration of the affairs of this city is my excuse.

In conclusion, I beg to inform you that I have conferred freely with Admiral Dewey upon the contents of this communication and am delegated by him to state that he fully approves of the same in all respects; that the commands of our Government compel us to act as herein indicated, and that between our respective forces there will be unanimity and complete concert of action.

I am, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

E. S. OTIS,
Major-General U. S. V.,
United States Military Governor in the Philippines.

On September 13, a commission sent by Aguinaldo and consisting of three members, one of whom was the treasurer and another the attorney-general of the insurgent government, called for the purpose of discussing the subject of my letter of the 8th. They asked me to withdraw it and simply request in writing that the insurgent troops retire to the line designated by General Merritt, which I refused to do, stating that unless they withdrew as directed we would be obliged to resort to force. They then asked that I withdraw the letter and issue a request unaccompanied by any threat to use force, as Aguinaldo was fearful that he would be unable to remove his troops upon a demand. To which I replied that the letter of the 8th instant would stand. They then said that as the demands of that letter must remain unchanged, the insurgents would withdraw as directed therein, but

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that if I would express in writing a simple request to Aguinaldo to withdraw to the lines which I designated—something which he could show to the troops and induce them to think that he was simply acting upon a request from these headquarters—he would probably be able to retire his men without much difficulty; that, of course, they themselves understood the direction to withdraw, which would be obeyed, and thereupon repeated their desire to obtain a note of request, whereupon I furnished them with the following:

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., September 13, 1898.

THE COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE FORCES.

SIR: Referring to my communication of September 8, I have the honor to inform you that I have had a most agreeable conversation with certain gentlemen who are in the interests of your revolutionary government upon the matters therein contained. We have discussed at length the complications now existing, which will exist, and will doubtless increase, while our troops continue to occupy jointly certain districts of the city of Manila. I have urged upon them the necessity of the withdrawal of your troops in order that the friendly relations which have always been maintained by and between them and the forces of the United States Government may be perpetuated. I am sure that the gentlemen fully appreciate my sentiments and will clearly report them to you. May I ask you to patiently listen to their report of our conversation?

It is my desire that our friendly intercourse and mutual amicable relations be continued; that they be not jeopardized if we can by consistent action avoid it, and such, I am certain, is the desire of yourself and associates.

May I ask, therefore, that you withdraw your troops from Manila?

Permit me to add in conclusion that I have that confidence in your ability and patriotism which will lead you to accede to this request.

I am, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

E. S. OTIS,
*Major-General, U. S. V.,
United States Military Governor in the Philippines.*

In reply to which, on the 16th, the following was received:

MALOLOS, BULACAN, *September 16, 1898.*

THE COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE AMERICAN FORCES.

MY DEAR SIR: Referring to your esteemed communication, dated the 13th instant, I have the honor to inform you that I have given appropriate orders that my troops should abandon their most advanced positions within some of the suburbs, and that they should retire to points where contact with yours would be more difficult, in order to avoid all occasion for conflict.

I hope that by these presents you will be fully convinced of my constant desire to preserve amicable relations with the American forces, even at the risk of sacrificing a part of the confidence placed in my government by the Philippine people.

A consideration of my many occupations will serve to excuse me for not having answered with the promptness desired.

Your very respectful servant,

EMILIO AGUINALDO.

On the evening of the 15th the armed insurgent organizations withdrew from the city and all of its suburbs, as acknowledged by their leaders, excepting from one small outlying district. This, certain agents of Aguinaldo asked on the previous day to be permitted to retain for a short time, on the plea that the general officer in command would not obey instructions, and they proposed to remove his men gradually by organizations and thereafter to punish him for his disobedience. The withdrawal was effected adroitly, as the insurgents marched out in excellent spirits, cheering the American troops.

During the progress of these negotiations the tactical organization of troops was being effected. General Merritt, on August 23, had formed the corps into two divisions, the first at Cavite, composed of troops recently arrived and expected to arrive later, with certain



CAMP McCLOUD OUTPOST. DECEMBER 8, 1898.

exceptions; the second, of those stationed in Manila. Early in September orders were issued announcing the staff officers of the corps and department; also announcing to the command the promotions of Brigadier-Generals Anderson, MacArthur, and Greene to major-generals U. S. V., and of Colonels Ovenshine and Hale and Lieutenant-Colonel Whittier to the grade of brigadier-generals of volunteers; also the composition of divisions, which were organized as follows: The first, comprising all troops in the district of Cavite, Major-General Anderson to command, and consisting of one brigade to be commanded by Brig. Gen. H. G. Otis; the second, under command of Major-General MacArthur, consisting of two brigades, to be commanded, respectively, by Brigadier-Generals Ovenshine and Hale. Measures were taken to promptly meet any difficulties which might arise under the demand to withdraw from the city which had been served upon the insurgents. Brig. Gen. R. P. Hughes, U. S. V., relieved General MacArthur as provost-marshal of Manila, and was placed in command of a separate brigade to constitute the provost guard, consisting of the Twenty-third Infantry, the Second Oregon, and First Montana regiments of volunteers.

In General Merritt's orders of August 15 and 16, wherein he prescribed regulations for the government of Manila, he announced as follows:

In addition to his duties as brigade commander, Brig. Gen. Arthur MacArthur, U. S. V., is hereby appointed military commandant of the walled city of Manila, and provost-marshal-general of the city of Manila, including all outlying districts within the municipal jurisdiction. * * * He will relieve the civil governor of his functions, and take possession of the offices, clerks, and all the machinery of administration of that office, retaining and employing the present subordinate officers of civil administration until in his judgment it is desirable to replace them by other appointments. * * * In paragraphs 3 and 4 of the terms of capitulation, full lists of public property and stores and returns in duplicate of the men by organizations are to be rendered to the United States within ten days, and public property of all kinds is to be turned over to the staff officers of the United States designated to receive them. Under these paragraphs the chief of artillery at these headquarters and the chiefs of the staff departments will take possession of the public property turned over as above, pertaining to their respective departments. The returns of prisoners will be submitted to the military commandant of the city, who will assign the men, for quarters, in such public buildings and barracks as are not required for the use of United States troops. * * * The chief paymaster at these headquarters will turn over such portions of the Spanish public funds received by him, by virtue of this order, to the military commandant above designated, as may be necessary for the administration of his office. All removals and appointments of subordinate officers of civil administration and transfers of funds authorized by the order must receive the approval of the commanding general before action is taken.

In addition to the command of his brigade, Brig. Gen. F. V. Greene, U. S. V., will perform the duties hitherto performed by the intendente-general de hacienda, and will have charge, subject to instructions of the major-general commanding, of all fiscal affairs of the government of Manila.

Col. C. A. Whittier, U. S. V., is appointed collector of customs, and the chief paymaster, Department of the Pacific, will designate a bonded officer of the Pay Department as custodian of all public funds. Both of these officers will report to Brigadier-General Greene for instructions.

Under this last paragraph, Maj. Charles H. Whipple, paymaster, U. S. A., was directed to receive the Spanish public funds. Maj. R. B. C. Bement, U. S. Volunteer Engineers, had already been appointed the collector of internal revenue, and by request of General Merritt and consent of Admiral Dewey, Capt. Henry Glass, U. S. N., was designated as captain of the port.

On August 22 military commissions and provost courts were provided for and their jurisdiction defined. In the proclamation issued

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at the time of the surrender of the city, it was ordered that the municipal laws "should be considered as continuing in force in so far as compatible with the purposes of military government," and should "be administered through the ordinary tribunals substantially as before occupation, but by officers appointed by the government of occupation."

By department orders, issued on the eve of his departure, General Merritt, under instructions from Washington, relieved General Greene and personal staff from duty, directing their return to the United States, and appointed Lieut. Col. C. A. Whittier, inspector-general of the corps (and shortly afterwards announced as brigadier-general of volunteers), intendente de hacienda, which gave him charge of all fiscal matters in the territory of occupation, and continued him as collector of customs.

Such were the chief measures announced and the means adopted to continue in part and establish in part a temporary government to administer the affairs of the city of Manila. Unfortunately, the Spanish civil authorities abandoned most of their civil offices without making transfer of the public records and property. The officers of the Spanish army never made satisfactory returns of their troops, by organization or otherwise, and did not render lists of property to the United States within the period of ten days, as promised in the capitulatory articles, nor have they ever rendered such lists. The civil court justices vacated their positions and gradually sailed for Spain without giving notice of their intention to depart, nor taking the necessary measures to render secure the property and especially the records of their courts, many of which could never be found; and which, presumably, they took with them. To be sure, they had not been authorized to exercise their functions as judges by the government of occupation, as provided for in the articles of capitulation, until October 4, 1898, and then only in a limited degree, as the granting of such authority, in the then prevailing condition of public feeling, would have been politically disastrous, or at least most injurious, to United States interests. Indeed, in two or three instances when, without appointment or authority, they attempted to judicially determine questions in litigation and pending at the time of the surrender of the city, indignant protests were submitted by inhabitants, both native and foreign, and instructions to suspend action on the ground of unauthorized proceedings were issued from the office of the military governor.

Finally, upon October 7, to meet the needs of the citizens for tribunals to pass upon questions of a strictly civil character, the following order was issued:


Until otherwise directed from these headquarters, the civil courts, as composed and constituted by the laws of Spain, which were held and administered prior to August 13, 1898, within Philippine territory now subject to United States military occupation and control, are permitted to resume at once the exercise of the civil jurisdiction conferred by Spanish laws within the limits of that territory, subject, however, to such supervision by the military government of the United States here instituted as in its judgment the interests of that Government may demand. This privilege does not extend to or embrace permission to institute criminal proceedings or to exercise criminal jurisdiction of any nature or character whatsoever.

The provisions of orders heretofore issued by the authority of the United States in the Philippine Islands inconsistent with the foregoing instructions and directions are hereby revoked.

The difficulties and perplexities which confronted all officers appointed to conduct civil affairs were therefore very great. The



VIEW OF MANILA. (No. 1.)



VIEW OF MANILA (No. 2.)



VIEW OF MANILA. (No. 3.)

prisons were full to overflowing with convicted criminals and persons charged with crimes. Immediate attempts were made to relieve this congestion, and applications of the friends of those incarcerated, for their release, were constant. In the jail deliveries which followed, although conducted after search of records obtainable at the time, a few of the most notorious criminals escaped. Subsequently greater care was exercised and each individual case was made the subject of investigation, and even then, when pardon accompanied by release was granted, it was frequently followed by application for the return of embargoed estates, which presented very perplexing questions for determination, involving a study of many Spanish war-measure decrees.

The city government which was in operation at the time of surrender and the revenue measures practiced for its support were the results of national, colonial, and local decrees, orders, and approved recommendations, more or less complicated, with amendatory features, uncodified, and running over a period of many years, presenting a system so complex that after the study of months it is not yet fully understood and certainly not appreciated. The monthly expenditures for the city have been double the amount of its receipts, but as all collections of whatever nature made in the islands are deposited with the general fund in the Treasury and money is drawn therefrom on warrants as demands arise, no difficulty has been experienced.

The chiefs of the supply departments and staff corps of the Army, who had been directed to receive and receipt for the Spanish military stores when the prescribed lists should be presented, were obliged to rely solely upon their own efforts to discover this property, as no assistance was tendered by the officers of Spain. They were, it is believed, fairly successful in their persistent searches, took up and accounted for the property found, considerable of which, such as clothing, subsistence, and medicines, were expended in the care of Spanish prisoners of war. The inventories which they made were very advantageous in the final settlement of United States and Spanish claims in regard to this class of property. General Merritt's orders and those which closely followed were based on the articles of capitulation by which it was transferred to the United States, as information concerning the peace protocol of August 12, which held in abeyance all questions of property rights pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace, had not been received. The fifth article of the Paris treaty of December 10 returned to Spain all these army stores and property, and the inventories which our officers had taken constituted the basis of intelligent settlement with the representatives of that government under treaty stipulations, and in many instances enabled those representatives to formulate their demands.

For three and one-half months Admiral Dewey with his squadron and the insurgents on land had kept Manila tightly bottled. All commerce had been interdicted, internal trade paralyzed, and food supplies were nearly exhausted. Upon the opening of the port merchants were clamoring for the reestablishment of inter-island commerce.

They had advanced large amounts of money on their harvested crops of tobacco, hemp, and sugar which awaited, at many points of the various islands, shipment to Manila. No present relief could be furnished by the military authorities. The harbor was filled with Spanish shipping and that of other European countries. The United States was not represented by merchantmen of any character. Spain owned and was entitled to possession of all Philippine territory, except temporary

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occupancy of the bay, harbor, and city of Manila, although the insurgents had forcibly seized upon many cities and ports. The insurrection had to spread to, and was active in, all the islands with the exception of the Sulu Archipelago, and there the hereditary antagonism of the Moros was only comparatively dormant. Spain was concentrating her scattered forces in the south at the central Visayan Islands and at Zamboanga, and the Spanish general who was in immediate charge of Spanish military affairs (General Rios) had made his headquarters at Iloilo. Through negotiations with General Rios, conducted under War Department permission, an arrangement was effected whereby vessels carrying either the Spanish or American flag might engage in trade at a number of the inter-island ports, the Spanish laws to be applied to shipment and commercial privileges. But a grave difficulty still presented itself. Vessels flying the Spanish flag could not safely enter any ports which had been seized by the insurgents, nor could inter-island commerce be opened to foreign governments as it was free and undutiable in all respects. The merchants formerly employing the flag of Spain resorted to sale and transfer of their ships to American residents, technical doubtless in many instances, but upon furnishing due written proof of a full compliance with United States consular regulations in these particulars, provisional American registration was granted. Many of these vessels were thereupon released and trade became quite active. Still another difficulty was encountered and materially affected the public revenue. The customs tariffs and regulations which has been prescribed for application were faulty in many respects and required amendment before they could be intelligently applied. It was, therefore, ordered on September 29 that "the enforcement of these regulations be postponed until the 10th day of November next, and that the tariffs and duties at present imposed be continued to be applied in the port of Manila until that date, with this exception, viz, that all goods and merchandise secured, or purchased, within the dominions of Spain (the Philippine Islands excepted) since April 25, last, the date of formal declaration of war by the United States Government between that country and the Kingdom of Spain, shall be received into this port upon the same conditions as to payment of tariffs and duties as the goods and merchandise of strictly neutral nations."

Upon October 3 Capt. J. F. Evans, of the volunteer subsistence department, who had been sent to the Philippines to assist in revenue matters, was assigned to duty at the custom-house, his services to be temporarily "confined to a careful consideration of trade conditions and an exhaustive study of the United States customs and tariff regulations prescribed for application, with a view of suggesting amendments and modifications therein, in order to render them as practicable as possible to existing circumstances." The entire labor of revision was imposed upon him and he performed it in a most satisfactory manner. His revision was adopted and put in force at the announced date (November 10), has given satisfaction to all parties concerned, and has worked smoothly, only a few minor amendments having been made since it became operative.

There were also other complications which arose from Spanish action or a misunderstanding on the part of the United States authorities of Spanish expressed intention as to the particular measures which must be adopted to secure the entrance of American vessels to Spanish ports—such as sailing under Spanish captains and the obtaining, under certain conditions, from General Rios himself, at Iloilo, of a special permit

to visit certain trading points. Occasionally a vessel was turned back on her course by Spanish officers or denied entrance to a port after arrival there. Of this the merchants complained and the complaints became the subject of considerable official correspondence and controversy. The insurgents, too, whose government had taken firm root at Malolos, were, through the medium of president, cabinet, and congress, reeling off decrees and constitutional provisions at a rapid rate. Their army was continually successful against the small Spanish garrisons scattered throughout the islands, and they were beginning to acquire the belief that they were invincible. Revenue was their need and desire, and this they began to derive quite largely from imposing export duties on all products shipped to Manila from any shipping point in their possession, compelling the merchants to pay on their property some 10 per cent *ad valorem* upon removal. These many obstacles so impeded commerce that trade languished and the customs revenues were greatly impaired.

With the entrance of the United States troops into Manila and the opening up of that port immigration became active. Business men from our own and other countries, studying the situation, were quite numerous. Members of the criminal classes, who always follow the wake of a conquering army, came from the American and Asiatic seacoasts in large numbers. The native population of the city rapidly increased and was augmented by a considerable Chinese influx, most of which presented cedulas or certificates of personal identity, issued by the late Spanish Government, in order to prove former residence in the islands, as the United States Chinese exclusion law was directed to be applied. Aguinaldo's army of observation, on the outskirts of the city, contained many natives or residents of Manila, who, with all others of his soldiers, were accorded if unarmed, though uniformed, full liberty to enter any portion of the same. All these heterogeneous elements, with the 14,000 United States troops quartered here, filled the city to repletion and gave the provost-marshal-general and his guards ample occupation. The outside country was not yet shut to trade and the port was open to all foreign ships. Hence subsistence was abundant and the minor business industries were well employed.

In a former portion of this report I stated the fact that the insurgent authorities had received permission to continue in occupancy of certain suburbs of the city for a short time when they, on September 15, withdrew their troops from its interior portions. They did not subsequently remove their troops in accordance with agreement, but appeared to be determined to retain Paco and Pandacan, as they believed them to be advantageous military positions, south of the Pasig River. The assertion was made, and became current, that these suburbs were not within the jurisdiction of Manila, and it became advisable to make search and survey to gain desired information on that point. These were made by Lieutenant-Colonel Potter, chief engineer of the corps.

The survey showed that the city had never been correctly mapped, especially as concerned the trend of the Pasig River and the lines of outlying districts. The best opinion did not consider the suburbs, still occupied by the insurgent troops, beyond city limits, but no decree could be found which fixed their political status. These troops had given great annoyance. Their officers had extorted contributions from the citizens of Manila, some of whom they had kidnaped and carried away. They had placed guards upon the river bank and in

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many instances refused to permit our officers to pass their lines, although a mutual agreement had been made which permitted the individual members of both armies, when unarmed, to pass and re-pass all military lines without hindrance. A number of reports were submitted of insurgent interference in this respect. General Anderson called at my quarters on October 9, and complained of the indignity he had received at the hands of the insurgents, in not being permitted to proceed up the river through the insurgent lines, and was thereupon informed that, as soon as a certain map of survey could be completed, General Aguinaldo would be directed to remove his troops from Paco. On the following day he submitted the following official complaint:

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Cavite Arsenal, P. I., October 10, 1898.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to report that yesterday, the 9th instant, while proceeding up the Pasig River, on the steam launch *Canacao*, with three officers of my staff, the American flag flying over the boat, I was stopped by an armed Filipino guard and informed that we could go no farther. Explaining that we were an unarmed party of American officers out upon an excursion, we were informed that, by orders given two days before, no Americans, armed or unarmed, were allowed to pass up the Pasig River without a special permit from President Aguinaldo.

I demanded to see the written order, and it was brought and shown me. It was an official letter signed by Pio del Pilar, division general, written in Tagalo and stamped with what appeared to be an official seal. It purported to be issued by the authority of the president of the revolutionary government, and forbade Americans, either armed or unarmed, from passing up the Pasig River. It was signed by Pilar himself.

As this is a distinctly hostile act, I beg leave to ask how far we are to submit to this kind of interference.

It is respectfully submitted that whether this act of Pilar was authorized or not by the assumed insurgent government, it should, in any event, be resented.

Very respectfully,

THOMAS H. ANDERSON,
Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding Division.

As soon as the completed map of survey of the city could be blue printed a communication was prepared and taken by one of my aids to Malolos. An allusion was made therein to General Aguinaldo's letter of September 16, in which he informed me of his action of the previous day in withdrawing troops in consonance with my former request and which did not at the time require reply. The communication was as follows:

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES MILITARY GOVERNOR,
Manila, P. I., October 14, 1898.

GEN. EMILIO AGUINALDO,
Commanding Philippine Revolutionary Forces, Malolos, P. I.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your favor of the 16th ultimo, and beg to apologize for the late official recognition of the same, presenting as a reason for my delay the necessity of obtaining certain information in order to arrive at conclusions in matters materially affecting the substance of our late correspondence, the securing of which has been attended with great difficulty.

I fully appreciate the friendly spirit manifested toward my Government in your expressions of regard, which your action in retiring your troops has confirmed, but I believe there has existed and still exists some misunderstanding as to the limits of territory which that Government is compelled to occupy and administer under its international obligations with Spain, the responsibility for which it can not escape.

The articles of capitulation transferred the city of Manila, with suburbs and all defenses, as I had the honor to inform you in my letter of September 8. It was found impossible to determine definitely, on any existing map, either the limits of

the city or the lines of its defenses. The latter had been variously placed, at some points retired and at others thrust out beyond the conceded city limits. I therefore directed my chief engineer, by a careful search of the municipal records and an actual survey, to ascertain the lines within which occupation by United States troops was obligatory by reason of the terms of the surrender. He has finally concluded these directed labors, and has presented a map, of which the inclosed blue print is a copy, on which is traced in white the lines determined upon. By reference to this print and a comparison of the same with all former existing maps of the city and suburbs, it will be perceived that the latter vary materially from it, especially as to the trend of the Pasig River and the location of the Spanish defenses. The lines of circumvallation on the print begin at the Bocana de Vitas and thence they follow Maypajo Creek until they reach the line of the Lico road produced, thence proceed along said line and road to Lico, thence to the junction of the two roads in front of the Chinese hospital, thence along the road in front of said hospital to the north corner of the hospital wall, thence to Blockhouse No. 4, thence by Blockhouses Nos. 5, 6, and 7 to San Juan del Monte Creek at the aqueduct, thence down said creek and up the Rio Pasig to the mouth of Concordia Creek, thence by Concordia and Tripa de Gallinas creeks to a point opposite the place where the road from Cingalon to Pineda (Pasai) turns sharply to the right, thence by road to Maitubig, and thence to the mouth of the Malate Creek. This map is believed to be correct, as the surveying and platting were executed with the greatest care and with a desire for accuracy. The lines do not include all of the territory which the late Spanish chief engineer of this city has described as lying within its suburbs and a larger proportion of them are drawn within the lines of the city's defenses; but they are practical, and include all portions of the suburbs which my Government, under its promises to Spain, could be expected to hold possession of under any demands which Spain might present.

In your withdrawal of troops I note that to the north they retired to the line described on the map furnished by my predecessor, General Merritt, while to the east and south his request was not observed. As far as Paco is concerned, it was understood that the troops in that section would be withdrawn within a short period of time, and I have now the honor to represent that the retention of that mutually conceded suburb has been a source of great annoyance to the American authorities, and, as I fully believe, to yourself, while the revolutionary forces along the Cingalon and connecting roads have been the cause of complaint from the inhabitants of that section.

I am therefore compelled by reason of my instructions, which direct me to execute faithfully the articles of the Spanish capitulation, because of the interests of my Government and, as I sincerely believe, the welfare of your own forces, to ask that you withdraw all your troops beyond the lines marked in the accompanying blue print which are above described, and I must request such withdrawal on or before the 20th instant, else I shall be forced into some action looking to that end.

Permit me, in conclusion, General, to bring to your attention facts of which you are doubtless ignorant, and which all connected with the American authorities, especially that vast majority who have entertained a decided and pronounced friendly interest in the Philippine people, have viewed with more or less indignation. In a number of instances kidnaping and robbery have been committed recently within the city by parties who claimed to be connected with your forces, some of whom stated that they were acting under your instructions. This I can not believe; but the high-handed offenses committed by these persons show how important it is, for the interests of all concerned, to withdraw your troops as herein requested. In numerous instances my officers have submitted complaints to me that they have been arrested and been compelled to turn back to the city, though journeying as unarmed and peaceful citizens merely with the intent to seek health and recreation; and on Sunday last a funeral party from the British war ship *Powerful*, now lying within this harbor, was so delayed by the insurgent forces at Paco, when proceeding to its English cemetery, that it was obliged to return to its vessel and repeat the journey on the following day. I fail to see how such proceedings can be justified before enlightened public opinion, and it is a matter of profound surprise to me that people seeking relief from the control of a government, by which, in the pronounced judgment of a large portion of the civilized world, it has been oppressed for centuries, should permit its armed authorities to so conduct themselves as to arouse the indignation of friendly and assistant nations. The indignities which my Government has suffered from the revolutionary forces still illegally maintained at Paco (few of them are cited herein) can not be tolerated in future. Resistance to the high-handed proceedings there committed is not merely considered a duty from which there is no escape, but would be esteemed a virtue by any civilized government cognizant of

the facts. I do not for a moment permit myself to entertain the impression that either you, or the able advisers by whom you are surrounded, have authorized these insults to my Government, but I must bring them to the notice of the authorities which maintain these troops, and upon which rests the legal responsibility for their conduct.

There is another matter which I beg respectfully to present to your distinguished consideration. There are a great number of United States soldiers within this city and a large accession, primarily intended and equipped by my Government for use against the armed forces of Spain, is en route for this port. The continued unhealthfulness of the city, notwithstanding the strenuous efforts we are making for a thorough police of the same, may make it necessary to temporarily encamp such troops as are suffering from diseases contracted here on some point of land which promises favorable sanitary conditions for restoration to health.

Should the emergency become imminent, the dictates of humanity and the overwhelming demands of my Government would oblige me to establish a convalescent camp in this locality, to which troops could be sent for recuperation, and to relieve the congested situation which must attend the presence of so large a body of armed men within a thickly populated city. I have in mind for this possible camp the grounds on the shore of the bay formerly occupied by United States troops and designated Camp Dewey, or the high ground to the east of the city. It is my desire to place it at a locality which would not inconvenience any organizations connected with your forces or the surrounding inhabitants, and to the emergency of this anticipated proceeding I respectfully invite your consideration and ask your assistance should execution become necessary. Should action of this character be decided upon, I beg of you to rest firmly in my unqualified assurances that it will be undertaken in a spirit of the greatest friendliness and with the sincere desire to neither compromise nor affect in the slightest degree your interests and those of the people whom you represent, but, on the contrary, to enhance them.

Permit me to subscribe myself, General, with the highest respect,

Your most obedient servant,

E. S. OTIS,
Major-General, U. S. V.,

United States Military Governor in the Philippines.

On the 18th of October three accredited representatives from Aguinaldo called, and the chairman, Dr. Tavera, a member of the Malolos cabinet, presented a note, of which the following is a copy:

MANILA, October 18, 1899.

His Excellency Major-General OTIS,

Military Governor of the United States Forces in the Philippines.

GENERAL: I have the honor to place in your hands this note, which I bring personally, in which I make known the object of the mission confided to me by President Aguinaldo and which I will reiterate verbally. The letter dated the 14th of this month, which you directed to General Aguinaldo, reached his hands, and desirous of complying with your desires he called in council all of his generals and made known to them the desires which you expressed in your letter.

Highly appreciating the spirit of friendship and good feeling which is constantly noted in your honorable letters and which reflects the sentiments of Americans and of their policy toward us, the generals of Mr. Aguinaldo cheerfully accede to that which you ask.

But the idea of the possibility that Spain may return to this territory and occupy Manila as the result of the decision of the Americo-Spanish conference now in session in Paris, has caused said generals to try and obtain a modification of the demands which you make in your letter of the 14th.

Having verbally explained, for your consideration, the reasons which influence the manner of thought of the Philippine generals, I shall make also the following propositions, made by President Aguinaldo:

First. The Filipinos will retire beyond the line of demarcation indicated in the blue print, as you desire.

Second. The Filipinos will retain Pandacan under their jurisdiction.

Third. The Filipinos consider it of the greatest importance to occupy the blockhouses, with their forces of the line, in view of the possible return of the Spanish, promising not to pass with arms.

Fourth. General Aguinaldo asks of you an extension of the time indicated, for evacuation of his troops.

I repeat, sir, with the greatest consideration and respect,

T. H. PARDO DE TAVERA.

Considerable discussion followed and Tavera, a man of excellent scientific and professional attainments, long a resident of Paris and educated there, and who had advocated openly the establishment of American sovereignty in the islands as necessary to the welfare of the inhabitants, ably represented his chief, strongly urging the concessions requested in his communication. It developed that my letter of the 14th had aroused fierce opposition; that Aguinaldo had indignantly disclaimed any knowledge of the promise to gradually withdraw the troops from Paco and Pandacan, and that opinion on the question to withdraw or fight, which the insurgent leaders had discussed, was well-nigh equally divided. All the concessions requested were denied. Then an extension of the date fixed in my letter upon which the insurgent troops must be retired to October 25 was asked for and granted. In the course of our conversation Dr. Tavera and his associates strongly urged permission to retain all the Spanish blockhouses, but were informed that we could not yield in this matter, as some of them were within the lines beyond which they must withdraw. They then reverted to the blockhouses northeast of the city which were on those lines, saying that they had no shelter for their troops if they were taken from them, and I remarked casually that I did not consider them of any importance, as we did not intend to occupy them, but that I was unable to concede the point. It seems, however, that I was misunderstood in this matter, and the committee reported to Aguinaldo that these blockhouses would remain in his possession. When, six days later, after I had corrected this mistaken impression, Dr. Tavera called upon me in person and explained the most unfortunate position in which he had been placed by reason of this misunderstanding, I informed him that I would not take immediate action even if the insurgents did not vacate these houses on the date announced. All this appears in subsequent correspondence.

On October 20 it was reported that insurgent troops were moving southward by railway from Malolos and other points and were being concentrated near the north line of the city. On calling the attention of the insurgent authorities to this threatening demonstration the concentration ceased and many of the troops were removed.

On October 23 the following was received:

REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Presidency, Malolos, October 22, 1898.

General E. S. OTIS,

Commander in Chief of the American Forces, Manila, P. I.

GENERAL: In view of your favor of the 14th instant, I consulted the opinions of my generals and advisory council, and I have appointed Dr. Pardo de Tavera in order that he might place before you the wishes of all, as he did on the 18th. Said commissioners, upon giving me an account of your wishes, told me that you had consented to postpone the ultimatum for the withdrawal of our troops until the 25th and the retention by our forces of the blockhouses situated on the line shown on the blue map which you sent me with said letter, but had not acceded to the desires of the Philippine people that my forces continue to occupy Pandacan. Relative to the latter point, I take the liberty of telling you that your predecessor, General Merritt, understood that the American forces only ought to occupy, according to the terms of the capitulation of Manila, the city and its environs, i. e., Binondo, Tondo, Santa Cruz, Quiapo, Sampaloc, San Miguel, Concepcion, Ermita, Malate, and Paco, or San Fernando de Dilao, and thus he clearly puts it in his letter of August 20 last. The town of Pandacan has always been considered outside of the old municipal limits of Manila, which the general himself mentions in said letter, and I hope your high sense of judgment will see it thus.

Nevertheless, I understand that your forces are already occupying the Uli-Uli, Nactahan, and Santa Mesa districts, which, although belonging to the jurisdiction of Pandacan, they can continue to do, in order to prevent the continual encounters with mine which cause disagreeable incidents.

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I take pleasure in manifesting to you that it is not lack of confidence, and much less animosity, that prompts me to write in this manner. To-day, more than ever, the Filipinos desire to live in peace and perfect harmony with the Americans, because they will take care that the Philippines do not return under the odious Spanish dominion.

✓ When it is possible for a formal convention to pacify and harmonize the interests of the two peoples, then the suspicions of my people—which I can not completely quiet with my prestige and authority, no matter what good desires move me—will disappear.

I beg of you not to consider as an insult to your flag a bad interpretation of my orders, which I will severely punish according to the gravity of the offense. You, with your keen perception, will understand that a people agitated by a revolution return gradually, not suddenly, to their normal life, no matter how educated they are supposed to be. It becomes necessary for me to act with much tact in order to give no cause for internal dissensions.

And this consideration is what obliges me to ask you about the form and conditions with which you wish to establish a sanitarium within my lines; because I wish, at all cost, to prevent the possibility of your complaints being renewed concerning acts emanating from the continual contact of our forces. I understand that you have considered it necessary to demand the withdrawal of our forces, notwithstanding the friendship which binds us, in order to prevent friction. On this account, although I highly appreciate the humane sentiments which prompt you, I do not dare allow it, without previous explanations, for the very reason that I wish to preserve the friendship that constitutes the welfare of both peoples.

I hope you will pardon me, as the necessity of consulting various advisers has obliged me to delay my answer.

I am, General, with the greatest consideration, your obedient servant,

EMILIO AGUINALDO.

The representatives of Aguinaldo who presented this communication came prepared to argue its merits, and after considerable conversation I sent the oral reply that the subject had been exhaustively discussed and that General Aguinaldo must withdraw his troops from the lines designated on or before the date announced, remarking at the time that I would make formal reply later to certain points which he had presented in his note.

The insurgent troops were withdrawn on the afternoon and evening of October 25, as promised, and on October 27 the following letter was sent to Malolos, and brought out those of November 4 and 16, which hereinafter appear. These terminated all official correspondence upon the subjects therein discussed:

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,

Manila, P. I., October 27, 1898.


Gen. EMILIO AGUINALDO,

Commanding Revolutionary Forces, Malolos, P. I.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 22d instant, and have awaited the result of correspondence and conferences upon the subject of which you treat.

✓ Concerning the conference of the 18th instant with your representative, Dr. Pardo de Tavera, it resulted in an honest misunderstanding between us in one slight particular only. The doctor very ably, by letter, submitted your wishes—one of which was the retention of the blockhouses on the designated line. In regard to this matter, I said I was powerless to make any concessions, and in the conversation which followed remarked, in substance, through the interpreter, that we did not wish to occupy them, as we did not consider them of any importance. The doctor, I can conceive, very naturally misunderstood my meaning—in fact the interpreter might have done so—and when, on the 24th instant, the doctor again called and forcibly expressed his construction of my language, I was so impressed with his earnestness and honesty of purpose and convictions, I remarked that, although the law would not permit a concession, I would not raise any objection, unless hereafter compelled to do so by my superior authority, if your forces continued to occupy the blockhouses to the north of the Pasig River.

I have referred to General Merritt's letter of August 20, which you mention, and find that it is as you state. Unfortunately, I am bound by the terms of capitulation, which recite "the city and defenses of Manila and its suburbs." Pandacan



INSURGENT REGIMENT PREPARING TO LEAVE MANILA.

is certainly far within the line of defense and, from information obtained from two weighty sources, I have been led to believe that it has, of late, been considered one of the city's suburbs, although we have been unable to find any Spanish decree which fixes its status with definiteness.

In regard to the establishment of a convalescent camp for the restoration to health of members of my command, it was my intention to consult you and arrive at an understanding in the matter before attempting anything of the kind. I knew you would not offer objections if it could be so placed as not to give your people annoyance, since it could not be in any wise a menace, but, on the contrary, would place our sick within your power and to a certain extent under your protection. I have that confidence in your humane sentiments and in the kindly impulses of your people as to believe that you would surely consent to a measure of this character, and I think the poorer classes of surrounding communities would be pecuniarily benefited by the small trade that it would give rise to, as hospitals make many purchases of edible products which your people would be glad to furnish. Should necessity arise under which I would be forced to take action, it will be my pleasure to confer with you before proceeding in the matter, and I am fully convinced that you will give assent and assistance.

Permit me, General, to assure you that I fully appreciate the difficulties under which you labor in your endeavors to carry out the desires and demands of your people. As I have already expressed myself in former communications, I am fully convinced of your wish to maintain harmonious relations with the United States forces and government of Manila, and that you deplore, with me, any proceeding which may disturb that harmony and friendly feeling. I have been fully aware that all unpleasant incidents which have occurred, and to which I alluded in my former letter, were due entirely to irresponsible and unwarranted action of subordinates, and I am constantly called upon to correct misconceptions entertained by my troops and to punish offenses which they have wantonly committed.

I am gratified with the success, both as concerns the interests of the Filipino people and the United States troops, which has attended our mutual efforts for the amicable adjustment of affairs, and sincerely hope that the manifested good will which now exists by and between our forces may be long continued.

I am, General, most sincerely, your obedient servant,

E. S. OTIS,
Major-General, U. S. V.,
United States Military Governor in the Philippines.

REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Presidency, Malolos, November 4, 1898.

Maj. Gen. E. S. OTIS,

Commander in Chief of the American Forces of Occupation of Manila.

GENERAL: In having the honor of answering your letter of the 27th of October last, I shall make no mention of the first paragraphs of the same, because I see, with pleasure, that the matter referred to in them has had a solution adjusted to your desires.

I shall limit myself only to the last paragraphs that speak of the establishment of a camp for convalescents. Concerning this paragraph, I ought to observe that from the moment when a concession is made of a part of the territory occupied by our forces and a hospital is built in it, you will have to place there a force in charge to look after the interests there created, unless it depends for security solely and exclusively upon the guaranty offered by the laws dictated by our government.

You, yourself, General, have always impressed me more than once with the fact of the impossibility of a dual occupation of Manila, because the continual contact of your forces and mine might give place to innumerable disagreeable incidents, if not serious and grave conflicts, which may disturb the harmony that exists between us. I am fully aware of the humanity you invoke in favor of the sick, but on the strength of this consideration it is my sacred duty to look after millions of souls whose security and interests would be compromised if a conflict between us should ensue. The only solution possible is to completely cede you the use of this encampment, and this, as you will understand, requires some fixed basis of arrangement more concrete than can result from a verbal one made in a conference. Besides it is my duty to submit these conditions to the representatives of the people.

It is not lack of confidence which obliges me to proceed in this manner; it is necessity. These bases, if in the meanwhile a friendly convention between your

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Government and mine is not realized, will constitute the provisional rules that will serve as the form for the solution of the claims that might occur.

And, above all, these bases will contribute very much to perpetuate the friendship that exists between us, because my people will take great care not to break them.

I am, with the greatest consideration, your attentive and obedient servant,
EMILIO AGUINALDO.

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINES,
Manila, P. I., November 10, 1898.

Gen. EMILIO AGUINALDO,
Commanding Revolutionary Forces, Malolos, P. I.

GENERAL: I received with pleasure your note of the 4th instant, and have the honor to reply to the point you present in regard to the establishment of a convalescent camp beyond the present line of actual occupation by the United States troops, as follows:

I am not convinced that such establishment will be at all necessary, and, in fact, from present indications it would appear that we shall be able to care for our sick within the line and defenses of Manila.

With regard to right of occupancy of territory, so many international questions arise under the articles of capitulation with Spain, which the United States is in honor bound to strictly construe and obey in all matters affecting its action, that I do not intend to present them for determination if it can be consistently avoided, especially not those which might demand argument and decision, such, for instance, as might arise regarding shore lines, which rightful occupation by the United States of the bay and harbor of Manila, with conceded rights of use for commercial purposes, might involve.

I am, General, with great respect, your obedient servant,

E. S. OTIS,
*Major-General, U. S. V.,
United States Military Governor in the Philippines.*

During the latter part of October instructions were received from Washington directing that effort be made to secure the release of members of the Spanish clergy and religious orders who were held by the insurgent government as prisoners of war. Correspondence ensued and is here given to serve as a basis for comment in a later portion of this report. Four communications passed, of which the following are copies:

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., November 2, 1898.

Gen. EMILIO AGUINALDO,
Commanding Philippine Revolutionary Forces, Malolos, P. I.

GENERAL: By direction of my Government, I have the honor to present for your distinguished consideration a subject which is causing much comment and a great deal of severe criticism of the Filipino people throughout Europe and among the very large class of Catholic citizens of my own country, and that is the retention, as prisoners of war, of the Spanish Catholic clergy and nuns. I believe that a vast majority of the reports of great cruelty and barbarous treatment practiced by the Filipinos toward these individuals which have been put in general circulation are untrue. Indeed, I have forbidden cablegrams prepared on this subject, which I had good reason to suppose could not be substantiated, to be sent to other countries, and I have informed the United States authorities that many rumors of this nature in circulation throughout the civilized world were greatly exaggerated. Still, however, the facts stand out prominently that these individuals have suffered privations and hardships and are still held in captivity, and fabrications charging most cruel and inhuman treatment resulting in loss of life will continue to be spread abroad to the great detriment of the interest and welfare of the Filipino people. I do not consider that I sacrificed in any particular the confidence reposed in me by my Government in communicating to you that it has been requested by the Vatican at Rome and by many distinguished men high in the councils of nations to employ its good offices in efforts to secure the liberty of the Spanish clergy and of all individuals connected with religious orders now held in durance, among whom are especially mentioned the Bishop of New Segovia and the nuns in the northwestern part of the island of Luzon.

It is, of course, needless for me to present to you or the able counselors by whom

you are surrounded, and, indeed, it may be considered a presumption on my part to invite your attention to the fact that this clergy, and, indeed, the civil functionaries of the Spanish Government, can not under a strict interpretation of the rules of international law be deemed prisoners of war except in certain very aggravated cases. It would require most decided action on the part of members of religious orders to place them in that category, and the seizure and retention of nuns or interference with them in the practice of what they consider their duties under their sacred religious vows is invariably looked upon with marked disfavor by all nations claiming to practice civilized warfare. All this is well known to you, and I only allude to it to account, in a measure, for the erroneous impressions which publicly prevail regarding the humane sentiments and good intentions cherished by the Filipinos, and which are so damaging to them in securing a position as a people which they seek to invoke. You will please pardon me for this allusion, but the matter is so important to the best interests of the Filipinos that I have taken the liberty, uninvited, to present it.

Confident that you seek the welfare of your people, may I in that confidence ask you to use your conceded influence to correct this condition of affairs and to act with me in efforts to place these prisoners in a position which will put an end to the acrimonious criticisms which now so widely prevail? I would be pleased to receive them here at Manila and care for them while they make preparations to leave the country, as I am informed many of them desire to do; and more particularly does it appear to me as most essential that prompt action be taken with regard to the nuns. Any traveling expense or cost of food required to effect their removal to this point I would be glad to meet should you desire it.

I am, General, with great respect, your obedient servant,

E. S. OTIS,
Major-General, U. S. V.,
United States Military Governor in the Philippines.

REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Presidency, Malolos, November 3, 1898.

Maj. Gen. E. S. OTIS,
Commander in Chief of American Forces of Occupation in the Philippines.

GENERAL: I take pleasure in acknowledging the receipt of your kind communication of yesterday's date, and I ought to tell you that your observations, far from displeasing me, are very useful to me, as they are dictated by the enlightenment acquired in the atmosphere of a free country.

I ought also to inform you, especially, that we do not make prisoners of women and children, and much less of the nuns. If some woman or child is found among our prisoners, it is because they are part of the family of one from whom they do not wish to be separated, requiring us to support them at the expense of the Philippine treasury. This detail is not foreseen in international law, but the Filipinos observe this custom, prompted by humane sentiments.

I am glad to hear you say that the Spanish clergy and civil officials can not be prisoners of war according to international law. Before answering this point allow me to observe that we have only taken as prisoners the priests (*sacerdotes religiosos*) belonging to the Spanish clergy, and not those who live the life of monks; and permit me to make this point clear in order that the explanation which I have the pleasure of giving you may be more intelligible, and so, also, that foreign public opinion may not be mistaken. It is true that international law declares in general that the clergy and civil officials can not be prisoners of war, but the spirit of these very laws exclude the Spanish priests (*sacerdotes religiosos*) and civil officials in the Philippines, because they (*Spaniards*) alone possess the certain class of persons known by that name.

Beginning with the Spanish civil officials, I take the liberty of pointing out to you that at the beginning of the declaration of war between the United States and Spain they were obliged by General Augustin to bear arms, without distinction as to class, and even before, during the first stages of the Philippine revolution, Spanish civil officials were already formed into armed volunteer corps who, if they did not frequently go into the field in company with the regular soldiers, shot and arrested defenseless and pacific inhabitants in order to imprison them and submit them to indescribable torture. Besides, I ought also to say that in the Spanish penal prisons and penitentiaries groan even hundreds of prisoners and deported Filipinos who were torn away from their homes on account of the suspicions of the old Spanish Government, and thanks to the arts and malicious customs of the priests (*sacerdotes religiosos*) called ministers of peace.

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Relative to the priests, or rather Spanish "sacerdotes religiosos," I take the liberty of laying before you the following points:

A. The religious corporations of the Philippines have acquired large agricultural colonies by means of fraud. In olden times the Filipinos, prompted by their religion, gave away a part of the products of their lands to the old priests (sacerdotes religiosos) for their support. But in the course of time that which was prompted by spiritual motive they made obligatory, taking possession of the lands, in order to better secure it, and making the proprietors dependents or colonists who could not refuse paying, because of the vengeance of the Spanish authorities, whom the said sacerdotes had in their favor, through bribery.

B. According to the canons of the Roman Church, these priests or religious sacerdotes can not claim the privilege of absolving, which is solely reserved to the secular clergy to which the Filipino priests belong. Nevertheless, the ecclesiastics, in order to be able to exercise the duties of parochial priests (cura parroco) in the Philippine towns, have been cheating the Vatican and foreign public opinion, picturing these towns as savage ranches, which require the care of Spanish religious missionaries that the natives may not return to their ancient idolatry. The Filipino priests who have tried to rectify this false opinion of the Vatican relative to the religious state of the country, in order to be obedient to the canons of the church, died martyrs, accused by the ecclesiastics of being disturbers.

C. The same priests (sacerdotes religiosos) tried also to cheat the Spanish Government, making it believe that they were the only upholders of Spanish sovereignty in the Philippines, and although the Spanish authorities recognized the fraud, they did not want to admit anything, as they were influenced by the gold of the religious corporations. These priests, exercising the right of absolving in the Philippine towns, have been for a long time the absolute masters of the life, honor, and property of the Filipinos. For this reason, it is a widely known and notorious fact, recognized by all the foreigners who have studied Philippine affairs, that the primary causes of the Philippine revolution were the ecclesiastical corporations which, taking advantage of the corrupt Spanish Government, have robbed the country, preventing progress and liberty.

With these antecedents, General, you will understand that, owing to the influence and interests of the religious corporations in the Philippines, it is neither just nor politic to set at liberty the priests (sacerdotes religiosos). The archbishop, as well as the Spanish bishops in the Philippines, belong to the regular Spanish clergy, and it is not prudent to allow them to continue ruling in these islands, as they can incite a counter revolution, assisted by their gold and some fanatic Filipinos, who still obey their commands.

When the Filipino priests, unjustly spurned by the Vatican, have obtained the right to appointment to the duties of bishops and parochial priests, then there will be no danger to the public tranquillity in setting at liberty the ecclesiastics. The Spanish Government and the Pope have proven themselves ignorant of law or justice, when one deals with their interests. For that reason the Filipinos wish to hold the civil officials in order to obtain the liberty of the prisoners and deported Filipinos; and the priests in order to obtain from the Vatican the recognition of the Philippine clergy.

As a representative of the Government of the United States, I beg of you, General, with the greatest kindness, to notify it that neither vengeance nor hate influence the Filipinos when they hold the civil officials and Spanish ecclesiastics, but that public interests and the peace of the Philippine people demand these measures. International law will have to give way before the just cause of a country of millions of souls, because this cause is one of humanity, civilization, and progress. My people exact these measures and I can not but comply with their will. If you, General, can interpret the sentiments of the people to your Government and foreign public opinion, and by this means correct the erroneous ideas emanating from the ignorance of the true condition of the country, you will make yourself a creditor to the gratitude of the Filipino people and the civilized world.

I am, with the greatest consideration, your most obedient servant,
EMILIO AGUINALDO.

OFFICE UNITED STATES MILITARY GOVERNOR
IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., November 10, 1898.

Gen. EMILIO AGUINALDO,
Commanding Philippine Revolutionary Forces, Malolos, P. I.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your cordial communication of the 3d instant, for which permit me to thank you, and to which my *manifold duties* have denied me the pleasure of replying as promptly as I wished.

I highly appreciate your expressed desire to act for the public interests, the peace of the Filipinos and in accordance with the dictates of humanity, but you will pardon my candid confession that I am unable to comprehend the force of your remark to the effect that international law must give way before the just cause of a country of millions of souls because it is one of humanity. I fail to understand how the principles of that law can be antagonistic in any particular to the welfare of a people, founded, as they are, on the best interpretation of the law of nature, which the acknowledged wisdom of ages of human progress has been able to bestow. Every independent nation claiming advanced enlightenment professes to be bound by these obligations of that law and certainly would be held responsible by the civilized world should it openly violate them.

My previous letter contained the request of my Government for the release of the clergy and members of religious orders, including nuns of a certain locality reported to be held by you as prisoners of war. Your reply informs me that you hold as such prisoners the Spanish priests and former civil officials, but not women and children, "much less nuns." In regard to the latter, I must have been misinformed, for I received the impression that they sought return of their personal effects, of which they had been deprived, with permission to join their friends in this city. Your letter, however, assures me that they have not been despoiled and possess full liberty of action to journey whosoever they please. This information I will gladly convey to my Government and to persons immediately interested in their welfare who have expressed concern for their safety as regards health, life, and individual property.

In respect to the Spanish officials whom you hold as prisoners of war, you are pleased to remark that during the first stages of the Filipino revolution they were formed into an armed volunteer corps, were subsequently obliged to bear arms without distinction as to class, and that if they did not frequently take the field with the army of the enemy, nevertheless shot and arrested peaceable and defenseless inhabitants. These you desire to retain until opportunity offers to exchange them for Filipino prisoners now in the hands of Spain. I am not conversant with the facts you narrate, and am not therefore competent to arrive at any conclusion. It is, however, a well-established principle of law that the chief officers of a hostile government, such as its diplomatic agents and those who are of particular importance and use to it, become, upon capture, prisoners of war, but I do not think that its minor officials are classed in that category, unless armed or attached in some capacity to a hostile army for the purpose of rendering active aid.

As regards the members of the Spanish clergy I understand you to state, in substance, that they are held as prisoners of war on account of the grave offenses committed by them while Luzon was under the practical domination of Spain; that they were the primary and principal cause of the revolution which has been in progress for the past two years; that it is not prudent to set them at liberty, as they are disposed, and might be able, if released, to incite a counter revolution in Spanish interests, and that they are retained in prison not only for such reasons, but also to compel the Vatican to recognize the conceded rights of the Filipino clergy, which has heretofore been denied it.

Accepting these as established facts (my knowledge is not to the contrary), the conclusion does not appear to follow that these members of the clergy can be considered prisoners of war, and I can not conceive how, under the laws of war or any international right arising from the state of belligerency existing between the Filipinos and Spain, they can be so denominated. Nor do I understand your suggestion that the spirit of these laws, if not their context, excludes these people from the protection which strict interpretation bestows, whatever may have been their previous crimes. Even if these priests belonged to religious corporations, against which the Filipinos had well-grounded complaint for past offenses, and indeed for cruelties received at their hands; even if they exhorted the communities in which they resided to resist the revolutionists, and might still do so if released; even if they persecuted the Spanish subjects among whom they lived, they could not be considered as prisoners of war in any sense of that term unless captured while making armed resistance or giving active armed aid to the enemy.

The law of nations allows every sovereign government to make war upon another, and concedes the right of revolution to a people greatly oppressed, but it does not admit a violation of the rules of regular warfare regarding the status of persons arrested or captured or in the treatment of prisoners of war, although they may belong to the forces of an unjust assailant or a formerly tyrannical master.

The expressed intention of holding these Spanish priests as prisoners of war in order to force the Vatican of Rome into certain acknowledgments with appropriate action I can not conceive to be well founded in law, custom, or precedent, and am convinced that such a position is untenable.

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In this somewhat hasty letter, General, I have accepted all your facts for the sake of argument, and am unable to reach your conclusion, viz. that the members of the religious orders are rightfully kept imprisoned, and that the interests of the Filipino people demand their retention. I do not think that the views you advance would receive favorable general acceptance, and believe therefore, in all sincerity, that the good name, reputation, and welfare of that people would be greatly enhanced by relieving those men from the captivity which they have so long endured.

I can only ask in conclusion that the wishes of my Government may receive more favorable consideration than your most friendly letter indicates.

I am, General, with great respect, your obedient servant,

E. S. OTIS,
Major-General U. S. V.,
United States Military Governor in the Philippines.

PRESIDENCY REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES,
MALOLOS, November 18, 1898.

To Maj. Gen. E. S. OTIS,
General in Chief of the American forces of Occupation in Manila.

GENERAL: Allow me to inform you that I have received your kind letter of the 10th instant; begging you to pardon the tardiness with which I answer, because of my many occupations.

I highly appreciate your desire to intercede for the liberty of the Spanish civil officials and the priests, and be assured that if well-founded reasons did not exist in order to retain them, always attentive to the laws of humanity and agreeing with the principles that regulate the relations of independent states, I would not have given you occasion to make in their favor the petition that elevates you so much.

In my last letter I have advanced the reasons which I have convinced myself justifies me in considering as prisoners of war said employees and ecclesiastics. Nevertheless, you attempt to depreciate the force of my arguments, relative to which I beg of you to kindly favor me by listening to my answer.

You say in your letter that in virtue of the principles of a right well established the chief employees of a hostile government, as well as diplomatic agents and those that render services of a particular importance, can be considered as prisoners of war; but that you do not think mere employees can be classified in said category unless they are armed or in some way attached to a hostile army for the purpose of lending their active aid. And in view of this assertion, coming from a person so competent, I can not do less than congratulate myself, for in that statement you recognize as justified the principal reasons that I uphold in retaining as prisoners the civil employees as well as the priests.

Admitting that principle, it must be confessed that it is strictly in conformity with my conduct if it is admitted (an undeniable fact) that the civil employees, as well as the regular priests (parrocos), not only supported in an active way those who combated against the Filipino revolutionists, but also personally took up arms in order to fight against them.

I have already said in my last letter that the decree of General Augustin of the 23d of last April obliged not only the employees of the state and municipality to take up arms but also the Spaniards born here, and that in the first epoch of the Filipino revolution they formed armed volunteer corps which, while guarding the towns, made arrests, tortured the prisoners, executed defenseless citizens, or joined the regular soldiers to fight against the revolutionists. General, read carefully the local papers from the time the revolution began and you will see there the proof of what I say. The pages of said papers are indisputable evidence of the military services rendered by the civil employees of the Spanish Government and the compensation received by them as a premium for their services. With these antecedents is there room for the least argument that the Spanish civil employees should not be held as prisoners of war?

The same, if not worse, can be said of the priests. The latter, degrading their office, transformed from servants of the Lord to feudal lords and supported by the Spanish Government, were absolute masters of the lives, lands, and honor of the Filipinos.

At the beginning of the revolution they did not discharge the duties of ministers of peace or preach gentleness or Christian charity. but, profaning their sacred mission, they made themselves the police of the Spanish Government, false denouncers of innocent citizens.

It seems incredible that those who should raise their prayers to stop so much cruelty and infamy committed by the Spanish Government, those who should give themselves over to reclusion and mortification and penance for so much crime, were precisely those who took part in the affairs, and with base insinuations, with infamous accusations and ideas of vengeance, increased more and more the pyre of the dead, and the defamatory charges through which were sacrificed precious and innocent lives and the honor of many citizens.

Again, vengeance does not move me in treating these ecclesiastics as prisoners of war. I conform to the principles of international law advanced by yourself, for, apart from the abuses committed by the priests, to which I have referred in my last letter, and the facts that I add in my present one, you are informed that they have taken up arms against the revolution: as, for example, the priests (parrocos) of the town of Lipa, province of Batangas, who made themselves leaders of volunteer corps. In Manila, during the siege of the town by your forces, all the ecclesiastics, organized and uniformed, formed a part of the municipal armed guard, and all of them you may be sure have lent their directive and effective cooperation to the forces that fought against the Filipinos, not only maintaining at their expense armed bodies, but accompanying them in their expeditions as well as inciting them to battle.

The convents have been the most impregnable defenses where the Spanish combatants, together with the priests, shielded themselves in order to attack the revolutionists, and this government preserves quite a number of muskets taken from the ecclesiastics. Therefore, the principle which you mention can be applied to them, and it follows in consequence that they should be treated as prisoners of war—the more so if all their civil attributes are taken into consideration. There is reason, therefore, to class them in the category of chief employees or those rendering service of special importance.

The principles of international law sustained by the most noted authors were taken into account by me when I treated as prisoners of war civil employees and the priests. Jore, Martens, Bluntschli, and others, hold that all persons, though not forming a part of the army, but who follow it to perform their pacific functions, can be held as prisoners of war. I only exempt the hospital personnel, according to the Geneva convention, provided that they take no active part in the war; and the Spanish-American encyclopedia says: "All those who form part of the enemy's forces, whether they are regular troops or militia, all those who accompany armies on their expeditions, the newspaper correspondents, providers, even the civil officials, can be made prisoners."

Besides, retort (reprisalias) is a right admitted by the most cultured nations as a penal power to be exercised by one of the belligerents with respect to the other when the latter violates the rules or laws generally accepted; or as a sanction in the sense that by it the reprisalia can require the enemy to fulfill his duties.

In virtue of the right of retort, during the war of North American independence, the great Washington, to avenge the shooting of an American colonel, a prisoner in the hands of the English, deemed beyond the rules of war the English Colonel Argyll, a prisoner held by the Americans. Thanks to the intervention of the Queen of France, the order was not executed. In virtue of the same right, the German generals in the war of 1870 ordered the houses in which their soldiers had been treacherously attacked to be fired and destroyed.

If there were then no international rules to justify the retention of the civil officials and priests as prisoners of war, could not we Filipinos, not even considered belligerents by the other nations, invoke the right of retort in order to secure measures obliging the Spanish Government to grant the liberty of many Filipinos (prisoners for political reasons) and check their barbarous methods of torturing and shooting the lovers of liberty and independence of their country?

This is the reason why, in my last letter, I said that international law would have to give way before the just cause of a country of millions of souls, because this cause is one of humanity, civilization, and progress.

It is far from my intention, in making this assertion, to show you that in retaining as prisoners the persons in whose liberty you are interested, I cite international law only when attending to the desires of my people, because I have well demonstrated that in taking this determination I have really been guided by those laws, at least when they do not greatly prejudice the welfare of my people. I have only wanted to say that in many cases the principles of international law, generally observed by the most cultured of nations, must conform to existing circumstances in the interest of a people who bewail the violation of those laws. For this reason it is understood that the most civilized nations recognize the right of retort. Thus also, General, when I tell you that the Filipino people desire to hold as prisoners the civil officials in order to obtain the release of the deported Filipinos and their priests, and in order to obtain from the Vatican the rights of the

Philippine clergy, I have not wished to defend the measures adopted on that ground alone, when other well-founded principles justify my conduct. I have only wished to indicate that at the opportune moment, notwithstanding the motives previously advanced, liberty can be granted to these prisoners without the displeasure of the people.

I should like to see that moment arrive as soon as possible, to demonstrate to you my liveliest sympathy for the fulfillment of your desires, which to-day I am impeded from meeting for well-understood reasons.

The Philippine people, who aspire to a life of liberty and independence, have not deserved from the civilized nations, not even the United States, at least until the present time, the recognition of their rights in their war against Spain. They have the glory of having complied with the rules required to be observed by belligerent powers and nothing can be said to the contrary. I have no doubt, General, that having given your noble impulses and cultured judgment and sympathy to my country you will know how to interpret the sentiments of this letter before your Government and the civilized world and to justify my conduct in holding as prisoners of war the civil officials and the priests.

I close this letter, begging you to pardon the trouble that its perusal will cause you.

I remain, your most respectful servant,

EMILIO AGUINALDO.

The last reply, and possibly the first, was drawn by Aguinaldo's attorney-general, a person of excellent legal attainments, who is now serving as one of the United States judges in the court of the audiencia, and was considered unanswerable by the Malolos government. It received newspaper publication at Malolos and here in Manila. An answer was drafted in part, but never delivered. It recited the fact that the discussion of the subject had reached proportions never contemplated; that I was not authorized to intercede for the release of the civil officials, and that my requests had been limited to priests or members of religious orders, and further remarked as follows:

A reference to the correspondence will show that my expressed desires are limited strictly to requests of that character, and in reference to them you have been good enough to inform me that of the classes of persons named you hold as prisoners of war only the Spanish clergy, permitting full freedom of action to all female members of religious institutions.

The announcement of that portion of your policy which affects nuns, or women who are devoting their services to the interest of church and benevolent societies, was received with satisfaction and has disarmed, to a certain extent, the hostile critics who have proclaimed that the revolutionary forces were imposing barbarous treatment on inhabitants in Luzon whom they retained in captivity. Appreciating this sentiment, I was pleased to assure one of the good ladies of the church, Dona Sista del Rosario of the Dominicans, who called for an expression of my opinion as to whether she could make a contemplated journey to the province of Cagayan for the relief of certain nuns, that she would not experience any difficulty in so doing, as their movements were entirely optional with themselves and would not be interfered with.

Returning now to the subject of my Government's request, viz. that which concerns priests. You are pleased to quote from my letter of November 10, not, however, the language employed, but as understood by you, doubtless, and to apply it in aid of your argument for their retention. The meaning of my language is very different from that which you believed it to convey. My remark referred strictly to civil officials, was only a passing brief attention given to one which your former letter contained and had nothing whatever to do with any other class of individuals. I said that it was "a well-established principle of law that the *chief officers* of a hostile government, such as its diplomatic agents and those who were of *particular* importance and use to it, became, upon capture, prisoners of war," not its minor officials, unless armed or attached in some capacity to a hostile army, etc. I had not then, nor have I now, the impression that the priests could be classed as important civil officials of the Spanish Government, nor as minor civil officers armed as soldiers or attached to the Spanish hostile army warring against the insurgent forces in the field.

Formerly, as you are aware, a lawful prisoner of war was an active combatant secured by capture or through surrender. In these later times the class has been greatly enlarged, and embraces members of the sovereign family, ministers and

diplomatic agents of a government, and persons of importance at particular moments, though separate from the mass of combatants. This extension is due to the fact that no great hardships should now attend the lot of a prisoner of war, while his detention may help to defeat the military operations of the enemy or assist those of the army making the arrest.

With an army in the field pursuing active hostilities, the laws of war permit civilians accompanying it to be taken and held as prisoners temporarily and while their services may be of benefit to that army. The termination of hostilities should put an end to the period of imprisonment. So with the priests. If their confinement as prisoners of war was ever lawful, further detention can hardly be justified on the ground that it will assist your revolutionary government, or that release will injure it, unless, possibly, you apprehend determined hostility thereto, manifesting itself in dangerous demonstrations on the part of the people who may be governed by their prejudices or spirit of revenge, for it is understood to be the desire of the priests to return to Spain and not linger in these islands longer than is absolutely necessary; and it is conceded, I presume, that, removed from the country, they will be powerless to aid Spain in its further efforts to crush what it is pleased to denominate a formidable rebellion. The plea that you hold them to effect an exchange for priests of Philippine nativity and to compel certain recognition of principles by the Vatican at Rome is not well founded. The imprisoned native priests were probably state prisoners when Spain held acknowledged control of the islands and before rebellion had raised its front. The pacification, too, which terminated in the agreement or so-called treaty of Biac-na-bato may have set at rest all questions arising in the cases of prisoners captured during the rebellion of 1896. For an army to seize members of the clergy and hold them as prisoners of war for the purposes of effecting the release and return of certain civilians, placed in captivity long before that army or the government to which it belongs had an existence, must be considered a novel proceeding. To seize Spanish citizens, whatever their offenses, and hold them as prisoners of war to compel certain action by the Vatican of Rome is most assuredly indefensible under any circumstances.

The war doctrine of "retort" which you introduce in your argument can not be applied, and you certainly do not wish to be understood as contending that you would be justified in shooting friars, whom you hold as prisoners of war, simply because Spanish subjects tried and convicted under the forms of law were executed, etc.

As stated, this answer was not served, as I had been reliably informed that Aguinaldo contemplated, or had promised influential Filipinos to release the minor civil officials, but that the temper of the people was such that he could not let go the members of the religious orders held in captivity. I also had an impression that he would not keep his reported promise with regard to the Spanish officials, but intended to hold them for certain purposes, the chiefest of which were to secure large money considerations and European action tending to the recognition of his government. I therefore informed the War Department that efforts to obtain the release of the Spanish clergy were unavailing. The course which has since been pursued by the insurgent authorities has confirmed the correctness of the impressions which were received at that time.

The general allusions made in former portions of this report to the action taken by the United States authorities which the private rights of or the former privileges and obligations enjoyed by or imposed upon the inhabitants while under Spanish administration, do not show the true significance of that action in many essential particulars.

Manila is the capital of territory having seven or eight millions of people. The different islands and in some instances the different provinces of the same island are dependent upon each other for the necessities of life. Certain sections of the country confine their industries for the most part to the cultivation of rice, others to tobacco, or to hemp or sugar, or the raising of live stock, and exchanging these products in a great degree for articles of consumption or other necessities, which are conveyed in light-draft vessels to the numerous

towns and villages which are situated on the 5,000 miles or more of island coast. The hemp, sugar, and tobacco districts must have rice, and that in kind becomes the medium of exchange for their products. Little money is used or needed. The merchants of these towns and villages receive the principal product of the district for the merchandise sold to the inhabitants and barter the products of other districts for it. The great center of the island trade is Manila, and trade is controlled and conducted mostly by Europeans—the Chinamen, however, looking carefully after its retail features. The closing of the port of Manila, or a radical change in the restrictions or regulations under which this trade is carried on, would seriously affect the inhabitants of the islands, and the business interests of the large merchants who are also the exporters of the native products.

Under present social conditions as affected by the special industries of particular sections, it is possible, by completely interdicting interisland commerce, to reduce to great individual suffering the mass of the inhabitants, as well as to seriously impair the large European or foreign business capital which has been invested here for commercial purposes. As has been stated, the surrender of Manila threw into the possession of the United States for control, not only the municipal affairs of the city, but the commerce, the shipping, and a large share of the trade revenues of the Philippines, with power to modify at its pleasure the regulations by which that trade has been conducted. The orders of the President wisely directed in effect a continuance of late prevailing customs duties, with very slight modifications, and the public interests demand that relief should be extended to the people of the islands through the resumption of trade. These modifications, however, slight as they were and unavoidable under the circumstances, were the sources of grievances on the part of individual merchants, which they presented through the consuls of their governments or in person. The least change in the former tariff schedule affected those who were stocked or those who wished to import merchandise, and gave competitors unfair advantages. Many had bought goods in Spain at high market rates for the purpose of securing the Spanish trade privileges on home products, and were unable to have delivery made in Manila on account of the war. They therefore asked to have the Spanish trade privileges extended to these special goods to avoid the great pecuniary loss which they must otherwise suffer. Repeated requests of this character occasioned a great deal of correspondence, and the concession of September 29 was thereupon granted, which was to the effect that all such goods as might be entered prior to November 10, the date which the amended tariff regulations were to go into effect, might, upon due proof of facts, be admitted under the old Spanish customs rules. Even this concession did not meet the merchants' demands, and they contended for a longer time in which to present their goods, but had to be denied after fruitless argument by both parties in interest.

The United States had not only assumed charge of the customs regulations of the islands, but also of all fiscal matters. General Greene, and subsequently General Whittier, was appointed to the position of intendente general de hacienda, which was really the office of the colonial minister of finance, and although their duties were limited in orders to "the supervision of the fiscal affairs of the government of Manila," they were obliged to consider those of a general character quite extensively, such as importation and internal revenue. The colonial treasury had been surrendered, and its administration

involved questions of local and general import. The funds of both the city, the island, the peninsular government, the money deposits of private individuals guaranteeing faithful performance of local and other contracts were merged beyond possibility of segregation. The laws, however, could not be considered to impose obligations upon any of the inhabitants of the islands living outside of territory in the rightful possession of the United States, however they might be applied to residents of Manila. There was a dual occupation of this office of intendente general, as Spanish officials still considered those fiscal matters which related to the business of the islands in which Manila was not concerned. To avoid unnecessary complications and also to simplify administration, the office was placed in temporary suspension and all fiscal matters supervised from the office of the military governor. The bureau of internal revenue, like the customs, as soon as taken possession of by the United States officers, presented perplexing questions. The sources of revenue and the proper administration of funds depended upon numerous Spanish decrees extending over a long period of years. It received moneys which belonged to the funds of the city, executed the stamp laws, the industrial tax regulations, and looked after the issuing of personal cedula to the inhabitants of the islands, etc. As soon as the office was established the residents of the city began to tender the periodical payments. The question as to what character of taxes should be collected by the United States came up for consideration. Back taxes were paid in and refundments or credits on prior payments requested. In answer to questions submitted by the collector of internal revenue, the following specific instructions were given and show the nature of the difficulties presented.

OFFICE OF THE MILITARY SECRETARY,
Manila, P. I., September 15, 1898.

Maj. R. B. C. BEMENT, U. S. V.,
Collector of Internal Revenue, Manila, P. I.

SIR: I am directed by the military governor to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of September 14, with inclosed exhibit of cash received by you since the 26th ultimo. He directs me to say, in answer to your question as to whether you shall receive the railroad tax or not, that he is not convinced that the United States Government has the right to collect it. It was a tax imposed by the general Spanish Philippine Government for services performed in the island of Luzon.

The United States have rightful occupation of the city of Manila and its defenses only. Under the prevailing armistice they have no right to impose taxes for services performed in any other part of the world. This tax, being a provincial or colonial tax, makes it doubtful if it comes within the taxes which can be paid to the present authorities of the city of Manila. The Spanish governor stationed at Iloilo, who has jurisdiction over all portions of the Philippine Islands not in the actual rightful possession of the United States, might be able to raise a good legal point should we accept this railroad tax. Further consideration will be given to the question.

The military governor directs me further to say that as regards our right to issue the old personal cedula he is also in doubt, as he is not aware what privileges it conferred upon the person to whom it was granted; that he has been told that it was in the nature of a passport, permitting the holder to journey in all portions of the islands. Such authority the United States can not give, so that any cedula issued by us would not be of value to the party to whom issued. It would merely be evidence of personal identification giving the right to remain in and travel about the city of Manila or through the territory over which the United States holds sway. If he is incorrect in his impressions please inform him.

For these and other reasons (one of which is the dislike exhibited by the inhabitants to the cedula tax) he has not thought it consistent with good policy to issue the cedula.

Very respectfully,

HENRY C. CABELL,
Military Secretary.

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OFFICE OF THE MILITARY SECRETARY,
Manila, P. I., September 21, 1898.

Maj. R. B. C. BEMENT, U. S. V.,
Collector of Customs and Internal Revenue, Manila, P. I.

SIR: I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 19th instant with inclosures (the inclosures I herewith return), and to state in reply that the only policy which can be pursued under the present American administration of this city is to refuse to consider all claims which were pending, treating them as claims against the Spanish Government, in which we are not interested. As a consequence of this policy we must, to be consistent, ignore all debts due to the Spanish Government prior to occupancy, whether in the nature of taxes or otherwise. We retain all moneys and securities found in the Spanish treasury at the inception of occupation as the property of the public enemy and do not acknowledge the validity of any liens which the former subjects of Spain (whose status is at present that of Spanish citizens with citizenship held in abeyance) may submit for requested adjustment. In pursuance of that policy the answer to the first question submitted by you must be, "Yes; only received taxes which have accrued since August 13."

The answer to the second question is, "Yes; refund taxes for the portion of the quarters prior to August 13 and retain taxes which have accrued since that date."

To the third question the answer is, "No." Parties who have paid taxes to the Spanish Government may possibly have a claim against the Spanish Government, but certainly not against the United States Government. Money in the treasury at the time it was surrendered to the United States is public money and can not be returned in liquidation of Spanish indebtedness, whatever the nature of that indebtedness.

You will not make any refundments in any instance except from money actually received by you.

To the fourth question the answer is contained in answers already made.

The fifth query is met in the second answer.

To be plain, the collector of internal revenue should refund only from money received by him. Money covered into the Spanish treasury by Spanish officials for whatever purpose, or from whatever source, must remain there.

By command of Major-General Otis:

HENRY C. CABELL, *Military Secretary.*

Inquiries were continually being presented from this department of public affairs, which necessitated the labor of discovering and translating a great many Spanish decrees by which the department was affected. The question of issuing the cedula, from which an annual revenue amounting to \$4,000,000 had been received, and which was one of the chief grievances presented by the Filipinos against the Spanish Government because of its cost, was long considered, and was finally requested by the inhabitants, as it furnished the simplest means of personal identification, provided it could be given for a money consideration not burdensome. It was therefore issued to applicants, numbering over 60,000, at a rate sufficient to pay all the expenses connected with the issuing of the same. It was eagerly sought by the people and was a source of great satisfaction. This department, too, was so closely connected with the administration of strictly municipal affairs (since it collected a considerable share of the city revenue) as to present complications. The city revenue came from more than twenty different sources, including urban taxes collected at the office of internal revenue, 10 per cent of the amounts collected for port, harbor, and light dues, etc.

Until 1894 the municipality, strictly speaking, consisted of the walled town, and was then extended to embrace the adjacent surrounding villages, such as Ermita, Malate, Binondo, and others, which had previously been granted a certain abridged independent control of its public affairs. The royal decree of January, 1894, under which this change was brought about, pretended to recognize to a certain extent the clannish or tribal, or rather family, hereditary customs which enter into the public affairs of all Filipino village communities, but






PART OF THE LUNETTA AT MANILA.



NORTHERLY END OF THE LIZNETA SANCTUARY

1



PARADE ON THE LUNETTA, BY THE SECOND OREGON REGIMENT.

had little weight in the formation of the new government. The entire city was divided into eleven districts, and a considerable number of the city officers were made elective under stringent ballot regulations.

The Governor-General, however, appointed to the most responsible positions, and had the power of absolute veto on all actions of the municipal council, so that in fact the city continued to be, as formerly, under quasi-military administration. Should the prescribed sources of revenue fail to furnish the necessary public funds, the council might seek others from which to draw, and upon approval of its recommendations by the Governor-General that certain new features of taxation be introduced, they were at once applied. A reestablishment of this so-called city government by the United States was an impossibility, even if the spirit of the inhabitants had made it prudent. Therefore complete control of not only the police of the city, but of all its municipal affairs was entrusted to the provost-marshal-general. He was directed to deposit in the general treasury, as was also the officer of internal revenue, all funds received from any source whatsoever and to draw on the public treasury for moneys to cover the necessary city expenditures. The accompanying reports of the provost-marshal-general and the collector of internal revenue explain the constitution and workings of these respective departments.

The subject of Chinese immigration had to be considered very soon after occupation. Many of this class of inhabitants had retired to China during the three years of political agitation which had preceded the surrender of Manila. Now, when the United States took possession and a more stable government was predicted, they sought to return. Large numbers, too, who had never resided in the Philippines endeavored to enter, in order to take advantage of the reviving trade facilities anticipated. Notwithstanding the many thousands who had permanently settled in the islands, who, as residents, were conducting large business enterprises, a great share of the retail trade in the larger cities, the minor exchanges in merchandise carried on between the outlying towns and villages, and who were extensively employed to perform the more arduous and exhausting kinds of manual labor; notwithstanding the very marked strain of Chinese blood noticeable in a fair proportion of the native inhabitants, showing considerable consanguineous relationships, the old hereditary race prejudice was still active and continually manifested itself in illegal and oftentimes bloody demonstrations.

The Filipino is by nature an agriculturist; the Chinaman a trader not burdened by a troublesome conscience when seeking the profits of traffic. The former is more or less indolent in normal conditions. The latter is ever on the alert for individual pecuniary gain, is more than a match for the Filipino when any business relationship is established between them and is apt to pay for the advantages he acquires by subsequent robbery and oftentimes murder. Pursuing his avocation through the country as an insignificant trader carrying his pack of goods, he is considered by the more unruly classes of Filipinos as a desirable object for sequestration and often disappears forever by some means unknown to relatives and friends. Still, he persistently confronts all these personal dangers, obedient to his mastering desire to acquire money. Under Spanish rule the Chinese residents controlled the opium trade, secured the greater share of the profits from legalized gambling which was extensively prosecuted throughout the islands, were the winners in lawful raffling, and were close seconds to the Filipinos in the business enterprises attending the licensed occupation of cockfighting.

Not only was this active race enmity and the unfortunate existing conditions which were more or less its consequences giving trouble, but the Chinamen themselves were divided into warring factions. By the larger faction the acting Chinese consul was accused of taking advantage of his consular powers by exacting payments of money for his individual profit. The consul thereupon asked permission to discipline his refractory countrymen and to deport in his discretion those whom he might discover to belong to the criminal classes.

After due consideration of the perplexing questions which presented themselves upon the opening of the port of Manila in this matter of Chinese immigration, the conclusion was reached that the application of the United States statutes controlling such immigration to United States territory furnished the best solution, and therefore within the month succeeding our occupation the following instructions were issued:

The laws of the United States, which prohibit the entrance of Chinese, will be enforced here.

The exceptions are:

Chinese laborers, skilled or unskilled, formerly resident in Manila and temporarily absent therefrom, will be allowed to return upon proper proof of such previous residence, which may be made by presentation of a Spanish cedula or certificate of the American consul, of the port from which the returning Chinese have sailed.

The closest scrutiny of such cédulas and certificates is enjoined, and in doubtful cases the collector of this port will require them to be supported by additional proof, and no Chinaman, of whatever nationality, will be permitted by him to land except upon conclusive proof of previous residence.

There will be exempted from the above restrictions the parties named in article 3 of the convention between the United States of America and the Empire of China, published in supplement to the Revised Statutes of the United States, volume 2, pages 153-7, to wit: Chinese officials, teachers, students, merchants, or travelers for curiosity or pleasure. The coming of these classes of Chinese will be permitted upon the production of a certificate from their Government or the government where they last resided, vised by the diplomatic or consular representative of the United States in the country or port whence they depart, supplemented by such further proof as is required in section 6 of an act of Congress, approved July 5, 1884.

All Chinese entering this port shall register at the office of the Chinese consul or consular agent.

It is also directed that the following regulations shall govern the return to this port of Chinese laborers, skilled or unskilled, residents of Manila, who leave this port after this date.

Every such Chinese laborer will, before his departure from this port, report to the collector of customs or his deputy, who will enter in a registry, to be kept for that purpose, the name of such laborer, his age, occupation, physical marks or peculiarities, and such other facts as may be deemed necessary for the purpose of identification.

Said collector or his deputy will furnish to every such departing Chinese laborer a certificate to be signed by said collector or his deputy, which certificate shall set forth all the facts shown by the registry book above mentioned, corresponding with said registry in all particulars.

The certificate herein provided for shall entitle such Chinese laborer to whom the same is issued to return and reenter this port upon producing and delivering the same to the collector of customs of said port, and said certificate shall be the only evidence permissible to establish his right to reentry, but said certificate may be controverted and the facts therein disproved by the United States authorities. Upon delivering such certificate by such Chinese laborer to the collector of customs at the time of reentry into this port said collector shall cause the same to be filed in the custom-house and duly canceled.

These instructions are still practiced substantially—the only modifications made consisting in methods of application—and the orders which have been issued by the War Department since their date have confirmed them. The action taken by the United States and Chinese governments in changing the consular representative of the latter has

resulted in quieting very materially the complaints of the resident Chinese against each other, although an occasional one is submitted. The conditions of these residents and their evident interest in a stable government to enable them to practice their natural trading propensities, also the utter absence of any patriotic sentiment by which they could possibly be animated, renders the conduct of many of them anomalous. Within our military lines they are ardent friends of the Americans, and, beyond, a good many are apparently active insurgents. They fill subordinate positions in the insurgent army, and one of the ablest insurgent general officers is a Chinaman, but his chief occupation appears to be to look carefully after the finances within the territory of his sphere of action. They have performed a great deal of the vast amount of manual labor expended in the construction of the insurgent intrenchments which are encountered by our army wherever it is called upon to operate, but under impressment, doubtless, as they seize every opportunity to escape insurgent domination, provided they are not restrained by their individual property interests.

Allusion is made in a former portion of this report to the difficulties encountered in reestablishing satisfactory civil tribunals. It is there asserted that "the civil court justices vacated their positions and gradually sailed for Spain without giving notice of their intention to depart." Before this happened there had been a few interesting incidents connected with the opening of the courts by the Spanish judges without previous consultation with the military authorities, which excited the inhabitants of the city, who submitted strong protests. The provost-marshal-general therefore was directed to close the minor civil tribunals and the court of the first instance—a court with jurisdiction coextensive with the territorial limits of a province. There was also in session the court of the *audiencia*, or the supreme court of the islands, having appellate jurisdiction exclusively. The chief justice, whose court was empowered by Spanish decree to sit in the city of Manila only, claimed the right to hold court and to at least administer upon cases affecting inhabitants not resident in the city, independent of United States authority, and also argued its right to determine cases, both civil and criminal, which were pending on appeal prior to United States occupation. In submitting his request or demand, he asked for a personal interview, and the following reply was returned:

OFFICE OF THE MILITARY GOVERNOR,
Manila, P. I., September 25, 1898.

Hon. SERVANDO F. VICTORIA,
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 21st instant, a translation of which is now before me. Replying thereto, I beg to inform your honor that so much of your communication as is devoted to the discussion of the question of continuance under military government, such as has been established in the city of Manila by the United States, of the local courts of the country and of the civil laws (municipal), has received the consideration which its importance merits, and to say further that the views expressed by you in the main have my concurrence.

But while it is true, as pointed out by your honor, that under the conditions noted the generally accepted rule under international law is that all civil law continues to take its usual course in places and territory under military government, and is usually administered by the ordinary tribunals substantially as before the establishment of the military government; it is likewise true, and I am sure will be admitted by your honor, that these laws continue in force and the local courts continue in the exercise of their jurisdiction only with the sanction of the occupying belligerent, which may, for cause deemed sufficient by it, suspend the same or wholly supersede them. Upon the establishment of military government at this place, it was decreed by my predecessor that "municipal laws (the term 'municipal

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pal laws' being used in its broader sense and in contradistinction to the term 'international law'), such as affect private rights of persons and property, regulate local institutions, and provide for the punishment of crime, shall be considered as continuing in force so far as compatible with the purposes of military government, and that they be administered through the ordinary tribunals substantially as before occupation, but by officers appointed by the government of occupation." (See paragraph 8 of proclamation dated August 14, 1898.)

The effect of this provision was to suspend operation of your court, and other courts of subordinate jurisdiction sitting at Manila, until reorganized in accordance with its requirements, and it is not understood how this unequivocal language could be misunderstood.

I am informed that the provision of the proclamation above quoted was inserted after mature deliberation, and that there was understood to exist a necessity for the restriction placed upon the exercise of jurisdiction by your honor's court, and by the subordinate courts heretofore referred to, in the then condition of the public mind toward these tribunals.

Whether it is now necessary to continue the restrictions heretofore placed upon the operations of the courts named is a question which I have at present under consideration. The assurance contained in your letter to the effect that the supreme court presided over by you and the subordinate courts "considered themselves obliged to cooperate with their continual functions to the better realization of a service which the army of occupation of your excellency's command took charge of," is a most important consideration in relieving me of such doubts as have arisen. I am very desirous that the judiciary shall resume its customary jurisdiction, provided that adequate assurance can be had that the exercise of such jurisdiction shall not in any way tend to defeat or obstruct the operations of the established government and will not result in a widespread discontent and dissatisfaction among the great majority of the people subject to the military government, thereby creating greater difficulties and hardships than those pointed out in your communication, and which it is your desire as well as my own to mitigate.

I beg to assure you that the questions raised by you shall have my earnest attention, and to the end that a complete understanding may be brought about and the purpose we both have in view may be advanced as rapidly as possible, I shall be pleased to appoint an interview with you in my office when informed of the time that will be most convenient for your honor to respond to such an invitation.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. S. OTIS,

Major-General, U. S. V., Military Governor.

Several conferences followed, also interviews with leading Filipino lawyers, and the result was the order of October 7, set out in a former portion of this report, by which the courts were permitted to resume the exercise of all civil jurisdiction conferred by Spanish laws, but not criminal jurisdiction of any nature. The permitted use of these abridged functions was not satisfactory to the Spanish judges, and their courts were gradually closed, depriving citizens of temporary legal process in their business transactions, which in a few instances was desired, except in so far as they obtained remedy through the military governor's office.

All citizens charged with crimes and misdemeanors were in the meantime brought before military commissions and provost courts, which were occasionally instructed, in order that they might meet varying conditions as occasion demanded. These military tribunals have worked very satisfactorily and have been acceptable to the inhabitants because of conceded just administration and celerity of action. Even now since the reestablishment of the civil courts they transact a large amount of business, as civil jurisdiction does "not extend to and include crimes and offenses committed by citizens of or persons sojourning within the Philippine Islands, which are prejudicial to military administration and discipline, except by authority specially conferred by the military governor."

The surrendered Spanish treasury, in which the deposit safes and

vaults had been carefully examined and contents correctly inventoried by a board of officers appointed for that purpose, the members of which returned thereto all former contents and securely sealed the same to await the determination of the question of rightful possession of contents, gave a good deal of annoyance on account of the numerous applications of private individuals for the return to them of money, bonds, or other securities which they had deposited voluntarily as investments or in exchange for Spanish bonds never received, or to guarantee the specific performance of contracts which they had entered into with the city and provisional governments. The treasury books showed many special individual deposits in money and many special deposits of bonds, some of which were properly designated when placed in the Spanish vaults, so that ownership could be readily determined. The money which individuals claimed that they had deposited, if received and retained, had been merged into the general fund, and together with the claimed bonds would have exceeded in amount probably all the money and paper securities which the treasury contained. The correspondence between these individuals and the military authorities was voluminous. The conclusions reached are shown in the following communications:

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., October 6, 1898.

MR. JOSE DE GURENA,

Attorney for Dr. Francisco Sainz, Manila, P. I.

SIR: The military governor directs me to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of a few days since (which is apparently without date), in which you request the return to your client of certain moneys deposited by him in the Spanish treasury at Manila, etc., which were to be held in trust by the Spanish Government as security for the specific performance of certain contracts which he had entered into with the Government of that country.

In reply, I am directed to return the copies of contracts submitted by you and to state that your client appears to have a claim against the Spanish Government for moneys deposited, but none against the Government of the United States.

All funds which came into the possession of the United States upon the surrender of the city of Manila and its defenses on August 13 last, were surrendered as public funds, and were turned over to the United States under articles of capitulation requiring that "all funds in the Spanish treasury and all public funds shall be turned over to the authorities of the United States." As you are evidently aware, there is no requirement of international law to the effect that funds, the title of which is vested in the United States by capture, shall be distributed among such persons as have pecuniary claims against the country from which the funds were captured. The contracts made by and between your client and the Spanish Government evidently rest in suspension by reason of "the act of the public enemy," and may be revived in full force upon the cessation of United States military occupation and return of the territory occupied to Spain. The military government holds as a legal proposition that a Spanish subject (with citizenship in temporary abeyance) can not have, either in equity or law, a lien upon moneys surrendered by the Spanish Government as its public funds. They came into the possession of the United States wholly unincumbered and title passed to my Government with possession.

Very respectfully,

HENRY C. CABELL,
Military Secretary.

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., September 19, 1899.

Messrs. B. AENLLE & Co.,
46 Magallanes street, Manila.

GENTLEMEN: In reply to your communication of the 9th instant, the military governor directs me to state that investigation shows that the bonds you mention in the communication are in the possession of the present custodian of the Spanish

public funds, and that they can not be delivered at the present time for the following reasons, viz:

That they concern a contract entered into by Spanish authorities and a subject of Spain; that all obligations of such a nature, and all rights under them, are suspended during the existence of war between the dominion of Spain and the United States Government, and remain in suspension until the final declaration of peace between those two countries.

That the military government of the United States established in Manila is not under any obligations to recognize in any way formerly existing regulations between Spain and its subjects, whether arising under contract or otherwise.

That it is not the duty of that government, and it might be said its right, to attempt to adjust claims of such a character. They remain in abeyance, and are revived upon the declaration of peace.

Very respectfully, yours,

HENRY C. CABELL,
Military Secretary.

In answer to individual requests for the return of voluntary bond deposits, which could be identified and ownership established by marks and designations accompanying these special deposits, applicants were informed that they must await the unsealing of the safes, which could not be done until some settlement of American and Spanish interests should be arrived at. The result has been that the money deposits merged into the general fund have not been recognized as creating any obligation against the United States Government, which received this entire fund as the public money of Spain; that the recognized special deposits have been returned to the individual owners, under the supervision of the United States and Spanish boards of liquidation, which were appointed several months since to settle the respective interests of those Governments under the provisions of the late Paris treaty.

There was another class of cases which for a brief period constantly obtruded themselves and which involved long-continued study and careful consideration. They arose upon the applications of individuals for the return to them of their estates embargoed by the Spanish authorities during the recent rebellion. The estates of many Filipinos who were charged with treason were taken possession of and administered upon by Spanish officials. After the United States had taken Manila, present and returning residents who had suffered from this cause sought the restoration of their properties. The case of the Cortes Filipino family, which had taken refuge in Hongkong, was pushed for determination before the Manila military authorities with all the vigor of demonstration of which the members of that family and the United States consuls at Hongkong and Manila were capable. These embargoes affected individual real properties, a portion of which might be situated in the city, a part in some other locality under Spanish domination, and such was the condition of the Cortes estate. A conclusion was finally reached on the facts presented and rendered in the following expressed opinion, of date November 25:

That the present United States military occupation of a portion of the Philippine Islands, under and by virtue of the armistice existing between the Governments of the United States and Spain, is of a temporary character and does not place upon the former any obligations to redress or even inquire into alleged grievances imposed by the latter while dominant here upon its subjects, especially if such allegations are submitted by those subjects and concern only their individual property rights; that the United States, under its temporary occupancy and the conditions which prevail, would not be justified in setting aside the laws of Spain and the decisions of its courts when individual property rights are alone concerned, not even in matters arising under its war decrees promulgated for the correction, or the punishment it may be, of its refractory subjects participating in a formidable rebellion with intention to destroy its sovereign power; that the

relief asked for by the petitioners is civil in its nature and should be sought in the civil courts of the conquered, which have been continued and are permitted to exercise their formerly conferred civil jurisdiction in all matters not involving arrests of persons and criminal prosecution, and therefore the case does not concern the military administration, specially constituted for other purposes; that the case involves a question of United States revenue, since the petitioners demand a return to them as Spanish subjects of the public property of Spain as declared by its authorities to which the United States has succeeded and which it has the legal right to receive and enjoy, for I ascertain by reference to the Spanish military code that the effect of the declared embargo of the property of the petitioners and the proceedings taken under it was to vest the uses and profits of the embargoed estates in the Spanish Government while the embargo continued—title to the same remaining in the individual owners from whom possession was taken.

The active continuance of the embargo was made to depend upon pardon or the result of trial by the Spanish courts upon the charge of treason, rebellion, or sedition, confiscation attending conviction and sentence and restoration following acquittal. During the existence of the embargo the real property affected was apparently held in trust by the Spanish Government for its sole use and benefit, with remainder vested in parties formerly holding the unqualified fee, and dependent upon a contingency involving due conviction of the crime of disloyalty to that government. These conclusions are supported by explanatory provisions contained in a decree issued by the governor-general on January 19, 1897, wherein it was declared that in the case "of an absent culprit presenting himself and being acquitted by the court, he will only have a right to claim a return of the property not alienated and to the rents and profits which have not been applied." Finally, it is concluded that the United States Government during its occupancy under its truce with Spain, which provides only for a temporary cessation of hostilities, would be recreant to its trust should it knowingly divert, without just cause arising under the laws of war, properties the uses of which would again inure to the dominion of Spain upon a return of Spanish sovereignty. Declared permanent possession by the United States would modify conditions and present the entire question in a different aspect, for then the rights of all concerned, whether dependent upon treaty obligations or otherwise, would be defined or become easy of interpretation.

It was therefore ordered that the provost-marshal-general seize all funds of the Cortez estate on deposit in the local banks, take forcible possession of all the real properties belonging to that estate which were situated in the city of Manila, and administer the same for the use and benefit of the United States Government. These conclusions arrived at, which were fully justified by the facts, enabled the United States authorities to take legal possession, temporarily at least, of not only the realty but also the personalty of the estate which Spain held, and which belonged to the public properties she had promised to surrender under the articles of capitulation. The provost-marshal-general took possession of the estate as directed, accounted for the proceeds received while he held possession, and finally, under the instructions of the War Department, turned estate, with all proceeds, over to the owners. This case served as a precedent for future proceedings upon questions of embargo, although in cases of minor importance embargoed property was at once turned over to the claimant upon due proof of right to receive it.

Until October 14 the United States troops in the Philippines remained stationed at Manila and Cavite, as provided in General Merritt's orders of August 23, with very slight exceptions, Major-General Anderson retaining supervision of the district of Cavite and Major-General MacArthur of the troops stationed in Manila, the three organizations composing the provost guard continuing, however, under the control of Brigadier-General Hughes.

They were most bountifully supplied with subsistence and medicines, but light clothing suited to the climate and facilities necessary

for occupying and messing in barracks were needed. These were soon obtained through contract and purchase from the merchants of Hongkong and Manila and by shipment from the United States. The troops received tactical instructions daily, but the weather was too hot for much physical exertion, and time hung heavily upon them. They entertained the impression that the Spanish war had terminated, and the volunteers appeared to believe that they should be recalled to the United States at once and regular troops sent out to perform the monotonous garrison duties which were about to follow the victory of Manila. Many became ill from too free indulgence in the fruits and manufactured drinks of the country, and indifference to that care and attention of person which a tropical climate makes necessary. Homesickness alone produced illness in numerous cases, so that early in September the hospitals began to be rapidly filled. This led to the adoption of judicious precautionary measures. Aguinaldo was faithfully executing his agreement made with General Merritt with regard to water privileges and the city waterworks, which was to permit us to use the pumping station situated 8 miles from the walled city, provided we would pay the men of his selection for running it and defray all the necessary expenditures. This we were faithfully doing, but the water secured was not of desired quality and boiling and distilling were resorted to. Circular instructions prepared by the Medical Department, warning men of the results of injudicious action, were issued from headquarters, and all sanitary measures possible were adopted.

The sick rate, however, increased. On September 4 one hundred and thirteen sick soldiers were shipped to the United States, as their restoration to health in this climate was extremely improbable, and more followed. The percent of sickness to numerical strength in some organizations rose to 20, and in two or three organizations to 30, while in others it did not exceed 6 or 8, although the latter were no better housed nor provided for than the former; but the men of the latter were, without doubt, better supervised and watched over by their officers and were measurably contented with conditions. As long as the practice of sending sick men home continued there was no improvement in the sick rate, but as soon as the convalescent hospital was established on Corregidor Island (an island at the entrance of Manila Bay) and the sick sent there for treatment a marked change for the better was apparent. In November improvement was noticeable, and in January the health of this army would compare favorably with those of any concentrated army of like proportions in existence. To be sure the men had become by this time fairly acclimatized, and new troops arriving here will be obliged to pass through this period of acclimatization before they become properly efficient for prolonged service in the field.

During my first weeks of duty here I was impressed with the spirit of suspicion and the partially concealed unfriendly feeling manifested by the Tagalos toward the American forces. That they either had very little confidence in our promises or were then forming conclusions to oppose any establishment of United States authority in Luzon was apparent, however loudly they might disclaim hostile intent or declare as an excuse for their attitude fear of the return of Spain. I saw, however, with satisfaction, their ablest men by education and mental equipment taking part in their authoritative deliberations, and I had considerable confidence in the efficacy of their suggestions and advice. Still, after carefully weighing conditions, I was unable to

arrive at any satisfactory conclusions. To a cable received on September 16, I replied on the next day as follows:

ADJUTANT-GENERAL ARMY, *Washington*:

Referring to telegram yesterday, now think prudence dictates increased force—this after deliberation on situation appearing to-day and possible developments. Force sufficient for present purposes, but contingencies may arise difficult to meet. Parties plotting constantly to convey erroneous impressions and excite insurgents. Demands of city government and sick list draw heavily on armed organizations. An additional 5,000 men could be used to supply losses and give greater confidence. Battalions of Eighteenth and Twenty-third Infantry, still in San Francisco, should join at once.

Measures were being applied constantly to improve the sanitary condition of the city, to increase the efficiency of the troops, and to meet any emergency which might develop from an uprising of the inhabitants, or from hasty action by any portion of our or the insurgent forces, which, though maintaining amicable intercourse, were, in fact, in an attitude of resistance and hostility upon all questions involving the right of armed occupation of the suburbs and defenses of Manila. The insurgent soldiers had looted extensively the portions of the city to which they gained access, and were greatly disappointed that this privilege over other parts of the same was not accorded them. Their enforced withdrawal to outer lines was the cause of discontent, and augmented any desire which they may have formerly entertained to resist or attack the American troops. This growing discontent was observable among the lower classes of the city's inhabitants, from whom a considerable share of Aguinaldo's army was drawn, and was undoubtedly increased by the reprehensible conduct and illegal actions of some of our own men, who were severely punished for their misdeeds when detected. Outwardly, however, relations of the most friendly character were maintained. The officers and enlisted men of the two armies mingled in friendly social intercourse. To the casual observer the only discordant element in this dense complex population, made up of every nation and tongue in existence, were the hated Spanish prisoners, whom the Filipinos still longed to persecute and kill, and who were obliged to keep within the walls of Old Manila for safety.

Repeated conferences were held with influential insurgents, whose chief aim appeared to be to obtain some authoritative expression on the intent of the United States with regard to the Philippines, and complained that they were unable to discover anyone who could speak *ex cathedra*. They asserted that their Malolos arrangement was a government *de facto*, which had the right to ask an expression of intent from the United States Government.

To increase and better organize the force in Manila, the following orders were issued on October 14:

The troops comprising this command, with the exception of the Twenty-third U. S. Infantry, Thirteenth Minnesota, and Second Oregon Regiments of volunteer infantry, which will continue to constitute the guard and police force of the provost-marshal-general of the city, the Eighteenth U. S. Infantry, and the detachment of California Volunteer Heavy Artillery, which will compose the permanent garrison of Cavite, are organized into two divisions, designated as First and Second Divisions of the Eighth Army Corps, each to consist of two brigades.

The following designated troops, now quartered and to be quartered in the city south of the Pasig River, will form the First Division:

Six troops of the Fourth U. S. Cavalry.
Light Batteries D and G, Sixth U. S. Artillery.
The Astor Battery.
Fourteenth U. S. Infantry.
First California Volunteer Infantry.
First Idaho Volunteer Infantry.
First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.
Battalion First Wyoming Volunteer Infantry.

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The following organizations north of the Pasig River will compose the Second Division:

- Company A, Battalion of Engineers.
- Four batteries Third U. S. Artillery.
- Batteries A and B, Utah Volunteer Light Artillery.
- First Colorado Volunteer Infantry.
- First Montana Volunteer Infantry.
- First Nebraska Volunteer Infantry.
- Tenth Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry.
- First South Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

Troops expected to arrive from San Francisco soon will be assigned to these divisions when numerical strength and facilities for quartering will be considered.

For the purpose of enforcing discipline through general court-martial proceedings, together with appropriate action to be taken to that end, the First and Eighteenth Companies, Volunteer Signal Corps, are attached to the First, and the Hospital Corps, U. S. A., to the Second Division.

Maj. Gen. T. M. Anderson, U. S. V., is assigned to the command of the First Division, and Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur, U. S. V., to the command of the Second. They will submit as soon as practicable the proposed organization of brigades of their commands.

Brig. Gen. Charles King and Samuel Ovenshine, U. S. V., are assigned for duty with the First Division, and Brig. Gen. H. G. Otis and Irving Hale, U. S. V., to the Second Division. They will report in person to the commanding generals of their respective divisions for assignment to brigade commands (General King, expected to arrive soon, so reporting upon arrival).

Officers now serving on the staffs of general officers under proper orders will continue on such service. The chief quartermaster and chief commissary of the command will nominate officers of their respective departments for assignment as division and brigade quartermasters and commissaries, being mindful of assignments in those capacities which have already been made. The chief surgeon of the command will nominate officers of the Medical Department for assignment as chief surgeons of divisions.

The organized divisions had little exacting duty to perform, as the provost-marshal-general with his guard of three regiments was held responsible for the preservation of order within the more thickly populated portions of the city. Division commanders looked carefully after the health, practical instruction and personal conduct of their men, prescribed drills and practiced ceremonies, and watched by means of small outposts the armed insurgents to the number of six or eight thousand, who maintained a warlike attitude on the outer lines. The Army Regulations, appropriate to peace conditions, were enforced in matters of examinations, courts, boards, returns, reports, and correspondence. Barracks, quarters, messing facilities, and sanitary surroundings were improved, and in so far as strictly military operations were concerned the passing period was devoid of excitement or apparent importance. In answer to request to make a statement in regard to the welfare of the troops, I remarked, on November 19, that since August none had arrived except absent members of and recruits for organizations which had preceded them; that the fifth expedition left San Francisco between the 19th of October and the 8th of November and its advance was expected daily, and continued as follows:

The medical department of the corps has always been well supplied with medical stores. There has been a shortage of medical officers which has been fairly well met through contract physicians. Now we are abundantly supplied with medical stores and hospital buildings, though medical officers have been overworked. The sick report to-day is about 12 per cent of the command; that of the British army in this latitude is about 10 per cent. The most of our sickness is of a mild type, and the health of the troops is now markedly improved. The total number of deaths of the command since leaving San Francisco is 161, or a little more than 1 per cent. Of these deaths 54 were due to typhoid fever, 25 to wounds received in battle, 7 to accident, 13 to dysentery, and 13 to smallpox. This number of deaths among 15,000 men, covering a period of several months, is surprisingly light.

In the matter of subsistence the troops have never suffered. They have been supplied with abundant rations, better even than any body of men I ever had association with. There is to-day well stored in this city subsistence for 17,000 men for

four months. Also large supplies for sale to officers and men, all of which are in excellent condition. In addition to the regular issues 30 cents per day is given to each organization for every man reported ill with which to buy delicacies needed by the sick. Doubtless troops have suffered somewhat because of their lack of knowledge to properly prepare their food, but all with former experience such as our Regular regiments are acquiring additional regimental funds. The command is now fairly well supplied with all needful quartermaster's articles excepting wagon transportation. The volunteers are still armed with the old Springfield rifle, but steps have been taken to supply the most reliable of them with the Krag-Jorgensen and smokeless ammunition.

No one can tell what duties these troops may be called upon to perform. It is more than probable, should the islands be retained by the United States, that they will be kept exceedingly busy establishing United States authority and maintaining a fair degree of order. In casting over all the difficulties which have been met in transporting these soldiers, composed mostly of raw material, over 7,000 miles of water and placing them here in good condition and well supplied, results must be considered as quite satisfactory. Nothing of the kind had ever before been attempted and no previous preparation had been made.

On November 21 and 25 the absent battalions of the Eighteenth and Twenty-third Infantry arrived.

Throughout that month, and a good portion of December, the troops remained quiet, their health steadily improving. On December 2 I cabled the Adjutant-General of the Army that the percentage of sick of the command, as reported on November 30, was $10\frac{1}{2}$ as against $12\frac{1}{2}$ for October 31; that the number of deaths was 26 as against 45 for October; that the sick rate was about the same as that among troops of other governments serving in tropical climates; that one-third of the sick were suffering from typhoid and malarial fevers; one-sixth from intestinal troubles, and that the remaining half of all ailments were slight in character. The only matters in which troops took special interest grew out of their speculations on the attitude and probable intentions of the insurgents.

On December 1 the United States transport *Indiana*, with headquarters and 2 battalions of the Kansas Volunteers arrived, followed on the 7th of that month by the transports *Newport* and *Pennsylvania* with other volunteer organizations. The volunteers, however, had grown weary of their service and many applied for their discharge on the plea that the Spanish war had terminated. They were firmly impressed with the belief that the future occupation of the United States Army in the islands would be confined to garrison duty, a belief that was shared by the older European residents and the abler natives of Manila, and they considered that such duty should be performed by regulars. My own confidence at this time in a satisfactory solution of the difficulties which confronted us may be gathered from a dispatch sent to Washington on December 7, wherein I stated that conditions were improving and that there were signs of revolutionary disintegration; that I had conferred with a number of the members of the revolutionary government and thought that the most of them would favor peaceful submission to United States authority. I had strong reasons for this expressed confidence from assurances made to me by some of the ablest Filipinos who had occupied positions of importance in the insurgent government and had signified their intention to withdraw from it. Had the volunteers then supposed that their services would soon be demanded to maintain the honor and integrity of their country they would willingly have awaited the emergency. But all official proceedings tended to give them the contrary impression. Returning transports were carrying back to San Francisco numbers of specially discharged men. On December 13 the Astor Battery was relieved from duty and directed to proceed to New York City. Its departure on the

16th of the month was followed soon by the sailing for home of one-third of the Nebraska regiment. Individual applications for discharge became numerous, and on December 15 I forwarded to the Adjutant-General of the Army the following communication:

I have the honor to forward herewith 427 applications from enlisted men of this command for their discharge from the service, some on specially stated grounds which require consideration, but for the most part on the plea that War Department orders entitle them to it. They refer to paragraph 2, General Orders No. 40, current series, and think that the present cessation of active hostilities between the United States and Spain is the "close of the war" within the meaning of that paragraph; hence these numerous individual applications which they consider the paragraph invited them to make.

Doubtless the end of the war awaits the proclamation of peace, and in these islands that day may be somewhat deferred.

The number of these applications indicates the desire of the enlisted men of the command to escape the country, and shows how difficult it is to hold them in conditions of contented discipline. Much of this desire to escape their military obligations at a time when their services are especially demanded arises from homesickness, and that fact accounts largely for the heavy percentum of sickness with which we have been afflicted.

Under present exigencies I am obliged to disapprove all of these applications.

But notwithstanding the desire to hold the volunteers as above expressed (and it was necessary to hold them or no army would remain), I continued to believe that we might overcome difficulties without resort to force, for, on December 22, in answer to an inquiry as to the truth of certain newspaper statements of that date which charged us with the commission of grave offenses, I cabled that Manila was never more quiet; that order prevailed and that the native population of the city had been greatly augmented within three months; that the criminal class was large, and that representatives of the same were arriving from the United States and Asiatic coasts, who were closely watched; that the conduct of the troops was good, to a degree in fact that it was subject of favorable comment by the citizens, and that disorders were promptly punished, as the business transacted by the courts would show. I further asserted that the disparaging statements which appeared in the United States, Hongkong, and Singapore newspapers were without an element of truth, and that military rule was firm as circumstances demanded, since outbreaks were likely to occur. Still I continued to have confidence in the peaceful solution of affairs, although it was apparent that the radical element in the insurgent councils (consisting of men without property and of little character, by whom the passions of the more ignorant natives were being inflamed and who were then organizing within the city clubs for legitimate improvement and amusement, as they claimed, but really for revolutionary purposes), might precipitate hostilities without giving us much warning. Aguinaldo, too, aided by his more intimate associates, was constantly levying and collecting war contributions and exciting the people with the cry for independence. He was in constant communication with a business firm of American membership mostly, having headquarters in Hongkong (one of whose members, individually present in Manila, had been appointed chief of ordnance of the insurgent army), and was secretly negotiating for a large supply of arms and ammunition, all of which was well known to me at the time.

During this period of quiet, in so far as strictly military affairs were concerned, the labors of civil administration were very exacting, and necessitated a mass of correspondence too voluminous to be embodied in this report. A few extracts will be submitted to show the character of the questions which were constantly presenting themselves for official determination. Already many individual claims against the United

States for damages to or loss of property, caused for the most part by the insurgent soldiers who had been in occupation of a portion of the city, were being received.

Great difficulties attended the efforts to administer on business principles the city revenues; to ascertain all former sources of that revenue; to put the proper machinery in operation to collect that portion of it the payment of which was considered appropriate and just, and to detect the constantly perpetrated frauds made easy under practices of long standing, and bring guilty officials or city employees to punishment.

The merchants were importunate. Those of foreign citizenship complained to the resident consuls of their respective governments, by whom their protests were officially submitted. This action appeared to threaten international complications, and had to be promptly and judiciously met. On October 31 the following reply was sent to one of these representatives of a foreign power, from whom a protest signed by nearly all the resident business men of his government was received:

DEAR SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 29th instant, with attached copy of declaration and petition of certain resident merchants of Manila, inclosed.

Had this protest been presented to the military governor of Manila by the protestants, the matter complained of might possibly have readily received some satisfactory adjustment, but as it has been submitted direct to the government of " " " as a declaration and protest against the action of the United States authorities, and received as such by that government, it becomes a matter requiring mature deliberation. I have therefore the honor to invite your attention to the statement of facts contained in this declaration, the conclusions which protestants have drawn therefrom, and the presentation of facts as understood by the United States authorities here stationed, with their legal conclusions briefly submitted.

The protestants correctly recite the publication of the official circular from the office of the United States military governor on the 26th instant, but the alleged facts, viz, "that with the exception of a few, and some of them insignificant, ports (and that under certain restrictions which greatly embarrass trade), the interisland trade of the Philippines is prohibited," are not warranted. Still, it is possible that this narration was merely intended to be a conclusive summary of facts set up in the indicated circular, and if so, it is only fair to treat them as such, and they may be considered in connection with the remaining conclusions which the protest contains and which are "That the principal hemp-producing districts, such as Albay, Sorsogon, Leyte, and Samar, are closed by this circular against Manila trade, involving incalculable loss to " " " interest in the Philippines;" "that the arbitrary enforcement of vessels engaged, being obliged to carry Spanish officers only, is a measure almost impossible to fulfill, as vessels are unable to comply therewith in view of the danger the Spanish officers would be exposed to from the native crews which they carry and the insufficiency of qualified Spaniards to man the vessels," and further "that if this arbitrary order is enforced it will entail the complete ruin of Manila trade."

The above, independent of the allegations regarding the business interests of the protestants, comprises, it is believed, all the facts and conclusions which the protest contains.

For reply to these several criticisms (although unaccompanied by any expressed opinion upon the right to demand remedial action) I beg to invite your attention to a brief summary of the endeavors made by the United States authorities for the interests of Manila merchants in the matter of coasting trade, and thereafter to give correct interpretation of the circular which appears to be the object of complaint.

Shortly after United States authority had been established in the city of Manila, to wit, August 29, the Spanish governor-general of the Philippines was approached with a proposition for the reestablishment of interisland commerce in products of the country. To this that officer responded with a cablegram, of which the inclosed exhibit marked A, is a certified copy. This cablegram was interpreted as follows: "As soon as the port of Manila is open to Spanish ships flying their flag I will order that all the ports in the territories under my command shall immediately admit American ships flying the American flag," etc.

Thereafter, upon receiving information from merchants that coasting vessels from this port were not permitted to land at certain of the ports in the Visayas, the attention of the Spanish governor-general was called to the fact and he replied, on October 14, that he would send his chief of staff to Manila for conference. At the first meeting with that staff officer, upon being invited to explain the action of his chief

in arresting the progress of trade sought to be carried on in accordance with an existing agreement, he replied that his government had executed the agreement, which only extended to the ports of Iloilo, Cebu, and Zamboanga. Upon being shown the original dispatch from Iloilo, of which Exhibit A is a copy, he replied that the Spanish word "puertos," used therein, embraced only ports of entry, of which the three above named are all the southern islands contain, and that such was the understanding of the Spanish Government when the cablegram was sent. To the question why vessels dispatched on or about September 1 were permitted to trade at other ports, he replied in substance that they were not interfered with as it was believed that they were not committing injury.

The explanation as to the true signification of the word "puertos" and the expressed intent of the Spanish Government was received in good faith, and endeavors were then made to secure an extension of coasting privileges. As a result, this representative of the Spanish governor-general agreed that all ports of the islands at which the authority of Spain was maintained or which were occupied by Spanish troops would be considered as open to all vessels engaged in legitimate commerce and flying either the Spanish or American flag, provided officers in charge of vessels were of Spanish birth or nationality (they could not trust Filipino crews because of their sympathies with the insurgents), and provided the United States military governor would vouch by cablegram at the time of sailing of vessels from Manila that they contained nothing objectionable. Upon pressing the representative for further latitude of trade in Spanish possessions he agreed, on behalf of his principal, to add the ports of Yligan, Dumaguete, and Surigao on like conditions, but with the further proviso that application and consent for vessels to enter them should be previously made and obtained. He was then pressed to include the ports of Calbayog and Carrigarra, but replied that his government had no troops there—only Indian officials—and that it could not guarantee protection or safety to vessels entering the same. Asked, Spanish authority having ceased there, if he would consider that the vessels then had the right to enter, he replied that the ports were in the same condition as those in the island of Luzon, in the possession of the revolutionary forces, and that the Spanish Government could not be held responsible for any damage to entering vessels which might result. No further concessions were obtainable, as it was said the governor-general, under present conditions, was powerless to grant them. Inquiry was made by this office if Spaniards to take charge of vessels could be secured to carry on this trade, and reply was received that they could be secured without any difficulty. Thereupon the circular inclosed, marked B, was issued for the information of all parties concerned, it being considered to contain the best terms in furtherance of the interests of Manila merchants which could be secured at this time. It was drawn up and ratified by the Spanish governor-general's representative in order that the Spanish Government might be held to a faithful performance of its obligations.

The circular is not understood to be of the nature expressed in the protest. It is viewed as a concession and in no wise as a prohibition on the part of the Spanish Government, which is at liberty to close its ports to outside commerce and influences if it elects to do so. A government almost in extremis mortis, as certainly the Spanish Government in the central Philippine Islands must be considered to be at present, has the lawful right to shut temporarily all of its ports, whether declared of entry or otherwise, and whatever the business interests of outside merchants, be they foreigners or citizens of its domain. This is a declared international right fully accepted.

I can not perceive, therefore, that any present action can be adopted to further the interests of the protestants, and accepting in good faith the action of the Spanish authorities in all previous negotiations, as vouched for by them, and as it is necessary to do in the absence of proof to the contrary, I can not see that there exists just cause for complaint against the United States authorities. I am still in correspondence in regard to all these matters and may be able to secure more advantageous conditions, although a disinterested party might casually conclude that this vigorous attack on the policy or intention, or possibly the integrity of constituted authority, on the part of resident merchants might tend to diminish future persistent efforts for their welfare.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. S. OTIS,
Major-General U. S. V.,
United States Military Governor in the Philippines.

The correspondence was brought to a satisfactory conclusion upon November 8 by the following communication:

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 4th instant wherein you inform this office that the action of certain protestants (" " " subjects residing and doing business here) should not be considered in any wise as the action of the official representative of their government in this city

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further than his notarial functions are concerned. I am pleased to accept this construction, and shall give the matter no further consideration.

As regards the parties protestant whose joint and very satisfactory communication you inclosed and is appreciated, I am certain that they will soon be firmly convinced that the United States authorities have not omitted to make continued effort to advance their business interests in every way possible. It appears to me, however, that they have not a full appreciation of the difficulties which the government of the United States established here have been obliged to contend with.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. S. OTIS,
Major-General, U. S. V., United States Military Governor.

The clearance of vessels continued to give annoyance, as the political conditions in the southern islands were constantly changing, and the coasting trade agreement between the Spanish and American officials could not be satisfactorily executed, as correspondence, of which the following communications are copies, clearly indicates:

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., November 12, 1898.

CAPTAIN OF THE PORT, *Manila, P. I.*

SIR: I am directed to inform you that the military governor has just received a cablegram from Iloilo, dated the 8th instant, and cabled from Capiz on the 11th instant, of which the following is a translation:

"ILOILO, November 8, 1898.

"GOVERNOR-GENERAL TO GENERAL OTIS,
" *Military Governor, Manila:*

"Your telegram of present date received. I order consul, Kongkong, not to send cargo whatever in consideration of what your excellency indicates. I spoke of the affair to the commander of the *Charleston*."

This in response to a telegram from this office, dated November 1, 1898, of which the following is a copy:

"GOVERNOR-GENERAL, Iloilo:

"Spanish consul, Hongkong, cleared vessel flying British flag on coasting trade to southern ports, Luzon, thence to Manila. Vessel arrived from Legaspi and has been permitted to enter under protest. This clearance viewed as in violation of agreement.

"OTIS,
" *United States Military Governor in the Philippines.*"

Very respectfully,

C. H. MURRAY,
Captain, Fourth U. S. Cavalry, Aid.

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., November 25, 1898.

CAPTAIN OF THE PORT, *Manila, P. I.*

SIR: I am directed to return to you the inclosed letter of Messrs. Smith, Bell & Co., and to say in reply that, as is well known, a circular was issued from this office on October 26, 1898, announcing that under a mutual agreement between the United States and Spanish authorities vessels flying either the American or Spanish flag could be dispatched for Tacloban and other southern ports named, provided due notice by cable was given the governor-general at Iloilo that they were engaged in legitimate commerce.

In the case of the vessel of the Compania Maritima, the *Salvadora*, which had a like experience with the vessel *Cebu*, the military governor telegraphed the governor-general at Cebu, on the 16th, stating that the vessel had cleared from this port October 28 for Iloilo, Cebu, and Tacloban; that the vessel was turned back from Cebu and not permitted to proceed to Tacloban to the great loss of merchants, as the Cebu authorities reported that they could not permit vessel to enter any ports excepting those styled ports of entry. To this cablegram General Rios replied as follows:

"Regret what has occurred with steamer *Salvadora* in Cebu. Attribute it to interruption of telegraph lines that exists, making my notice, which I repeat by mail, arrive late. Begging your excellency that hereafter, at the same time, to notify me and the governor-general in Cebu when vessel does not previously touch at Iloilo."

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It would seem, from the above dispatch of the 19th, that either the Spanish authorities in the southern islands are not keeping faith (which is not charged nor believed) or that they have neglected to inform officers at the various ports of the agreements which have been entered into. Under present conditions it is not possible to comply with General Rios's late request, as there are no opportunities to cable either Iloilo or Cebu, since the cable company's staff at Cebu has been removed on account of threatened danger from insurgents. Conditions therefore seem to be such that the Spanish authorities are not able to keep their agreement because of the action of the public enemy, and might plead excuse for any seeming violation of the same. Vessels hereafter clearing for the southern ports, named in the notice with which you have been furnished, will be obliged to clear assuming all attendant risks.

Further action will be taken in the matter of the *Cebu* to ascertain what remedies can be applied in instances of such a character.

Very respectfully,

C. H. MURRAY,
Captain, Fourth U. S. Cavalry, Aid.

The requests of certain merchants for permission to pass their merchandise through the customs as Spanish goods under former Spanish tariff rates, on the plea of purchase in Spain before declaration of war and inability to present it sooner, continued throughout the year. They were presented, many by them individually, and some through their consuls. Every case was based upon a slightly different statement of facts, which was fully considered in replies. Applications made through the consul for Germany show the character of this correspondence:

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., October 5, 1898.

Hon. Dr. FR. KRUGER,
Consul for Germany at the port of Manila.

SIR: Referring to your note of the 1st instant, I have the honor to state that the reason for deferring the application of the United States customs tariff and regulations from October 1 to November 10 was to gain sufficient time to make modifications therein in certain particulars in order to better adapt them to existing conditions. It was discovered that errors had been committed in the preparation or compilation of these regulations, and it was with the desire to make the necessary corrections that the postponement was ordered.

A slight concession was granted to the merchants of Manila, which was thought would not prejudice United States interests, and it was considered that sufficient notice was given to place them on their guard and allow them opportunity to protect themselves. The interests of the Manila merchants are so conflicting that no rule of general action could be adopted which would be satisfactory to all, and the requests submitted by the merchants in whose behalf you write have received greater consideration than those of merchants of the United States do when a change of tariff duties are made. There a tariff law takes effect as soon as enacted, and the rule of caveat emptor applies.

The proof which will be required to show that merchandise from Spanish ports prior to April 25, 1898, will be, independent of the accustomed manifests of cargo, bills of lading, and the usual consular certificates, a certificate from the United States consular agent at the Spanish port of shipment to the effect that the goods were purchased prior to April 25, and in case there is no United States consular agent at such port then a certificate of a consular agent of Great Britain at such port as the goods were so purchased.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

E. S. OTIS, *Military Governor.*

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., December 21, 1898.

Hon. Dr. FR. KRUGER,
German Consul, Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 19th instant, with inclosure, which refers to merchandise shipped from Spain and recently received in this port. Concerning such goods you refer to an order issued from this office on September 29, last, in which directions were given that goods secured or purchased in Spain prior to April 25, last, would be received at this port until November 10 under the former Spanish tariff regulations.

That order clearly indicates that such merchandise received here after the last-named date would be subject to the same duties as the goods of all other neutral nations, the United States included.



CALLE DEL AROSOIO BANONIO

Notwithstanding the instructions contained in this order, goods purchased in Spain by Manila merchants which arrived here as late as the present month have been admitted under the conditions expressed in that order, the merchants showing satisfactorily that delay in making shipments was beyond their control.

In respect to the entry of these goods you say that certain proofs of purchase in Spain, as regards time and circumstances, which were presented by the merchants, have not been accepted by the collector of customs. On this point you quote my letter of October 5, indicating the proofs it will be necessary for the merchants to furnish, among which was included the following:

"A certificate from the United States consular agent at the Spanish port of shipment to the effect that the goods were purchased prior to April 25, and in case there is no United States consular agent at such port then the certificate of the consular agent of Great Britain at such port that the goods were so purchased."

You state that the merchants interested gave the best proofs they could under the circumstances, and that it was impossible to secure the certificate of the British consul at Barcelona (acting for the United States) as to shipment; that under the proof the merchandise has not been admitted as desired.

Undoubtedly the customs authorities have acted within the instructions received from this office in demanding a consular certificate, and the subject now becomes a matter for further deliberation and further instructions. Your request is that the collector of customs be authorized to return the guaranties which the merchants had given in order to have the goods passed, and that their affidavits, made before the British consul at Barcelona, be accepted in lieu of the consular certificate which orders have prescribed.

The request will receive attention, and you will be informed soon of conclusions reached.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. S. OTIS, *Military Governor.*

After full investigation this application was denied, as were all others of like import which were submitted about that time. In arriving at conclusions, the possibility of purchasing goods in Spain under a continuing contract for purchase, or placing orders for them under an agreement for delivery at some future distant date, was considered, as well as the conflicting interests of merchants who were stocked or had recently purchased elsewhere than in Spain, and who antagonized favorable action on the applications.

The Spanish prisoners gave annoyance and were a menace to public tranquillity and the health of the city. Requests for permission to expatriate them were preferred on several occasions, but such action could not be taken without the consent of both Spain and the United States, since the disposition of the Philippine Islands awaited the result of treaty stipulation. These prisoners might yet be needed in the islands by Spain for military service. When Manila capitulated, many of them were ill and required careful attention and special treatment. All the necessary articles and appliances were furnished the Spanish officers with which to bestow the needed care. The prisoners soon commenced to improve in physical condition, but, having no employment, indulged too frequently in reprehensible conduct, and were an object of suspicion by our officers, who thought that they would require close restraint should hostilities with the Filipinos ensue. The old antipathy between insurgent and Spanish soldiers, which in the first few weeks of our occupation of the city was intense, and which manifested itself in slight rioting, followed in one instance by the murder of an insurgent officer near one of the gates of the walled city, was gradually disappearing, and Spanish officers and enlisted men began to mingle in friendly intercourse with insurgent troops.

No accurate lists of numbers had been made, nor could one be prepared from the rolls of organizations obtainable. Finally, on October 1, the provost-marshal-general was directed to make an accurate count of all present. For this purpose he caused the various organizations to form, at the same hour, at the places where they were severally quartered,

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and had one of his officers with each of the organizations to verify numbers by actual count. This method of verification was repeated on subsequent occasions.

Under the terms of the capitulation the Spanish officers, though prisoners of war, were permitted to immediately supervise the affairs of the organizations to which they belonged. In the demoralization which followed the condition of prisoners of war, their authority was greatly diminished; and the general who was nominally in command of these Spanish forces made formal request to impose, through adequate punishments, a more efficient discipline. This was denied in the following letter:

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., November 28, 1898.

Gen. FRANCISCO RIZZO,
Commanding Spanish Forces, Manila, P. I.

GENERAL: Referring to the request made by you a few days since, that officers of the Spanish Army be permitted and assisted to enforce against their men, now prisoners of war, the disciplinary measures of the Spanish military code, I have the honor to reply that after mature deliberation on the special points contained in the request submitted the conclusion has been reached that conditions do not permit the American authorities to grant all that has been asked. They will endeavor to do what they can consistently to preserve good conduct on the part of the prisoners, and with that end in view instructions have been given to retain them within the walled city after 5 o'clock in the evening, and to compel them to retire to their respective barracks after the hour of 8.

The American authorities are responsible for the care of these prisoners, and must see that they receive humane treatment in accordance with the dictates and spirit of their own military code, and therefore no promises can be given as to the methods they will apply in exercising supervision. It is our desire to do all we can to carry out the wishes of the Spanish officers who are looking after the welfare of their men, but it will readily occur to you that under prevailing conditions we can not enter into any agreements which fetter in any wise a free latitude of action in the special cases which may arise.

I am, General, with great respect, your obedient servant,

E. S. OTIS, *Military Governor.*

Early in October certain Spanish officers, prisoners of war, asked for permission to depart for Spain on account of illness, and their requests were favorably indorsed by General Rizzo. Applying to the War Department for instructions in these cases, I was directed, on October 7, to grant, in my discretion, requests of this character. Whereupon, on application in writing, accompanied by the proper disability certificate of a Spanish surgeon and the approval of the general officer present and supervising Spanish affairs, passports with permission to return to Spain were given. A considerable number took advantage of this privilege before the general authority to send home the prisoners was received. On December 14 the Spanish authorities served upon me notice of the contemplated discharge of the native troops held in Manila as prisoners. Although it was known that a good many of the 3,000 of these prisoners had deserted to the insurgents, it was deemed important to weigh the probable results of this contemplated communicated action, and the following letters were prepared and delivered:

Captain-General Rizzo,
General of Division of the Spanish Army, Manila, P. I.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of this morning, in which you inform me you are about to discharge from the Spanish service the Spanish native troops held as United States prisoners of war in this city.

I beg that you defer your contemplated action in this matter of discharge until I may be able to make inquiry as to the condition, intent, and former places of domicile of these troops, that I may act understandingly with regard to them. As prisoners of war, under the articles of capitulation, they should remain under guard within the city and under the immediate supervision of their officers until instructions as to their final disposition are received from Madrid and Washington.

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You will therefore please suspend all action relating to their discharge until I may be able to communicate further with you.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. S. OTIS,

Major-General, U. S. V., United States Military Governor in the Philippines.

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., December 17, 1898.

Division General FRANCISCO RIZZO,
Commanding Spanish Forces, Manila, P. I.

GENERAL: In further response to your letter of the 14th instant, regarding your contemplated action in the matter of discharging Spanish native troops held in this city as prisoners of war, I have the honor to inform you that exhaustive inquiry has been made as to their permanent homes and possible conduct should they be discharged at this time. It has been ascertained that a very large number of them came from the southern islands, and that some of them, though of Luzon, would be afraid to return to their homes, even if discharged. Those living in the southern islands should be sent there; those of Luzon who are afraid to return to their homes should be kept here in Manila. There are others of these natives who might give trouble in the city if discharged, and they should be kept under restraint.

All the native troops, therefore, will be continued in their present status as prisoners of war, to remain in restraint under the immediate supervision of their officers until the chief authorities of the dominion of Spain and the United States give final directions as to their disposition. This is in conformity with the articles of capitulation of August 14, last.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. S. OTIS,

Major-General, U. S. V., United States Military Governor in the Philippines.

These natives were subsequently discharged in Manila. Some were taken to a western Luzon province and released, and others were permitted to go from the city in any direction they wished, or to remain in it if they desired. It was subsequently a noticeable fact that they became the most formidable troops in Aguinaldo's army, fought splendidly at Calocan, where they lost in casualties a large portion of their numbers.

About this date Spanish officers, with their families, were arriving in the city from the southern islands. Some of them had been exercising command of native troops, which were disbanded there or had deserted to the enemy, or they were not desired in the Spanish military organizations still retained at the south. They came ostensibly to secure transportation to Spain by vessels plying between Manila and Barcelona. Lingering with us a considerable period, and not knowing their numbers, request was made upon the Spanish authorities for their names and intention, and the further request was made that the United States authorities be notified in future of the fact of the arrival of any Spanish officers from southern ports.

The United States authorities, after entering Manila, had continued in place the Spanish officers who had exercised charge of the large city prisons, where about 2,000 suspects and convicts were confined. General Hughes, the provost-marshal general, who had supervision of these prisons, detected, while inspecting the August and September prison accounts, fraudulent transactions in which these officers were concerned. He thereupon placed them in arrest and submitted the charges of "conspiracy to embezzle public funds in violation of the laws of war," and "embezzlement in violation of the laws of war," when they were brought before a military commission for trial. The result of the court's long and patient investigation, during which the accused officers had the benefit of the best American and Spanish legal advice obtainable, and of their own selection, was the conviction

of two of them, and the acquittal of the third upon an admittedly proven alibi. The two who were convicted were each sentenced to pay a fine in "the sum of \$2,500 in gold coin of the United States, and to be confined at hard labor in such place of confinement as may be designated by the reviewing authority for a period of three years." The review of the case is in language as follows:

In the foregoing case of Carlos Aymerich, Branlio Zorita, and Jose Ruiz, jointly tried by a military commission for conspiracy to embezzle, and the embezzlement of, public funds, the commission has adjudged a finding of acquittal as to Carlos Aymerich, evidently considering certain evidence submitted to it and tending to establish an alibi as to this accused, as having an important bearing upon the case, to the extent, at least, of raising a reasonable doubt as to his participation in the offenses alleged. In this view the reviewing authority does not concur, believing that the evidence of record conclusively establishes the criminal responsibility of the said Aymerich jointly with the other accused under both charges, and is, therefore, unable to concur in the finding of acquittal in his case. Orders have already been issued for his release from confinement.

The findings and sentences adjudged the other two accused, to wit, Branlio Zorita and Jose Ruiz, are approved. In view of the confinement already served by them and the circumstances surrounding this case, deemed in certain respects to justify the extension of clemency, the confinement at hard labor for three years awarded each of these accused is reduced to six months. As mitigated, the sentences will be duly executed and so much thereof as relates to confinement, at Bilibid Prison.

The commission took up the trial of these cases on November 22 last, and gave a long and patient hearing to the voluminous testimony introduced and the lengthy arguments of the prosecuting officers and defendants' counsel. The funds which it was charged that the parties had misappropriated accrued previous to the date of United States occupation, but were subsequently covered as expended in the payment of fraudulent vouchers manufactured in August and September for services rendered and property delivered for the benefit of the prisons prior to that date. They therefore belonged to the United States by capture, or promised surrender under the capitulatory articles. The Spanish authorities labored in the interests of the accused, and the date on which they were brought before the military commission the chief of staff of the Spanish general, who subsequently acted as assistant counsel for one and submitted an able closing argument on the merits, sent in a written application asking that they be remanded to the Spanish authorities for trial, representing that the honor of Spain was involved. He was informed, however, that the United States tribunal, which had been directed to judicially determine the question of their guilt or innocence, had not been ordered until after an exhaustive investigation had been made and the justness and expediency of the step carefully considered. The cases were not published until March 13, after the offenders had been in arrest for six months. Some time thereafter, and on April 19, a petition was presented, headed by his grace the archbishop of Manila and signed by its leading inhabitants, Spanish and foreign mostly, praying for the release of Zorita, though acknowledging the justness of his sentence. He was released on the payment of \$2,500, gold, his time of confinement having nearly virtually expired. Ruiz still remains in confinement. No decided effort by friends for the commutation of his sentence has been made. It would be matter for satisfaction if the same action could be applied in his case as in that of Zorita.

Another case, that of a Spanish newspaper editor, one Antonio Hidalgo, charged with "publishing and circulating seditious newspaper articles in violation of the laws of war," was brought before a military commission in November last. The accused was found guilty and sentenced "to pay a fine of \$500 in United States gold coin to, and for the

use and benefit of, the United States; that he be placed and kept outside of the lines of the territory now occupied by, and within and under the jurisdiction of, the military forces of the United States, and that the press, type, furniture, material, and all appurtenances of the printing office of *La Voz Española* be confiscated and sold for the use and benefit of the United States.

The review is as follows:

In the foregoing case of Antonio Hidalgo the record discloses that the accused was accorded an impartial trial, his rights having been protected at every stage thereof. The findings are in accord with the evidence, and the sentence, in amount and character of punishment awarded, shows that the commission correctly estimated the criminality which, under the conditions existing at the time of their commission, was involved in the offenses of which the accused stands convicted. Such a sentence the reviewing authority is reluctant to modify.

It appears, however, from facts elicited since the conclusion of the trial that the accused fully appreciates the gravity of the offenses committed by him, and regrets their commission. He has furnished satisfactory proof of previous good character and reputable standing in this community, and has directly and through influential citizens petitioned for clemency. In view of these facts, and in the belief that the example furnished by this trial and conviction constitutes sufficient warning that the military government here established possesses and will exercise the power necessary to protect itself against libelous and seditious publications designed to asperse its character and weaken its authority, the reviewing authority is pleased to remit so much of the sentence as relates to confiscation of property and to the deportation of the accused beyond the lines now occupied by the military forces of the United States.

The fine imposed is reduced to \$250, gold coin of the United States, the accused to stand committed until such fine is paid; the confinement under this sentence not to exceed three months.

As mitigated, the sentence will be duly executed.

The fine was paid and Hidalgo released. The trial produced a good deal of excitement, both on account of the standing of the accused in the community, his numerous friends among the better citizens, and the novel proceeding. The case was prosecuted for the sake of example and to give warning to the proprietors of other newspapers of the penalties which might be imposed upon them if they continued to indulge in abuse and calumny. It has had beneficial effects.

This period was one of plotting in the interests of the insurgent cause and men of every nationality appeared to be engaged in questionable enterprises promising individual gain. Rumors of the purchase and introduction of arms and ammunition at various ports on the Luzon coast were incessant. Admiral Dewey had seized a vessel at Batangas engaged in this contraband trade, but the cargo had entered the interior. It was an understood fact that money in considerable quantities was being sent to the insurgent junta at Hongkong, which was then presided over, or at least advised, by an American citizen and a British subject. Insurgent delegations departed for Japan and the cities on the Asiatic coast. All this occasioned a mass of correspondence with United States representatives stationed in these countries. Smuggling and illicit trade of a varied character was being actively conducted, and the cunning of the Filipino and the Chinese was difficult to contend with. Insurgent newspapers had been established in our midst and often indulged in criticisms of the manner in which affairs were being conducted, but were generally busy insinuating that the United States offered nothing advantageous to the Filipinos, who had expended so much blood and treasure for their independence. The formerly expressed fear that Spain would return had given way to the statement that it was the intention of the United States to replace her in the odious domination which she had exercised for centuries. The better class of Filipinos recommended the suppression of these Filipino newspapers, and to my question whether the people believed

the statements found in them, replied that they did and were greatly impressed. The editors were warned and became more temperate in their denunciations, even asking assistance to place before the people the true condition of affairs. Able articles were prepared and furnished, at my request, by the well-known scientist, Dr. Becker, upon the true theory of government and the probable intention of the United States in Luzon and other islands. They were generally used by these editors as targets for such unfriendly criticisms as their supple and peculiar minds could invent. A sanguinary and venomous article would be followed for three or four successive days by temperate productions favoring United States protection on lines which they were powerless to explain or understand.

Questions of grave import were being constantly thrust upon the United States authorities, some having decided international significance demanding prompt attention. The acting American consul was busy with political and commercial problems, among which were those relating to the acquisition of citizenship or the participation by foreign vessels in interisland trade. On December 9 he was informed of a decision which had shortly before been rendered and expressed in the following terms:

The effect of section 8, article 1, of the Constitution of the United States, and legislation by Congress thereunder, is to vest the exclusive power of conferring citizenship by naturalization in Congress. This power is not shared by State or Territorial governments, nor by military governments established by the United States in the exercise of its war power.

In establishing rules on the subject, Congress has provided among other conditions upon which citizenship will be conferred upon aliens, excepting those having service in the Army or Navy, a previous residence of five years within the territorial limits of the United States. It is very clear that this condition has not been complied with by the within-named applicant.

United States citizenship may also result from (1) completed conquest and incorporation of territory, and (2) from treaty. No act of the individual in the former case is necessary other than election to become a citizen, usually manifested by continued domicile within the territory conquered and incorporated. In the latter case it is necessary only for the individual to comply with the conditions that the treaty may establish. Until negotiations have proceeded further it is impossible to determine whether the within applicant can avail himself of either of these methods.

Applications for citizenship can not be acted upon at the present time; they could merely be received and filed.

To his inquiry with regard to coasting trade privileges he was informed by communication as follows:

In reply to your note of yesterday with inclosure, I am directed to state that the inclosure granting the permission of the Spanish Government to do certain acts as therein explained was given July 5, last, prior to United States' occupation of the city and harbor of Manila, and under conditions, both in this respect and in so far as the outside ports of Luzon are concerned, which have materially changed.

Since that time certain agreements have been entered into between the representatives of the United States and Spain which the action contemplated in the inclosure would violate, and hence can not now be carried into execution. Vessels can not be cleared from this port for interisland ports, under the Norwegian flag.

As regards the tobacco now in the upper country, it can be brought to this port by vessels of the Maritime Company, sailing under the American flag. That company has two vessels engaged in this trade which will be able to bring in all the tobacco grown in the upper provinces, and at uniform transportation rates to all owners concerned. The *Venus*, now due here, will sail in about four days for Aparri, and the *Saturnus*, now en voyage for that port, will soon be here, and as soon as she can unload will return. Information has been obtained that the whole tobacco crop can be moved by these two vessels and in sufficient time to prevent injury to the crops.

Your inclosure is herewith returned.

The sphere of United States action in the Philippines was now about to be enlarged. During the last interview with General Rios's staff

officer on the subject of interisland trade, alluded to in a former portion of this report, he submitted a proposition for the relief of the Spanish garrison at Iloilo by our troops, saying that General Rios would be pleased to turn that city over to the United States authorities and withdraw to Zamboanga. The proposition was discussed, but immediate action was not considered practicable, and he was requested to convey to the general our appreciation of his offer and to report that permission would be sought to accept it as soon as the Paris treaty negotiations indicated unmistakably that the United States would succeed to the government of the islands. About December 13 a petition was received, signed by the business men and firms of Iloilo, asking for American protection there. On December 14 I cabled to Washington the following:

Bankers and merchants with business houses at Iloilo petition American protection at Iloilo. Spanish authorities are still holding out, but will receive United States troops. Insurgents reported favorable to American annexation. Can send troops. Shall any action be taken?

No response was received until the 19th of that month, when I was informed that the President and Secretary were absent from Washington, and that a consideration of my question would await their return, which would be shortly. Appreciating the great desirability of securing possession of this city, the second of the Philippines in importance, I was anxious to receive an affirmative answer to my cable question of the 14th instant. It was reported that the Spanish troops were hard pressed by the insurgents, who had made an attack a few days previous, declaring that they would capture the town before the arrival of the Americans. It was also stated that the attack had been repulsed, with a loss to the insurgents of 300 men.

The petition for protection which had been submitted by the business men appeared to me to furnish sufficient ground upon which to base intervention in their behalf, independent of specific instructions from Washington, and I therefore, in conference with Admiral Dewey, asked that one of his war vessels convoy troops which I meditated sending to Iloilo at once. This the Admiral thought it not wise to do, as we were awaiting authority which had already been sought, and furthermore that he was of the opinion General Rios would hold out. I shared with him this latter conviction and awaited directions. On December 23 the following dispatch was received:

WASHINGTON, December 23, 1898.

OTIS, Manila:

Answering your message, December 14, the President directs that you send necessary troops to Iloilo, to preserve the peace and protect life and property. It is most important that there should be no conflict with the insurgents. Be conciliatory, but firm.

By order of the Secretary of War.

These instructions were conveyed to Admiral Dewey and I cabled the following:

MANILA, December 23, 1898.

General RIOS,

Governor-General Philippine Islands, Iloilo, Panay:

A considerable United States force, Army and Navy, will leave Manila in two or three days, and its commanding general is ordered to confer with you at Iloilo.

OTIS,
United States Military Governor.

This message was sent to Capiz, a northern point of the island of Panay, then the terminus of the cable, whence messages were telegraphed overland to Iloilo before the insurgents had destroyed the land

lines. Cable messages were sent subsequently by special gunboats which reported for them at short intervals. The next morning the superintendent of the cable company surprised me with the information that two gunboats arrived at Capiz the day before, collected all telegrams, and left for Iloilo at 5.35 p. m.; that my dispatch did not reach the cable office there till 5.50 p. m.; that the cable operator reported that General Rios would leave Iloilo with all Spaniards for Lambagan the afternoon of the 24th, and would go to Manila by the end of the month. Efforts were immediately made to communicate by other means with General Rios before he could evacuate the city. A coasting vessel was secured, with which Lieutenant-Colonel Potter, of the Engineer Corps, was directed to proceed, and if possible communicate in person with General Rios, requesting that he continue in possession of the city until the arrival of our troops. Colonel Potter departed on his mission that night and nothing was heard from him until the morning of the 28th, when he returned. He reported that General Rios had evacuated on the evening of the 24th, thirty-nine hours before his arrival; that he found the insurgents in possession of the city; that he had landed and held an interview with the consul for Great Britain, and that the town was quiet, Aguinaldo's flag flying, and that he could not reach any conclusions as to the probable results of General Miller's arrival; that he saw the latter on the evening of the 27th and reported to him fully the situation as he had found it. On the morning of the 27th I telegraphed Admiral Dewey, at Cavite, as follows:

Nothing from Colonel Potter. Capiz reports having seen vessel offshore last evening and thinks that possibly insurgent authorities there would not permit landing. If Potter remains at Iloilo, Rios still holds out. Should he arrive here within the next twelve hours, Rios has evacuated.

I thereafter telegraphed Admiral Dewey the substance of two dispatches as soon as delivered, which were as follows:

ILOILO, December 24.

Treaty of Paris signed; my Government orders me to go to Manila, where I shall arrive at end of month, and in accordance with your excellency will hasten repatriation.

General Rios.

Also,

Steamer which arrived yesterday at Capiz is Spanish gunboat *Elcano*. Iloilo evacuated on the 24th.

This last message was received from the cable company. I also telegraphed the Admiral that "Colonel Potter not having reported, I am inclined to think that Spaniards still hold Iloilo." I then cabled the following:

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, Washington:

Iloilo expedition left last night. Reported that Spanish forces evacuated 24th instant. Report not confirmed. General Miller fully instructed as to action whether Spanish forces there or not. Action to accord fully with President's directions. Will cable results as soon as possible. Expedition should reach Iloilo to-morrow morning.

As soon as Colonel Porter had received instructions to proceed, as above indicated, the following was issued:

GENERAL ORDERS, } HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
No. 39. } Manila, P. I., December 24, 1898.

I.—Brig. Gen. Marcus P. Miller, U. S. V., is assigned to the command of the following named troops, viz:

Light Battery G, Sixth U. S. Artillery.
Eighteenth U. S. Infantry.
Fifty-first Iowa Infantry.

And will proceed with them to Iloilo, island of Panay, by transports *Newport, Arizona*, and *Pennsylvania*, under such naval escort as the rear-admiral commanding the Asiatic Squadron may furnish him, and there execute the special instructions he will receive from these headquarters.

The troops will constitute a separate brigade within the meaning of the Seventy-third Article of War, to be known and designated as the First Separate Brigade of the Eighth Army Corps. They will be equipped and supplied as orders already and hereafter to be issued indicate.

The following-named officers will constitute the staff of the First Separate Brigade of the Eighth Army Corps:

First Lieut. C. G. Woodward, Third U. S. Artillery, aid, acting assistant adjutant-general.

Capt. John B. Jefferey, U. S. V., quartermaster.

Capt. C. R. Krauthoff, commissary of subsistence, U. S. V., commissary.

Maj. E. R. Morris, brigade surgeon, U. S. V., chief surgeon.

By command of Major General Otis:

THOMAS H. BARRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

General Miller and the Iowa regiment of volunteers had recently arrived. The regiment remained on the transport prepared for departure. Light Battery G, Sixth Regiment U. S. Artillery and the Eighteenth Infantry had been directed to hold themselves in readiness for this expected service. Carefully prepared instructions were then issued, of which the following is a copy:

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR,
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., December 24, 1898.

Brig. Gen. MARCUS P. MILLER, U. S. V.,
Commanding First Separate Brigade, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: In obedience to the instructions of the President of the United States, dated the 23d instant, directing that troops be sent to Iloilo, island of Panay, there "to preserve the peace and protect life and property," your command has been selected for this duty and has been ordered to depart therefor on Monday next, the 26th instant.

Those instructions contain the following cautionary language:

"It is most important that there should be no conflict with the insurgents. Be conciliatory, but firm."

When they were given it was supposed that the Spanish forces in Iloilo and in conflict with the insurgent inhabitants of the island would retain their hold of the city until the arrival of United States troops, when they would transfer all authority to the latter and peaceably evacuate. From cable dispatches received this morning from northern Panay, it is feared that the Spanish troops may surrender the city to the insurgents before your arrival, in which event your duties will become more complicated and will require delicate and skillful action for successful prosecution. However, every possible precautionary measure has been taken to retain the Spanish forces there. Yesterday a cablegram was sent to northern Panay, the limit of telegraphic communication with Iloilo, advising the commanding general of those forces of your early departure for that port, and this evening a fast vessel will be dispatched carrying the same information, but it is possible that these measures may fail to accomplish desired results.

In the event of your arrival at Iloilo prior to the departure of the Spanish troops therefrom, you will communicate with their commanding general, inviting him, in accordance with an existing mutual understanding, to then remove his forces, to permit you to take formal possession of the city and thereupon with his consent you will proceed to occupy the same with your command. If, on the contrary, you find the city to be in the possession of the insurgents, you will proceed with great caution, avoiding all manifestation of meditated forcible action and undue display of force. You will place yourself in communication with the insurgent authorities through the representative men of Iloilo, whom you will take from Manila with you on your voyage, and who will use their best endeavors to bring to a successful determination any difficulties which may present themselves. You will make known to the inhabitants the purpose of the United States, which, having succeeded to all the rights of Spain in the Philippine Islands, under treaty stipulations following conquest in the Eastern and Western hemispheres, intends to establish among them an efficient and most stable form of government which shall fully protect them in all their private interests and liberties, in which they shall have representation, and which will secure for them increasing and abundant prosperity. As a slight proof of your declared intention, you will release unto them the Spanish native soldiers sent here by the Spanish Government, who, through the efforts of the United States

authorities, will be returned to their homes in Panay, who will accompany you and who are grateful for the supervision which those authorities have exercised over them. You will find the representative people of Iloilo a superior class and amenable to reason, and it is believed that they will place confidence in the faith and good intentions of the United States and will accord you a most favorable reception. No undue haste will be made and the rights of your Government will be fully made known and insisted upon. Conflict between troops will be avoided unless it becomes necessary for defense. Should you be able to effect a landing as a result of your negotiations you will disembark only a sufficient portion of your command to subserve present purposes—the remainder being held on transports awaiting further instructions. Should you not be able to effect a landing without conflict, you will hold your forces on your transports in the vicinity of Iloilo and await further directions from these headquarters. But in all these matters you must be governed to a great extent by your own good judgment after a careful deliberation upon conditions, having in view the instructions of the President of the United States to avoid armed repression.

The government which you are called upon to establish at Iloilo will be one of military occupation. Upon taking possession it will be your duty to issue an order proclaiming such a government within the territory occupied or controlled by the United States forces under your command. The municipal laws of the territory occupied, such as affect private rights of persons and property and provide for the punishment of crime, are to be considered as continuing in force so far as compatible with the new order of things, unless suspended or superseded by proper military authority. The judges and other officials connected with the administration of these laws may, if they accept the authority of the United States, continue to administer the ordinary law of the land as between man and man, but under the supervision of the said military authorities. The local courts thus continued in power shall not, however, exercise jurisdiction over any crime or offense committed by any person belonging to the Army of the United States, or any retainer of the Army, or person serving with it, or any person furnishing or transporting army supplies, nor over any crime or offense committed on either of the same by any inhabitant or temporary resident of said territory. In such cases, except when courts-martial have cognizance, jurisdiction to try and punish is vested in military commissions and provost courts which will be convened (by you) from time to time as occasion may require.

For the purpose of providing for the prompt punishment of crime in cases where the civil courts may fail, from whatever cause, the military commissions and provost courts will, in addition to the exercise of powers above indicated, be vested with jurisdiction concurrent with the civil courts to hear and determine all crimes and offenses committed by inhabitants or temporary residents within the limits of United States occupation. Of these crimes and offenses, those which are capital and such others as you may desire to refer to it will be brought to trial before a military commission, and those which are not capital, which may be adequately punished within the punishing powers of provost courts, may be referred to them for trial. Trials by civil courts, however, will be preferred where there is satisfactory reason to believe that justice will be done.

In all sentences imposed by military commissions and provost courts the punishments awarded shall conform, as far as possible, in character and degree to the laws of the United States, or of either of the States, or to the customs of war. The proceedings of military commissions after being acted upon by you will be forwarded to these headquarters for the action of the commanding general. The punishment awarded by provost courts shall not exceed confinement, with or without hard labor, for a period of one year or a fine of \$1,000 or both. The sentences of these courts do not require approval, but may be mitigated or remitted by you. Copies of orders on these subjects, the provisions of which control the action of the military courts established in this city, will be furnished you for your information and guidance and for application under conditions similar to those prevailing here.

It will be necessary for you to create a government for the determination of city affairs under the direct supervision of a provost-marshal, to appoint officers and assistants for the collection and care of revenue, and to conduct postal affairs. The customs regulations in force here will be applied by you at Iloilo, and an officer connected therewith has been directed to report to you for appointment as collector of customs, who will be provided with copies of all customs regulations and the necessary blank forms. You will be furnished with the requisite assistants, thoroughly supplied, to establish upon your arrival all necessary mail facilities, and you will apply in this department the postal laws of the United States Government.

Iloilo is an important point of entry, and to secure competent aid for duty in connection with the port you will consult Captain Dyer of the Navy, commanding officer of the *Baltimore*, which escorts your transports, who has a thorough practical acquaintance with such matters.

In establishing your administration you will consult various orders and regulations governing all these subjects at this port—making your actions conform thereto in all essential particulars. No further instructions can be given you. Much must depend upon your tact and discretion and your ability to meet varying circumstances as they arise. However, should you fail to secure a peaceable entry into the city, you will report fully your proceedings to these headquarters and request further instructions.

By command of Major-General Otis:

THOMAS H. BARRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

On the evening of General Miller's departure the following was also furnished him:

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., December 26, 1898.

Brig. Gen. M. P. MILLER, U. S. V.,
Commanding First Separate Brigade, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I am directed by the major-general commanding to furnish you with the following instructions:

In case the Spanish forces have evacuated Iloilo, you will, on approaching that city, keep your transports *Arizona* and *Pennsylvania* well to the rear and beyond the view of the inhabitants of Iloilo, and you will take into the Iloilo waters your naval escorts, the *Baltimore* and *Callao*, and the transport vessel *Union*, on which are the native Spanish troops, with your vessel, the *Newport*. You will make known to the insurgent authorities the object of bringing the large force with you, which is, viz: To take possession of other ports in the islands, if conditions and circumstances are favorable, but that it may be necessary to keep troops at Iloilo until definite instructions concerning other ports of the islands are received from Washington.

Very respectfully,

THOMAS H. BARRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

General Miller, in command, escorted by the U. S. S. *Baltimore*, sailed on the evening of the 26th, and as Colonel Potter did not return until the morning of the 28th, we were without any information for thirty-six hours. In the meantime reports were brought that Aguinaldo had expressed satisfaction with the situation, as fighting would certainly commence at Iloilo upon the landing of our troops, which would excite the natives in Luzon to active hostilities. He had issued orders, it was intimated, to oppose landing, but feared that a considerable force of Tagalos sent there would not be in time to participate. It was afterwards learned that these special insurgent troops did not reach Panay until December 29.

In the foregoing instructions mention is made of representative men of Iloilo and Spanish native soldiers, whom General Miller was directed to take with him, the first to assist in making the object of the United States known and the latter in proof of good intentions. The soldiers referred to were sent by General Rios to Manila for discharge from the Spanish military service, without permission or warning. They were about 200 of a lot numbering 600 or 700, and were Visayans belonging mostly to Panay, while the remainder were Tagalos. They were discharged upon arrival in the harbor, though not paid off, as the Spanish authorities pleaded lack of sufficient public funds, and request was submitted to permit them to land in the city. After much deliberation, it was decided to land such of them as desired to remain in Luzon on the northern shore of Manila Bay, and to send to Panay those who desired to go south. The 200, who were accompanied by their families, elected to go south. They were placed upon a Government transport, rationed, each given a small amount of money from the public funds, and departed for their homes with General Miller's command. The representative business men had come up from Iloilo a short time before for the purpose, as they asserted, of arranging matters with the Americans so that

there might be a peaceful solution of affairs. They were introduced by some of the native citizens in whom confidence was placed, and expressed themselves as desirous of having the United States troops go to Iloilo, and to accompany them in order that they might prevail upon the people to receive them without opposition. These men were intelligent and apparently very much in earnest, and General Miller, who was present at the last conference, shared fully my opinion as to their honesty. He took them with him on his own transport and gave the best accommodations the vessel offered, free of charge. Upon arrival at Iloilo, he sent them into the city to prepare the way for him and they were seen no more. He landed the discharged native soldiers on the Panay coast, and it is believed that they joined the insurgent ranks without taking much time for consideration. It was subsequently ascertained that while temporarily sojourning in Manila one of these representative men quietly visited Malolos, and received Aguinaldo's orders, which he carried with him to his people.

Lieutenant-Colonel Potter, when returning from Iloilo, had met the command of General Miller and had reported the situation to him when some distance north, off the Panay coast. Upon receiving his report, and being ignorant of General Miller's movements, I returned him at once with the following instructions:

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., December 28, 1898.

Brig. Gen. MARCUS P. MILLER, U. S. V.,
Commanding First Separate Brigade, Eighth Army Corps, Iloilo, P. I.

SIR: Lieutenant-Colonel Potter has just arrived and reported the situation at Iloilo. He reports the evacuation of the city by the Spanish forces, and that the insurgents are in full possession; he further reports that those authorities were anticipating your arrival, and that there was a widely prevailing sentiment in the city in favor of receiving your forces without resistance. All of this, Colonel Potter informed me, he made known to you when he consulted you yesterday on his return trip.

To meet this state of affairs your instructions need modification, although it is believed that you will grasp the situation as presented and be governed by conditions. Your instructions bid you to be conciliatory but firm, and, further, that you will not make any great display of force, but seek to gain possession of the city through peaceable negotiations, not exercising undue haste; that should you fail to secure a peaceable entry into the city you will report fully your proceedings to these headquarters and request further instructions.

By firmness and conciliatory action it is believed that you will be able to land your force without conflict, but you will make as strong a display of the same as possible, landing them and taking possession of the city forcibly, if more pacific measures are without avail. It is, of course, necessary now, in this stage of the proceedings, to occupy Iloilo, and the manner of doing so must be left to your discretion, avoiding conflict if possible, but accepting it if necessary to accomplish the object.

Information received here is to the effect that the insurgent forces are weak in strength even when united—that they are not united, but are divided in their sentiments toward the United States Government, the majority being friendly disposed.

No further instructions can be given you, and there is no disposition to limit your discretionary action. Conduct affairs in accordance with the demands of the situation, having in view always the necessity of occupying the city with your troops.

Colonel Potter will return as soon as you report to him the situation, unless you wish to retain him for a short time to acquaint him with results of action already taken or action which you meditate.

Very respectfully,

E. S. OTIS,
Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

LATER.

Since writing the above I am in receipt of information from the Malolos government, which was gathered yesterday. Its former cabinet resigned a few days ago because of its inability to agree with Aguinaldo and his confidential advisers. A new provisional cabinet has been appointed, consisting of men hostile to American annexation, among whom are a number of army officers. These men are closely watching the results of your expedition and greatly hope that you will be obliged

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY. 61

to use force to gain Iloilo. They think that conflict there would inspire the people here to take up arms against the Americans. It is therefore still quite necessary to avoid force if you can do so and still succeed.

E. S. OTIS,
Major-General, etc.

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., December 28, 1898.

Lieut. Col. C. L. POTTER,
Chief Engineer Officer, Department Pacific and Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: Since delivering to you instructions for General Miller, I am in receipt of a dispatch from Admiral Dewey saying it is not practicable to send the *Callao* to Iloilo, and he further thinks the proper thing now to do is to recall the expedition, as the insurgents are in full possession and will probably not give up without a fight. This expression of view on the part of the Admiral only confirms my view that you should use every possible means of conciliation, and still I am not of the belief that the expedition can be returned. Better that we leave the war vessel and a small force to confront Iloilo and scatter the force to other ports in the southern islands, where troops are very much needed at the present time. You will therefore inform General Miller to be governed by these views as nearly as possible. I will try and send further information in regard to the condition of the islands to-morrow or next day. Notwithstanding all this, I still hold to my view that Iloilo must be taken.

Very respectfully,

E. S. OTIS,
Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

Lieutenant-Colonel Potter sailed as soon as he had received these instructions. I then cabled to the Adjutant-General of the Army such information as I had obtained from Iloilo, adding in my dispatch that I could not arrive at conclusions as to results, and would not hear from there for four days, as cable communication had been destroyed; that the Spanish forces had evacuated all stations in the southern islands, except Zamboanga, by orders, as they asserted, from Madrid. On December 30 I cabled Washington that—

All military stations outside of Luzon, with the exception of Zamboanga, turned over by Spaniards to inhabitants, who may be denominated insurgents with more or less hostility to the United States. Some points we can take without friction, and could have taken nearly all outside of Luzon peaceably before the 23d and 24th of the month, when Spain withdrew her forces without our knowledge. Am waiting to hear results from Iloilo, and am meditating action in islands of Leyte, Samar, and Cebu, in all of which Luzon insurgents have been at work for several months. Conditions here at Manila and character of inhabitants not understood in the United States. Large number of insurgent troops still in the field, scattered throughout Luzon provinces, and about 6,000 outside this city, which contains large number of sympathizers, who have threatened uprising. Former insurgent cabinet disrupted, provisional one formed, consisting mostly of irresponsible men who demand complete independence and war with United States. The situation requires delicate manipulation, and our troops here can not be widely scattered at present. Great majority of men of property desire annexation, others seek personal advancement and plunder, promises of which hold insurgents together, but already much dissatisfaction in ranks and conflicts with inhabitants in middle provinces. Will report further in a few days. Am in consultation with Admiral Dewey, now engaged in efforts to stop shipment of insurgent arms from China and Japan through meditated seizure. We will probably send another force south within a short time.

General Miller's first report was received at these headquarters on the morning of December 30, and was as follows:

HDQRS. FIRST BRIGADE, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
ON BOARD TRANSPORT NEWPORT,
Iloilo Harbor, P. I., December 28, 1898—3 p. m.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to report that my command arrived in the harbor of Iloilo about 10 a. m. to-day. The *Arizona* and *Pennsylvania* were left at Point Luzaron, 30 miles away. The *Baltimore* and *Newport* anchored off the city.

62 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

An aid of the commanding general, Martin Delgado, immediately reported aboard my ship. I gave him an interview. He reported that the commanding general desired to know "if we had anything against them—were we going to interfere with them?" I informed him that I had written a letter stating to his commanding officer and the people of Iloilo the object of my visit, and would send the letter over. Accordingly, Lieut. M. K. Barroll, Third Artillery, and two volunteer aids and the commission went to visit the commanding general. They were met by a subcommittee, of the committee of which R. Lopez was president, General Delgado being present. My aids gave them my letter (a copy inclosed). They wanted to know of Lieutenant Barroll almost at the very first whether he had any instructions for them from Aguinaldo. He answered no: but that the instructions were from Major-General Otis, commanding the Philippine Islands United States forces. After reading the letter they claimed that they had no power to act in cases affecting their federal government, but promised to meet me on my ship to-morrow afternoon.

When we entered their flag was flying from two places in the city. At 3 p. m. to-day it was not flying. I presume this was because my letter claimed the authority of the Spanish Government over Iloilo, as it was abandoned by the Spanish troops.

They were polite, but I think them determined not to give us control, except we use force, when they will yield without much fighting. They have taken charge of the custom-house and post-office. They know that our troop ships are off Point Luzaron, therefore I ordered them in to-night—not nearer than 6 miles.

The city is quiet, but the white citizens, especially Americans, are afraid. Their force is estimated at 800 well-armed men, 1,000 badly armed men, and 1,000 men with guns, pikes, etc.; ammunition not supposed to be abundant.

I am told now that the members of the commission are afraid to express an opinion in our favor. The fact that their people are in possession of the city has changed the views of the many wavering ones. The longer they remain in possession collecting customs, running post-offices, the more they will be confirmed in the idea that they can do it. I should recommend that force be used at once, in which case I desire the *Callao*, or some other light-draft boat, and the California heavy artillery battalion sent down till the place is taken. With the forces now here and that in addition I would not expect to fire a single shot, as the native troops would move out. I will keep you informed.

Very respectfully,

M. P. MILLER,
Brigadier-General, U. S. F., Commanding First Separate Brigade.

The following is a copy of the inclosure referred to in the above communication:

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
ON BOARD TRANSPORT NEWPORT,
Iloilo Harbor, P. I., December 28, 1898.

COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE TROOPS AT ILOILO, ISLAND OF PANAY,
AND THE PEOPLE OF ILOILO AND THE ISLAND OF PANAY:

The troops under my command appeared here under an order of the President of the United States of America promulgated by Major-General Otis, commanding all of the troops of the United States in the Philippine Islands. It is accompanied by the United States naval ship *Baltimore*, sent by Admiral Dewey, commanding the United States squadron in these Asiatic waters.

When these orders were communicated to me it was supposed that the troops of Spain were still in possession at Iloilo, and that the transfer of possession and governmental authority would be by them to representatives of the Government of the United States, which has succeeded, by virtue of conquest supplemented by treaty stipulations, to all the rights heretofore exercised by Spain in these islands. Upon arrival I find that the city of Iloilo is in the reported possession of native troops. The intention of this letter is to place myself in communication with those now exercising authority at Iloilo, with the view to the accomplishment of my mission to this place as above indicated.

This communication will be handed you by my aid, Lieut. M. K. Barroll, Third Artillery, who is accompanied by four gentlemen, former residents of Iloilo, who will make known to you more in detail the purposes of the presence of my command at this place.

There accompanies my command on the steamship *Union* certain Spanish soldiers, natives of the island of Pana, whom it is my purpose, at a later date, to release with the privilege of returning to their homes, an act which it is hoped will be interpreted as an evidence of the good will of the major-general commanding in the Philippines, under whose orders I am acting.

I shall be pleased to receive a call from representatives of those to whom this communication is addressed on board the transport *Newport* at as early an hour as your convenience will allow.

Very respectfully,

M. P. MILLER,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V.,
Commanding First Separate Brigade, Eighth Army Corps.

General Miller's second report, dated December 30, and forwarded by a merchant vessel, is as follows:

HEADQUARTERS FIRST SEPARATE BRIGADE,
ON BOARD TRANSPORT NEWPORT,
Iloilo Harbor, P. I., December 30, 1898.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS.

SIR: I want to report that a committee of people having civil control of the city of Iloilo, and claiming also control of the island, met me here yesterday at 6 p. m., and again claimed that they could not turn over the control of Iloilo to my command without consulting Aguinaldo. Should they agree to do it their lives and property would be in danger. After a long talk, setting forth the intention of our Government, explaining the kind of government, and reading to them extracts of your letter of instructions in reference to the same matter, I told them there was no time to consult Aguinaldo and my demand was that the President of the United States, as successor to the rights of Spain in these islands, required them to turn over the control of the city of Iloilo. I then asked them directly: "Should we land would you meet us with armed resistance?" They could not answer that question. I asked them if they would not have their troops march out of the city and permit us, their friends, to move in without resistance to-morrow, the 31st instant. They requested time to consult with the committee that they represented, promising to return with a definite reply at noon, December 30 (to-day).

Lieutenant-Colonel Potter, corps engineer, arrived here yesterday evening with a letter of instructions from you to me. It is my intention to land troops in twenty-four hours, after having served notice on the foreign consuls of the city and the people to that effect.

The estimate of armed native troops to-day is 3,500, who are said to be massed in the city and at Jaro and Molo, and six or seven thousand from the mountains armed with bolos, who are massed at the same places.

I think I should have the Twentieth Kansas Regiment sent to me as soon as possible; 20,000 rounds of .45 caliber ammunition for Gatling guns should be supplied. Two field mortars (3.6 inches), with equipments and supply of ammunition, should be sent to me at once.

I forward this communication by the steamer *Union*.

M. P. MILLER,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding Brigade.

General Miller's next report is dated December 31, and was received on January 2. It is as follows:

HEADQUARTERS SEPARATE BRIGADE,
Iloilo Harbor, P. I., December 30, 1898.

COMMANDING GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,
Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have just concluded second conference with commission representing the native government at Iloilo. They submitted a communication, copy inclosed herewith.

This communication was supplemented by verbal statements that if we insisted on landing our troops, but without arms and as friends, they could not answer for the attitude of the people, but that the army would endeavor to restrain the people. If we landed in force they would not answer for attitude of either army or people. This means, plainly, armed resistance to our landing.

A large number of native troops have been brought to the city within the past thirty-six hours. Best estimate 12,000, 2,500 of which are armed with rifles, the remainder being armed with bolos only. Their ammunition supply reported limited.

The situation is further complicated by petition of Iloilo merchants, representing the larger part of mercantile interests there, copy of which find herewith.

I understand, General, that it was at the request of many of the parties signing this petition for protection of life and property at Iloilo that this expedition was organized and dispatched to this point; that their request was largely its justification. Their present attitude contradicts their previous petition in a measure, and

64 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

as the situation, if forced by me by a landing of United States troops, promises great loss of life among noncombatants and destruction of private property at Iloilo, I have deemed it best to delay compliance with my orders for a sufficient time to communicate the above information to you and receive your instructions. I am further influenced to this delay because of the fact that before making the formidable attack upon Iloilo now necessary, it would be incumbent upon me to give the usual notice looking to the removal of noncombatants to points of safety.

I entertain no doubt of my ability to take and hold Iloilo with my present force, but in view of excitement prevailing among inhabitants of the city and island as reported to me, and the large number of people assembled in the city, it might be prudent to send an additional regiment to this point.

Two steam launches suitable for towing rowboats for use in landing troops are much needed.

Very respectfully,

M. P. MILLER,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

The inclosure reads:

[Translation of the letter from President Lopez, of the federal government of Bisayas, to General Miller.]

GENERAL: Upon the return of your commissioners last night we determined and discussed in a definite manner the situation and the attitude of this reason of Bisayas, in regard to its relations and dependence upon the central government of Luzon; and in view of what these commissioners have manifested, I have the honor to notify you that, in conjunction with the people, the army, and committee, we insist upon our pretension not to consent, in our present situation, to any foreign interference without express orders from the central government of Luzon, upon which we state once more that we depend, and with which we are one in ideas, as we have been until now in sacrifices.

Therefore, if you insist on your side upon disembarking your forces, this is our final attitude.

May God give you, etc.

Iloilo, December 30, 1898.

R. LOPEZ,
President.
Vice Secretary.

To General MILLER.

The petition of merchants bore the signatures of the leading business men of Iloilo, was of date December 29, and read as follows:

General MILLER,

Commanding United States Forces, Iloilo Bay:

We, the undersigned merchants of Iloilo, beg you to take into consideration our large interests and the probable result of a conflict with the natives, which in our belief would seriously prejudice and harm the trade of these islands for years to come. We ask you to consider the orders they have received from their chief, Aginaldo, of Malolos.

General Miller further reported on same date (probably a later hour of the day) that the situation remained unchanged; except it was rumored that 200 armed men arrived at Iloilo from Negros. He continued:

I this morning requested the commanding officer of the *Baltimore*, if compatible with his instructions, to take such measures as he deemed necessary to prevent the entrance of vessels carrying armed men into the Iloilo River. He happened in after I got my letter written, and I brought the subject up. Orally he informed me that he had no right to do this; that under his instructions he does not feel authorized to commence the attack, and acts in defense of our expedition only.

The insurgents have occupied an old star fort at the point of the peninsula, the site of Iloilo, the fire of which sweeps beaches on which we propose to land. My troops have got to commence the attack; I therefore shall put a mountain and gatling gun in boats and open fire on their fort and a storehouse near it filled with troops, at 2,500 yards, thus inviting the captain of the *Baltimore* to help defend us by attacking the enemy to the best effect.

We are aware that on the successful accomplishment of this contest depends the future speedy yielding of insurrectionary movements in the islands. The insurgents

raised their flag over the fort this morning. The action as above entitled will be contingent on future instructions to be received from the department commander.

Very respectfully,

M. P. MILLER,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V.

The excitement in Manila and Malolos over this Iloilo affair became rapidly more intense and manifested itself in unmistakable signs of danger to the still languishing peace should an attack be made by our troops upon that city. Aguinaldo's government was now in full possession of very radical men, the majority of whom desired war in any event, and it was in a great measure dominated by his army. These men desired some immediate action on the part of the United States by which they might be able to arouse the opposition of the inhabitants against its troops, and anticipated hostilities at Iloilo appeared to them to offer the desired material.

I had also incidentally heard from Iloilo that General Miller would probably meet with insurgent opposition should he attempt to make a landing there. Knowing the great desire of the United States Government to maintain peace by all honorable means, maturely considering the situation in Luzon which had been so quickly developed, meditating the transfer later of more troops to Iloilo when the unnatural excitement should be allayed, and an opportunity presenting itself to communicate with General Miller by a British man-of-war, whose captain courteously offered to take any message I might desire to send, I sent on the evening of December 29 the following hastily prepared communication:

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., December 29, 1898.

Brig. Gen. MARCUS P. MILLER, U. S. V.,
Commanding First Separate Brigade, Eighth Army Corps, Iloilo, Panay.

SIR: This will be delivered to you by Captain Montgomery, of the British navy, who leaves for Iloilo in the morning. I inclose copy of our translation of a cablegram received to-day in cipher, from which you will understand the position and policy of our Government toward these islands.

Do not be in haste with your negotiations for the surrender of the city. Should there be strong and very decided opposition to your entry, backed by considerable force, do not be in haste. It will not do to bombard the city, nor will it do to let the natives loot and burn it. Foreigners have large possessions there and a great deal of money in the banks. You can remain in the harbor with your force. If you meet with decided or strong opposition, await there further instructions, and if necessary I can direct a portion of your force to other ports in the southern islands, where you will not meet much, if any, opposition. I trust in your discretion.

Very truly, yours,

E. S. OTIS,
Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

I contemplated at the time the sending of the First California Volunteers to the southern waters as soon as conditions at Manila would justify the weakening of the military force here, and immediately directed that regiment to be put in readiness for embarkation. It was placed on board five small merchant vessels preparatory to sailing at any directed moment, was retained thereon for several days, when Luzon affairs indicating that it might be required for use in Manila in a short time it was returned to its former barracks.

The cablegram referred to in the above letter to General Miller was the proclamation of the President received in cipher. The translation was completed about an hour before the letter was written, and was transmitted to General Miller to inform him of the policy which the Government intended to pursue. Neither its contents nor feasibility of immediate issue had been carefully considered. No direction for its publication had been given and it was not supposed that it would be

proclaimed at Iloilo. The general, however, under the impression that it had been transmitted for publication, issued it very soon after it was received, and in his letter of January 6 informed me as follows:

Three days ago I sent to the governing committee (R. Lopez, president) a copy of the letter of instructions of the President and asked that they permit the entry of my troops. No answer has been received and I expect none. I had copies of the President's instructions translated into Spanish and distributed to the people in various ways, and am informed that the people laugh at it. The insurgents call us cowards and are fortifying the old fort at the point of the peninsula, and are mounting old smooth-bore guns left by the Spaniards. They are intrenching everywhere, are bent on having one fight, and are confident of victory. As I informed you in my letter of yesterday, I believe that we can now capture the city with the force now present and with the assistance of the Navy without the loss of much life and without much destruction of property, and should we destroy it all I believe it would be of advantage to the city, as a newer city would be built up soon. The character of the natives, having been under the subjugation of Spain so long, is such that once well punished they will submit to fate. The people are superstitious and believe in fate, and now believe that fate will give them victory.

His letter of the previous day, January 5, is as follows:

HDQRS. FIRST SEPARATE BRIGADE, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
ON BOARD TRANSPORT NEWPORT,
Iloilo Harbor, P. I., January 5, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS.

SIR: I have the honor to report the situation as quite serious. The native troops now number over 4,000 well-armed men. There are more than 12,000 armed with bolos and miscellaneous weapons. They are constantly intrenching about the fort and at the mouth of the Iloilo River. I do not allow anyone on shore, as the insurgent commander sent me word that he would not be responsible for our unarmed men in town.

Last evening about 6.40 o'clock, just at dark, while at supper, the captain of the water boat went toward the rear of the boat, where the guard was stationed, and suddenly sprang at the guard with a knife, cut the head of one of the guard through the skull, and the other one on the arm and jaw; the latter was knocked overboard and then struck by the native on the head with an oar. One native then jumped overboard and escaped; the two others were secured. A boat from the ship was lowered and picked up the soldier in the water, who is not badly hurt. The soldier cut on the head is likely to die, but there is a slight hope of his recovery.

I think the longer we wait before attack the harder it will be to put down the insurrection.

The city is entirely at the mercy of the *Baltimore*, and with her assistance, advancing under her guns and Captain Bridgman's battery, I have no doubt we can drive the insurgents out of the city, but their army will confront us outside. That situation would be intolerable, even if firing ceases. I would therefore recommend that a force sufficient to beat them badly in the open field should be prepared ready to send down, if required, after the city is taken. Let no one convince you that peaceful measures can settle the difficulty here, unless you first settle matters peacefully in Manila and Luzon Island.

The English and German war ships and all other large vessels in the harbor have daily received refugees from the city. Many of the city people with their effects are leaving on small coasting steamers for neighboring islands.

Order appears to be maintained in the city, except for Americans who feel humiliated and want to get at them.

Very respectfully,

M. P. MILLER,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

After fully considering the President's proclamation and the temper of the Tagalos with whom I was daily discussing political problems and the friendly intentions of the United States Government toward them, I concluded that there were certain words and expressions therein, such as "sovereignty," "right of cession," and those which directed immediate occupation, etc., though most admirably employed and tersely expressive of actual conditions, might be advantageously used by the Tagalo war party to incite widespread hostilities among the natives. The ignorant classes had been taught to believe that certain

words, as "sovereignty," "protection," etc., had peculiar meaning disastrous to their welfare and significant of future political domination, like that from which they had recently been freed. It was my opinion, therefore, that I would be justified in so amending the paper that the beneficent object of the United States Government would be brought clearly within the comprehension of the people, and this conclusion was the more readily reached because of the radical change of the past few days in the constitution of Aguinaldo's government, which could not have been understood at Washington at the time the proclamation was prepared. It was also believed that the proclamation had been induced partially by the suggestions of the naval authorities here, which three weeks previous, and while affairs were in a specific and comparatively quiet state, had recommended "that the President issue a proclamation defining the policy of the United States Government in the Philippine Islands and assuring the inhabitants that it is our intention to interfere as little as possible in the internal affairs of the islands. That as soon as they developed their capability for self-government their powers and privileges will be increased. That will allay the spirit of unrest." These authorities at that time recommended the government of the islands as a territory with a civilian as a governor, to be followed later by a naval and military commission to determine questions of a naval and military character.

The amended proclamation was thereupon prepared, and fearing that General Miller would give publicity to the former, copies of which, if issued, would be circulated soon in Luzon, I again dispatched Lieutenant-Colonel Potter to Iloilo, both to ascertain the course of events there and to advise the commanding general of the dangers threatening in Luzon, and which might be augmented if any action was taken which the insurgents could make use of in furtherance of their unfriendly designs. General Miller thought his action in making publication of the proclamation on January 3 correct, as he had not been instructed to the contrary, and his opinion, he contended, was confirmed by a War Department dispatch which I had directed Colonel Potter to deliver to him, and which he had received on January 6. He was satisfied that the use he had made of the proclamation was that contemplated by the War Department authorities, but it was not long before it was delivered at Malolos and was the object of venomous attack.

Nothing further of great moment transpired at Iloilo for several successive days, and we return to the narrative of Manila events. General Miller, however, remained eager for battle, and with his command restive under the taunts of the natives and criticisms of foreign citizens, he repeatedly asked for permission to attack the city. Complications of a civil nature were also arising as shown in his communication of January 8, of which the following is a copy:

HDQRS. FIRST SEPARATE BRIGADE, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
ON BOARD TRANSPORT NEWPORT,
Iloilo Harbor, P. I., Sunday, January 8, 1899—2 p.m.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS.

SIR: I have the honor to report, for the information of the major-general commanding, that the situation here is not improving since my last report. I have not landed the Fifty-first Iowa on the island opposite to Iloilo, as two boat crews of troops of the Fifty-first Iowa landed on the 5th instant, and were met by over 75 to 100 natives armed with various weapons, rifles, shotguns, and knives, who asked them their business and warned them off with threats of bringing out more troops if they did not go away. The men of the regiment are well, and the colonel does not desire to land under such circumstances of hostility. The insurgents are still at work fortifying; last night they sunk four mud scows at the mouth of the Iloilo River to prevent passage of our Navy. This did not annoy us, as the *Petrel's* place for action, if we

have one, is undisturbed. The city is so completely under the control of the war-ships of the Navy that we are indifferent as to what the insurgents do. When the time comes nothing can save insurgents in the city but flight. The subject most disturbing to our American minds is the fact that a Dutch ship is loading with sugar; who shall collect the duty is a question. Captain Evans and I discussed the question last evening without conclusion. The duties will amount to \$5,000, quite a snug sum, with which the insurgents will be able to buy machine guns, etc., if we leave them alone. Other ships arriving will add more and more to their revenues.

The port ought to be closed if it is a practicable thing, after due notice to foreign governments. We need here two good steam launches capable of towing a line of rowboats rapidly for landing purposes. We can not get them here without seizing them, and the good ones are under the protection of foreign flags.

As to the insurgents yielding to the order of the President and allowing occupation, it will not be done unless the central government at Malolos directs them to do so. If we have to fight at Manila and here, I should think it better to strike the first blow here, as, with the assistance of the Navy, result in our favor can scarcely be doubted.

Very respectfully,

M. P. MILLER,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

Full official Iloilo correspondence which was carried on about this date, together with reported interviews on the situation, will be found in the accompanying report of Brigadier-General Hughes, U. S. V., now commanding there. They are of interest and of considerable importance in showing the then existing attitude of Spanish civil officials toward our Government.

The amended proclamation of January 4 appeared in the English, Spanish, and Tagalo languages, and was published in Manila through newspapers and posters. The English text is as follows:

PROCLAMATION.

OFFICE OF THE MILITARY GOVERNOR OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., January 4, 1898.

To the People of the Philippine Islands:

Instructions of His Excellency the President of the United States relative to the administration of affairs in the Philippine Islands have been transmitted to me by direction of the honorable the Secretary of War, under date of December 28, 1898. They direct me to publish and proclaim, in the most public manner, to the inhabitants of these islands that in the war against Spain the United States forces came here to destroy the power of that nation and to give the blessings of peace and individual freedom to the Philippine people; that we are here as friends of the Filipinos; to protect them in their homes, their employments, their individual and religious liberty, and that all persons who, either by active aid or honest endeavor, cooperate with the Government of the United States to give effect to these beneficent purposes, will receive the reward of its support and protection.

The President of the United States has assumed that the municipal laws of the country in respect to private rights and property and the repression of crime are to be considered as continuing in force in so far as they be applicable to a free people, and should be administered by the ordinary tribunals of justice, presided over by representatives of the people and those in thorough sympathy with them in their desires for good government; that the functions and duties connected with civil and municipal administration are to be performed by such officers as wish to accept the assistance of the United States, chosen in so far as it may be practicable from the inhabitants of the islands; that while the management of public property and revenues and the use of all public means of transportation are to be conducted under the military authorities, until such authorities can be replaced by civil administration, all private property, whether of individuals or corporations, must be respected and protected. If private property be taken for military uses it shall be paid for at a fair valuation in cash if possible, and when payment in cash is not practicable at the time, receipts therefor will be given to be taken up and liquidated as soon as cash becomes available. The ports of the Philippine Islands shall be open to the commerce of all foreign nations, and goods and merchandise not prohibited for military reasons by the military authorities shall be admitted upon payment of such duties and charges as shall be in force at the time of importation.

The President concludes his instructions in the following language:

"Finally, it should be the earnest and paramount aim of the Administration to

win the confidence, respect, and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines by insuring to them in every possible way the full measure of individual rights and liberty which is the heritage of a free people, and by proving to them that the mission of the United States is one of beneficent assimilation, which will substitute the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule. In the fulfillment of this high mission, while upholding the temporary administration of affairs for the greatest good of the governed, there will be sedulously maintained the strong arm of authority to repress disturbance, and to overcome all obstacles to the bestowal of the blessings of good and stable government upon the people of the Philippine Islands."

From the tenor and substance of the above instructions of the President, I am fully of the opinion that it is the intention of the United States Government, while directing affairs generally, to appoint the representative men now forming the controlling element of the Filipinos to civil positions of trust and responsibility, and it will be my aim to appoint thereto such Filipinos as may be acceptable to the supreme authorities at Washington.

It is also my belief that it is the intention of the United States Government to draw from the Filipino people so much of the military force of the islands as is possible and consistent with a free and well-constituted government of the country, and it is my desire to inaugurate a policy of that character. I am also convinced that it is the intention of the United States Government to seek the establishment of a most liberal government for the islands, in which the people themselves shall have as full representation as the maintenance of law and order will permit, and which shall be susceptible of development, on lines of increased representation and the bestowal of increased powers, into a government as free and independent as is enjoyed by the most favored provinces of the world.

It will be my constant endeavor to cooperate with the Filipino people, seeking the good of the country, and I invite their full confidence and aid.

E. S. OTIS,
Major-General, U. S. V., Military Governor.

Before publication of this proclamation I endeavored to obtain from able Filipino residents of the city an expression of opinion as to its probable effect upon the population, but was not much encouraged. A few days thereafter they declared the publication to have been a mistake, although the foreign residents appeared to believe the proclamation most excellent in tone and moderation, offered everything that the most hostile of the insurgents could expect, and undoubtedly would have a beneficial influence. It was received by the better classes of natives with satisfaction, as it was the first authoritative announcement of the attitude which the United States assumed toward the islands and declared the policy which it intended to pursue, and because the declared policy was one which, in their opinion, conditions imperatively demanded should be imposed for the interests of the Filipino people who were incapable of self-government. The publication separated more widely the friendly and war factions of the inhabitants and was the cause of exciting discussion.

The ablest of insurgent newspapers, which was now issued at Malolos and edited by the uncompromising Luna, he who had been an openly declared enemy of the United States from the time Manila capitulated, subsequently commanded an insurgent army and was assassinated while exercising chief military command of the insurgent forces, attacked the policy of the United States as declared in the proclamation, and its assumption of sovereignty over the islands, with all the vigor of which he was capable. He went further and contended that the policy as declared was merely a subterfuge to temporarily quiet the people until measures could be inaugurated and applied to put in practice all the odious features of government which Spain had employed. Everything tended simply to a change of masters for the Filipino people without amelioration of condition. This paper was published in Tagalo, had a considerable circulation, and was assisted by other Tagalo publications. No statement reflecting upon the United States Government and its

troops in Manila was too base, untruthful, or improbable for newspaper circulation, and unfortunately received credit by the more ignorant of the natives, although the subject of ridicule or indignant comment by the abler Filipinos. Aguinaldo met the proclamation by a counter one in which he indignantly protested against the claim of sovereignty by the United States in the islands, which really had been conquered from the Spaniards through the blood and treasure of his countrymen, and abused me for my assumption of the title of military governor. Even the women of Cavite province, in a document numerous signed by them, gave me to understand that after all the men were killed off they were prepared to shed their patriotic blood for the liberty and independence of their country. The efforts made by Aguinaldo and his assisants made a decided impression on the inhabitants of Luzon outside of Manila, who acquired an unfavorable opinion, to say the least, of an American citizen, whom of course few of them had ever seen. The insurgent army was especially affected by this tirade of abuse of Americans, but agreeably so, as it had met and conquered the soldiers of Spain and only awaited an opportunity to demonstrate its invincibility in war with the United States troops cooped up in Manila and whom it had commenced to insult and charge with cowardice. Shortly before this time the insurgents had commenced the organization of clubs in the city, membership in which now, I was informed, amounted to 10,000. The chief organizer was a shrewd mestizo, a former close companion of Aguinaldo, by whom he had been commissioned to perform this work. He was a friend and associate of some of our officers; was engaged in organizing the clubs only, as he stated, to give the poorer classes amusement and education; held public entertainments in athletics to which our officers were invited, and in which our soldiers were asked to participate. Gradually arms were being secretly introduced and bolos were being manufactured and distributed. The arms were kept concealed in buildings, and many of them were subsequently captured. The Chinamen were carrying on a lucrative business in bolo making, but the provost-marshal had cruelly seized considerable of their stock. These clubs had received military organization and were commanded by cunning Filipino officers regularly appointed by the Malolos government. The chief organizer departed after organization had been perfected and thereafter became a confidential adviser in Malolos affairs. This organization was the subject of grave apprehension, as it was composed of the worst social element of the city, and was kept under police supervision as closely as possible. It was also dreaded by the better class of Filipino inhabitants, many of whom believed themselves selected for assassination on account of their expressed desires for American protection. The streets of the city were thronged with unarmed insurgent officers and enlisted men from the numerically increasing insurgent line on the outskirts, proud of their uniforms and exhibiting matchless conceit, amusing to our men, who were apparently unconcerned observers, but who were quick to take in the rapidly changing conditions.

In the midst of this suppressed excitement the city was comparatively quiet, crime well suppressed, and business interests were flourishing. The merchants were active to take advantages of all avenues of trade possible. Vessels were sent to the China coasts for products to supply the southern ports, entered and cleared at the port of Iloilo against the protest of General Miller, and paid the accustomed charges on dutiable goods and products to the insurgents, who had installed themselves there. United States consuls at Singapore and Hongkong asked the

perplexing question whether vessels could be cleared for Iloilo and Cebu, and could be answered evasively only, as follows:

MANILA, P. I., January 9, 1899.

United States Consul-General WILDMAN, *Hongkong*:

United States not yet administering civil affairs at either Iloilo or Cebu. No new consular action as to these ports should be inaugurated at present.

OTIS.

The Manila Chamber of Commerce took this matter up for investigation and saw that the rights of merchants in ports virtually at war with the United States were denied. I was called upon for an explanation and addressed its secretary as follows:

SIR: I am in receipt of the communication of the Manila Chamber of Commerce of yesterday, the 12th instant, in which I am informed that "the American consul at Hongkong declines to dispatch steamers or vessels for Cebu and Iloilo; also, that American authorities here will not allow a steamer to come here with permission to proceed to Cebu, and request information as to the course to be pursued in the immediate future by the American authorities with regard to the above-named ports."

In reply, I have the honor to inform you that the United States consul at Hongkong having, on the 6th instant, made inquiry in the matter of clearing vessels at Hongkong for Iloilo and Cebu, was answered on the 9th instant, by cable, as follows:

"The United States not yet administering civil affairs at either Iloilo or Cebu. No new consular action as to these ports should be inaugurated at present."

This message to the American consul is not considered authoritative by any means, as we have no authority to give him directions, and the matter of clearing vessels at Hongkong rests entirely within his discretion.

To the categorical questions which you submit I am pleased to return answer as follows:

To the first question my answer is: Not by any act of the United States authorities at Manila.

To the second question I reply that: Trade can be conducted, in so far as the United States authorities now in occupancy of these islands are concerned, the same as formerly. Vessels will be cleared from this port for ports of the islands until instructions received from my Government indicate a contrary course of action.

To the third question I can only answer that: All the instructions thus far received from my Government are embodied in the proclamation issued from this office on the 4th instant, which I inclose and to which I respectfully refer.

The consul for Great Britain wished to know why a British steamer had been suspiciously dealt with and was replied to as follows:

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of this date, and to say in reply that the matter referred to therein will be investigated. It is reported that the steamer *Zweena* arrived from Singapore with a general cargo, a part of which it appears is destined for Iloilo by same vessel. From reports received and declarations made it was believed that she had on board contraband of war. The reports received justified the action which has been taken in so far as search was concerned.

And again inquiring concerning seizure at Manila of a small steamer, in which a British subject claimed to be interested, he received the following reply:

MANILA, P. I., January 2, 1899.

Hon. H. A. RAMSDEN,

H. B. M. Consul, Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 31st ultimo, inclosing copies of correspondence between yourself and Messrs. Holliday, Wise & Co., in the matter of the seizure by the United States authorities of the steamer *Laguna de Bay* in the Pasig River.

The seizure of this vessel became necessary for Government purposes, and before it was made the owner of the same had been consulted. Later, Mr. Ashton, in your company, called upon me at this office, when I assured him that the Government would not allow the steamer to engage in private trade on the Pasig River, and that it was prepared to make good to parties concerned any loss which Government action would entail. At the time of this conference I was under the impression that the

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captain of the port had given permission for this boat to navigate the Pasig River, but have been informed to the contrary. It is hoped that this matter can be satisfactorily adjusted in a few days.

Very sincerely, yours,

E. S. OTIS,
United States Military Governor.

In the meantime the local Spanish authorities were present and desired to close up the pending international business. As early as December 28, I was informed by the superior Spanish officer present that the treaty of peace had been concluded and that he wished to take up the settlement of affairs. I replied that I had not received any information or instructions in the matter, but as soon as received would cooperate with him in every way possible. On the following day he applied for permission to leave the islands. He was a prisoner of war, in fact, supervising the affairs of the Spanish prisoners present in Manila. A high-toned gentleman, a most courteous and accomplished officer, our official relations had always been pleasant and agreeable. I replied to his application in the following terms:

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES MILITARY GOVERNOR,
Manila, P. I., December 29, 1898.

Division General FRANCISCO RIZZO,
Commanding Spanish Forces, Manila, P. I.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this instant requesting passport to return to Spain next month, and in reply thereto I hasten to inform you that you are free to leave at any time you may desire, and that it will give me great pleasure to render you every assistance that you may need in making the necessary preparations for your departure on so long a voyage.

I am, General, with much esteem, your obedient servant,

E. S. OTIS,
Major-General, U. S. V., United States Military Governor.

Shortly thereafter General Rios, general of division of the Spanish army, who had been commanding in the south, arrived in Manila. He had been directed by his Government to supervise, as acting governor-general, Spanish interests in the islands, and at once addressed himself vigorously to the settlement of affairs and the shipment of Spanish prisoners, for which I had received authority. In personal conferences, through numerous communications and written requests, he occupied considerable of the time of the United States authorities, although it was as yet impossible to consider many of the matters which he presented, since the Paris treaty had not received ratification. A few responses to the letters he submitted indicate the variety of the subjects which he wished promptly attended to and the difficulties of compliance. They are as follows:

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., January 9, 1899.

His Excellency DIEGO DE LOS RIOS Y NICALAU,
General of Division, Spanish Army, Manila, P. I.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this instant, referring to embarkation of Spanish troops, prisoners of war, on the 11th instant, and to say in reply that there is no objection on the part of the United States Government, and that I will give appropriate instructions to the officials having charge of such business to have your excellency's desires consummated.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. S. OTIS,
*Major-General, U. S. V.,
United States Military Governor in the Philippines.*

JANUARY 10, 1899.

GENERAL: In a hurried communication of last evening, sent in response to your letter of yesterday, in which you inform me that you must discharge in Mindanao, about

2,000 troops who were taken there from the Visayan and Luzon islands, and further say that it is impossible to scatter them to their several homes, I suggested that the Visayans might be taken to Iloilo and I will see that the necessary orders are given to the United States authorities there to permit them to land upon arrival. The Luzon men will probably give great trouble if they are brought into the harbor of Manila at the present time. Many of those already received here escaped from the authorities, and with the convicts sent by you have fixed themselves in Manila, where they give a good deal of annoyance. We can not receive any more of these troops in the city at present, and I wish you would delay sending them to this island. After a short period we may be able to take them and send them to their respective homes. I am very desirous of giving this matter full consideration before arriving at further conclusions.

I would like to be informed of the approximate number of Visayans, and also the number of Luzon men you intend to bring north, stating each class separately.

JANUARY 12, 1899.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 10th instant, in which you request me to direct my officers to hand over to the chiefs of the several departments of the Spanish hacienda certain public documents belonging to the Spanish Government, etc.

In reply permit me to state that since our late conversation on this subject I telegraphed my Government of your desire in this particular and I have not yet received any response.

Being, as I am, entirely ignorant, in so far as official information is concerned, of the relations existing between Spain and the United States at the present time, I do not think that I have the power to act favorably upon your request until the instructions of my Government are received.

JANUARY 14, 1899.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 21st instant, referring to your wish to appoint a Spanish clerk in the Manila post-office, and in reply would say that I am unable to grant your request, as the appointment of all postal clerks is under the exclusive control of the Post-Office Department of the United States.

JANUARY 16, 1899.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 15th instant just received, referring to the embarkation of about 400 Spanish troops, prisoners of war, on the steamship *Monserrat*, and to say in reply that there is no objection on the part of the United States. Appropriate instructions will be given to the officials having charge of such business in order that your excellency's desires may be consummated.

JANUARY 20, 1899.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of yesterday received this morning, in which you inform me that there are about 630 native troops here belonging to the Visayas.

As soon as you desire to assemble the men and turn them over, I can send them to Iloilo under proper guard. Concerning the Luzon men, we will be glad to send them to some point nearer Manila than Albay.

I have instructed General Hughes to make all necessary arrangements for the shipment of the Visayans and he will confer with any officer you may be pleased to name in regard to the matter.

JANUARY 24, 1899.

GENERAL: I have given instructions to the custodian and treasurer of public funds to permit any committee whom you may appoint to examine the books and records of that office for the period of time previous to American occupation of Manila.

The treasurer will be pleased to show you exhibits of the contents of the safes of the Treasury as reported by board of officers appointed under authority from these headquarters. The safes were sealed after this board had inventoried the contents and have not since been opened.

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JANUARY 25, 1899.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 24th instant, and in reply to say that I have directed the captain of the port to permit the ladies, children, and Mr. Ricardi Fernandez and his assistant, now on the *General Alra*, to land. I have also directed him to permit the officers upon that vessel to visit you on official business, and to permit a small party to land daily for the purpose of purchasing supplies.

JANUARY 26, 1899.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter requesting that the regimental records, books, and documents belonging to the Spanish troops formerly occupying certain barracks of this city be returned to you. In accordance with your request I will instruct the provost-marshal-general to turn over to any officer whom you may name to receive the same, all records belonging to Spanish regiments which are in the possession of the United States authorities.

It should be remembered that at the time United States occupation of the city commenced a great deal of public property was abandoned by the Spanish officials, never having been turned over under the terms of the capitulation. The United States authorities have collected and preserved all such property in so far as it was possible for them to do so.

MANILA, P. I., January 26, 1899.

Brig. Gen. VICENTE ARIZMENDIZ,
Spanish Army, Manila, P. I.

SIR: I am directed by the military governor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 24th instant, referring to a commission of the Spanish army of which you had been appointed president by his excellency General Diego de los Rios, Spanish army, and in reply to say that he has not yet received any information as to the terms of the treaty of peace between the Governments of Spain and the United States, now awaiting ratification, and that he is not therefore at this time prepared to enter upon the subject of the final disposition of Spanish troops, records, funds, and property under the control of the United States forces in the Philippine Islands.

Very respectfully,

C. H. MURRAY,
Captain, Fourth U. S. Cavalry, Aid.

MANILA, January 29, 1899.

His Excellency DIEGO DE LOS RIOS Y NICALAU,
Division General, Spanish Army, Manila, P. I.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of yesterday, and beg to reply that instructions have been given to the United States officer who was placed in supervisory charge of the building containing the mint to give the necessary orders to enable you to carry out your expressed wish.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. S. OTIS,
Major-General, U. S. V., U. S. Military Governor.

JANUARY 31, 1899.

GENERAL: Replying further to your communication of the 17th instant, to that portion of the same which asks that "permission be given for the withdrawal of everything concerning the settlement in hand and which does not affect the treasury of the establishment, properly speaking," I have the honor to state that I have received as yet no instructions from the United States Government concerning these matters, and am ignorant of the terms of the pending treaty between Spain and the United States, now awaiting ratification. I am, therefore, powerless to act understandingly until I receive information and directions from Washington, which will doubtless be furnished me as soon as the proposed treaty receives validity.

In the meantime I shall be glad to further your desires in every way in so far as I am able, and it will be possible for me to adopt some preliminary measures, subject to future confirmation. * * *

The inference may be drawn from the tenor of the foregoing replies to the written application of General Rios, that time was sought to

properly meet his demands. Time was required to consider fully what specific action was necessary to guard United States interests and its rights under the treaty, which was not yet of validity, not having received ratification. But it was also deemed inexpedient to enter upon any course of proceedings which would embarrass the United States Government in case the proposed treaty should ultimately fail of confirmation. Not until January 31 were the preliminaries of any decided course determined upon, except in so far as the repatriation of prisoners and the surrender of strictly military property and records were concerned. Then a board of officers was appointed for the purposes shown in Department orders of that date, which read as follows:

4. A board of officers, to consist of Maj. Charles McClure, chief paymaster of the department; Maj. C. U. Gantenbein, Second Oregon, U. S. V., and Second Lieut. M. A. Hildreth, First North Dakota, U. S. V., is hereby appointed to meet and confer with a committee named by his excellency Division General Diego de los Rios y Nicalan, Spanish Army, for the purpose, as stated, "of clearing the accounts of the Spanish Government in the Philippines." The board will determine upon some definite course of procedure by which the Spanish committee can have access to all records and documents now in possession of the United States authorities which it may desire to consult, and will arrange therefor. No property or records can be delivered until the proposed treaty receives validity through ratification, and the board will continue its sessions anticipating that event, when definite instructions looking to a settlement of public affairs, judicial and executive, can be conveyed. The board will ascertain fully the desires of the committee as to the nature and full extent of its desired action and give it every possible facility consistent with the present status of affairs.

On January 31 201 commissioned officers and 2,541 enlisted men, prisoners of war, and about 200 sick officers, also prisoners, who departed individually under privileges specially granted, had sailed for Spain. Several thousand remained within the walled town, whose probable conduct in the event of serious disturbances within the city was the subject of much speculative discussion.

From August, 1898, to the time the treaty of Paris came from the representatives of the contracting Governments, the insurgents had maintained their military lines around Manila on the plea that they desired to be prepared to meet the soldiers of Spain, should she return to her late possessions. As soon as the result of the treaty negotiations became known, the dishonesty of that plea became fully apparent. Then the crisis in the insurgent government was at hand. Aguinaldo and his able adviser, Mabini, the man who had furnished the brains for the radical element and who, in fact, was the government, proposed to transfer the declaration of open hostilities from Spain to the United States. This the conservative members of the cabinet and congress would not countenance, and the result was their withdrawal. Mabini was able to form a new cabinet with himself as dictator, and to dominate the remaining members of congress. Independence was the cry and the extermination of the Americans the determination. They then sought an excuse to inaugurate hostilities, but the United States had kept strictly within its legal rights and had simply performed its international obligations. Repeated efforts were made to secure some mark of recognition for their government from the American authorities, some of which appeared to be quite cunningly devised. I was addressed by so-called ministers of state on diplomatic subjects, and was visited by accredited members of the Malolos government. The various foreign consuls resident in Manila were officially informed by this government of its proceedings and furnished with copies of its so-called decrees. Never since the time Aguinaldo returned to Cavite in May of 1898 and placed himself under the masterful spirit of Mabini had he the slight-

est intention to accept the kind offices and assistance of the United States, except as they might be employed to hold Spain throttled while he worked the scheme of self-aggrandizement. His success was not in the least astonishing, as after the various islands had driven out the few remaining and discouraged soldiers of their openly declared enemy, they naturally turned to Luzon for some form of central government, the islands of the south being well aware of their inability to maintain successful separate and distinct political establishments. The crude one in process of formation in central Luzon offered itself through its visiting agents and was accepted in part (notwithstanding race animosities and divergent business interests) and very probably because no other alternative was offered. The eight months of opportunity given the ambitious Tagalo by the hold on Spain which the United States maintained was sufficient also for him to send his troops and designing men into the distant provinces and hold the unarmed natives in subjection while he imposed military authority, and thus in December, 1898, we find in northern and southeastern Luzon, in Mindoro, Samar, Leyte, Panay, and even on the coast of Mindanao and in some of the smaller islands, the aggressive Tagalo, present in person, and whether civilian or soldier, supreme in authority. The success which attended the political efforts of Aguinaldo and his close associates, and gave them such sudden and unexpected power was not calculated to induce them to accept subordinate positions in a reestablished government, and the original premeditated intention to control supremely at least a portion of the Filipino people had become firmly fixed. The cry for liberty and independence (really license and despotism under their governing methods) and the vile aspersions of the motives of the United States, which they have widely circulated, have served them to stir up distrust and fear of the American among the people to a considerable extent, especially those of Tagalo origin. The charge which they continually brought, until December last, that the United States administration in power intended to restore the islands to Spain, which until then was the chief cause of discontent and excitement, and in the asserted truth and circulation of which they were greatly assisted by the Spanish, resident and representative, fell flat when the result of the labors of the Paris treaty commissions became known. Then the pretext that the United States was about to substitute itself for Spain, continuing all her former governing abuses, including the imposed authority of the hated friar, was resorted to and had its effect on the ignorant masses. Whatever action the United States might now take, except to immediately withdraw its authority and subject the people to anarchy and the European vast property interests in these islands to destruction, could be so tortured as to support this pretext. It was eagerly waited for by the now irresponsible band of conspirators at Malolos, few of whom had anything to lose and everything to gain by inciting hostility. The United States proclamation issued on the 4th of January offered them the first opportunity and was the opportunity which they desired. No sooner was it published than it brought out a virtual declaration of war from, in this instance at least, the wretchedly advised President Aguinaldo, who, on January 5, issued the following:

The government of the Philippines has considered it its duty to set forth to the civilized powers the facts determining the rupture of its amicable relations with the army of the United States of America in these islands, to the end that they may thereby reach the conviction that I, for my part, have done everything possible to avoid it, although at the cost of many rights uselessly sacrificed.

After the naval combat, which occurred on May 1 of last year, between the Spanish squadron and that of America, the commander of the latter consented to

my return from Hongkong to this beloved soil, and he distributed among the Filipinos some rifles found in the arsenal at Cavite, doubtless with the intention of reestablishing the revolution, somewhat quieted by the convention of Biac-nabato, in order to have the Filipinos on his side.

The people, influenced by the declaration of war between the United States and Spain, understood the necessity of fighting for their liberty, feeling sure that Spain would be destroyed and rendered incapable of leading them along the road to prosperity and progress. The Filipinos hailed my advent with joy, and I had the honor of being proclaimed leader on account of the services which I had rendered in the former revolution.

Then all the Filipinos without distinction of classes took arms, and every province hastened to expel from its frontiers the Spanish forces. This is the explanation of the fact that, after the lapse of so short a period of time, my government rules the whole of Luzon, the Visaya Islands, and a part of Mindanao.

Although the North Americans took no part in these military operations, which cost no little blood and gold, my government does not disavow the fact that the destruction of the Spanish squadron and the gift of some rifles from the arsenal to my people influenced the progress of our arms to some extent. It was also taken for granted that the American forces would necessarily sympathize with the revolution which they had managed to encourage, and which had saved them much blood and great hardships; and, above all, we entertained absolute confidence in the history and traditions of a people which fought for its independence and for the abolition of slavery, which posed as the champion liberator of oppressed peoples; we felt ourselves under the safeguard of a free people.

The Americans, seeing the friendly disposition of the Filipino people, disembarked forces at the town of Paranaque and took up positions all along the line occupied by my troops, as far as Maytubig, taking possession of many trenches constructed by my people, by the employment of astuteness, not unaccompanied by violence. They forced a capitulation on the garrison of Manila, which, inasmuch as it was invested by my troops, was compelled to surrender at the first attack. In this I took a very active part, although I was not notified, my forces reaching as far as the suburbs of Malate, Ermita, Paco, Sampaloc, and Tondo.

Notwithstanding these services, and although the Spaniards would not have surrendered but for the fact that my troops had closed every avenue of escape to the towns of the interior, the American generals not only ignored me entirely in the stipulations for capitulation, but also requested that my forces should retire from the port of Cavite and the suburbs of Manila.

I represented to the American generals the injustice done me, and requested in friendly terms that they should at least expressly recognize my cooperation, but they utterly declined to do so. Nevertheless, being always desirous of showing friendliness and good feeling toward those who called themselves liberators of the Philippine people, I ordered my troops to evacuate the port of Cavite and the suburbs of Ermita, Malate, Sampaloc, and Tondo, retaining only a portion of the suburb of Paco.

In spite of these concessions, not many days passed before Admiral Dewey, without any reason whatever, arrested our steam launches, which had been plying in the bay of Manila with his express consent. Almost at the same time I received a letter from General Otis, commander of the American army of occupation, demanding that I should withdraw my forces beyond the lines marked on a map which he also sent me, and which showed within the lines the town of Pandacan and the hamlet of Singalong, which never have belonged to the municipal area of Manila and its suburbs.

In view of this unjustifiable attitude of both American leaders, I summoned a council of my generals and asked the advice of my cabinet, and in conformity with the opinion of both bodies I named commissioners, who placed themselves in communication with these Americans. Although Admiral Dewey received in an insolent manner and with aggressive phrases my commissioners, whom he did not permit to speak, I yielded to the friendly suggestions of General Otis, withdrawing my forces to the desired line for the purpose of avoiding contact with his troops. This gave rise to many misunderstandings, but I hoped that once the Paris conference was at an end my people would obtain the independence promised them by the consul-general in Singapore, Mr. Pratt, and that the friendship formerly assured and proclaimed in manifestoes and speeches would be established by the American generals who have reached these shores.

But it did not turn out thus. The said generals accepted my concessions in favor of peace and friendship as indications of weakness. Thus it is that, with rising ambition, they ordered forces to Iloilo on December 26, with the purpose of acquiring for themselves the title of conquerors of that portion of the Philippine Islands occupied by my government.

Such procedures, so foreign to the dictates of culture and the usages observed by civilized nations, gave me the right to act without observing the usual rules of

intercourse. Nevertheless, in order to be correct to the end, I sent to General Otis commissioners charged to solicit him to desist from his rash enterprise, but they were not listened to.

My government can not remain indifferent in view of such a violent and aggressive seizure of a portion of its territory by a nation which has arrogated to itself the title, champion of oppressed nations. Thus it is that my government is disposed to open hostilities if the American troops attempt to take forcible possession of the Visaya Islands. I denounce these acts before the world, in order that the conscience of mankind may pronounce its infallible verdict as to who are the true oppressors of nations and the tormentors of human kind.

Upon their heads be all the blood which may be shed.

EMILIO AGUINALDO.

MALOLO, *January 5, 1899.*

A number of copies of this unfortunate declaration were speedily sent out for circulation among the people, when an effort was made to recall them and substitute an amended edition, but a few had found their way to Manila and were eagerly sought after by the citizens. That evening the insurgent newspaper entitled "The Herald of the Revolution" published a supplement in which the following appeared:

OFFICIAL MANIFESTO OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT!

To my brothers, the Filipinos, and to all the respectable consuls and other foreigners:

A proclamation of Mr. E. S. Otis, major-general of the United States Volunteers, appeared in Manila papers yesterday, compelled me to issue the present, with a view to expose to all who read and understand the present document my most solemn protest against the whole contents of the said proclamation, the duties of my conscience toward God, my political compromises toward my beloved people, and my private and official relationship with the United States nation, all of which forced me to do so.

The General Otis called himself in the said proclamation military governor of the Philippine Islands. I protest one and a thousand times, with all the energy of my soul, against such authority.

I solemnly declare that neither at Singapore, Hongkong, nor here in the Philippines did I ever agree, by word or in writing, to recognize the sovereignty of America in this our lovely country. On the contrary, I declare that I returned to these islands, transported by the United States man-of-war, on the 19th of May last, with the decided and firm intention to fight the Spaniards in order to reconquer our liberty and independence. I have thus declared in my official proclamation dated May 24, and I have likewise published in a manifest addressed to the Filipino people on the 12th of June last, when, in my native village of Kawil, I exhibited for the first time our holy national flag as a sacred emblem of that sublime aspiration, and finally, so it was confirmed by the American general, Mr. Merritt, antecessor of Mr. E. S. Otis, in the manifest which he addressed to the Filipino people days before he *intimated* the Spanish general, Mr. Jaudenes, the surrender of the city of Manila, in which manifest he clearly and positively said that the army and navy of the United States came here to give us our liberty and destroy the bad rule of the Spanish Government. To say all at a time, nationals and foreigners are witnesses that the army and navy of the United States stationed here have acknowledged the fact of the belligerency of the Filipinos, whose flag has triumphantly crossed our seas before the eyes of the foreign nations here represented by their respective consuls.

As in General Otis's proclamation he alluded to some instructions edited by His Excellency the President of the United States, referring to the administration of the matters in the Philippine Islands, I in the name of God, the root and fountain of all justice, and that of all the right which has been visibly granted to me to direct my dear brothers in the difficult work of our regeneration, protest most solemnly against this intrusion of the United States Government on the sovereignty of these islands.

I equally protest in the name of the Filipino people against the said intrusion, because as they have granted their vote of confidence appointing me president of the nation, although I don't consider that I deserve such, therefore I consider it my duty to defend to death its liberty and independence.

Finally, I protest against such an unexpected act of sovereignty of the United States in these islands, in the name of all the proceedings which I have in my possession with regard to my relationship with the United States authorities, which unmistakably prove that the United States did not take me from Hongkong to fight

the Spaniards for their benefit, but for the benefit of our liberty and independence, for which purpose the said authorities verbally promised me their most decided assistance and efficacious cooperation; and so should you all my dear brothers understand, in order that we may united act according to the idea of our liberty and independence, which were our most noble desires, and assist with your work to obtain our aim with the strength which our old conviction may afford and must not go back in the way of glory which we have obtained.

The unmistakable intention of Aguinaldo, as shown in these proclamations, taken in connection with the well-known fact that what remains of his congress was subservient to Mabini's dictation, was ample notice to the troops to prepare for hostile demonstrations on the part of the insurgent army. Greater precautionary measures were directed and taken in the way of redistributing organizations throughout the city, in advancing and strengthening (though still far within our own mutually conceded military lines) our posts of observation, and for the quick response of the men if summoned for defensive action. Otherwise no change in the conduct, condition, or temper of the troops was observable. So quietly were these precautions effected that Filipino citizens, noticing the apparent indifference of our men, warned me repeatedly of the danger to be apprehended from a sudden simultaneous attack of the insurgents within and without the city, and were quietly informed that we did not anticipate any great difficulty. Another very noticeable proof of premeditated intent on the part of the insurgents was perceived in the excitement manifested by the natives and their removal in large numbers from the city. All avenues of exit were filled with vehicles transporting families and household effects to surrounding villages. The railway properties were taxed to their utmost capacity in carrying the fleeing inhabitants to the north within the protection of the established insurgent military lines. Aguinaldo, by written communications and messages, invited his old-time friends to send their families to Malolos, where their safety was assured, but Hongkong was considered a more secure retreat and was taken advantage of. A carefully prepared estimate showed that 40,000 of the inhabitants of the city departed within the period of fifteen days.

Early in the month I had cabled the authorities at Washington that open hostilities at Iloilo meant war throughout the islands, and that I had cautioned General Miller and the troops at Iloilo Harbor; and on the 9th instant I received a joint dispatch signed by the Secretaries of the Army and Navy and addressed to Admiral Dewey and myself, conveying the instructions and suggestions of the President, which were in part as follows:

Am most desirous that conflict be avoided. Your statement that a conflict at Iloilo or at any other southern ports means war in all the islands increases that desire. Such conflict would be most unfortunate considering the present, and might have results unfavorably affecting the future. Glad you did not permit Miller to bring on hostilities. Time given the insurgents can not injure us, and must weaken and discourage them. They will see our benevolent purposes and recognize that before we can give them good government our sovereignty must be conceded and unquestioned. Tact and kindness most essential at this time. * * * We accepted the Philippines from high duty in the interests of their inhabitants and for humanity and civilization. Our sacrifices were made with this humane motive. We desire to improve the condition of the inhabitants, seeking their peace, liberty, and pursuit of their highest good. * * * Will send commissioners if you think desirable to cooperate with you both in your delicate task. They can not leave here for two weeks or reach Manila for two months. * * * If possible to hasten repatriation of Spanish soldiers before the treaty is ratified it will be done. * * * Hope good counsel will prevail among the inhabitants and that you will find means to avoid bloodshed and restore tranquillity to that unhappy island. How is the health of Miller's command?

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When this dispatch was shown Admiral Dewey he immediately remarked that he had recommended a commission, and desiring to be in accord with him I cabled as follows:

MANILA, P. I., January 10, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Washington*:

Have conferred with Admiral Dewey. We think commissioners of tact and discretion could do excellent work here. Great difficulty is that leaders can not control ignorant classes. Health of Miller's command good.

I also cabled:

Our troops well in hand and confident that we can meet emergencies. Long conference last night and concessions asked, but insurgents have no definite idea of what they want. Further conference to be held. If peace kept for few days more immediate danger will have passed.

The injunctions of His Excellency the President of the United States to exert ourselves to preserve the peace had an excellent effect upon the command. Officers and men, confident of their ability to successfully meet the declared enemy, were restless under the restraints which had been imposed and were eager to avenge the insults received. Now they submit very quietly to the taunts and aggressive demonstrations of members of the insurgent army who continue to throng the streets of the business portions of the city.

Subsequent to January 5, and before the President's message had been received, I was approached by influential Filipino gentlemen (through an agent, an American citizen, they fearing that their individual safety would be endangered should they call in person) who expressed a strong desire for continued peace and an harmonious settlement of difficulties. They asked me to appoint a commission which could confer with one to be appointed by the Malolos government, with a view to working out a plan for the adjustment of the conflicting political interests of the parties concerned. Reply was made that the so-called Malolos government could not be officially recognized by word or act, but that I would gladly call a board of officers to confer with one which General Aguinaldo might appoint. The gentlemen made two or three hurried trips to Malolos, and on January 9 I received the following communication:

MALOLOS, January 9, 1899.

Maj. Gen. E. S. OTIS,

General of the American Forces of Occupation in Manila.


GENERAL: I have been informed after the interview between the commissioners of my government and Mr. Carman that there will be no inconvenience on your part in naming, as commanding general, representatives that will confer with those whom I will name for the same object.

Although it not being explained to me the reason why you could not treat with the commissioners of my government, I have the faculty for doing the same with those of the commanding general, "who can not be recognized." Nevertheless, for the sake of peace, I have considered it advisable to name, as "commanding general," a commission composed of the following gentlemen: Mr. Florentino Flores, Eufasio Flores, and Manuel Arguelles, that they may together represent me and arrive at an accord with those whom you will name, with the object of using such methods as will normalize the actual situation created by the attitude of your Government and troops.

If you will deign to attend to said commissioners and through these methods come to some understanding, "if only temporary," that will insure the peace and harmony among ourselves, the Filipino public would reach a grateful glory.

I am, yours, General, with the highest consideration, your most respected servant.

EMILIO AGUINALDO.



NORTH GATE OF MANILA.

Reply was at once made to Aguinaldo's peculiar letter, and was expressed in the following terms:

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS.

Manila, P. I., January 9, 1899.

General EMILIO AGUINALDO,

Commanding Revolutionary Forces, Malolos, P. I.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of to-day, and am much pleased at the action you have taken. I greatly regret that you have not a clear understanding of my position and motives, and trust that my explanation, assisted by the conference I have invited, will make them clear to you.

In my official capacity I am merely the agent of the United States Government to conduct its affairs under the limits which its constitution, laws, precedents, and specific instructions prescribe. I have not the authority to recognize any national or civil power not already formally recognized by my Government, unless specially authorized to do so by the instructions of the Executive of the United States. For this reason I was unable to receive officially the representatives of the revolutionary government, and endeavored to make that inability clear to the distinguished gentlemen with whom I had the pleasure to converse a few evenings since. You will bear witness that my course throughout my entire official connection with affairs here has been consistent, and it has pained me that I have not been able to receive and answer communications of the cabinet officers of the government at Malolos, fearing that I might be erroneously charged with lack of courtesy.

Permit me now briefly, General, to speak of the serious misunderstanding which exists between the Filipino people and the representatives of the United States Government, and which I hope that our commissioners, by a thorough discussion, may be able to dispel. I sincerely believe that all desire peace and harmony, and yet by the machinations of evil-disposed persons we have been influenced to think that we occupy the position of adversaries. The Filipinos appear to be of opinion that we meditate attack, while I am under the strict orders of the President of the United States to avoid conflict in every way possible. My troops, witnessing the earnestness, the comparatively disturbed and unfriendly attitude of the revolutionary troops, and many of the citizens of Manila, conclude that active hostilities have been determined upon, although it must be clearly within the comprehension of unprejudiced and reflecting minds that the welfare and happiness of the Filipino people depends upon the friendly protection of the United States. The hand of Spain was forced, and she has acknowledged before the whole world that all her claimed rights in this country have departed by due process of law. This treaty acknowledgment, with the conditions which accompany it, awaits ratification by the Senate of the United States; and the action of its Congress must also be secured before the Executive of that Government can proclaim a definite policy. That policy must conform to the will of the people of the United States expressed through its representatives in Congress. For that action the Filipino people should wait, at least, before severing the existing friendly relations. I am governed by a desire to further the interests of the Filipino people and shall continue to labor with that end in view. There shall be no conflict of forces if I am able to avoid it; and still I shall endeavor to maintain a position to meet all emergencies that may arise.

Permit me to subscribe myself, General, with the highest respect, your most obedient servant,

E. S. OTIS,

Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

The following order calling a board was thereupon issued, and the president of the same was directed to arrange for a meeting with the commission appointed by Aguinaldo as soon as practicable:

SPECIAL ORDERS, }
No. 9. }

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,

Manila, P. I., January 9, 1899.

[Extract.]

8. Brig. Gen. R. P. Hughes, U. S. V., Col. James F. Smith, First California Volunteers, Lieut. Col. E. H. Crowder, judge-advocate, U. S. Volunteers, are hereby appointed a commission to meet a commission of like number appointed by General Aguinaldo, and to confer with regard to the situation of affairs and to arrive at a mutual understanding of the intent, purposes, aim, and desires of the Filipino people and the people of the United States, that peace and harmonious relations between these respective peoples may be continued.

By command of Major-General Otis:

THOMAS H. BARRY,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

The representative boards engaged in joint conference on the evening of the day the order was issued, and had repeated and prolonged evening sessions, sometimes extending far into the night. Minutes of proceedings were kept and submitted, and the various extended arguments indulged in were duly reported to me after the adjournment of each special session. The board representing the insurgent interests could not give any satisfactory explanation of the qualified sovereignty, measure of protection, or specific autonomy which it thought should be vested in or enjoyed by the respective governments, nor present any practical plan for the solution of the vexed political problems which constantly arose in the progress of the discussion. It conceded the fact that the protection of the United States was essential to the integrity and welfare of the islands, but could not determine how that protection should be applied; certainly not to the extent of interference with internal affairs further than the collection of customs, possibly, from which source the United States might receive a compensation for the protection furnished. They begged for some tangible concessions from the United States Government—one which they could present to the people and which might serve to allay the excitement. Nothing could be accomplished without the sacrifice of some of the attributes of sovereignty, and certainly that could not be done by any existing authority.

Finally, the conferences became the object of insurgent suspicion, and of amusement to those who did not wish beneficial results. The newspapers announced that a peace commission was about to be sent from the United States, and it was observed that the volunteers were not being sent home as the newspapers announced had been ordered. What was the meaning of this commission when one was in session already and why were the regular regiments being dispatched from the United States? The United States authorities were merely endeavoring to gain time to place themselves in position to impose slavery on the Filipinos.

The members of the insurgent board inquired of our officers as to these matters. Upon the report of facts by General Hughes I informed him that I would address him an explanatory letter which he could present, if he chose, at the next and last conference, and accordingly sent him the following communication:

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., January 25, 1899.

Brigadier-General HUGHES,

Chairman of committee appointed to meet a committee appointed by General Aguinaldo to confer with regard to the situation of affairs and to arrive at a mutual understanding of the intent, purposes, aim, and desires of the Filipino people and the people of the United States.

SIR: I am informed that the Filipino people do not place confidence in our good intentions which they are seeking from this conference. The fact that the President has appointed a commission seems to have confirmed them in their impressions. It might be well, therefore, to give you a brief history of events having relation to these commissioners. They are as follows:

Early in December Admiral Dewey and myself received instructions from Washington to report the condition of affairs and offer suggestions. Upon December 7 Admiral Dewey telegraphed as follows:

"It is strongly urged that the President issue a proclamation defining the policy of the United States Government in the Philippine Islands and showing the inhabitants that it is our intention to interfere in the internal affairs of the Philippines as little as possible; that as they develop their capabilities of government their powers and privileges will be increased. That will allay the spirit of unrest. The Spanish soldiers should be expatriated as soon as possible; they are a source of discord and danger."

And the Admiral goes on to say that a force of several regiments raised from among the best insurgent troops and officered by the best of their leaders would do much to disarm opposition.

Upon this suggestion I think the proclamation was issued. Later Admiral Dewey cabled (I think sometime about the 1st of January, I am not aware of the date) that he thought the appointment of a commission by the President would be an excellent thing. On January 9 I was asked by the Washington authorities what I thought of the appointment of a commission to confer with the revolutionary authorities, and I replied that I thought it might do excellent work here. Before this date, early in January, I had been requested by prominent Filipinos to appoint a committee from my own command to meet a like committee to be appointed by General Aguinaldo. This was done on January 9, one day before receiving the Washington dispatch asking if I thought the appointment of a commission by the President would be advantageous. Hence, what might be styled the two commissions have no relationship whatever. The one of which you are president, sitting to ascertain the desires of the Filipinos and having no authority to grant concessions except by permission of the Washington authorities; the other commission, appointed from Washington, comes with full instructions from the President of the United States and empowered to act for him.

On January 16 I telegraphed to Washington as follows:

"Conditions improving; confidence of citizens returning; business active. Conference held Saturday; insurgents presented following statement, asking that it be cabled: 'Undersigned commissioners commander in chief of revolutionary army of these islands state to commissioners of General Otis that aspiration Filipino people is independence, with restrictions resulting from conditions which its government agree with American when latter agree to officially recognize the former.' No conclusion reached; another conference to-morrow evening. I understand insurgents wish qualified independence under United States protection."

To this dispatch no reply has been received.

Upon another matter, viz, the sending of regular troops here, the purpose of which has been greatly misunderstood, you may communicate the following dispatch, received on December 7:

"General Otis, *Manila*:

"The Secretary of War directs you to send Astor Battery home on first returning transport. If you can spare volunteers to take first returning ships, send them in the order of their arrival. Six regular regiments are in course of preparation to report to you. It is probable that part of them will sail direct from this coast by way of canal—thus to give you good transports available for service from San Francisco."

The meaning and intent of this dispatch was to return the volunteer troops as soon as possible and to send part back by the transports then in the harbor, if practicable. The Astor Battery was sent home, but I declined to send other volunteer troops at that time, as the revolutionary government had assumed a threatening attitude, notwithstanding our great desire for peace and harmony. The orders from Washington have not changed. I still have authority to return the volunteer troops, so that they can be discharged in the United States, by any returning vessels available, but I decline to return them as long as we are threatened with active hostilities. Under the articles of capitulation still prevailing with Spain, as there has been no ratification as yet of a treaty, I am obliged to hold Manila and its defenses, but no hostile act will be inaugurated by the United States troops.

Very sincerely yours,

E. S. OTIS,

Major-General, U. S. F., United States Military Governor.

The commissioners held their final joint conference, I think, on January 25. With the insurgent representatives it was one continued plea for some concession which would satisfy the people. One of them was a man of excellent legal ability, who had occupied an important judicial position at Cebu under the Spanish Government for a number of years. He had recently arrived in Manila, and on the invitation of Aguinaldo had visited Malolos. He was animated with a desire to restore harmonious relations, or at least to effect a temporary peace until the existing excitement could be allayed, when the people might listen to reason. He secured the appointment of Aguinaldo's board and was named thereon as the most important member, but he was so circumscribed by specific instructions that he could not accomplish anything. I charged him with playing a false part, basing the charge on a knowledge of his legal acquirements. He confessed that he was fully aware of the untenable position he occupied, and was powerless under

the circumstances. He was an adept at legal fiction and could discover pregnant both negative and positive in every international postulate. The appointment of the President's commission had caused so much speculation, both as to membership and object, that I desired to correct mistaken impressions and to take away further opportunity for deliberate falsehood, and knowing that this gentleman still held friendly relations with the Malolos authorities and desired to know the truth in the matter, I sent him the following unofficial letter:

MANILA, P. I., February 3, 1899.

HON. FLORENTINE TORRES, *Manila, P. I.*

MY DEAR SIR: I am in receipt of a Washington dispatch dated the 1st instant, which informs me that the gentlemen who expect to serve on the proposed commission on the part of the United States will reach Hongkong on the 21st of the month. They will probably arrive here about the 25th.

So many inaccuracies have been spread abroad concerning the identity of the gentlemen of the commission that I desire to make explanation. They are Messrs. Denby, Schurman, and Worcester. Respecting the first, he is doubtless well known as the late United States minister to China; the second is the president of Cornell University, one of the leading institutions of learning of the United States; the third is Professor Worcester, of the University of Michigan, also one of our leading educators and who has a personal acquaintance with the Philippines, he having spent some time here. He is a friend of Dr. Bourns, of our health board, who formerly made a tour of the Philippine Islands in the interest of science.

I am sure the reputation of these gentlemen will commend them to the Filipino people as men of probity, ability, and most humane sentiments, having at heart the interest of that people. Admiral Dewey and myself have also been placed on this commission—the Government following the policy pursued with reference to Cuba and Porto Rico. My own inclinations and desire are not to serve thereon, being simply a soldier, but I must obey the commands of my Government.

It is quite important that friendly relations be maintained in every way among all of us, and I am doing my utmost to that end. A great deal of friction has been caused by the action of troops, resulting, I am certain, from a misunderstanding of conditions. Our soldiers are frequently insulted and threatened within our own lines, but thus far have quietly submitted, obeying their instructions. If, however, these threatening demonstrations should proceed so far as to endanger life, I might not be able to hold them in check. I trust that the revolutionary authorities will exercise every endeavor to put a stop to demonstrations similar to those witnessed during the past two days.

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

E. S. OTIS.

A few days before the above letter was written and on January 26, I was surprised by the receipt of a letter from Aguinaldo because of the boldness with which he therein indicated his purpose to continue his assumptions and establish their correctness by the arbitrament of war. I cabled it in cipher to Washington in accordance with his request, as it contained such suggestive announcements of the course of conduct he was likely to pursue. The cablegram and my reply to the communication are as follows:

MANILA, P. I., January 27, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Washington:*

The following received:

"PHILIPPINE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT,
"Office of Secretary of Foreign Affairs.

"Maj. Gen. E. S. OTIS,

"Commander in Chief of the American Forces of Occupation in Manila:

"My government has promulgated the political constitution of the Philippine Republic, which is to day enthusiastically proclaimed by the people, because of its conviction that its duty is to interpret faithfully the aspirations of that people—a people making superhuman efforts to revindicate their sovereignty and their nationality before the civilized powers.

"To this end, of the governments to-day recognized and observed among cultured nations they have adopted the form of government most compatible with their aspirations, endeavoring to adjust their actions to the dictates of reason and of right, in order to demonstrate their aptitude for civil life.

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"And, taking the liberty to notify your excellency, I confidently hope that, doing justice to the Philippine people, you will be pleased to inform the Government of your nation that the desire of mine, upon being accorded official recognition, is to contribute to the best of its scanty ability to the establishment of a general peace.

"May God keep your excellency many years.

"EMILIO AGUINALDO.

[Seal of the revolutionary
government of the Philippines.]

"A. MAHINI.

"MALOLOS, January 23, 1899."

OTIS.

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
MANILA, P. I., January 27, 1899.

Gen. EMILIO AGUINALDO,
Commanding Philippine Revolutionary Forces, Malolos, P. I.

GENERAL: I have the honor to inform you that I received yesterday a communication dated the 23d instant, signed by you and purporting to be issued from the office of the secretary of foreign affairs of the "Philippine national government."

I am pleased to further inform you that a translation of that communication into the English language, as shown in the accompanying paper, has been cabled in full to the United States authorities at Washington.

I am, General, with great respect, your obedient servant,

E. S. OTIS,
Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

In the meantime General Miller's command was retained in the harbor of Iloilo. It continued to be greatly dissatisfied because it was not allowed to seize the city. The Fifty-first Iowa Volunteers had remained on its transport since leaving San Francisco, a period of more than seventy days. It was very necessary to disembark it for sanitary reasons, and any attempt to do so on the Panay coast or the adjacent small islands would have resulted in conflict with natives. It was directed to return to this harbor, where upon arrival it was placed at Cavite, relieving the Tennessee regiment, which was brought to this city. On January 20 General Miller wrote that it would be his aim "to maintain the existing conditions of friendly relations with these people," and continued:

The people here will follow the conditions in Luzon and will permit our military occupation of Iloilo as soon as ordered from the central government. Outwardly the best terms of friendship exist personally between us. I have informed them verbally that they could go on with their usual occupations, afloat and ashore, without interference from us; that seizures we made were necessities merely to enable us to get along from day to day and that nothing would be taken otherwise. They are satisfied apparently, believe me most implicitly, and everything is pleasant.

There were two or three matters outside of the enforced policy of nonmilitary action which greatly troubled General Miller. He had gone from Manila prepared to establish civil government and had with him his officers of the port and of customs. The merchant vessels entering and leaving Iloilo with subsistence and merchandise and plying their trade between that point, Manila, Singapore, and the Chinese coast, paying duty to the Iloilo insurgents in defiance of protest, became objects of suspicion, and their transaction enabled the avowed enemy to obtain food and reap revenue much to the detriment of our interests. The Spanish native military organizations which had been performing service in the south continued to be brought to Manila in spite of our repeated objections, on the plea that Spain could do nothing else with them, and it was difficult to see how she could. Those of them who were native of the central islands were sent to Panay, and those having former homes in Luzon were scattered

there, although we entertained the belief that they would be gathered to attack us.

To General Miller's complaint concerning the transactions of merchants and his request to be permitted to close the Iloilo port, or compel all traders to pay accustomed duties to his proper officers, he was instructed in communications of January 16 and 21 as follows:

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., January 16, 1899.

The COMMANDING GENERAL,
First Separate Brigade, Eighth Army Corps,
Iloilo, Island of Panay.

SIR: Replying to the letter of Captain Evans of January 13, forwarded by you on same date, I am directed to state that the case is well put by Captain Evans under the President's recent proclamation, except the President directs in that proclamation that all the ports in the actual possession of the land and naval forces of the United States will be open to the commerce of the world. The port of Iloilo is not in the actual possession of the United States forces, as they merely occupy the harbor.

The objections which present themselves to the course recommended by Captain Evans are:

1. Until the ratification of the treaty of peace the United States has not the legal right to occupy the port of Iloilo, except by the consent of Spain. Spanish authority over the southern islands of the Philippines remains intact until the treaty is ratified. If, however, Spain had turned over the port of Iloilo to the United States, then the question of legal right as between the United States and Spain would have been settled and the United States would then have succeeded to the rights of Spain in so far as the collection of duties is concerned. Spain did not turn it over to the United States authorities. Her action, viewed in the mildest light, was that of simple abandonment, for which she is responsible. As far as the United States are concerned, Spain, under a strict interpretation of international law, has still the right to enter that port and collect duties until that right is terminated by treaty ratification.

2. The closing of the port and the collection of duties on merchandise taken from the island would be an acknowledgment on our part that the self-constituted authorities at Iloilo stand in the position of belligerents or enemies of the United States, which position we do not recognize. They are (Spanish subjects really until the ratification of the treaty) recognized as a friendly community with whom we are at peace.

3. Should foreign vessels accept clearance papers from the Iloilo captain of the port, it would be difficult to understand the position in which they would place themselves. Undoubtedly such action would give rise to grave questions, possibly involving international complication; and should they seek to clear through your authorities after having acknowledged the insurgents at Iloilo by paying duties to them, then they would recognize either Spanish or insurgent authority at Iloilo and that of the United States in the harbor.

They probably would do everything that both the insurgent and United States authorities would demand of them and make under protest any payment which might be demanded. Conditions are so complicated that these headquarters do not feel at liberty to give positive instructions for your guidance, and they will be sought from Washington, which as soon as received will be transmitted to you.

In the meantime you will not make any demands on the merchants nor interfere by any overt act of force with the commerce of the port. It might be well to assert United States right to conduct the commerce of the port, but you can state that you have represented the case to the proper authorities and are waiting instructions. Any forcible act of detention or seizure might produce most unsatisfactory results.

I inclose your prepared communication intended for the British vice-consul. It is unobjectionable and should be sent to him.

Since writing the above I understand from Captain Montgomery, of the British navy, who has just returned from Iloilo, that he discussed all these matters with the Iloilo merchants, endeavoring to come to some arrangement which would be satisfactory to the United States. He reports that he advised the merchants and the English consul to give a promise in writing to pay duties in the future upon all goods now taken out to whomsoever they might be due after affairs had become adjusted.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS H. BARRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

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HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., January 21, 1899.

The COMMANDING GENERAL,
First Separate Brigade, Eighth Army Corps, Iloilo, Panay.

SIR: I am directed to inform you that there will be sent out to-day by steamer *St. Paul* to Iloilo a number of discharged native-Spanish troops, to wit, to the number of about 600. These discharged soldiers live in the southern islands, and it is thought that they will give less trouble if landed at Iloilo than if landed at other points. You will therefore please receive them at Iloilo or in the vicinity. The vessel transporting them, with its guard—a company of the First Tennessee Volunteers—will be directed by you to return immediately to this port.

In regard to the collection of duties on merchandise at Iloilo, you were informed that your suggestions on that subject, received through Colonel Potter, would be submitted to Washington for decision. They were so submitted, and the following cablegram has been received in response:

“WASHINGTON, January 19.

“OTIS, Manila:

“The President desires no forcible measures to be used for the present in collecting customs duties at Iloilo.

“CORBIN.”

You will therefore be guided by these instructions, which are in line with those sent you from these headquarters. Matters here remain in a very excited condition, and conflict with the insurgent troops is avoided only by the skillful supervision of officers. Please report the condition of affairs at Iloilo.

Very respectfully, yours,

THOMAS H. BARRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Still General Miller was greatly dissatisfied with his surroundings. He could not perform military service, nor could he conduct business affairs. He was kept watching and waiting under very unpleasant circumstances, which grew more irksome every passing day. On February 3, the day previous to the opening of actual hostilities at Manila, he wrote:

HDQRS. FIRST SEPARATE BRIGADE, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
ON BOARD TRANSPORT NEWPORT,
Iloilo Harbor, P. I., February 3, 1899.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Department of the Pacific, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to report the military situation here unchanged. The insurgents are reported to be placing another gun in position. This is outside and near the entrance to the fort, bearing on our ships.

The insurgents in town are to-day having a little trouble. Two companies in the main barracks demanded some pay and better food, and threatened to take up their arms and go back into the country if they were not paid. The row is not yet settled. Some \$15,000—export and import duty—have been received in the collector's office, and I presume the troops want a part of that.

Reports from the southern islands, Negros and Cebu, are to the effect that those people realize that they can not succeed with an independent government and want us to take possession.

I still feel that this place—Iloilo—ought to be captured. Such a step would deprive the insurgents of large receipts from customs, cripple their means to pay the soldiers, and arouse the people favorable to us in the southern islands to express more freely their true sentiments. I am well satisfied that a great proportion of the inhabitants of Panay, Negros, and Cebu are favorable to our occupation at once.

A large proportion of the supplies for the Iloilo people come from the American steamers from Manila, a trade which is carried on through the collector of the port of Manila with the insurgents at Iloilo. Is there no way to stop this trade? Cutting off supplies in this way will help to bring these people to terms. I can't understand how such a business can be carried on against the best good of our country.

Very respectfully,

M. P. MILLER,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

During this period rapidly succeeding significant events were fast approaching a state of war and strongly indicated the fixed determination of the insurgent government to drive the United States from

Luzon as soon as it could gather its armed men in sufficient numbers. It had appropriated the railway, every engine, and most of its rolling stock. It was perfecting its intrenchments around us, planting its guns, concentrating its troops, and bringing up its army supplies, though still publicly asserting its desire for peace. With the cunning which it had always attempted to practice in its amateur diplomacy it endeavored to force the United States to commit the first physical act of hostility in the way of musketry fire, in order to appeal to the sympathies of the foreign public for a seemingly oppressed people, which it falsely claimed to represent. In this it signally failed. The knifing and attempted shooting of our picket sentries brought no hostile response, except the killing, by the intended victim, of the assassin who had so dexterously used the knife upon him. The excitement within the city was very noticeable, and the cruelty of the "Americano" was the theme. No one seemed to be possessed of any fixed determination but the Tagalo. All others were watching for new demonstrations and waiting for developments. Manila is unparalleled for diversity of race and babel of tongues; also for its grade of enlightenment from barbaric ignorance to the highest civilized stage. Rumors innumerable and of the most varied character filled the atmosphere. To-day attack was imminent, and to-morrow friendly councils were about to prevail. One fairly well acquainted with the scheming in progress and the trend of events could not reach any satisfactory conclusions on the probabilities of war, and to one unacquainted therewith sane conclusions were impossible. I endeavored to inform Admiral Dewey of the actual situation from day to day, and a few extracts from hastily dictated letters of that time will show how hard it was to formulate opinion. These brief extracts are also an index to swiftly recurring events. The following are furnished:

MANILA, P. I., January 16, 1899.

I have been too busy to write, but had there been anything special to communicate should have done so. The city is now very quiet and people are again appearing on the streets, seemingly confident that no immediate disturbances are likely to ensue.

Our conferences with General Aguinaldo's commissioners are still in progress. The commissioners had a long session on Saturday evening and meet again to-morrow evening. The conferences seem to have quieted the atmosphere very much. The Malolos congress on Saturday, I understand, disposed of some radical questions by vote. Indications are that the United States Government received favorable consideration. I do not look for anything to develop in the next few days, but we are obliged to keep up constant vigilance.

JANUARY 19, 1899.

* * * Everything remains quiet in the city. It is rumored this morning that insurgents say we are only trying to prolong our conference until we can receive more troops, and that the commission appointed, or to be appointed, by the President is only another ruse to gain time. Their army seems to be more or less excited and is considering the matter whether it would not be policy to destroy us all at once, before we can get any more soldiers. All this may be called street rumor, but it is very actively circulated. The insurgent army is becoming very tired of doing nothing and demands blood. Business is being transacted as usual; a good many people on the streets and quite a number returning again to town.

JANUARY 21, 1899.

I was very sorry when I learned yesterday that you had withdrawn the *Monterey* and *Concord*. I said last night that there was no immediate prospect of trouble. By that expression I meant that there would be no outbreak for a day or two. From my information this morning I am convinced that the insurgents intend to try their hand in a very short time—how soon I can not tell. They will not now permit us to cross their lines and have been very insulting to our officers, calling to them that very shortly that they would give us battle. My best information is that they have fully determined to attack both outside and within the city before our additional

troops arrive, and the least spark may start a conflagration. Your war vessels placed as formerly will not incite them to an attack, but will add to their fears of success in case they begin it. They are no longer amenable to reason; the lower elements have gained control and their congress is powerless to manage them. The best Filipinos in the city say that they are going to attack the city, and that they will do it very soon, entertaining the insane idea that they can drive us out. Should they attack, the fight will be over before your vessels can reach the points where they were formerly placed.

I am sending out to-day for Iloilo a transport with 600 discharged native Spanish soldiers who live in the southern islands, and am trying to get rid of about 1,500 of these native troops whose homes are in Luzon. They are all insurgents now and give us trouble in the city.

JANUARY 23, 1899.

* * * No exciting developments this morning. Another conference was held yesterday between Aguinaldo's and our representatives, resulting in very little. It was adjourned until next Wednesday. Aguinaldo is insisting upon the recognition of independence and the return of the *Abbie* and the launches. I understand that the Malolos congress passed the proposed constitution with the clause inserted which Mabini insisted on, viz, "Placing the power in the hands of Aguinaldo to declare war."

The city is very quiet. Yesterday we got rid of 276 of the discharged Spanish-native troops, sending them down the bay. We have still remaining 315 of the Macabebes who are afraid to go out of Manila, and about 300 other natives who want to stay here.

I had a long talk with General Rios yesterday. He says that there are 24 officers, with servants, on his vessel, and considerable money, which he would like to have remain there, and 71 passengers, besides the soldiers and crew; that the officers belong to organizations which have been disbanded, and that they came here with their families and property with the intention of going back to Spain by first available transport at their own expense, and he does not want the soldiers or troops to land. I have directed the captain of the port to land the officers and passengers and to keep the vessel in the harbor. * * * Nothing this morning from Washington. The dispatch of yesterday directed me to make strenuous efforts to have insurgents release Spanish prisoners whom they hold. I replied that my influence was not great at present, and that I had made such an effort to release the Spanish priests that I was now accused of being in partnership with the archbishop.

JANUARY 24, 1899.

Things look a little ominous to-day. You have undoubtedly seen in the papers an account of yesterday's affairs at Malolos, viz: The proclaiming of the constitution, the proclaiming of Aguinaldo as president, captain-general, and everything else, and the speech delivered by Paterno, in which he announced that they would drive the invader from the soil. Everything points to their determination to attack us, if they can persuade themselves that they can do so successfully, before the regular regiments arrive. This is confirmed in a great many ways and I am sure it is the policy on which they are at present proceeding. They may succeed in burning a portion of the town, but little else, I imagine.

JANUARY 25, 1899.

I am in receipt of your letter of this morning. I do not consider that the war is over for the present. The insurgents would attack at once if they could be convinced that their efforts would meet with success. The leading Filipinos of the city are afraid to come near me and are in a very excited condition. They know the dangers of an outbreak at any moment, and we are holding all troops well in hand constantly. The business men of all nationalities are intently watching developments. The revolutionary government seems to be in the ascendancy, and our former Filipino friends who favored annexation a short time ago are, for personal safety, giving a sort of adherence to the Malolos government. All this I fully know, and a great deal more which I can tell you first opportunity, but which it would not be prudent to write.

The Cavite Filipinos went out to join the insurgent ranks during the inspection and review in that zone by their secretary of war—at least so I think—and they can quickly go back to the ranks at any time they may be called upon to do so.

FEBRUARY 3, 1899.

One of the * * * launches arrived yesterday, cleared from Hongkong; she is one of the three of which * * * wrote, and concerning which I reported that from information received here that I was quite certain was about to bring arms. Upon arrival here her cargo tallied with her manifest and she was apparently all right. * * *

The officer in charge explained that she was about two days late in arriving, owing to bad weather, which compelled her to lie off the coast. These two days gave her time to run to the coast and discharge.

Yesterday afternoon General MacArthur, whose troops north of the Pasig have experienced trouble with the insurgents who have passed over his lines, sent Major Strong, his adjutant-general, out to the officer in command to demand an explanation. Strong, on passing our lines, was placed under a strong insurgent guard and taken to Mandaloyan, a point on the Pasig across the San Juan River. There he found the officer in charge and quite a considerable insurgent force taking from several boxes a quantity of new revolvers and Mauser rifles which had just been received. Spanish prisoners were there (the Spanish prisoners whom the insurgents hold) putting the parts of the rifles together and making them ready for distribution.

There has been a great deal of friction along the lines the past two days, and we will be unable to tamely submit to the insulting conduct and threatening demonstrations of these insurgents much longer. I am informed, however, that the chief men of the insurgent government desire to avoid any conflict at present; possibly for the reason that they are expecting to receive arms very soon, possibly because they fear they may not be successful at the present time, and possibly because they may have a belief that they can secure what they desire without conflict. They are constantly asking me to make concessions, that they may be able to control their troops. They have seized a number of our men, and some, I think, inside our lines. Yesterday I sent Lieutenant Haan, of the Engineer Corps, to Malolos to secure the release of the men; he did not return last evening, but telegraphed me from Malolos that he would explain his delay on his return, which he intimated would be to-day.

The city is quiet, though there is a vast amount of underlying excitement. We are constantly losing our employees. Yesterday seven of our men at our Malacanan quarters left us suddenly to join the insurgents, so we are now very short-handed. They stole and took with them whatever they could find of value, one of them driving out of the lines Colonel Barry's carriage, which we consider lost property.

Notwithstanding these ominous signs, unremitting exertions were continually being made for a satisfactory solution of affairs. On the 11th of January I had sent my adjutant-general, Colonel Barry, to Malolos, directing him to bear a written message to Aguinaldo, procure a personal interview with him if possible, acquaint him fully with the efforts we were making to preserve the peace, and impress upon him the necessity for more conservative action on the part of his troops. At this time a visit by an officer at the insurgent capital was not considered an agreeable pastime, as he was liable to receive gross insults. Colonel Barry, however, met with little difficulty, presented himself at Aguinaldo's headquarters, and requested of his secretary permission to pay his respects in person, stating that he was the bearer of an important communication concerning which General Otis desired him to confer with the general. Aguinaldo's secretary received the letter, stating that he would present it and make known General Otis's request. Soon after he returned, conveying General Aguinaldo's regrets that press of business did not permit him to accord the personal interview requested, and the colonel was referred to President Mabini, of the cabinet. Mabini received him graciously, and quite a lengthy interview followed. Mabini assured him, in substance, that the insurgent government had exerted itself to maintain friendly relations with the Americans; had thus far succeeded; that it would continue to make exertion to this end, but that it could not control its people beyond a certain point, as they were greatly excited; that his government would do all in its power to effect an amicable adjustment of pending difficulties. The communication which Colonel Barry presented was the one of January 9, in response to Aguinaldo's letter of that date, in which he announced the appointment of the insurgent commission and which appears on a former page.

I will now quote from my report to the Adjutant-General of the Army of April 6, in which I submitted a statement of the services of our

troops during February, and endeavored to present succinctly the more important actions with resulting causes from which war ensued:

During the latter part of January the insurgents along their established lines and within the city exhibited increased aggressiveness, assuming a defiant attitude, so much so that our troops were gathered well in hand to meet any demonstrations which might be attempted. Insurgent armed parties entered far within our lines and defied our troops to resist their approaches. To arrest these proceedings, our officers, and citizens of Manila connected with the insurgent government, were sent to insurgent general officers at various places along their lines to request that they keep their men in check, which the latter invariably promised to do, paying, however, little heed to their promises. On February 1 a small detachment belonging to our engineer company was arrested within our territory and sent to Malolos. This act brought on the following correspondence:

"HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
"Manila, P. I., February 2, 1899.

"General EMILIO AGUINALDO,
"Commanding Filipino Revolutionary Forces, Malolos.

"GENERAL: I have the honor to inform you that a small party of engineers, consisting of a sergeant and four privates, who are engaged in making surveys for the completion of the map of Manila, which the Engineer Corps is now busy in perfecting, has been missing for two or three days and is reported to be confined in Malolos. The detachment was sent out to do work within the city, with directions to confine itself to the city and suburban lines. Why they were arrested I do not understand, nor can I imagine for what reason they are held at Malolos. I am also informed that a citizen connected with Harper's Weekly, newspaper, of New York, engaged in taking views for that paper, has also been arrested and held as a prisoner. I know nothing of this except from report, nor do I know who the man is. I am also informed that a private soldier who went beyond the lines without authority, and for what motive I do not know, is also held as a prisoner.

"I send my staff officer, Lieutenant Haan, of the Engineer Corps, to make inquiries and request your action in this matter.

"I am doing everything possible to preserve the peace and avoid all friction until the Filipino people can be made fully acquainted with the sentiments and intentions of the American Government, when I am confident they will appreciate the endeavors of the United States and will again look upon that country as their friend and protector. I also fully believe that the present unrest is the result of the machinations of evil-disposed persons.

"I am, General, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

"E. S. OTIS,
"Major-General, U. S. A., Commanding."

"MALOLOS, February 4, 1899.

"Major-General OTIS,

"Chief of the Forces of Occupation of Manila and Cavite.

"GENERAL: In reply to your letter of February 2, I have the honor to state that the sergeant and four American soldiers of the Engineer Corps, to-day liberated, were detained within our territory, beyond our advanced lines on Solis street, examining our intrenchments and defenses at a distance of less than 200 meters.

"The said individuals carried a revolver, knives, a compass, plans of Manila and its suburbs, a book with topographical notes, a measuring tape, a machete, two penknives, scales, etc.

"I deeply regret that these soldiers have been taken within our lines, according to the testimony of our officers' witnesses of our detention, inasmuch as there exists a decree, dated October 20, which prohibits all foreigners from approaching our defensive works, taking photographic views of the same, drawing plans, or entering our territory with arms, although free transit is permitted all who are unarmed.

"The correspondent of Harper's Weekly was arrested in San Juan del Monte taking photographic views, and the proof of this is that in care of Colonel Miguel he has been sent his camera and his horse.

"I must state that in consideration of the friendship of the Filipino people for the Americans the said soldiers have not been imprisoned, but detained in accordance with the spirit of the decree of October 20 last. They have been lodged in the Gobierno Militar and have been issued the daily rations of our officers. If they have been uncomfortable it is due to the excessive sobriety of our race and soldiers, who are accustomed to eat but little and sleep on the hard ground.

"With these explanations I believe, General, you will understand the motive for the detention of your soldiers to-day liberated and who have been treated with all due consideration.

"I therefore hope that your determination may be another motive on which to base our friendly relations with the great American Republic, and in consideration of this I also decree the liberty of the correspondent referred to.

"I am, General, as ever, your obedient servant,

"EMILIO AGUINALDO."

It will be observed that the insurgent government insisted that this engineer party was arrested outside of our small field of operations, which I am confident was not the fact, but the correspondence is given to show the efforts of the American authorities to sustain the peace. During all this time our officers and men were insulted and openly proclaimed to be cowards; our outposts were attacked at night, and the impression became general that the insurgents, notwithstanding our efforts, would indulge soon in open attack, in the belief apparently entertained by them that they would meet with feeble resistance. During the entire month of January they had labored incessantly to strongly intrench their lines and place their artillery in position, and boasted freely of their intentions to soon drive the American forces out of Manila. On the night of February 2 they sent in a strong detachment to draw the fire of our outposts, which took up a position immediately in front and within a few yards of the same. The outpost was strengthened by a few of our men, who silently bore their taunts and abuse the entire night. This was reported to me by General MacArthur, whom I directed to communicate with the officer in command of the insurgent troops concerned. His prepared letter was shown me and approved, and the reply received (both papers found in General MacArthur's accompanying report) was all that could be desired. However, the agreement was ignored by the insurgents, and on the evening of February 4 another demonstration was made on one of our small outposts, which occupied a retired position at least 150 yards within the line which had been mutually agreed upon—an insurgent approaching the picket and refusing to halt or answer when challenged. The result was that our picket discharged his piece, when the insurgent troops near Santa Mesa opened a spirited fire on our troops there stationed.

The insurgent had thus succeeded in drawing the fire of a small outpost, which they had evidently labored with all their ingenuity to accomplish, in order to justify in some way their premeditated attack. It is not believed that the chief insurgent leaders wished to open hostilities at this time, as they were not completely prepared to assume the initiative. They desired two or three days more to perfect their arrangements, but the zeal of their army brought on the crisis which anticipated their premeditated action. They could not have delayed long, however, for it was their object to force an issue before American troops, then en route, could arrive in Manila.

We now take up for review the more important affairs of the second period of the year which this directed report must present—the period extending from February 4, 1899, to the present date.

The returns of the United States troops rendered on January 31 gave a numerical strength present in the Philippines of 819 commissioned officers and 20,032 enlisted men. Of these, 77 officers and 2,338 enlisted men were absent in Cavite and at Iloilo Harbor. These numbers included all officers and enlisted men belonging to the line or attached to staff corps, a good many of whom had been detached for

service in the various branches of civil administration which had been inaugurated or reestablished. On February 2 I cabled to Washington that the deaths in all organizations since their arrival in the islands numbered 220, of which 41 were due to the casualties of battle and accident, that 64 had been caused by typhoid fever, 43 by smallpox, 22 by dysentery, 8 by malarial fevers, and the others were due to various diseases; that the prevalence of smallpox caused apprehension, but that the entire command had been vaccinated several times, and 12 physicians, mostly resident, had been engaged several weeks in vaccinating natives; that 9 per cent of the command was then reported sick, but that the great majority of all ailments were slight in character. Subtracting from the entire numerical strength of all troops present in the islands, those at Cavite and Iloilo, the sick, those serving in the civil departments, and those belonging strictly to and doing duty in the staff organizations, the effective men of the line, officers and soldiers, were about 14,000. Of these, 3,000 belonged to the provost guard and were expected to check the demonstrations of the natives and preserve order within Manila. The troops were occupying a great many buildings located in the various parts of the city, and it was the declared intention of the secret hostile organizations in our midst to burn them as soon as our troops should be called to the lines of defense determined upon in order to resist the insurgent attack from without, as well as to destroy by fire the more important business sections. For this purpose they had provided themselves with a considerable quantity of kerosene oil, some of which had previously been seized or confiscated. It was necessary, therefore, to detail an efficient permanent guard to protect each barrack building, which was made up partially of special-duty men. And it might be remarked here that a curious feature of the insurgent plan of making war, which its soldiers invariably practiced for two months after active hostilities commenced, was to burn property indiscriminately, following Russia's example during Napoleon's advance on Moscow, of which they had heard, or Spain's practice in the islands when the natives were considered to deserve chastisement.

After estimating the necessities for the proper protection of the city, it was ascertained that we had about 10,000 men available with whom to meet Aguinaldo's concentrated army, variously estimated at from twenty to thirty thousand, but we had the interior of the circumscribed half circle which was occupied by his troops—his flanks resting on Manila Bay north and south of the city and about 5 miles distant from each other, and his center about 4 miles east of the walled town, cut by the Pasig River. The river was not fordable and there were no means of crossing it, except by small boats, hence insurgent troops of one wing could not give support to the other in order to meet any emergency of battle which might arise. We therefore had no fear for results in so far as the efforts of the encircling force were concerned. To a Washington dispatch of inquiry received about February 1, I replied that in case hostilities were forced upon us we could handle Aguinaldo's army, and only feared the burning of the city by the unfriendly partially organized portion of the inhabitants.

Several weeks previous to this date we had moved the Nebraska regiment from its barracks in the thickly-settled Binondo district to the high, unoccupied ground at Santa Mesa, the most eastern suburb of the city, where it was placed in camp. This change was made for sanitary reasons solely, as the regiment had been suffering from a very high rate of sickness caused by unhealthy locality. The new location

was within the view and the range of the Mauser rifles of the insurgents along the San Juan River portion of their line. During the latter part of January I was informed by good Filipino authority that the insurgents meditated an attack on these troops and was advised to remove them or, in their exposed place, the insurgents would kill them all. General MacArthur, who commanded north of the Pasig, warned Colonel Stotsenburg, who commanded that regiment and camp, and placed 2 guns of the Utah Artillery in position a short distance removed therefrom. It was expected that insurgents would make the initiative at this point and they acted strictly in accordance with our anticipations.

General Aguinaldo was now at the zenith of his power. He had recently repressed rebellion which had raised its head in central Luzon. He had assembled a pliant congress, many members of which had been appointed by him to represent far distant congressional districts, and which had voted him the dictator of the lives and fortunes of all the inhabitants of the Philippines. He dominated Manila, and when he ordered that the birthday of the martyred Rizal should be appropriately observed there, business was paralyzed and not a native dared to pursue his accustomed daily labors. Not a province had the courage to oppose his appointed governors, backed by their Tagalo guards, although a few of those governors had previously suffered martyrdom for the zeal exhibited in collecting money and sequestering private property. The southern islands were obedient. The appointed governor for one, and that one not eager for independence, wrote in January:

To the Honorable President of the Revolutionary Government of the Philippines

HONORABLE SIR: This government has received the respected communication from the presidency under your command, ordering that under no pretext whatever are American or other foreign troops to be permitted to land on this island, which order it will be my pleasant duty to comply with as far as the scanty forces under my command will permit. I have, under to-day's date, ordered the officials under my command in charge of the towns of this province to follow the same instructions, under pain of the most severe penalties.

I have the honor to reply as above to the communication before cited.

God guard you for many years for our liberty and independence.

He was hailed from Europe as the savior of his country and as first of "the generous and noble Tagalo people," and was assured of "the sympathy of all liberal and noble nations." He was called upon to take a prominent part in United States politics, and those extending the invitation said:

President AGUINALDO.

DEAR SIR: In the interest and welfare of the Filipino Republic, I take the liberty to write you regarding an educational work to be published in this country representing the views of the antiexpansion party, or the people who wish to see a free and independent Philippine republic.

The object of this work is to increase public sentiment against annexation of the Philippines. Therefore, believing that some facts from the pen of your honor would strengthen the cause, I am authorized to ask certain questions.

First. Will you kindly state the per cent of those who wish annexation to the United States, if such there be?

Second. Will the natives take constant interest in political affairs under self-government?

Third. Are they upon recognition ready to drop their arms and enter upon an enterprising industrial life?

After answering these questions, a short article regarding the Philippine feeling toward this country and their wished-for independence will be appreciated, and I am confident will very materially strengthen this cause in the election to decide the policy of our country.

Hoping your sincere love for your people will insure an immediate reply, I remain,

Very respectfully,

He was confident that the great majority of the people of the United States justified him in his rebellion, and as for its soldiers whom he had shut up in Manila, many sympathized with his people in their struggle for independence and would not fight him. To an unbeliever in this last conviction he said, "Go to the lines at Santa Ana and be convinced," and the man went and pretended to believe. The encouragements and friendly advice he received from foreign parts through newspapers and communications from admirers, absent delegates, and representatives assured him of an easy solution of the war problem before him if he could strike while only a few volunteers confronted him and before the regulars then en route could arrive. He therefore confidently concentrated his well armed and ammunitioned forces to man the holes his troops had been weeks in digging and where they would be secure from attack in any event, even if success did not attend his efforts to slaughter the Americans or drive them into the waters of the bay. These preparations consummated, he prepared the outlines of his declaration of war, the full text of which was published at Malolos on the evening and very shortly after his hostile shots were first responded to by our troops, and without considering cause or intent. The longed-for opportunity had arrived and he hastened to embrace it. The declaration was circulated in Manila the next morning, and read as follows:

GENERAL ORDER TO THE PHILIPPINE ARMY.

Nine o'clock p. m., this date, I received from Caloocan station a message communicated to me that the American forces, without prior notification or any just motive, attacked our camp at San Juan del Monte and our forces garrisoning the blockhouses around the outskirts of Manila, causing losses among our soldiers, who in view of this unexpected aggression and of the decided attack of the aggressors, were obliged to defend themselves until the firing became general all along the line.

No one can deplore more than I this rupture of hostilities. I have a clear conscience that I have endeavored to avoid it at all costs, using all my efforts to preserve friendship with the army of occupation, even at the cost of not a few humiliations and many sacrificed rights.

But it is my unavoidable duty to maintain the integrity of the national honor and that of the army so unjustly attacked by those who, posing as our friends and liberators, attempted to dominate us in place of the Spaniards, as is shown by the grievances enumerated in my manifest of January 8 last; such as the continued outrages and violent exactions committed against the people of Manila, the useless conferences, and all my frustrated efforts in favor of peace and concord.

Summoned by this unexpected provocation, urged by the duties imposed upon me by honor and patriotism and for the defense of the nation intrusted to me, calling on God as a witness of my good faith and the uprightness of my intentions—

I order and command:

1. Peace and friendly relations between the Philippine forces and the American forces of occupation are broken, and the latter will be treated as enemies, with the limits prescribed by the laws of war.

2. American soldiers who may be captured by the Philippine forces will be treated as prisoners of war.

3. This proclamation shall be communicated to the accredited consuls of Manila, and to congress, in order that it may accord the suspension of the constitutional guarantees and the resulting declaration of war.

Given at Malolos February 4, 1899.

EMILIO AGUINALDO,
General-in-Chief.

TO THE PHILIPPINE PEOPLE.

By my proclamation of yesterday I have published the outbreak of hostilities between the Philippine forces and the American forces of occupation in Manila, unjustly and unexpectedly provoked by the latter.

In my manifest of January 8 last I published the grievances suffered by the Philippine forces at the hands of the army of occupation. The constant outrages and taunts, which have caused the misery of the people of Manila, and, finally, the

useless conferences and the contempt shown the Philippine government prove the premeditated transgression of justice and liberty.

I know that war has always produced great losses; I know that the Philippine people have not yet recovered from past losses and are not in the condition to endure others. But I also know by experience how bitter is slavery, and by experience I know that we should sacrifice all on the altar of our honor and of the national integrity so unjustly attacked.

I have tried to avoid, as far as it has been possible for me to do so, armed conflict, in my endeavors to assure our independence by pacific means and to avoid more costly sacrifices. But all my efforts have been useless against the measureless pride of the American Government and of its representatives in these islands, who have treated me as a rebel because I defend the sacred interests of my country and do not make myself an instrument of their dastardly intentions.

Past campaigns will have convinced you that the people are strong when they wish to be so. Without arms we have driven from our beloved country our ancient masters, and without arms we can repulse the foreign invasion as long as we wish to do so. Providence always has means in reserve and prompt help for the weak in order that they may not be annihilated by the strong; that justice may be done and humanity progress.

Be not discouraged. Our independence has been watered by the generous blood of our martyrs. Blood which may be shed in the future will strengthen it. Nature has never despised generous sacrifices.

But remember that in order that our efforts may not be wasted, that our vows may be listened to, that our ends may be gained, it is indispensable that we adjust our actions to the rules of law and of right, learning to triumph over our enemies and to conquer our own evil passions.

EMILIO AGUINALDO,
President of the Philippine Republic.

MALOLO, February 5, 1899.

The battle of Manila, which commenced at half past 8 o'clock on the evening of February 4, continued until 5 the next evening. Its details were fully reported on April 6 last, and it is not necessary to present them anew. I insert a short extract from that report to show the determination of the insurgents to provoke conflict:

During the entire month of January they had labored incessantly to strongly intrench their lines and place their artillery in position. * * * On the night of February 2 they sent in a strong detachment to draw the fire of our outpost, which took up a position immediately in front of and within a few yards of the same. The outpost was strengthened by a few men, who silently bore the detachment's taunts and abuse the entire night. This was reported to me by General MacArthur, whom I directed to communicate with the officer in command of the insurgent troops concerned. His prepared letter was shown me and approved, and the reply received (both papers found in General MacArthur's accompanying report) was all that could be desired. However, the agreement entered into was ignored by the insurgents, and on the evening of February 4 another demonstration was made on one of our small outposts, which occupied a retired position, at least 150 yards within the line which had been mutually agreed upon, an insurgent approaching the picket and refusing to halt or answer when challenged. The result was our picket discharged his piece, when the insurgent troops near Santa Mesa opened a spirited fire on our troops there stationed.

The engagement was one strictly defensive on the part of the insurgents and of vigorous attack by our forces, although during the night it was confined to an exchange of fire between the opposing lines on the north from the Pasig River to the Lico road, a distance of about 2 miles, with an occasional shot on the south in the vicinity of Paco, and a few straggling shots on the extreme left in the direction of Caloocan. Admiral Dewey had placed two vessels a short distance off shore to the north and one to the south of our flanks, where they rested on Manila Bay, and shortly after daybreak on the morning of the 5th I telegraphed him: "Heavy firing all along our north front at midnight and at 4 a. m. Casual firing at Paco. Several casualties in Tondo district. *Charleston* and *Callao* could give efficient aid in that vicinity," and at 6.50 a. m. I wired him that "firing continues; few casualties; a sharp raking fire of one-half hour just to north of blockhouse on Vitas

Pass would reach insurgent line and demoralize them." This was effected, and the *Monadnock* on the south was also doing good service. At midnight General Anderson, who commanded all troops south of the Pasig, consisting of King's and Ovenshine's brigades, was directed to hold them in readiness to receive a morning attack, but not to attack until further instructed. Our immediate interests lay to the northeast and comprised the pumping station and deposito of the waterworks, which it was necessary to secure, although we had provided for their loss, in so far as the army was concerned, by erecting a number of distilling plants along the river banks, by which good water could be obtained. Stotsenburg had attacked early in the morning, drove the enemy from the blockhouses in his front, and reported that he could capture the powder magazine and waterworks (deposito meaning, though pumping station understood at the time) if desired. MacArthur had been pressing back the enemy in his entire front, inflicting heavy loss. He had called for troops to fill gap on Stotsenburg's left, and a battalion of the First Tennessee Regiment of the provost guard, under the command of its colonel, was sent him, and the following correspondence by telegraph ensued:

General MACARTHUR: Stotsenburg reports: "Have captured blockhouses 6 and 7; burned 6. Can capture powder magazine and waterworks if desired." Battalion First Tennessee has passed to report to you. Let Stotsenburg go ahead with aid of Tennessee, if conditions permit, and capture magazine. Waterworks must wait. Not prudent to advance small force so far out.

OTIS.

General OTIS: Am making inquiries at various parts of line to determine expediency of moving Stotsenburg as you suggest, so as to extend entire line from Maraquina to Caloocan. Stotsenburg's success on right may have induced them to retire on the left. This I am now trying to ascertain. Do you approve of this movement if I find it expedient?

MACARTHUR.

General MACARTHUR: Do not think extension of our line from Maraquina to Caloocan prudent. Our flank would be greatly exposed at Maraquina. You had all your available troops under arms all night, and portion of them must have rest and sleep, so that you could not place more than 3,000 men on line permanently. I think Stotsenburg meant reservoir and not waterworks.

OTIS.

The Nebraska regiment and Tennessee battalion advanced rapidly during the morning and captured the powder house and deposito, and the South Dakota regiment on the left drove the enemy from all their intrenchments as far to the westward as the Lico road, and about noon the following telegram was sent to General MacArthur:

Reported that insurgent troops were arriving all night and this morning for service in your front. Think line you suggest from coast to Chinese Hospital your proper one, not permitting Stotsenburg to expose your right flank unnecessarily.

The insurgents had firm possession of the railway and all of its rolling stock, and were utilizing it to the best advantage in forwarding to Caloocan its troops from the north. To my dispatch General MacArthur replied as follows:

Have your dispatch. Will act accordingly and try and occupy Chinese Hospital and extend the line to the left from that point. We have everything now to include blockhouse 4, and I have no doubt when Colonel Kessler gets a gun, which I have sent to the front, we will demolish and occupy the hospital if it is still defended by the insurgents. At 11.20 a. m. Stotsenburg is crossing San Juan River at the bridge; have authorized him to proceed according to your advice, but to be prudent and not go too far, as the left of the insurgent line still holding on, or at all events not yet occupied by us.

This line was established during the afternoon, and General MacArthur had little to contend with for the remainder of the day, his chief difficulty thereafter coming from the rear, from which an occasional hostile shot was fired, and in the evening he telegraphed he had everything at the front with the exception of two companies of the Montana, and continued: "If you will look at the map you will see that my line extends from a point opposite San Pedro Macati to the bay. It will hardly be possible to bring anybody in to-night, as new demands may arise. I suggest, but do not request, that a battalion be sent here for an extraordinary reserve, to be placed along the Lico road to Calle Iris."

Two companies were borrowed from the provost guard and placed as requested.

The troops of General Anderson became eager to attack the enemy early on the morning of the 5th, and at 7.48 o'clock a. m. permission was granted, the general being cautioned: Do not advance too far, and look out for your flanks and the *Monadnock*."

General King had asked to swing his brigade, the left of which rested on the Pasig near Santa Ana, to the left, thereby driving the enemy in his front to the river, where he would have him at his mercy. This was authorized and the Californias, Washingtons, and Idahos responding with great vigor, the movement was attended with signal success. The insurgent casualties here were very heavy and many were drowned in the Pasig, having attempted to cross it to escape punishment. Meanwhile the right of Anderson's line, which was confronted by an almost impenetrable thicket, was meeting with serious difficulties. It had driven the insurgents from their intrenchments on the extreme right, but at the center in the jungle and swamp they held on with great tenacity. This position was pressed by a portion of the Fourteenth Infantry, under Captain Murphy, and Wheeler's troop of the Fourth Cavalry, which advanced slowly, shooting the insurgents in their formidable intrenchments, which they had constructed therein, as they refused to yield. At 11 o'clock a. m. I telegraphed General Anderson as follows:

Establish your final line from coast opposite Pasay to San Pedro Macati. This gives you a short line and command of all the roads leading to the north and a fairly open country. You can undertake it as soon as Murphy overcomes difficulty in his front. The North Dakotas can advance along coast of bay near Pasay. You can attend to all this as soon as you are sure of capturing San Pedro Macati.

And I thereupon telegraphed Admiral Dewey as follows:

Have directed Anderson to establish southern line between Pasay and San Pedro Macati on Pasig. He will move down as soon as he has full possession of San Pedro Macati, which will soon fall into his hands. Will you keep vessel to the front to assist advance down coast?

General Anderson seemed doubtful if his troops could obtain possession of the indicated line (the Pasay and San Pedro Macati road) that afternoon on account of the difficulty experienced at his center. He had telegraphed from Battery Kuoll, right of Paco bridge, at 12.30 p. m.:

King has taken Santa Ana; 200 prisoners. Many Filipinos reported killed. Our loss unknown; believed not to be heavy. Owenshine has cleared his front on his right, driving them back to our old intrenchments. Captain Murphy said to have advanced to blockhouse 14, but insurgents still hold flanking position on his right. Have sent down one gun which has opened on them, but do not know with what results. Firing still continues. Last seen of Smith (colonel of California regiment, meaning) was advancing on the right with two battalions and entering San Pedro Macati. Prevent insurgent reinforcements crossing river,

And later he telegraphed from Paco bridge as follows:

Major-General Anderson presents his compliments and says that he has sent all available troops to rout insurgents on Captain Murphy's flank, but that present force is inadequate to accomplish this. He requests that he be reenforced with a battalion from General Hughes's command, and with these he is confident he can drive insurgents out.

Another battalion of the Tennessee regiment was borrowed from the provost-marshal and was conducted by my aid, Captain Sanders, to the center of this line, but did not arrive until the ground had been carried.

I had sent Lieutenant-Colonels Crowder and Potter to make known to General Anderson the particulars of the movement desired, and finally, fearing that some misunderstanding might result, explained to Lieutenant-Colonel Barry, my adjutant-general, all particulars, making careful reference to the map, and dispatched him to confer with General Ovenshine. He went direct to that officer, whose troops on the right of the line had returned to the original position of the morning, fearing the shells from the guns of the *Monadnock*, which struck uncomfortably near. When Colonel Barry explained fully to him what was expected of his troops, he at once took up the advance, swinging a part of his line to the left, attacking the enemy in the flank—whom he soon routed and drove beyond the range of fire—and placed his entire line firmly on the Pasay road.

At 4.30 o'clock Colonel Barry telegraphed me as follows:

Have just returned from the fight in front of Murphy's position. Insurgents driven out in sharp fight when General Ovenshine advanced toward Pasay. Little loss to our forces, but insurgents badly handled. Many killed. Will see General Anderson, then return to Malacanan. Word has just been received that Ovenshine has taken Pasay without resistance. Anderson at San Pedro Macati. Will return to Malacanan.

At 4.45 I telegraphed General Anderson as follows:

First North Dakota, Fourteenth Infantry, and Fourth Cavalry on Pasay road. King must fall out and take position on that road to-night. That will be your permanent line. If you can spare Tennessee return it. May be trouble in Tondo and Binondo to-night. MacArthur's troops occupying position far in advance of this morning and all on the line.

During the night of February 4 and the following day the inhabitants of the city were greatly agitated, fearing for their personal safety. Streets were almost deserted, except by our troops. Two or three attempts were made to assemble by the secret military organizations, but were promptly checked by Brigadier-General Hughes, the provost-marshal-general, who had admirably placed and retained his force at the more important points. His action was quick and decisive. Early on the morning of the 5th his police companies so effectively delivered their fire upon these assembling organizations that they were dispersed and discouraged. Their loss in killed could not have exceeded 50 or 60, but they made no further very dangerous demonstrations until the night of February 23, when they suffered a severe experience for their temerity. At the close of the day on the 5th Admiral Dewey inquired concerning the situation, and was replied to as follows:

Situation satisfactory. On south we hold road from Pasay to San Pedro Macati. On the north we hold the water reservoir, San Juan del Monte, and all blockhouses. Country peaceful and city quiet. Troops fought magnificently. Insurgent dead between 500 and 1,000. Lots of prisoners and 2 Krupp guns captured. Insurgents demoralized. We owe you gratitude for your great aid.

Our casualties for the day in killed and wounded numbered about 250. Those of the insurgents will never be known. Our hospitals were filled with their wounded, our prisons with their captured, and

we buried 700 of them. Their loss was estimated at 3,000, and considering the number who died on the field of battle might be deemed conservative.

On February 6 it was ascertained that Colonel Smith, with his Californians, had not halted at San Pedro Macati, but had pursued the fleeing enemy up the Pasig River. No one seemed to know definitely his location, except that it was somewhere in the vicinity of the towns of Pasig, Pateros, or Taguig. He had gone on with 2 battalions of his regiment and occupied these villages, receiving the written surrender of the inhabitants. General Anderson was directed to withdraw him at once to the Pasay road, which he did not reach until the 8th of the month. The enemy took possession of the towns which he had evacuated upon his directed withdrawal and celebrated a victory. They had been collecting to the east of the town of Pasig and on the south, and there was danger that they would cut off Smith's retreat, in case he did not fall back without delay to his directed position.

A movement from the southern line was not considered advisable, as the bulk of insurgent troops were again concentrating on the north in the vicinity of Caloocan, and the short, admirable southern line which we had established was easily defended and could spare troops for any emergency at the north.

On the morning of the 6th our attention was given to the large number of partisans or bushwhackers, mostly in rear of our lines, who were continually firing from nipa huts or other places of concealment upon our passing transportation, messengers, and detachments. Nearly all the barrack guards had been forwarded to the front and the provost guard was widely dispersed on the outskirts of the city. In some instances it was necessary to resort to radical measures and destroy many of the nipa huts which, situated in the bamboo and banana thickets, gave protection to scattered insurgents who doubtless belonged to the interior organizations or city insurgent militia. The day was devoted to the removal of these dangerous and threatening obstacles and the burial of the dead. About noon Colonel Stotsenburg telegraphed from the Deposito, or water reservoir, the following:

General MacArthur instructs me to wire suggestions about waterworks. They should be taken and line of pipe occupied and guarded. I think I can do it from here and if necessary run the pumps, occupying the high ground in rear, and connecting with the left of the First Division at San Pedro Macati. My command consists of the First Nebraska, Tennessee battalion, the 2 companies of the Colorado regiment, and 4 pieces of artillery. There is no engineer at the waterworks and no coal. I do not think we shall find any difficulty between here and there.

Stotsenburg's command was augmented by a battalion of the Twenty third Infantry from the provost guard, under command of Major Goodale, and he was directed to proceed and carry out his plan. Later that evening I sent for General Hale, who commanded the right brigade of MacArthur's line, informing him that I had just received information that a part of Stotsenburg's command was in difficulty, having been attacked by insurgents, and that it was short of ammunition and without water. Hale at once proceeded to the Deposito and wired me that Stotsenburg upon leaving the waterworks had ordered Goodale to take his battalion out the Maraquina road, extending his right to connect with his (Stotsenburg's) left, and continued:

Although I had not contemplated sending any troops to Maraquina, I did not consider it desirable to change orders and leave Stotsenburg's left flank without the protection he was anticipating, and as there was little resistance met through the district traveled and as we heard no firing on our left, there appeared to be no special danger in Goodale's position. We threw some shells in the direction of the headquarters at Maraquina to show them that they were covered by artillery fire and to deter them from any attack they might make on Goodale's command.

General Hale ascertained that the reports which I had received were greatly exaggerated and that no portion of Stotsenburg's command was in any immediate danger. He at once adopted measures to keep open communication with the pumping station, which Stotsenburg had successfully reached, by means of large detachments which patrolled the 4 miles of road between Deposito and the station, and the following morning I received this telegram from General MacArthur:

Stotsenburg just reports that he has found the missing pump machinery, that insurgents have abandoned Maraquina, and that 10 companies went toward Pasig. This command has been actively engaged since Friday and wants to rest to-day and to-morrow. I have authorized him to do so and not to make any further active movement of any kind without specific orders. Large band of insurgents, armed and equipped, moving toward Pasig. Recommend sending gunboat up river to prevent them crossing. Seem to be concentrating south of Pasig. Captain Randolph is now here and I can give him any orders you wish.

To which reply was made:

Order Captain Randolph to take the gunboat to San Pedro Macati and remain in that vicinity. Information will be forwarded to him at that point. Acknowledge and report action.

The gunboat referred to was a former Pasig River passenger steamboat known as the *Laguna de Bay*, which we had seized, though subsequently purchased, about two weeks before active hostilities commenced, for service on the upper Pasig, should occasion require. On her we had placed machine and 6-pounder guns and heavy sheet-iron protection, and detailed for duty with her 2 officers and 65 men. She was commanded by Captain Randolph, of the Third Artillery, and afterwards by Captain Grant, of the Utah Artillery, who was an experienced steamboat man, having been formerly engaged as a captain of a passenger vessel plying the northern United States lakes. She was a formidable and ugly-looking craft, drawing only 4 feet of water, gave the insurgents much uneasiness, and subsequently great fear whenever on the Pasig River, in the waters of the *Laguna de Bay*, or in the rivers of Bulacan province she chanced to appear. She was fearlessly handled and was considered to be equivalent to a regiment of men whenever engaged. Her repeated successes led us to purchase and put in defensive condition three other small light-draft river steamboats or launches, which, though inferior to the *Laguna de Bay* as fighting machines, have rendered excellent service.

The insurgent troops, which Colonel Stotsenburg reported as moving upon the town of Pasig, at the head of the river of that name, were those which, in connection with the insurgents in the south, it was believed were about to concentrate to resist Colonel Smith and his two lost battalions of the California regiment then in that vicinity, which on the 6th had been ordered to withdraw immediately to their intended position at San Pedro Macati.

On February 7 division commanders looked to the means of readily supplying their troops with ammunition, subsistence, and water, and whatever else might be needed. For this service we had only the primitive transportation of the country. A few days before the fighting commenced Major Devol, transportation quartermaster of the command, had been directed to assemble his hired carts at a certain locality in the city upon the first indication of active hostilities and to be prepared to seize and assemble there, also, all wheeled vehicles of which he could obtain possession. These instructions he carried out most effectively, and the firing line was at all times supplied with every essential requirement. Citizens who suffered losses thereby were instructed to submit their claims, which were promptly settled, and over \$7,000 (Mexican) were paid to them on these particular accounts. A good many unauthorized

seizures were made by enlisted men going to and returning from the front, sent in many instances for ammunition and rations. This was checked under formal orders issued on the 7th instant, and all inhabitants were compensated who thereby suffered.

On the morning of the 7th Colonel Stotsenburg reported that he had found all missing parts of the pumping machinery. Steps were at once taken to put this machinery in order and in the course of two days the city was receiving an abundant water supply, which has continued since that date.

The demoralization of the insurgents, which the rough handling they had unexpectedly received from the American mode of conducting warfare hitherto unknown in these islands, and pronounced by them to be new and unsoldierly, continued for two or three days. The leaders, confessing that their men were overmatched by our troops, contended that they could overcome by numbers what was lacking in individual characteristics. They commenced at once a reconcentration of all their forces in every direction, hastening from the north by rail every available man whether armed with rifle or bolo. Still, they had lost a good many of their original soldiers, who, thoroughly satisfied with the results of their war for independence, had escaped to their homes in distant villages. There was no lack of ammunition or subsistence for the troops on the north, but those on the south had lost through capture all the rice and cartridges which they had stored near their original lines and could not be resupplied without difficulty. The bolo men of the city, who had remained quiet since the afternoon of the 5th, began to show again a turbulent disposition, and as early as February 8 became bold and defiant. It became necessary to make new combinations, for the insurgents still persisted in the intention to carry out their former pre-conceived plan of action, which was to be an attack on our front, assisted by an overwhelming uprising of the city insurgent militia.

Our southern line was short and secure. The northern line had a sharp protruding angle at the Chinese church, $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles southeast of Caloocan; thence it extended southeasterly toward the deposito; thence south to the Pasig River with a strong outpost at the pumping station, 4 miles east of the deposito. The left of this line was refused, running from the Chinese church to Vitas Pass in a southwesterly direction. Two battalions of the provost guard had been sent to the pumping station and other portions of it had been placed far out in the suburbs. The increased insurgent activity within the city obliged the return of all this guard for city service, and to effect it, the Wyoming battalion, three troops of the Fourth Cavalry, the North Dakota regiment, and two guns of Dyer's Light Battery were withdrawn from Anderson's front. The first organization relieved the Twenty-third battalion at the pumping station. The cavalry and artillery troops were sent to General MacArthur for use in the vicinity of the Chinese church, and the North Dakota regiment was placed in Malate (where an uprising was threatened) for temporary duty.

General MacArthur had requested permission to swing his left on the town of Caloocan thereby giving him an excellent continuous and direct line on good ground from that town to the deposito, but was requested to remain as quiet as possible for a couple of days until the enemy could effect complete concentration in his front, when another opportunity to punish him very severely would be presented. This he did, and on the 10th of the month (it having been reported that Luna had placed about 4,000 insurgents south of Caloocan in front of MacArthur's refused left) he was directed to rectify his alignment, which

he accomplished on the afternoon of the 10th, by a very spirited attack on the part of the Montana, Kansas, and Pennsylvania Volunteers, and the Third Artillery (brigade of Brig. Gen. H. G. Otis) swinging on the Chinese church as a pivot. The attack, preceded by a fire of thirty minutes from the guns of the Navy vessels on and in front of Caloocan, consisted of an impetuous charge which swept away every obstacle, inflicting great damage on the enemy, who fought stubbornly within his intrenchments for a time, but finally fled indiscriminately to the rear. Our troops pursued beyond the line which it was intended to establish, rushed on to and over the stone walls which surrounded the Caloocan cemetery, where the insurgents had placed a strong force, which they well-nigh destroyed. Darkness coming on the troops were quickly recalled, and the line, with the left resting on Caloocan was occupied—the extreme left being refused to guard against any movement from the direction of the town of Malabon.

During the afternoon of February 8 I received the following dispatch from Admiral Dewey:

Have sent flag of truce to San Roque directing withdrawal of insurgent troops. If white flag is not flying at 9 a. m. to-morrow shall open with ships. Please direct colonel commanding to occupy San Roque after insurgent troops leave. This is most important in interest of navy.

San Roque was a thickly populated village connected with the naval station at Cavite by a causeway over a narrow intervening strip of water and was at the mercy of the guns of the navy. The insurgent troops formerly occupying Cavite had taken possession of this point, where they had been augmented by considerable accessions from the Cavite province. Our own troops, consisting of the Fifty-first Iowa Regiment, 2 California battalions of heavy artillery, the Wyoming Light Artillery, and the Nevada troop of dismounted cavalry, commanded by Colonel Loper, of the Fifty-first Iowa Regiment, occupied Cavite and guarded the causeway between the two towns. Upon receipt of the Admiral's telegram, Colonel Loper was properly instructed, and at 9 o'clock on the morning of the following day the insurgents, having kerosened San Roque, fired it and withdrew, crossing the neck which joins it to the mainland. Our troops at once took possession and by persistent efforts saved from destruction many of its best buildings. The inhabitants fled, preceding or accompanying the insurgents, and Colonel Loper stationed guards there and placed a force across the narrow neck of land at a point about a mile distant from Cavite, where he confronted the insurgent intrenchments on the main shore, where troops have since been maintained and from which point they have operated by reconnoissance as far as old Cavite and San Francisco de Malabon.

Affairs at the open ports of Iloilo and Cebu, for which foreign and domestic merchant vessels had persistently cleared, furnishing goods and paying tribute to the insurgent authorities, and foreign men-of-war were intently watching the progress of events, gave great annoyance. The questions presented bristled with conundrums of a political character, and the United States consuls on the Asiatic coast wanted positive information of condition and status. The territory was no longer Spain's, but we still hesitated to take decisive action for fear of provoking the insurgents, or really giving them the excuse to attack us which they desired. Now this last obstacle had been removed by their determined onslaughts on Manila, and it was very important for overmastering political reasons to take possession of these southern ports, through force or otherwise, as circumstances might demand. Notwithstanding our military strength at Manila was so limited that we could

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not pursue into the interior the fleeing enemy, we knew our ability to worst him should he appear anywhere in our vicinity, and concluded that exigencies compelled us to clear up the field which we were confronting at Iloilo. On February 7 I asked authority to direct General Miller to take the place. This being received, the Tennessee regiment, which had been acting with the Manila provost guard, was forwarded to that point, sailing on the 9th instant. On the evening of the previous day I dispatched Lieutenant-Colonel Potter with the following instructions:

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., February 8, 1899.

Brigadier-General MILLER, U. S. V.,
Commanding First Separate Brigade, Eighth Army Corps, Iloilo, Panay.

SIR: The commanding general directs that you occupy Iloilo with your troops as soon as practicable, having a care for the lives and property of the inhabitants of that city and giving to citizens the necessary notice to withdraw therefrom in case resistance is anticipated.

The admiral commanding the United States naval forces on the Asiatic Station will direct the commanding officers of naval vessels in the harbor of Iloilo to support you in your operations.

Avoid destruction of property in so far as may be possible with successful operations, and endeavor to prevent destruction of same by native troops.

The First Tennessee regiment will sail for Iloilo to-morrow morning, the 9th instant, and upon its arrival you will be able to make your dispositions.

The commanding general trusts to your ability and discretion, and does not desire to give you more specific instructions, permitting full latitude of action on your part. These instructions will be handed to you by Lieutenant-Colonel Potter, who leaves this evening by steamer *Butuan*. He will remain with you until you are able to report the results of your action in executing these instructions, when you will dispatch him to these headquarters with report of same.

Very respectfully,

THOMAS H. BARRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Shortly after Lieutenant-Colonel Potter arrived with instructions, and on the morning of the 10th General Miller had a conference with the commanding officers of the United States war vessels in the harbor and with certain business men in Iloilo, when the time to be given the insurgents to surrender or evacuate and for the inhabitants to withdraw from the city was determined upon. With the navy commanders the plan of battle, in case it became necessary to forcibly take the place, was discussed, but not fully agreed upon. The results arrived at are given in the following communications:

HDQRS. FIRST SEPARATE BRIGADE, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
ON BOARD TRANSPORT NEWPORT,
Iloilo Harbor, P. I., February 10, 1899.

COMMANDING GENERAL NATIVE FORCES, Iloilo.

SIR: In a communication from Gen. Roque Lopez, dated December 31, 1898, it was stated that armed resistance would be offered to the forces of the United States in case they attempted to occupy Iloilo without the consent of General Aguinaldo. This communication was referred, for instructions, to Major-General Otis, commanding the United States forces in the Philippine Islands. After a long delay orders have arrived, and I am now directed by him to occupy the city of Iloilo with my troops as soon as practicable. I therefore call on you to deliver up the city of Iloilo and adjacent territory, and to surrender the armed forces occupying the same before sunset Saturday, the 11th instant, or I shall proceed with my troops to occupy the city by force. It is requested that you give warning to all noncombatants in Iloilo, Jaro, and Molo that in case of resistance their city and villages will be exposed to bombardment. Any attempt on your part in the interim to close the Iloilo River or to throw up or improve any defensive works will at once be met by fire from the United States war ships and my troops. Free ingress and egress to boats going to and coming from Iloilo will be permitted until sunset Saturday, the 11th instant. After this time all communications must be under flag of truce.

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Official communication has been received by the steamship *Butuan* of the complete defeat and scattering of the insurgent forces in the neighborhood of Manila.

Very respectfully,

M. P. MILLER,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

HDQRS. FIRST SEPARATE BRIGADE, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
ON BOARD TRANSPORT NEWPORT,
Iloilo Harbor, P. I., February 10, 1899.

To the British, German, and American Vice-Consulates:

In view of anticipated hostilities, notice is hereby given you to cause all persons who are under your protection to seek a place of safety before 5 a. m. Sunday, the 12th instant. Hostilities may commence at any time after that hour and date.

Very respectfully,

M. P. MILLER,
Brigadier General, U. S. V., Commanding.

Official copy also respectfully furnished commanding officers H. M. S. *Pigmy*, and U. S. S. *Boston*, and U. S. S. *Petrel*.

By command of Brigadier-General Miller.

CHAS. G. WOODWARD,
First Lieutenant, Third U. S. Artillery, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

The Tennessee regiment arrived at Iloilo on the night of February 10, and next morning about 9 o'clock four commissioners sent by the inhabitants boarded the *Newport*, General Miller's vessel, to discuss the situation. While in conference two shots were heard, which were fired from one of the war vessels as warning shots to the insurgents who were engaged in throwing up intrenchments at or near the fort located on the city's water line, against which proceeding they had been warned in the letter furnished them the previous day. To these shots the insurgents replied, and at 9.30 a. m. the fort and the war vessels (the *Baltimore* and *Petrel*) became actively engaged. The army not anticipating this action, had made very little preparation for landing its troops. The navy attack was followed by a landing of its men, the seizure of the fort, the hoisting of the United States flag over the same and the entrance of the men to the city—the insurgents retiring before landing was effected, and firing the town during their retreat. Lieutenant-Colonel Potter, who was a witness and participant in the affair, made written report of the events which came under his observation. The vessels which he mentions, namely, the *Arizona*, *St. Paul*, and *Newport*, were troop transports; the *Boston* and *Petrel*, vessels of the Navy; the *Iloilo* and *Vicenti*, launches. Colonel Potter states as follows:

As we left the *Arizona* we saw the *Boston's* boats about halfway to the shore. The captain of the *St. Paul* wanted to move his vessel nearer shore and was allowed to do so. As she anchored, her starboard boats were full and we towed them in and landed them, while the *Iloilo*, which came up (having been relieved at the *Arizona* by the *Vicenti*, which had left the flatboat anchored) towed in the port boats a few minutes later. The exact time of this landing I did not note, but afterwards saw a recorded signal from the *Petrel* to the *Boston*, which said it was 12 o'clock. All of this took time, as the tide was running very strong. From our launch, as we preceded the *St. Paul* to her anchorage near shore, we saw the flag hauled down and ours go up, and soon after saw the navy forces advancing from the fort to the first warehouse, where they appeared to stop and come back. This afterwards proved to be only the *Petrel's* men, who landed on the other side of the fort, where we had not seen them, while the *Boston's* men under Lieutenant Niblack, had gone uptown. Not knowing this, I started up the road, where I was met by a signal man from the *Petrel*, who said they had received a message from the *Petrel* that we must be careful in advancing into town, as a great many insurgents were left in the buildings as well as in rifle pits which were dug on either side of the street. This caused us to wait for a sufficient force to occupy all side streets

and advance cautiously (at least half an hour being thus lost), when, to our surprise, on arriving at the custom-house, we found Lieutenant Niblack's force receiving a few shots from the enemy up river, but they had come to this point without seeing any insurgents or hearing a shot.

At the first shot from the *Boston* the insurgents began firing the town as they retreated up town along the main street, fire being applied to both sides of the street. I saw some places where they had failed to set fire, but where wood saturated with coal oil was piled against doors. Before the Navy was through with the bombardment fires had been set away up on Calle Real, and as a strong breeze was blowing there was little chance of saving anything to leeward of the fires.

A few troops with General Miller got through the fires just beyond the custom-house, but the rest of us were cut off from advancing for two hours. These few troops advanced with no resistance and took Jaro and Molo bridges. Fires were set along the road to the Jaro bridge before any possible landing could have saved them, and very little was burned except to leeward, where the smoke and flames were such as to drive back company after company trying to get to the few troops in front, who would be in great peril if attacked in force. But all attempts failed for a time. I saw two companies of Major Cheatham's battalion try to get around by wading on the beach, but they were driven back. It was a case which would have baffled professional firemen with a complete apparatus for fighting fire.

General Miller, in a report made February 20, remarks:

No arrangement or agreement with the senior officer of the Navy was made that he should open the attack without conferring with me, but it seemed he construed my letter to the insurgents in that light and commenced the attack. My command had been living on the rough bay ever since first arriving. With great difficulty we had gotten possession of two lighters and three steam launches to transfer coal barges, etc., from supply ships to permanent ships. At the time of the attack the *Samar* was endeavoring to tow the barge *Cartagena* to the *Newport* for the purpose of placing a light battery on it. The *Arizona* had a coaling ship alongside; the other launch was en route to the *St. Paul*. " " " The Navy landed their forces promptly, and found upon arrival at the plaza an almost impassable barrier of fire toward Jaro bridge. I think a quicker landing of my troops would have found the same conditions in front; as it was, I pushed through the flames with what force I could get through and saved several buildings beyond the plaza, near Jaro bridge, and along the banks of the Iloilo.

I now quote from the accompanying report of General Hughes, commanding at present in the Visayan Islands:

Upon receipt of this information ways and means were taken by the insurgents, then in occupation and control, for burning the city. Large quantities of petroleum were secured and stored in the ayuntamiento, Calle Rosario, Calle San Pedro, etc. In the early morning of February 11, before any shots had been fired or any immediate action was evident, these supplies of oil were distributed about the city and placed in dwellings, shops, stores, etc., so as to make the work of the incendiaries easy, swift, and sure. The statement is made that the local president and other officials in uniform assisted in the distribution of the petroleum, and the mayor of the city, Señor Leon, is said to have followed the example of the mayor of Moscow by setting fire to his own house before abandoning the city, which had been confided to his care.

On the morning of the 11th the insurgents were discovered putting guns in position on the beach for defense, and as this was in violation of the conditions specified by General Miller in granting time for noncombatants, etc., to make their dispositions for what might occur, the naval gunboat *Petrel* fired two warning shots, upon which the land battery being put in position opened fire on the *Petrel*, which opened an action that had not been contemplated or expected on the part of either the troops or their commanders until the following morning.

Firing having opened between the hostile forces, the incendiaries in the city immediately began their assigned work, and the city was soon in flames. Meanwhile the troops were being landed on the beach and the right bank of the river, and working their way through and around the fire succeeded in reaching and securing possession of the bridge across the Iloilo River leading to Jaro, and also the bridge across the estuary on the road to Molo. Possession of these points assured General Miller's possession of the city. In submitting the fact to the department commander General Miller remarks:

"It was not contemplated to make an attack before the hour named to the consuls, but the insurgent forces having begun acts of hostility, military necessity required that action should be taken and followed up. Such action certainly made no difference regarding the destruction of property, as it was a matter of common

report that every preparation had been made by the forces of the insurgents at Iloilo to set fire to the city at the first hostile shot."

In another letter, written by General Miller on the 21st of February, the following remark occurs:

"I have no doubt it is owing to the premature attack that any of the buildings are saved. The plan was one of total destruction by fire."

On the following day the suburb of Jaro was taken by Major Keller with a battalion of the Eighteenth Infantry and a battery of machine guns. General Miller reported as follows:

"HDQRS. FIRST SEPARATE BRIGADE, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,

Iloilo, P. I., February 12, 1899.

"ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DEPT. OF THE PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS.

"SIR: I have the honor to report the military situation as very vexatious. We have captured Iloilo, as before reported, but the position of the insurgents has been such that all the time we are exposed to sharpshooters' fire with the Mauser rifle, and no one knows when he is safe. Jaro and Molo occupied would relieve us from this trouble, but I should have a battalion of four companies more to hold Molo. To-day at 2 p. m. I sent a reconnoissance to both Jaro and Molo—a battalion of the Tennessee to Molo and one of the Eighteenth Infantry to Jaro. At Molo no enemy was found; at Jaro the enemy was encountered and skirmishing commenced at once. The insurgents were about 1,000 strong. They threw an accurate and concentrated fire. They fought well, but finally retreated to Jaro and were driven beyond it. I reenforced the first battalion with the second, and we held Jaro to-night. Second Lieut. F. C. Bolles, Eighteenth Infantry, attached to the machine battery, was wounded through the left leg below the knee and one private through the lung and another through the leg. Will send specific report as soon as possible. Our troops of the Eighteenth were under the command of Major Keller, and afterwards the two battalions were under the command of Colonel Van Valzah. Major Keller's battalion, assisted by the machine-gun battery, under Lieutenant Ostheim, did the work. Major Keller is an able, fearless, and brave officer; also Lieutenant Ostheim. I shall make recommendation about them later.

"Very respectfully,

"M. P. MILLER,

Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding."

On the 14th of February Major Keller made a reconnoissance in the direction of Santa Barbara, and 4 miles from Jaro he encountered the enemy, about 500 strong, and drove them back some distance. He lost 1 noncommissioned officer killed and 1 wounded.

On the 19th of February a reconnoissance was made to Oton by a battalion of the First Tennessee Volunteers, but no enemy was found.

A battalion of the First Tennessee Volunteers made a reconnoissance in the direction of San Miguel via Mandurriao on the 25th of February. The enemy was found a short distance beyond Mandurriao and driven back without loss to our troops.

The military operations which have since taken place in Panay will be noted in a later portion of this report. As soon as Iloilo was occupied by our troops a government was established and has been successfully prosecuted.

The rapid changes in the spirit, demeanor, and demonstrations of the inhabitants of Manila of all classes between the 5th and 10th of February could be witnessed only in a community made up of the most heterogeneous elements. On the 6th the educated business classes, foreign and native born, were surprisingly hopeful that hostilities would soon end. The natives of the middle and working classes were sullen, though undetermined. The large Chinese laboring population rejoiced over the punishment of their race enemies and the opportunity offered it for looting the country from which the insurgent forces had been driven. These Chinese had followed quite closely our advancing lines and secured many minor articles of property which by them were considered of value. We had employed them, too, extensively to perform a good deal of the work connected with supplying the troops at the front, and they performed faithful service. On the 7th business became active again and the streets were thronged as usual. The night was the most exciting portion of the twenty-four hours, as the occa-

sional shots of our sentries, the burning of nipa buildings (the work of incendiaries), and the frequently detected interchange of signals between the insurgents within and those without the city lines gave constant warning of the dangers which threatened us. The means of supplying subsistence for this large motley population presented a problem for solution in which new conditions continually obtruded themselves. The great majority of the population never provides for the morrow and depends upon the numerous city markets for its daily supply of food, made up almost exclusively, rice excepted, of the products of the adjacent country. That source of supply had been virtually closed since the latter part of January, and interisland traffic had been arrested by the event of war. On February 8 it was officially reported that the insurgent troops to the east of the city had returned to the mountains and those to the south had disappeared, whereupon orders were issued to permit the resumption of trade along the Pasig River to the Laguna de Bay. This it was expected would give Manila the products of the lake country, from which source she had always obtained a large portion of articles for daily consumption. No sooner, however, was this traffic reopened than the insurgents seized the Upper Pasig country and threw a large force into the towns of Pasig, Pateros, and Taguig, which it advanced to Guadalupe, within rifle shot of San Pedro Macati, where the left of General Anderson's line rested. The bold resumption of the offensive at this point, the rapid concentration taking place at the north, and the restoration of communication between the northern and southern insurgent armies depressed the better social element of the city and correspondingly elevated the hopes of the hostile military organizations in our midst. Active demonstrations, in attacking troops on the streets, setting fires in thickly populated districts, with an occasional murder or assassination, were resumed, and rendered it again necessary to take every precautionary measure for the city's safety. Orders were given to the division commanders to confine the duties of their men within the city to the protection of their barracks, and not permit them to patrol the streets, as the provost-marshal-general was prepared to effectually repress any attempt on the part of the inhabitants to inflict serious damage.

On the evening of February 9 I wired General MacArthur at the Chinese church, the advanced angle of his line, the following:

Reported that the insurgents will attack at 3 o'clock in the morning. Their plan to attack your front in large force and at the same time to rise in your rear in Lico district. They have been entering through Vitas swamps all day and landing at intersection of Calle Sande and Calle de Lemery at bridge. Bolo men will form between Vitas district and Lico road.

About the same hour General MacArthur telegraphed:

It has been necessary to reinforce the blockhouse at the mouth of Vitas Creek on account of the threatening attitude of the surrounding population. Please have the situation examined and either authorize the abandonment of the blockhouse entirely or make it part of the provost duty of the city. The company there is from Kansas, and concentration in front of that regiment is reported as still in progress.

The general was directed to hold on to the position, it being considered of vital importance, and assistance was sent to the company occupying the point. Later the general was instructed in telegram as follows:

Not intended that you should keep 3 troops at Vitas Creek unless necessary to protect your rear from contemplated annoyance on part of inhabitants of section. You are far out and General Hughes can not efficiently reach you. The bolo men of *Tondo are restless to-day.*

The action of February 10, already hereinbefore reported, followed, but instead of having a quieting effect on the hostile portion of the inhabitants, appeared to incite them to greater energy. Rumors of meditated uprisings were constant and were only checked by the untiring watchfulness of the provost guard. Fires in different sections of the city, mostly in the outskirts, were of nightly occurrence.

On February 15 the provost-marshal-general secured an order issued by the Malolos government through the responsible officer who had raised and organized the hostile inhabitants within the city and then departed for the insurgent capital, which directed a rising that evening, and which for barbarous intent is unequaled in these modern times of civilized warfare. A translation reads in part as follows:

First. You will so dispose that at 8 o'clock at night the individuals of the territorial militia at your order will be found united in all the streets of San Pedro armed with their "bolos" and revolvers and guns and ammunition, if convenient.

Second. Philippine families only will be respected. They should not be molested, but all other individuals, of whatever race they may be, will be exterminated without any compassion after the extermination of the army of occupation.

Third. The defenders of the Philippines in your command will attack the guard at Bilibid and liberate the prisoners and "presidarios," and, having accomplished this, they will be armed, saying to them, "Brothers, we must avenge ourselves on the Americans and exterminate them, that we may take our revenge for the infamies and treacheries which they have committed upon us. Have no compassion upon them; attack with vigor. All Filipinos 'en masse' will second you. Long live Filipino independence!"

Fifth. The order which will be followed in the attack will be as follows: The sharpshooters of Tondo and Santa Ana will begin the attack from without, and these shots will be the signal for the militia of Trozo, Binondo, Quiapo, and Sampaloc to go out into the street and do their duty. Those of Paco, Ermita and Malate, Santa Cruz and San Miguel will not start out until 12 o'clock unless they see their companions need assistance.

Sixth. The militia will start out at 3 o'clock in the morning. If all do their duty our revenge will be complete. Brothers, Europe contemplates us. We know how to die as men, shedding our blood in defense of the liberty of our country. Death to the tyrants, war without quarter to the false Americans, who have deceived us! Either independence or death!

Of course arrangements were made to immediately check this contemplated demonstration, but the order gave us our first positive assurance of the tactics which the insurgents intended to pursue and confirmed the rumors of intent which had been prevalent since the last week in January. This fortunate precaution served to keep very active the watchfulness of all officers charged with the safety of the city, and vigilance was rewarded on the night of February 22, when a directed rising was attempted and was successful in its inception and primary stages. Considerable numbers of armed insurgents, passing by water and through swamps around MacArthur's left, entered Tondo, the northern district of the city, about a mile to the rear of his line, and there concealed themselves, awaiting their opportunity. Shortly after dark in the evening a number of buildings, some of considerable importance, situated in the thickly settled portion of Binondo, were simultaneously fired, having been previously kerosened, and while the city fire department (a department the membership of which was confined to natives who had always proved loyal) was making great efforts to extinguish the fires, or at least hold them under control, the fire hose was repeatedly cut and musketry shooting commenced very near them at the north, on the Tondo and Binondo line. This General Hughes, present in person, soon checked with his troops, driving the attacking parties northward, when other fires broke out in the Binondo district near the river bank, which threatened our army supplies.

These were quickly extinguished and the armed insurgents again driven northward. Early the next morning General Hughes moved against this enemy secreted in Tondo, which may have numbered 1,000 or more, drove it northward toward General MacArthur's lines, although it resisted stoutly from its concealments in the bambo and rice paddies, and behind barricades which it had erected. The enemy's casualties numbered about 500, while General Hughes's loss, owing to the rapidity and fierceness of his attack, was very slight. This punishment put an end to the dangerous demonstrations within the city on the part of the insurgent inhabitants, and thereafter they failed to respond to the orders given them by the Malolos government, much to the latter's indignation, which charged them with a lack of patriotism. Since February 23, few shots of sentinels or patrols have been heard within the confines of Manila, and those in the nighttime, which were aimed generally at the towers of churches and convents from which responsive signals were being transmitted to the signals seen at prominent points occupied by the insurgent troops.

While these interesting events were passing in Manila, our outer lines were being placed in a condition of defense so that they might be securely held by fewer troops, thus giving us the men to operate with and initiate attack on the increasing forces of the enemy, who were becoming quite bold again. The length of our line north of the Pasig River was about 9 miles, and it was necessary to maintain it for the safety of the city and the protection of our water plant. Besides the force at the pumping station, we were obliged to keep a large detachment on the Maraquina road north of the station, and to patrol the road between it and the reservoir, a distance of about 4 miles. These detached troops, which were commanded by Colonel Stotsenburg, invited the attention of the insurgents. About the 12th instant they made a spirited attack on the Maraquina outpost, but were signally defeated and driven several miles northward through San Francisco del Monte toward Caloocan. On February 22 the First Nebraska and Wyoming Volunteers attacked and scattered a considerable body of insurgents between the reservoir, pumping station, and Pasig River, which had placed itself in that locality, and on February 24 a detachment of the Oregon regiment and a company of the Nebraska infantry attacked and defeated an insurgent force north of the Maraquina road. Similar actions occurred on the 25th and 27th of the month, when the persistent enemy was driven northward with considerable loss. Again, on March 5, 6, and 7, portions of the Nebraska, Oregon, and Utah troops were obliged to attack and drive off other bodies of insurgent troops which appeared near the pumping station and on the Maraquina road. These expeditions served to check their ardor in that direction, and they began to pay more attention to other portions of our lines, becoming very annoying in the vicinity of Caloocan and in front of San Pedro Macati. At these points the troops wanted to attack, but nothing substantial could be gained thereby and the city would be exposed needlessly. The line of the Pasig was considered as the first requisite to improve our military situation, and we were awaiting the arrival of troops, daily expected. The Twentieth Infantry reported February 23, and the Twenty-second Infantry March 4 and 5. This gave us sufficient additional force to take the initiative. We had lost the Tennessee Volunteers, sent to Iloilo, and received two additional regiments, and our enlisted strength for duty in and around Manila, the provost guard included, numbered nearly 15,000 men. A provisional brigade was formed consisting of the Twentieth and Twenty-second regiments of

infantry, 3 troops of the Fourth Cavalry, a section of Light Battery D, Sixth Artillery, 2 battalions of the Washington and 7 companies of the Oregon Volunteers, and Brig. Gen. Lloyd Wheaton, U. S. V., was placed in command. This brigade engaged the enemy at Guadalupe ridge, near San Pedro Macati, at Pasig, Pateros, Cainta, and Taguig, and drove him out and beyond these towns. The insurgents, however, concentrated near Taguig, and made a spirited attack on General Wheaton's troops there, inflicting a few casualties, but he collected his forces quickly and early the next morning made a counter attack, which the insurgents were unable to withstand, routed them and drove them 15 miles down the shore of the lake. Their losses in killed and wounded numbered more than 200, while General Wheaton's casualties in the entire six days engaged (between March 10 and 17) did not aggregate 30. The gunboat *Laguna de Bay*, Captain Grant, of the Utah Artillery, commanding, assisted greatly in these affairs, opened the river to the lake which she entered, dispersed the insurgents' shipping, which consisted of launches, cascoes, and innumerable small boats, considerable of which were captured. Garrisons were established at the towns of Pasig, Pateros and Taguig, with one gunboat in the lake and one in the river, when the remainder of the brigade was returned to the city and incorporated in other organizations. The line of the Pasig was thus established and the insurgent communication between their forces to the north and on the south was permanently interrupted.

In the meantime my native scouts were obtaining information at the north. Malolos had become a war depot; also Calumpit and Baliuag. It was reported that the former city contained a very large quantity of rifle ammunition; that the intervening country beyond Caloocan and along the line of the railroad was virtually covered with defensive works, intrenchments having been constructed every few hundred yards. Lieutenant-General Luna boasted of having available on the short line fronting General MacArthur's left 16,000 men, but my scouts numbered those between Caloocan and Malolos at from six to eight thousand and verified their estimates by personal observation. This concentrated insurgent force was then our true objective, and it was believed that it would stand and receive our attacks. Our troops were impatient to be let loose and were in excellent health and spirits.

The Fourth and Seventeenth Infantry, with Major-General Lawton and staff, arrived from New York City between the 10th and 22d of March. New military combinations were made on March 17, General Lawton relieving Major-General Anderson, who had been advanced to the position of brigadier-general in the regular establishment and directed to proceed to the United States. Both this division and the second, that of General MacArthur, were given three brigades, those in the first commanded by Brigadier-Generals Ovenshine, King, and Wheaton, and those in the second by Brigadier-Generals Hale, Otis, and Hall. To secure sufficient force for the northern advance it was necessary to take all available organizations from both divisions, but Manila and the waterworks must remain covered. A separate column for General MacArthur was made up from his own immediate command, composed mostly of the volunteers, and consisting of the brigades of Brigadier-Generals Otis and Hale, the Colorado regiment being left to guard the deposito and pumping station. Brigadier-General Wheaton was directed to take command of the left of this line from La Loma to Caloocan, and the Kansans, Montanas, Pennsylvanians, and a battalion of the Third Artillery and nearly all the Utah Light Artillery were relieved therefrom by the Oregon Volunteers, the Third and Twenty-

second Infantry, a battalion of the Twenty-third Infantry of the provost guard subsequently reporting, and two or three days thereafter the Minnesota Volunteers, which had been relieved from the provost guard by the Twentieth Infantry. Brigadier-General Hall was assigned to the right of this line, having the Colorado and Wyoming troops, the Fourth and Seventeenth Infantry, and a platoon of the Utah Light Artillery. He was directed to make a demonstration to the north when General MacArthur should take up his advance, for which everything was in readiness on March 24. That night the troops intended to take part in this particular movement were withdrawn from the trenches and assembled behind La Loma and the Deposito and very early the next morning proceeded on their march. General MacArthur's instructions were to move in two columns in echelon from the right, the right brigade (Hale's) preceding the left (Otis's) by a considerable distance, so that the latter would cover the left and rear of the former and neutralize any attack from the insurgents in that direction, who were very strong from Caloocan to Balintauag on the Novaliches road. Wheaton, whose left rested at La Loma, and who was expected to swing to the left on Caloocan at the proper time, was directed not to move until specially directed, unless MacArthur's left column should become seriously engaged and need assistance. The advancing columns were to move on Novaliches—Hale's brigade to that point by San Francisco del Monte and Bagbag, and Otis's keeping to the left and retired was expected to strike the Novaliches road near and to the right of Balintauag. Crossing the Tulihan River, fordable at Novaliches, they were to turn to the westward and thence proceeding by the road which strikes the railway south of Polo were to place themselves on the left flank of the enemy while General Wheaton made a frontal attack. This matured plan failed in part, owing to the natural obstacles which were constantly met on the line of march. Hale's brigade moving by San Francisco del Monte encountered serious difficulties there and beyond, and was obliged to drive off detachments of the enemy, by which it was unavoidably detained, and the left brigade gained the advance. It was attacked by the insurgents, when Wheaton commenced his swinging movement to the left and diverted their attention. The brigade struck the Tulihan River some distance below Novaliches, crossed its artillery and transportation only by a great deal of labor, because of the high banks and the dense growth of brush, while the right brigade continued on to Novaliches and took the designated western route. This march was exhausting in the extreme, and the entire day was consumed when the right bank of the river was attained. Early the next morning both brigades marched toward the railway, but could not develop a line northward in the immediate vicinity of Polo, as intended, on account of the swamps, thick masses of brush, and tropical undergrowth through which the artillery and transportation could not be passed, not even the men.

While these brigades were executing this movement that of General Wheaton had engaged the enemy with great spirit. Some time before evening it had driven him from all of his intrenchments back and across the Tulihan River, which it was about to cross in pursuit when its advance was arrested to await developments on the enemy's left flank by the troops expected from Novaliches. The next morning, as soon as the head of that column had about gained the railway line, it was permitted to renew the attack, and, quickly passing the river at two points and aided by the flanking troops, completely routed the enemy and drove him northward and beyond Polo, where he made a determined

stand the following day, from which he was driven by General MacArthur's united troops with considerable loss. From that date to end of the month MacArthur pressed northward the enemy, who stubbornly contested every village and locality having defensive advantages and burned every town from which it was obliged to retreat. Our troops entered Malolos, the insurgent capital, March 31. That alleged government had removed all its records and property, and its army set fire to the city when it retreated on Calumpit and Quingua before our advance. The troops needed rest, and it was necessary to repair the railway over which the advance had been made in order to forward the necessary supplies. The line of communication, too, was long, considering the position of the enemy on our flank and the few troops which could be spared to protect it, and it was believed that a water base could be established at Malolos which would make available for the field an additional 1,500 men. Our casualties from the commencement of hostilities to April 1 were 12 officers and 127 enlisted men killed and 48 officers and 833 enlisted men wounded. The sick among these troops which had advanced to the north increased to 15 per cent, due mostly to their exhaustive labors and to heat prostrations.

Efforts to secure a water line of communication by Manila Bay and the Malolos estuary were made immediately and continued for more than two weeks. The proper mouth of the estuary was found with considerable difficulty. A bar had formed in front of it, making the entrance very tortuous. Up this two of our gunboats worked their way, but encountered well-driven piles and other obstructions which the insurgents had placed there and around which mud and sand had collected, making the water too shoal for navigation. Near the mouth of the stream a dredge was used and the gunboats removed a good many of the pile obstructions, but satisfactory results could not be obtained and the work was abandoned. A considerable detail of soldiers was made to put in sufficient repair for immediate use the railway from Manila to Malolos, and Chinese labor was hired. The track had been considerably damaged by the insurgents and a number of bridges partially destroyed, but Major Devol, of the Quartermaster's Department, overcame all difficulties, and, with the engines captured at Caloocan, gave Malolos daily railway train service.

While these preliminaries to a farther northern advance were being made General Lawton, commanding the First Division of the corps, was directed to proceed to the city of Santa Cruz, on the south shore of the Laguna de Bay, and secure a number of launches and a Spanish gunboat, which were reported to be concealed in a narrow stream passing along the eastern limit of that city. Returning, he was directed to seize Calamba, an important strategic point on account of its being at the intersection of important roads and telegraphic lines. For this purpose he was obliged to draw troops from the lines about Manila and along the Pasig River. He collected and concentrated parts of organizations, numbering all told 1,509 men, consisting of 3 dismounted troops of the Fourth Cavalry, 2 mountain guns, 8 companies of the Fourteenth Infantry, 4 companies of the Idaho and 4 of the North Dakota Volunteers, and an organization of 200 sharpshooters, largely drawn from the Washington regiment. With these troops, in several cascoes towed by three of our gunboats, he proceeded across the lake on April 9, captured on the following day Santa Cruz, which he found intrenched and strongly defended, drove the enemy several miles into the interior, and proceeded to secure the vessels for which he had been sent. The water of the lake had become very low and the boats could not be

passed over the bar at the river's mouth. Reporting this fact and the further fact that he could not make a landing at Calamba on account of shoal water, a dredge was sent him from Manila, and also instructions to return immediately to the city with his force as soon as he could secure possession of the vessels in the river, as his services were required here, and that the taking of Calamba was not imperative at this time. He returned on April 17, bringing six steam launches and two cascoes which the enemy had concealed near Santa Cruz. The Spanish gunboat was not found, and was subsequently captured at Calamba with machinery in good condition, but without her guns, which the insurgents had taken for land service.

The insurgents at the north were becoming very bold again. They had worked around in the swampy country to the westward and rear of Malolos, and down along the roads, paths, and villages to the eastward, from which they were making occasional nightly incursions on the railroad for the purpose of destroying it. We could not remain quiet, as we did not have sufficient troops to maintain the long lines we were holding if we permitted the enemy to concentrate and take the initiative. The total strength of the Eighth Corps present in the Philippines at this time was 967 officers and 25,036 enlisted men, of whom 5,000 were serving at Cavite and the Visayan islands. Of these 836 were of the Engineer, Signal, and Hospital Corps; 2,739 were sick and in confinement as prisoners, and some 1,500 were on special duty in the various staff departments or assisting in civil administration. The available fighting force in Luzon, Cavite excepted, numbered, therefore, about 16,500 men.

General MacArthur could not advance beyond Malolos with the troops at his disposal while the enemy so seriously threatened his flanks and line of communication. To assist him, the formation of an independent column, to consist of nearly 4,000 men, to be taken from the Manila lines and the railway guards, and to move to the north, on the flank of the enemy, was determined upon. The formation and movement of this column was intrusted to General Lawton, who entered upon this special service as soon as he returned from Santa Cruz. He concentrated near Caloocan the Twenty-second Infantry, which had been relieved from duty on the railroad a short time previous; 8 companies of the Third Infantry; the First North Dakota Volunteers; 4 troops of the Fourth Cavalry (one mounted); Hawthorne's battery of light guns, portion of Light Battery D, Sixth Artillery; and a detachment of the Signal Corps. He was furnished with such transportation of the country as could be secured, and was instructed to move these troops along the base of the mountains by Novaliches, San Jose, and Nozagaray, where the balance of his column, consisting of 8 companies of the Minnesota and 7 of the Oregon Volunteers, to be taken from the railway and to march from Bocaue by way of Santa Maria, would join him. The last-named troops were to escort ten days' supplies for his command by quartermaster's transportation, which had just been received from the United States and was then being put in readiness for the road. These movements commenced, and the railroad south of Bigaa being thereby rendered secure, it was intended that General MacArthur should move on Calumpit, leaving sufficient force between Bigaa and Malolos to guard his line. General Lawton, after concentration at Nozagaray, was directed to move on Balinag, from which point, the swamps being dry, he could act on an enemy opposing MacArthur's advance. General Lawton started from near Caloocan on April 22; encountered some opposition from the enemy at Novaliches and en route from San Jose,

which did not impede his march; but soon after leaving Novaliches his road, a well-defined and prominent one on all Spanish maps, became a trail, and subsequently a trail crossing or passing through rice patches, swampy country, and unbridged streams, over which his advance was conducted with the greatest difficulty. His troops proved equal to the occasion, and after he had lost many of his carabaos, or water buffalo, from heat exhaustion, they cheerfully hauled the transportation, working one day the entire time for 3 miles progress. He in person reached Nozagaray on April 25 and met there the Bocaue column, which had arrived that morning, and there awaited the Bocaue transportation and supplies, which had been detained, and the rear of the Novaliches column.

General MacArthur took up his advance on the 24th. The Bagbag and Calumpit rivers, over which the railroad bridges had been partially destroyed, were in his front, and there were no means of crossing them. The country was low, swampy, and considerable of it covered with brush, rendering it very difficult for military operations, and the insurgents had constructed strong intrenchments along the rivers and thought themselves secure. General Hale with his brigade was sent to the eastward, up the Bagbag River, and crossed in the face of fierce opposition at the Quingua ford, about 4 miles from Malolos; thence swinging down the right bank of that river he took the enemy's intrenchments in reverse, inflicting heavy losses. Wheaton, who now commanded a brigade of the division, as soon as Hale's descent had somewhat cleared his front, succeeded in crossing his troops over the railway bridge, after slight repair, and that portion of Calumpit south of the river of that name was lost to the enemy the following day. Lieutenant-General Luna commanded in person the insurgent troops north of the river and had collected a considerable force, estimated at 4,000 men, to oppose the crossing, while 3,000 were held at Baliuag, to the east. To his right as far as Haganoy strong detachments were maintained, and also to his left connecting with Baliuag. In the face of this opposition MacArthur's men effected the crossing on April 28, under the accurate concentrated fire of the guns of the Utah Light Artillery, commanded by Major Young. This fire drove back the enemy from the river bank and the Kansas men, swimming the rapid river, were enabled to secure boat transportation on the northern shore. Crossing with this and on the railroad bridge (of which, though a span had been dropped, the outer rails remained) a foothold was secured and the enemy was soon after driven northward up the railroad track for a distance of 2 miles.

General Lawton, having concentrated his force at Nozagaray and Angat, drove the enemy to the north and westward in a number of spirited engagements and was directed to proceed to Baliuag. A short time thereafter I was informed that 2,000 armed insurgents were about to march north from San Mateo, a place 8 miles northeast of Manila, under the command of General Pilar; that it would pass on a mountain road with the intention of gaining the flank of Lawton, who was directed to keep his scouts well out to the eastward from Nozagaray, which he did without discovering the expected hostile column which, to the number of 1,000, had passed farther to the right and entered the country to the northeast of Baliuag. The latter place, with large stores of rice and sugar, was captured in a spirited attack after slight opposition, the enemy retreating northward, while General Lawton, maintaining great activity to his right and front, felt along the east bank of the Rio Grande in the vicinity of San Luis to ascertain if the enemy was

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present. He was detained at Baliuag to await the delivery of rations for his command by way of Malolos and to enable General MacArthur to secure an advanced point in a more open country and discover the whereabouts of the retreating enemy. On May 5 he was instructed as follows:

GENERAL LAWTON, Baliuag:

Can not determine definite movement until MacArthur gets in position and is prepared for further action. His advance is at San Fernando. In the meantime hold present positions, observing any movements of insurgents to the north and east of you. MacArthur is confident insurgents retired up railroad instead of passing northeastward.

On the same day the following telegram was sent to General MacArthur:

You will arrest your advance at San Fernando. It is impossible to ascertain route taken by insurgents, who were not expected to make a stand at San Fernando. It is believed they will take the road to Arayat, in the direction of San Isidro. They have strong intrenchments at first-named place. Report fully conditions and casualties as soon as practicable. We congratulate your troops.

Gunboats will soon start to seek entrance of Rio Grande, but we can not obtain any encouraging information. The river from Calumpit north is navigable; the mouth very difficult of access.

Lawton holds Masin, Baliuag, and Quingua. Had quite a sharp engagement capturing first-named place. Insurgents attacked Owenshine's line last evening; quickly repulsed. They have appeared on the lake with cascos and are very active.

On May 6 the following telegrams were sent, which show the situation as then understood:

Major KOBBE, Third Artillery, Malolos:

You will take command of all the troops on the railway between Calumpit and Marilao and so dispose them as to furnish the best protection to this line of communication. It is reported that a large force from the province of Morong is now moving to attack General Lawton's right by way of Nozagaray and Angat. It is possible that a portion of this force may appear at Santa Maria and attempt the destruction of the railroad in that vicinity. With General Lawton's force at Baliuag, a detachment at Quingua, and another at Bagbag Bridge, it would appear that only that portion of the line between Guiguinto and Marilao could be in danger. Bocaue and Bigaa should be made strong, having detachments well out toward Santa Maria. Acknowledge receipt.

MANILA, May 6.

General LAWTON, Baliuag:

Please report localities at which rice and sugar found and destroyed by your scouts were captured and what section of country your scouts are observing to-day.

MacArthur's success at Santo Tomas and San Fernando greater than at first reported. Enemy's loss was very severe, they leaving some 50 or 60 dead on the field and probably a couple of hundred rifles. * * * Enemy evidently thinks you are supplied by Angat. The insurgent force at San Mateo was ready to move last night. It is fairly well armed, has fair amount ammunition and plenty of rice. Subsistence and ammunition transported by extra men. Watch well by scouting parties country to the east of you. The reported line of enemy's march is Norzagaray, Angat, San Rafael and Bustos. Also rumored that a force may strike at Santa Maria. General Hall will send out detachments to watch road by Novaliches. Acknowledge receipt.

From all the information I was able to obtain, and from the fact that the inhabitants of the Tarlac province and to the north of the same were not strongly in sympathy with the rebellion, I was convinced that Luna's immediate army, which had confronted MacArthur's

troops, would retire by Arayat, a strong natural position and strongly intrenched, into the Tagalo province of Nueva Ecija covering San Isidro, where abundant supplies could be obtained. As soon as MacArthur, by scouting to his front, had definitely ascertained and reported that this army had retreated on the line of railroad the situation was understood. There was one objective army on the line of railroad and another covering the country in front of Baliuag and to the east of the Rio Grande River. General Lawton was detained at Baliuag scouting to his north and east for several successive days, taking, in the meantime, Maasin, which he occupied with his advance, and capturing at various places a considerable quantity of the enemy's food supplies, which had been stored in improvised granaries. General MacArthur was directed to take Bacolor and Guagua to his left and rear, and thus establish a water base at Guagua, as the railroad was not in operation beyond Bagbag, south of Calumpit, and could not be placed in condition for use as far as San Fernando in less time than ten days, at least, and the bridges not for two or three weeks. Fortunately an engine and a few cars had been captured near San Fernando and could do service north of Calumpit after a slight repair of the railway track.

On May 7 Captain Grant, of the Utah Artillery, with two gunboats, was instructed to proceed from Manila to Guagua with supplies for MacArthur's troops, with whom he was directed to communicate at that point. He found the entrance of the Guagua River without difficulty, proceeded upstream until Sexmoan was reached, when he was fired upon by some 500 of the enemy strongly intrenched on a projecting point of the river bank. He passed the point without responding, swung into the bank immediately after passing it and opened a deadly fire, striking the insurgents in flank behind their breastworks, and quickly scattered those who were able to retire. He met no further opposition until Guagua was reached. Then he boldly ran along the city's wharves and cleared the place of the few armed insurgents present, who set fire to several buildings and retreated. Landing his men, he pursued the enemy a short distance, then assisted the citizens to extinguish the fires, and retired to his boats. The San Fernando troops not appearing, he returned to Manila on the following day. Before Captain Grant was directed to proceed to Guagua General MacArthur had signified his ability to communicate with him there, but subsequently, and after Grant was beyond recall, he reported that his situation was such with regard to the enemy that he did not consider the movement on Bacolor and Guagua prudent. At the first-named place there was quite a force of the enemy intrenched, and he did not think that his force at that time was sufficient to drive it off and hold the Guagua line while maintaining also his line of communication by rail. As soon as Captain Grant reported at Manila he was directed to find the mouth of the Rio Grande and pass up that stream to Calumpit, which place he successfully reached without marked incident on May 10. He was then directed to proceed up the river and clear the banks of insurgents as far as Candaba, which he accomplished, having a sharp engagement at San Luis. These boats could navigate this river as far up as Arayat, a point some 12 miles northeast of San Fernando, and could keep that line open without much difficulty. It was determined, therefore, to move MacArthur's troops on Luna's flank, as a further immediate advance up the railroad was impracticable because of the impossibility of then taking supplies by that route; and after

we had secured the Rio Grande, on May 11, I telegraphed MacArthur as follows:

No intention to make San Fernando base for future operations. You say supply by water at that point impracticable and reconstruction of railway necessary. Several days yet required to reach Calumpit with railway, and probably several more necessary to reach San Fernando. Calumpit will be the base and troops supplied, for a time at least, by cascoes to be sent there at once. There are 6 feet of water in Rio Grande to Candaba, and it is practicable for light-draft boats to reach San Isidro. Your first objective is Candaba, where gunboats can meet you; thence probably by river road north. One-half light battery and your convalescents, of which 100 South Dakota men should go up to-day, will be sent you, and probably 2 battalions Seventeenth Infantry. This will carry your enlisted force to about 4,000 and should be ample to drive any force enemy can place in your front. General Lawton has a more difficult problem. The enemy has a large force at San Ildefonso and San Miguel, and it is now reported that Generals Pilar and Geronimo have reached latter point. Should Lawton be pressed hard it may be necessary for you to give assistance by way of Candaba, otherwise he will join you on river near San Isidro. It is believed that gunboats, cascoes, and launches can supply you on river, and it will not be necessary for your train to carry very much supply. One battalion Seventeenth Infantry will probably be sent you tomorrow afternoon. You will necessarily need sufficient supplies on starting to take you to Candaba. There is great necessity for celerity of movement, and it is desired that it be inaugurated as soon as practicable.

To this dispatch the General replied that he would act on the instructions contained therein at once, but considered the directed movement a very delicate one and that conditions should be carefully weighed before it was attempted; that his position at San Fernando was satisfactory, and that he thought the troops should remain to recuperate until the railway could be repaired to that point; that he had about 3,800 men, 2,600 of whom were continually on the fighting line, and that he desired to exchange regiments which were with him for some in rear, which were comparatively fresh; that Luna was in his immediate front with 2,500 men and had 1,000 at Mexico, on the Candaba road, and that there were possibly 10,000, between him and the Baliuag country. MacArthur's troops were at this time pretty well worn out, and a great many of them were on sick report. They had been fighting almost continually for three months in a tropical climate and over a swampy country through which wagon transportation could not be moved. There were no fresh troops to send to San Fernando. The withdrawal of the Spanish forces in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, where troops must be placed, the necessity of sending others to Cebu and to increase those in Negros—all of which was imperatively demanded at this time—rendered conditions somewhat critical. I had also been directed to return the volunteer organizations to the United States without delay, and in response I cabled, on May 11, to Washington as follows:

Volunteer organizations first to return now at Negros and 45 miles from Manila at front. Expected that transports now arriving will take returning volunteers. Volunteers understand they will begin to leave for United States latter part of month. Know importance of their presence here at this time, and accept sacrifices which United States interests make imperative. *Hancock* now entering harbor. Transports returning this week carry sick and wounded men. *Pennsylvania* and *St. Paul* not needed longer in southern waters where they have been retained, hence dispatched. Transports *Nelson* and *Cleveland* brought freight; return without cargo.

This I did after consulting with some of the most prominent volunteer officers, pointing out to them the delicate situation we were in, and they responded that the volunteers would willingly remain until it was cleared up or until more of the regular regiments then en route could arrive. We must now either advance at the north or retreat to

Calumpit, holding the railroad in our rear and await reinforcements with which to replace all volunteers, having in the meantime a large insurgent force in our immediate front and a continually increasing one south of Manila, which had become annoying and which now numbered 5,000 men. It was therefore determined to direct MacArthur to hold on to San Fernando with what force he had, operating against and holding Luna as best he could; to send a detached column up the Rio Grande, and to permit Lawton to advance. The Ninth and Seventeenth Infantry had reported by April 23, and the Twenty-first arrived on May 11. This gave us opportunity to forward more of the Manila troops. Major Kobbe, Third Artillery, then at Malolos, was directed to Calumpit, to which point 1 battalion of the Ninth Infantry, 3 of the Seventeenth, and Light Battery E, First Artillery were sent. He was ordered to proceed up the river with this force to Candaba, attended by the gunboats which were to haul cascoes loaded with 20,000 extra rations. This command left Calumpit May 16 and reached Candaba the following day, having encountered little opposition.

On May 13 General Lawton reported from Baliuag that a commission sent by General Aguinaldo had presented itself and desired to be sent to Manila to confer with the United States Peace Commission. He was instructed as follows:

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., May 13, 1899.

Maj. Gen. H. W. LAWTON, U. S. V.,
Commanding United States Forces, Baliuag, Luzon.

GENERAL: The commanding general of the United States forces in the Philippines directs me to inform you that you will reply to the communication addressed to you by Gen. Gregorio del Pilar, of the Philippine forces at your front, which communication was delivered to me by Captain Sewell, of your staff, and is herewith returned, that should General Aguinaldo desire to send representative men to confer with the United States commission now in session in this city, you are at liberty and will pass such body through your lines, promising them safe conduct to and from Manila and ample protection during their stay here. Railway transportation between Malolos and Manila is freely accorded.

Very respectfully,

THOMAS H. BARRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

This commission was received by me upon arrival and made known its mission, which was to take preliminary action toward the negotiation of terms of peace. It was quickly informed that cessation of hostilities depended entirely upon surrender of arms and the disbandment of their military organizations. Expressing then the desire to confer with the peace commission, it was afforded the opportunity. For lack of time I was not present at any of these conferences, which extended through two days. The commission was then sent north through our lines, having accomplished nothing in so far as my knowledge extended.

On May 14 General Lawton was given permission to advance on San Miguel as his objective. Leaving a battalion of troops at Baliuag he marched rapidly on Ildefonso, where he routed a strong force of the enemy by a dexterous flank movement to his right, and proceeding on San Miguel, where the enemy was strongly intrenched, accomplished the same result by similar tactics. On the evening of May 15 he was instructed as follows:

General LAWTON, San Miguel:

Your next objective is San Isidro, unless your progress so much impeded by enemy that your subsistence likely to give out, in which event you should seek road to Rio Grande and try to communicate with Kobbe's column and gunboats, where

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you will find rations. Kobbe's column will be pushed up as rapidly as possible, but can not tell how far gunboats can ascend river. Believe they can ascend to Arayat, where enemy have heavy intrenchments. Watch well your right. It is reported that a large number of insurgents are at Biacnabato. Report not verified. No change in MacArthur's front. Still confronted by about 5,000 men.

Marching out of San Miguel the next morning, where he left a containing force, he struck the insurgents, whom he drove to the right and left, and bewildering them by his rapidity of movement, which rendered them unable to concentrate, he seized San Isidro, the third insurgent capital, on May 17, General Aguinaldo and cabinet, with troops, having retired to Cabanatuan, 14 miles to the north, on road leading into the mountains of northern Luzon. Late in the evening of that day General MacArthur reported as follows:

My information is not absolutely certain, but everything indicates that insurgents from my front and right retired along the railroad. A reconnoitering party reached the 67-kilometer post, and at that point discovered stragglers apparently in rear of a column moving in their front. We went out the road through Mexico to Santa Ana and found both points vacated, and was informed by natives that insurgent soldiers had gone to Angeles. Up to late hour this afternoon the line between here and Bacolor was still occupied by insurgents. To-morrow I hope to get definite information.

The following day it was ascertained that Luna had retreated on Tarlac with about 3,000 men, leaving a considerable force under General Mascardo on General MacArthur's left, with headquarters at Santa Rita or in that vicinity. It was believed that a considerable insurgent force would be found at the strong defensive position of Arayat, and to that point both General Lawton and Major Kobbe were sent, General Lawton being instructed at midnight May 17 as follows:

General LAWTON, *San Isidro*:

Your next objective, Arayat down Rio Grande, after troops have rested and peace restored at San Isidro. Arayat reported to be strongly intrenched. Kobbe and gunboats started up river this morning at 6. This early announcement, fearing telegraphic communication may be lost.

On the following morning the following information was sent him:

General LAWTON, *San Isidro*:

General MacArthur reports that from information almost positive he believes that 1,000 of Luna's men have retired to Florida Blanca and Porac, which are to his left; that Luna with 3,000 armed men is at Tarlac. He states that all his information is to the effect that Luna has not sent assistance to the east and is not likely to do so, as there is no cooperation between him and the force on the San Isidro line. He states that Major Bell is on reconnoissance and now at or near Angeles; that he will not probably hear from him until late this evening. MacArthur's information was obtained from inhabitants of the country and an Englishman, Mr. Sims, who left Tarlac last evening and has just entered his lines.

Should this information prove true, all of the force sent by you to San Miguel this morning should continue its journey to Baliuag. Troops at San Miguel can not be supplied during the season of heavy rains.

Lawton, descending the Rio Grande, and Kobbe, ascending the stream, struck the place on the same hour of the day; found only a small force there, which quickly retreated. It was now determined to operate on General Luna's left flank, Lawton, reenforced by Kobbe, to take the road to Tarlac, when it was ascertained that General Luna had removed his headquarters to Bayambang, only a few miles north of Dagupan, and that his troops were retiring north of Tarlac. The railway facilities which the insurgents possessed rendered a rapid retreat on their part very easy.

The rainy season had now come and the volunteer organizations

must be hastened homeward, and should a column be sent to Tarlac the enemy would retire, leaving us a destroyed or badly damaged railroad without the means to operate it, and we were seriously crippled for lack of wagon transportation. Our troops once at Tarlac could not be supplied, and all were needed at other points until we could consummate the difficult feat of exchanging the volunteers for organizations of the regular establishment. We must keep what we had gained, and could do that by establishing a line to the front, extending from San Fernando on the left to Baliuag on the right, from which it would be easy to resume operations. General Lawton was recalled, a sufficient force placed at Candaba, San Luis, Calumpit, and Baliuag to hold the country in rear, and steps were taken to return and ship the volunteers as rapidly as circumstances would permit. But the condition of General MacArthur's troops was not improving. The volunteers had again become very restless and desired to depart. On June 2 the surgeon of one of these regiments reported that of 873 officers and enlisted men 30 per cent were in the Manila hospitals sick and wounded, 30 per cent were sick at San Fernando, "and of the remainder there are not 8 men in each company who have the strength to endure one day's march." In respect to this report the chief surgeon of MacArthur's division remarked that he had made a careful examination of the men and that of the whole number in the regiment then present only 96 were fit for duty. The division commander remarked on May 22 and June 5, with regard to these and similar reports, as follows:

The duty required of the men of this brigade, in common with the other commands of the division, has been severe and continuous since the 4th of February of the current year. The sun, field rations, physical exertion, and the abnormal excitement arising from almost constant exposure to fire action have operated to bring about a general enervation from which the men do not seem to readily recover, although the present conditions are very favorable. The four regiments now present have an enlisted strength of 8,701. Of these 1,003 are sick and wounded, leaving an effective of 2,698, which, after deducting necessary details for special duty, yields only 2,307 for the firing line, many of whom could not march 5 miles under the conditions which obtained from Malolos to this place.

The physical condition of men in the organizations which originally commenced the campaign in this division and are still at the front has during the past month been a matter of great concern. The difficulties are progressive and without any apparent fluctuation are growing worse from day to day.

For four months these men have been continually under arms night and day, exposed in a relaxing climate to a scorching sun, almost as destructive and much harder to bear than the enemy's fire, until apparently the severe, unrelenting, and almost unexampled strain has told upon whole organizations to such an extent that they are now completely worn out and broken in health.

Later the chief surgeon of the department stated, when commenting on the conditions presented:

I can add nothing to the careful and valuable report made by the chief surgeon of the division. The data must be accurate and the conclusion unimpeachable. These men and the men of the companion regiments have been overworked, are broken down, and will not be fit for duty as a regiment within any reasonable period. It is difficult to explain, except at a length that would be unacceptable, how these physiological factors operate, but the fact remains, and here is a striking illustration of it, that commands do become worn out precisely as the fifth indorsement states.

The weakened hearts and quickened pulses indicate a condition akin to that of typhoid fever convalescence, and restoration to physical efficiency will not take place in this climate within any reasonable period, and meanwhile such men display no vital resistance to acute disease.

This feature of the "soldier's irritable heart" was a condition well recognized during the severe strain of the civil war, but with these men there is the additional disability of general physical prostration.

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These reports I forwarded to Washington on June 23, with the following indorsement:

Respectfully forwarded to the Adjutant-General of the Army. I have inquired carefully into the condition of health of these organizations, which is now improving. The cause of sickness may be attributed, I believe, to the great strain attendant upon constant fighting, with lack of needed rest, neglect of person during this period, because of which a peculiar disease, designated itch, was developed, and indiscriminate consumption of fruit, which was abundant in the country over which troops passed and are stationed, and the use of water not potable. The South Dakota regiment was brought to Manila two weeks ago and is rapidly improving. The Kansas regiment is en route and the Montana regiment will soon follow. I think, like the Oregon regiment, when orders to take passage to the United States are issued, that both the Montana and South Dakota troops will recover with astonishing rapidity. There are few cases of serious illness. San Fernando, the present station of these troops, is considered somewhat as a health resort by the Filipinos, and there seems to be no good reason why men should not improve as rapidly there as in Manila, except that there is in the vicinity of San Fernando a very active enemy, which must be constantly watched, necessitating a larger percentage of men on outpost duty than at some other points.

The headquarters and 10 companies of the Third Infantry, with a platoon of artillery and a mounted troop of the Fourth Cavalry, took station at Baliuag, and headquarters and 2 battalions of the Twenty-second Infantry were placed at Candaba and San Luis, to be assisted, in case of attack, by one of the gunboats which was left in the Rio Grande, and which was to be used also in forwarding supplies from Calumpit. The rains coming on and heavy storms having been predicted for that section of country, the troops at San Miguel, whose rations were about exhausted, were ordered to fall back at once on Baliuag. They were attacked while en route at Ildefonso and Maasin, and were obliged to halt twice and drive off the enemy, which they did effectively, but the enemy published and celebrated for a long time their signal victories at Ildefonso, San Miguel, and San Isidro.

During these Luzon military operations affairs in the central islands became more or less critical, demanded careful supervision, and occasionally an accession of troops. As early as February 3 General Miller had reported from Iloilo that the inhabitants of Negros and Cebu realized that they could not successfully establish an independent government and wished the United States to exercise control. After the capture of Iloilo the navy visited the city of Cebu and took quiet possession of the place—the commanding officer of the force assuming direction of the business of the captain of the port and collector of customs and entering into an arrangement with the more prominent citizens to permit them to conduct their own internal affairs. This was reported to me with the request that troops be sent to that point to assist the small navy force there in case of necessity. On receipt of this information, and on February 26, the following order was issued and executed:

A battalion of the Twenty-third U. S. Infantry, Maj. G. A. Goodale commanding, will proceed at once by transport *Pennsylvania* to the port of Cebu, Island of Cebu, for the purpose of furnishing immediate protection to the inhabitants and property of that locality. The battalion will be supplied with rations for thirty days and 300 rounds of ammunition per man.

This did not relieve the officers of the Navy of the administration of civil affairs, the management of which it was desirable to turn over to the Army, and they continued in control awaiting our action to take formal possession. Upon General Miller's report that he had held a conference with some of the principal citizens of the island of Negros



CALLE DE MALACANAN (SAN MIGUEL, MANILA). ON THE RIGHT IS THE ENTRANCE TO THE SUMMER PALACE OF MALACANAN, FORMER RESIDENCE OF SPANISH MILITARY GOVERNOR, NOW RESIDENCE OF GEN. E. S. OTIS, UNITED STATES MILITARY GOVERNOR.

and that they had raised the United States flag, wished a few troops to protect them from the Tagalos, whom they had declined to receive in the island, and desired to be sent to Manila to present conditions and solicit aid, instructions were given for a compliance with their request, whereupon a committee of four gentlemen arrived here on the 21st of February. Several conferences followed. They had, they said, established a crude temporary government, appointing a governor who was one of their number; that if permitted to arm a small battalion of natives to be placed under the direction of the United States officers and to receive the assistance of a few United States troops, they were confident that the quiet of the island could be maintained and the Tagalo element successfully restrained. A great deal of conversation, consuming portions of several successive days, followed. They were eager to be informed of the purposes of the United States, and were informed that a military government with general supervision of their affairs must be erected and maintained until Congressional legislation prescribed the nature and measure of control which would be imposed; that no assurances could be given them except that the civil government to be finally established would be republican in character and would give them as much local representation as the intelligence and animus of the people permitted and as was in harmony with their own and the interests of the United States.

The troops asked for were provided, and the committee was advised to return, call their representative people together, and, acting with and under the advice of the military governor whom I would send, to formulate and submit a plan of government for the administration of strictly internal affairs, which upon receipt I would forward for the consideration of the United States supreme authorities. I selected for their governor Colonel Smith, of the First California Volunteers, now brigadier-general of volunteers, an excellent soldier and a lawyer of experience. He had several conferences with them and won their confidence and esteem, when they expressed a strong desire to have him and a few troops accompany them to Negros, which was favorably acted upon.

To meet the situation which was rapidly developing in Panay, Negros, and Cebu the following orders were issued:

GENERAL ORDERS, } HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS.
No. 8. } Manila, P. I., March 1, 1899.

1. A military district, comprising the islands of Panay, Negros, and Cebu and such other Visayan Islands as may be hereafter designated, to be known as the Visayan military district, is hereby established and placed under the supervision of Brig. Gen. Marcus P. Miller, U. S. A., commanding First Separate Brigade, Eighth Army Corps, with headquarters at Iloilo. The troops already sent to Cebu and those about to embark for Negros will furnish all possible protection to those islands, maintaining peace and order while administering the civil affairs throughout the islands on lines prescribed by the military government.

2. Col. James F. Smith, First Regiment California Volunteer Infantry, is hereby detached from his regiment, and will proceed by U. S. transport *St. Paul* with the troops mentioned in paragraph 5 of this order to Bacolod, Negros, via Iloilo, reporting upon his arrival at the last-named point to Brig. Gen. M. P. Miller, U. S. A., commanding the Visayan military district, the specific instructions which he has received from these headquarters, and there to receive such additional instructions as General Miller may wish to give in furtherance of their execution.

3. Colonel Smith is assigned to the command of the subdistrict of the island of Negros, and will establish his headquarters at the capital of that island, furnishing protection to the inhabitants thereof, whom he will assist to develop civil administration over the affairs of that island in accordance with the specific instructions already received from these headquarters.

4. Col. James F. Smith, First California Volunteer Infantry, commanding sub-district of the island of Negros, will upon his arrival there, as directed in paragraph 2 of this order, proceed to organize from the natives of the island a civil police of 200 men, placing the organization under military discipline and retaining entire supervision of it. The men will be employed by the Quartermaster's Department and will be reported monthly on the quartermaster's form of persons and articles hired, on which will be stated their nativity and age, in addition to periods of service. Their compensation will be fixed by the scale of wages prevailing on the island, and the funds to pay for the services will be furnished from these headquarters. Each employee will receive a fixed ration, in addition to his money compensation, which will correspond to the native ration issued in this city. The Ordnance Department will turn over the necessary ordnance to arm and equip these men.

5. The Third Battalion of the First California Volunteer Infantry will embark at once on the U. S. transport *St. Paul*, prepared to proceed to Bacolod, island of Negros. It will be provided with rations for thirty days and 150,000 rounds of rifle ammunition. The commanding officer of this battalion (Maj. H. T. Sime, First California Volunteer Infantry) will report to Col. James F. Smith, of that regiment, for more specific instructions.

By command of Major-General Otis:

THOMAS H. BARRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

General Smith, with the troops and commissioners, left Manila on March 2, and on arrival at Bacolod, the capital of Negros, he took station and successfully organized a battalion of 200 natives, which has been loyal and has performed good service for the United States to the present date. But certain of the inhabitants of Tagalo nativity and others who were disaffected, aided by their friends in Panay, both with advice and war material, and assisted by the robber bands of the mountains, created disturbances in the western, central, and southern portions of the island which culminated in active hostilities. Smith, with his troops, went in pursuit of their concentrated forces wherever they chanced to be and successfully routed them, but it was impossible to cover the country and prevent reconcentration. He thereupon called for another battalion of his regiment, which was sent him on March 22. With this increased command he visited all occupied points of the island, and especially held in check the people of Dumaguete and Bais, on the southeast coast, where the insurgent element for a time appeared to be in the ascendancy.

This force not proving sufficient to place troops at all necessary points, a call was made for the third battalion of the regiment, which was forwarded on May 21. In the meantime the population of occidental and oriental Negros chose delegates to represent their several political districts in a convention at Bacolod, where, after some two months labor under the direction and protection of General Smith, a constitution was prepared for submission to the President of the United States. This document, having been received here, was forwarded to Washington about July 20 with appropriate remark, and served as a basis for the following order:

GENERAL ORDERS. }

No. 30.

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., July 22, 1899.

The people of Negros, through duly accredited representatives, having freely acknowledged the sovereignty of the United States over that island, and having developed and forwarded to His Excellency the President of the United States, for the consideration and deliberation of Congress, a proposed constitution or body of fundamental laws, upon which they seek to have established for themselves a republican form of government, it is deemed essential, pending final

action by the President and the Congress of the United States thereon, and while military supervision of the affairs of the island must be maintained, that a provisional government to administer its civil matters be instituted, under which the people may enjoy the largest measure of civil liberty compatible with prevailing conditions and which shall conform to their desires as expressed in their proposed constitution.

It is therefore ordered that a government for that island be established as speedily as practicable in plan and scope as indicated in the following enumerated provisions—the same to remain in force until modified by constituted authority.

I. The government of the island of Negros shall consist of a military governor, appointed by the United States military governor of the Philippines, who shall command the United States troops stationed therein a civil governor and advisory council elected by the people. The military governor shall appoint secretaries of the treasury, interior, agriculture, public instruction, an attorney-general, and an auditor, who shall act under his immediate instructions. The seat of government shall be established at Bacolod.

II. The military governor shall exercise the supreme executive power. He shall see that the laws are executed; shall appoint to office and fill all vacancies in office not herein otherwise provided for, and may, with the approval of the military governor of the Philippines, remove any officer from office. He shall perform such other functions as the duties of his position may require.

III. The civil governor: There shall be elected by the people a civil governor, who shall advise the military governor on all public civil questions, and who shall preside over the advisory council. He shall countersign all grants and commissions of a civil nature which are executed by the military governor; attend every session of the advisory council, and in case of a tie vote in said body he shall cast the deciding vote; shall receive all bills and resolutions of the advisory council; shall attest the official acts of the military governor in so far as strictly civil matters are concerned; shall affix the great seal with his own attestation to all civil commissions, pardons, and public instruments to which the official signature of the military governor is required, and perform such other duties as may be duly conferred upon him.

IV. The advisory council: An advisory council, to consist of 8 members, shall be elected by the people, and shall be selected within the following territorial limits: One from the island of Negros at large; three from Oriental Negros, and four from Occidental Negros. The times and places of electing these members, after the first election, shall be fixed by the advisory council on the approval of the military governor.

Occidental Negros shall have four members of the advisory council, representing four districts, constituted and designated as follows:

The cities and pueblos of San Carlos, Calatrava, Escalante, Sagay, Cadiz, Manapla, Victorias, and Saravia shall compose the first district.

The cities and pueblos of Estaquio Lopez, Guimbalaon, Silay, Talisay, Lacson, Granada, Murcia, Bacolod, Sumag, Kansilayan, and Abuanan shall compose the second district.

The cities and pueblos of Bago, Maa, Pulupandan, Valladolid, San Enrique, La Carlota, Pontevedra, La Castellana, and Magallon shall compose the third district.

The cities and pueblos of Ginigaran, Binalbagan, Soledad, Isabela, Jimamaylan, Suay, Kabankalan, Ilog, Dankalan, Guiljugan, Kauayan, and Isiu shall compose the fourth district.

Oriental Negros shall have three members of the advisory council, representing three districts constituted and designated as follows:

The cities and pueblos of Dumaguete, Valencia, Bakon, Dauin, Zamboanguita, Siaton, Tolon, and Bayauan shall compose the First district.

The cities and pueblos of Sibulan, Ayukitan, Amblan, Tanjay, Bais, Manjuyod, Ayungon, Zayaran, Jimalalud, and Guijulan shall compose the Second district.

The cities and pueblos of Siquijor, Kamoan, Maria, Laay and San Juan shall compose the Third district.

V. Elections: The times and places of holding elections for the civil governor and for members of the advisory council shall be fixed by the military governor of the island.

VI. Qualifications of voters: In order to be qualified to vote at any election a person shall (1) be a male citizen of the island of Negros; (2) he shall have attained the age of 21 years; (3) he shall be able to speak, read, and write understandingly the English, Spanish, or Visayan language, or he must be the owner of real property worth \$500 or pay a rental on real property of the value of \$1,000; (4) he must have resided in the island not less than one year preceding and in the district in

which he offers to register as a voter not less than three months immediately preceding the time when he offers to register; (5) he shall, prior to each regular election, during the time prescribed by law for registration, have caused his name to be entered on the register of voters for his district; and (6) prior to such registration he shall have paid all taxes due by him to the government: *Provided*, That no insane person, or deaf-mute who can not read or write, shall be allowed to register or vote.

The military governor shall make suitable provisions for the registration of voters, for the preparation of ballots, and for the method of casting votes at the first election.

VII. The military governor of the island shall have the right to veto all bills or resolutions adopted by the advisory council, and his veto shall be final if not disapproved by the military governor of the Philippines.

VIII. The advisory council shall discharge all the ordinary duties of a legislature.

IX. The secretary of the treasury: It shall be the duty of the secretary of the treasury to receive and safely keep all the public funds not confided by law to the custody of other officers, to expend money only upon warrants drawn by the auditor attached to the vouchers upon which the warrants are drawn, to keep a careful account of all moneys received and expended by law, and once a month to report to the auditor an itemized statement of the warrants paid and the money balances on hand in the treasury. He shall perform such other duties as may be prescribed by law.

X. The secretary of the interior: It shall be the duty of the secretary of the interior to supervise public lands, forests, mines, surveys, public works, provide for the taking of the census, and to take appropriate measures for safeguarding the public health. He shall perform such other duties as may be duly committed to his charge.

XI. The secretary of agriculture: It shall be the duty of the secretary of agriculture to study the agricultural resources of the island with a view to increasing the wealth derived therefrom. He shall give special attention to the means of combating diseases or pests which attack animals or crops, to the study and recommendation of improved methods of cultivation, to the introduction of new products suited to the climate and soil, and shall perform such other duties as may be legally prescribed.

XII. The secretary of public instruction shall have charge of the establishment and maintenance of free public schools for primary instruction throughout the island, and of such other schools of higher instruction as may be required or suited to the needs and advancement of the people. He shall have general supervision of all matters relating to public instruction.

XIII. The attorney-general: It shall be the duty of the attorney-general to prosecute and defend all causes to which the Island of Negros or any one of its officers is a party, and to give legal advice to any officer of the civil departments whenever the same shall be required of him in his official capacity. He shall perform such other duties as may be prescribed by law.

XIV. The auditor: It shall be the duty of the auditor to report to the military governor, whenever so required, an itemized statement of the expenses of the government for past periods, and an itemized estimate of all expenses of the government for the ensuing fiscal year, accompanied by a report of the amount of money on hand in the treasury to meet such expenses, and the amount of revenue necessary to be raised for government purposes by taxation or otherwise. He shall also report such scheme as to him may seem proper to secure economy in the public service. He shall draw warrants on the secretary of the treasury for all sums of public money required and estimated for by officers of the government, after having satisfied himself of the legality and correctness of the proposed expenditures which the money asked for is to meet. He shall perform such other duties as shall be legally imposed.

XV. Municipal governments: Municipal governments shall be organized as soon as possible under the supervision of the military and civil governors and the advisory council. They shall have the usual powers and perform the usual duties of such bodies, subject to the direction of the military governor.

XVI. Officers of cities, towns, and municipalities in office at the time of the promulgation of this order shall continue to act in their official capacity until successors are elected, selected, or appointed and qualified.

XVII. The judiciary: The judicial power shall be vested in three judges, who shall be appointed by the military governor of the island. They shall severally hold court at such times and places as may be determined by the advisory council and the military and civil governors, and shall sit in banc, at a time and place to be fixed by that authority, in order to hear appeals. Their modes of procedure,

terms of office, and compensation shall be fixed by the advisory council, on the approval of the military governor. Appeal shall lie from the court in banc to the supreme court, at Manila, in all civil cases where the amount involved exceeds \$500 (Mexican), and in all criminal cases amounting to felony.

XVIII. Inferior courts shall be provided for and established under the advice and recommendation of the civil governor and advisory council.

XIX. The jurisdiction of these courts shall not extend to nor include crimes and offenses committed by either citizens or persons sojourning within the Island of Negros which are prejudicial to military administration and discipline, except by authority specially conferred by the military governor. Jurisdiction to try and award punishment in these classes of cases remains vested in provost courts, courts-martial, or military commissions.

XX. All cases and actions pending at the time of the promulgation of this order are hereby transferred for trial and determination to the courts of appropriate jurisdiction provided for in the preceding paragraphs.

XXI. The style of all process shall be "The Judicial Department of Negros," and all prosecutions shall be carried on in the name of and by the authority of said judicial department.

XXII. Education: Free public schools shall be established throughout the populous districts of the island, in which the English language shall be taught, and this subject will receive the careful consideration of the advisory council.

XXIII. Revenue and taxation: The advisory council, presided over by the civil governor, is authorized to devise and adopt a system of taxation uniform in operation in order to raise revenue for the support of government and for all other necessary purposes. The burden of government must be equally and equitably distributed among the people.

XXIV. The military authorities will collect and receive the customs revenue, if any, will control postal matters and Philippine interisland trade and commerce.

XXV. The military governor shall, subject to the approval of the military governor of the Philippines, determine all questions not herein specifically mentioned and which do not come under the jurisdiction of the advisory council.

XXVI. The compensation of civil officers shall be as follows:

		Mexican currency.
Civil governor	per annum	\$6,000.00
Secretary of the treasury	do	3,000.00
Secretary of the interior	do	3,000.00
Secretary of agriculture	do	3,000.00
Secretary of public instruction	do	3,000.00
Attorney-general	do	3,000.00
Auditor	do	3,000.00
Members of advisory council, for each day while in session	per day	8.00

And 50 cents for each kilometer of distances traveled between place of residence and place of meeting and return. The period of the regular session of the advisory council shall not exceed one hundred and twenty days during the year, but in case of necessity the civil governor, with the approval of the military governor, shall call extra sessions for such periods of time as shall be deemed proper and shall be designated in the call. Per diem and mileage at the rate fixed above shall be allowed the members of the advisory council for any extra session they may attend.

XXVII. The military governor of the island is empowered to take all necessary action to put in execution the foregoing directory provisions. Instructions prescribing methods and date of election of officers who are to be selected by ballot will be issued, and the election will be held at as early a day as practicable.

By command of Major-General Otis:

THOMAS H. BARRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

In the new field of politics, upon which these people entered with alacrity, there were many disagreements—the result of personal ambitions probably, as well as of antagonistic honest opinion, and complaints were heard and opposition was frequently offered to the civil officers of districts to whom they had intrusted the preservation of law and order. Those exercising the civil power, acquainted only with Spanish methods, sought to organize a military police force which was made responsible only to its founder and which executed his orders in a very arbitrary and oftentimes cruel manner. It was unreliable, and a portion of it served the Tagalo and robber element,

to which many deserted. Through all the turmoils and difficulties experienced by the advocates for United States Government General Smith retained the confidence of all factions and assisted to heal their differences. They desired an election of such classes of officers as might be permitted to direct local affairs under United States military supervision, and an opportunity to manifest their fitness for an abridged form of government has been given them. What the result will be can not as yet be forecast with any certainty, but it is to be hoped that they will meet the expectations of those desiring their ultimate welfare, both for the benefits they will receive thereby and also for the sake of example to the inhabitants of the other Philippine Islands, who are now distrustful of United States intentions and its expressed good will toward them. By this latter and very large class of Filipinos affairs in Negros are closely watched, and a successfully conducted government there—one which will protect individual rights and give a fair measure of individual liberty—will be a most important factor in the pacification labors of these islands.

The United States troops in Negros have performed severe service. The Californians have been replaced by the Sixth Infantry, which, like its predecessors, has responded promptly to every demand and shown itself well able to master the military situation. General Smith still exercises supervision, and to his unremitting efforts, tact, and ability is due the fact that serious obstacles have been surmounted. Robber bands have always existed in the mountains of Negros, and their recent accessions from without encouraged them to assume a defiant front, but the heavy chastisements which they have received at the hands of our troops has well-nigh destroyed them.

Arrangements were made early to take over the civil administration of affairs of the city of Cebu. Lieutenant-Colonel Hamer, of the Idaho Volunteers, a lawyer by profession, who had filled the position of judge of one of the Manila provost courts with great credit, was selected for that duty, and on March 14 the following order was issued:

GENERAL ORDERS, {
No. 13. }

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., March 14, 1899.

1. The island of Cebu will constitute a subdistrict of the Visayan military district, with headquarters at the city of Cebu. Lieut. Col. Thomas R. Hamer, First Idaho Volunteer Infantry, is assigned to the command of the same and will proceed to that city by way of Iloilo, where he will report to the commanding general of the district for any directions the latter may desire to convey to enable him to execute the specific instructions which he will receive from these headquarters to guide him in the performance of his duties. Colonel Hamer will report to the commanding general of the department for conference and instructions and will take passage on transport *Indiana*, which has been directed to proceed to Iloilo as soon as necessary repairs to steamer can be made.

By command of Major-General Otis:

THOMAS H. BARRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

The battalion of the Twenty-third Infantry which was sent to Cebu the latter part of February had not taken any action in civil matters, but had preserved order in the community. The citizens had looked after their own local interests, and officers of the Navy had continued to conduct harbor and customs affairs, from which they were now relieved by army officers detailed to perform the duties of those positions. Shortly thereafter the dissensions between the friendly-disposed and hostile-intentioned natives became bitter and culminated in the assassination of one of the most prominent citizens simply because he advocated United States protection, and attempts were

made upon the lives of a number of others who favored United States occupation. The towns within a short radius of distance began to show the first war paint of rebellion, and the mountain peaks behind Cebu exhibited preparations for defense, or possibly attack, in newly constructed rifle intrenchments. Contraband trade along the coast of the island was active and gave the small gunboats manned by the natives considerable exciting occupation. Colonel Hamer called for additional force, and a battalion of the Tennessee regiment was sent him from Iloilo. Shortly before incursions into the interior were made by detached companies of the Twenty-third Infantry, at first without encountering much opposition, but afterwards by very decided opposition. It was apparent that the rebellion was growing stronger each succeeding day, and that increased force would be required to cope with it. The Cebu people possess great numbers of small sailing crafts, with which they are accustomed to conduct trade between their own and neighboring islands. With these they skirted other coasts and robbed the inhabitants. They impoverished and reduced to hunger the natives of the island of Bohol, and with the aid of the Tagalos and other emissaries introduced arms and ammunition among their own people. On April 6 Colonel Hamer wrote:

Our present occupancy includes only the old town of Cebu, while the insurgents under Francisco Llamas occupy the adjoining town of San Nicholas, which, in fact, is a part of the city of Cebu. This man Llamas is an active and cunning fellow whom the natives fear to the extent of conceding to him supernatural power. I may say in this connection that the president seems to hold like views with the rest of the natives on this subject. The vice-president and treasurer deny that they fear him and say that if we had sufficient force to inspire the natives with confidence in our ability to protect them Llamas's standard would be deserted, as he is deeply hated as well as feared by the people, and they only await a safe opportunity to throw off his yoke. After carefully looking over the ground I have come to the conclusion that now is the time for us to perfect our occupation of the island. We can accomplish it now with the display of force, and, in my opinion, without the loss of a man. * * * The southern coast line of the island contains all the towns of any consequence. If you can send me two more battalions, I will undertake to occupy these towns and establish in each a government which will acknowledge the supremacy of the United States, and this, too, without the loss of a single man.

But there were no troops available, for Luzon demanded every armed man. We permitted Cebu to drift and foment opposition, careful to hold securely its principal city, an important trading point and one of the open ports of the Philippines. The insurgent leaders organized their forces as best they could, without much interruption on our part, until in their conceit they commenced to assemble a force 4 miles out of the city and on the overlooking mountains, with which to drive us off at the opportune time. It grew to 1,500 and then to 2,000, having several pieces of artillery in position and rifles and ammunition in considerable quantities. Its positions were believed to be impregnable, and now as I write I learn that Colonel Snyder, of the Nineteenth Infantry, who a short time since was sent there with a portion of his regiment to relieve the Tennessee battalion—having collected all troops at hand, consisting of that contingent of his own regiment present, two companies of the Sixth Infantry sent by General Hughes from Iloilo, the Twenty-third Infantry battalion, and the Tennessee Volunteers, who chanced that way on their homeward voyage and who offered their services—has cleared the neighboring mountains of all insurgents, excepting those who now lie buried there, and has gathered in their weapons of war.

The better class of the population of the island of Cebu greatly desire stable government, and this they know they can not obtain without American supremacy and protection. When the Tagalo is driven out and the ignorant element which now cries for independence, having no conception of the meaning of the term, is forced to betake itself to legitimate occupation instead of robbery, the island will be easily controlled, and at present it would appear that the time required to bring about that desirable condition of things would not extend far into the future.

About the middle of April I was requested by the Spanish authorities to relieve the troops of Spain in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. In the group of islands last named matters were represented from Singapore and other points as being in a very unsatisfactory state, and it was asserted that the Sultan and his *datos* were securing large supplies of arms and ammunition from the Asiatic and neighboring coasts. The inhabitants (Moros) had always given Spain trouble. They had always manifested toward Spain a feeling of subdued hostility when not actually at war with her, and she had been able to impose only a recognition of very much abridged sovereignty. The Spanish acting governor-general (General Rios), who for a long time had supervised Spanish affairs in the south, informed me that he had never succeeded in stopping there the trade in arms, and as for commerce, it could never be placed under proper restrictions. We felt therefore considerable hesitancy in dispatching to the archipelago the limited force which then could be sent from Manila, apprehending more or less difficulty in securely holding necessary positions should we garrison them. All the Spanish troops which were formerly stationed along the coast of the island of Mindanao had been concentrated at Zamboanga, its chief city. The Tagalos had taken possession of the northern and northeastern coast and, with their confederates, the country in the vicinity of the above-named place.

In March the Spanish authorities advertised for public sale at the naval station of Isabella, on Basilan Island, a short distance south of Zamboanga, 13 of their gunboats which had been formerly used on the island coasts. These boats were purchased by a syndicate composed of private individuals, with the understanding that it would deliver them to the United States authorities in the harbor of Manila.

The agent of the syndicate, who after purchasing was about to leave for Isabella to receive delivery of the boats and transport them north, was informed that if he could secure the armament belonging to the vessels the United States would receive it from him at cost price. Having been promised protection by the United States Navy while en route with the vessels to Manila, he sailed for Isabella by one of the coasting merchant vessels, taking with him crews for such of the boats as were serviceable, and received them there from the Spanish authorities with their armaments, which he bought under the agreement above stated. He steamed out of Isabella Harbor, and to protect him on his voyage, awaited near Zamboanga the coming of the United States war vessel which by some misunderstanding had been detained at a northern port. While awaiting the arrival of this war vessel, and less than twenty-four hours before it reported, his fleet was seized by Mindanao insurgents, and nearly one-half of his ordnance, consisting of artillery, rifles, and ammunition for same, was taken from him and landed about a mile from Zamboanga on the Mindanao coast. By this seizure the insurgents were supplied with a few pieces

of artillery, 11 quick-firing guns, 375 rifles, with considerable ammunition for all guns and pieces, and could therefore place themselves in fair condition for attack or defense. After they had captured and landed the arms complaint was made by the agent to the commanding officer of the Spanish troops at Zamboanga, who, it was understood, after having received the assurances of the insurgent chiefs that the arms would not be employed against his troops, did not concern himself further in the matter. The gunboats and what remained of the armament were convoyed to Manila by the naval authorities and turned over to the Army, which completed the purchase by payment from the accruing civil funds of the Philippines. They were subsequently transferred to the Navy for use, and under the direction of its commander in chief have ever since rendered most efficient service along the shallow coasts and harbors of the islands. The possession of these arms by the Mindanao insurgents rendered it inexpedient to land troops at Zamboanga and attempt to hold the place with any force which could be spared from Luzon. General Rios was therefore informed that we were not prepared to relieve his garrisons at either Zamboanga or in the Sulu Archipelago until organizations then en route should arrive; that the United States was entitled to a reasonable time to take over the places which Spain desired to surrender, and that since the ratification of the treaty such time had not intervened. Thus action was held in abeyance until May 13, when news of a surprising character was received, which is shown in the following explanatory communication:

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., May 14, 1899.

Admiral GEORGE DEWEY, U. S. N.,
Commanding United States Naval Force on Asiatic Station,
Flag Ship *Olympia*, Manila Harbor, P. I.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL: Yesterday I received a dispatch from Iloilo stating that the insurgents had made an attack upon the Spanish garrison at Zamboanga, using the arms and quick-firing guns which they had captured from the Spanish gunboats. They were repulsed, but the Spanish general in command and two of his officers were wounded, one enlisted man was killed and a few wounded. The insurgents have cut off their water supply and the Spanish garrison is left in rather a perilous condition.

Last evening a cablegram sent from Iloilo by the Spanish naval lieutenant, Cano, addressed to General Rios and sent in my care, was also received. This cited facts substantially as did the cablegram sent to me. General Rios telegraphed to Madrid and received directions to withdraw the Zamboanga and Jolo garrisons immediately. He called this morning and wished me to send troops down there at once. I made him no promise, but told him I would defer my answer until tomorrow. He asked me then if you would not send down a war vessel to cruise in those waters to give aid to the Spanish garrison in case it should be placed in extremity, to which I replied that I did not know, but would seek the information from you.

The situation here is as follows: We have no more troops at the present time than we need here in Luzon, especially if we carry out the campaign as projected. Lawton took San Miguel yesterday afternoon and will be far out in a day or two. Kobbe with 1,500 men accompanies the boats up the Rio Grande River from Calumpit and will start on Tuesday morning. MacArthur seems to have all he can do to cover the Pampanga province and give the inhabitants the protection from the insurgent troops which they demand. To the south of us the number of insurgents seem to be increasing, while to the east and north of the city they still maintain their hold.

We are still holding here the two Spanish vessels, the *Leon XIII* and the *Puerto Rico*, which General Rios desires to use to take his troops away from Zamboanga and Jolo. He said this morning that if these vessels could not be given him he must depend upon some of the merchant vessels in port to take his troops off or suffer the consequences of disobedience of his Government's orders.

132 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

Looking over the entire field, 2,000 men at least will be required to take and hold Zamboanga, its environments, and the water supply. The rebels there have a good deal of artillery, and, I think, are supplied with some 600 or 800 rifles, for which they have plenty of ammunition. Jolo can be occupied with about 600 men. I think, therefore, that it might be a good scheme to send the garrison to Jolo as soon as possible, or the Moros will destroy the fortifications and guns and turn them upon us when we appear. As for Zamboanga, I am afraid that we will have to permit the Spaniards to withdraw and take it later. * * *

Does it seem desirable to send a vessel down to southern waters, as Rios requests, or could you convey our troops down south within two or three days?

One of our great needs here is light artillery. We have plenty on the transports coming, which, unfortunately, is not here now. The light battery which reported last week came off without its guns, and they are following it on the steamer *Leelanaw*, which left San Francisco on the 3d of the month. There are 20 companies of troops due here within the next two weeks; also quite a number of recruits. * * *

Yours, very truly,

E. S. OTIS,
Major-General, U. S. V., Military Governor.

To this communication Admiral Dewey responded that he would convey our troops and furnish General Rios with any assistance he desired, and I informed the general that, while regretting that we could not send troops to Zamboanga immediately, we would relieve his Sulu garrisons. The field was then carefully looked over, and as a battalion of the Twenty-third Infantry was already at Cebu it was determined to send the remainder of that regiment to the archipelago; whereupon the following orders were issued:

GENERAL ORDERS, } . HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
No. 28. } *Manila, P. I., May 15, 1899.*

The Twenty-third United States Infantry is relieved from duty at this station and will proceed at once by transport to Jolo, island of Jolo, and relieve from duty there the troops of Spain now constituting the garrison at that place.

The quartermaster's department will furnish the necessary transportation, and the subsistence will supply rations for this command for thirty days.

By command of Major-General Otis:

THOMAS H. BARRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

General Rios, with two merchant vessels, sailed on May 17 for the south to place in readiness for departure his garrison at Zamboanga, with the understanding that our troops would arrive at Jolo on board the transport *Leon XIII* in sufficient season for his archipelago garrisons to take advantage of it, sail by way of Zamboanga, when all of his command could embark, and proceed homeward. He promised to render useless all the Zamboanga guns and destroy all ammunition there which was not to be removed, and this it is believed that he did.

The headquarters and two battalions of the Twenty-third Infantry, upon reaching Jolo, found the Spanish soldiers well prepared to depart, although they did not expect to be relieved by our troops. A Spanish staff officer took passage on the vessel with instructions from General Rios to govern their movements. The small garrison maintained at Siassi, island of Siassi, had been withdrawn to Jolo and the former place turned over to the Sultan, who had in person gone there from Maibun, his capital, and taken formal possession. The exchange of troops was quietly effected, full military honors were accorded, and the flags of the respective nations participating were saluted by our war vessel in the harbor when the Spaniards were formed to march out of the post and embark.

The force sent to Jolo arrived on May 19, and consisted of 19 line officers, 2 assistant surgeons, a chaplain, and 733 enlisted men. It

relieved a garrison consisting of 24 officers and 800 enlisted men. The post or village is described as follows:

It is hardly more than a good-sized military post, beautifully laid out, with broad, clean streets, lined with flowering trees and gardens, and surrounded by a loop-holed wall about 8 feet high and 1½ feet thick. The population is estimated at 400, mostly Chinamen, one German, no other Europeans. Four male Moros live within the walls. The public buildings are in a dilapidated condition. The governor's residence and office is one small building. There is one group of barracks (four buildings) which will accommodate one battalion. The theater will accommodate one company, and outlying blockhouses two companies. A commissary, post-office, schoolhouse, a hospital for about 100 beds, a market, and some few small structures compose the remainder of the public buildings.

The commanding officer of the United States troops reported the day after his arrival that—

The situation, in so far as determined from our limited experience, is as follows: Spain possesses the small walled town known as Jolo. The governor has complete control within the walls. There are no civil courts, no civil officers. Outside the walls the Sultan of Jolo and Borneo is the ruler. Spain pays him \$200, Mexican, per month. At present he is not on the island, but is visiting one of the neighboring islands about 30 miles south. He has recently returned from Mecca, and now dresses in European costume. Spanish soldiers seldom go beyond the range of the outlying blockhouses. The relation between the natives (Moros) and Spain is not altogether harmonious.

Subsequent reports showed that the Spanish troops had received orders to prepare for withdrawal from the archipelago and expected to depart very soon, but had not been informed that they would be relieved by United States troops. The Spanish commandant and governor had therefore taken the Sultan to Siassi from Maibun and turned the place over to him, and intended to turn over Jolo also when his force should evacuate. Our arrival was most opportune, and a matter of surprise—unpleasantly so—to the Sultan, who expected to award his *datos* with this acquired possession. His *datos* on Jolo Island were not, however, on the most amicable terms with him, and seemed to be pleased to welcome the Americans. They called on Captain Pratt, who was in command of our troops, expressed friendly intentions, and gave adhesion to the United States.

The captain, with some of his officers, returned the call, were the first Europeans who had ever entered the house of the chief neighboring *dato*, and were hospitably entertained. The Sultan, disappointed, lingered at Siassi, where he had established a police and garrison, and did not respond to the invitation to call upon our officers. His mother, the Sultanese, however, who was at Maibun, sent the Sultan's secretary to welcome the Americans, when a return call was made upon her and she received our representatives most graciously and expressed gratification. Thus through the diplomacy of Captain Pratt and his subordinates a most satisfactory condition of affairs was attained upon which to base future negotiations, which were conducted by Brig. Gen. John C. Bates, U. S. V., during July and August.

Brigadier-General Hughes was relieved as provost-marshal-general at Manila and assigned to the command of the Visayan military district on May 25. He proceeded to his headquarters at Iloilo, Panay, early in June with instructions to carefully supervise matters in Negros and Cebu, but not to conduct any military operations in Panay further than was necessary to hold Iloilo and its outlying villages, then in our possession, as no additional troops could be given him and as the policy of nonaction in the island other than might be considered defense would result in dissensions between the Visayan and Tagalo, who, should we attack, would unite all factions for resistance. The

policy has worked excellently. Tagalo soldiers to the number of about 2,000 had been sent from Luzon. Their officers practically assumed the conduct of all Panay affairs, even if they did not do so ostensibly or expressly, and the Panay inhabitants have been made to suffer severe pecuniary losses and in some parts of the island great lack of provisions, while robbery and other crimes have prevailed. The manifested hostility between Visayan and Tagalo is now very pronounced. We have been invited by the former to take possession of northern and eastern Panay, with promises of assistance if we would consent to do so, and very recently the Tagalos assumed control in every particular, disarmed all the Visayans on the plea that they could not be relied upon for support, and are conducting a military government in accordance with their individual desires, the chief object of which is reported to be individual pecuniary profit.

While during the month of May the majority of our troops were operating to the north of Manila in central Luzon, the insurgents in the Cavite and Morong provinces, south and east of the city, were very active, and extreme watchfulness on the part of our thin lines of defense was necessary. Their numbers continued to increase until they had concentrated some 6,000 on the south and some 2,500 to the east. The former had been recently animated with some mysterious belief to the effect that the Americans were about to be given over to them for slaughter. Among them a battalion of boys of tender age appeared, whose mission was to throw stones at the enemy under the guidance of Providence; but one or two of the little fellows were wounded, and the desire for self-preservation being stronger than their religious enthusiasm, they were seen no more. This concentrated southern force made daily demonstrations of some character, and an occasional attack, when the loss of a few of their men cooled their ardor for two or three successive days. An advance to the south with the intention of permanent or temporary occupation was not desirable. Should it be made and towns or villages be taken, the inhabitants would pray for protection against the return of the insurgents, and this could not be given them from the troops available without seriously interfering with projected operations. Hence, on the south we had occasionally driven back the enemy a few miles when he became annoying and then returned the troops to the old lines. To the east and northeast reconnoissances were made frequently to locate the shifting foe, ascertain his intentions, and provide the necessary precautionary measures.

General Lawton was directed to disperse his troops at Candaba, turning over the Third, Seventeenth, and Twenty-second Infantry to the Second Division, to be established on the new line from San Fernando to Baliuag, with a station at Quingua, and to send back to Manila the most of the Fourth Cavalry, the North Dakota and Oregon Volunteers, placing the Minnesotans on the railroad between Bocave and Caloocan. He therefore gave orders for the troops at San Miguel to withdraw to Baliuag and left Candaba on May 23.

The withdrawal of these troops and the descent made on the Rio Grande River to Candaba excited the insurgents to great activity, they supposing that a retreat was intended. They forwarded their forces by rail to General MacArthur's front and concentrated near San Miguel. On the march to Baliuag our troops encountered them morning, noon, and evening, and suffered in casualties 2 men killed and 13 wounded, but the enemy left with them 16 killed, a considerable number of wounded, and a few prisoners, besides a small amount

of property. This movement placed the entire Third Infantry, a battalion of the Twenty-second Infantry, a troop of the Fourth Cavalry, mounted, and two guns at Baliuag, rendering the place too strong for attack, and the enemy withdrew to the north. Upon the following day, May 24, a force of the insurgents attacked an outpost on the right of San Fernando, when a collision occurred involving the South Dakota, Kansas, and Iowa volunteers and portions of the Seventeenth and Twenty-second Infantry, with the result that the enemy was badly handled and retreated, leaving 50 dead and 38 wounded on the field, and we captured 28 prisoners, 50 rifles, and other property; our casualties, 7 killed and 6 wounded, all of the South Dakota regiment. These minor affairs corrected the impressions of the enemy as to our intentions of retreating, and no action of importance took place at the north for some time.

During the month of May we had a large accession of regular troops, consisting of six organizations, the Thirteenth Infantry arriving on the 29th of that month. On the last day of May there were present in the Philippines 1,201 commissioned officers and 33,026 enlisted men, of whom 614 officers and 6,098 enlisted men were stationed in the southern islands and at the Cavite naval station. Deducting the 13 per cent of sick, special-duty men, and those undergoing court-martial sentences, there were for duty in all the islands 25,809 enlisted men, and in Luzon, the Cavite arsenal excepted, 20,965. This was a large force, sufficient to accomplish efficient work with celerity, but of the entire number present over 16,000 were volunteers or were awaiting discharge under War Department promises and less than 18,000 were regulars owing further service to the Government. These 16,000 men must be assembled, must be individually accounted for, placed in condition for departure, and shipped to the United States at the earliest date.

The great labor attending this shipment was entered upon on May 25, when specific orders to govern all particulars of procedure were issued. The volunteers had been somewhat careless in rendering returns for men and public property and were not familiar with legal requirements in these matters. Hence several days were necessary to straighten out rolls, returns, and discharge papers after the organizations were assembled. Under the War Department directions it was ordered that the departure of these troops should be permitted in accordance with priority of date of arrival. This brought the Oregon and California troops first, but the latter were scattered over the island of Negros. The Oregon troops were assembled in Manila on May 26 and directed to hasten the necessary paper work and the transfer of public property which was to be left behind. This was not accomplished until about June 10, and portions of the regiment in the meantime took part in the military operations in the vicinity of the city. It sailed on June 14, a delay of two or three days attending its decision on a question it was allowed to determine whether to sail for San Francisco or Portland, Oreg. A regular regiment must be secured to relieve the Californians in Negros, and the Sixth Infantry, then en route, was selected. It did not arrive until June 18, when it was sent south. But prevailing typhoons delayed relief, and the Californians did not leave Manila Harbor until July 26, after the Nebraska, Utah, Pennsylvania, and Colorado troops had taken their departure.

Troops were about to depart much more rapidly than they could be received, and the country we were covering must be held. It was not possible, therefore, to make extensive offensive demonstrations

until the Eighth Army Corps could pull itself together again. In the meantime the insurgents were making great exertions to worst us by attacking our lines of communication and our force in the province of Pampanga. But all of their efforts were futile and resulted in their repeated discomfiture.

The latter part of May it was reported that the inhabitants at Antipolo, Morong, and other near towns east of Manila were suffering heavily on account of the crimes committed by General Pilar's insurgent troops, and they called for protection. Pilar enjoys the reputation of being for years the bandit chief of that section of country. He stood high in the favor of Aguinaldo, either on account of the latter's fear of him or because he had the ability to keep together and direct troops drawn from the criminal classes. He had within his command about 2,500 men and formerly operated south of the Pasig, from which he had been driven, and subsequently commanded the province of Morong. As soon as General Lawton returned to Manila he was instructed to collect a force and cause these insurgent troops to be driven off. Assembling 2,500 men at the pumping station, under command of Brigadier-General Hall, he directed it on June 3 upon Antipolo, and at the same time moved 8 companies of the Washington Volunteers by lake to Morong, and the First North Dakota and a battalion of the Twelfth Infantry on Taguig from Pasig. The rough character of the country in the direction of Antipolo and the heat of the day caused Hall's column to move slowly. He met with slight resistance from a scattered force of 300 at the base of the mountains and entered that place the following morning. Morong and Taguig were taken, and the narrow strip of land extending into the Laguna de Bay from the north was explored without discovering the presence of the enemy, unless in the guise of the "amigo," with weapon carefully concealed, a character of partisan which prevails extensively in this country when first captured by our troops. The insurgents had scattered, and most of them at least had taken the trails into the mountains, where they could not be profitably pursued. On the march to Antipolo our casualties were 2 men killed and 9 wounded, and at Taytay 2 men killed. The enemy suffered a much greater loss and left 9 dead and a number of wounded on the Morong field alone, where our troops did not meet with any casualty. Morong was occupied for a time and from it reconnaissances were made into the interior and along the shore of the Laguna. Its garrison was removed across the lake to Calamba, when that point became a permanent station.

The enemy had become again boldly demonstrative at the south and it became necessary to throw him back once more. He had intrenched himself very strongly in the vicinity of Paranaque and near Taguig; also in front of San Pedro Macati, the center of our line. On June 7 General Lawton was instructed to concentrate a force of 4,000 men approximately in the vicinity of the last-named town, to be placed under the immediate supervision of Generals Wheaton and Owenshine, move the same to the front and center in two columns, disperse the enemy in the immediate front, and then, swinging these columns to the right and left, place them in rear, if possible, of his strong positions on our flanks. Dispositions were completed on June 9, and early the next morning the command moved out. Six companies of the Colorados constituted the advance guard, took the direction of the intrenchments in the immediate front, which they attacked with great vigor. The enemy was soon driven and scattered. Wheaton, *swinging to the left*, soon routed the insurgents in that direction, who

made such rapid flight to the south that few of them were caught. Ovenshine took up his swinging movement to the right to place his troops on the Bacoar road south of Las Pinas, but, unfortunately, the day was one of the most enervating of the year. The sky was cloudless and no air stirring. The troops, which had recently arrived from the United States, began to be overcome with the heat before they had marched 2 miles. The colonel of the Thirteenth Infantry was prostrated from sunstroke, and nearly all of that regiment fell out on the line of march before it had proceeded as far south as Paranaque. General Lawton accompanied this column in person, and, quickly taking in the situation, directed Wheaton's column to join as soon as possible; but before this was accomplished the enemy, advancing from Paranaque, boldly attacked what remained of Ovenshine's men. He was repulsed after some active skirmishing, and, Wheaton joining, the march in the direction of Las Pinas was continued, and late in the afternoon General Lawton was obliged to halt a little south of east of Las Pinas, but could not secure the road by which it was believed the enemy would retreat. His men had suffered severely from the hard march, and especially from lack of water, for scarcely any that was potable could be found by them.

Fully 50 per cent had succumbed to the heat and fatigues of the day. The insurgents, too, had suffered from the same causes, and in addition had been signally defeated. They left on the battlefield a great number of dead, over 70 of whom were discovered and counted, while our casualties summed up at 1 enlisted man killed and 2 officers and 21 men wounded. That night the enemy escaped from Paranaque and Las Pinas by the Bacoar road and across the Zapote River, along which they had constructed formidable intrenchments, where they had, in 1896, gained a great victory over the Spaniards, and where they believed they would be invincible. In fact, a great number of them had made religious vows, assumed under superstitious rites, to overthrow the Americans there or die in the ditches.

The most conservative estimate of their numbers was 3,000, and to meet this condition of affairs new combinations must be made. The Thirteenth Infantry was brought into Manila and placed on the north line, relieving the Fourth Infantry and Wyoming Battalion, which were sent to General Lawton, who in the meantime had carefully reconnoitered the enemy's position and had concluded to attack at the Zapote River bridge of the Bacoar road. In reconnoitering near that point in person with two companies of the Twenty-first Infantry he was suddenly attacked on front and flanks by a large force of the enemy from its brush concealments, whereupon, retiring a short distance and hurrying up supports, he threw it back upon the river. His troops, having been resupplied with rations and ammunition, and his reinforcements forwarded, all by water transportation plying between Manila and Paranaque, he, on June 13, attacked the enemy in his intrenchments on the Zapote. The country was most uninviting for military operations, and he made his dispositions for a main attack on the river bridge, near which, after hard and persistent effort, he had secured a position which flanked a portion of the enemy's lines. The Navy had, in the meantime, at a point on the shore of the bay, landed from one of its vessels near Las Pinas 38 men and a quick-firing gun where it could do execution on the left flank of the insurgents should they attempt demonstrations in that direction. At 3 o'clock that afternoon General Lawton wired to headquarters in Manila that the battle was severe, and that the enemy was fighting in strong force and with determination. Twenty minutes later he

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telegraphed, "We are having a beautiful battle. Hurry up ammunition; we will need it;" and at 4 o'clock: "We have bridge. It has cost us dearly. Battle not yet over. It is a battle, however. I can not approximate our loss. It will be 15 or 20, I think. Several are killed—2 or 3. I have not had time to ascertain." That evening he telegraphed as follows:

LAS PINAS, June 15—6.07 p. m.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF PACIFIC:

Impossible to give many details of fight. We were engaged at close range this morning. Enemy came boldly into the open ground and advanced to 130 and 100 yards. This evening we assaulted trenches 25 feet thick, crossing river in their front. Many of enemy's dead lay in trenches. We now occupy south side of river. The report of wounded in engagement this a. m. was exaggerated. Many heat prostrations were reported wounded. The number will be about 7 or 8. The surgeon reports 29 wounded, now in hospital. I know there are several more to come and none of the dead are yet in. I believe some 40 will cover the killed and wounded for the day. The men and officers fought like Americans, and I will mention later several for most distinguished gallantry. Among them General Ovenshine; Captain Sage, Twenty-third Infantry; Lieutenants Donovan and Connolley, Twenty-first Infantry, the latter two wounded.

LAWTON, Major-General, Volunteers.

The enemy fled southward up the Zapote River to Imus and San Nicholas, a few westward along the shore of the bay, and our troops took possession of Bacoar, extending their outposts toward Old Cavite and Imus. The inhabitants gladly welcomed their arrival and offered to furnish every assistance in their power if the requisite protection could be given them. It was not desired nor was it the intention to pursue the enemy southward under any circumstances if it involved us with even temporary occupation of the country, as our strength did not justify such a scattering of our forces, and as every available man should be sent toward our true objective in the north. The Cavite and Batangas provinces, though the original hotbeds of all insurrections in these islands, were without military importance under the conditions then prevailing, and General Lawton, before moving out of Manila, was warned against taking possession of any southern country which looked to permanency. However, the inhabitants of this section were suffering for rice and those near the bay coast had not planted their crops. They importuned us for the continued presence of troops, that they might unmolested commence their planting and be assured that they would receive the reward of their labors. On the morning of June 15 General Lawton telegraphed as follows:

A representative of the civil government at Imus has just come, formally announcing the surrender of that place and inviting the Americans to enter. He states the insurgents all left yesterday afternoon in the direction of San Francisco de Malabon. He states the people of that section are frightened and tired of war and want peace, and welcome the Americans with pleasure. This man states in further explanation of the direction taken by the troops leaving Imus that they went in several directions, but generally toward Dasmariñas and Malabon; that the men were much demoralized, but were afraid of their generals; that they have little ammunition, one rapid-fire gun, and one muzzle loading gun. They commenced removing the cartridge factory three days since and that it was taken to Buena Vista, which lies between Malabon and Dasmariñas. The reconnoissance made yesterday did not find the enemy, although it went almost to Imus. The bridge below Bacoar is now in our possession and guarded. One hundred and twenty-five insurgents buried yesterday here. Sixteen men, including one captain, were buried at Imus yesterday. I think we should push the enemy a little more. This man states that the people do not wish war and that they look upon the Americans as friends and are glad to see them come, but that Aguinaldo and his cut-throats (this is his own expression) only desire war. The vicinity of our fight on the extreme right, where the reconnoissance was made this morning, has not yet been visited; many dead must be found there.

While General Lawton was operating in the vicinity of Las Pinas and the mouth of the Zapote River 300 men of the Cavite garrison, taken from the California Heavy Artillery and the Pennsylvania regiment, were sent southward on reconnoissance along the neck of land which connects that point and the main shore, against the town of Novaleta—this to create a diversion in our favor and ascertain what we could of the enemy's positions and intentions. These troops were engaged on this duty and incidental movements for three successive days. They penetrated the country to Old Cavite, San Francisco de Malabon and nearly to Rosario, and determined the fact that no great number of the insurgents could have retreated in that direction, although still in considerable force in that section. The following response, therefore, was sent to General Lawton's telegram, which is above set out:

Do not think that insurgents retreated to San Francisco de Malabon, except probably small detachments may have gone in that direction. Road from Imus to Malabon very bad, and all insurgents have retired from Novaleta. Their proper line of retreat would have been south. We do not wish to hold Imus, but you can send there a couple of battalions, with 2 guns for temporary purposes, utilizing for present dispositions all troops you have and the 3 battalions sent you this morning. My information is that many insurgents have received instructions from Baldamero Aguinaldo to return to their homes with their guns, and to secrete guns for future use. This may account for the unusual number of "amigos" at Paranaque. Rice and beef for distribution to the inhabitants will be sent to Las Pinas, also to Paranaque, in the morning.

That morning I had cabled to Washington the following:

MANILA, P. I., June 15, 1899.

AGWAR, Washington:

Success Lawton's troops Cavite Province greater than reported yesterday. Enemy numbering over 4,000 lost in killed, wounded, and captured more than one-third; remainder much scattered: have retreated south to Imus, their arsenal. Of 5 pieces of artillery, 3 captured. Navy aided greatly on shore of bay, landing forces occasionally. Inhabitants in that country rejoice at deliverance, and welcome with enthusiastic demonstrations arrival of our troops.

OTIS.

It subsequently appeared that the insurgent army, after retreating through Imus, divided, the larger portion continuing its retreat south to Dasmarinas, about 8 miles distant therefrom, the remainder proceeding westward to Malabon, where they were found in increased numbers on June 16 by the Cavite reconnoissance detachments. On that day General Wheaton was sent to Imus with the Fourth Infantry and a platoon of artillery.

On this date the military operations of the insurgents in the north, who were again becoming quite active, received a severe check, and once more comparative quiet in that section was restored. At noon we received a dispatch from General MacArthur, sent from San Fernando, as follows:

At about 4.30 this a. m. an extensive demonstration was made by insurgents against this place. They appeared on our entire front, on both sides of the river—that is to say, the town was entirely surrounded. The diameter of the line of insurgent operations was about 3 miles. As far as the town was concerned, the attack was reported at all points with considerable loss to insurgents. Our loss not yet ascertained, probably not large. Line went down immediately. * * *

Since writing have information of 50 feet of track being taken up in vicinity of Apalit station. Mallory takes material, and will repair break if possible. We have in neighborhood of 50 of enemy's dead in our possession and something like 25 wounded. Some 75 guns have been captured and are in our possession or destroyed. Our loss so far reported, 12 wounded; mostly slight. Further particulars as soon as ascertained.

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In the afternoon the following was received:

SAN FERNANDO, *June 16—2.21 p. m.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL:

In reply to wire requesting report of particulars of attack this a. m., reference is respectfully made to my previous message in the premises; in addition to which it is further remarked that preparations inside the insurgent lines have been apparent for a number of days, and that the affair this a. m. was premeditated and intended to be on a very large scale, with a view to surrounding this command and severing communication between here and Calumpit. There is very little doubt now that Aguinaldo was present in person and that the number of troops employed numbered quite 5,000 armed men, many of whom have been recently brought from the north by train, and possibly even from the line east of the Pinag de Candana. This elaborate preparation resulted in complete failure at every point, although every position in our front was attacked. We have in our hands in the neighborhood of 100 dead and wounded insurgents, and their losses probably run well into the hundreds.

MACARTHUR, *Major-General.*

And later in the day General MacArthur telegraphed:

It is reported, with a considerable probability of being true, that Aguinaldo was present in command of troops here this morning, or in the immediate vicinity, supervising operations. The demonstration was on a very extensive scale, in which not less than 3,000 men were employed, and probably very many more. The movement has been in preparation for several days; the details were very elaborate. The Iowa regiment did some fine work immediately after appearance of enemy in their immediate vicinity. They made an extensive return in fine shape, and drove the insurgents back through their own works and out of sight, with heavy punishment of enemy, 15 of whose dead were left in their hands and 12 wounded. The Kansas regiment also made a handsome offensive return. The insurgent left 39 of their dead with them and quite a number of wounded.

After General Wheaton had reached Imus he endeavored to locate the enemy by reconnoissance, and, believing him to be in considerable force, he was strengthened by additional troops, so that he had with him the entire Fourth and a battalion of the Fourteenth Infantry, the Nevada Cavalry, and 4 pieces of artillery. On the morning of June 19 he sent Major Bubb, with his battalion of the Fourth Infantry and 1 gun, southward on the Dasmarinas road. Shortly before noon, when the reconnoitering party had advanced some 6 or 7 miles without encountering opposition and was about to return, the enemy, in strong force, concealed in the thick brush and the surrounding swampy undergrowth, suddenly made an attack on its front and flank. Bubb, fighting his men skillfully against heavy odds, slowly retreated, for four hours inflicting punishment on the enemy, until General Wheaton, learning of the affair and taking the 2 remaining battalions of the Fourth Infantry and 3 guns, joined him. Wheaton then quickly threw forward his entire force, routed the enemy, and drove him at rapid pace back on Dasmarinas, near which he bivouacked for the night. As soon as this movement was reported, a battalion of the Ninth Infantry was hastened from Bacoor to Imus for the purpose of strengthening the force left there, thus rendering the place secure against attack from the direction of either San Nicholas or Malabon, and to reinforce Wheaton, if necessary. Its position at Bacoor was taken by 200 men hastily moved across Manila Bay in cascoes from the Cavite Arsenal. On the evening of the following day this dispatch was received:

DASMARINAS, *June 20—6.40 p. m.*

Major-General OTIS;

Yesterday I sent Bubb's battalion, Fourth Infantry, and one 3.2-inch gun on reconnoissance on Dasmarinas road, from Imus. Seven miles out he met the enemy in force, advancing to attack on Imus. He engaged in combat with them until 1, in person, reenforced him with 2 battalions and 3 guns. The enemy was com-

pletely routed, flying in the direction of Dasmarinas and San Francisco. His loss in killed was large—55 of his dead were brought to Dasmarinas church. The column bivouacked on the Dasmarinas road for the night. This morning I reenforced the column with 7 companies and advanced and occupied Dasmarinas, small bodies of the enemy resisting on the front and flanks. They had 6 killed and 2 wounded brought to Dasmarinas church. Our loss so far, only 3 wounded. Yesterday we had 4 killed and 20 wounded—all of the Fourth Infantry. The enemy's main body is now between here and San Francisco. Dasmarinas has but few houses, is surrounded by swamps, and is a long day's march from Imus. Road impracticable in bad weather. I will return to Imus with my command to-morrow, unless otherwise directed.

WHEATON.

He was directed to drive off or destroy the insurgents' moving arsenal or cartridge manufactory reported to be at Buena Vista, a near point, and thereupon return to Imus, as the roads had been rendered impracticable by heavy rains for any further operations in that section. Buena Vista could not be reached on account of intervening swamps, and the column returned to Imus, experiencing difficulty in moving the artillery over the wretched roads. Shortly thereafter all troops were retired from Imus, except the Fourth Infantry and a platoon of artillery. The Fourteenth Infantry and a troop of cavalry were left to garrison the towns of Bacoar, Las Pinas, and Paranaque. Local municipal governments of a primitive character were established, supervised by officers present in command of troops, and the people, apparently well satisfied, betook themselves to the planting of their rice and their formerly accustomed avocations.

We had thus, under circumstances which had been forced upon us by the determined opposition of the insurgents, enlarged our holdings in the south by a considerable acquisition of territory which was without strategic importance, although it made control of the waters of Manila Bay less difficult, as the coast was now in our possession from the province of Bataan to the Cavite Peninsula, excepting the slight portion between Bacoar and Noveleta on the south. But this occupation deprived us of the active aid of 2,500 men for field movements when their services at the north were important.

We were now busily engaged in discharging over 60 per cent of the enlisted men of the artillery and infantry regiments of the regular establishment, which had joined us previous to February, and in bringing into Manila and preparing for departure the volunteer organizations. We had still in the Visayas 6,200 men and in Luzon 26,000, of whom more than 20,000 were for duty, but the most of the volunteers were not considered available, except possibly to meet some unexpected emergency, and before the end of July more than 8,000 of them had been discharged or sailed for the United States, their places being in part taken by new arrivals.

The end of the month found us with 29,427 enlisted men, of whom 23,279 were reported for duty, and of whom 18,000 were in the island of Luzon. Active hostilities were maintained by a continued series of minor affairs, notwithstanding the unparalleled heavy rainfall of 46 inches in a single month, with an accompaniment of a number of severe typhoons. These affairs occurred mostly on our railway line of communication and at the north, and attended our endeavors to open the Laguna de Bay country for traffic with Manila, for which the inhabitants were particularly desirous. The latter efforts were not successful to any great extent because of insurgent bands which appeared at various points on the lake to secure the commercial advantages and the persistent labors of traders in Manila, either insurgent

sympathizers or seekers (who were of varied nationalities) for individual gain, whom pecuniary profit influenced more than conscience or fear of punishment. It was found to be impossible to hold in satisfactory check contraband trade, and as for the rice and other articles of subsistence sent out of the city, it was ascertained that the greater portion of it found its way to the insurgent troops. This trade was therefore again placed under restrictions, which are enforced still. The troops doing duty in the lake region were active. A dismounted squadron of the Fourth Cavalry, under the command of Captain McGrath, supplied with a launch and cascoes as transportation, visited many points on the lake and were received at times with white flags and the friendly demonstrations of the inhabitants and at times by the bullets of the insurgent troops, whom they invariably drove into the interior, but who returned after our men departed. On July 26 Calamba, which had been strongly intrenched and supposedly firmly held, was captured by General Lawton's troops, consisting of the Twenty-first Infantry, a squadron of the Fourth Cavalry, and a battalion drawn from the Washington regiment, all placed under the command of Brigadier-General Hall, with the loss in casualties of 3 men killed and 11 wounded. The insurgents stoutly resisted, but, as it has always happened in such cases, they experienced a costly discomfiture. Los Banos, the location of an expensive military hospital erected by Spain, was also taken, and the two places are still held by our troops, composed of a platoon of Light Battery F, Fifth Artillery, and the entire Twenty-first Infantry. Several attempts have been made to dislodge them by concentrated forces of the enemy, which have resulted in failure and severe punishment.

Our returns for August 31 showed a total Army force present in the Philippines of 30,963 officers and enlisted men, of whom more than 3,500 were volunteers awaiting shipment and men of the regular regiments about to be discharged, and hence could not be reckoned among the available. Of this total, twelve and a fraction per cent were sick, leaving 27,189 officers and men for duty. Deducting therefrom the volunteers, there were left less than 24,000 officers and men for duty, of whom 4,145 were absent in Jolo, the Visayan Islands, and at Cavite Arsenal. Of the less than 20,000 remaining for duty in Luzon, 2,600 belonged to the provost guard of the city of Manila, 1,900 were on special duty, 345 were in confinement, and nearly 900 were members of the Hospital Corps. The force of active combatants outside of the city was therefore between 13,000 and 14,000 men, of whom 5,000 were required to hold the long line encircling the same. We received from the United States in August 133 officers and 4,247 enlisted men, consisting of an engineer company, the Nineteenth Infantry, 10 companies of the Twenty-fourth and Twenty-fifth Infantry, 2 troops of Fourth Cavalry, and 1,195 recruits for the various regular organizations.

The casualties in killed and wounded among all United States troops in the Philippines from August 1, 1898, to August 31, 1899, number 1,900 and were, from the period from August 1 to February 4, which includes the capture of Manila from the Spaniards, 1 commissioned officer and 18 enlisted men killed or fatally wounded, 11 officers and 97 enlisted men wounded, but not fatally; and for the period from February 4, when the insurgents declared war against the United States, to August 31, 1899, 19 officers and 342 enlisted men killed or who died of wounds received in battle and 87 officers and 1,325 enlisted men wounded.

The majority of the wounded have recovered. Only 4 enlisted men have been reported as captured in action. One hundred and seventy-eight men dropped as deserters are still at large. Many of them escaped from the islands, but this desertion list includes men who absented themselves from their companies without permission and carelessly wandered beyond our lines into the enemy's country. These possibly aggregate 30 or 40. A few men who had been discovered as former deserters from the Army again deserted direct to the enemy, and some of them, it is rumored, hold commissions in Aguinaldo's forces. One officer, Captain Rockefeller, Ninth Infantry, is missing. While inspecting his picket posts near Manila on the night of April 29 he lost his bearings and wandered away from his command. Search was made for him for two days by a detachment of his regiment, but unsuccessfully, and no satisfactory information has been received concerning him, although repeated inquiries in various directions have been made. Deaths from accident for the thirteen months ending August 31, 1899, aggregate 5 officers and 91 enlisted men, of which 58 resulted from drowning and 11 suicide. Those drowned were mostly engaged in reconnoissance duty at the time and lost their lives in attempts to cross rivers swollen by heavy rainfalls. Deaths from disease number 12 officers and 426 enlisted men, of whom 90 died of variola, 120 of typhoid fever, and 72 of dysentery. Therefore the total loss by deaths from battle and disease of the Eighth Army Corps in the Philippines for the thirteen months ending August 31, 1899, was 37 commissioned officers and 879 enlisted men, and the total of deaths and casualties of every description, slight wounds included, numbered 144 among commissioned officers and 2,208 among enlisted men.

During the entire period covered by the foregoing general recital of the strictly military operations of the troops in these islands, the varied subjects arising in civil administration, the settlement of affairs between Spain and the United States, and the antagonistic individual interests connected with trade and commerce gave constant perplexity and required unremitting labor. When the armed insurgents had been driven away from the vicinity of Manila, the inhabitants of Manila asked for some sign of American expressed intention in inaugurating its Filipino government. We had control of nearly all of the province in which the city is situated, and it was believed for a time that we could with safety set up a provincial governor and revive, to a certain extent, the formerly enforced civil regulations with which the people were acquainted, amending them so that reported past abuses could not be practiced. The organization of a civil government for Manila was also taken under advisement, but conservative precaution indicated that such action might be attended with risk, especially as to property, for the population was becoming very dense, and much of it of a floating character, and needed close watching and a measurable degree of repression. Manila is now and for some time has been looked upon by the natives as the only safe refuge in Luzon, and unless those seeking it for an abiding place were restrained numbers would soon become too great to carry out necessary sanitary measures for the preservation of the public health and possibly to enforce the required public regulations for the public safety. No correct census of the city's population has ever been taken and none has been attempted for several years. Estimates vary widely. Conservative people place it under 400,000 and some educated and practical Filipino residents report it as high as 600,000. The majority

of this mass is irresponsible and easily excited. Insurgent agents, some with fair social standing, if not prominence, and holding appointments from Aguinaldo, are continually plotting in our midst, and Manila and every landed province under our control has its accredited insurgent governor. Under these prevailing conditions the introduction of a civil supervision of affairs by citizens, though under general military control, has been deferred. In the city a civil native police force has been organized, numbering 360, which is divided into four companies, each having its native captain and sergeants, and has worked admirably thus far in connection with the provost guard. These men, like our fire department, have thus far proved true, and are feared by the criminals and disloyal element of the population much more than our soldiers who patrol the streets, because they are known to and are closely watched by them. Other cities and towns in our possession were accorded local government under military supervisory restrictions, as shown in the following directory provisions of orders, viz:

1. In each town there will be a municipal council, composed of a president and as many representatives or headmen as there may be wards or barrios in the town, which shall be charged with the maintenance of public order and the regulation of municipal affairs in particulars hereinafter named. It will formulate rules to govern its sessions and order of business connected therewith, and by majority vote (to be determined by the president in case of a tie) will, through the adoption of ordinances or decrees, to be executed by the president, administer the municipal government; but no ordinance or decree shall be enforced until it receives the approval of the commanding officer of the troops there stationed.

2. The president shall be elected by a viva voce vote of residents of the town, approved by the commanding officer, and, together with the headmen or representatives of the council, shall hold office for one year. He shall be of native birth and parentage and a resident and property owner of the town. The headmen shall be elected by a viva voce vote of residents of their wards or barrios and shall reside and own property therein.

3. The president shall be the executive of the municipal council to execute its decrees issued for the following purposes, viz:

- To establish a police force.

- To collect taxes and license fees, to act as treasurer of public funds, and to make disbursements on warrants of the council.

- To enforce regulations relating to traffic and the sale of spirits, to establish and regulate markets, to inspect live stock and record transfers and brands of the same.

- To perform the duties formerly belonging to the lieutenant of the paddy fields.

- To enforce sanitary measures.

- To establish schools.

- To provide for lighting the town.

4. The senior headman, or one designated by the council, shall be vice-president of the same, assistant to the president, and shall be ex officio lieutenant of police.

5. The headman of a ward is the delegate of the president for that ward; shall take measures to maintain order, and shall have power to appoint two assistants.

6. The council shall have no jurisdiction in civil cases, but on the application of parties in interest and their agreement in writing to accept the award of the council, it shall hear and decide cases involving property not exceeding in value \$500.

7. In criminal matters the president, representing the council, shall make the preliminary examination and, according to the result, discharge the prisoner or transfer him immediately to the custody of the military authorities for trial by provost court.

8. The lieutenant of police may arrest or order the arrest of persons violating a city ordinance, disturbing the peace, or accused of crime; but no person shall be held in confinement longer than twenty-four hours without a preliminary examination, and no person shall be arrested for nonpayment of taxes or for debt.

9. The president shall render to the council during the first week of each month a certified account of collections under each tax, and of disbursements made during the preceding month. Said accounts, having been approved by the council, shall be forwarded, with vouchers, to the commanding officer of the troops, who shall make and retain a certified copy thereof.

10. Special appropriations shall require a unanimous vote of the council: regular disbursements may be made by ordinary decree on a majority vote.

11. Whenever the commanding officer of troops shall notify, in writing, the council that in his judgment a decree issued under subdivision 3 is inadequately executed, or shall make any other criticism or recommendation, the council will convene as soon thereafter as practicable to consider his communication and shall make written reply thereto, which reply, if he deem it insufficient, he shall forward, with his remarks, through military channels to these headquarters.

12. The foregoing provisions, tentative in character, are subject to amendment by enlargement or curtailment, as special conditions or development may make necessary.

In most instances these simple local establishments answer all purposes of a temporary nature and are drawn from former Spanish decrees and customs. In some cases the president has been discovered to be an ardent insurgent, engaged in forcing money collections in the interest of the enemy, but he is apt to desert his post and join his friends with his extortions before he can be arrested. One in whom confidence had been placed sold out for a general's commission and is now actively engaged in annoying our troops south of Manila. The lack of manifested surprise or indignation on the part of citizens by whom these criminals had been intrusted with the management of local affairs on discovering that they had been deceived and robbed presents an unfavorable commentary on the moral complexion of the native.

The Spanish civil courts, from which criminal jurisdiction had been taken, as shown on pages 59 and 60 of this report, had voluntarily closed their sessions in October and November, leaving the administration of justice by constituted tribunals to the provost courts of our creation. These provost courts could meet requirements in commercial matters, but the business of merchants and the property transactions of inhabitants necessitated judicial assistance of a strictly civil nature. The reestablishment of civil courts became the subject of mature deliberation. A number of conferences were held with Judge Arellano, a leading Filipino lawyer, who accepted the position of secretary of state in Aguinaldo's cabinet under popular pressure and from which he had withdrawn of his own volition shortly after acceptance, in the conviction that he could not thereby serve the interests of his people. After much hesitancy he promised to comply with my request to assist in the reestablishment of the supreme court of the islands and those of inferior jurisdiction for the city of Manila and suburbs. He advised strongly against a purely native judiciary, as the Asiatic consular court practice would result, since domiciled foreigners would not submit to the orders of a native court except under protest and appeal for relief to their own governments, and this would give rise to international difficulties. He advised that judges be selected from the most competent lawyers of the islands, and from United States officers versed in the law and acquainted with United States civil codes of procedure, to the end that simpler forms of practice might be substituted gradually for the cumbersome and dilatory methods hitherto pursued by Spain. The Spanish law, built upon royal prerogative, legislative enactments, and decrees of governing officers issued under conferred powers, extending over a period of centuries, has never been codified. In order to organize tribunals of justice, with membership other than Spanish and with modified powers and forms of procedure, in order to impose upon the inhabitants the laws of Spain intelligently amended in essential particulars, required

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exhaustive research. This labor Judge Arellano undertook and carried to sufficient completion to enable us to make the necessary legal modifications and to organize the courts. His recommendation for the appointment of certain men to the bench who were drawn not only from Luzon but also from the Visayan Islands were approved and orders prepared by him and Lieutenant-Colonel Crowder, of the judge-advocate's department, were duly issued, as follows:

GENERAL ORDERS, }

No. 20. }

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., May 29, 1899.

I. Chapter 3, title 2, of the Organic Royal Decree of January 5, 1891, prescribing the qualifications of appointees to colonial judicial office, is, in its application to judicial appointments in the Philippine Islands, hereby suspended.

II. The supreme court of the Philippine Islands (*audiencia territorial*), heretofore administered in the city of Manila, the exercise of whose jurisdiction has been suspended as to criminal affairs since August 13, 1898, and as to civil affairs since January 30, 1899, is hereby reestablished and will exercise the jurisdiction, civil and criminal, which it possessed prior to August 13, 1898, in so far as compatible with the supremacy of the United States in said islands, and will administer the laws recognized as continuing in force by proclamation from these headquarters dated August 14, 1898, except in so far as they have been, or may hereafter be, modified by authority of the United States.

III. The following appointments are announced:

President (*presidente*), D. Cayetano Arellano.

CIVIL BRANCH (*SALA DE LO CIVIL*).

President (*presidente*), D. Manuel Araullo.

Associate justices (*magistrados*), D. Gregorio Aranaeta, Lieut. Col. E. H. Crowder, judge-advocate, U. S. V.

CRIMINAL BRANCH (*SALA DE LO CRIMINAL*).

President (*presidente*), D. Raymundo Melliza. Associate justices (*magistrados*), D. Ambrosio Rianzares, D. Julio Llorente, Maj. R. W. Young, Utah Volunteer Light Artillery, Capt. W. E. Birkhimer, Third U. S. Artillery.

ATTORNEYS (*MINISTERIO FISCAL*).

Attorney of the supreme court (*fiscal de la audiencia territorial*), D. Florentino Torres.

Assistant attorney (*teniente fiscal*), D. Dionisio Chanco.

The appointment of subordinate officials of this court will be announced later.

IV. The supreme court as above constituted will meet upon the call of its president at the earliest practical date for the purpose of organization and for the formulation of such recommendations relating to its procedure under United States authority as may be deemed by it advisable.

The officers herein named and all others who may be appointed hereafter to act in any capacity in connection with the administration of courts of justice in these islands will, before entering upon the discharge of their official duties, subscribe and take the following

OATH OF OFFICE.

I, ———, having been appointed ——— in the Philippine Islands, recognize and accept the supreme authority of the United States of America. And I do solemnly swear that I will maintain good faith and fidelity to that Government; that I will obey the existing laws which rule in the Philippine Islands, as well as the legal orders and decrees of the duly constituted government therein; that I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion, and will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office upon which I am about to enter. So help me God.

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The prescribed oath may be administered by the judge of the provost court of Manila, or by such other officers as may be designated for that purpose by proper authority.

By command of Major-General Otis:

THOMAS H. BARRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

GENERAL ORDERS, }
No. 20. }

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., June 5, 1899.

The courts of first instance of the province of Manila and the courts of the peace heretofore held in the city of Manila, P. I., are hereby reestablished and will exercise the jurisdiction, civil and criminal, possessed by them prior to August 13, 1898, in so far as compatible with the supremacy of the United States in the Philippine Islands and the exercise of military government therein, and will administer the laws recognized as continuing in force by proclamation from these headquarters dated August 14, 1898, except in so far as these laws have been, or hereafter may be, modified by authority of the United States.

The division of the province of Manila into the four judicial districts of Binondo, Tondo, Quiapo, and Intramuros, as such districts existed prior to August 13, 1898, is continued. The territorial jurisdiction of the justice of the peace in each of these districts shall be coextensive with that of the court of first instance therein.

The following appointments are announced for courts of first instance:

DISTRICT OF BINONDO.

Judge, D. Antonio Majarreis; district attorney, D. Perfecto Gabriel.

DISTRICT OF TONDO.

Judge, D. Basilio Regalado Mapa; district attorney, D. Jose Ner.

DISTRICT OF QUIAPO.

Judge, D. Hipolito Magsalin; district attorney, D. Vicente Rodriguez.

DISTRICT OF INTRAMUROS.

Judge, D. Jose Baza Enriquez; district attorney, D. Lucio Villarreal.

The following for the justice courts:

DISTRICT OF BINONDO.

Justice of the peace, D. Jose M. Memije; substitute, D. Ramon Manalac Alberto.

DISTRICT OF TONDO.

Justice of the peace, D. Pedro Ricafort; substitute, D. Ignacio Ver de la Cruz.

DISTRICT OF QUIAPO.

Justice of the peace, D. Martiniano Veloso; substitute, D. Claudio Gabriel.

DISTRICT OF INTRAMUROS.

Justice of the peace, D. Jose Martinez Quintero; substitute, D. Jose del Castillo.

The following appointments in the supreme court of the Philippine Islands are hereby announced:

Secretary of civil branch, D. Roman Espiritu.

Secretary of criminal branch, D. Ramon Fernandez.

Assistant attorneys, D. Tomas G. Del Rosario, D. Antonio Constantino.

Secretary of the fiscalia, D. Bartolome Revilla.

The secretaries of the court above appointed shall receipt to Lieut. Col. E. H. Crowder, judge-advocate, U. S. V., for records and property pertaining to their respective branches of the court.

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The division of the city and province of Manila into two districts for the purpose of registering titles to property, as such districts existed prior to August 13, 1898, is confirmed, and the following appointments of registrars for the same announced:

Registrar for the north district, D. Simplicio del Rosario.

Registrar for the south district, D. Francisco Ortigas.

By command of Major-General Otis:

THOMAS H. BARRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

GENERAL ORDERS, }
No. 22. }

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., June 17, 1899.

I. The supreme court of the Philippine Islands and the courts of first instance and of the peace for the province of Manila, reestablished in General Orders Nos. 20 and 21, current series, this office, are announced as open and in the exercise of their jurisdiction, civil and criminal, on and after Wednesday, June 21, 1899. The sessions of the supreme court will be held in the building known as the "audien-
cia;" those of the courts of first instance and of the peace in the building known as the "Casa de la Moneda," Intramuros.

II. The jurisdiction of the courts specified in Paragraph I of this order, and of other civil courts which may hereafter be reestablished, shall not extend to and include crimes and offenses, committed by either citizens of or persons sojourning within the Philippine Islands, which are prejudicial to military administration and discipline, except by authority specially conferred by the military governor. Jurisdiction to try and award punishment in the class of cases designated remains vested in provost courts, courts-martial, or military commissions.

By command of Major-General Otis:

THOMAS H. BARRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

These orders were followed by others abolishing useless offices and methods of procedure, prescribing rules under which attorneys could be admitted to practice, in putting in force an amended notarial law, and announcing the appointment of notaries and other court officers. The court of the audiencia took up at once unfinished business and the hearing and deciding of appeal civil causes. It has worked industriously and conscientiously under the able leadership of the president, and I doubt if any former Philippine tribunal has ever displayed equal legal ability. Some friction attended the running of the minor courts, which has been greatly reduced and has about ceased under special provisions of orders issued to meet varying conditions. The jurisdiction and punishing power of the superior provost court has been extended to meet cases of fraud involving the public revenue. All of these tribunals have succeeded in accomplishing the objects for which they were established beyond my expectation, and will, I am convinced, lay the foundation upon which to build an able and satisfactory judiciary for the islands when peace shall succeed war.

Two of the three civilian members of the so-called peace commission, which was appointed early in January, arrived on March 5, and the third, Colonel Denby, on April 2, two days after our troops had entered the insurgent capital of Malolos. The first meeting was held on March 20, when an organization was effected and its presiding officer, President Schurman, was requested to prepare an address to the Filipino people, to be issued as a proclamation, expressive of the desires and intentions of the United States Government in taking control of the islands. This he did, and the paper which he subsequently presented was pronounced excellent in tone and terms and most admirably indicative of the liberal and humane policy which it was understood by all that the United States intended to adopt. It was unanimously decided to print, publish, post, and disseminate as much as possible

among the inhabitants under insurgent domination this address, printing the same in the English, Spanish, and Tagalo languages. This was done, but scarcely had it been posted in Manila twenty-four hours before it was so torn and mutilated as to be unrecognizable. It suffered the same fate as the proclamation of January 4, set out in pages 113 and 114 of this report; but it produced a marked beneficial influence on the people, especially those outside our lines, as it carried with it a conviction of the United States' intentions, on account of the source from which it emanated, it being an expression from a committee of gentlemen specially appointed to proclaim the policy which the United States would pursue.

So pernicious to insurgent interests was its effect that Aguinaldo or his officers took measures to repress it wherever it was possible for them to do so. It is still the subject of discussion, and insurgents of influence have recently expressed a willingness to accept its terms and abide by its promises could they be assured that Congress would redeem them. This commission will probably very soon report its proceedings, investigations, conclusions, and recommendations, if it has not already done so. Though a member, I found it impossible to attend many of its sessions, and am ignorant of the scope or particulars of its labors. Its members, especially Colonel Denby and Professor Worcester, who remained here until their very recent recall, were of great assistance in strengthening the confidence of our native friends in the promises and good intentions of the United States with regard to the country, and aided me in many ways by counsel and by their investigations of practical subjects which were presented for determination.

The shipment of Spanish prisoners of war was taken up in earnest as soon as the ratification of the Paris treaty was officially communicated; also the settlement of property rights between Spain and the United States, upon which extended argument was indulged in as to the meaning of treaty provisions which must determine ownership. There were also involved the rights of many private citizens who had invested in undelivered Spanish bonds of a late issue, which had been retained in the treasury or who had deposited with the Spanish Government money or securities for the performance of obligations assumed. Under a mutual agreement boards of officers to consider all questions of disagreement or on which antagonistic opinion was held were appointed by the resident authorities of the two nations interested, Spain also appointing a special liquidation committee of its citizens to present her interests in matters of a strictly civil nature. The labors of these boards were very great and extended over a period of several months. The United States board was convoked in the following order:

A board of officers, to consist of Maj. Charles McClure, chief paymaster of the department; Maj. C. U. Gantenbein, Second Oregon, U. S. V., and Second Lieut. M. A. Hildreth, First North Dakota, U. S. V., is hereby appointed to meet and confer with a committee named by his excellency Division General Diego de los Rios y Nicalau, Spanish army, for the purpose, as stated, of clearing the accounts of the Spanish Government in the Philippines. The board will determine upon some definite course of procedure by which the Spanish committee can have access to all records and documents now in possession of the United States authorities which it may desire to consult, and will arrange therefor. No property or records can be delivered until the proposed treaty receives validity through ratification, and the board will continue its sessions anticipating that event when definite instructions looking to a settlement of public affairs, judicial and executive, can be conveyed. The board will ascertain fully the desires of the committee as to the nature and full extent of its desired action and give it every possible facility consistent with the present status of affairs.

Membership in this board was frequently changed, owing to emergencies of service. All of the original members were sooner or later relieved and substitution made, Lieutenant-Colonel Miley taking the place of Major McClure, and the former, an officer of very marked ability, who died in September, was succeeded by Lieutenant-Colonel Hull, of the judge-advocate's department, through resulting seniority. The duties of the board are approaching completion, and probably it can be dissolved soon. It was found necessary to give it broad latitude of action, and on April 22 it was empowered to administer oaths and take testimony in matters over which it was authorized to exercise jurisdiction, either by way of investigation or arbitrament. Questions of property rights upon which agreements could not be reached were referred for instructions. The more important of these were submitted to Washington for authoritative decision, and a construction of the meaning of the treaty provisions was obtained, which served as a rule for future guidance. The accompanying brief report of this board shows the character and general scope of its action, with its conclusions, but not the varied details of proceedings, which were exhaustive on all subjects presented for consideration.

At an early date there were presented claims of corporations which had obtained and were operating under Spanish concessions, for payment for public services, losses accruing for lack of protection as promised in those concessions, or for damages to property inflicted by both insurgents and United States representatives; also very many claims from business houses and private individuals for destruction, loss, damage, or retention of their property, whether occasioned by the insurgents or our troops. Minor ones of undoubted validity were adjusted and paid from public funds, but those in which doubtful questions of legal obligations arose have been held in abeyance. To give attention to all claims presented it was finally necessary to organize a board of claims, and the following order was issued:

SPECIAL ORDERS, }
No. 3. }

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., April 18, 1899.

A board of officers is hereby appointed to consider and pass upon such claims against the United States Government, preferred by parties resident or otherwise in the Philippine Islands, and arising by reason of United States occupation, as may be submitted to it from this office for investigation and opinion. It will be guided in its decisions by the rules of interpretation adopted by this office in its past consideration of demands of this nature, in so far as they be applicable to circumstances and conditions. The board will meet to-morrow, the 19th instant, at 10 o'clock a. m., or as soon thereafter as practicable, at the office of the judge-advocate of the Department of the Pacific, for the purpose of organization and fixing upon methods of procedure to govern its deliberations; and thereafter it will hold its sessions at such times and places as the presiding officer may announce:

Detail for the board.—Lieut. Col. E. H. Crowder, judge-advocate, U. S. V.; Maj. C. U. Gantenbein, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry; Capt. H. A. Greene, Twentieth United States Infantry; Capt. J. G. Ballance, Twenty-second United States Infantry.

By command of Major-General Otis:

THOMAS H. BARRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Membership in this board has been changed occasionally as circumstances compelled, but the senior member is still serving thereon. It formulated and published rules to govern its proceedings and for the information of all persons who desired to submit claims and by which they were to be guided in the preparation and submission of the same.

Sixty-four claims, aggregating \$605,000 (Mexican money), were received from residents of southern Luzon and for the most part Manila, and mostly involving the burning and looting of abandoned houses in the battles of February 5 and 22 at Manila. Few of this character appear to possess merit and are poorly sustained by proof of facts. Several asking for the return of property which was captured in the enemy's country or which was seized by our men for convenience of transportation have been adjusted without difficulty. The destruction of private property as a necessary incident of war in driving the insurgents from their defensive positions in the suburbs of Manila is the question involved in passing upon most of these demands. Twenty-five claims, aggregating \$1,338,116 (Mexican), have been received from Iloilo. They are defectively and carelessly drawn and very indefinite as to details. Only in a few cases is proof of ownership of property submitted. All but two call for damages to property incident to the forcible occupation of the city by our troops on February 11 last, when the insurgents upon retiring burned a considerable portion of it. One of the two exceptions is a claim for \$6,000 presented by a Spaniard through the consular office, because of the seizure of his printing establishment after abandonment, wherein was printed a scurrilous newspaper, violently incendiary and abusive of the United States while our troops occupied Iloilo Harbor, before the seizure of the city. The other is also a demand for \$6,000 from a Spaniard for the destruction of his boat and cargo by the U. S. S. *Bennington* while believed to be engaged in illicit trade. Mostly all others of these claims are based on the alleged responsibility of the United States to pay damages to the several owners of property destroyed in the Iloilo fire set by the insurgents upon forced evacuation, because of the fact that the United States began the attack on the city before the expiration of time announced in the notice to residents that it would commence, thus depriving them of the opportunity to remove or place their property which was destroyed in better condition for preservation. The action of the Army and Navy, which constitutes the chief argument of the claimants for the legal validity of their demands, has been set out on pages 175-177 of this report. All but two of these claimants are subjects of foreign countries.

Under War Department instructions giving protection to the owners of patents and copyrights issued by the United States, the following directions were published:

I. The offices of patents, of copyrights, and of trade-marks, heretofore administered as separate bureau of the "Direccion-General de Administracion Civil," are hereby consolidated into a single office, to be known as the Office of Patents, Copyrights, and Trade-marks, and placed in charge of Capt. George P. Ahern, Ninth U. S. Infantry, who will receipt to the Spanish authorities for all records, documents, and property pertaining thereto.

II. The duties enjoined in Circular No. 12, division of customs and insular affairs, in reference to the filing here of patents and trade-marks issued in the United States and duly registered in the United States Patent Office, and all duties which, under the laws relating to patents, copyrights, and trade-marks applicable to the Philippines, pertained to the "Director-General de Administracion Civil" and his subordinates, are hereby devolved upon the officer in charge of the office of patents, copyrights, and trade-marks above designated; all matters of administration arising in that office which, under those laws, required the action of any higher authority than the "Director-General de Administracion Civil" will be forwarded for consideration and action to the office of the United States military governor in the Philippines.

III. So much of Article 27 of the royal decree of October 26, 1888, regulating the concession and use of trade-marks, as requires reference to the Real Sociedad

Economica of industrial marks, designs, or models presented for registration, for investigation and report as to whether such marks, designs, or models are already in use or are the property of third persons, is hereby suspended.

The business of this bureau has been active, requiring the work of an interpreter and two clerks under the constant supervision of Captain Ahern. It required him to collect and file all former Spanish records obtainable on this subject, some of which were kept in Spain, and now the office is running smoothly comparatively. Every mail from the United States brings many certified patents for file, and the exacted fee of \$1 for filing more than pays the office expenses.

In Manila and a few other cities where our troops are stationed to give inhabitants protection schools have been established. Parents and children are eager for primary-school instruction and are very desirous to acquire a speaking knowledge of the English language. In the city of Manila more than 5,000 children are attending these schools, which are maintained at a cost of nearly 10,000 Mexican dollars a month. Instructors are drawn from the former Spanish and Filipino teachers, augmented by Americans, some of whom are discharged men from volunteer organizations and some from those who came to the islands on account of individual desire. The superintendent is a former soldier who had considerable experience in this profession in the United States. Many applications for positions as teachers are received through mailed communications and from persons who, if the references furnished can be relied on, would render valuable service here, but it will require time to firmly establish this educational plant. The higher education which the islands have hitherto enjoyed, as well as that of a minor character, has been entirely under the control of the religious orders and has centered in Manila. The Dominican order, rich in landed estates acquired through a series of years, inaugurating its educational policy under royal assistance, money contributions, and decrees when the educational field was entirely in the possession of the clergy, and seizing on by degrees to the educational institutions and scientific schools organized by the Jesuits under royal protection and conducted with funds from individual testators after that order had been driven from the islands, built up the University of Manila and gradually incorporated in it these Jesuit foundations. Great effort was made to sever them from Dominican authority by recent Spanish statesmen of advanced ideas, but without success, and now the leading Filipinos demand that severance and a return to State supervision. Much time and labor in historical research has been expended by Lieutenant-Colonel Crowder of the law department in the investigation of these matters, and his able reports of past and present conditions and legal conclusions derived therefrom has so presented the subject that radical action can be taken in some instances and has been determined upon. The Archbishop of Manila, who, I am informed, is a member of the Dominican order, has served parole notice that he will strenuously oppose such action and has been invited to submit his protest at an early date.

In our last allusion to the Sulu Archipelago it was stated (see page 222) that the occupation of Jolo by our troops on May 19 and the friendly relations established between them and the representative Moros placed affairs there in a very satisfactory condition for future negotiations, which were conducted by Brigadier-General Bates. The islands of the archipelago, that of Basilan, and those of Palauan and Balabac, were localities of concern. In Palauan, where Spain maintained a resident governor and to which she had transported some of



CATHEDRAL, OLD MANILA. IN FOREGROUND RUINS OF FORMER GOVERNOR'S PALACE, DESTROYED BY EARTHQUAKE.

her state criminals, the Tagalo had succeeded. The Spanish governor had been murdered and all prisoners released. At Balabac a very important light-house had been established, which was necessary to to the safe navigation of those waters. At Basilan a naval station of some importance had been built up. Our Navy looked after all matters connected with the Palauan Islands in so far as keeping affairs there in check were concerned; reestablished the light at Balabac, where it had dispersed and driven off with loss an attacking party of natives and where it keeps a small detachment of men, and has closely watched Basilan and the near city of Zamboanga. Conditions may be inferred from instructions given on July 3 and 11 to General Bates, who was sent to the Sulu Archipelago to propose terms of agreement to the Moros, who had become very importunate to be informed of the meaning of our occupation of the islands, and to explain United States intentions. They are as follows:

OFFICE MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., July 8, 1899.

Gen. J. C. BATES, U. S. V.,
Manila, P. I.

GENERAL: In compliance with orders this day issued directing you to proceed to the Jolo Archipelago, there to execute specific instructions to be communicated by the department commander, you will proceed as soon as practicable to the United States military station of Jolo, on the island of that name, and there place yourself in communication with the Sultan of Jolo, who is believed to be at Siassi, where he was sojourning when the last information concerning him was received.

You are hereby appointed and constituted an agent on the part of the United States military authorities in the Philippines to discuss, enter into negotiations, and perfect, if possible, a written agreement of character and scope as herein-after explained, with the Sultan, which upon approval at these headquarters and confirmation by the supreme executive authority of the United States, will prescribe and control the future relations, social and political, between the United States Government and the inhabitants of the archipelago. The written memoranda herewith furnished you, which mention cursorily and very briefly the past political status and recent history of those people in so far as their domestic and political relations with other nations are concerned; which present suggestions and recommendations, contained in the remarks and speculations of persons who have been personally acquainted with them, as to the proper policy of control or supervision which should be adopted by the United States in its dealings with their native authorities; which give the extent and results of contact and relationship with them thus far developed on the part of the United States through its military agency established in the port of Jolo, will enable you to understand the character and difficulties of the labor with which you are charged.

By reference to these memoranda you will perceive that in your discussions with the Sultan and his dates the question of sovereignty will be forced to the front, and they will undoubtedly request an expression of opinion thereon, as they seem to be impressed apparently with the belief that the recent Spanish authorities with whom they were in relationship have transferred full sovereignty of the islands to them. The question is one which admits of easy solution, legally considered, since by the terms of treaties or protocols between Spain and European powers (those referred to in the memoranda) Spanish sovereignty over the archipelago is conceded. Under the agreement between Spain and the Sultan and dates of July, 1878, the latter acknowledged Spanish sovereignty in the entire archipelago of Jolo and agreed to become loyal Spanish subjects, receiving in consideration certain specific payments in money. The sovereignty of Spain, thus established and acknowledged by all parties in interest, was transferred to the United States by the Paris treaty. The United States has succeeded to all the rights which Spain held in the archipelago, and its sovereignty over the same is an established fact. But the inquiry arises as to the extent to which that sovereignty can be applied under the agreement of 1878 with the Moros. Sovereignty, of course, implies full power of political control, but it is not incompatible with concessionary grants between sovereign and subject. The Moros acknowledged through their accepted chiefs Spanish sovereignty and their subjection thereto, and that nation in turn conferred upon their chiefs certain powers of supervision

over them and their affairs. The kingly prerogatives of Spain, thus abridged by solemn concession, have descended to the United States, and conditions existing at the time of transfer should remain. The Moros are entitled to enjoy the identical privileges which they possessed at the time of transfer, and to continue to enjoy them until abridged or modified by future mutual agreement between them and the United States, to which they owe loyalty, unless it becomes necessary to invoke the exercise of the supreme powers of sovereignty to meet emergencies. You will therefore acquaint yourself thoroughly with the terms of the agreement of 1878, and take them as a basis for your directed negotiations.

Possibly you will discover that the Sultan and datos are laboring under the mistaken impression that Spain, upon withdrawing recently her military forces from the islands, reconveyed sovereignty to them. This claim on their part is mentioned in the memorandum citing the action of the United States troops at Jolo, and may be seriously entertained by them, because of the reported Spanish action in placing them in possession of Siassi, accompanied by promises to likewise turn over Jolo. If they seriously entertain such an illusion, it will require tact and adroitness to dispel it, and a discussion of the United States benevolent intentions, and its wish to establish friendly relations with them in order to carry out those intentions, should precede any decided attempt at correction.

The territorial extent of the Jolo Archipelago, as authoritatively established, is set out in the accompanying memoranda in all essential particulars, except as to the island of Basilan, where Spain maintained an important naval station, which is still in existence, though not yet in United States actual possession. You will make inquiry with regard to this island and ascertain if the Sultan claims any authority over it, conceding nothing, however, on the point as to right of absolute control on the part of the United States. The naval station is closely connected with Zamboanga, over which and the adjacent country Spain exercised complete supervision. The Sultan and datos have exacted tribute from Cagayan-Jolo and Balabac, and, in fact, from southern Palauan; also, when possible, from other islands which Spain owned absolutely for more than three hundred years. Hence, the fact of taking tribute is not proof of a legal right to do so. Palauan and Balabac are not considered to be portions of the archipelago, though it may not be policy to attempt to determine with the Sultan, at present, any question of ownership which may arise in discussion. Spain maintained a governor in Palauan, and shore accessories, such as light-house, etc., with some form of supervisory government in Balabac. The United States demands with regard to these islands will be announced when the result of practical investigation now being pursued is ascertained. It may be well, therefore, to avoid presenting this matter to the Sultan or his representatives in these directed preliminary negotiations, and should he advance it, policy dictates that time should be requested to arrive at a knowledge of facts.

It is greatly desired by the United States for the sake of the individual improvement and social advancement of the Moros, and for the development of the trade and agriculture of the islands in their interests, also for the welfare of both the United States and Moros, that mutual friendly and well-defined relations be established. If the Sultan can be made to give credit to and fully understand the intentions of the United States, the desired result can be accomplished. The United States will accept the obligations of Spain under the agreement of 1878 in the matter of money annuities, and in proof of sincerity you will offer as a present to the Sultan and datos \$10,000, Mexican, with which you will be supplied before leaving for Jolo—the same to be handed over to them, respectively, in amounts agreeing with the ratio of payments made to them by the Spanish Government for their declared services. From the 1st of September next, and thereafter, the United States will pay to them regularly the sums promised by Spain in its agreement of 1878, and in any subsequent promises of which proof can be furnished.

The United States will promise, in return for the concessions to be hereinafter mentioned, not to interfere with, but to protect the Moros in the free exercise of their religion and customs, social and domestic, and will respect the rights and dignities of the Sultan and his advisers. It promises not to interfere in their affairs of internal economy and political administration further than to respond to their requests for assistance or to render supervisory action through advice and instruction in those special features of administration connected with the development of trade and agricultural resources, and the methods of conducting and employing the same for the improvement and efficiency of government. It agrees to insure to the Sultan and his people the enjoyment of these rights and privileges against all foreign nations, and will declare all trade of the Sultan and his people with any portion of the Philippine Islands conducted under the American flag

free, unlimited, and undutiable. It demands, of course, the right to exercise control over the places within its actual occupation.

In return for the promised assurances the Sultan and his chiefs, acknowledging the sovereignty of the United States, should stipulate to permit that Government to occupy and control such points in the islands as the execution of the obligations which it assumes make necessary, whether for naval or military operations against foreign aggression or to disperse attempted piratical excursions. They will agree to accept and fly on all occasions, and continuously, the American flag as the emblem and proof of United States sovereignty. They should promise to give a loyal support to the United States to maintain the integrity and peace of the archipelago, not to permit acts of piracy by their people on its waters, and to assist the United States Government to suppress and abolish this crime by whomsoever attempts to commit it, whether American, inhabitant, or alien. They should agree to deliver to the United States authorities for trial and punishment all persons, other than those of their own people, whom they arrest on the charge of committing crimes or misdemeanors. They should stipulate to prohibit the purchase by or the delivery to their people of rifles or war materials, as the possession of them has a tendency to stir up strife among their separate communities and to destroy the peace of the islands, which, for the welfare of all parties concerned, should be maintained.

Should the Sultan and his dates request assistance by way of instruction, through competent American representatives, to improve port regulations and conveniences in the interest of commerce or to build up agriculture and increase merchantable products in the islands, or to instruct the rising generation of Moros in industrial and mechanical pursuits through the medium of schools or practical appliances, the United States will gladly respond. It will endeavor to select the proper individuals to go among and associate with them to impart constant valuable information in all such matters—the necessities of which for the growth in riches and the well being of all inhabitants of the islands should be impressed upon the Sultan and his principal advisers.

All these and other subjects of minor significance, which will suggest themselves to you in the progress of the negotiations, when conditions will be better understood, are for your consideration and appropriate action.

Any agreement which you may be able to effect will be of force only upon approval and ratification by superior authority, and this must be distinctly understood and so stated in the instrument. The agreement will be subject to future modifications by the mutual consent of all parties in interest.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. S. OTIS,
Major-General, U. S. V., Military Governor.

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., July 11, 1899.

Gen. J. C. BATES, U. S. V., Manila, P. I.:

GENERAL: Referring to instructions of the 3d instant in the matter of the directed conference having in view the execution of an agreement with the Sultan of Jolo, it is considered expedient to modify slightly, in certain particulars, those instructions and to state somewhat more specifically objects which it is desired to attain.

By an investigation of the records in the Manila archives to discover the meaning and extent of certain stipulations in the agreements made from time to time by and between the Spanish authorities and the Sultan, which establish conditions of trade in the Archipelago and announce the status of the Sultan, it is discovered that these conditions and status are very varying, and it can not be ascertained. In fact, it is a conclusion to be drawn from the records, that Spain never announced nor conceived a definite, fixed policy of control over the archipelago which looked to improvement and permanency. Its frequent recorded actions seem to have been the result of a desire to temporarily meet difficulties growing out of some strained relationship with the Moros existing at the time, accompanied by the evident fixed purpose to maintain a sufficient number of troops in the archipelago to show to Europe that occupation in fact which would demonstrate Spanish sovereignty.

By no other conclusion can the varying stipulations of executed agreements between Spain and the Moros be accounted for. They are not explained in any recorded correspondence, and conditions existing at the dates they were entered into warrant the belief at which we have arrived. It will be seen that the Sultan

and his dates are at one time given all the revenues; that Spain permits the Sultan to collect all revenues at ports in actual Spanish occupation, notwithstanding its treaties with European powers permit it to levy duties at such ports, and that Spain's entire action deprives it of money receipts, but imposes upon her continual heavy expenditures for only simple nominal occupation of a few ports. Neither has Spain ever attempted to lay the foundation for any reforms looking to the future collection of revenues to meet any of the outlay, whether by the development of trade or improvement of natural resources. The pursuit of such a policy, if policy it can be called, is suicidal to the interests of the supervising country and the interests of the people supervised. The United States should seek to adopt a policy which, if devoid of immediate national benefit, promises beneficial results both in the matter of revenue (that is, revenue to meet the necessary outlaying expenditures) and at the same time will be attended by the improvement of the educational and social conditions of the inhabitants and the development of their country in trade and agricultural resources—that is, a policy which will be mutually advantageous to all parties concerned.

It is therefore important to make somewhat more specific the former instructions and to modify them in certain particulars, as follows:

It is quite important that the United States shall occupy the principal distributing centers of trade, to build up and develop a revenue and to supervise that development. This the Spanish treaties with foreign powers permit. Siassi should be occupied by our troops at no distant day and two or three other important points. This necessity you will keep in view in your negotiations and will show the Sultan the blessings which would be conferred upon his people by intelligent establishment and development.

In declaring "all trade of the Sultan and his people with any portion of the Philippine Islands, conducted under the American flag, free, unlimited, and undisturbed," care must be taken to guard against the possibility of the introduction of foreign commerce into the archipelago and thence into other Philippine ports without paying the prescribed duties. It is only the products of the archipelago which can have the benefits of interisland commerce.

While the Sultan might be supported and may receive revenue from certain avenues, pearl fisheries, etc., which he is now enjoying, there should be some understanding as to future revenues to be derived from a newly constructed and increasing trade in foreign products. Negotiations should look to the establishment of a financial and commercial system based upon modern methods, which, while not destructively antagonistic to present conditions, can be developed upon lines consistent with modern practices.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. S. OTIS,

Major-General, U. S. V., Military Governor.

General Bates had a difficult task to perform and executed it with tact and ability. While a number of the principal dates were favorably inclined, the Sultan, not responding to invitations, kept aloof and was represented by his secretary, until finally, the general appearing at Maibung, the Moro capital, a personal interview was secured. He being also Sultan of North Borneo and receiving large annual payments from the North Borneo Trading Company, expected like returns from the United States, and seemed more anxious to obtain personal revenue than benefits for his people. Securing the port of Siassi from the Spaniards, establishing there his guards and police, he had received customs revenues from the Sandaken trade which he was loath to surrender. Negotiations continued well into August, and finally, after long conferences, an agreement was reached by which the United States secured much more liberal terms than the Spaniards were ever able to obtain. Full reports of the conferences have been duly forwarded, together with the agreement proposed for authoritative action. It is believed that if peace can be maintained a trade can be built up which will prove highly beneficial to both the United States and the Moro people and will be the means of opening avenues through which a more advanced civilization can be developed in these islands.

The population of the Sulu Archipelago is reckoned at 120,000, mostly domiciled in the island of Jolo, and numbers 20,000 fighting men. Hostilities would be unfortunate for all parties concerned, would be very expensive to the United States in men and money, and destructive of any advancement of the Moros for years to come. Spain's long struggle with these people and their dislike for the former dominant race in the Philippines, inherited, it would seem, by each rising generation during three centuries, furnishes an instructive lesson. Under the pending agreement General Bates, assisted by the officers of the Navy, quietly placed garrisons of one company each at Siassi and at Bongao, on the Tawai Tawai group of islands, where they were well received by the friendly natives. With the approval of the agreement, the only difficulty to a satisfactory settlement of the Sulu affairs will arise from discontent on the part of the Sultan personally because of a supposed decrease in anticipated revenues or the machinations of the insurgents of Mindanao, who are endeavoring to create a feeling of distrust and hostility among the natives against the United States troops.

The Sultan's government is one of perfect despotism, in form at least, as all political power is supposed to center in his person; but this does not prevent frequent outbreaks on the part of the datos, who frequently revolt, and are now, in two or three instances, in declared enmity. All Moros, however, profess the Mohammedan religion, introduced in the fourteenth century, and the sacredness of the person of the Sultan is therefore a tenet of faith. This fact would prevent any marked success by a dato in attempting to secure supreme power. Spain endeavored to supplant the Sultan with one of his most enterprising chiefs and signally failed. Peonage or a species of serfdom enters largely into the social and domestic arrangements and a dato's following or clan submits itself without protest to his arbitrary will. The Moro political fabric bears resemblance to the state of feudal times—the Sultan exercising supreme power by divine right, and his datos, like the feudal lords, supporting or opposing him at will, and by force of arms occasionally, but not to the extent of dethronement, as that would be too great a sacrilege for a Mohammedan people to seek to consummate. The United States must accept these people as they are, and endeavor to ameliorate their condition by degrees, and the best means to insure success appears to be through the cultivation of friendly sentiments and the introduction of trade and commerce upon approved business methods. To undertake forcible radical action for the amelioration of conditions or to so interfere with their domestic relations as to arouse their suspicions and distrust would be attended with unfortunate consequences.

The experience of the past year has conclusively demonstrated that the labors demanded to organize, supply, command, and exchange an army actively engaged in hostilities are small in comparison to those which are required to supervise the business, social and political interests, and the individual rights of several millions of people without established government or any existing rules of action excepting such as may be imposed by military control. In the Philippines chaos, in so far as a civil administration of public affairs is concerned, followed the overthrow of the despotism of Spain and was succeeded throughout the islands by the rule of the sword, which has recently been directed by a few unprincipled Tagalos, who have retained power thus far, although it is gradually passing from their grasp, by deceiving the ignorant masses with the assertion that the United States

intended to enslave and destroy them, and with the cry for independence and republican government. The experience of the people has taught them that the rule of Spain was mild in comparison with this substituted governing power, and the great majority of them—at least of those who are able to reflect or who have property at stake—desire its destruction. Many are held in subjection by the armed bodies in their midst, and their lives and property would pay the penalty of resistance should they attempt it either by word or act. During this political transition business interests and individual property rights have been in jeopardy. Incorporated companies holding valuable concessions granted by Spain, business houses which have made large money investments for the purpose of conducting trade and commerce in these islands, vested property interests, recently acquired estates by testament and descent and those encumbered by mortgage or embargo, are fruitful sources of continually recurring questions which require able civil administration and the assistance of courts of justice with their auxiliary appliances to properly adjust, but which have been thrust upon the military authorities for determination, together with all matters of a criminal nature involving alleged fraudulent transactions which demand speedy remedial action, as well as offenses of a more serious character. Fortunately the large property interests held by corporations and business houses belong for the most part to Europeans and are to a certain extent respected by the insurgent government through fear of incurring universal civilized condemnation should it destroy or openly appropriate them.

So, also, the foreign element of the population engaged in conducting trade are very largely citizens of strong European governments, whose persons are comparatively secure wherever in the islands they may wish to journey. Hence, it has been possible to carry on trade whenever the interests of the United States or the necessities of the large Philippine population dwelling within the country of our occupation has demanded it. Unfortunately, too, it might be said, this comparative security of person and property incites the commercial classes to business activity and a desire for insurgent trade incompatible with war conditions, even though contraband does not materially enter; has occasioned voluminous correspondence and incessant applications for trade permits, necessitated constant watchfulness on the part of the army, and especially of the navy, and has required at times needed unpleasant consequent action. The volume of trade, however, for the year ending August 31, has been quite large, and merchants have suffered much less than is generally supposed. Of the three staple articles of the islands, hemp, tobacco, and sugar, only the latter shows a very marked depreciation in amounts secured and exported. About the same quantity of hemp has been taken from the shipping ports during the past as in the preceding year, and large exportations of tobacco have been made. There still remains in the islands considerable quantities of both hemp and tobacco, but Aguinaldo a short time since issued what was called a decree, most injurious to his interests, forbidding his Tagalo guards to permit, at the ports where they were stationed, the entrance of any merchant vessel flying the American flag, and as all interisland commerce is carried on under that flag, his decree virtually terminated at all points where his troops are maintained, with the result that the inhabitants are deprived of rice and other necessary articles of food. The decree has caused discontent and suffering and has taken from the insurgents much of their revenue, while it has not affected United States interests nor the inhabitants

within our lines, as they are now well supplied and will soon reap an abundant harvest from their crops, which they have planted since United States protection has been given them.

So unpopular is this decree that the outside inhabitants declare that they will resist its execution should American vessels appear in their harbors, but our experience thus far is that a battalion of Tagalo guards can hold down many large communities of unarmed natives. Merchants, if permitted, would take all the risks of interisland trade notwithstanding this restrictive decree and solemnly contract to suffer all losses attendant upon their venture, which would sooner or later doubtless appear as claims from marine insurance companies; but a wise policy dictates that trade facilities should remain for the present in the condition which Aguinaldo by his decree intended to place them. He has acted under it in one instance only, and then in the case of a vessel anchored in a port of western Luzon and which had sailed before it was known that the decree had been issued. His troops seized the crew and cargo and when the navy went to its relief burned the vessel and fired upon the rescuing party. The return fire of the navy upon the intrenched insurgent troops has been publicly proclaimed from insurgent headquarters as an act of barbarous warfare which should be condemned by all civilized nations.

The customs receipts (a fair index of the volume of trade) for the year ending August 31 were \$7,783,000, currency of the country—a larger amount than ever before received in an equal portion of time, and this while we held the port of Iloilo for only six and that of Cebu for but five months of the period.

In the matter of the public revenue, the United States has collected less than one-half of the greatest total amount which Spain has drawn from the islands in a corresponding length of time, for the reason that the extent of our occupation of territory has been very limited and because some of its former most prolific sources of taxation have been ignored. The largest yearly amount which Spain ever received was a little less than \$17,500,000, of which a little more than one-third was derived from customs, one-quarter from the sale of "cedulas personales," or certificates of personal identity, which every inhabitant was obliged to purchase, and about \$1,200,000 from lotteries and gambling and the opium and cock-fighting contractors. The \$5,500,000 which Spain received from cedula, licensed gambling, and contracts which the United States courts would hold void on grounds of public policy, would in any event, even if all the islands had been pacified and occupied, have been lost to us, as no attempts at collection would have been made.

However, the cedula tax might have yielded something, for although this is the most hated by the natives of all taxes formerly imposed upon them, they desire the cedula, as this simple means of identity is valuable to them in conducting business and when journeying through the islands. In response to the expressed desire of the inhabitants of Manila for this ticket, it was given on personal application at a nominal sum sufficient to defray the cost of issuance, and over sixty thousand of them were distributed in a short space of time from the Manila office of internal revenue. The annual revenue of nearly a million of dollars received by Spain from convict labor, exclusive taxes on Chinese residents, sales of public lands, profits of the mint, and local consumption tobacco taxes could not be collected by the United States. So, also, the internal-revenue collections on real estate, industries, and stamped paper have been confined to Manila

and Iloilo, and the yield therefrom has been but a fraction of the receipts which our control of all the islands would have insured. The internal-revenue receipts during a year of occupation of Manila, or from August 18, 1898, were \$577,748. The grand total of all public money receipts from every source for the year ending August 19, 1899, one year from the date the United States took possession of the public offices in Manila (August, 1898, yielding very small returns), amounted to \$8,239,435, of which \$7,790,692 were from customs alone. Larger returns from legitimate sources might have been obtained, but it took time to adjust the machinery for collection, and long-existing fraudulent practices have been indulged in. Heavy punishments have been meted out when offenses have been detected, and the labor to improve the civil service is still being diligently prosecuted.

Spain's system of taxation was very ingeniously devised in order to obtain all revenue possible to cover the expenditures of administering the islands, but I believe that every annual budget showed a deficit. With the restoration of peace and active business conditions, the development of natural resources, the introduction of machinery and practical business enterprises, the construction of railroads and highways, and the encouragement of the people in profitable labor, I am convinced that trade and commerce would be greatly increased and the amount of revenue doubled in a short period of time, without imposing the burdens which were complained of during Spanish supremacy. Even in this season of war commerce has increased. For the five and one-half months ending with December last, 77 foreign and 260 coast vessels entered and 80 foreign and 251 coast vessels cleared from our ports, making a total of 668 vessels, with a total tonnage of 657,740 tons; while for the six months ending with June last, 155 foreign and 367 coast vessels entered and 163 foreign and 409 coast vessels cleared, making a total of 1,049 and having a tonnage of 133,935 tons.

The most of the revenue received has been expended, both for war and civil purposes, by a few selected disbursing officers, and every dollar has been accounted for. There remained on August 31 \$1,364,085.39, nearly one-half of which stood pledged to pay for temporary barracks and hospitals for troops and for a large refrigerating plant to be erected in Manila. All results of action taken in connection with the collection and expenditure of the public revenue from the date of the capitulation of this city to June 30 last, the end of the fiscal year, are shown in the accompanying reports of the collecting and disbursing officers, to which attention is invited.

The present current money of the islands consists of the Filipino dollar, of which 6,000,000 were sent from Spain in 1897, about \$10,000,000 in subsidiary coins, eight or ten millions of Mexican dollars, and \$1,500,000 in bank notes of the Banco Espanol-Filipino.

The former standard money was gold, consisting of the Spanish "onzas" and the \$1, \$2, and \$4 gold pieces minted in Manila. All of these have been driven out of circulation by the cheaper silver currency. The Banco Espanol-Filipino is the only bank which has the power to make paper issue. Under Spanish concession and in return for loans made to that Government, it was granted the privilege of issuing its notes amounting to three times its capital stock of \$1,500,000, and its paper dollar is considered the equivalent of the Mexican silver dollar. The Spanish Government had representation in the management of this bank, and recently the bank invited the United States authorities here to avail itself of this privilege by the appoint-

ment of an accredited agent, which invitation has been declined, as such action might be construed to be an acknowledgment on the part of the United States of its obligation to recognize under treaty promises the validity of the Spanish concession. The War Department has paid out in Manila United States gold currency in considerable quantities, and it is believed that about \$3,000,000 from these disbursements have been hoarded by the inhabitants. The money in circulation, therefore, in the Philippines is less than \$30,000,000 of silver, or the equivalent—a very small sum to transact the volume of business; but then a large share of this trade depends upon credit and the exchange of the country's products, so that comparatively little money is required to conduct it. However, during the yearly periods of greatest exportation money to move the crops becomes very scarce and rates of exchange high. Exchange fluctuations were greater in Spanish times than at present, for in 1878 Spain prohibited by decree the importation of Mexican dollars of a mintage later than the date of the decree except under high duty payments and gave no substitute. This induced smuggling from the foreign Asiatic ports, and the smuggler was paid a handsome profit for the hazard he encountered. The enterprise was brisk until money became plentiful and exchange had again returned to a nominal figure.

When money was in great demand the price of the Mexican dollar was considerably above its Hongkong value in gold and sold in Manila for from 10 to 15 per cent more than its actual value. The currency of the country still fluctuates daily according to the price of silver in the great money markets of the world and has no stable value. This, however, appears to affect very little ordinary business unless purchases of merchandise and services must be paid for in gold, when these fluctuations enter largely into the calculations of profit and loss. The merchant who buys gold in Manila must pay not only the rate of exchange, but the estimated cost of transporting the metal, and if he wishes to convert gold into silver he must pay high exchange rates and the cost of shipment of the Mexican dollar. The public revenue is paid in the currency of the country, as is most expedient, else daily silver fluctuations would necessitate daily difficult calculations upon the gold value of the money offered at the various public offices; but as it is for the most part expended here for services and on local contract purchases the difficulties attending rates of exchange are not serious. The officers and enlisted men of the Army who are paid in gold have been the principal sufferers, as they are obliged to exchange their gold for silver to meet their local payments. The two established banks of the islands other than the Banco Espanol-Filipino, above mentioned, are branches of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation and the Chartered Bank of India, Australia, and China. These have been made depositories of the public civil funds and generally make the money exchanges for the Army. For a long time they allowed but two dollars silver for one in gold, but recently have arranged for receiving gold deposits from disbursing officers on account and to make payments thereon in gold. This entire question of the currency requires the mature deliberation of our most eminent monetary authorities.

Of the islands of the Philippines which contain large populations and which furnish valuable products for shipment to foreign marts, which engage largely in trade and in which business interests of importance have been established, the United States have not as yet taken possession of Samar, Leyte, and Mindanao, and none of Panay,

with the exception of its chief city and surroundings. The southern and northern coasts of Luzon, where hemp and tobacco are produced in large quantities, still remain subject to insurgent dictation. When United States occupation of these islands and provinces will be effected depends upon the arrival of troops in sufficient numbers to justify the establishment of permanent garrisons.

Little difficulty attends the act of taking possession of and temporarily holding any section of the country. A column of 3,000 men could march through and successfully contend with any force which the insurgents could place in its route, but they would close in behind it and again prey upon the inhabitants, persecuting without mercy those who had manifested any friendly feeling toward the American troops. The policy of the insurgent authorities has been to arm the bandits of the mountain sections and the natives who have formerly lived on the proceeds of crime. Many of these men have deserted the ranks, and now armed, plunder their countrymen who have property or money without discrimination. If communities could be protected against this source of danger and be assured of protection from the outrages which have been committed by the organized insurgent force, formidable opposition to American supremacy would cease. The inhabitants have confidence in the American troops. Even the insurgent leaders take advantage of the humane and charitable policy which the United States authorities have thus far pursued. They seek to place their families and property in Manila, where a number of the families of the most noted of their chiefs are now living in comfort and luxury, believing, notwithstanding their conduct and offenses, which, under approved rules of law, would subject their families to removal and all their property to confiscation, and which rules it may yet be to our interests to apply, that they can pursue rebellion as long as they desire and in the end escape all punishment. So confident are they of the nature and scope of American charity that their ill-gotten gains—acquired through robbery, in fact, but under the guise of a pretended government contending, they say, for liberty against oppression—are deposited in our banks or are invested in our trade. And still, while they manifest this absolute confidence by their individual acts, they publicly circulate the most malicious statements their active imaginations can invent regarding United States intention and the horrors of war which our troops indulge in. An active society in Hongkong, composed of their people and certain Europeans retained under high pay, and in which American membership is believed to exist, which feeds and fattens upon the corruption it is able to produce, fills the islands and the world with its invented published statements of abuse. While they fill the newspaper press with their false statements of atrocities committed by our troops, their chief, Aguinaldo, writes:

We will never accept a treaty of peace dishonorable to the Filipino arms, and consequently disastrous to the future of the country, which is what our enemies desire. For this reason I advise all those who feel that they have not strength to make this sacrifice, and whose services are not indispensable to our government, to return to the capital or to the towns occupied by the enemy, reserving themselves in order to strengthen the organization of the government when independence is gained. They can then take the places of those who need rest after the fatigues of the struggle. I am not displeased that some of the Filipinos have accepted positions from Americans. On the contrary, I am glad of it, for in that manner they can better appreciate the true American character. I am still more glad because of the fact that our enemies, having had recourse to Filipinos for the discharge of the duties of high offices in the public administration, will demonstrate that they acknowledge the capacity of the people to govern themselves.

While the Tagalo newspapers publish to the portion of their people still dominated by the insurgents stories of insurgent prowess, and sum up American losses in battle to date at an even 26,000, Aguinaldo publishes his proclamations, exhorting the people to hold out until December, when the American Congress will surely grant them independence under his leadership, against which all good Filipinos, I am certain, would most assuredly protest. On this line one of the principal members of the Hongkong junta writes:

Do you think that the country should deliver itself completely to the promises made by those who call themselves representatives of that great Republic and great people when we well know by the Constitution of the country that they can not be trusted, because they are not authorized for that purpose and can not be except by the approval of Congress? If this be so, is it not true that it is better to wait for Congress first to determine the governmental régime to be established in our beloved country? On the other hand, it is certain that if that struggle is not kept up the parties will unite and we shall hereafter be treated as the negroes are. * * * And why not, then, my dear friend, support that other party, in order that we gain recognition of our rights, with all the necessary guaranties? Otis and company offer but little security that the autonomy or any other system of government which they establish there will be respected. I am informed that there is not a countryman of ours who does not want peace, but they want it on a basis of guaranties in favor of the people.

Even more; so just is our cause that, gaining sympathy, several European powers have made official offers to provide us with everything we require; but as we consider the war which is being sustained is not against America, because we know that 80 per cent of that great people, which on one occasion struggled for the independence which it now enjoys, is in favor of us, but only against McKinley and his party. Other offers made have not been accepted because we have complete assurance that very soon the imperialist party will come to reason and will concede us the guaranties, etc.

So deep an impression have statements of this character made upon able Filipinos who favor United States control and are conscientiously laboring for its complete establishment that I am importuned by them for information as to the trend of United States political affairs and to state if, in my opinion, they are finally to be surrendered to the mercies of their insurgent countrymen.

The islands are flooded with the abusive literature which has birth in Asiatic ports and is published in Spanish and native languages. What was ostensibly a private letter prepared by a European who has never visited these islands, and which was written in Hongkong, is circulated publicly by the Hongkong junta. Extracts therefrom read as follows:

You and the Filipinos who aspire to peace in the form of autonomy believe the hollow words of the Yankees. You write me: "We have no people to govern ourselves. That is the truth. We shall have them after ten years of American sovereignty."

I reply: We shall not have them in ten, twenty, or a hundred years, because the Yankees will never acknowledge the aptitude of an inferior race to govern the country, and, as you know, under the heading of inferior races they class the Spaniards themselves. Do not dream that when American sovereignty is implanted in the country the American officeholders will give up. Never! This is what will happen: During the first few years they will admit a few Filipinos, either because it is difficult for the Yankees to learn at once the administration of the country, so different from America, or in order to disarm for the moment the suspicion of the Americanist Filipinos. After those five or ten years of apprenticeship they will tear off the mask with which they now dissemble their true object of governing the country exclusively by Anglo-Saxons, as they have done with all countries which belonged, prior to Yankee domination, to the Spanish Empire. With that proud scorn which characterizes the Yankee in his political and social contact with colored people, they will close their ears to the complaints and aspirations of the sons of the country, and will laugh at those who helped to bring the country under the American yoke.

Yes, my friend, the Americans have no intention of leaving the Philippines, and once that sovereignty is recognized and the brave Filipino army disbanded they will send to the Philippines swarms of genuine officeholders, who will treat the noble sons of the country as they do the "colored gentlemen" in the United States. To the Yankees you are only a "nigger," who in the present circumstances, full of difficulties for the Yankees, is the object of a more or less perfectly simulated respect. But alas for you when the day arrives when the Yankees will no longer need your help and cooperation!

Do not look for the Americans to do anything to assist the national progress of the country. In America the Government takes no part in the education of the nation. All education is the work of private individuals or associations. The Yankees have absolutely no interest whatever in raising to a higher educational level the native masses, both because the Government will not interest itself in such an enterprise, and because such a policy would be contrary to the object of the American imperialist, which is to convert the archipelago into a field for exploitation by trusts and officeholders.

If the Filipinos accept American sovereignty with a halt and blind autonomy, if they permit the United States to seize the offices of the country and make these sacrifices in the hope that when they have fit men to govern the country the Americans will turn the government over to the native element, reducing the American personnel to the governor-general, then the Filipinos are going to sacrifice their liberty, their honor, their race, and, in short, everything which is included within the meaning of nationality, upon the altar of illusions. For if the Americans are the sovereigns, it depends upon them to say whether the Filipinos have sufficient men for the government of the country. They never will say it, because interests of purse, of race, and, in short, all the vital interests of Anglo-Saxonism will prevent it—American interests which prevent a real and sincere autonomy, which are the same which caused the Spanish friars to oppose the assimilation of the country and the secularization of the curacies."

The disaffected element of the population, or the emissaries of Aguinaldo's government, contend that the United States has given nothing substantial as yet in response to its administrative promises. The archbishop, they declare, still holds political sway, the friars have not been driven out nor killed, the Spaniards have been continued in office, the chief representative of United States authority here (who has never witnessed Roman Catholic ceremonies a dozen times in his life) is an ardent Romanist and draws inspirations from the droppings of the Roman Catholic sanctuary as set up in the Philippines. Remove these abominations, they say, and we will willingly accept United States protection and supremacy. Secretly these same critics and complainants assert that these friars and Spaniards render valuable aid to the insurgent cause in many ways, and the number of Spaniards now officering their troops is strong proof that their assertions are correct.

The insurgent armed forces are not to be feared except as they oppress their own people and delay returns to conditions of peace. The length of time they have been in the field and their conduct has given the practical lesson to the inhabitants that they can not expect security under Tagalo rule. The lesson is deeply impressed and required time to produce conviction. Had the rebellion been crushed immediately upon its open defiant demonstrations of last February it would soon have appeared in new form, for the mass of the people were intoxicated with the cry for independence and self-government which the reflecting classes now realize is impossible until true political education is more generally diffused. The political conditions which will follow armed resistance demand the most serious attention of our eminent statesmen, and Congressional action can not be too much accelerated. Now all executive functions of a civil character in these islands centers in a military command which is called upon to administer the law governing the various departmental offices of the executive branch of the United States Government and to set aside

Spanish decrees when such are in conflict therewith. The multitude of obtrusive and perplexing questions which arise for determination can only be appreciated by those who have confronted such a situation. I have been assisted in all duties of administration by a conscientious, hard-working, and able staff, who, with the officers ably exercising the command of troops, have given me their loyal support. I herewith transmit their several annual reports, which furnish valuable details on particular subjects which are only alluded to in a very general manner in the foregoing pages.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. S. OTIS,
*Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding Department
of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, and
Military Governor in the Philippines.*

APPENDIX A.

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., August 12, 1899.

COMMANDING GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC
AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report pertaining to the adjutant-general's department at these headquarters, to accompany the annual report of the department commander.

I arrived in San Francisco, Cal., and reported to Maj. Gen. E. S. Otis, U. S. V., on the 20th of May, 1898, in compliance with telegraphic instructions from the Secretary of War, dated May 17, 1898, and assumed the duties of adjutant-general of the Philippine Islands expeditionary forces upon date of arrival, performing the same until the 30th of that month, when General Orders, No. 1, Headquarters Expeditionary Forces and Department of the Pacific, announced me as assistant adjutant-general of that command.

On the 13th of June I was assigned as adjutant-general of the Independent Division, Eighth Army Corps, and on the 23d of June was appointed adjutant-general of that corps, remaining on duty at Camp Merritt, assisting in the organization of the expeditionary troops until four expeditions had been prepared, equipped, and dispatched to the Philippine Islands, when, in obedience to orders, I embarked July 15, 1898, on the transport *Peru*, arriving in Manila on the 21st of August, 1898.

On the 23d of that month I relieved Brig. Gen. J. B. Babcock, U. S. V., of his duties as adjutant-general, Department of the Pacific, and on the 30th was appointed adjutant-general, Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps.

The duties and responsibilities of this office during the past year have been enormous. With four trained civil-service clerks, three from the Department of the Colorado and one from the Department of the Columbia—viz, Frederick Donnelly, chief clerk; Joseph H. Porter, Marshal W. Cardwell, and John Burton—one civilian clerk, J. J. O'Loughlen, whose employment was authorized by the Secretary of War on May 30, 1898, and the few enlisted men selected from the command, the immense and increasing business has been carried on without the services of an assistant.

The organization of this command, composed mostly of volunteers from our extreme Western States, some of whom had practically no former regimental organization, none completely equipped, and many arriving in San Francisco without clothing, arms, or equipments, their transportation 8,000 miles across the Pacific Ocean without loss and the molding of them into the cohesive, well-instructed, disciplined, equipped, and supplied Eighth Corps—whose fighting efficiency in these tropical regions, under the most trying conditions of climate and terrain, has challenged the admiration of the world—entailed incessant labor upon all connected with these headquarters, for whose efficiency and devotion to duty the results attained speak volumes.

Ten volunteer regiments have been returned to the United States for muster out, and others are being prepared for embarkation as transports become available.

The exodus of thousands of soldiers and the incoming of other thousands add considerable to the burden of the office. Besides caring for the troops here, those being sent to the United States, and those arriving, three volunteer regiments have been organized, two of which are already equipped for the field and the third well under way.

During the past year over 50,000 original communications have been received, each averaging at least one inclosure and two indorsements. All have been recorded, indexed, and have received the proper action. Ten thousand letters and telegrams have been sent out, recorded, and indexed. In addition, 4,182 orders have been drafted, involving much labor in the way of research, reference, proof reading, indexing, filing, and distribution. In all, about 375,000 papers have been handled and disposed of.

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With the scant clerical force available, this work has been accomplished only by the superhuman efforts of the few old clerks above mentioned, who have labored incessantly during long hours—first, in instructing the enlisted clerks, and second, in doing double duty themselves. The records of these headquarters are a gratifying exhibit of their fidelity to the interests of the service.

It is impossible to obtain the necessary enlisted clerical assistance, there being a dearth of such material in this command, especially now that the volunteers have been relieved and are en route or under orders to proceed home.

Fifty civilian clerks are needed to properly carry on the work of this office in all its details under existing conditions.

This is not an extravagant estimate when it is considered that this command nearly doubles the entire United States Army in recent peace times; is engaged in active hostilities under extraordinary conditions of climate, weather, and terrain; is removed 8,000 miles from its base of supplies, and that all communications coming to and going from it, including most of those that originate and terminate within the command, and full instructions governing all field operations are transmitted from or through and made of record in this office.

There are now on duty 22 clerks—9 civilians and 13 enlisted men.

The retention of many clerks at the different department headquarters in the United States and the sending of a few to the front to bear the burden—and these few paid the lowest salary—is unjust. The salaries paid to clerks of the supply departments, as compared with those authorized the clerks of this department, constitutes a standing and unjust discrimination against a most faithful and intelligent class of public servants.

It is recommended that the clerks authorized by the act of Congress approved March 3, 1899, be rotated in duties and stations, by which means the inefficient can be weeded out and every clerk in the corps made competent to perform any duty or fill any position in the Adjutant-General's Department. Those assigned to duty outside the United States should receive the highest salary authorized by law and should be relieved at the expiration of a two years' tour of such duty and returned to stations in the United States, being replaced by clerks who have had no foreign service, except in cases where the individual concerned prefers and is well suited and acclimated to the foreign station.

The argument advanced by the sponsors of the recently enacted legislation which increased the pay of the civil-service clerks of the Adjutant General's Department was, it is understood, that clerks on foreign service were under more expense than those in the United States. The contemplation of the act in this respect has not been fulfilled, at least in so far as it should affect the pay of the very efficient and meritorious clerks of great experience and length of service on duty at these headquarters, none of whom has received any increase in salary so far as known, though the same has been repeatedly recommended by the department commander and myself.

No recruiting has been done excepting the reenlistment of discharged soldiers and the necessary enlistments for the new volunteer regiments.

Owing to active field operations it was not practicable to hold the officers' lyceum, though schools for the commissioned and noncommissioned officers were held in all organizations prior to the beginning of hostilities on February 4 last.

The following statistics for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1899, are submitted: Changes of stations of troops; changes of personnel, officers and enlisted; roster of troops.

Very respectfully,

THOMAS H. BARRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

EXHIBIT A.

Changes of stations of troops from July 1, 1898, to June 30, 1899.

Organization.	Date of departure.	From—	Date of arrival.	At—	Authority.
First California Volunteer Infantry	May 23, 1898	San Francisco, Cal.	June 30, 1898	Manila, P. I.	General Order No. 4, series 1898, headquarters United States expeditionary forces.
Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry	do	do	do	do	Do.
Fourteenth U. S. Infantry, Companies A, C, D, E, F	do	do	do	do	Do.
First Colorado Volunteer Infantry	June 15, 1898	do	July 17, 1898	do	Special Order No. 4, series 1898, independent division, Philippine Islands expeditionary forces.
Utah Volunteer Artillery, Light Batteries A, B	do	do	do	do	Do.
Tenth Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry	do	do	do	do	Do.
Eighteenth U. S. Infantry, Companies A, B, E, G	do	do	do	do	Do.
Twenty-third U. S. Infantry, Companies D, E, F, H	do	do	do	do	Do.
First Nebraska Volunteer Infantry	do	do	do	do	Special Order No. 11, series 1898, independent division, Philippine Islands expeditionary forces.
Astor Battery	June 20, 1898	do	July 23, 1898	do	Special Order No. 24, series 1898, independent division, Philippine Islands expeditionary forces.
Third U. S. Artillery, Batteries H, K	do	do	do	do	Do.
Twenty-third U. S. Infantry, headquarters and Companies B, C, G, L	June 27, 1898	do	July 31, 1898	do	Special Order No. 19, series 1898, headquarters independent division, Philippine Islands expeditionary forces.
Eighteenth U. S. Infantry, headquarters and Companies C, D, F, H	do	do	do	do	Special Order No. 19, series 1898, headquarters independent division, Philippine Islands Expeditionary Forces.
Company A, Engineer Battalion, U. S. A	do	do	do	do	Do.
First Idaho Volunteer Infantry	do	do	do	do	Special Order No. 11, series 1898, headquarters independent division, Philippine Islands Expeditionary Forces.
First Battalion Wyoming Volunteer Infantry	do	do	do	do	Do.
Third U. S. Artillery, Batteries G and L	do	do	do	do	Independent Division, Philippine Islands
Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry	do	do	do	do	Expeditionary Forces.
First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry	June 28, 1898	do	do	do	Special Order No. 17, series 1898, headquarters independent division, Philippine Islands Expeditionary Forces.
Fourth U. S. Cavalry, Troops C, E, G, I, K, L	July 15, 1898	do	Aug. 21, 1898	do	Do.
Sixth U. S. Artillery, Light Batteries D and G	do	do	do	do	Do.
Fourteenth U. S. Infantry, headquarters and Companies G, I, K, L, M	do	do	do	do	Special Order No. 30, series 1898, headquarters independent division, Eighth Army Corps.
First Montana Volunteer Infantry	July 18, 1898	do	do	do	Do.
		do	Aug. 24, 1898	do	Special Order No. 41, series 1898, headquarters independent division, Eighth Army Corps.

EXHIBIT A.—Changes of stations of troops from July 1, 1898, to June 30, 1899—Continued.

Organization.	Date of departure.	From—	Date of arrival.	At—	Authority.
First South Dakota Volunteer Infantry, headquarters and Second and Third Battalions.	July 23, 1898	San Francisco, Cal.	Aug. 24, 1898	Manila, P. I.	Special order No. 41, series 1898, headquarters Independent Division, Eighth Army Corps.
First South Dakota Volunteer Infantry, First Battalion.	do.	do.	do.	do.	Do.
Twenty-third U. S. Infantry, Companies A, I, K, M.	July 28, 1898	do.	Aug. 31, 1898	do.	Special Order No. 41, series 1898, Headquarters Independent Division, Eighth Army Corps.
California Volunteer Heavy Artillery, Battery D.	Oct. 17, 1898	do.	Nov. 21, 1898	do.	Special Order No. 155, series 1898, Department of California.
California Volunteer Heavy Artillery, Battery A.	do.	do.	do.	do.	Special Orders Nos. 155 and 157, series 1898, Department of California.
First Washington Volunteer Infantry, Companies F, G, I, L.	do.	do.	Nov. 22, 1898	do.	Do.
Eighteenth U. S. Infantry, Companies I, K, L, M.	Nov. 10, 1898	Honolulu, H. I.	do.	do.	Special Order No. 157, series 1898, Department of California.
First Washington Volunteer Infantry, headquarters and Companies A, B, C, D, E, H, K, M.	Oct. 28, 1898	San Francisco, Cal.	Nov. 25, 1898	do.	Special Order No. 111, series 1898, Department of California.
First Tennessee Volunteer Infantry, headquarters and Companies A, B, C, E, F, L, M.	Oct. 30, 1898	do.	Nov. 28, 1898	do.	Special Order No. 160, series 1898, Department of California.
Twentieth Kansas Volunteer Infantry, headquarters and Companies C, D, E, G, H, I, K, M.	Oct. 27, 1898	do.	Nov. 30, 1898	do.	Special Order No. 168, series 1898, Department of California.
First Tennessee Volunteer Infantry, Companies D, V, H, I, K.	Nov. 6, 1898	do.	Dec. 6, 1898	do.	Special Order No. 173, series 1898, Department of California.
Nevada Volunteer Cavalry, Troop A.	do.	do.	do.	do.	Do.
Twentieth Kansas Volunteer Infantry, Companies A, B, F, L.	Nov. 8, 1898	do.	Dec. 7, 1898	do.	Special Order No. 171, series 1898, Department of California.
Young Volunteer Artillery, Light Battery A.	do.	do.	do.	do.	Do.
Fifty-first Iowa Volunteer Infantry.	Nov. 3, 1898	do.	do.	do.	Do.
Twentieth U. S. Infantry.	Jan. 28, 1899	Department of the Missouri.	do.	do.	Special Order No. 188, series 1898, Department of California.
Twenty-second U. S. Infantry, Headquarters and Companies A, B, D, H, K, M.	Feb. 1, 1899	do.	Feb. 23, 1899	do.	General Order No. 21, series 1898, Department of the Missouri.
Twenty-second U. S. Infantry, Companies C, E, F, G, I, L.	do.	do.	Mar. 4, 1899	do.	General Order No. 2, series 1899, Department of the Missouri.
Fourth U. S. Infantry.	Jan. 19, 1899	Department of the Lakes.	Mar. 5, 1899	do.	Do.
Seventeenth U. S. Infantry, Companies B, G, I, M.	do.	do.	Mar. 10, 1899	do.	Special Order No. 5, series 1899, Department of the Lakes.
Seventeenth U. S. Infantry, Companies D, H, K, I.	Feb. 3, 1899	do.	do.	do.	Do.
Third U. S. Infantry.	do.	Department of Dakota.	Mar. 22, 1899	do.	Special Order No. 14, series 1899, Department of the Lakes.
			do.	do.	Special Order No. 11, series 1899, Department of Dakota.

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Twelfth U. S. Infantry.....	Feb. 19, 1899	Department of the Missouri.	Apr. 14, 1899	do	General Order No. 22, series 1898, Department of the Missouri.
Seventeenth U. S. Infantry, Headquarters and Companies A, C, E, F.	do	Department of the Missouri.	do	do	Special Order No. 28, series 1899, Department of the Lakes.
Ninth U. S. Infantry, Headquarters and Companies A, F, G, I, L, M.	Mar. 24, 1899	Department of the East.	Apr. 28, 1899	do	General Order No. 35, series 1899, Adjutant-General's Office.
Ninth U. S. Infantry, Companies B, C, D, E, H, K.	Mar. 28, 1899	do	Apr. 27, 1899	do	Do.
Twenty-first U. S. Infantry.....	Apr. 18, 1899	do	May 11, 1899	do	General Order No. 56, series 1899, Adjutant-General's Office.
First U. S. Artillery, Light Battery E.	do	Department of the Missouri.	do	do	General Order No. 35, series 1899, Adjutant-General's Office.
Sixth U. S. Artillery, Headquarters and Batteries B, C, E, F, H, I, M, O.	Apr. 20, 1899	Department of the East.	May 18, 1899	do	General Order No. 56, series 1899, Adjutant-General's Office.
Fourth U. S. Artillery, Light Battery F.	do	do	May 28, 1899	do	Do.
Fifth U. S. Artillery, Light Battery F.	do	do	do	do	General Order No. 35, series 1899, Adjutant-General's Office.
Thirteenth U. S. Infantry.....	Apr. 27, 1899	do	May 29, 1899	do	Do.
Sixth U. S. Infantry.....	May 22, 1899	Department of the Gulf.	June 18, 1899	do	Do.
Sixteenth U. S. Infantry.....	May 30, 1899	Department of the Missouri.	June 28, 1899	do	Special Order No. 138, series 1898, Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps.
Astor Battery.....	Dec. 15, 1898	Manila, P. I.		Transferred to San Francisco, Cal.	Special Order No. 157, series 1899, Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps.
Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry.....	June 14, 1899	do		do	Do.
First Company Volunteer Signal Corps.....	do	do		do	Special Order No. 168, series 1899, Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps.
Utah Volunteer Artillery, Light Batteries A, B.	July 1, 1899	do		do	Special Order No. 162, series 1899, Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps.
First Nebraska Volunteer Infantry.....	do	do		do	Do.
Tenth Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry.....	Dec. 28, 1898	do	Dec. 29, 1898	do	Department commander.
Sixth U. S. Artillery, Light Battery G.	do	do	do	Iloilo, island of Panay, P. I.	Do.
Eighteenth U. S. Infantry.....	do	do	do	do	Do.
Fifty-first Iowa Volunteer Infantry.....	Jan. 29, 1899	Iloilo, island of Panay, P. I.	Jan. 31, 1899	Manila, P. I.	Do.
Do.....	do	do	do	do	Do.
First Tennessee Volunteer Infantry.....	Feb. 8, 1899	Manila, P. I.	Feb. 10, 1899	Iloilo, island of Panay, P. I.	Do.
First California Volunteer Infantry, Companies A, B, E, H.	Mar. 1, 1899	do	Mar. 6, 1899	Bacolod, island of Negros, P. I.	Do.
Twenty-third U. S. Infantry, Companies A, I, K, M.	Feb. 26, 1899	do	Feb. 28, 1899	Cebu, island of Negros, P. I.	Do.
First California Volunteer Infantry, headquarters and Companies F, C, L, M.	Mar. 24, 1899	do	Mar. 27, 1899	Bacolod, island of Negros, P. I.	Do.
Twenty-third U. S. Infantry, headquarters and Companies B, C, D, E, F, G, H, L.	May 17, 1899	do	May 19, 1899	Jolo, island of Negros, P. I.	Do.
First California Volunteer Infantry, Companies C, D, I, K.	May 25, 1899	do	May 30, 1899	Negros, island of Negros, P. I.	Do.
Sixth U. S. Infantry.....	June 28, 1899	do	July 1, 1899	do	Do.

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EXHIBIT B.

Changes in personnel from July 1, 1898, to June 30, 1899.

OFFICERS.

Gain:		Loss:	
By transfer	1,538	By transfer	203
By appointment	86	By discharge	67
		Died—	
		Killed in action	14
		Of wounds received in ac-	
		tion	4
		Of disease, etc.	16
Total	1,614	Total	304

ENLISTED MEN.

Gain:		Loss:	
By enlistment	3,580	Discharged—	
By reenlistment	347	By expiration of service ..	805
By transfer	36,587	For disability	692
From desertion	55	For other causes	1,782
		By transfer	3,060
		By retirement	3
		Died—	
		Killed in action	231
		Of wounds received in ac-	
		tion	75
		Of disease, etc.	414
Total	40,569	Deserted	156
		Total	7,218

The strength of the Department, present and absent, June 30, 1899, is 1,810 commissioned officers and 33,351 enlisted men.

THOMAS H. BARRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., June 30, 1899.

APPENDIX B.

DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR-GENERAL,
Manila, P. I., August 13, 1899.

TO THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS.

SIR: In obedience to instructions dated July 21 I have the honor to submit a report on the business and the administration of this office during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1899.

Pursuant to General Orders, No. 19, Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, dated April 4, 1899, I took charge of the office. Prior to that date there are no records of the transaction of any business. The beginning of the fiscal year, July 1, 1898, found Lieut. Col. C. A. Whittier, U. S. V., as inspector-general of the Department of the Pacific and the corps, pursuant to General Orders, No. 1, dated June 23, 1898. On September 1, 1898, by General Orders, No. 12, Brig. Gen. R. P. Hughes, U. S. V., was announced as inspector-general of the department and the corps, and on the 4th of the same month, by General Orders, No. 14, he was appointed provost-marshal-general of the city and suburbs of Manila, practically leaving the office vacant from that time until the date of my order as given above.

On April 5 I was detailed as a member of the board of officers to meet and confer with the Spanish board of liquidation, and on May 27 I was appointed collector of customs at Manila and for the islands, in addition to my duties as inspector-general. For this reason my individual report must be confined to the routine business of this office, as I have had no opportunity for personally inspecting the troops in the field.

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The other officers of the Inspector-General's Department on duty in this department are Maj. John S. Mallory, U. S. V., inspector-general, Second Division; Maj. Charles G. Starr, U. S. V., inspector-general, First Division, and Maj. Cunliffe H. Murray, U. S. V., secretary to the military governor.

INSPECTION OF MONEY ACCOUNTABILITY.

The following tabulated statement includes all money inspections made by me and by the division inspectors from April 4 to June 30, 1899:

Inspection of money accounts of disbursing officers.

Date of inspection.	Name of officer.	Rank and department	Total to be accounted for.	Balance on hand.
1899.				
Apr. 15	Maj. Wm. G. Gambrill.	Major and additional paymaster, Manila, P. I.	\$584,929.80	\$76,886.51
Apr. 15	William B. Rochester, jr.	do	794,389.20	75,721.22
Apr. 15	Maj. W. B. Schofield.	Additional paymaster, Manila, P. I.	1,705,353.64	70,052.39
Apr. 15	Maj. C. E. Stanton	Major and additional paymaster, Manila, P. I.	1,729,663.28	
Apr. 15	Maj. M. F. Sheary	do	745,544.21	67,814.53
Apr. 18	Lieut. Col. Henry Lippincott.	Deputy surgeon-general, chief surgeon Department Pacific and Eighth Army Corps.	30,000.00	28,918.34
Apr. 20	Maj. R. E. Thompson.	Disbursing officer, Volunteer Signal Corps, Manila, P. I.	10,000.00	
Apr. 20	Maj. H. C. Fitzgerald.	Major and additional paymaster, Manila, P. I.	619,324.40	
Apr. 20	Wm. O. Bailey	First lieutenant, Volunteer Signal Corps, disbursing officer.	15,000.00	10,214.17
Apr. 20	D. L. Brainard	Captain and commissary of subsistence, U. S. A., Haines Mission, Alaska	3,765.00	
Apr. 20	do	Captain and commissary of subsistence, chief commissary, Manila, P. I.	850,559.52	39,153.52
Apr. 20	do	Captain and commissary of subsistence, Alaska.	50,054.86	
Apr. 21	J. W. Pope	Lieutenant-colonel and chief quartermaster, U. S. V., Manila, P. I.	1,629,082.66	630,616.22
Apr. 22	Col. Charles L. Potter.	Lieutenant-colonel, U. S. V., captain Corps of Engineers, U. S. A., Manila, P. I.	39,050.00	8,826.71
Apr. 22	John M. Sears	Major and additional paymaster, Manila, P. I.	959,156.81	73,875.33
Apr. 27	Capt. C. R. Krauthoff.	Chief commissary and issuing commissary, Manila, P. I.	9,671.01	934.98
Apr. 27	do	Commissary, sales depot at Quiapo, Manila, P. I.	11,130.03	2,062.98
Apr. 27	do	Chief commissary, First Separate Brigade, issuing commissary, Manila, P. I.	9,671.01	943.98
Apr. 28	Capt. S. B. Bootes	Commissary, Manila, P. I.	8,357.24	
Apr. 29	Lieut. C. H. Martin	First lieutenant, Fourteenth Infantry, acting assistant quartermaster, Manila, P. I.	2,900.28	1,555.44
Apr. 29	Dr. W. H. Corbusier.	Major and surgeon, U. S. A., disbursing officer medical depot, Manila, P. I.	50,000.00	12,557.02
Apr. 30	Maj. S. R. Jones	Depot quartermaster, Manila, P. I.	239,561.12	74,366.08
Apr. 30	C. du Pont Coudert	Captain and commissary, U. S. V., Manila, P. I.	9,000.00	
May 8	Maj. W. H. Anderson.	Chief commissary of subsistence, U. S. V., depot commissary, Manila, P. I.	78,318.19	871.74
May 24	Maj. Charles McClure.	Paymaster, U. S. A., Manila, P. I.	7,813,183.36	1,486,499.62
May 31	Maj. R. H. Fitzhugh ¹ .	Chief commissary of subsistence, U. S. V., San Fernando, P. I.	63,230.31	61.43
June 17	Capt. J. A. Logan, jr. ¹	Commissary of subsistence, U. S. V., Second Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, in the field.	7,784.03	208.00
June 23	Capt. E. R. Butler ¹	Assistant quartermaster, U. S. V., San Fernando, P. I.	10,070.50	541.99
June 29	Capt. J. B. Handy ²	Commissary of subsistence, U. S. V., Manila, P. I. (San Pedro Macati).	12,903.24	1,238.97
June 30	Capt. C. G. Sawtelle, jr. ¹	Assistant quartermaster, U. S. V., in the field.	3,755.96	1,733.36
			18,065,409.66	2,665,664.13

¹ Inspection made by Maj. John S. Mallory, inspector-general, U. S. Volunteers.

² Inspection made by Maj. C. G. Starr, inspector-general, U. S. Volunteers.

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INSPECTIONS OF PROPERTY.

By examination of records in the Adjutant-General's Office it is found that 173 inventory and inspection reports have been presented and acted upon during the year, and of these 29 have been acted upon by me.

The results of my action on the inventories presented are summarized in the tabular statement which follows:

Class.	Number of inventories.	Number of articles.	Cost.	Number of articles continued in service.	Destroyed.	Broken up.	Sold.	Number of articles to be turned in to depot.
Subsistence stores.....	10	1,313,443	\$11,669.06	22,626	1,290,814	3
Quartermaster supplies.....	16	45,977	10,368.01	208	13,045	758	5,646	10,117
Ordnance stores.....	2	206	152.82	204	2
Public civil fund.....	1	19	19
Total	29	1,359,645	22,189.89	208	35,894	758	1,296,460	10,122

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS.

Since assuming my duties as department inspector, pursuant to instructions from the department commander, I have made eight special investigations. Five of the investigations were on charges against officers and men, of a military nature and of regimental difficulties, two in relation to treatment of insurgent prisoners and one of a banking and loan institution in Manila, known as the "Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros." The examination of the books and business of this institution is repeated every month.

REPORTS OF DIVISION INSPECTORS.

Reports covering the following points have, at my request, been made by the inspectors of the first and second divisions:

Efficiency, discipline, and appearance of troops; state of arms, equipments, and accouterments of all kinds; sufficiency and variety of the ration; the serviceability and the sufficiency of camp and garrison equipage and clothing; the necessity or wisdom of any change in the ration or in the clothing for service in tropical climate; a description of the transportation that has been employed in furnishing supplies to troops in the field, setting forth suggestions for improvements which will include the capabilities that have been displayed by the horse and mule for service in the Philippines; sanitation of camps and barracks; health, cleanliness, and spirits of the command; description of the climate and terrain of the country over which the operations of the troops have been conducted.

Their reports follow:

FIRST DIVISION, MAJOR STARR.

History.—This division was placed under the command of Maj. Gen. H. W. Lawton, U. S. V., on March 18, 1899, and my knowledge of it dates from that time. It was announced as "temporary" and has at various times included the following troops:

Regulars: Fourth Cavalry, Troops C, G, and L (dismounted); E, I, and K, mounted; E, First Artillery; F, Fourth Artillery; F, Fifth Artillery; D, Sixth Artillery; First Separate Mountain Battery; Third Infantry; Fourth Infantry; Ninth Infantry; Twelfth Infantry; Thirteenth Infantry; Fourteenth Infantry; Sixteenth Infantry; Twenty-first Infantry; Twenty-second Infantry.

Volunteers: First California Volunteer Infantry (1 battalion); First Colorado Volunteer Infantry; First Idaho Volunteer Infantry (8 companies); Fifty-first Iowa Volunteer Infantry (1 battalion); Twentieth Kansas Volunteer Infantry (1 battalion); First Montana Volunteer Infantry; First Nebraska Volunteer Infantry; First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry; Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry; First South Dakota Volunteer Infantry; First Washington Volunteer Infantry; First Wyoming Volunteer Infantry (4 companies); First Nevada Volunteer Cavalry, Troop A.

During this period of four months the commanding general and staff have been in the field with various parts of it and actively engaged, and on the march sixty days, divided over four expeditions in as many different sections of the country.

The balance of the time the troops have been constantly changing location, and but few have remained more than a short time at any one place. They have been either on the line or as temporary garrison in various places, and such a thing as a regular tactical inspection has been out of the question. At the present time the command is extended from Caloocan on the north to Imus on the south, a distance of some 20 miles in a direct line, but as the line runs at least 30 miles is covered, with one battalion at Morong and another in cascoes on the lake. It will be seen that with the exception of a few regiments all those which have been in the Eighth Corps have also at one time or another been a part of this command.

Efficiency, discipline, and appearance of troops.—The Eighth Corps is at present in a transition state. The volunteer regiments which composed the greater part of it up to a month or so since are being sent home and are replaced by regular troops. These volunteer regiments have been in service here for the most part for several months, and much of that service has been in the field under fire. They had acquired a knowledge from experience of caring for themselves, both in camp and in action, which can be learned in no other way, and their efficiency can not be questioned.

Their discipline in many respects is excellent, but in others, notably a disposition to loot and destroy, is not so good. This has been improved very much, however, since the positive policy relative to those matters has been announced.

The appearance is that of an army in the field where the question of uniform is governed only by the ability to get it, and where personal comfort is considered instead of regulations. The regulars being made up, so far as the late arrivals are concerned, of many recruits, are by no means up to the standard and have much to learn. Many of the officers have been appointed but a short time, have no military experience or knowledge, and many of the older ones are absent from sickness or other causes. Discipline and appearance can be greatly improved and efficiency will only come with time and experience.

State of arms, equipments, and accouterments of all kinds.—The regular troops have complete equipments of latest pattern and all in good condition. The retention of the Springfield in hands of any of our troops is a great error. The smokeless-powder cartridge is not a success in it and its range is faulty. To be forced to endure an enemy's fire and be powerless to damage him in return is placing too much upon any man, and the way in which the volunteers have stood up against this and gone to the front in the face of it can not be too highly praised. It shows how fully their hearts were in the work cut out for them.

Sufficiency, variety, and quality of ration.—The ration is sufficient in quantity but the quality is often to be questioned. Much of the packing for United States trade is not suited to the service, and stores in this climate do not keep well. Canned corned beef is much to be preferred to any other part of the preserved meat ration. Great difficulty is experienced in dividing rations into small parts for small detachments and isolated men, and a special packing for service uses should be adopted. It should be packed each article in a certain convenient number of ration units—50, 100, or whatever might be convenient—and would be issued and transferred entirely in rations and not in pounds.

When the various parts of the ration are all supplied it is sufficiently varied, but as a rule all parts are not supplied. Troops in permanent camps or in garrison live very well, but in the field, and at times in the trenches, hard bread, corned beef, and coffee have formed the diet for weeks at a time. If the various parts of the ration are all supplied and of good quality, it is quite enough in both quantity and variety.

The serviceability and sufficiency of camp and garrison equipage and clothing.—When at hand does very well. Troops should in this climate be in barracks rather than under canvas, as in the rainy season the great thing is to keep dry and off the ground. This latter can hardly be accomplished if under canvas. The blue flannel shirt should be exchanged for one of either gray or khaki color, as the blue makes a very prominent mark at long range. Flannel is much to be desired, but with a change of color. Many shoes have proved of poor manufacture, but when seen have been too badly worn to determine the maker. At times it has seemed that old lots of clothing have been furnished without regard to size, and I have seen four different men who claimed to require shoes of sizes ranging from 7½ to 11 go off contented with shoes marked 9½, and all said they had a fit.

Rubber clothing should be at hand for issue to guards in the wet season, as is fur clothing in the northern parts.

The necessity and wisdom for any change in the ration or clothing for service in tropical climate.—Only as above indicated, as there is sufficient variety now on both lists to meet any conditions. The only trouble is, and has been, to obtain that which was wanted at the time when wanted.

A description of the transportation.—Until a short time since only buffalo and carts of native use have been available; these suited only for slow movement on good roads, as from Manila to some depot, as stores hauled under contract. They are not suited for movement with troops. The carabao carts are of all sorts and kinds. All are heavy. Some have solid wheels, and all are utterly unsuited for army transportation with a moving column. The best speed to be gotten from the bulls is only about 2 miles per hour—under rather than over—and about 7 miles per day is their limit of distance. They must be soaked in water every hour or so or they fall in harness, and, all around, are about as thoroughly unsuited to our use as it is possible to conceive of. The falling of a carabao necessitates stopping the entire train to wait till he is watered and soaked and on his feet again, or leaving behind in an enemy's country a cart with its load and a few men to guard, to take big chances on ever getting to camp. The roads only permit of one cart at a time and not a double line, and the train is strung out for a longer distance than safety admits of.

Pony carts are only makeshifts to carry small loads, such as officers' and company-mess outfits, and they add also to the length of the line.

Good roads are a necessity for both pony and bull carts, and a slight rain adds 100 per cent to the difficulty of getting either along. A heavy rain will render these roads impassable to either. Pack trains are much needed and escort wagons with broad tires and 4 mules. Mules seem to do well out here. Horses for saddle purposes are required, or small mules. Native ponies do very well under the saddle, but not for draft purposes, and our American horses so far have stood the climate very well. Shelter in the wet season is necessary for all animals.

Sanitation of camps and barracks.—A constant effort has been made in each regiment observed to keep clean its camp and barracks, when fortunate enough to have any. Constant change of location of regiments, but not of camps, has given a great deal of work for all in this matter, but close attention and, as a rule, the conditions have been very fair.

Health, cleanliness, and spirits of command.—The sick reports show to-day (July 25): Present, sick in quarters, 667; absent, sick in hospitals, 827, mostly of a malarious nature and with an admixture of bowel complaints. The men, so far as their persons are concerned, endeavor to keep clean, but in the field and trenches there is great difficulty in cleaning clothing. The spirits of the command is fair. The volunteers as a rule are looking forward to going home and are getting impatient, and the regulars are accepting the conditions as they find them, because they can not help it. Most of them would prefer service anywhere in the United States to the best stations here, and look forward to getting out some time. The officers can see nothing ahead but a long stay here under unpleasant conditions, and endure it as best they can.

Description of climate and terrane.—The small part of the island passed over and now under control of the United States is flat and uninteresting. It is very fertile and has been highly cultivated at one time, but much is now a waste. Under American methods of farming it can be made to produce immense crops. A great part of it is now under water from the late rains, and I am informed will be in that condition most of the time until October or November. The months of May, June, and July have been very hot in the sun, and the heat is oppressive, although, perhaps, the thermometer does not stand high. Much malaria abounds, but not so severe as the Cuban calentura.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. G. STARR,
Major, Inspector-General, U. S. V.

SECOND DIVISION, MAJOR MALLORY.

Inspections of troops.—The following organizations that have at different times comprised the Second Division, or have been attached to it, have been inspected under arms by me during the past year since their arrival in the Philippines:

Regular troops: Company A, Battalion of Engineers; Fourth Cavalry Squadron (6 troops); Third U. S. Artillery (4 batteries); Astor Battery; Ninth Infantry; Twelfth Infantry; Seventeenth Infantry; Fourteenth Infantry (band and 7 companies).

Volunteer troops: Battalion of Utah Light Artillery (2 batteries); First Colorado Infantry; First Idaho Infantry (2 battalions); Twentieth Kansas Infantry; First Montana Infantry; First Nebraska Infantry; First North Dakota Infantry (2 battalions); Tenth Pennsylvania Infantry (2 battalions); First South Dakota Infantry; First Wyoming Infantry (1 battalion).

Some of these organizations were inspected under arms twice or oftener, Capt. James Lockett, Fourth U. S. Cavalry, aide, who acted as inspector-general of

the division during the month I was on detached service at Iloilo, inspecting 3 regiments in that time.

In addition, repeated inspections of the camps and barracks of all troops in the division were made, inspections and investigations at the same time being conducted as to sanitary conditions, economical use of rations, quality and sufficiency of uniform clothing, character of the water supply and whether orders as to boiling and filtering drinking water and other regulations established by the division commander looking to the health, instruction, and efficiency of the command were being carried out.

Inspections of every description made by me were ordered by the division commander and were of a special nature, their character and scope being prescribed by him and reports of the inspections being submitted to him. These reports were then referred by the division commander to the commanding officers of the organizations concerned, through brigade headquarters, with instructions to correct any irregularities and defects pointed out and return with the official action taken.

Efficiency, discipline, and general appearance.—The efficiency of most of the regular organizations in the division has been somewhat impaired by the sudden addition of raw recruits in such large numbers as to render their speedy assimilation difficult. There being urgent need for troops for active operations, these organizations were of necessity placed upon the firing line before there had been time and opportunity for thorough training of recruits in drill, fire discipline, target practice, etc. In addition, all of these regiments have suffered because of the small number of officers present for duty, there being often only one officer to a company. Further, it has sometimes been necessary to place in command of a company a young officer recently appointed and necessarily with little experience, particularly if appointed from civil life. Nevertheless, as in each regiment the majority of officers were professionally educated, experienced, and generally equipped for the work in hand, and as in each company there was a leaven of well-trained, thoroughly disciplined soldiers, these regiments have proved themselves fully equal to the task of coping with and invariably defeating their semisavage adversaries. A creditable state of discipline, all things considered, has as a rule been maintained in the regular organizations. The principal breaches of discipline have occurred in the performance of guard duty. The excessive heat and the fatiguing climatic conditions generally have a tendency to induce a laxity in the performance of this important duty, but a steady improvement is visible.

In the matter of general appearance, the evident intelligence and superb physique of the men, excepting some recruits, as a rule enlisted after the close of the Spanish war, have excited universally favorable comment. These remarks as to general appearance apply to the volunteers equally with the regulars, but the appearance of the volunteers and of the regulars of the earlier expeditions was marred to some extent by the unsuitable character of the uniforms furnished for use in this climate. The excellent discipline and high state of efficiency to which the four batteries of the Third U. S. Artillery, acting as infantry, have been brought have been so marked as to demand special mention; this in spite of the fact that the great majority of the enlisted men of each battery at the beginning of the Spanish-American war were necessarily recruits owing to the sudden large increase in the strength of these organizations. The credit for this efficiency is due primarily to the commanding officer, Maj. W. A. Kobbé, Third Artillery, and secondarily to the other officers of the command and the leaven of trained non-commissioned officers. The volunteer organizations, while composed of magnificent raw material, were originally noticeably deficient in discipline and general training, except, possibly, in the matter of drill. In the interval between the close of the Spanish war and the outbreak of the Filipino insurrection some opportunity was afforded for training and instruction, and this was utilized to the fullest extent, and after hostilities with the insurgents actually began the intervals between active operations were similarly availed of. As a result of the painstaking methods initiated and pursued considerable improvement was soon apparent, the improvement being most noticeable in those volunteer regiments commanded by regular officers. The troops of the Second Division consisted, up to the date of the capture of San Fernando and for some time afterwards, largely of volunteer regiments from the Western States of the Union, and each of these organizations contained a large per cent of men accustomed to the use of firearms and to life on the frontier and possessing, therefore, peculiar qualifications for warfare against a semisavage foe.

Arms, equipments, and accouterments.—The arms, equipments, and accouterments in use by the regular troops recently inspected were found to be in a serviceable condition, but bore evidence of the hard usage to which they had been

subjected by field service. The arms have been kept in good working order, in spite of constant exposure to rain and partial immersion when fording or swimming streams, by the liberal use of oil—cocoanut oil being used when cosmoline was not obtainable. All leather material, however, seems to have suffered considerably from climatic causes. No troops, regular or volunteer, in the division carried blanket bags or packs in the field, as it was a physical impossibility to do so. Their use has been confined to that of valises in barracks or camp or when traveling by train. The Springfield rifles, with which the volunteer troops were armed during a large portion of their service in the Philippines, had, as a rule, been used by the militia of the various States for years. Nevertheless, when inspecting them after they had been subjected to hard usage in Luzon, I found such of them as were still serviceable to be in better condition than when I inspected them in San Francisco before the various expeditions started. This was because the volunteers had learned how to take care of their arms. The 3.2-inch guns used by the Utah batteries were of the earliest model and when turned over to the Third U. S. Artillery at San Fernando were much worn by the hard service they had been subjected to in the Spanish war as well as during the present insurrection.

Many Springfield bayonets were lost or thrown away by the volunteers when penetrating bamboo jungles, swamps, etc. Later, many men left their bayonets in camp when going into action, and these were frequently lost also, judging by the proceedings of boards of survey. The equipments and accouterments furnished the volunteers had for the most part been in use by the militia or Regular Army for years and speedily became unserviceable in the Philippines. The wearing out of haversacks was also hastened by the carrying of extra Springfield ammunition in them. While at Malolos all the available .30-caliber rifles and accouterments at the Manila Arsenal were divided among the volunteers, and after arrival at San Fernando all the volunteer troops then remaining in the division were equipped with the .30-caliber arm. Although at the beginning of the Spanish-American war many volunteers were inclined to mistrust the efficiency of the .30-caliber rifle and to prefer the Springfield, their experience in the Philippines converted practically all the volunteers in the division into advocates of the .30-caliber arms, especially when opposed to an enemy armed with the Mauser or other long-range weapon.

Clothing and equipage.—When the troops of the earlier expeditions left San Francisco, khaki clothing was not available for issue, and as a result these troops were not suitably clad for service in the Tropics. Some issues of blue uniforms and blue shirts, furnished by San Francisco contractors, were also of inferior quality, as stated in the report to which attention was invited above. Nevertheless, although for some time the troops—especially the volunteers—were not able to present a neat, military, and at the same time comfortable appearance on the streets of Manila, the brown canvas suit, with leggings and campaign hat, proved to be very serviceable in the field. This was also the case when blue shirts, provided they were army standard, were substituted for the canvas coats, as was almost invariably done by the volunteers.

In the campaign involving the capture of Malolos and San Fernando the men frequently wore no drawers, and at times some of them no socks. Also when going into action the volunteers wore at times an undershirt instead of a canvas coat or blue shirt. The heat was at times so terrible and the fatigue so great of advancing under fire of the enemy through bogs, swamps, and bamboo jungles, and of fording and swimming streams, that what the soldier carried on his person was reduced to the barest necessities. As a result, he carried, in addition to his scanty clothing, only his arms, ammunition, canteen of water, haversack (which usually contained more extra ammunition than food), and usually a poncho, but never a blanket. When the troops remained in camp any length of time, as at Malolos and San Fernando, necessary clothing was brought up from the points where it had been left. Although for some time previous to the outbreak of the insurrection the demand for uniform clothing, especially khaki uniforms, campaign hats, and leggings, was so overwhelming that the depot quartermaster at Manila was not able always to supply the troops as promptly as was desirable, recent inspections showed that the troops inspected had either in possession of the men sufficient and suitable clothing for the field or that the regimental quartermasters had it in their storehouses and were preparing to issue it. As to the wisdom or necessity for any change in the clothing for tropical service, I am of the opinion that for field service a stout khaki uniform, substantially of the present pattern, with the present canvas leggings and the present kind of campaign hat, made, if possible, of better material and more suitably ventilated, can not be improved upon, it being admitted, however, that brown canvas clothing is as serviceable as khaki, but warmer. The wearing of this field uniform in garrison in stormy weather should be permitted. For ceremonies and garrison wear in

fair weather I believe a white duck uniform should be prescribed. The troops in the division, judging from the inspections and inquiries recently made, are fairly well provided with camp equipage. No tents of any kind, however, were used in the recent campaign, except in camps of some duration, as at Malolos and San Fernando, and then only by a small portion of the command when vacant native huts were not sufficient. On the advance the men slept in the open, supplementing their ponchos with beds of rice straw when stacks of it were convenient. Canvas mildews badly in this climate, even when the tents are pitched, and tentage becomes unserviceable rapidly in this way.

The ration.—The ration now furnished to the soldier in the Philippines is amply sufficient; its components are usually excellent in quality, and, in view of recently authorized alternative issues, are sufficiently varied. It is difficult to transport bacon so many thousand miles over tropical seas and keep it on hand any length of time in these islands without its becoming rancid or so strong as to be unpalatable. The potatoes and onions brought from the United States are of excellent quality and usually in a good state of preservation. The beef, whether furnished from the United States or Australia, is excellent.

Transportation of supplies in campaign.—In the recent campaign, terminating in the capture of San Fernando, the following was the allowance of transportation: For each regiment, 2 escort wagons, each drawn by 4 army mules, and 12 pack ponies, when that number was procurable. In addition, each company was provided with one cart (carreton) drawn by a water buffalo (carabao). The carreton is a two-wheeled cart, having two shafts, to which a yoke is attached and dropped over the neck of the carabao. It was found by experience that the maximum load for an escort wagon over fair roads for a day's march in the country traversed was 3,000 pounds; for a carreton, 1,000 pounds; American pack mule, 175 pounds; Filipino pack pony, 125 pounds.

During the wet season these loads have to be reduced from 30 to 50 per cent. Two carabaos should always be provided for a carreton and driven tandem or by reliefs. During this campaign enough carabaos were captured to admit of this being generally done. As a draft animal the carabao resembles the American ox, but is greatly his inferior in powers of endurance. If driven a day in hot weather without being given a bath, he usually either dies or becomes crazed. He should have, whenever practicable, three baths a day in hot weather. The use of carabaos as pack animals has been recently advocated. It is agreed that little, if any, forage for his use would have to be carried, as he can with little difficulty subsist on what the country affords. It is probable, however, that his cargo would frequently be spoiled by his amusing himself in every convenient pool of water. In getting supplies across a river some 50 yards wide several carabaos were packed with ammunition, the loads averaging over 280 pounds. One who was too heavily packed disappeared beneath the water and was invisible for over a minute, but finally landed safely with his pack and joined the others. This incident occurred while supplies were being forwarded from the Bagbag River to troops at the front. The carabaos used in the campaign for draft purposes were driven by Chinamen, who controlled and guided them by means of a ring in the nose, as is usual. Whenever it was practicable to use the railroad it proved to be of inestimable value; particularly in accumulating reserves of supplies at Malolos and San Fernando. Before the repair of the Rio Grande railroad bridge, no engine being available on the further side, a train of cars pushed by Chinese coolies was organized, and with it several trips were made from Calumpit to San Fernando, bringing each trip some 60,000 pounds of subsistence stores, including fresh beef. With regard to the capabilities displayed by the American horse and mule in the Philippines, the following notes furnished by Capt. Fred Wheeler, Fourth U. S. Cavalry, at my request, are particularly interesting. Captain Wheeler's own troop is mounted on American horses, but at least one troop in the squadron he has commanded has as mounts Philippine ponies. The arduous field service of this officer since his arrival in the islands renders his experience particularly valuable.

SAN FERNANDO, P. I., July 25, 1899.

Maj. J. S. MALLORY.

SIR: My experience with horses and mules in the Philippines during the past five months is as follows:

There seems nothing in the climate detrimental to American horses and mules. A sudden change of feed is injurious here as well as in the United States. Mud and exposure to cold rains are the most serious things to contend with, the former being much the worse.

Good fresh water at least twice a day is very important. I have been told by natives that the Spanish horses died from being watered at stagnant or brackish

wells. Most American horses and mules will eat unhusked rice of good quality, sugar and corn fodder, rice growing in fields, and grass in the field or cut in bunches, the latter three items being eaten readily. They will eat willingly the green leaves of bamboo. Horses are liable to cramps and to fall off in flesh on sugar and corn fodder and on rice, which they only eat when quite hungry. The best feed is baled hay and oats, but that is not absolutely necessary. The American horses stood the work around and to Malolos better than native ponies, and suffered decidedly less from disease. They can travel faster and farther also. Mules can work in heat that will kill carabaos, travel much more rapidly, and make better transportation. The latter live more readily on coarse, scanty forage. Horses and mules readily eat unthrashed rice straw. I see no reason why horses and mules can not live a week or two off the country where I have been, if we are allowed to take what can be found and are moving around.

F. WHEELER, *Captain, Fourth Cavalry.*

Sanitation of camps and barracks.—While the troops of the Second Division were quartered in Manila previous to the insurrection they occupied as barracks whatever buildings were available, these consisting of a few Spanish barracks, convents, one or two tobacco factories, and several residences. When first occupied, these were found to be in an unsanitary condition, as a rule, but after this was corrected fairly satisfactory sanitary conditions were maintained. Since the outbreak of the insurrection the troops have been in the field, but when not engaged in active operations they have been and are quartered in native houses of the towns abandoned by the insurgents, in convents, and whatever government houses are found in such towns. Field sinks are used, their location being changed when necessary, and fairly satisfactory sanitary conditions are maintained. The native houses are cottages, as a rule, made of bamboo, thatched with nipa palm leaves, and, although apparently frail, answer fairly well as temporary shelter.

Health, cleanliness, and spirits of the command.—On account of the prevalence of streams and the abundance of water generally the men are enabled to wash their persons and clothes as often as necessary. The health of an organization seems to be a function of the number of months it has been in campaign, those that have been longest in the field having the largest per cent of noneffectives. Each march that is made under a burning sun and over swampy country, each engagement that is fought, and each tour of outpost duty that is served seems to require the expenditure of a certain amount of vital energy, which probably would be restored if suitable opportunity for rest and recuperation were afforded. When enough troops arrive to enable those at the front to be put temporarily in reserve and relieved from the strain they are kept under, a great improvement is to be expected. The spirits of both officers and men are reasonably good and their morals superb.

Terrain and climate.—A very great part of the area over which the operations of the Second Division have been carried is occupied by actual or abandoned lowland rice fields. Each of these is sufficiently reduced to a dead level and surrounded with a dike, the inclosed areas being usually rectangles. These dikes are usually from 10 to 20 inches thick and about the same height; the sides of the rectangles vary in length from 20 to 30 yards.

When advancing to the attack of the enemy's trenches over those open fields the dikes furnished convenient limits for rushes and furnished some shelter while the men regained their breath. The lowland rice plants when young require to be flooded, which accounts for the peculiarity of these fields. They would scarcely be practicable in a country in which nature had not done much leveling of inequalities. The country between Manila and San Fernando is intersected by numerous streams and water courses, some of the former being rivers of considerable depth, and, as in the case of the Rio Grande, of considerable velocity, especially when swollen by floods. The country west of the railroad is in the nature of a delta. It is, in fact, the confluent deltas of the various streams flowing into Manila Bay. It has the usual characteristics of such an area, being flat, marshy, and intersected by salt-water bayous of bewildering complexity. Between Calumpit and Santo Tomas these bayous occupy a large portion of the area east as well as west of the railroad, and rendered operations exceedingly difficult. In the delta region much of the drinking water is brackish, and barely potable. Between Caloocan and Meycauayan, particularly east of the railroad, the country is of a more broken, rolling character. There are no real forests in the region under discussion. Bamboo line many of the streams and sloughs, and about the villages there are many banana and cocoanut groves, areca palms, and large spreading mango trees, besides others too numerous to mention. The entire country operated over afforded many naturally strong defensive positions, which, if held by a

determined adversary, would be almost impregnable. The insurgents occupied successively numerous intrenchments usually well constructed, but their works were, as a rule, not continuous, and at times, not being well located strategically, could be readily flanked. From Caloccan to Malolos there were only a few showers of rain, and the heat was oppressive only a portion of the day. While camped at Malolos, and during the advance to San Fernando, there was also but little rain, but the heat during the day was overpowering. The nights were always cool enough to admit of sleeping comfortably. The temperature in the month of May, which is considered the hottest month of the year, was between 1 and 2 degrees below normal; both June and July were nearly normal in temperature. In July the rainfall was phenomenal, being 47 inches—considerably more than three times the normal amount.

Remarks.—There can be little else said of the different administrative and supply departments except to speak of their general excellence. Experience has pointed out defects and suggested improvements in all of them, but the remedies and changes have been introduced, with the result that each is almost perfect.

There are two deficiencies existing in our system, however, that no power outside of Congress can remedy, and to these I desire to invite special attention. They are, first, the great scarcity of trained and experienced officers on duty with the regiments, and, second, the complete failure of the present court-martial system to handle the volume of business that arises in time of war.

If the full complement authorized by law were continually on duty with a regiment, no complaint could be made; but many are demanded for work in civil administration, for detached military service, for assignment to duty with volunteer organizations, while many others are either wounded or sick. The consequence is that many company organizations are left with one officer, and he too often has had only a few months' experience. It is hardly necessary to explain why a company or regiment loses its efficiency in war under these conditions. Until actually confronted with the facts and the results above indicated I have always considered that a double line of lieutenants, on account of the resulting slow promotions, was a detriment to efficiency; but I would strongly urge that it be revived for all branches of the service in time of peace if trained officers for the emergency of war can not be obtained in any other way. The efficiency of the Army in time of war is of prime necessity and all other considerations must give place to it. There should be no difficulty, however, in removing, by appropriate legislation, the obstacle of slow promotion which is urged against increase of officers in a company organization. Legislation to this end would have had its wisdom amply justified during the last war and in the insurrection that is now being put down here.

Referring to the second defect, the need for remedial legislation is fully as urgent. The court-martial system that is the most efficacious is the one that will aid wise and experienced officers in transforming the raw recruit into the trained and well-disciplined regular in the shortest time. It is the one that will provide that the punishment follows the offense or breach of discipline the most surely and the most quickly. The inadequacy of the present system is apparent and certain. The number of cases that must of necessity be brought before a general court-martial is so large that the deterrent effect of the punishment, when it is at last imposed, is entirely lost.

Very respectfully,

WM. E. BIRKHIMER,
Colonel, Twenty-eighth U. S. Volunteer Infantry,
President Board of Survey.

(Convened by Special Orders No. 258, paragraph 5, Headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps.)

APPENDIX C.

HDQRS. DEPARTMENT PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
OFFICE OF JUDGE-ADVOCATE,
Manila, P. I., August 15, 1899.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps,
Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit herewith the report of the transactions of this office for the period ending June 30, 1899.

Two officers were tried by general courts-martial; one acquitted, and the other

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received a light sentence. Of enlisted men there were 563 cases; 67 acquitted, 15 cases disapproved, and 99 sentenced to dishonorable discharge.

The following will show the work in detail:

	No. of trials.	17th A. W.	20th A. W.	21st A. W.	22d A. W.	24th A. W.	26th A. W.	22d A. W.	33d A. W.	38th A. W.	39th A. W.	40th A. W.	42d A. W.	53th A. W.	60th A. W.	62d A. W.	Total.
3d U. S. Infantry.....	34	0	0	1	0	0	0	4	1	6	6	0	0	3	0	16	37
4th U. S. Infantry.....	31	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	34
12th U. S. Infantry.....	43	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	4
14th U. S. Infantry.....	47	0	0	1	0	1	0	7	13	13	1	1	0	0	0	34	64
17th U. S. Infantry.....	62	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	6
18th U. S. Infantry.....	62	1	0	5	9	0	0	0	1	12	2	1	0	6	6	32	70
20th U. S. Infantry.....	36	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	17	2	0	0	4	0	14	40
23d U. S. Infantry.....	37	1	0	1	0	0	0	3	0	4	6	1	0	0	0	24	42
5th U. S. Artillery.....	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
6th U. S. Artillery.....	14	0	0	3	0	0	0	3	1	4	0	0	0	1	1	11	20
4th U. S. Cavalry.....	17	0	0	1	0	0	0	3	0	2	2	2	0	10	7	28	28
13th Minnesota Infantry, U. S. V.....	13	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	8	14
1st South Dakota Infantry, U. S. V.....	6	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	4	8
1st North Dakota Infantry, U. S. V.....	23	0	1	4	0	0	0	4	1	5	4	1	0	1	0	13	34
1st Nebraska Infantry, U. S. V.....	18	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	4	0	0	0	4	0	7	17
1st Colorado Infantry, U. S. V.....	34	0	0	4	0	0	0	4	2	7	4	1	0	3	0	19	44
2d Oregon Infantry, U. S. V.....	19	0	2	1	0	0	0	2	0	2	1	2	0	0	1	11	22
1st California Infantry, U. S. V.....	28	0	2	2	0	0	0	4	1	6	4	1	0	0	0	18	38
1st Washington Infantry, U. S. V.....	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	3
10th Pennsylvania Infantry, U. S. V.....	20	0	1	3	0	0	0	2	1	1	1	1	0	2	0	15	27
1st Idaho Infantry, U. S. V.....	18	0	5	4	0	0	0	1	1	0	2	0	0	2	0	13	38
1st Tennessee Infantry, U. S. V.....	7	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	3	8
1st Wyoming Infantry, U. S. V.....	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	3	7
20th Kansas Infantry, U. S. V.....	10	0	0	2	0	1	0	4	0	0	1	0	4	1	0	6	19
51st Iowa Infantry, U. S. V.....	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	3
1st Montana Infantry, U. S. V.....	35	0	2	10	0	0	0	4	2	4	0	3	2	2	0	21	50
1st California Heavy Artillery, U. S. V.....	4	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	7
1st Utah Artillery, U. S. V.....	4	0	0	1	0	0	0	9	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	4
1st Wyoming Artillery, U. S. V.....	4	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	5
1st Nevada Cavalry, U. S. V.....	5	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	7	7
Hospital Corps, U. S. A.....	25	1	1	1	0	0	0	9	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	22	37
Engineer and Signal Corps.....	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Total.....	563	5	14	61	10	2	1	71	19	97	53	15	10	40	14	327	730

Only three cases of garrison court-martial have been reported and on file in this office. Of these, two were disapproved for irregularities; in the other the finding was "not guilty."

The summary court established by the act passed last year has been the main agency in the administration of military justice. There were 7,090 men tried in this department by summary court. There were 10,603 trials. There were 11,902 charges. The number of acquittals was 552. The cases set forth under the Twenty-first Article of War, and the cases of "sleeping on post," and other capital offenses, have been set aside by the proper orders.

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U. S. REGULAR SERVICE.

	Number of trials.	No. of different men.	17th A. W.	20th A. W.	21st A. W.	31st A. W.	32d A. W.	33d A. W.	38th A. W.	40th A. W.	62d A. W.	Other articles of war.	Total.
3d U. S. Infantry.....	246	206	1	0	0	0	24	33	5	2	214	0	279
4th U. S. Infantry.....	281	168	1	1	1	0	156	36	2	0	116	3	316
6th U. S. Infantry.....	91	86	0	0	0	0	11	18	0	0	111	0	102
9th U. S. Infantry.....	178	156	1	0	0	4	70	31	4	0	75	0	221
12th U. S. Infantry.....	367	345	0	1	0	1	163	30	16	0	205	0	411
13th U. S. Infantry.....	362	273	1	0	0	1	171	63	5	0	190	0	451
14th U. S. Infantry.....	521	369	1	0	0	0	148	93	19	3	352	0	616
16th U. S. Infantry.....	54	54	0	0	0	0	11	8	0	0	41	0	60
17th U. S. Infantry.....	282	218	6	0	2	1	69	42	4	3	130	0	297
18th U. S. Infantry.....	454	278	1	0	0	0	124	85	17	0	325	0	553
20th U. S. Infantry.....	779	404	1	0	0	0	242	127	79	3	443	1	914
21st U. S. Infantry.....	46	46	0	0	0	0	36	5	0	0	22	0	56
22d U. S. Infantry.....	249	243	4	0	0	0	27	7	1	4	142	1	242
23d U. S. Infantry.....	896	514	0	0	0	0	166	135	25	0	627	0	957
24th U. S. Infantry.....	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	2
3d U. S. Artillery.....	577	297	0	0	0	0	151	98	17	3	425	0	694
5th U. S. Artillery.....	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	3	0	4
6th U. S. Artillery.....	321	180	0	0	1	1	76	92	12	4	193	0	379
4th U. S. Cavalry.....	432	251	0	0	0	0	115	98	9	0	246	0	468
Hospital Corps.....	197	154	0	1	0	1	64	15	2	0	165	0	248
Engineer and Signal Corps..	89	47	0	0	0	1	16	39	3	0	43	0	102

U. S. VOLUNTEER SERVICE.

13th Minnesota Infantry.....	431	366	0	1	0	10	175	96	8	1	192	2	485
1st South Dakota Infantry.....	235	152	0	0	0	0	57	46	4	4	169	0	280
1st North Dakota Infantry.....	149	89	0	1	1	3	29	31	3	2	112	1	183
1st Nebraska Infantry.....	205	237	5	3	2	2	57	99	2	1	170	2	343
1st Colorado Infantry.....	368	215	0	0	8	3	77	129	13	0	214	0	420
2d Oregon Infantry.....	570	357	0	0	0	7	185	177	8	2	180	0	563
1st California Infantry.....	362	266	0	0	0	5	139	46	8	0	188	9	395
1st Washington Infantry.....	203	143	0	1	13	1	55	59	6	1	71	1	208
10th Pennsylvania Infantry.....	64	48	1	1	2	2	15	14	11	0	84	3	133
1st Idaho Infantry.....	187	131	0	0	5	3	34	35	3	0	134	1	215
1st Tennessee Infantry.....	244	158	0	0	8	0	33	40	6	5	134	0	226
1st Wyoming Infantry.....	179	86	0	0	0	0	53	72	0	1	59	2	187
20th Kansas Infantry.....	162	130	0	0	4	0	14	56	3	2	97	1	177
51st Iowa Infantry.....	67	49	0	1	0	0	18	13	1	0	38	0	71
1st Montana Infantry.....	441	239	0	0	0	8	60	259	21	0	85	0	433
1st California Heavy Artillery.....	67	65	0	0	0	0	23	10	5	0	35	0	73
1st Utah Light Artillery.....	103	75	1	0	0	0	19	31	3	1	53	2	110
1st Wyoming Light Artillery.....	33	32	0	0	0	0	5	12	0	0	21	1	39
1st Nevada Cavalry.....	19	19	0	0	0	0	1	4	2	0	12	0	19
Total.....	10,605	7,000	24	11	47	54	2,912	2,305	325	79	6,115	30	11,902

No comparisons can be made by regiments, nor can any percentages be given which would be of any value, because the personnel of this command has been undergoing such a constant change, and the organizations have been in this department for such various periods of time. The average number of enlisted men in this command has been 21,078.

The following table will show trials by military commission:

	Cases.	Number of prisoners.	Prisoners escaped before trial.	Acquitted.	Convicted.	Sentence disapproved.
Murder.....	3	3	1	0	2	2
Embezzlement.....	1	1	0	1	2	0
Seditious publication.....	1	1	0	0	1	0
Rape.....	1	1	0	0	1	0
Looting.....	3	3	0	0	3	0
Total.....	9	11	1	1	9	2

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The superior provost court was established by General Orders No. 8, August 22, 1898. The judges have been Lieut. Col. Charles L. Jewett, judge-advocate, U. S. V., August 22 to November 16, 1898; Maj. R. W. Young, Utah Light Artillery, November 16, 1898, to March 16, 1899; Maj. John A. Hull, judge-advocate, U. S. V., March 16, 1899, to June 30, 1899.

The following will show the work in detail:

Month.	Number of cases.	Number of prisoners.	Convicted.	Discharged.	Other disposition.	Male.	Female.	Nationality of prisoners.
August	41	58	30	26	2	58	0	Native, 40; Chinese, 17; American, 1.
September ..	19	35	15	18	2	35	0	Native, 28; American, 2; English, 1.
October	31	45	31	13	1	44	1	Native, 39; Chinese, 1; Spanish, 3; American, 2.
November ..	25	26	23	3	0	25	1	Native, 21; Spanish, 3; American, 2.
December ..	37	43	35	8	0	37	6	Native, 32; Chinese, 6; French, 3; American, 1; British, 1.
January	27	53	32	20	1	51	2	Native, 28; Chinese, 20; American, 3; Spanish, 2.
February ¹								
March	12	20	10	7	3	16	4	Native, 17; Chinese, 2; Spanish, 1.
April	24	33	20	8	5	30	3	Native, 20; Chinese, 4; American, 6; Spanish, 2; English, 1.
May	14	26	11	15	0	25	1	Native, 12; Chinese, 6; American, 8.
June	24	27	20	4	3	27	0	Native, 15; Chinese, 3; American, 8; Spanish, 1.
Total ..	254	306	227	122	17	348	18	Native, 252; Chinese, 59; American, 33; Spanish, 16; English, 3; French, 3.

¹ No session. Major Young, judge, absent with command in field.

Aggregate punishment adjudged, \$56,905; 139 years, 6 months, 20 days.

The classification of offenses is as follows:

Larceny and theft	81	Assault to kill	9
Abduction	36	Rape	9
Gambling	35	Forgery	8
Burglary	29	Blackmail and extortion	7
Robbery	20	Assault and battery	6
Assault	19	Impersonation of official	6
Counterfeiting	15	Arson	4
Assault and kidnapping	15	Fraud	4
Manufacturing contraband of war ..	15	Embezzlement	4
Violation of orders (sailors)	15	Smuggling	4
Receiving stolen goods	10	Not classified	16

Of the inferior court of Manila I have been unable to find any report prior to January 1. The following will show the consolidation of the reports from January to June, during which time Capt. Frank T. Corrison, Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry, presided as judge:

Month.	Number of cases.	Number of prisoners.	Convicted.	Discharged.	Other disposition.	Number of days' confinement.	Amount fines (pesos).
January	428	660	526	80	48	810	7,461
February	290	386	322	59	5	2,050	4,671
March	466	665	702	155	8	1,000	5,714.30
April	478	751	538	191	22	940	6,069
May	495	686	720	153	20	870	6,522
June	359	798	650	128	20	1,080	5,287
Total	2,476	4,353	3,458	772	123	6,750	35,754.30

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Classification of cases.

Blackmail and extortion	9	Carrying concealed weapons	20
Aiding the enemy	9	Smuggling	23
Prostitution	12	Larceny and theft	323
Embezzlement	7	Attempted larceny	16
Selling liquors to soldiers	16	Robbery	26
Manufacturing contraband of war	5	Attempted robbery	5
Vagrancy	15	Impersonation of soldier	10
Committing nuisance	71	Assault	123
Violation of ordinance	581	Assault and battery	141
Pocketpicking	21	Attempted assault	9
Looting	6	Burglary	11
Fraud	38	Receiving stolen goods	23
Reckless driving	25	Gambling	154
Resisting arrest	8	Violation of license ordinance	220
Cruelty to animals	45	Rape	6
Disorderly conduct	449	Unclassified	15

The following tables show the work of the provost courts at Cavite, Iloilo, and Jaro, P. I., as shown by the reports on file:

Record of trials by provost court, Cavite, P. I., for period ending June 30, 1899.

	Cases.	Prisoners.	Attempt to smuggle.	Attempt to deceive military authorities.	Disorderly conduct.	Drunk and disorderly.	Gambling.	Malingering and arson.	Signaling enemy of United States.	Larceny.	Violation of the liquor law.	Violation of the revenue law.	Wife beating.	Failure to pay debts.	Smoking opium.	Robbery.	Assault.	Discharging firearms.	Fighting.	Carrying concealed weapon.
January	21	41			1		15			4	3			1	9	1	2	1	2	1
February	6	10							1		1									
March	3	7						4												
April	3	5								3	1									
May	6	8	1				4						1				1			
June	7	10		3		4				1										
Total ...	43	79	1	3	1	4	19	4	1	11	6	1	1	1	9	1	3	1	2	1

	Smuggling.	Selling property unlawfully.	Threatening assault.	Acquittals.	Fines.	Number of days' imprisonment.	Chinese.	Filipino.	Spanish.	American.	Males.	Females.	Judges.
January	1			6	Pesos. 202.00	70	11	19	10	1	41		Capt. W. J. Whitthorne, First Tennessee, U. S. V.
February	6	1	1	1	35.50			10			10		Capt. Warren H. Ickis, Fifty-first Iowa, U. S. V.
March				4	20.00	30		7			7		Do.
April				1	45.00		5				5		Do.
May					35.00		5	1			6		Capt. Thos. S. Crago, Tenth Pennsylvania, U. S. V.
June				1	56.00		4	4	1	1	10		Do.
Total ...	7	1	1	13	483.50	100	25	31	11	2	79		

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Record of provost court, Iloilo, Panay Island, P. I., for period ending June 30, 1899.

[Judges: Lieut. Elmer W. Clark, Eighteenth U. S. Infantry; Capt. William J. Whitthorne, First Tennessee Infantry, U. S. V.]

JUNE, 1899.

Cases	73
Prisoners	75
Contempt of court	1
Cruelty to animals	1
Disorderly conduct	2
Disturbing the peace	2
Drunk and disorderly	3
Fighting	5
Fraud	1
Larceny	17
Obtaining goods under false pretenses	2
Obtaining money under false pretenses	1
Selling goods without a license	15
Smuggling	3
Vandalism	2
Violation of orders	20
Acquittals	14
Fines	pesos 1,959
Number of days' imprisonment	520
Chinese	24
Filipinos	25
Spaniards	18
Americans	6
Germans	2
Males	74
Female	1

Inferior provost court, Jaro, P. I., for June, 1899.

[Judge, Capt. William B. Wheeler, Eighteenth U. S. Infantry.]

	Cases.	Prisoners.	Guilty.	Fines.	Native.	Male.
Attempt to smuggle.....	3	3	3	Pesos. 20	3	3

From the report of special boards of survey on file in this office it was found there were 137 desertions. The deserters belong to the following organizations:

Thirteenth Infantry	24	First Washington Volunteer Infantry	4
Twelfth Infantry	19	Sixth Infantry	3
Sixth Artillery	15	Hospital Corps	3
Ninth Infantry	7	Third Artillery	2
Sixteenth Infantry	7	Eighteenth Infantry	2
Fourteenth Infantry	6	Nevada Cavalry	2
Wyoming Light Artillery	6	Twenty-second Infantry	1
Fourth Infantry	6	Fourth Cavalry	1
Third Infantry	5	First South Dakota Volunteer Infantry	1
Seventeenth Infantry	5	First Nebraska Volunteer Infantry	1
Twenty-first Infantry	5	First California Volunteer Infantry	1
Twenty-third Infantry	5	First Wyoming Volunteer Infantry	1
Twentieth Infantry	4		

The cause of desertion, as shown by the boards of survey, are as follows:

Unknown	80	Debts	4
Service in Philippines	23	Drunkenness	4
General worthlessness	8	Dissatisfied with service	4
Fear of punishment	5	Religion	1
Cowardice	5	Fear of professional operation	1

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Quite a number of these are reported from troops en route to Manila, and it is very probable a number were left on shore by the vessels sailing and that they afterwards reported to their various commands. How many did this it is impossible for me to determine, as there are no reports of such character in this office.

The repeal of the ninety-fourth article of war is respectfully recommended.

The establishment of a war court, with a limited punishing power, but greater than that exercised by the summary court, is recommended. As it is now, with the troops in the field and the commands shifting from one division to another, with no facilities for preparing the complete record, which is necessary, a great many prisoners remain in confinement a long time without trial; besides, the witnesses forget facts, resulting in a miscarriage of justice, and the restraining effect of an example is lost.

The summary court has been of unmeasured assistance; the proceeding is proper and the results have given universal satisfaction.

Although every requisition for books for the library of this office has been promptly filled by the Judge-Advocate-General, the necessity for a great increase is pressing.

Lieut. Col. E. H. Crowder, judge-advocate, U. S. V., was judge-advocate from the organization of this command until June 3, 1899, on which date he was relieved by me.

Respectfully submitted.

JOHN A. HULL,
Major and Judge-Advocate, U. S. V., Judge-Advocate.

APPENDIX D.

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH CORPS, U. S. A.,
OFFICE OF CHIEF QUARTERMASTER,
Ayuntamiento, Manila, August 21, 1899.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,
Manila, P. I.

SIR: In compliance with instructions of these headquarters, I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the quartermaster's department for the past fiscal year:

The beginning of the fiscal year found the quartermaster's department engaged in the problems of preparing the troops for the expedition to the Philippines, which had been completed on the 29th day of June, when the headquarters of the department left San Francisco on the *Newport* for the destination of the expedition.

The work of coaling the transports and clothing the troops, which had taken place prior to the departure of the *Newport*, has already been reported and need not be repeated.

LACK OF EXPERIENCED QUARTERMASTERS.

One of the first deficiencies which confronted me was a lack of experienced quartermasters, and I regard this as one of the most prominent defects of the organization of these forces, at least until within two months. It has been very often asserted that our Army had too large a percentage of staff officers, but if this war has proved anything it has conclusively demonstrated that so far as the Quartermaster's Department is concerned this is the reverse of the fact. In truth, the lack of sufficient experienced quartermasters has been most severely felt and has had to be remedied most inefficiently by the appointment and detail of a large number of officers of the line, who were badly needed in the ranks, and a large number of wholly inexperienced officers, who have been a detriment rather than an aid to the service in most cases.

A comparison of the relative number of officers in the different departments, as late as November 16, shows the following:

General officers, 9; adjutants-general, 5; commissary officers, 9; commissary sergeants, 4; medical officers, 50; hospital stewards, 6; paymasters, 10; engineers, 7; signal officers, 12; quartermasters, 7; quartermaster-sergeants, none.

During the earlier operations of this corps only 3 officers of the Quartermaster's Department of the Regular Army had been ordered to duty with the same.

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ARRIVAL AT HONOLULU.

The *Newport* left San Francisco on the 29th of June, two days after the rest of the fleet—*Indiana*, *Ohio*, *City of Para*, *Morgan City*, and *Valencia*—but joined the fleet at Honolulu, where those which had previously arrived were found still coaling. The coal which had been contracted for by the Quartermaster's Department had not arrived and the vessels were coaled from that purchased for the Navy.

By working at night the fleet was fully coaled by the next morning after the arrival of the *Newport*, which had occurred in the early hours of the 7th of July, and all were ready to leave when some portion of the machinery of the *Indiana* got out of order and the commanding general decided to leave the rest of the fleet and sail forward with the *Newport*. The *Newport* arrived in Manila Bay on the 25th day of July, 1898.

TRANSPORTS.

The chartering of transports was done from Washington—the *City of Pekin* by the Navy Department and the others by the War Department. These were: *City of Sydney*, *Australia*, *Colon*, *Zealandia*, *Senator*, *China*, *Indiana*, *Ohio*, *Valencia*, *Pennsylvania*, *Newport*, *Morgan City*, *City of Para*, *City of Puebla*, *City of Rio de Janeiro*, *St. Paul*, and *Peru*.

Though some of these, as the *China*, *Newport*, *St. Paul*, and others, were especially good, all proved fairly good vessels for the purpose of carrying troops and supplies.

The comfort of the soldiers was as well looked after as could be reasonably expected in so hurried a preparation, and their bunks, bathing arrangements, and means of getting pure air and good water were generally good on those transports which I had the opportunity to inspect, and the arrangements for the comfort of officers were also good, with the exception, in a number of cases, of the arrangement for fare on the way. I heard a great deal of complaint in regard to the result of the system—which I think wholly vicious—of allowing the vessels chartered by the Government to make their own conditions for feeding the officers without any check on their abuse or any way of enforcing the fulfillment of the agreement on either side. It was true that officers had the alternative of providing their own food and cooking, but this was generally impracticable, and I am convinced that the Government should compel a chartered vessel to provide the food and cooking for the officers and fix the rate, which should not have exceeded \$1 in any case. Most of the transports of this expedition charged \$1.50 per day, and it is very doubtful if a single vessel provided food that was worth any such sum. The *City of Pekin*, *Australia*, and *City of Sydney* charged \$2.50 per day, whereas the *St. Paul* furnished excellent fare for 90 cents per day. If the Government is not prepared to require the owners of these vessels to provide, at a fixed rate, for the fare of officers, then there would be much less discontent if the officers, where organizations are transported, should be required to provide their own messing arrangements and the owner of the transport required to provide facilities for cooking.

There is certainty that in some instances the officers had reason to complain of the fare provided on these high-priced Government transports.

There was also some reason to complain that some of the transports, as in the case of the *Zealandia*, did not provide suitable arrangements for sufficient drinking water, and some did not have any ice machines, while others had, these differences producing discontent.

However, it seems to me that on the whole the transports performed good service and earned their apparently large compensations.

SITUATION IN MANILA BAY.

When the *Newport* reached its anchorage in Manila Bay, it was found that of the first fleet of transports—consisting of the *City of Sydney*, *Australia*, and *City of Pekin*—the *City of Sydney* and *Australia* had unloaded at Cavite and departed.

The fleet of the second expedition remained in the harbor and were still unloading; nor was this work completed for weeks.

The situation of affairs, so far as the quartermaster's department was concerned, was one of the most remarkable that ever confronted a transportation officer. As above stated, the fleet of the second expedition—*Zealandia*, *Colon*, *Senator*, and *China*—were mostly to be unloaded still; the troops of the second expedition were investing the city of Manila and holding the town of Cavite; were to be fed from two different points, separated by the bay; to be clothed and rationed and communications kept open, while the means for doing so were the worst and most

inadequate that it is possible to conceive. These means of transportation consisted of one launch of small size, but seaworthy qualities, which had been hired by order of General Anderson, aided by two small steamers—vessels of inferior quality—under the control of the Navy, but allowed to run across the bay at stated times to tow cascoes loaded with rations and other needs of the command. The camp of the investing force was situated near the shore of the bay, several miles from the city of Manila, to the north, where the water was so shallow that neither the steamers which did the towing nor the steam launch of the quartermaster's department could approach near, and as the bay was often rough, particularly at this season, it was often difficult to get the cascoes to the shore without endangering the destruction of the vessel and of the stores.

Rowboats, hired from the natives, had to come out to take off those arriving at the camp. The boats of the transports were too large to be suitable for this purpose.

The available cascoes were far below the necessities of the command, and adding to this that many were swamped and lost, the situation was of the most discouraging description possible to imagine. The road around the bay from Cavite to Camp Dewey was impassable and 25 miles in extent. During very rough sea there was actual danger of this force at the camp being cut off from communication with the fleet and Cavite, as was practically the case at the time of the battle of July 31.

The commanding general and nearly all of the staff remained on board the *Newport* and were practically imprisoned thereon for a large part of the time, the one available steam launch being wholly inadequate to enable the various staff officers to go about as necessity demanded. The situation would, of course, have been worse had the general and staff landed at either Camp Dewey or Cavite, the central location of the ship being more favorable to reach either point or to communicate with the fleet of Admiral Dewey.

Here, again, the lack of trained quartermasters was severely felt. Major Ruhlin, who had been assigned to duty as depot quartermaster and had, in consequence, attended to the selection and storage of the chief part of the quartermaster's property, and to whom had been invoiced all such property, was left behind. There was, on arrival at Manila, no quartermaster of the Regular Army except Major Jones, who was acting as depot quartermaster at Cavite.

A quartermaster was needed at Camp Dewey to organize the transportation at that point, and Major Jones was sent there. No quartermaster was available to replace him but Major Wadsworth, U. S. V., a wholly untrained officer, and he was ordered to that duty and remained until the fall of Manila.

While the question of water transportation was vital, that of land transportation was becoming daily more important, as more troops and supplies were landed and the active work of the siege began to be pushed with great vigor with the greater number of troops at hand. I had suggested a train of 500 to 5,000 Chinamen from Amoy or Hongkong, the best labor by far in the Orient, but this was not approved.

There were some of these available here, but not sufficient in number nor equal to those direct from China. The other means of transportation were water-ox carts and pony carts for supplies, and ponies, carromatas, and carriages for persons. The chief part of the former had decamped off into the country for fear of seizure. Hiring became so expensive and difficult that buying of ponies and teams had to be resorted to in a large measure. The price of a pony ran up from \$20 to \$150 per animal.

The need of such transportation increased, as rough weather soon began to compel landing at a distance from Camp Dewey, chiefly at Parañaque, 3 miles away. Transportation by land and water had to be furnished all the departments—the subsistence, medical, ordnance, pay, and signal—as best it could with the means at hand. A landing was found at Parañaque, at the mouth of a river, where was a species of wharf, and this landing was much more secure than that at Camp Dewey, though a bar across the mouth of the river in the bay made ingress and egress difficult at low tide. Some of the landing was done at Bacoor, but this was too far from the camp (7 miles) and the road too bad to make the place suitable for landing, though the bend in the bay made the water much smoother.

A train was organized by Major Jones from ponies and carts (partly bought and partly hired) which sufficed to move the effects sent to Parañaque and landed, and the problem of land transportation was to a limited extent solved, though the number of teams was inadequate to the demand, and inconvenience to the troops could not be wholly avoided. Natives and Chinese were engaged to assist, and eked out the lack of animals and vehicles to some extent, and some carabao carts were also secured to aid in transporting the numerous supplies for the increasing command at Camp Dewey.

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The problem of water transportation still remained the greatest desideratum, and I fortunately found a large side-wheel steamer, the *Kwong Hoi*, owned by Whiley & Evans, which I was enabled to charter at \$500 (Mexican) per day (\$250), which proved of great value in moving troops and supplies during some two weeks immediately preceding the capture of Manila and in moving the main portion of the escort of the commanding general into Manila on the occasion of the surrender. This boat could, in high water, land at the wharf at Cavite, and at the time of the greatest need I succeeded in moving on this vessel a good part of the troops left on the transports into Cavite, whence they were also sent as needed to Parañaque.

Despite the fact that the *Kwong Hoi* drew too much water to go as far inshore as desired, and could not in the rough weather stay alongside the transports, by reason of the danger of injury to her side wheels, still the vessel proved of great value in the entire lack of light vessels and launches. This vessel could carry a thousand men and many tons of freight at once. It was fortunate that it happened to be available at so critical a period.

The fact that it was so difficult to do anything imprisoned on the *Newport* finally caused General Merritt to order me to take station at Cavite on the 10th of August, where I remained until the final attack on the city of Manila, which took place on the 13th. By means of the chartered steamer *Kwong Hoi* and a little steamer, *Isabela*, the troops had been landed as wanted at Cavite, and had been sent over to Camp Dewey and Cavite, and were so disposed that it was possible to keep open communication by marching, if necessary, and the command was felt to be in a practicable position for all contingencies. It was, however, necessary to hasten operations, and the Navy was asked to aid in landing at Parañaque the remainder of the troops at Cavite and those on the transports, and three or four of the numerous navy launches were furnished, which, with some navy rowboats and those of the transports, were used to complete the landing of the residue of the command at Parañaque. The landing was managed by several naval lieutenants, and was completed in two or three days, despite very rough weather, one boat, with some 20 men, being upset and the soldiers in it being thrown into the water, but all were saved, and only a few rifles were lost. If the land forces had had the continuous use of three such launches, almost all of the troubles which had disturbed the transportation branch would have been largely remedied.

On the evening of August 12 an order was sent me to report with 2 battalions of the Second Oregon Volunteers, under Colonel Summers, the next day on the *Kwong Hoi* to the commanding general on the *Newport*, as escort on his entrance into Manila.

At the hour named, 8 o'clock, I reported to the commanding general, and a large part of the staff—the chief surgeon, chief commissary, judge-advocate, chief engineer, chief paymaster—and others of the general staff were ordered to accompany me, together with the aforesaid battalions, commanded by Colonel Summers and the *Kwong Hoi* was ordered to follow the *Zafiro*, the dispatch boat of Admiral Dewey, on which the commanding general, with the rest of his staff, were located, at a distance of half a mile. The fight of the land forces and the bombardment of the works of the enemy by the fleet were plainly witnessed, and the *Kwong Hoi* was a good part of the time in easy range of the shore batteries of Manila, but no shot was fired, either at the fleet or at our boat. We witnessed from the *Kwong Hoi* all the preliminaries of the surrender, and followed the launch of the commanding general so far inshore as the vessel could go, and then some naval rowboats, but no launches, took the staff officers and the two battalions to the wall along the canal and River Pasig, whence they had to walk a mile along the river and into the city. It was somewhat late when the other staff officers and myself reached the palace of the ayuntamiento, where the commanding general was receiving the surrender of the Spaniards.

DUTY SINCE THE OCCUPATION OF MANILA.

Since occupying Manila the chief duties of this department have related to—

1. Providing of native forage for animals purchased or hired—ponies and bulls.
2. Printing.
3. Purchase of miscellaneous articles obtainable in this market, or at Hong-kong, for the military forces of the department.
4. Disinterments of deceased officers and soldiers.
5. Renting quarters for staff and line officers.
6. Building nipa barracks and other buildings for use of troops.
7. Repair of barracks and quarters.
8. Refrigerating plant.

9. Housing of troops.
 10. Renting storehouses for all kinds of stores—quartermaster, engineer, subsistence, signal, regimental, company, etc.
 11. Purchasing and hiring land transportation—ponies, bulls (water oxen), carriages, quilezes, bull carts, pony carts, etc.
 12. Providing transportation on inland waters and around the bay to occupying troops.
 13. Transporting supplies to Iloilo, Cebu, Negros, Jolo, etc.
 14. Purchasing of Spanish gunboats, launches, and other water transportation.
 15. Taking possession of and operating a railroad from Manila to San Fernando.
 16. The hiring of ordinary labor for moving stores; coaling; unloading and loading vessels, cascoes, and distributing supplies, etc.
 17. Hiring and caring for coolies employed for forces operating in the field.
 18. Putting in proper sanitary condition of barracks and quarters, and removal of excreta.
 19. Transportation of funds for the Quartermaster's Department.
 20. Disbursement of public civil funds.
 21. Providing wholesome water.
 22. Purchasing and preparing, for service on inland lake and rivers, of gunboats manned by officers and soldiers of the Eighth Army Corps.
 23. Purchasing coal for transports.
 24. Purchasing coal and other supplies; hire of pilots; renting of dry docks, etc., at Nagasaki, Japan, and Hongkong, China.
 25. Transportation of officers, discharged soldiers, and others, on Government transports to the United States.
 26. Purchasing articles needed for soldiers on United States transports.
 27. Sending back to the United States volunteer organizations enlisted for the Spanish war.
 28. Discharging, coaling, and loading transports in Manila Bay.
 29. Transporting troops and supplies from Manila to other islands in the Philippine Archipelago.
 30. Furnishing funds to transports when in need; giving sailing orders to the same; making needed repairs to transports, etc., after arrival in Manila Bay.
 31. Purchasing and supplying clothing and equipage, particularly khaki and white drill uniforms, and bamboo bunks.
 32. Receiving and issuing all kinds of quartermaster supplies to the army at this place.
 33. Building and repairing of hospitals.
 34. Settlement of claims for houses, horses, bulls, carriages, carts, etc., seized for military use during active hostilities.
- Nearly all the payments relating to the above duties were made from public civil funds. For instance, in June, while the chief quartermaster expended \$308,327.97 of the public civil fund of the islands, he expended only \$81,598.24 of the funds of the Quartermaster's Department, and this expenditure was chiefly for coaling transports at Nagasaki.

1. *Providing of native forage for animals purchased or hired—ponies and bulls.*—It has been necessary to provide native forage, consisting of paddy (rice in the husk) and grass, for the ponies and water oxen purchased and hired. It has been difficult to do this since the war with the Filipinos has broken out, as much of the forage has to come from beyond the hostile lines, and this could not always be done without trouble, and the price has been raised accordingly. It has been found that the American animals—horses and mules—can become accustomed to this forage to a considerable extent. This is important, as the oats and hay sent from the United States are liable to become damaged from the moisture of the damp climate. Large quantities of home forage, for this reason, should not be sent at a time; in fact, it is not safe to send more than two months' supply of forage at one time, because it is liable to mildew and becomes musty during the rainy season, say from May until October, or even somewhat later. It is possible that under the most advantageous circumstances, with good storage and plenty of room, it might keep sound, but storage is limited, and it is unsafe to risk large quantities for the present, as sufficient storage is not available.

2. *Printing.*—The printing establishment which was brought out with the expedition of General Merritt has proved of immense benefit to the department, as there has been no establishment on these islands capable of doing the kind of work required by the headquarters of the department and the office of the military governor. The original contract, in which the department required all accounts to be forwarded before payment, was impossible of execution, as the contractor could not afford to wait—in all cases three months, and in case of error

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six months—for his pay, which amounts to about \$3,300 per month; but this was remedied by making payment, under the contract, from public civil funds. A bindery and ruling machine have been added, and, recently, a rubber-stamp outfit, there being no place in the city where good rubber stamps could be made; and such stamps are as much needed as any one thing in the line of office supplies.

3. *Purchase of miscellaneous articles obtainable in this market or at Hongkong for the military forces of the department.*—A considerable part of the duties of this office, as well as those of the depot quartermaster's, has been the purchase of various miscellaneous supplies, in addition to clothing immediately needed, such as stationery, plumbing supplies, horse medicines, brick, lime, cement, office furniture, and a great variety of such articles. When such could not be found here, purchase has been occasionally made at Hongkong. The prices have generally been reasonable, when the articles could be procured, but the desired articles could seldom be obtained, though some substitute has been made to answer.

4. *Disinterments of deceased officers and soldiers.*—This department has been charged with the removal of the remains of deceased officers and soldiers, and a portion of those who have died have been sent to the United States. The Quartermaster-General sent out a party of undertakers to prepare the bodies for transportation to the United States, but at the time of the arrival of the party active operations in the field were in full progress, and it was found that it would be dangerous to the command to remove certain bodies. In consequence, on the recommendation of the chief surgeon, all disinterments were suspended by order of the department commander, with the approval of the War Department, and few remains have since been sent home, although it may be possible to complete the desired work in the fall. A report of those remains which have been shipped is appended. The duty of supervising this work was confided to Capt. C. H. Martin, then assistant quartermaster, U. S. Volunteers (now captain, Fourteenth U. S. Infantry), and he has performed the delicate duty with great care and good judgment. (See report of Capt. C. H. Martin herewith, marked A.)

The Quartermaster-General sent out an expert, and after investigation, careful study, and trial, the expert agrees with Captain Martin and myself that it would be injudicious to disinter any body until after six months, and it should not be done under a year; and that it would be far better that the remains be buried in simple wooden coffins, which admit of the quicker action of nature, unavoidable in any case, and allows of the removal of remains all the sooner.

I recommend that this be adopted as the general rule of action of the War Department. I would state that where it was desired, and was possible, all remains have been embalmed at once upon death and sent home; but this is seldom possible.

5. *Renting quarters for staff and line officers.*—The renting of quarters for officers has formed a large portion of the work of this office. The general staff and other officers not on duty with the troops have not been allowed commutation of quarters, so that this portion of the work, which usually falls upon the Pay Department, had to be added to the work of the Quartermaster's Department, with the additional duty of accommodating the tastes of officers, or finding suitable houses for residences where such houses were so scarce. This was increased by the advent of many families of officers. The frequent changes of officers made it difficult to keep account of the rentals, and has proved an unusually vexatious kind of duty, much more so than finding suitable barracks and storehouses where no personality is involved. Almost all rentals have been paid out of public civil funds.

With much difficulty the troops and officers and their families have been fairly well housed, and there has not been unusual complaint. (See Statement of buildings rented in Manila, marked B.)

6. *Building nipa barracks and other buildings for use of troops.*—The uncertainty which existed regarding the occupation of these islands and the generally unsettled state of the policy, due to the attitude of the Filipinos, the delay in the peace negotiations, etc., but especially the uncertainty as to the number of troops to occupy this city eventually, have prevented the work of building permanent quarters for troops so far; but several large sets of nipa barracks have been constructed and are in course of construction which have been or will be of great advantage. Such structures are certainly not economical or desirable for prolonged use, but under the pressure of imminent necessity this was probably the best thing to be done; but I firmly believe that early action should be taken to build solid, permanent, sanitary barracks for the number of troops estimated to be permanently located here, say 5,000 to 10,000, the number to form a permanent garrison. Barracks should also be built, as a matter of both economy and health of the troops, at other places which must have permanent garrisons, such as Iloilo,

Bacolod, Jolo, etc. Nipa barracks have been built at Manila, Calocan, Santa Mesa, etc. (See report of Capt. R. Sulzer, herewith, marked C; report of those built by Major Devol to be added when his report is received.)

7. *Repair of barracks and quarters.*—When the troops were quartered in the different houses and “cuartels” of this city, their places of abode presented, so far as conveniences were concerned, the aspect of houses of the United States, say fifty years ago, in plumbing, roofing, and general conveniences, and the troops assigned to them speedily began to require the means of remedying what would at once be recognized as defects in a modern American building. Where these buildings were found to belong to the public all reasonable repairs were ordered to be made, and in cases of private ownership repairs were required to be made by the owners, so far as the same could be done without friction, and even then they were made where such did not conflict with private rights and were not too expensive.

8. *Refrigerating plant.*—The information has been given this office by the Quartermaster-General that a large refrigerator plant is to be erected at this point, and a most convenient site has been secured for its location on the left bank of the Pasig River, between the Bridge of Spain and the suspension bridge above, which ground is public property and is the most convenient location in Manila. Advertisement has been issued for 3,500,000 common brick, 200,000 pressed brick, and 12,000 barrels of lime, in accordance with the direction of the Quartermaster-General. This plant will be of the greatest benefit to the troops, who at times can not get meat from the refrigerator ships on account of the stormy weather (though this is rare), and they will also be free from the chances of delay of ships and spoiling of meat and will be sure of a plentiful supply of the most necessary article—ice.

9. *Housing of troops.*—The matter of providing barracks for the invading troops suddenly thrown into a crowded city where the foreign population, occupying all the important buildings, had been greatly increased, while building was entirely stagnant, was a serious one from the first, and but for the good nature and willingness of the volunteers to recognize the situation, and not knowing or considering what was allowed by regulations, it might have caused embarrassment. The department did the best it could under the circumstances, hiring all the available buildings, seizing others under military necessity (the claims arising from which have been all amicably settled), and the soldiers of the Eighth Army Corps were fairly well provided for while occupying this city. (See report of buildings rented, marked B.)

10. *Renting storehouses for all kinds of stores—quartermaster, engineer, subsistence, signal, regimental, company, etc.*—The difficulty of securing sufficient buildings for storehouses has increased with the addition of the forces and to the stores on hand. Storehouses have been needed and rented for quartermaster's stores, subsistence, engineer, signal, regimental, and company property, etc. Especially with the first two mentioned it was needed that such storage should be on the river bank for ease of taking the stores from the cascos which bring them from the transports in the harbor, and loading the same, when transported by water. Lately a large, fine, and conveniently located and arranged storehouse has been obtained for the depot quartermaster, which will add to the ease with which stores can be received and arranged for issue and storing. There is, however, a large portion of ground on the river bank, formerly used by the Spaniards, with tramways and shops, which has been recommended as a suitable place on which to build a patently needed depot storehouse and general workshops. Plans and estimates for such buildings have been submitted, but the want of public civil funds have prevented the approval of this construction so far.

The plans and estimates for such buildings as would answer our needs indicate a cost of about \$250,000 gold. I am satisfied this amount could be saved in labor within a few years from the convenience of this location and the use of the tramways and docks, etc. Shops for repair and other ordinary quartermaster's workshops could be advantageously located here also, and these are particularly needed.

11. *Purchasing and hiring land transportation, ponies, water oxen, carriages, quilezes, bull carts, pony carts, etc.*—In the former portion of this report I have mentioned the difficulty of securing land transportation—horses or ponies, water oxen, and pony and ox carts. The difficulty lessened until the outbreak of the war, on February 4, when the number of available animals decreased rapidly, and all that could be conveniently secured had to be seized. However, all that could be procured did not prove sufficient, although the number seized tided the department over so that not only was the command satisfied with the transportation service, but the transportation quartermaster, Maj. C. A. Devol, received the praise of the command for his energetic action, in which he was fully sustained by the proper authorities. The success with which supplies of subsistence, forage, ammunition, clothing, etc., were pushed forward to the fighting line as it

spread farther away from the city was phenomenal and excited the admiration of the whole command.

The difficulty of providing land transportation has been continuous during the whole disturbance, although it has been largely a matter of expense, since there has seldom been a time when transportation could not have been obtained by paying sufficient per vehicle. It has been the policy of this department to inculcate strict economy, absolute honesty, and transparent integrity into all transactions, and it was considered that payment of an excessive rate would be detrimental to these principles. In attempting to remedy this lack of animals we have purchased horses from Australia and attempted to do so from China, under the most favorable recommendations in both cases. But both have proved failures, because the animals furnished are far below the standard prescribed in the regulations, even with all necessary modifications. On the contrary, the horses and mules which have been received from the United States have come without appreciable loss, especially this side of Honolulu, and have been thoroughly tried, and with proper food they have endured this climate as well as that of any part of the United States, and in addition they soon begin to get used to the food of the native animals (rice in the husk, called "paddy" or "palay," and native green grass) and thrive here with oats and hay, supplemented by native forage, as well as the same animals in Texas.

I believe in supplying the forces in these islands from the home markets in all respects so far as possible, and I know of nothing that can be furnished with more certainty of satisfaction than mules and horses. The horses thrive here just as well as the mules, and the loss of the same in transit is inconsiderable.

12. Providing transportation on inland waters and around the bay to occupying troops.—After the radius of the captured territory about Manila increased so as to take in a considerable portion of the bay shore, supply of troops was rapidly changed from land to water transportation, which was much more desirable and available, especially during the calmer season previous to July. The river gunboats ran up to the Rio Grande and added to their usefulness by towing barges and cascoes to supply garrisons along that and other rivers. Paranaque, Bacoor, and other southern towns were also supplied from the bay, and all troops along the Pasig River have been so supplied from the first occupation of the bank of that river. This change greatly relieved the already overworked land transportation, which was becoming more difficult to procure and of a poorer quality all the time.

13. Transporting supplies to Iloilo, Cebu, Negros, Jolo, etc.—Since the capture of Iloilo and the taking possession of the islands of Cebu, Negros, and Jolo it has been necessary to supply the forces stationed in those islands from this point, and this has required additional work to the department here. Fortunately there is a line of steamers, owned by the Compania Maritima, which run about the islands, and these have been of great aid when no transport has been available, and their vessels have been frequently chartered, as needed. A depot has been established at Iloilo, which partially supplies the wants of these forces, but has not been perfected to fully supply the district of the Visayas so far, for the reason, in part, that no sufficient surplus has heretofore been available to stock such a depot.

14. Purchasing of Spanish gunboats, launches, and other water transportation.—As there were thirteen small Spanish gunboats for sale liable to get into the hands of the insurgents, the department commander directed me to put in a bid of \$150,000 (Mexican) for same, which, however, proved too low; but he afterwards directed the purchase of these gunboats at \$315,000 (Mexican coin), which was done out of public civil funds. Several launches have been purchased, and several small steamers have been chartered to run to the southern islands, at various times, all of which expense has been borne by the public civil fund. Numerous cascoes and launches have been under hire, habitually, for use in unloading transports and coaling same, and taking coal from colliers, unloading and loading supplies, and all the various needs for water transportation in this large and important seaport.

15. Taking possession of and operating a railroad from Manila to San Fernando.—As soon as Calocan was taken a considerable amount of rolling stock of the Manila and Dagupan Railroad fell into our hands, and as it would greatly facilitate the supply of the troops to use this road, possession was taken of the same, and the road was worked by detailed enlisted men and quartermaster's employees, and the said road has been steadily repaired as the troops have moved forward, and was a constant base of supply until San Fernando was reached, when a permanent base was formed at the other extremity of our possessions. This road, under the supervision of the transportation quartermaster (Maj. C. A. Devol), has been kept constantly running, to the great comfort and convenience of the troops.

Corporal Haisch (now lieutenant). of the Twentieth Kansas Volunteer Infantry, deserves great credit for his work as acting manager of the train service. With the exception of a short time when the road has been torn up by insurgents on one or two occasions, the road has performed as regular service as any road and has been well conducted.

16. *The hiring of ordinary labor for moving stores; coaling, unloading and loading vessels, cascoes, and distributing supplies, etc.*—The hiring of common and skilled labor has involved much work and care, and it is difficult to see what could be done without the Chinese in this respect. The Filipinos do well as drivers of carriages and pony carts, boatmen for charge of, and work with, cascoes, launches, etc. But for carrying and genuine hard work dependence is chiefly to be placed upon the few Chinese. They do most of the heavy work of loading and unloading of supplies, coaling and carrying, and the mechanical work is largely done by them also, such as carpentry. There is difficulty in getting the Filipinos to work, even out on the lines of the outpost, where work is needed and has been given to them to prevent suffering.

Common labor had to be hired for unloading and loading stores, coaling, carrying small supplies, cleaning public buildings occupied, and all the small wants of this large command. Wherever proper, such work as could be engaged has been employed under contract, which is by far the most efficient method of doing business here, as elsewhere.

17. *Hiring and caring for coolies employed for forces operating in the field.*—I have been an advocate of the use, for military purposes, of coolie labor and transportation during active operations since our early advent upon these islands. This oriental method of transportation was introduced for the use of the army here shortly after the outbreak of hostilities, when 50 coolies were hired as litter-bearers. The use has steadily grown, however, and now much of the dependence of the active force in the field is placed upon this kind of transportation. General Lawton was the first to bring real system into the use of this labor when he ordered, with the approval of the department commander, 72 coolies hired to the regiment, and had each coolie tagged to show where he belonged and to keep an accurate account of the number engaged and in use. These coolies have proven of the greatest benefit to his command in its very active operations, and the usefulness of such labor has been fully demonstrated. When properly cared for and used with discretion, there is no more useful kind of transportation. The coolie can carry about half the amount of supplies that can be carried by a pack mule, and by no means requires the same amount of care. This mode of transportation has been under the disadvantage of obtaining it among the comparatively few Chinamen to be found in the island of Luzon, of inferior physique and habits of ease unknown among the stalwart coolies to be obtained in China. The price to be paid here is also greater than I have been offered with regard to such as could be contracted for from China. The reports of the use of this mode of transportation to save our troops from the intolerable burdens necessary to carry on a campaign in this hot and enervating climate have been favorable, and it will doubtless be used more and more in the future if this war continues.

18. *Putting in proper sanitary condition of barracks and quarters and the removal of excreta.*—Every building and all the quarters used by the troops were in a most wretched condition so far as sanitation is concerned, and a great deal of work has had to be done in putting these buildings in a condition to secure a reasonable state of wholesomeness for the troops occupying the same. This has been done at the expense of the public civil fund, wherever the location was public quarters, and where private it has been the endeavor to have the owners do this work of repair; and even in case of private buildings it has been necessary to expend this fund in repairing the buildings when the owner declined to do so. The whole city is in a most unsanitary condition, and modern plumbing and sewerage are generally wanting, and the troops have been guarded against such a deplorable state of affairs so far as it has been possible to do so. In addition to this it has been necessary to provide for the removal of the excreta and sewage from public quarters by means of contracts with Chinamen and others to perform the work.

19. *Transportation of funds for the quartermaster's department.*—An important problem which should be solved is the method of sending out funds for the quartermaster's department, on one phase of which I have been required to report. In that report it was advocated that all dealings should be, so far as possible, in the only currency understood or generally used here—Mexican coin. The most economical method of placing funds to the credit of this department here would be the actual purchase in the United States of Mexican dollars and the shipment of the same by transport. There are inconveniences in this method,

but if it can be done and the funds are authorized to be deposited in the banks here, the saving would be considerable. The cost of transportation would be slight by this method, and the saving in exchange would be great. When obtained by any other method, the exchange (cost of freight and insurance) must be paid by the Government. All dealings must really be in Mexican coin, whether purchased with gold or however obtained. When gold credit is given, the method of purchasing Mexican coin has been to get a rate from each of the principal banks—the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation and the Chartered Bank of India, Australia, and China—and accept the most advantageous offer. The same method is acted upon when gold is to be purchased with Mexican silver. The Treasury rate of Mexican silver for each quarter is furnished by the Quartermaster-General, and all quartermasters' accounts are stated in United States currency at the given rate. In either case of purchase the banks charge a percentage which is very large. In small transactions the banks have often given only 2 Mexican dollars for 1 gold, when the gold was worth, at the Treasury rate, \$2.11. The letter of credit on London is convenient in making payments for coal at Nagasaki and transactions at Hongkong.

When Mexican silver is purchased and deposited in the Chartered Bank or the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, as was done September 26, 1898, nearly all payments of important amounts could be made by check, as is done by disbursing officers in the United States and is done here in regard to public civil funds.

20. *Disbursement of public civil funds.*—I desire to represent to the department commander that after the most earnest and honest endeavor to carry out the requirements of the General Orders, Nos. 3 and 5, office of the military governor in the Philippine Islands, series of 1898, I find it not only impracticable to carry out the real intention of said order, to require all disbursements made by the Quartermaster's Department to be done by the chief quartermaster, as the expenditures have grown and spread over so large a territory, but compels that officer to turn over large sums of money on memorandum receipts, contrary to Revised Statutes, 3622, and to incur serious pecuniary liabilities beyond the customs of the service. I have said that I have tried to meet the intention of the department commander in the desirable object of curtailing and controlling expenditures, one of the most important desiderata in any new system of administration, but have found it difficult to make quartermasters understand a system which allows the disbursement of funds without being required to account to the proper auditor for the same.

The object will be equally accomplished by holding the chief quartermaster as fully responsible for disbursements as at present, but allowing him to turn over funds to disbursing officers in accordance with the method pursued in the United States. I would state that, in order to keep the department simply running, in obedience to orders, I have in possession of the depot quartermaster alone on memorandum receipts at present \$76,000, and a total in the hands of all quartermasters of \$81,444.10, for which I am nominally responsible.

I have repeatedly represented the difficulties of this system to the department commander, while agreeing entirely in the object and aim and intention of the order, which I have held could be as fully accomplished by holding the chief quartermaster responsible for the disbursements, without forbidding the actual transfer of funds, in case of authorized expenditures.

I would recommend that, instead of restricting the turning over of funds, the chief quartermaster should require authority for all expenditures and make a preliminary audit, and transmit these accounts, with his remarks, to the auditor of public accounts of the islands. This would conform exactly to the form followed in the United States and relieve the chief quartermaster of a direct responsibility for funds, which neither his commission, nor customs of the service, nor of bonds, nor Revised Statutes, contemplate, and be equally effective for the object of the department commander.

Money in this case should only be turned over on requisitions, with the regulation inhibition that turning over on requisitions does not carry authority for any expenditure of funds.

I earnestly recommend that this system be adopted by the department commander.

21. *Providing wholesome water.*—Before leaving San Francisco five plants for distilling water were purchased and turned over for the use of the troops in these islands. Of these, three have been set up and have proved of great benefit to the troops. The water has been sent out to the lines, however far, where the troops could be reached, and these distilling plants have proved of inestimable benefit to such troops as could be reached. Where troops have been stationed along the line of the railroad, at San Fernando, Malolos, Calocan, etc., it has been possible to supply them and thus prevent the troubles innumerable caused by bad water

In addition, several engines of these distilling plants have been turned over to the medical department for use of the ice plant at Cavite, which has been of great necessity to the sick, according to the statements of the chief surgeon.

22. *Purchasing and preparing for service, on inland lake and rivers, of gunboats manned by officers and soldiers of the Eighth Army Corps.*—It became evident shortly after this war broke out that it would be absolutely necessary to control the Pasig River and the lake from which it flows, and, in consequence, the department commander ordered the seizure of a large launch, named *Laguna de Bay*, afterwards paid for from public civil funds, and it was armored as a gunboat and armed with suitable cannon and rapid-fire guns. This proved so effective and useful that several other launches were fitted out by the transportation quartermaster—the *Oeste* (captured when Manila surrendered), the *Conadonga* (captured from the insurgents by General Lawton), and the *Napindan*. The transportation quartermaster was required to do the work of preparing these vessels and providing crews before they were turned over for military use and repairing the same.

23. *Purchasing coal for transports at Manila.*—It has required a great deal of work and careful attention to secure the absolutely necessary supplies of coal for the transports arriving at this port during the year. In many cases it has been necessary to make purchases in open market, and, generally, the usual forms of making contracts for such supplies, as would be done in the United States, has been utterly impracticable. The conditions are entirely different, and the time required to advertise and make regular contracts and get the same approved has been wanting. There has generally been decided economy in accepting advantageous offers, and, when such have been accepted, the approval of the department commander has been obtained and purchase made upon such approval. Whenever time has allowed or circumstances have permitted, the regular forms have been followed so far as practicable; but the securing of bondsmen and bonds, with the conditions of citizenship and other requirements, would ordinarily be impossible, and the insistence upon such forms would paralyze the movements of transports and cause delay and loss.

During the season of moderately calm weather very little demurrage has been paid; but during the typhoon season both the Government and private parties have had to pay demurrage, depending solely upon the weather in this bay, which is one of the most uncertain in the world.

I had at times to procure coal in small quantities from the navy, and the prices that I have had to pay in such cases have been higher than the price at which the army coal was purchased.

24. *Purchasing coal and other supplies, hire of pilots, renting of dry docks, etc., at Nagasaki, Japan, and Hongkong, China.*—The extreme difficulty experienced in coaling at this point early proved that the delay in coaling here would be too expensive, and resort was soon had to giving the transports only sufficient coal to carry them to Nagasaki and have them coal at that point for the remainder of the voyage. At that port coaling can be done in the briefest time of any place in the Orient, and, besides the necessity for haste in sending forward the transports, the Japanese coal could be procured so cheap that much saving of expense resulted. I believe that almost all ocean liners use this coal, and certainly all transports, whereof the charter party does not require the Government to furnish the coal, take this kind of coal. The cheaper coal is more advantageous to the Government also, in this, that most of the charter parties of transports provide that the coal remaining in the bunkers when the vessel is released shall be sold to the vessel at a comparatively small amount, which would result in a heavy loss with the high-priced coal. This is particularly true of transports requiring large amounts of coal for ballast.

I had understood that the Japanese coal was reasonably satisfactory, but recently complaint has been made of the quality of the coal, and I have been ordered to purchase Welsh coal, which costs 20 yen, as against 6.75 yen, the present price at which Japanese coal has been offered. The attached figures have been furnished me to show that there would be a loss of at least \$400 per day in the case of the last voyage of the *Grant*, as an illustration, to which I invite careful consideration, with respect to the future purchases of coal for returning transports.

I understand that the navy purchases Welsh coal, but the choice in this case is determined largely by the question of smokelessness and the steaming capacity in proportion to the space occupied by the coal. The higher-priced coal requires less handling—in which it is an advantage to the crew—but the Government transports have fully sufficient men to do all the work required with any kind of coal. Therefore, as nearly all the Government transports have sufficient bunker capacity for any kind of coal, the question of economy of space need not in general be considered. In other ways the advantages and disadvantages, in regard to dust, etc., of the two kinds of coal very nearly balance each other, the question

of expense being the only one needing serious consideration. (See copy of letters herewith marked D.)

It has been said that Nagasaki was chosen because of the rapidity with which coaling can be done there, as well as the cheapness of the coal, but if it is decided to continue the purchase of Welsh coal it would be decidedly of advantage to select Yokohama as the coaling place, because Welsh coal is as cheap there (I have been offered Welsh coal at Yokohama for the same price as at Nagasaki), and coaling can be done almost as rapidly, and the route via Yokohama is shorter by a thousand miles than via Nagasaki, and almost directly on the northern route of steamers journeying to San Francisco. (See letter herewith marked E.)

25. *Transportation of officers, discharged soldiers, and others on Government transports to the United States.*—Another part of the quartermaster's work has been providing transportation for officers and soldiers, under orders and discharged, on United States transports, which requires considerable work where there is so large a force. All officers and soldiers under orders or discharged, or mustered out, are, as a rule, required to go back on transports, and while the transports are all required for the returning volunteer organizations it has been difficult to find places for the transients; and when discharged soldiers are detained for any length of time beyond that which would be required to secure passage on commercial lines, much serious complaint has been made. All have been sent as fast as accommodations could be found, and no long detentions have been allowed; but I must acknowledge that I do not consider any detention just to those who have served faithfully under the severest conditions. (See list of transports arriving and departing, marked F, hereto attached.)

26. *Purchasing articles needed for soldiers on United States transports.*—In an army of 25,000 to 35,000, such as this has been in the Philippines, there are constant discharges of soldiers who are entitled to be returned to the United States, and it has been decided to return these on the transports to their country. They are entitled to provisions, as well as transportation, in lieu of traveling expenses. When, therefore, large numbers of discharged soldiers are sent back on any transport, it is often necessary to provide bedding and cooking and eating utensils for their use.

When such cases occurred it has been necessary for the Quartermaster's Department to provide for such necessities, and purchases had to be made for that purpose where the articles were not on hand. In some cases these purchases have been authorized by me to be made at Nagasaki where time has not permitted or the articles were not to be had in Manila. These arrangements have been cheerfully made by the coal contractors, who have willingly accepted the position of agents, to the great convenience of the Government, all their bills for purchases being promptly paid in all cases.

27. *Sending back to the United States volunteer organizations enlisted for the Spanish war.*—A good part of the attention of this office has lately been taken up with the matter of transporting the volunteer organizations, which were enlisted for the Spanish war, back to the United States, and the problem has also been much complicated by the requirement that all discharged soldiers shall be sent back by transports. There are great numbers who are entitled to their discharge—both volunteers and regulars—and these all want to go back on the first available means of transportation. On this account it has been found necessary to crowd the returning transports more than is desirable or would otherwise be necessary. In addition, there are numbers of officers and soldiers who are ordered back to the United States on various kinds of duties or to hospitals for treatment, etc., who take up part of the available space on all transports. The matter has been further complicated by the typhoon season coming on, so that either loading or coaling has been done with much delay and under the most difficult circumstances. (See report hereto attached marked G.)

28. *Discharging, coaling, and loading transports in Manila Bay.*—I have on several occasions endeavored to give the Quartermaster-General some idea of the difficulty under which we have labored in coaling vessels and loading and unloading the same during the typhoon season. It is impossible for anyone accustomed to the conveniences for performing the usual functions pertaining to arriving and departing of vessels at ordinary harbors to conceive of the troubles and trials of those who are required to unload and load, to embark and disembark, from such vessels supplies and troops in this great bay, which is no harbor at all, but merely an arm of the sea, especially when haste and economy are to be exercised. During the typhoon season the waves rise to such violence that at times for weeks no work whatever can be done, and the impatience natural to those who are desirous of returning home rises to fever heat, and those responsible are involved in the condemnation of the elements beyond any control. During the more quiet period the work goes

on as rapidly as possible under the constant interruption of church holidays and festivals, but when the elements combine with the inertia of the natives the trials of those required to do the best possible under the adverse circumstances become heavy and discouraging.

I know the trials of this state of affairs from having had direct charge of the duties last year, and the remembrance of those trials are revived during the current year.

This has been particularly aggravating because the worst period of the year has coincided with the return of the volunteer regiments to their homes. Everything that could be done has been done, but it is impossible to contend with both nature and man in the tropics. As one illustration, I will cite the instance that not one pound of coal could be placed in the bunkers of the *Grant* for a whole week.

As has been the invariable case with the volunteer force in the Philippines, here has been no unreasonable complaint and no trouble has arisen with the work of the Quartermaster's Department.

I can only emphasize my recommendation that, if this is to continue a station for these possessions—a necessity so long as the United States holds these islands—a suitable breakwater and dock should be built as soon as it is possible for the proper authorities to do so.

The delays have caused a considerable outlay in the payment of demurrage, as it has with merchant vessels, but this is unavoidable.

This attempt to fully explain the cause of delay has been made because it is known and recognized that all desire the return of the worthy volunteers at the earliest possible moment.

A partial remedy for these difficulties may be found in making coal contracts requiring delivery by sailing vessels, which places demurrage payments at the discharge rate of 100 tons per day instead of the usual steamer rate of three or four hundred tons, and by employing steam lighters when such can be secured. Coaling may then be done in typhoon weather by sending the collier or lighter with the vessel to be coaled into some near harbor, of which Maraveles and Subig Bay have already been mentioned.

A remedy suggested by the department commander that vessels should be sent direct from San Francisco to Nagasaki and there coaled has been adopted, which will go far to relieve the difficult conditions.

29. *Transporting troops and supplies from Manila to other islands in the Philippine Archipelago.*—This department has had much work in transporting troops and supplies from this station to all others in these islands. When no Government transport has been available, the small steamers of the *Compania Maritima* have frequently been chartered or engaged for the purpose. Movements of troops and supplies are constantly going on to and from the other islands, and endeavor has been made to meet the wants of the command promptly, and it has generally been the case that this could be done. The conditions in Manila Bay above described have been often exaggerated among the lower islands. Thus, in a recent case, the *Sherman* took three weeks to get the relief to the California Volunteers in Negros and that organization embarked to enable it to return home.

Ordinarily in good weather the conditions allow more rapid transportation, and all troops in the southern islands have been nearly as well supplied as those in Manila.

The rate charged by the *Compania Maritima* for freight and approved by the department commander is appended, marked H.

30. *Furnishing funds to transports when in need; giving sailing orders to the same; making needed repairs to transports, etc., after arrival in Manila Bay.*—The transports, both those owned by the Government and those chartered, frequently have found themselves in need of funds through unforeseen circumstances, and in all such cases this office, by authority of the Quartermaster-General, has supplied the necessary funds. In case of the chartered transports, the amounts advanced have been deducted from the amount due on the charters of the vessels.

These circumstances arise from unusual detention, from unexpected requirements, and all such necessities, and have been promptly met, to the convenience of the owners or the quartermaster in charge and without detriment to the Government.

When repairs are needed the same are promptly made, so as not to delay the vessel, as there are shops and companies here which can generally make all needed repairs, but when such can not be made here, Hongkong has always been found a convenient place for the purpose until lately, when the quarantine has prevented resort to that port.

The sailing orders for all transports are given from this office, in conformity to the instructions of the department commander.

31. *Purchasing and supplying clothing and equipage, particularly khaki and white drill uniforms, and bamboo bunks.*—I have heretofore recommended that a large supply of khaki drill be purchased and manufactured into uniforms at the Philadelphia depot of the Quartermaster's Department, which recommendation was favorably considered. Purchase of about 100,000 suits of this kind of khaki here has proved the superiority of the material furnished from Manchester, England, over any other received.

I am the more convinced that purchase should be made of thoroughly tested material from reliable firms, from the fact that complaints continue to be made of the khaki uniforms supplied from the United States, and boards of survey are frequently condemning such clothing. Instances in case of the relief, the Thirteenth U. S. Infantry, Sixth U. S. Artillery, and others, have been forwarded to the Quartermaster-General.

I have received and forwarded to the Quartermaster-General reports regarding the khaki purchased here, and favorable reports are almost universal. It is doubtful if, with the lack of trained experts, such favorable results will continue, and therefore, should a large force continue in these islands, a general clothing depot of the Quartermaster's Department should be established at Manila, with a full force of trained and skilled employees.

The light summer underclothing supplied from the Quartermaster's Department has been fairly satisfactory. These articles could doubtless be purchased somewhat cheaper here, but I think that this clothing should be supplied from the United States, as heretofore.

The lightest, cheapest, and probably the best clothing for this warm climate is made of white drill, similar to the khaki, but of much lighter texture. Ten thousand suits of such drill have been purchased here and have given general satisfaction, and authority to purchase 40,000 more has been granted by the department commander. This clothing can not be worn in active operations, as the color makes too conspicuous a mark.

The most unsatisfactory part of the uniform has been the helmet, and this is due to its shape. The back brim is not broad enough, and should be enlarged so as to fully shade the back of the head and neck. The English uniform helmet is the proper shape, and I think that shape should be adopted. The helmets covered with khaki have not been tried as yet, and may be satisfactory as to material, but not shape. It is, however, considered that protection is needed around the temple, which is secured in the British helmet by a band of considerable thickness.

The campaign hat seems still to be the favorite headgear, due probably to the fact that it folds easily, and can be used partly as a pillow while lying down, and remains firmly on the head in going through underbrush, etc. I believe, however, that some air space is necessary around the head. It has been suggested to make a firm band around the campaign hat, with some air space inside, which might possibly be done.

An attempt was made to settle upon a proper kind of headgear, and a board of officers was called for that purpose last fall, but such a variety of opinions were developed and so many recommendations were made that the proceedings were disapproved. The board was called chiefly to consider the adoption of a suitable straw hat, but straw hats were not generally favored.

The quartermasters of the command were called upon for suggestions as to alterations or additions to the present uniform, but few such reports have been received, which are hereto attached, marked "I."

Twenty-five thousand yards of khaki, "Stockport," for sale to officers have been ordered from Messrs. E. Spinner & Co., Bombay, at 8½d. per yard, and contract is being entered into for 30,000 suits of khaki, at \$3.45 (Mexican) per suit, and 20,000 extra trousers, at \$1.70 (Mexican) per pair; also 40,000 suits white drill uniform, at \$2.15 (Mexican) per suit.

It has been found absolutely necessary to raise the soldier above the ground while sleeping to insure any degree of health, and this has been done by the purchase of a large number of bamboo bunks (and some canvas bunks). Until lately these were made at the Bilibid prison, at 80 cents (Mexican) each; but latterly the active operations have raised the price of bamboo, and the cost has been raised greatly. The dampness and effluvia arising from this soil makes it dangerous to sleep on the ground or on the floor of houses, especially the first floor.

32. *Receiving and issuing all kinds of quartermaster's supplies to the Army at this place.*—The work of receiving and issuing all kinds of supplies has been arduous and complicated by reason of the fact that the stores had to be kept in the only available storehouse, and thence had to be issued largely to the individual organizations, at times even companies and detachments. With an army of 30,000 men the work involved in such duty must be immense. This part of the work has been greatly aided by the post quartermaster-sergeants sent out by the Quartermaster-General at my request.

Storage room is hard to find, and rentals are high, so that it is particularly desirable that no stores be sent out that have not been asked for. Deterioration is exceedingly rapid in this moist, damp climate, and it would be far better to throw supplies away than send them out here to be stored for any length of time in the expectation of utilizing the same. Such articles as clothing and perishable supplies are particularly referred to, but storage would soon exceed the value of any articles which are not needed, besides involving unnecessary labor and care upon those already hard pressed with the task of providing for a large army under new and difficult conditions. It is desired to emphasize the necessity for this course, as there is, no doubt, a large amount of surplus stores left from the war forces which it might be thought could be utilized here.

33. *Building and repairing of hospitals.*—The buildings taken or rented for hospitals have been those used by the Spaniards, and such other suitable buildings as could be secured, and one hospital is being built at Corregidor Island, the cost of which will be borne by the public civil fund. The buildings secured have needed many repairs, which have been made as rapidly and as well as the condition of labor here has permitted. In this way the many sick and wounded of the command have been attended to, so far as the duty of this department extends, in a fairly satisfactory manner. Considerable repairs have been put on the large First and Second Reserve hospitals, and others in a greater or less degree, all of which have required labor and care on the part of the Quartermaster's Department. (See report of Captain Sulzer herewith, marked C.)

34. *Settlement of claims for houses, horses, bulls, carriages, carts, etc., seized for military use during active hostilities.*—The settlement of claims arising from the occupation or seizure of houses, horses, bulls, carriages, and carts early in the occupation of the city and since the Filipino war broke out has engaged a considerable portion of the time and attention of the Quartermaster's Department, and has gone on steadily from the early days of the occupation of Manila. Buildings which the owners were only too glad to have the troops occupy for security have since been the subject for claims of rent, generally exorbitant. All these claims were at first sent to the office of the chief quartermaster for investigation and settlement, but it was represented that many of these claims were such as a body having authority to administer oaths could alone properly dispose of, and a board of claims has been instituted, though many claims are still sent for preliminary action into this office. By far the greatest portion of these claims have been adjusted with entire fairness to both the claimant and the United States, as the appended report will show. (See report of Capt. R. Sulzer, marked J.)

TRANSPORTS.

I firmly believe that the Quartermaster's Department should have and control its own means for the transport of supplies and troops, but these transports should be in the nature of carriers which are controlled, as in railroad transportation, by the quartermasters at the initial and culminating points (in this case Manila and San Francisco), while in all military duties relating to the troops transported the regimental quartermasters or acting assistant quartermasters should attend to details, and I have found these fully competent to perform the same, as they are required to do with such duties as those of post quartermaster.

The drain is too great upon the personnel of the Quartermaster's Department when the supply is so depleted that no more than 14 quartermasters can be spared for 25,000 to 35,000 men of an army in the field, with all the intricate and important duties devolving upon such quartermasters, while no less than 5 are given up to the transportation of supplies and troops on five particular transports. This is added to by the knowledge that all the latter can not only be secured, but can be found seeking the duty, when the former must often be ordered without such seeking. I am led to this observation by the number of applicants from the few quartermasters under my control for details on board of such Government transports, when I have had none for field duty away from the transports, and the evident desire of good officers to remain permanently on board ship when once detailed.

It seems to me that our quartermasters, particularly the younger class entering the service, should be taught that honor and credit more particularly lie in active duty with the troops in the field, and not in the safe and more comfortable duties on board of Government transports, far removed from the field of danger and discomfort.

I have observed that where quartermasters of the Department are detailed permanently on board Government vessels a considerable portion of the much-needed cabin portion of the vessels is taken up by the quartermaster and his clerks, while the higher line officers have to content themselves with modest accommodations.

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In fact, I have seen a general officer of the line put in a cabin with another officer when the quartermaster and his office took up the room equal to three cabins.

Where there is sufficient benefit to the service these considerations of a personal nature should be of little weight, but where, as I believe, no benefit accrues to the service therefrom it is a bad system, needing reform.

Under the idea here advocated the management of transportation should be from the shore. Quartermasters should be stationed at a few important coaling stations, such as Nagasaki has been for the past year, and the service of such quartermaster is needed there more than on board transports. If coaling and other duties now transacted at Nagasaki are done at Yokohama, the station should be changed to that point or wherever an important coaling and business station exists.

BALLAST.

I have represented to the Quartermaster-General, by cable, the necessity of providing all Government transports coming into these waters with ballast, as is required in the regular form for the charter parties of the Quartermaster's Department.

It has been found that in many cases, even when the greatest haste is needed, some vessel requires a large amount of coal simply for ballast. Thus, at the present time, the *Zealandia* requires not less than four or five hundred tons of coal simply for ballast, and the vessel which is wanted to take volunteers home at once is delayed by the necessity to put on board this amount of coal, which, in the typhoon season, may require a delay of a week or ten days, when the coaling of the total amount to take the vessel across the Pacific could be done at Nagasaki in twenty-four hours. Frequently these arriving transports are wanted to go at once to the other islands to carry troops and supplies, and again it is necessary to delay until coal is taken on for ballast. In such cases the Government has to pay for the transports during the delay, and, on the whole, many thousands of dollars are lost through this means. Of course, in some of these instances there is need to use the additional tonnage capacity which would be lost through the ballast for freight, but in other cases this weight is not needed for freight, and the ballast would otherwise be of advantage to the steadiness of the ship. If ballast cannot be placed in a vessel such a ship should not be chartered, if it can be avoided, for service in the Philippine Islands.

ORGANIZATION OF THE QUARTERMASTER'S DEPARTMENT, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS.

Chief quartermaster of the department and Eighth Corps, Lieut. Col. J. W. Pope, chief quartermaster, U. S. V. Assistant, Capt. Raymond Sulzer, assistant quartermaster, U. S. V., in matters pertaining to barracks and quarters, construction and repairs, and custodian of the Ayuntamiento.

Depot quartermaster, Maj. C. A. Devol, chief quartermaster, U. S. V. Assistants, Capt. C. C. Walcutt, jr., assistant quartermaster, U. S. V., in charge of land transportation; Capt. William E. Horton, assistant quartermaster, U. S. V., in charge of water transportation (detailed August 24, 1899).

Chief quartermaster, First Division, Eighth Corps, Maj. Guy Howard, quartermaster, U. S. A.

Brigade quartermasters, First Division, Eighth Corps, Capt. A. S. Bickham, assistant quartermaster, U. S. V.; Capt. W. M. Ekin, assistant quartermaster, U. S. V.

Chief quartermaster, Second Division, Eighth Corps, Capt. John Baxter, jr., assistant quartermaster, U. S. A.

Brigade quartermasters, Second Division, Eighth Corps, Capt. A. W. Perry, assistant quartermaster, U. S. V.; Capt. M. M. McMillin, assistant quartermaster, U. S. V.; Capt. W. C. Cannon, assistant quartermaster, U. S. V.

Depot quartermaster at Iloilo, Capt. W. G. Haan, assistant quartermaster, U. S. V.

Depot quartermaster at Bacolod, Capt. E. R. Butler, assistant quartermaster, U. S. V.

By far the most difficult and arduous work of this department has fallen upon Maj. C. A. Devol, chief quartermaster, U. S. V., who, as transportation quartermaster, has had the immediate duty of providing all transportation on land and water, and the care and supervision of the same. It is impossible to speak too highly of the superb manner in which this arduous labor has been performed, and of the devotion to duty, early and late, which has been shown by this officer throughout the most active campaign of which I have any knowledge, as well as before and since. He has shown marvelous capacity and untiring energy in supplying the command, and his success has been phenomenal.

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Next to this officer, and of similar devotion, has come that of Capt. C. C. Walcutt, who, as chief quartermaster, First Division, first under General Anderson during the trying time of the early part of the war, and latterly under General Lawton during his "flying" expeditions west, north, and south. Similarly has Captain Sawtelle shown ability and continuous activity as chief quartermaster, Second Division, under General MacArthur. His zeal and intelligence have been conspicuous and elicited the encomiums of his commanding general.

Of the work of Capt. Amos Kimball, acting quartermaster, U. S. V., as assistant to the transportation quartermaster, I have already spoken and though he has since been ordered to the United States, I desire to repeat the expression of approval of his services.

In another and entirely different line, as assistant to the chief quartermaster, Capt. Raymond Sulzer, assistant quartermaster, U. S. V., has rendered most valuable services in such matters as settlement of claims, renting and repairing of buildings, building and repairing of hospitals, purchasing of supplies, and various other similar duties, to which he has brought a willingness to do hard work and a zeal and intelligence and business capacity which have been of the greatest aid to the chief quartermaster, which I desire to record and acknowledge.

Capt. C. H. Martin, Fourteenth U. S. Infantry, lately assistant quartermaster, U. S. V., has performed the duties of quartermaster of the provost guard and has had numerous duties of the most intricate and onerous character and has shown unusual aptitude for the work and an ability which renders his being mustered out of the volunteer service a severe loss to the department, which I sincerely regret. I have seldom known a more zealous, capable, energetic, or efficient officer.

Capt. W. G. Haan, assistant quartermaster, U. S. V., was soon after his appointment detailed as depot quartermaster at Iloilo, and he has brought to the performance of these entirely new duties a knowledge and ability which puts him high among the best quartermasters of the department. Nearly all of the numerous duties of this department in the Visayan district have fallen upon him, and from the moment he took charge order has been inducted into all the operations of one of the most important posts in the Philippines, and I can not speak too highly of his work. He has constantly kept me posted on the affairs of this department at his post, and I have found that he knew exactly what ought to be done and how to do it, and has never failed to do his work successfully from the first.

The remaining quartermasters of the command have performed the duties which, while important in a degree, are not such as would give me an opportunity to observe or to judge intelligently of their qualifications. It would be unfair that this should militate in any degree against their characters, abilities, or qualifications for their positions.

Especially would the lack of mention of the following officers, who have reported too recently to give me any data to go upon in rendering an opinion, be unfair and unjust: Maj. Guy Howard, quartermaster, U. S. A.; Capt. John Baxter, jr., assistant quartermaster, U. S. A.; Capt. W. M. Ekin, assistant quartermaster, U. S. V.; Capt. M. M. McMillin, assistant quartermaster, U. S. V.; Capt. W. C. Cannon, assistant quartermaster, U. S. V.

The intelligent, capable, efficient, and zealous manner in which Maj. Guy Howard took hold of his duties immediately proved that his services would be a most desirable acquisition to this command.

POST QUARTERMASTER-SERGEANTS.

The post quartermaster-sergeants who have been sent out at my request have been of the greatest utility and have rendered faithful service, especially Sergt. S. M. Neisser, who came first and has been longest on duty. He has well performed the duty of making issues of clothing at the depot quartermaster's depot, and is entitled to recognition for his faithful and hard services in this exacting line.

It has been necessary to write this report without any general reports from the depot quartermaster and the chief quartermasters of the divisions, time and the great need for active services having rendered it impossible for the same to be submitted in time.

The report of the depot quartermaster is about to be sent forward, and will be appended to this report, marked K.

Very respectfully,

J. W. POPE,
Lieut. Col. and Chief Quartermaster, U. S. V., Chief Quartermaster.

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EXHIBIT A.

HEADQUARTERS PROVOST-MARSHAL-GENERAL,
QUARTERMASTER'S OFFICE,
Manila, P. I., August 4, 1899.

CHIEF QUARTERMASTER DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC
AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I.

SIR: In compliance with your request of the 3d instant, I have the honor to report the following list of remains of officers and enlisted men disinterred and transported to the United States since February 6, 1899, when I took charge of disinterments:

13. Egbert, Harry G., colonel Twenty-second U. S. Infantry.
2. Smith, William C., colonel First Tennessee Infantry, U. S. V.
15. Stotsenburg, John M., colonel First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. V.
1. McVay, H. E., captain and assistant surgeon, U. S. A.
3. McConville, Edward, major, First Idaho Infantry, U. S. V.
48. Diggles, Arthur M., major, Thirteenth Minnesota Infantry, U. S. V.
4. Elliott, David S., captain, Twentieth Kansas Infantry, U. S. V.
7. Mitchell, James, first lieutenant, Fourteenth U. S. Infantry.
46. Lazelle, Jacob H., first lieutenant, Eighteenth U. S. Infantry.
8. Alvord, Alfred, first lieutenant, Twentieth Kansas Infantry, U. S. V.
6. Harting, Edwin A., lieutenant, First South Dakota Infantry, U. S. V.
14. Gregg, John C., lieutenant, Fourth U. S. Infantry.
47. Foster, Pierce C., second lieutenant, Third U. S. Infantry.
5. French, Eugene S., second lieutenant, First Montana Infantry, U. S. V.
49. Bowser, Clifford H., first sergeant Company A, First Colorado Infantry, U. S. V.
16. Evans, William J., sergeant, Company C, First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. V.
9. McClellan, Hugh B., private, Company I, Fourteenth U. S. Infantry.
10. Nickelson, Andrew, private, Troop A, First Nevada Cavalry, U. S. V.
11. Lippman, John H., private, Troop K, Fourth U. S. Cavalry.
12. Prybil, H. Daniel, private, Astor Battery.
17. Nicholls, Daniel J., private, Company H, First California Infantry, U. S. V.
18. Johnson, Edgar J., private, Company D, Second Oregon Infantry, U. S. V.
19. Berdine, Walter, private, Company E, Twenty-third U. S. Infantry.
20. Paden, Leslie B., private, Company E, Thirteenth Minnesota Infantry, U. S. V.
21. Perkins, George H., private, Company B, First California Infantry, U. S. V.
22. Holbrook, Rufus K., private, Company C, Second Oregon Infantry, U. S. V.
23. Young, Edwin C., private, Company A, Second Oregon Infantry, U. S. V.
24. Minnick, Leroy S., private, Company C, First Wyoming Infantry, U. S. V.
25. Dickson, Henry, private, Company L, Thirteenth Minnesota Infantry, U. S. V.
26. Sargent, Thomas H., private, Hospital Corps, U. S. A.
27. Jobbling, Arthur, private, Company H, Eighteenth U. S. Infantry.
28. Whitman, Joseph W., private, Company M, First South Dakota Infantry, U. S. V.
29. Watson, Harry G., private, Company C, Thirteenth Minnesota Infantry, U. S. V.
30. Deckelman, Francis E., private, Hospital Corps, U. S. A.
31. Adams, John C., private, Company A, First Montana Infantry, U. S. V.
32. Fields, William, private, Hospital Corps, U. S. A.
33. O'Leary, William C., private, Company I, First Montana Infantry, U. S. V.
34. Bleck, John, private, Company B, First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. V.
35. Dennis, Albert, private, Company H, Thirteenth Minnesota Infantry, U. S. V.
36. Horton, Ray, private, Battery G, Sixth U. S. Artillery.
37. Mortenson, Martin C., private, Company E, First South Dakota Infantry, U. S. V.
38. Snethen, Harry G., private, Battery G, Sixth U. S. Artillery.
39. Griffin, William P., private, Battery G, Sixth U. S. Artillery.
40. McElliott, Daniel, private, Company A, First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. V.

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41. McLean, Walter J., private, Company L, First Montana Infantry, U. S. V.
42. Hassard, Morley E., private, Company M, First Wyoming Infantry, U. S. V.
43. Healy, James, private, Company I, Eighteenth U. S. Infantry.
44. Mancher, Edward, private, Company M, First South Dakota Infantry, U. S. V.
45. Saylor, Cary A., private, Company A, First Montana Infantry, U. S. V.

C. H. MARTIN,
Captain, Fourteenth U. S. Infantry, A. A. Q. M.

HEADQUARTERS PROVOST-MARSHAL-GENERAL,
QUARTERMASTER'S OFFICE,
Manila, P. I., August 17, 1899.

CHIEF QUARTERMASTER DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC
AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I.

SIR: I turn over to the transportation quartermaster to-day for shipment to the United States on the U. S. transport *Sheridan* the remains of the following officers and enlisted men; also the monument from the grave of Private Cardoza, Battalion of Engineers:

- Lee Forby, captain, First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. V.
Reinhold Richter, captain, First California Infantry, U. S. V.
Maurace Just, first sergeant Company A, First California Infantry, U. S. V.
James T. Cardoza, private, Battalion of Engineers.
Edwin A. O'Neill, private, Company H, First California Infantry, U. S. V.
John W. Dunmore, private, Company B, First California Infantry, U. S. V.

C. H. MARTIN,
Captain, Fourteenth U. S. Infantry, A. A. Q. M.

EXHIBIT B.

Statement of buildings rented in Manila, P. I.

No.	Location.	Owner or agent.	Rent.
1	46 Calle Alix, Sampoloc	Agaoa, Vicente G.	\$170.00
2	66 Calle Alix, Sampoloc	Atayde, Juan	100.00
3	58 Calle Real, Paco	Alcazar, Joaquin de	60.00
4	— Calle Real, Malate	Arellano, Cayetano S.	375.00
5	16 Calle Remedios	Aragon, Pontenciano	60.00
6	88 Calle Real, Malate	Aenlle, Ramon	120.00
7	20 Gral Solano, San Miguel	Ayala, Trinidad	100.00
8	8 Calle San Jose, Ermita	Baldwin, Barry	150.00
9	10 Calle San Jose, Ermita	do	96.00
10	91 Calle Real, Malate	do	180.00
11	23 Calle Real, Paco	Borja, Aniceta	60.00
12	88 Calle Nueva, Malate	Carnero, Petra	70.00
13	5 Alley off Concepcion, Ermita	Corrales, Felisa	42.00
14	5 Calle Concepcion, Ermita	do	120.00
15	7 Calle Paz, Paco	Chuidian, Candelaria	100.00
16	16 Calle Malacanan, San Miguel	Chuidian, Telesforo	375.00
17	3 Gral Solano, San Miguel	Clavet, Jose	96.00
18	68 Calle Alix, Sampoloc	Chofre, S.	400.00
19	8 Calle Alix, Sampoloc	Cuyngaum, Vicente	40.00
20	28 Calle San Sebastian, bake oven	Crisanto, Telesforo	40.00
21	1 Calle Alix, Sampoloc	Dominguez, Santiago	150.00
22	103 Calle Real, Sampoloc	Eguia, Lino	175.00
23	5 Gral Solano (4 rooms)	Eugster, Eduardo	90.00
24	38 Nozaleda, Paco	Formosa, Teodoro	120.00
25	6 Calle Urbiztondo, Binondo	Finlay, A. J.	100.00
26	26 Calle Echague, Quiapo (part)	Faustino, Fernando Canon	35.00
27	26 Calle Echague, Quiapo (part)	do	85.00
28	21 Calle San Jose, Ermita	Garcia, Matias	130.00
29	24 Calle San Sebastian, Sampoloc	Genato, Manual	150.00
30	4 Calle San Jose, Ermita	Gavieres, Augustin Garcia	50.00

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EXHIBIT B.—Statement of buildings rented in Manila, P. I.—Continued.

No.	Location.	Owner or agent.	Rent.
31	2 Calle Alejandro VI, Sampoloc	Hernandez, Dolores	\$300.00
32	25 Calle Real, Paco	Lopez, Frederico	70.00
33	"M" Paseo de Ascauga, Binondo	Lopez, Margarita	225.00
34	44 Calle Iris, San Sebastian	Leon, Pelagio de	50.00
35	29 Calle Nueva, Ermita	Martinez, Roman	80.00
36	1 and 3 Calle Santa Mesa, Sampoloc	Machuca, Jose	300.00
37	81 Calle Nozaleda, Paco	Moreno, Jose	70.00
38	Assumption College, Malate	McLeod, Alex. S., agent	1,000.00
39	66 Calle Nozaleda, Paco	Montano, F.	55.00
40	Zorrilla Theater	Model, Augustina	400.00
41	8 Calle Tazan, Ermita	Moreto, Emilio	30.00
42	16 Calle Nozaleda	Nunez, Jose	60.00
43	25 Calle San Antone, Sampoloc	Ocampo, Salvadoro	150.00
44	21 Calle Santa Mesa, Sampoloc	Oserio, F. P.	125.00
45	67 Calle Nueva, Malate	do	144.00
46	16 Calle San Luis, Ermita	Ortiz, Carmen	50.00
47	41 Calle Real, Ermita	Pardell, Vicente O. de	120.00
48	68 Calle Nozaleda, Paco	do	45.00
49	44 Calle Marina, Ermita	Perez, Rafael	50.00
50	73 Calle Nozaleda, Paco	do	40.00
51	2 Calle Santa Elena, Tondo	do	80.00
52	65 Calle Nozaleda, Paco	do	50.00
53	63 Calle Nozaleda, Paco	do	80.00
54	42 Calle Iris, San Sebastian	Paterno, Jose A.	45.00
55	23 Calle San Fernando, Binondo	Pazas, Ramon	75.00
56	20 Calle Alix, Sampoloc	Puente, Antonio la	83.00
57	1 Calle Alix, Sampoloc (part)	Pastor, Alejandro	80.00
58	25 Calle San Luis, Ermita	Pena, Jose de la	150.00
59	23 Calle San Luis, Ermita	do	45.00
60	20 Muelle de la Reina	Padilla, Maria Barbara	80.00
61	101 Calle Real, Malate	Rosario, Lorenzo del	200.00
62	2 Calle Barraca, Binondo	Reyes, Vicente S.	200.00
63	44 Calle Real, Ermita	Reyes, Teodoro de los	70.00
64	3 warehouses in Binondo	Roxas, Pedro P.	1,500.00
65	40 Calle Isaac Peral, Ermita	Rosales, Maximiano	60.00
66	Convent of San Sebastian	Recoletos, P. P.	150.00
67	9 Calle Real, Ermita	Silvestre, Felipa	110.00
68	1 Calle Concepcion, Ermita	Salamanca, Maria	40.00
69	35 Calle Loban, Paco	Senoran, Magdalena	55.00
70	54 Calle Nueva, Ermita	Sy Quia, Pedro	48.00
70A	25 Calle San Sebastian	Tuason & Co.	250.00
70B	10 and 12 Plaza de Santa Ana	do	150.00
71	House on Corregidor Island	Candido Francisco	35.00
72	1 Calle Real, Ermita (top part)	Enriquez, Jose	95.00
73	Carroceria Peninsular, Real, Paco	Fitton, W. A.	50.00
74	20 Calle San Luis, Ermita	Carolina Gomez de la Serna	95.00
75	2 Calle San Luis, Ermita	Gonzalez, V.	60.00
76	33 Calle Novaliches	Rivera Fidel	60.00
77	13 Calle Concepcion, Ermita	Salamanca, M.	130.00
78	Calle Panaderos, Santa Ana	Sackermann, E.	70.00
79	9 Cabillo, Manila	Saz-Orosco, Eugenia del	400.00
80	C. D. and E. Calle Santa Monica, Tondo	Sy-Lico, Suy	270.00
81	20 Calle Jolo, Binondo	Troen & Roza	250.00
82	5 Calle Paz, Paco	Ugarte, Antonia	80.00
83	23 Calle Malacanán, San Miguel	Velasco, Miguel	75.00
84	46 Calle Real, Ermita	Villemer, A.	70.00
85	24 Muralon del Norte (No. 2)	Yangco, Luis R.	300.00
86	74 Calle Nozaleda, Paco	Ybaseta, Jose	100.00
87	6 Calle Loban, Paco	Tor Asuncion Ventura	35.00
88	Corner Calle Jaboneros and Principe	Yangco, Luis R.	1,200.00
89	Bodega F. Calle Lara, Binondo	do	700.00
90	Bodega 3, Muelle de la Reina, on ground floor and 2 rear	Ynchausti & Co	400.00
91	71 and 69 Calle Real, Malate	Yparraguirre, Maria	105.00
92	12, 13, and 14 Calle Principe, Binondo	Yangco, Luis R.	150.00
93	House in Malate	Anellano, C. S.	70.00
94	17 Calle San Luis, Ermita	Ownership in dispute	60.00
95	Rear Convent, Calle Nueva (no number)	McLeod, Alex. S.	150.00
96	6 Calle San Jose, Ermita	Baldwin, Barry	150.00
97	Hotel Oriente (35 rooms)	Hamilton, A. H. de C.	800.00
98	6 Calle Herran, Malate	Valeriano, Miguel	35.00
99	6 Calle Real, Malate	Rosales, Maximiano	30.00
100	Outpost building, Cingalong	Raymundo, Matias	20.00
101	3 Muelle de la Reina	Rodriguez, Enrique	105.00
102	31 Calle Nueva, Ermita (1 room)	Herrera, Braelio	25.42
103	24 Calle Madrid (1 room)	Navarro, N.	25.42
104	do	do	25.42
105	62 Calle Nozaleda (1 room)	Valderco, Valeriano	25.42
106	13 Calle Palacio (1 room)	Preysler, J.	25.42
107	8 Calle Bilibid (1 room)	Gonzales, Melicio	25.42
108	Hotel Oriente (3 rooms)	Hamilton, A. H. de C.	60.00
109	Hotel Oriente (2 rooms)	do	48.00
110	do	do	45.00
111	Hotel Oriente (3 rooms)	do	60.00

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EXHIBIT B.—Statement of buildings rented in Manila, P. I.—Continued.

No.	Location.	Owner or agent.	Rent.
112	83 Calle Nozaleda, Paco	Samanillo, Augustina	\$500.00
113	79 Calle Nueva, Malate	Cayetana, Cornello S	190.00
114	43 Calle Arsenal, Cavite	Rodriguez, Salvador	10.00
115	6 Calle Real, Malate	Rosales, Maximiano	240.00
116	4 Calle Real, Malate	Alonzo, Pantaleana	40.00
117	House in San Pedro Macati	Pacos, Ramos	75.00
118	48 Calle Arsenal, Cavite	Rodriguez, Salvador	50.00
119	50 Calle Arsenal, Cavite	do	50.00
120	4 Calle San Pedro, Cavite	do	10.00
121	Storeroom D, Santa Monica	Sylloc, Suy	100.00
122	Storeroom E, Santa Monica	do	100.00
123	6 Calle Real, Malate (2 rooms)	Aenlle, Fanny	30.00
124	6 Calle Real, Malate (3 rooms)	do	60.00
125	6 Calle Real, Malate (2 rooms)	do	45.30
126	65 Calle Nueva, Ermita	Ferratosa, Francisco	120.00
127	1 Calle Real, Ermita (part)	Enriquez, Jose	40.00
128	do	do	120.00
	Total		17,867.52

EXHIBIT C.

Public civil funds.

BUILDINGS CONTRACTED FOR.

Post.	Character of work.	Cost (Mexican coin).
Corregidor Island, P. I.	Convalescent hospital (3 wards, fever ward, administration building).	\$51,600.00
Do	Two buildings for barracks (officers' quarters and kitchen).	13,000.00
Manila, P. I.	Commissary storehouse	4,696.00

Expenditures on public barracks and buildings from August 13, 1898, to June 30, 1899:

Repairs	\$4,500
Plumbing, water supply, etc.	1,800
Sewage, sanitary work, etc	18,000
Total	24,300

Respectfully submitted.

RAYMOND SULZER,
Captain and Assistant Quartermaster, U. S. V.

EXHIBIT D.

[Browne & Co., Kobe, Yokohama, Nagasaki, Moji.]

NAGASAKI, JAPAN, June 8, 1899.

MY DEAR COLONEL POE:

Excuse the liberty I take of sending you private lines on business matters, but one can be more forcible and place facts with greater clearness by doing so.

English or Japanese coals.—This is a question simply amounting to one point: Do you want a smokeless coal? If not, then coal giving the best result is what you want.

Take the *Grant* for example and work out her actual trip across last voyage—twenty-two days from start to finish—and you find:

22 days' steam, 50 tons English, say 1,320 tons, \$20	\$26,400
22 days' steam, 100 tons Japanese, say 2,200 tons, \$8	17,600

Giving a profit or saving of 8,800

Or exactly \$400 per day on a clear run of twenty-two days.

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The above, you will notice, is based on the actual coal consumed by the *Grant* (English), as advised me by her engineers, and I put the price at 20 yen, whereas the price ruling at the time was \$25.27. You will further notice that I put the supposed consumption of Japanese coal at 100 tons per day, a quantity I think slightly in excess of what she would really consume.

In this calculation I make such liberal allowances to show you that at the very best it is far cheaper to stick to Japan coal. Had I taken the English at \$25 I could show \$15,400 saving on one voyage of twenty-two days, say \$700 per day.

There is a further objection to English coal. It takes longer to handle it, and the natives will not trim it properly, owing to its being such dusty coal. The trimming at all times takes a good deal of watching, as our native friends are expert rogues, but with English coal we never attempt to check them. We have coaled the English navy for years, and also American, German, Italian, and any others we could catch. With all it is the custom to weigh the coal from our godowns and the ships put a guard over the boats. Such a system could never be arranged with the transport service, unless the steamers made up their minds to stay a week for a couple of thousand tons, when we can do that amount in Japanese coal in two days.

Again, as you know with English coal, when a vessel is coaling you shut every window and door, yet the dust penetrates to every part of the ship and no one remains on board unless absolutely bound to. With sick people on board it would become positively dangerous for them. There is no shutting out Cardiff dust.

The only points in favor of English coal (Cardiff) are that it is smokeless and requires less handling. The former is no advantage and the latter means more work for the stokers (if other coal is used) only, for which they are well paid.

Japanese coal means great saving in actual cost, saving in delay owing to the ease with which it can be handled, and, further, gives no inconvenience to crew or passengers when being put on board.

This is a long story, but it's all right. I wish I could come down and settle up sundry matters at your port, but at present I am too much tied down here.

We have just been appointed agents for the "Ha Kaid Tan Ro." They own the best coal in Japan. It comes from up north and is as good as any Australian. I hope to be able to tender for same to the transports, but cannot say yet if they can spare the quantity. I will tender also for "Fukuino" and the kind you already get, and for "Sembi," a slightly better lot, with a good name.

I shall be glad to get any telegraphic advices from you, especially if, after looking into the question, you decide to stick to Japanese coals.

Yours, very truly,

C. M. BIRNIE.

Lieut. Col. J. W. POPE, *Manila*.

[Browne & Co., Kobe, Yokohama, Nagasaki, Moji.]

JUNE 9, 1899.

CHARLES B. HARRIS, esq., *United States Consul, present*.

SIR: Referring to the writer's visit to you this morning in connection with your inquiry for price of English coal to be supplied United States transports, we beg to submit to you the following data, and in doing so point out to you the immense saving to the Government through the use of Japanese coal. The figures that are used are the actual time taken by the U. S. Transport *Grant*, and the coal consumption, as regards her English coal, is the official quantity certified as necessary per diem when she was handed over to the Government by her owners:

	Voyage.	Per day.	Total.	Cost per ton.	Total cost.
	<i>Days.</i>	<i>Tons.</i>	<i>Tons.</i>	<i>Yen.</i>	<i>Yen.</i>
Cardiff.....	22	60	1,320	17.50	23,100
Japanese.....	22	100	2,200	8.00	17,600

Leaving a saving of 5,500 yen in favor of Japanese coal.

The above is taken from the actual length of her voyage and the Cardiff coal requirement certified to by her owners, and same may be taken as well within the quantity she actually consumes.

In allowing, as above, 100 tons per day, you will no doubt be aware that we are some tons over her actual consumption. Again, the price of Japanese coal we have

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entered at last year's contract price. The new contract, if made in Japanese coal, will be at least 1 yen cheaper, and if the calculation be based thereon, same would show a profit for the voyage of 7,700 yen, a result which we venture to think should have serious consideration at your hands, apart from the fact that the strongest holders of Cardiff coal at this port are an English and a Russian firm, and a preference for English coal would put these firms in a better position to tender than firms coming under your own jurisdiction, such as ourselves.

Commending the above points to your favorable consideration, we beg to remain, sir, your obedient servants,

BROWNE & Co.,
Per C. M. BIRNIE.

Press copy to Colonel Pope.

EXHIBIT E.

No. 562.

CONSULATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Nagasaki, Japan, April 13, 1899.

Lient. Col. J. W. POPE,

*Lieutenant-Colonel and Chief Quartermaster, U. S. V.,
Chief Quartermaster, Manila, P. I.*

SIR: I am in receipt of your letter of the 30th ultimo, requesting some details from me showing the relative distances and periods of time taken by vessels between Manila and San Francisco via Nagasaki and via Yokohama, also as to the facilities for coaling and the cost of the same and the comparative advantages of each port.

In reply will state that the distance from Manila to Nagasaki is 1,344 miles, and from Nagasaki to San Francisco direct about 5,180 miles, making a total of 6,524 miles Manila to San Francisco via this port. The distance from Nagasaki to Yokohama via Inland Sea is 743 miles; from Yokohama to San Francisco is 4,536 miles, making a total of 6,623 miles Manila to San Francisco via Nagasaki and Yokohama. I am unable to inform you of the exact distance from Manila to Yokohama direct, but am under the impression that it is about 1,800 miles.

For your information I send you this day, under separate cover, a map showing "Tracks for full-powered steam vessels, in nautical miles."¹ It may be of use to you.

From masters of transports who have made the voyage direct from here to San Francisco I learn that the time taken on the voyage varies from seventeen to twenty-five days. Mail steamers make the voyage from here to San Francisco via Kobe, Yokohama, and Honolulu, in twenty-one days, stopping at Kobe and Honolulu twelve hours and Yokohama twenty-four hours. I also inclose for your information time-tables of the Pacific Mail and Occidental and Oriental Steamship companies.

The facilities for coaling at Nagasaki are of the very best; a large amount of coal can be loaded on a vessel in a few hours. For instance, the Empress Line of steamers can take on 2,000 tons between sunrise and sunset. An ordinary vessel, with facilities in proportion, should load 1,000 tons in the same space of time. Barges go alongside the vessel: ladders are put up the sides of the ship, and along the ladders and to the hatchway a string of coolies is placed. Along this line baskets holding 20 pounds of coal are passed, and the human elevator is kept busy until the vessel is coaled.

The coals of Nagasaki are from the mines of Takashima, Hoshima, Yokoshima, Sakeguchi, Ichimura, Kitagata, and Fukume. That from Takashima mine is the best here. I am told that before our navy in the Asiatic waters commenced using Cardiff they used that from Takashima alone. Sufficient coal from Takashima can not now be had in quantities to justify a supplier in contracting for that coal alone. Coal from Hoshima can not be had, by reason of the late fire in the mines. That from Yokoshima is, I am informed, nearly as good a coal as is Takashima, and that a mixture of Takashima and Yokoshima, one-half of each, can be purchased for 8 yen (\$4 gold) f. o. b., quality and weights guaranteed. I learn that these coals are used very largely by the following steamship companies that make regular calls at this port: Pacific Mail, Occidental and Oriental, Canadian Pacific (Empress Line), Peninsular and Oriental, Russian volunteer fleet, Russian Steam Navigation, and others. The coal from the Sakeguchi mine is used by the French

¹ Published June, 1891, at the Hydrographic Office, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., Richardson Clover, Lieutenant-commander, U. S. N., hydrographer to the Bureau of Navigation.

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Mail Line in very small quantities. It, I learn, can be purchased for 7.25 yen (\$3.62½ gold) f. o. b.

I also learn that the coal from the Kitagata, Fukume, and Ichimura mines is not at all desirable for steamers. These three coals can be purchased for from 7 yen (\$3.50 gold) to 7.25 yen (\$3.62½ gold) per ton f. o. b.

As to the facilities at Yokohama for handling coal, I know, personally, nothing. I am, however, informed that the coal sold there is brought either from this island or from the northern part of Japan. If such is the case, it must therefore be much higher in price than here. I am also informed that vessels can not be coaled as expeditiously at Yokohama as at Nagasaki, for the reason that Yokohama has not the conveniences for the work. Much time can also be saved in bad weather by coaling at Nagasaki, as the harbor is inclosed, while at Yokohama it is open.

Very respectfully,

CHARLES B. HARRIS,
United States Consul.

No. 663.]

CONSULATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Nagasaki, Japan, June 13, 1893.

Lieut. Col. J. W. POPE, *Chief Quartermaster, Manila, P. I.*

SIR: I am in receipt of your letter of the 30th ultimo, requesting that you be informed as to the relative desirability of the United States transports passing through the Inland Sea of Japan, or via the open route, on their way from Nagasaki to San Francisco.

In reply will state that, via the Inland Sea, a distance of 74 miles can be saved to a point 2 miles off Kobe, where the pilot would be dropped. From now until November 1 heavy weather may at any time be expected on the open route, which causes a decrease of speed; while by the inland route the vessel should make her usual time. I think the Inland Sea route is preferable the year round, solely on account of the weather.

The cost of pilotage is 150 yen for the trip.

My best services are always at your command.

Yours, respectfully,

CHARLES B. HARRIS, *Consul.*

U. S. TRANSPORT SHERIDAN,
Manila Bay, August 8, 1899.

Lieut. Col. J. W. POPE, *Chief Quartermaster, Manila, P. I.*

COLONEL: In the sailing orders received to-day through Major Devol you say, "You are authorized to proceed through the Inland Sea." * * * In reference to this I have the honor to state that Captain Higgins, master of the ship, advises me of the fact, of which I was also conversant, that it is a much more hazardous route to take than the outer route.

In view of this fact and article 49 of the Transport Regulations, Captain Higgins is unwilling to take the ship through the Inland Sea without a positive order to do so. He also tells me that he doubts if as large a ship as the *Sheridan* has ever gone through the Inland Sea. There are points in this sea where this ship and any other ship could not possibly pass; I therefore have the honor to request that some positive instructions be given on this subject.

Your obedient servant,

W. M. COULLING,
Captain and Assistant Quartermaster, U. S. V.

UNITED STATES CONSULATE-GENERAL,
Yokohama, Japan, April 18, 1899.

The CHIEF QUARTERMASTER,
Ayuntamiento, Manila.

SIR: In reply to your letter of March 30, 1899, I send herewith a table showing the distances in nautical miles, by steamship tracks, between Manila and eight other points, and the daily runs made by vessels of various speeds.

Steamer coal, trimmed in bunkers, can be obtained at Moji (in the Shimonoseki Straits, opposite to Bakan) by making arrangements before arrival, at prices ranging, for dust, from 4.20 yen to 5.30 yen per ton, and for lump coal, from 6.40 yen to 7.50 yen per ton. There are no facilities for repairs or docking at Moji.

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At Nagasaki good steamer coal can now be purchased at about 8 yen per ton, and ample docks and repair shops exist there.

At Kobe the price is also about 8 yen per ton, but sufficient docks are wanting.

At Yokohama the price is about 8.80 yen to 9 yen per ton, and the docks and repair shops are ample and excellent. (1 yen = \$0.50.)

I am, sir,

JOHN F. GORVEY,
Consul-General.

It is perhaps not improper for me to add that the above information is a careful digest made by George H. Scidmore, who has been deputy consul-general at this port for many years.

GORVEY.

Distances in nautical miles.

From—	To—								
	Yoko- hama.	Kobe.	Moji.	Naga- saki.	Shang- hai.	Hong- kong.	Ma- nila.	San Fran- cisco.	Hono- lulu.
Yokohama.....		346	536	696	1,050	1,590	1,753	4,536	3,400
Kobe.....	346		237	402	769	1,363	1,557	4,836	3,700
Moji.....	536	237		152	532	1,169	1,407	5,036	3,900
Nagasaki.....	696	402	152		426	1,065	1,298	5,200	4,060
Shanghai.....	1,050	769	532	426		859	1,235	5,570	4,435
Hongkong.....	1,590	1,363	1,169	1,065	859		628	6,381	4,917
Manila.....	1,753	1,557	1,407	1,298	1,235	628		16,200	14,800
San Francisco.....	4,536	4,836	5,036	5,200	5,570	6,381	16,200		2,100
Honolulu.....	3,400	3,700	3,900	4,060	4,435	4,917	14,800	2,100	

¹Approximate.

10 knots per hour—240 miles per day.

11 knots per hour—264 miles per day.

12 knots per hour—288 miles per day.

13 knots per hour—312 miles per day.

14 knots per hour—336 miles per day.

15 knots per hour—360 miles per day.

16 knots per hour—384 miles per day.

EXHIBIT F.

List showing the arrival and departure of transports at Manila, P. I.

Name.	Arrived.	De- parted.	Remarks.
	1898.	1898.	
City of Sydney.....	June 30	July 21	First expedition.
Australia.....	do	July 23	Do.
City of Pekin.....	do	July 30	Do.
Colon.....	July 17	Aug. 7	Second expedition.
Zealandia.....	do	Aug. 24	Do.
Senator.....	do	do	Do.
China.....	do	Aug. 30	Do.
Newport.....	July 25	Sept. 13	Third expedition.
Indiana.....	July 31	Sept. 1	Do.
Ohio.....	do	Sept. 3	Do.
Valencia.....	do	do	Do.
Morgan City.....	do	Sept. 20	Do.
City of Para.....	do	Oct. 26	Do.
City of Puebla.....	Aug. 21	Sept. 21	Fourth expedition.
Peru.....	do	Oct. 8	Do.
Pennsylvania.....	Aug. 24	Sept. 9	Do.
Rio de Janeiro.....	do	Sept. 22	Do.
St. Paul.....	Aug. 31	Sept. 26	Do.
Scandia.....	Oct. 2	Nov. 15	Fourth expedition (Warren).
Arizona.....	Sept. 23	Oct. 3	Hancock.
Senator.....	Nov. 21	Dec. 16	

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EXHIBIT F.—List showing the arrival and departure of transports at Manila, P. I.—Continued.

Name.	Arrived.	De- parted.	Remarks.
	1898.	1899.	
Valencia	Nov. 22	Jan. 13	Used in inter-island transportation.
Arizona	Nov. 25	Mar. 10	
Ohio	Nov. 26	Dec. 18	
	1898.	1899.	
Zealandia	Nov. 28	Jan. 25	Used as a meat ship at other ports.
Indiana	Dec. 1	June 18	
City of Puebla	Dec. 6	Feb. 2	
Newport	do.	Mar. 10	Part of Iloilo expedition.
Pennsylvania	Dec. 7	May 10	Expedition to Iloilo and meat ship.
St. Paul	Dec. 22	May 15	Inter-island transportation.
	1899.		
Scandia	Feb. 24	Mar. 11	Sailing vessel; brought mules, etc.
Tacoma	Mar. 1	Apr. 23	
Morgan City	Mar. 2	Mar. 13	
Senator	Mar. 4	Mar. 20	Brought stores.
Ohio	Mar. 5	do.	From New York.
Grant	Mar. 10	Mar. 25	
Centennial	Mar. 15	Mar. 29	
Sherman	Mar. 22	Apr. 3	From New York.
Roanoke	Mar. 30	Apr. 10	Brought stores.
Valencia	Apr. 6	Apr. 18	Do.
Portland	Apr. 10	Apr. 16	Do.
Relief	Apr. 12	June 23	Hospital ship.
Sheridan	Apr. 14	Apr. 27	From New York.
Connemaugh	Apr. 20	May 18	Brought mules and forage.
City of Puebla	Apr. 23	May 7	Brought recruits.
Zealandia	Apr. 26	May 9	
Nelson	May 2	May 11	
Cleveland	May 3	May 13	Went to Negros.
Hancock	May 11	July 1	
Warren	May 18	July 17	
Newport	May 23	June 14	Brought recruits.
Morgan City	May 27	June 24	
Ohio	May 29	June 14	
Senator	do.	July 1	Sailing vessel, with lumber, etc.
Marion Chilcott	June 5	July 4	
Leelanaw	June 13	July 4	
Sherman	June 19	July 26	Brought horses and mules.
Centennial	June 21	July 12	Went to Negros for Californians.
Hooker	June 26	July 31	Quartermaster and medical supplies.
Grant	June 27	July 31	Brought submarine cable.
Bidston Hill	July 10		Left San Francisco Apr. 25; supplies.
Zealandia	July 23	Aug. 23	
Sheridan	July 24	Aug. 12	
Valencia	July 30	Aug. 21	
Pennsylvania	Aug. 1		
Wyefield	Aug. 12		
Connemaugh	Aug. 18		
City of Para	Aug. 10		
Tartar	Aug. 21		

Transports en route for Manila.

Name.	Left San Francisco.	Name.	Left San Francisco.
Tacoma	July 28	St. Paul	Aug. 14
Newport	do.	Senator	Aug. 16
Ohio	do.	City of Sydney	Aug. 19
Indiana	Aug. 1	Siam	Aug. 20

Arrival and departure of transports—Continued.

Name of transport.	Date of charter.	Date of arrival.	From—	Date of departure.	To—	Rate of charter.
Australia.		June 30, 1898	San Francisco	July 23, 1898	San Francisco	
City of Sydney		do	do	July 25, 1898	do	
City of Peking.		do	do	July 30, 1898	do	\$18,000 per month.
Colon	Mar. 22, 1898	July 17, 1898	do	Aug. 1, 1898	do	
Zealandia	do	do	do	July 24, 1898	do	
Do.	do	do	do	July 25, 1899	do	\$1,000 per day.
Do.	do	Nov. 23, 1898	do	May 9, 1899	do	
Senator	do	Apr. 26, 1899	do	Aug. 24, 1898	do	
Do.	June 8, 1898	July 17, 1898	do	May 9, 1899	do	
Do.	do	Nov. 22, 1898	do	Dec. 16, 1898	do	
Do.	do	Mar. 4, 1899	do	May 20, 1899	do	
Do.	do	May 25, 1899	do	July 1, 1899	do	
China	do	July 17, 1898	do	Aug. 30, 1898	do	
Newport.	June 20, 1898	July 25, 1898	do	Sept. 13, 1898	do	\$1,000 per day.
Do.	do	Dec. 7, 1898	do	Dec. 23, 1898	Iloilo	
Do.	do	Feb. 21, 1899	Iloilo	Mar. 10, 1899	San Francisco	
Do.	do	May 24, 1899	San Francisco	June 14, 1899	do	\$25,000 per month.
Indiana	June 8, 1898	July 25, 1898	do	Sept. 1, 1898	do	
Do.	do	Dec. 1, 1898	do	Jan. 10, 1899	Iloilo	
Do.	do	Mar. 10, 1899	do	Mar. 22, 1899	do	
Do.	do	May 6, 1899	do	May 12, 1899	do	
Do.	do	June 8, 1899	do	June 8, 1899	do	
Ohio	do	July 31, 1898	do	Sept. 8, 1898	San Francisco	
Do.	do	Nov. 21, 1898	San Francisco	Dec. 31, 1898	do	
Do.	do	Mar. 29, 1899	do	Mar. 30, 1899	do	
Do.	do	May 29, 1899	do	June 11, 1899	do	\$400 per day.
Valencia	Feb. 21, 1898	July 31, 1898	do	Sept. 3, 1898	do	
Do.	do	Nov. 27, 1898	do	Jan. 31, 1899	do	
Do.	do	Apr. 31, 1898	do	Apr. 30, 1899	do	
Morgan City	Jan. 6, 1898	May 9, 1899	do	Sept. 23, 1899	do	\$900 per day.
Do.	do	Mar. 27, 1899	do	June 24, 1899	do	
Do.	do	July 31, 1898	do	Oct. 23, 1898	do	
City of Para.	do	Aug. 21, 1898	do	Oct. 8, 1898	do	
City of Peru.	do	Dec. 4, 1898	do	Sept. 21, 1898	do	\$900 per day.
City of Pueblo.	June 23, 1898	Dec. 4, 1898	do	Feb. 2, 1899	do	
Do.	do	Apr. 23, 1899	do	May 2, 1899	do	
Rio de Janeiro.	May 27, 1898	Aug. 24, 1898	do	Sept. 23, 1898	do	\$25,000 per month.
Pennsylvania.	July 7, 1898	do	do	Sept. 9, 1898	do	\$25,000 per month.
Do.	do	Dec. 7, 1898	do	Dec. 26, 1898	Iloilo	
Do.	do	Jan. 31, 1899	do	Feb. 25, 1899	Cebu	
Do.	do	May 2, 1899	Iloilo	May 10, 1899	San Francisco	
Do.	do	Aug. 31, 1898	San Francisco	Sept. 23, 1898	do	
St. Paul.	July 19, 1898	Dec. 21, 1898	do	Jan. 21, 1899	Iloilo	\$1,000 per day.
Do.	do	Feb. 23, 1899	Iloilo	Mar. 1, 1899	Negros and Cebu.	
Do.	do	Mar. 23, 1899	do	Apr. 9, 1899	Iloilo	

Arrival and departure of transports—Continued.

Name of transport.	Date of charter.	Date of arrival.	From—	Date of departure.	To—	Rate of charter.
St. Paul.	July 19, 1898	May 9, 1899	Hollo.	May 15, 1899	San Francisco.	
Arizona (Hancock).		Sept. 28, 1898	San Francisco.	Oct. 3, 1898	San Francisco.	
Do.		Nov. 25, 1898	do	Dec. 20, 1898	Hollo.	
Do.		Feb. 28, 1899	San Francisco.	Mar. 10, 1899	San Francisco.	
Do.		May 11, 1899	do	July 1, 1899	do	
Scandia (Warren).		Oct. 2, 1898	San Francisco.	Nov. 15, 1898	do	
Do.		Feb. 23, 1899	do	Mar. 11, 1899	do	
Do.		May 18, 1899	do	Mar. 25, 1899	Hollo.	
Do.		June 9, 1899	do	July 17, 1899	do	
Tacoma.		Mar. 1, 1899	San Francisco.	Apr. 24, 1899	San Francisco.	8250 per day.
Grant.	July 11, 1898	Mar. 10, 1899	New York.	Mar. 25, 1899	do	8275 per day.
Do.		June 27, 1899	San Francisco.			
Centennial.	Jan. 27, 1899	Mar. 15, 1899	do	Mar. 30, 1899	San Francisco.	
Do.	do.	June 21, 1899	do	July 12, 1899	do	
Sherman.		Mar. 22, 1899	New York.	Apr. 3, 1899	do	
Do.		June 22, 1899	San Francisco.	June 30, 1899	do	
Roanoke.	Feb. 21, 1899	Mar. 30, 1899	do	Apr. 10, 1899	Cebu.	8250 per day.
Portland.	Feb. 21, 1899	Apr. 9, 1899	do	Apr. 16, 1899	San Francisco.	8250 per day.
Relief.		Apr. 12, 1899	New York.	June 22, 1899	do	
Sheridan.		Apr. 14, 1899	do	Apr. 27, 1899	do	
Conemaugh.	Feb. 14, 1899	Apr. 31, 1899	San Francisco.	Apr. 27, 1899	do	
Do.	do.	May 3, 1899	Hollo.	Apr. 27, 1899	Hollo.	8250 per day.
Cleveland.		do	San Francisco.	May 18, 1899	San Francisco.	8250 per day.
Nelson.	Mar. 13, 1899	May 2, 1899	do	May 12, 1899	do	8250 per day.
Leelanaw.	Mar. 25, 1899	June 13, 1899	do	May 11, 1899	do	8250 per day.
Hooker.	Apr. 14, 1899	June 30, 1899	New York.	July 4, 1899	do	8250 per day.

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EXHIBIT G.

Statement of volunteer organizations which have returned to the United States, showing the transports which conveyed them, date of sailing, and strength.

No.	Organization.	Departure.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Transports.
1	Astor Battery.....	Dec 15, 1898	1	85	Senator.
2	Second Oregon Infantry.....	June 14, 1899	46	1,085	Newport and Ohio.
3	First Company Volunteer Signal Corps.do.....	4	32	Newport.
4	First Nebraska Infantry.....	July 1, 1899	42	812	Hancock.
5	Tenth Pennsylvania Infantry.....do.....	34	712	Senator.
6	Light Batteries A and B, Utah Artillery.do.....	9	258	Hancock.
7	First Colorado Infantry.....	July 17, 1899	46	836	Warren.
8	First California Infantry.....	July 28, 1899	41	1,000	Sherman.
9	Batteries A and B, California Heavy Artillery.do.....	9	276	Do.
10	First Idaho Infantry.....	July 31, 1899	28	441	Grant.
11	First North Dakota Infantry.....do.....	28	511	Do.
12	First Battalion Wyoming Infantry.....do.....	12	242	Do.
13	Light Battery Wyoming Artillery.....do.....	3	57	Do.
14	Thirteenth Minnesota Infantry.....	Aug 12, 1899	46	950	Sheridan.
15	First South Dakota Infantry.....do.....	42	825	Do.
16	First Montana Infantry.....	Aug. 23, 1899	48	892	Zealandia and Valencia.

EXHIBIT H.

Compania Maritima's rates of freight for commissary stores of United States Army.

		From Manila to Iloilo or Cebu.	From Manila to Jolo.
Rice in bags of 100 pounds.....	per bag..	\$0.18	\$0.38
Flour in bags of 100 pounds.....do.....	\$0.25	\$0.50
Potatoes in crates of 100 pounds.....per crate.....	\$0.50	\$0.80
Onions in crates of 94 pounds.....do.....	\$0.50	\$0.80
Sugar in mats of 100 pounds.....per mat.....	\$0.18	\$0.38
Beans in sacks of 100 pounds.....per sack.....	\$0.75	\$1.50
Coffee in sacks of 100 pounds.....do.....	\$0.75	\$1.50
Treasure.....	per cent on Mexican value.....
Cases of merchandise, tea, biscuits, canned goods, ham, bacon, and other provisions packed in boxes.....	per shp. c. f..	\$0.16	\$0.40

JOHN T. MACLEOD,
Managing Director.

MANILA, August 2, 1899.

EXHIBIT I.

STATEMENTS OF QUARTERMASTERS OF THE COMMAND REGARDING ALTERATIONS OR ADDITIONS TO THE PRESENT UNIFORM.

The only suggestion offered in the Twelfth Infantry is that fair leather shoes only be issued or allowed. The khaki clothing made here (or in Hongkong) is far more satisfactory than that brought from the United States.

MARK L. HERSEY,
First Lieutenant and Quartermaster, Twelfth Infantry.

I would suggest that for service in the Tropics a strong cork helmet be substituted for the campaign hat, the covering to be of khaki, and the helmet to have a good air space in the crown and around the band. The khaki uniform now issued is of good material, but garments marked as one size vary considerably in actual size.

L. L. DURFEE,
Captain and Quartermaster, Seventeenth Infantry.

216 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

In addition to the present uniform, I recommend for garrison or city duty four suits of white cotton drilling per man, and 20 cents, gold, per man per month laundry allowance. The khaki-colored nankeen underwear is admirable. Cholera bands of the pattern issued by the Spanish Government to troops should be added. Nothing as yet has been found which will take the place of the campaign hat in the field. The one objection to it is its great heat and no head ventilation.

For garrison duty I recommend a broad-brimmed straw hat, to be looped up on right side with a plain cloth button, color of the facings, or the branch of the service or corps, 1 inch diameter, with a brass number of the organization in the center, and a $\frac{1}{4}$ -inch band of same color as button.

C. G. SAWTELLE,
*Captain and Assistant Quartermaster, U. S. V.,
Chief Quartermaster First Division, Eighth Army Corps.*

Respectfully returned, with the suggestion that the poncho be made of oiled cloth instead of rubber. The sun soon renders the rubber poncho useless. The poncho should be 12 inches longer and 12 inches wider. The woolen blanket should also be made 12 inches wider. The khaki blouse would be more comfortable with a rolling collar. The campaign hat should have a higher crown, say three-fourths of an inch, and the rim should be one-half inch wider, and should be made of better material.

W. A. CAMPBELL,
First Lieutenant and Quartermaster, Twenty-second Infantry.

I have no suggestion to make regarding clothing. That now supplied I believe answers every purpose. Would like to see the tan or russet shoes provided as soon as possible. Some company commanders suggest a retention of the turn-down collar on khaki coats, and the placing of hooks on all to sustain weight of belt, and the doing away with the lower pockets.

J. M. MCANDREWS,
First Lieutenant and Quartermaster, Third Infantry.

I have the honor to submit the following suggestions, based upon observation, supplemented by conversation with company commanders:

First. That khaki trousers be supplied with two hip pockets and a watch pocket. As the blouse is not worn on the march, more convenience from pockets is necessary.

Second. That proper strings be supplied by the Quartermaster's Department for use with leggins. Strings are easily broken or worn out, and difficult to replace promptly. The Commissary Department does not sell a shoestring suitable for use with leggins.

Third. A suitable leather or canvas belt be furnished by the Quartermaster's Department for use in the place of suspenders; especially desirable in a tropical climate.

Fourth. Some officers have suggested an outer flannel shirt of the color of khaki to make the men less conspicuous as targets before the enemy.

Fifth. Trousers should be cut to make a better fit over the hips, and some suggestions are made that they should open and taper below the knee, and be supplied with buttons, in order to make less of a fold under the leggins and be cooler about the leg.

Sixth. The use of abdominal bandages is not practicable. The blue flannel shirt is better for this purpose, and thus becomes a very useful garment.

Seventh. The field desk should have the table lid protected at the corners by strap iron countersunk in the wood, to prevent the destruction of the lid by warping, and by separation of tongue-and-groove end pieces when exposed to the sun.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. R. FINLEY,
Captain, Ninth Infantry, Quartermaster.

EXHIBIT J.

Statement showing in detail number of claims presented and settled from February 16 to July 31, 1899.

Articles.	Name of claimant.	Date of seizure, impressment, etc.	Amount of full settlement claim.	Amount paid in full settlement.	Remarks.
1 Horse	Jacinto Cecillo	Feb. 6, 1899	\$30.00	\$30.00	Lost or killed.
2 Horse and quiles.	Venancio Ruiz	Feb. 7, 1899	43.00	43.00	Used and returned.
3 Horse and carriage	Jose Molina	Feb. 6, 1899	16.00	16.00	Do.
4 Horse and cartromata	Filomon Aragon	do	8.00	8.00	Do.
5 Cart and bull	Felix Bonifacio	do	8.00	8.00	Do.
6 Horse	do	do	21.00	21.00	Do.
7 Horse and quiles.	Juan Alcantara	Feb. 7, 1899	18.00	18.00	Do.
8 Horse	Mathew A. Basset	Feb. 7, 1899	18.00	18.00	Do.
9 Horse	Jose Hidalgo	Feb. 6, 1899	18.00	18.00	Do.
10 Horse, harness, and quiles.	Jose Tuniga	Feb. 6, 1899	18.00	18.00	Do.
11 Horse and quiles	Pero de la Cruz	Feb. 13, 1899	24.00	24.00	Do.
12 Horse	Gabriel Ventura	Feb. 8, 1899	21.00	21.00	Do.
13 Horse and cart	Agustino Arriola	Feb. 6, 1899	41.00	41.00	Do.
14 Horse	Manuel Mariano	Feb. 7, 1899	15.00	15.00	Do.
15 do	Laureano de Padua	Feb. 6, 1899	24.00	24.00	Do.
16 Horse and quiles.	Ladrona Luna	do	57.00	57.00	Do.
17 do	Gregorio N. Pison	Feb. 7, 1899	52.00	52.00	Do.
18 2 horses and 2 quilezes	Jose Jarama	Feb. 8, 1899	94.00	94.00	Do.
19 Horse and cartromata	Berthelma Gabel	Feb. 6, 1899	15.00	15.00	Do.
20 Horse and calera	Rufina Candelaria	Feb. 4, 1899	33.00	33.00	Do.
21 Horse and cartromata	Manuel R. Javier	Feb. 6, 1899	180.00	180.00	Do.
22 Horse and quiles	Maria Santos	do	51.00	51.00	Lost.
23 Horse and quiles	Juan Marco	do	138.00	138.00	Used and returned.
24 Horse and quiles	Agaton Venceslos	do	27.00	27.00	Do.
25 Horse and quiles	Carlos V. ga	do	27.00	27.00	Do.
26 Horse and cartromata	Andres Tomas	Feb. 27, 1899	50.00	50.00	Used and returned.
27 do	Victor Obispo	Feb. 6, 1899	51.00	51.00	Do.
28 Horse	Roque A. Santos	Feb. 11, 1899	63.00	63.00	Do.
29 Horse and cartromata	Jose Lopez	Feb. 8, 1899	16.50	16.50	Do.
30 do	Lo Tenco	Feb. 6, 1899	30.00	30.00	Do.
31 do	Hugo de los Santos	Feb. 8, 1899	66.00	66.00	Do.
32 Horse and quiles	Emeterio San Juan	Feb. 9, 1899	57.00	57.00	Do.
33 do	Concepcion Negral	Feb. 7, 1899	60.00	60.00	Do.
34 do	Josquin Borfa	Feb. 9, 1899	42.00	42.00	Do.
35 Quiles	Pedro Villanueva	Feb. 6, 1899	45.00	45.00	Do.
36 Horse and quiles	Manuel Verona	Feb. 24, 1899	15.00	11.00	Used and returned; repaired.
37 Horse	S. D. Martinez	Feb. 5, 1899	69.00	69.00	Used and returned.
38 Carretela	Sixta del Rosario	do	25.00	25.00	Do.
39 Quiles	M. Ga. del Rey	Mar. 3, 1899	70.00	50.00	Lost.
40 Horse and quiles	Ariston Balagtas	Feb. 6, 1899	25.00	25.00	Used and returned; repaired.
41 2 horses and quiles.	Miguel Reyes	do	30.00	30.00	Do.
			64.50	64.50	

EXHIBIT J.—Statement showing in detail number of claims presented and settled from February 16 to July 31, 1899—Continued.

Articles.	Name of claimant.	Date of seizure, impressment, etc.	Amount of claim.	Amount paid and full settlement.	Remarks.
42 Horse and carromata.	Agapita Custodia.	Feb. 7, 1899	\$57.50	\$57.50	Used and returned; repaired.
43 Quilez, carretela, and harness.	Marguerita Assencion.	Mar. 4, 1899	75.00	75.00	Carretela and harness lost; quilez returned damaged.
44 Horse.	Justa Pabalan.	Feb. 10, 1899	17.50	17.50	Used and returned.
45 Horse and carromata.	Jose A. Silos.	Feb. 5, 1899	36.00	36.00	Do.
46 Horse and quilez.	Guillermo Escusar.	do.	139.00	75.00	Horse lost; quilez returned damaged.
47 Horse.	Isidro Escamilla.	Feb. 11, 1899	6.00	6.00	Used and returned.
48 Horse.	Antonio Balagtas.	Feb. 7, 1899	75.00	50.00	Lost.
49 Horse.	Aristona Balagtas.	do.	19.00	19.00	Used and returned.
50 do.	Jose Toledo.	do.	29.00	29.00	Do.
51 Horse and quilezes.	Jose D. Raniviez.	Feb. 5, 1899	96.00	96.00	Do.
52 Horse and quilez.	Leocido de Asis.	Feb. 6, 1899	27.00	27.00	Do.
53 2 horses and cartage.	Lala Arle.	Feb. 7, 1899	690.00	400.00	Lost.
54 Horse and harness.	Joaquin Ma. Bayot.	Feb. 6, 1899	395.00	90.00	Do.
55 2 horses and quilez.	Jose Cavama.	do.	140.00	122.00	1 horse lost; quilez used and returned.
56 Horse and quilez.	Adela Diaz.	Feb. 5, 1899	210.00	193.00	Horse lost; quilez used and returned.
57 Carretela.	Vicente Gomez.	do.	130.00	112.00	Horse and harness lost; quilez returned damaged.
58 Horse, harness, and quilez.	Max Pealow.	Feb. 6, 1899	65.00	50.00	Lost.
59 6 horses and 3 carriages.	Bartela Reyes.	Feb. 5, 1899	585.00	150.00	4 horses lost; 2 horses and 3 carriages returned.
60 Horse and quilez.	Fidel Gomez.	Feb. 6, 1899	105.00	105.00	Lost.
61 2 horses and harness.	Petro Barrio.	do.	180.00	120.00	Do.
62 Horse, harness, and quilez.	Domingo E. Rosario.	Feb. 12, 1899	240.00	150.00	Do.
63 Horse.	Branlio Mfon.	Feb. 6, 1899	30.00	30.00	Do.
64 Horse and cart.	Jose Ma. Romero.	do.	130.00	100.00	Do.
65 Carabao.	Pedro Villanueva.	Feb. 7, 1899	70.00	50.00	Do.
66 Harness.	Benita Miranda.	Feb. 5, 1899	12.00	12.00	Do.
67 Horse.	Doretsea Bertran.	Feb. 6, 1899	75.00	75.00	Do.
68 Horse, carromata, and harness.	Maria Borreal.	Feb. 8, 1899	290.00	200.00	Do.
69 Horse, harness, and quilez.	Catalina Seylla.	Feb. 14, 1899	154.00	100.00	Horse and harness lost; quilez returned damaged.
70 2 quilez, 2 harness, and 1 horse.	Mariano Melgar.	Feb. 8, 1899	280.00	200.00	Lost.
71 1 horse, carromata, and harness.	Levy Bros.	Feb. 5, 1899	240.00	150.00	Horse and harness lost; carromata returned damaged.
72 Horse and quilez.	Fausta de Gusman.	Feb. 6, 1899	130.00	75.00	aged.
73 3 horses and harness.	Fan Chico.	do.	253.00	253.00	Used and returned.
74 Horse, carromata, and harness.	Dolores Ramirez.	Feb. 5, 1899	284.00	150.00	Lost.
75 Horse.	Gabriele Francisco.	Feb. 6, 1899	80.00	50.00	Do.
76 Horse, harness, and quilez.	Remed'os Camus.	do.	100.00	60.00	Killed for disease.
77 3 bulls and carts.	Kuenzie & Streiff.	do.	132.00	132.00	Horse and harness lost; quilez returned damaged.
78 Horse and quilez.	Alfonso Ma de Morintin.	Feb. 7, 1899	200.00	150.00	Used for 10 days and returned.
79 Harness and calesa.	H. A. Greene.	do.	75.00	75.00	Lost.
80 Horse.	Antonio Lopez.	Apr. 1, 1899	40.00	40.00	Do.
81 Horse and cart.	Fernando Garcia.	Feb. 7, 1899	120.00	120.00	Do.
82 Horse, quilez, and harness.	Augustina Neponuceno.	Feb. 5, 1899	280.00	140.00	Do.
83 Horse and quilez.	Elroy J. Eshevarria.	Feb. 6, 1899	175.00	140.00	Do.

84	Horse	John Maye	Feb. 7, 1899	15.00	Used and returned.
85	Horse and quilez	Nutilde Galvey	Feb. 6, 1899	12.00	Do.
86	Horse	Federico Rebolon	do	100.00	Killed.
87	2 horses	Crisanto Largo	do	150.00	Purchased.
88	Horse and cart	Pacifico Pueblo	do	85.00	Lost.
89	2 horses	F. Nelle Helios	do	150.00	Purchased.
90	Carromata	Juan Landal	do	16.00	Damages.
91	Horse and carriage	Joaquin del Alcazar	Feb. 15, 1899	300.00	Purchased for private use.
92	2 horses and carromata	W. A. Duff	Feb. 6, 1899	265.00	Lost.
93	Horse, harness, and quilez	Calcedonia Ballow	Feb. 4, 1899	250.00	Do.
94	2 horses	Simon A. Jose	Feb. 6, 1899	130.00	Purchased.
95	2 horses, 2 harness, and 2 quilez	R. Jimenez	Feb. 7, 1899	150.00	Lost.
96	2 carromatas	W. Jackson	Feb. 5, 1899	410.00	Damages.
97	Horse and carromata	Juan Kennedy	do	45.00	Horse killed; carromata damaged.
98	do	Pataleson Lopez	Aug. 15, 1898	200.00	Lost.
99	2 horses and 2 quilez	Eurebia Louenco	Feb. 5, 1899	120.00	1 horse killed; other property lost.
100	1 carratela	Mateo Marina	do	240.00	Used and returned.
101	Horse and carromata	Rufio Moucal	do	12.00	Lost.
102	Quilez and harness	Alejandro Pastor	Feb. 6, 1899	30.00	Do.
103	3 horses	Jose Trillo	Feb. 5, 1899	225.00	Do.
104	1 carabao	Joaquin Torrejon	Feb. 6, 1899	150.00	Do.
105		Kuenzle & Streiff	Feb. 5, 1899	210.00	Do.
			Feb. 8, 1899	85.00	Do.
	Total			11,755.00	
				8,782.00	

Respectfully submitted.

RAYMOND SULZER,
Captain and Assistant Quartermaster, U. S. V.

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Statement showing in detail claims still pending.

	Articles.	Name of claimant.	Date of seizure, impressment, etc.	Amount of claim.
1	Horse.....	Manuel Peypoch.....	Feb. 5, 1899	\$225
2	1 horse, harness, and carromata.....	Benita Valdes.....	do.....	233
3	3 horses, harness, and carromata.....	Josefa Valasco.....	Feb. 5 to Mar. 20, 1899	355
4	2 carabaos and carts.....	Andrea Torres.....	Feb. 8, 1899	203
5	1 horse and quilez.....	Juan Geronimo.....	Feb. 4, 1899	120
6	Horse and carromata.....	Narcisa Cuesta.....	Mar. 22, 1899	100
7	Horse and quilez.....	C. Gonzales.....	Feb. 6, 1899	225
8	2 horses and quilez.....	M. Casimera.....	Feb. 5, 1899	300
	Total.....			1,941

Respectfully submitted.

RAYMOND SULZER,
Captain and Assistant Quartermaster, U. S. V.

EXHIBIT K.

OFFICE OF THE DEPOT QUARTERMASTER,
Manila, P. I., August 4, 1899.

THE CHIEF QUARTERMASTER, DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS.

SIR: In reply to your request of the 17th instant, I have the honor to submit the following report in regard to the transportation department from September 1, 1898, when I assumed direct charge, to June 30, 1899.

TRANSPORTATION OF SUPPLIES.

In the early months transportation of supplies was attended with many difficulties.

First. In transporting from ships in the bay. The southwest monsoon blows almost constantly during August, September, and October, making the handling of stores almost impossible after 1 p. m.

This immense bay of 25 miles across is practically no harbor, the shore at all times getting the full force of the sea. If this is ever to be a large commercial port, some adequate protection for discharging vessels will have to be provided.

The discharge is made in lorchas and cascoes of about 75 and 25 tons, respectively. The work is performed by native stevedores. I tried to have this work performed by contract, but found the lack of prompt business methods here too much to contend with. I now hire natives at \$1 (Mexican) per day, working about 14 to a ship's hatch.

The discharge of coal is performed by Chinese coolies almost entirely. The native is not a success at this work. The coolies work by the ton, discharging into ships for 60 cents (Mexican) and on shore for 25 cents (Mexican).

It requires from 3,000 to 4,000 tons monthly to coal Government ships in this harbor.

The lorchas and cascoes become much damaged in rough weather. They are obtained by rental: the former for an average price of \$25 (Mexican) per day, according to size; the latter, \$13 (Mexican) per day. This includes hire of crews. I believe it would be economy to purchase from four to six 200-ton steam lighters in San Francisco or other ports. I am informed they can be built for about \$15,000 gold, each, and come over under their own steam. Any money spent on facilitating discharge of vessels in rough weather would be a saving in the end, as vessels lay for weeks here at times owing to inability to discharge cargo.

Second. The transportation on shore was undertaken entirely with native transportation—coolies, bull teams, and the native pony carts. Coolies and bull teams were hired by the day, and carts and ponies purchased (see statement herewith). The coolie was found good for short distances. The bull with cart can draw about 1 ton over a hard and level road. They do not travel over about 1 mile per hour and have to stop 2 hours in the middle of the day to be rationed and fed.

The pony carts are quite useful for drawing bread, meat, and other light loads.

The coolies now cost 80 cents (Mexican) per day; the bull teams, \$2.18 (Mexican) per day in Manila and \$2.80 (Mexican) per day in the field. The carts and ponies cost on an average \$1.80 (Mexican) for pony, cart, and harness complete. No other transportation was available until the arrival of the ship *Tacoma* on March 1, 1899.

With the arrival of more troops the work of the transportation department constantly increased. No mounts were transferred from the United States for mounted officers, and, by direction of the department commander, these were provided by purchase of native ponies, saddles, and bridles. One hundred and fifty of these ponies were also provided for mounting troops of the Fourth U. S. Cavalry. Altogether about 900 of these ponies have been purchased, at a cost of about \$80 (Mexican) per head. They are hardy and fairly useful. The prevalence of glanders, however, on the island has caused heavy losses in the above number.

While on the subject I would say that various attempts have been made to secure horses and mules from China and Australia, but without success. A small consignment of horses from Port Darwin, North Australia, were fairly satisfactory. Another from Melbourne was almost a failure. They could not become acclimated. A recent sample lot from Townsville, North Queensland, Australia, was rejected as being unsatisfactory, and price \$300 gold.

A consignment of mules from China was a farce. Animals offered were simply of no account. This was owing to old age and other infirmities, but I would not consider them the equal of American mules under any circumstances.

On the nights of February 4 and 5, when our forces were attacked by the insurgents, I had 75 carts and ponies in the corral, which had been purchased and held to meet such an emergency. These were all issued to carry ammunition and supplies to our rapidly extending lines within twenty-four hours. On the morning of February 5 I found all coolies and bull-team drivers in a state of panic, hidden all over the Tondo district. Their habitations had been previously located, however, and by 10 o'clock, with the able assistance of Mr. P. Norton, transportation agent, I had 150 bull teams and the necessary coolies routed out of their hiding places and available for use.

RAILROAD SERVICE.

After the breaking out of hostilities, it was found that all locomotives on the Manila and Dagupan Railroad had been taken beyond the insurgents' lines. On the night of February 10, after the battle of Calocan, Corporal Haisch, of the Twentieth Kansas Volunteer Infantry, in my employ (now second lieutenant of that regiment), went to the machine shops at Calocan and, with the assistance of men from the Twentieth Kansas and First Montana, had an engine in running order by morning. The following day and night five engines, which were found in a more or less dismantled state, were brought to Manila. They were subsequently repaired by the Quartermaster's Department, and have been in use ever since.

As the representatives of this railroad admitted the impossibility of their management operating the road, I assumed control at once, and ran on an average two daily trains, following the advance of the Second Division to San Fernando.


Fresh beef and condensed water were kept up to the firing line, and the wounded landed in Manila within a few hours after each engagement. The road was torn up in many places and bridges partially destroyed; one 60-foot iron span at Bagbag and one at Santo Tomas being dropped into the river at one end. These two spans were raised wholly and placed on the piers, under the immediate supervision of Mr. T. H. Mead, engineer in the Quartermaster's Department, formerly of the Union Iron Works, of San Francisco, Cal. The road is now operated to San Fernando and in fair shape.

WATER SERVICE.


The troops, as they advanced up the river and down the bay, were supplied by launches towing cascoes. I now have for this service the launches *Dora*, running to Corregidor Island; *Centinela*, to Bacoor and Parañaque, on the bay; *Nueva Ecija*, to Pasig and up the river; *Caridad*, to Calamba and points on the lake. These boats make daily trips, with the exception of the lake boat, which goes up one day, returning the next.

I also have, for towing service in the bay and immediate vicinity, the following chartered steam launches: *Fannie*, *Mariposa*, *Relampago*, *Isabela*, and *Capitan*.

Also employed under contract an average daily number of 12 lorchas and 50 cascoes, carrying supplies to and from transports to commands at bay-shore towns and points along the Pasig River and the Laguna de Bay.



NEW BARRACKS AT MALATE. CONSTRUCTED BY THE UNITED STATES.



NEW BARRACKS AT MALATE. CONSTRUCTED BY THE UNITED STATES.

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY. 223

I mention this as being a most marked contrast to my late experience in constructing Fort Hancock, Sandy Hook, N. J., when the contract was signed in December and no work whatever done until April 1.

These barracks are occupied and, I believe, give satisfaction. They are an adequate protection in this climate and are cool and well ventilated. I have since contracted for three more sets to accommodate one regiment each—one below Malate, one at Santa Mesa, and one at Caloocan. They are all in progress of construction now, the one at Malate being nearly finished. Owing to the increased price of material, the amount bid for these buildings has advanced, and the average cost for a set (27 buildings) was \$84,000 (Mexican).

DISTILLING PLANTS.

Nine distilling plants, complete, were received from the Union Iron Works, of San Francisco, Cal. They have been set up and operated as follows: One at Cavite, 1 at Iloilo, and 4 in Manila. They have a capacity of about 4,000 gallons in twenty-four hours. The Cavite plant was operated by the medical department and burned out three boilers. These had to be replaced by robbing the other plants. Requisitions to supply the additional boilers have been forwarded. Condensed water has been supplied to troops in Manila when required; also a daily supply sent up the railroad and river.

During the period for which this report is made, as per detailed statements Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, the following work has been performed in my department:

	Number.	Cost.
Laborers employed.....	132,447	\$108,288.01
Stevedores employed.....	15,448	
Bull teams employed.....	96,418	337,003.30
Lorchas employed.....	2,098	56,737.25
Cascoes employed.....	11,058	126,415.25
Army gunboats fitted out.....	6	125,612.66
Spanish gunboats purchased.....	13	315,000.00
Launches purchased.....	5	80,278.94
Horses purchased (native).....	904	84,058.97
Horses purchased (Australian).....	45	
Carriage hire.....		24,606.30
Quillex hire.....		79,240.75
Harness purchased.....		5,117.98
Steamships and launches hired.....		150,337.86
Repairs to steamships and launches.....		101,159.25
Pilots and crews hired on vessels.....		27,817.40
Water furnished transports.....		42,896.24
Bancas hired.....		210.00
Transporting discharged soldiers.....		2,045.00
Repairs to railroad bridge, track, and rolling stock.....		4,233.96
Employes' hire and repairs to quartermaster's corral.....		48,643.52
Transports unloaded (43)..... tons.....	43,780	
Colliers discharged (13)..... do.....	43,450	
Average cost of coal.....		695,200.00
Transports coaled (48)..... tons.....	28,283	
Freight cars handled.....	2,805	
Passenger cars handled.....	1,690	
Engines in daily use (average).....	2	
Nipa barracks constructed (27 buildings) (4).....		318,380.00
Corral stables, wagon shed, and warehouse (1).....		16,550.00
Total.....		2,749,830.64

Very respectfully,

C. A. DEVOL,
Major and Quartermaster, U. S. V., Depot Quartermaster.

224 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

EXHIBIT L.

Report of monthly payments from public civil funds, disbursed by Lieut. Col. J. W. Pope, chief quartermaster, U. S. V., Manila, P. I., from July 1, 1898, to June 30, 1899.

Date.	Regular supplies.	Claims.	Army transportation.	Sewage.	Rent and repairs.	Telegrams and telephones.	Labor.	Miscellaneous.	Total.
1898.									
September.....		\$82.00					\$58.00		\$120.00
October.....	\$1,095.61	100.75	\$59,932.35	\$2,705.95	\$4,919.20	\$15,036.22	854.84		86,634.82
November.....	15,789.72	1,750.00	56,184.25	1,267.56	15,245.90	6,023.50	715.85		99,956.78
December.....	53,734.22	1,494.30	103,382.35	6,944.70	28,508.11	10,032.78	316.90		204,368.36
1899.									
January.....	80,465.66	450.00	175,208.43	3,631.90	41,800.38	16,191.79	364.75	\$193.51	318,604.42
February.....	127,322.74		127,948.06	2,623.80	45,730.60	22,554.76			326,179.96
March.....	98,563.49		107,104.27	1,174.80	45,855.19	23,049.82			275,747.57
April.....	206,906.54		288,959.74	3,039.40	28,113.24	36,945.49		1,500.00	565,463.41
May.....	99,739.50		496,476.10	4,641.00	22,767.76	31,004.63			654,623.99
June.....	270,694.31		304,074.40	5,813.20	31,796.75	30,265.35			642,644.01
Total	939,311.79	3,857.05	1,719,227.95	32,141.21	264,732.13	191,094.34	2,310.84	1,693.51	3,174,368.22

NOTE.—The above-mentioned claims were ordered paid by the department commander; \$1,500 was a forfeiture by J. Galan for noncompliance with contract; \$193.51 was the interest on deposit with the Chartered Bank of India, Australia, and China. No payments from this fund were made previous to September 28, 1898.

Respectfully submitted.

J. W. POPE,
Lieutenant-Colonel and Chief Quartermaster, U. S. V.
MANILA, P. I., June 30, 1899.

Rent of land and water transportation and repairs to same, and hire of coolie and native labor, from September 1, 1898, to June 30, 1899, at headquarters Department of the Pacific.

LAND TRANSPORTATION.

Carriages.....	\$24,606.30
Quilezes.....	79,240.75
Bull teams.....	337,003.30
Repairs to railroad bridges, track, and rolling stock.....	4,233.96
Employees and cost of repairs at quartermaster's corral.....	48,643.52
Hire of coolie and native laborers.....	108,288.01

WATER TRANSPORTATION.

Expense of transporting discharged soldiers.....	2,045.00
Water for transports.....	42,896.24
Steamships and launches.....	150,337.86
Lorchas.....	56,737.25
Cascoes.....	126,415.25
Bancas.....	210.00
Hire of crews and pilots on vessels.....	27,817.40
Repairs to launches and steamships.....	101,159.25

C. A. DEVOL,
Major and Quartermaster, U. S. V.

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Cost by purchase and repairs to steamboats and launches converted into gunboats by the transportation department, headquarters Department of the Pacific, at Manila, P. I., from September 1, 1898, to June 30, 1899.

Date of purchase.	Original purchase.		Cost of converting into gunboats.	Total cost.
		Mexican coin.	Mexican coin.	Mexican coin.
Jan. 10, 1899	Laguna de Bay	\$35,000.00	\$13,300.38	\$48,300.38
Apr. 5, 1899	Napindan	40,000.00	7,853.18	47,853.18
	Oeste	Captured.	3,672.28	3,672.28
	Oceania	Captured.	2,837.28	2,837.28
	Covadonga	Captured.	2,949.54	2,949.54
	Florida	20,000.00		20,000.00
		95,000.00	30,612.66	125,612.66

C. A. DEVOL,
Major and Quartermaster, U. S. V.

Cost of purchase of launches, gunboats, and cruisers by the United States Government, now in use in Philippine waters at Manila, P. I., from September 1, 1898, to June 30, 1899.

Date of purchase.	Class.	Name.	Cost (Mexican coin).
April 5, 1899	Steam launch	Lee Fat	\$61,434.94
Do	do	Kar Shun	
Do	do	Com King	
June 9, 1899	do	Maud	11,000.00
June 21, 1899	do	Marie	7,842.00
May 2, 1899	Cruiser	El Cano	315,000.00
Do	Gunboat	Samar	
Do	do	Paragua	
Do	do	Manileno	
Do	do	Panay	
Do	do	Mindoro	
Do	do	Pampanga	
Do	do	Mareveles	
Do	do	Albay	
Do	do	Calamianes	
Do	Steam launch	Basco	
Do	do	Gardoqui	
Do	do	Urdaneta	
Total			395,276.94

C. A. DEVOL,
Major and Quartermaster, U. S. V.

Report of public animals and harness purchased by me from September 1, 1898, to June 30, 1899, showing cost of same.

Date of purchase.	Horses.				Harness.	
	Native ponies.		Australian.		Sets.	Average cost per set (Mexican coin).
	No.	Average cost (Mexican coin).	No.	Average cost (Mexican coin).		
Sept. 1, 1898 to June 30, 1899	904	\$30.18			263	\$19.46
Apr. 7, 1899			22	\$257.25		
Apr. 29, 1899			23			

TOTAL COST.

Native ponies	\$72,482.72
Australian horses	11,576.25
Harness	5,118.50
Total	89,177.47

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Summary of reports herewith as to number and cost of land and water transportation at Manila, P. I., from September 1, 1898, to June 30, 1899.

Number of laborers employed	132,447
Number of stevedores employed	15,448
Number of bull teams employed	96,418
Number of lorchas employed	2,098
Number of cascoes employed	11,058
Cost of horses (purchased)	\$84,058.97
Cost of harness (purchased)	\$5,117.98
Cost of launches, gunboats, and cruisers (purchased)	\$490,276.94
Cost of converting boats into gunboats (purchased)	\$30,612.66
Cost of land and water transportation, repairs to same, and coolie and native labor (purchased)	\$1,109,634.09
Grand total of expenditures of public civil funds under my direction (purchased)	\$1,719,700.64

C. A. DEVOL,
Major and Quartermaster, U. S. V.

Statement of all troops and property transported at Manila, P. I., during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1899.

Kind of transportation.	Passengers.			Stores.							
	Officers.	Men.	Total.	Horses.	Subsistence.	Quartermaster.	Ordnance.	Medical.	Signal.	Miscellaneous.	Total.
					Lbs.	Lbs.	Lbs.	Lbs.	Lbs.	Lbs.	Lbs.
Railroad		1	1								
Water ¹		114	114	1	546,841	254,901	1,750	14,107	11,930	1,200	830,729
By Government vessels	357	9,086	9,443		267,684	181,585	151,810	13,900	8,240	17,490	640,709
Grand total	357	9,201	9,558	1	814,525	436,486	153,560	28,007	20,170	18,690	1,471,438

¹ Not including transportation on vessels owned by the Government.

C. A. DEVOL,
Major and Quartermaster, U. S. V., Depot Quartermaster.

APPENDIX E.

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF COMMISSARY,
Manila, P. I., August 12, 1899.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps,
Manila, P. I.

SIR: In compliance with circular letter from your office of the 18th of July, I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the subsistence department of the Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps for the year ending June 30, 1899:

Transports conveying troops between San Francisco and this port were furnished with four months' rations and a liberal supply of sales stores. The quantity of fresh beef taken by the transports for use of the troops was entirely dependent on the facilities for its storage and preservation. On such of the vessels as were provided with cold-storage plants enough fresh beef was carried to warrant issue seven days in ten. On other vessels sufficient beef was packed in ice, in improvised rooms, to admit of issues every other day. Two of the transports carried live cattle, which were killed as required. In all instances it was the intention to supply fresh beef for fifteen days during the voyage to Manila, which was believed would

not exceed thirty days. Fresh roast and corned beef, both canned; salmon, bacon, mess pork, and mess beef, in about equal proportions, completed the issues of the meat component. The usual garrison ration, including fresh vegetables, was also supplied, and during certain designated hours the authorized articles kept for sale to officers and enlisted men could be purchased. Facilities for cooking were somewhat limited on a few of the vessels, and in consequence considerable time was required to serve the meals, but there was no suffering of any kind resulting from this delay.

Upon arrival of the first expedition in Manila Harbor a subsistence depot for issues and sales was established in Cavite, and all the transports were unloaded thereat. Arrangements were made with the navy whereby frozen beef was supplied the army from the cold storage ship *Culgoa*, and later the Commissary-General of Subsistence was requested to provide a vessel from Australia with a cargo of frozen beef for the future use of the army. This was done. The beef arrived here on the *Duke of Sutherland* September 16, 1898, and since that date the command, except for a few days, has been abundantly supplied with that product.

A contract was made in the United States to supply the command with fresh vegetables. The supply began in December and has been continuous and satisfactory ever since.

Rice, sugar, tea, and such other articles as can be procured here of suitable quality and price have been purchased. The bulk of all other articles required have been shipped from the United States, though a few have been ordered from Australia and China in an emergency.

During the severe storms which prevailed during the latter part of July and early in August much difficulty was experienced in landing stores for the troops occupying Camp Dewey, and not a few stores were lost in the heavy surf in attempting to put them on shore. Paranaque, having an excellent landing place, was finally decided upon as a base, and a subdepot was established there, the supplies being forwarded on bull carts to the troops at Camp Dewey, 2 miles distant.

Upon the capitulation of Manila the main depot of supply was at once established in Binondo, and all stores from incoming vessels were transferred to it. The depot at Cavite was continued, though the bulk of the supplies there were sent to the main storehouses in Binondo.

Sales depots for the convenience of officers and enlisted men were established in Calle Echague, Quiapo, Calle Nueva, Ermita, and in the Cuartel de España, walled city. While the troops were at Caloocan a sales depot was established on the train, which also carried a quantity of travel rations for emergencies. During the advance on Malolos these cars followed in the wake of the firing line and were opened each evening after the fighting was over for sales to officers and men.

For the convenience of all concerned rations were invoiced by the depot or issuing commissary direct to the commissaries of regiments and separate battalions, and by them issued on ration returns to the minor organizations.

Upon the breaking out of hostilities, February 4, 1899, temporary subdepots for issues and sales were established at various points as the troops advanced; the subdepots at Bacoor, on the south line, and at San Fernando, on the north line, being the most important. Smaller ones are now located at Malolos, San Luis, Baliuag, Morong, Candaba, Deposito, San Pedro Macati, Paranaque, Los Pinas, and Imus. At these places stores are kept on hand sufficient for from ten to sixty days' supply, except beef and bread, which have been forwarded daily from the issuing depot here, seven days in ten, or as frequently as the weather permitted.

On February 5 and 6, during active operations against the insurgents in the vicinity of Manila, travel rations were sent out to the various organizations on the firing line, no command being neglected.

The garrison ration, including fresh beef and vegetables, was resumed on the 7th, and thereafter regimental commissaries supervised the details of supplying their commands. Three days' travel rations were kept on hand by organizations, to be used only in event of an emergency. Upon the occupation by troops of the stations above named, fresh beef was supplied as frequently as transportation facilities would admit, a majority of the troops receiving issues seven days in ten.

When our forces occupied Iloilo, a subdepot was established there, and others were later established at Bacolod, Cebu, and Jolo. Supplies, with the exception of fresh beef, have been shipped to these points from this place, except to Bacolod, which was supplied from Iloilo. Fresh beef has been supplied to these troops by the purchase of native cattle, which were slaughtered as required, purchase having been made here for Iloilo, and by the commissaries themselves at the other points. Fresh vegetables were shipped to these stations every ten days or two weeks.

Upon entering Manila the subsistence and care of the Spanish soldiers, prisoners of war, devolved upon this department. These men were issued a ration substantially the same as the one previously issued by the Spanish authorities (see list inclosed, marked Exhibit A). To the sick in hospital and their attendants commutation of rations was allowed; and various other necessary expenditures for their care and comfort were authorized by the major-general commanding and paid by this department. All subsistence stores captured at the time of capitulation were issued to the soldiers, and further supplies were purchased as needed. All these expenses were made a charge against the public civil funds and paid for from it. This important duty was placed under the immediate charge of Capt. S. B. Boots, commissary of subsistence, U. S. V., who rendered excellent service.

The insurgent prisoners have been issued a ration very similar to that issued the native soldiers by the Spanish authorities, and was drawn, whenever possible, from stores captured from them, the remainder being paid for from subsistence funds (see list of rations inclosed, marked Exhibit B). This same (native) ration was issued to the Chinese stretcher bearers and to the native drivers (in the latter case only when necessary), and then bills were submitted and refundment made by the contractor furnishing the men.

For the police force (native) of Bacolod the same ration is used, all expenses being paid from the revenues of these islands.

Gratuitous issues of ration articles have been made at various times since the occupation of Manila to the following people: To lepers in the leper hospital, to civil hospitals and schools where the indigent sick are cared for, and to destitute natives in the provinces occupied by our troops south of the city. In some instances the so-called destitute natives sold the rations issued to them.

Arrangements have been made by this department for the subsistence of all enlisted men returning to the United States on account of sickness, wounds, or other causes, for all volunteer organizations returning for muster out, and for discharged soldiers. Two methods have been employed—the rations have been placed on board and regular issues made, cooks being furnished and a supply of sales stores also being sent; or contracts have been made with the steamship company to furnish meals at a stated price per day. This arrangement has, however, only been adopted when it was impracticable to employ the former, that being far more economical and satisfactory.

Large amounts of subsistence funds have been transferred to the officers of the Medical Department in charge of hospitals under the provisions of General Orders, No. 116, Adjutant-General's Office, of 1898, for the purchase of diet of sick in hospitals, and to those in charge of the sick and wounded on transports returning to the United States. In the same manner public civil funds have been transferred to the regimental surgeons, under General Orders, No. 25, of these headquarters, 1898, for the diet of sick in regimental and battalion hospitals.

To prevent the multiplication of boards of survey on deteriorated subsistence stores, instructions were issued from these headquarters on October 29, 1898 (see inclosed circular, marked C), providing that deteriorated subsistence stores could be returned to the depot commissary, who would replace them with articles of the same character, but of good quality. This system has worked satisfactorily and been the means of saving much labor. Moreover, the troops were not deprived indefinitely of the use of their stores, awaiting the slow action of a board of survey.

The gradual increase of this command from 14,000 to 35,000 troops necessitated a corresponding increase of storage facilities for subsistence supplies. Starting with a storehouse having a total area of 22,000 square feet, the space has expanded to almost 60,000 square feet, and additional room will soon be necessary to accommodate the stores expected to arrive on the next transports. In this connection attention is invited to the very interesting report herewith by Capt. W. H. Anderson, commissary of subsistence, U. S. V., depot commissary, Binondo.

As a rule, the officers of the Subsistence Department serving with this command have performed their duties zealously and efficiently and to my entire satisfaction. The most trying positions were those of depot commissary and issuing commissary, filled, respectively, by Maj. S. A. Cloman and Captain Anderson; and subsequent to Major Cloman's appointment as commissary of the *Scandia* (now *Warren*) Captain Anderson was made depot commissary and Captain Kranthoff appointed issuing commissary. Too much credit can not be given these officers for the efficient and satisfactory manner in which their respective offices were conducted.

The commissary sergeants of the United States Army detailed for duty in the Philippines have sustained their reputation for honesty and devotion to duty under all circumstances.

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY. 229

The work of the civilian clerks serving in the Subsistence Department with this command has been beyond all praise. Notwithstanding the trying conditions of climate and surroundings, these men have labored loyally and conscientiously in the performance of the various duties to which they have been assigned.

RATIONS.

The quality of the ration articles sent here from the United States has been generally good.

Beef.—From the arrival of the first expedition, on June 30, 1898, to September 15, 1898, the command drew its supply of fresh beef from the naval cold-storage vessel *Culgoa*; from September 16, 1898, to April 19, 1899, from the *Duke of Sutherland*, the cold-storage ship above referred to; from April 20 to May 16, from the naval vessel *Celtic*; from May 17 to date, from the *Duke of Westminster*, a cold-storage vessel from Australia arranged for by this office.

The price of the beef varied considerably, depending on whether furnished from the United States or from Australia. The following list gives the price of the various cargoes supplied to this command:

	Per pound.
<i>Culgoa</i> , frozen beef, from Australia	\$0.045623
<i>Duke of Sutherland</i> , frozen beef, from Australia:	
Fores075
Hinds08
<i>Celtic</i> , frozen beef, from San Francisco065
<i>Duke of Westminster</i> , frozen beef, from Australia089

Of course it is understood that the price of the beef furnished by the *Culgoa* and the *Celtic* was apparently considerably lower, owing to the fact that the cost of transportation was not included and that the proportionate share of the Army for the cost of maintaining the plant in condition to preserve the beef was very small. All the frozen Australian beef supplied to this command has been of superior quality, equal to any in the world, and is generally preferred to the American product. There is no record in this office of any complaint having ever been made by any organization as to its quality. Several times small quantities of this beef were kept in the depot, wrapped in canvas, for thirty-six hours and then issued, being in excellent condition and the interior still frozen. During active hostilities it was sent out on the firing line, being transported for miles on bull carts without any protection from the sun except the cotton cloth with which each quarter was covered. It was sent almost daily to the remote military stations to the north and south of Manila by rail, water, and wagon transportation, requiring, in some instances, most of the day to complete the journey, and no deterioration has ever been reported as resulting from the exposure. Chilled, refrigerated, or any other class of beef would have spoiled in transit under such conditions.

With the exception of one shipment, known as the "dry salt pack," all the issue bacon sent to this command from the United States has arrived in bad condition. One lot, shipped by the mail line via Hongkong, was almost a total loss, only about 35,000 pounds being saved from a shipment of 143,000 pounds. The difficulty arose from the fact that the bacon was too green, not being sufficiently cured and smoked for export, and especially for a tropical country. Moreover, the cases were unsuitable, and the pieces were packed so tightly as to prevent a circulation of air about them. Hereafter all bacon sent to this station will be cured for forty days, and will undoubtedly prove much more satisfactory. A quantity of excellent bacon was procured under emergency from Australia, but the price was too high for general use in the Army, being 17 cents per pound.

A great quantity of hard bread of a very inferior quality was received and, after being condemned by a board of survey, was sold for an insignificant sum. The bread was manufactured by the Portland Cracker Company, of San Francisco, and was improperly prepared and very poorly packed. Approximately a million and a quarter pounds were thus lost. The bread now being received, packed by other firms, is excellent.

Fresh vegetables have been supplied by contract since about December 1, and have been excellent in every respect. The price was 3½ cents per pound for potatoes and 5 cents per pound for onions, laid down in the warehouse of the depot commissary, the contractor being responsible for the condition of the vegetables for two weeks after delivery. The market of San Francisco, Japan, China, and Australia provided these vegetables, which have always arrived in excellent condition, being carefully crated and so stowed on the vessels as to avoid the heat from the boilers.

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Prior to December the vegetables for the command came from Australia and Japan and were purchased in open market. They were generally of inferior quality and very difficult to obtain. When fresh vegetables were not obtainable desiccated potatoes and onions were issued in lieu. The desiccated articles were never regarded with favor, owing to the failure of the cooks to prepare it in an appetizing form.

All the other articles of the ration were excellent.

The ration being elastic, such modifications were made in its components from time to time as were suggested by experience and the prevailing conditions. Mess beef and pork were eliminated; canned roast beef was issued only when desired by organizations or when the exigencies of the service demanded its use. By direction of the President, 2 ounces each of two of the three components, oatmeal, dried fruits, and rice, are issued in lieu of 4 ounces of fresh beef when desired. Other desirable changes have been recommended.

Emergency rations have not been used during the campaign, owing to the meat components being entirely of bacon and the liability of the pea meal to heat and spoil.

SALES STORES.

Great quantities of stores under this head have been ordered from the United States for the use of officers, enlisted men, and civilians connected with the command. From the time of the establishment of the first sales depot in Cavite the sales of all stores have been enormous. Every opportunity was given officers and men to purchase such stores as they desired, but sales to the latter were restricted somewhat to prevent articles from falling into unauthorized hands. In addition to the articles heretofore authorized, the Commissary-General has permitted the addition of about thirty new articles which were recommended as desirable at this remotestation. Attention is invited to the inclosed list marked D, showing approximately the articles of the ration and sales stores furnished this command to include June 30, 1898. A large saving was effected by purchasing the articles rice, sugar, and tea in this market.

The hospitals have made very large purchases of these stores from the funds transferred to them for the purpose of purchasing special diet for the sick, and the savings of organizations, which have been unusually large, have nearly all been expended in this way.

LOSSES ON STORES.

While it is impracticable to ascertain the exact quantity of stores lost through deterioration consequent upon climatic influences, it is believed that with the exception of bacon and fresh vegetables the percentage of losses on other stores have not been materially higher than in the United States. The shortages on stores shipped here from the United States have been heavy, due partially to the lack of method or system in stowing the goods on board and of failure to properly protect them against theft by soldiers and crew, but mainly to the pilfering of native laborers while bringing the stores from the ships to the warerooms. There have also been losses on all shipments made by the depot to other points where cascoes are used, which would appear to indicate the necessity for a guard to attend each loaded casco. Every effort has been made to reduce these losses to a minimum, but so far without satisfactory result. Some goods went astray when railroad shipments were made, but it is believed that they were eventually recovered.

Arrangements were recently perfected whereby perishable articles are shipped on the commercial lines, and it is thought that little trouble will now be experienced in keeping the supply up to the standard. The losses on stores shipped in this manner have been inconsiderable.

It is evident that there is much carelessness on the part of the masters of vessels in removing their cargoes. Stores are frequently received with the cases badly broken. In some instances the cases and contents have been literally crushed, indicating that reckless methods were employed in handling the goods that would not be tolerated by any mercantile firm.

A few stores were destroyed by white ants when the main depot was located in Cavite, but no trouble has been experienced here. The floors of the storehouses in Cavite were not provided with the rice husks or "eppa" which is used in all storehouses in Manila as a protection against these insects.

BREAD OVENS.

The portable bread ovens furnished this command have not been regarded with much favor. The heat is not distributed with uniformity, necessitating frequent *unsfers* of bread from the lower to the upper shelves, and vice versa. While the

bread is thus being changed the whole interior of the oven is exposed to the outside air, with the result that the temperature is materially lowered, causing the bread to "fall." The rear of the oven opposite the fire box burns out quickly. This could be remedied by substituting steel plates for the galvanized iron material of which the back is made.

Several large brick and stone ovens have been constructed here for use of organizations, and are giving much satisfaction. It was originally intended that each separate organization should have its own bakery, but the opening of hostilities prevented the execution of the plan.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

The following recommendations are made for the consideration of the major-general commanding:

I. That a bakery be constructed in each barracks or cuartel occupied by troops. The bakery should be of ample capacity to supply bread to all the troops occupying the cuartel, and should be under the personal supervision of the commanding officer.

While the bread furnished by the local bakers is fairly good, it is not equal to the bread made by the soldier bakers.

II. That authority be given for the construction of cold-storage plants in the garrisons of the southern islands, occupied by our troops, for use in preserving fresh beef and other perishable subsistence supplies. In this connection attention is invited to inclosed copy of a letter, marked E, forwarded by me in April last to the adjutant-general of this command. Since that time I have conversed with several people interested in similar plans, and believe that any one of three firms stand ready to erect these plants without cost to the Government, their revenue being derived from the sale of beef, ice, and cold-storage space to the troops. It would, of course, be necessary for the firm constructing such plants to receive some guaranty that the Government would receive beef for a stated period.

III. That a warehouse be erected for use of the subsistence department. Experience has shown the necessity for a storehouse for the use of the depot commissary, which should be of ample capacity to accommodate rations and sales stores for 40,000 men for a period of four months. This would enable the depot commissary to concentrate all his stores under one roof, thus economizing time, space, and labor. At the present time the subsistence supplies pertaining to this immediate command are stored in five different warehouses, which necessitates a large working force, and distributes valuable property over a large area, which adds materially to the difficulty of caring for it.

IV. In view of the issue of dried fruits as a component of the ration, it is believed the sugar ration should be increased to 20 pounds to every 100 rations. This increase appears to be demanded not only on account of the use of the dried fruits, but because of the craving for sweets, to which it appears all persons living in a tropical climate are subject. The vinegar ration could well be reduced one-half, and pickles substituted. In other respects, it is believed, the present ration should stand as it is until time and experience have demonstrated that a sweeping change is necessary. When the subject of diet in the Tropics is thoroughly investigated, it will be found that the man in Manila craves about the same food as the man in New York, and that he will eat it, too, if it is to be had.

The inclosed list, marked F, shows the name, rank, and duty of the officers and noncommissioned officers of the subsistence department serving with this command.

Attention is respectfully invited to the inclosed reports of Maj. R. H. Fitzhugh, chief commissary of subsistence, U. S. V.; Capt. W. H. Anderson, commissary of subsistence, U. S. V.; Capt. Charles R. Krauthoff, commissary of subsistence, U. S. V., and Capt. C. Dupont Coudert, commissary of subsistence, U. S. V. The report of Capt. S. B. Bootes, commissary of subsistence, U. S. V., will be forwarded later.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. L. BRAINARD,
Major, Commissary of Subsistence, U. S. V., Chief Commissary.

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EXHIBIT A.

Daily ration issued by the United States Subsistence Department to the Spanish prisoners of war.

SPANISH SOLDIERS (EUROPEAN).

Bread or flour.....pounds..	1	Salt.....pounds..	1.50
Meat, fresh.....do.....	1	Peas or beans.....do.....	1.25
Or salmon.....do.....	1	Coffee.....do.....	1.40
Or bacon or pork.....do.....	$\frac{1}{2}$	Sugar.....do.....	1.25
Or canned or salt beef.....do.....	$\frac{1}{2}$	Wine.....pint..	1

NATIVE SOLDIERS (FILIPINOS).

Rice.....pounds..	2	Lard.....pounds..	1.25
Meat, fresh.....do.....	$\frac{1}{2}$	Mangoes.....do.....	$\frac{1}{2}$
Or salmon.....do.....	$\frac{1}{2}$	Coffee.....do.....	1.40
Or bacon or pork.....do.....	$\frac{1}{2}$	Sugar.....do.....	1.25
Or canned or salt beef.....do.....	$\frac{1}{2}$	Vinegar, to 100 rations...gallon..	$\frac{1}{2}$
Salt.....do.....	1.50		

EXHIBIT B.

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
OFFICE OF CHIEF COMMISSARY,
Manila, P. I., August 2, 1899.

CIRCULAR.

The following is the ration for one day for Indian police, prisoners of war, and stretcher-bearers, as approved by the major-general commanding:

Rice.....pounds..	2	Coffee.....pounds..	1.40
Meat, fresh.....do.....	$\frac{1}{2}$	Sugar.....do.....	1.25
Or bacon or pork.....do.....	$\frac{1}{2}$	Salt.....do.....	1.50
Or canned or salt beef.....do.....	$\frac{1}{2}$	Soap.....ounces..	8.25
Or salmon.....do.....	$\frac{1}{2}$	Vinegar.....gills..	2.25

The meat component is issued in the following proportions: When practicable, fresh meat three days in ten; bacon one day in ten; salmon one day in ten, and roast beef, canned, five days in ten, or the last two may be issued as follows: Salmon three days, and roast beef, canned, three days in ten.

D. L. BRAINARD,
Major, Commissary of Subsistence, U. S. V., Chief Commissary.

EXHIBIT C.

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., October 29, 1898.

CIRCULAR.

The following has been submitted by the chief commissary of the command, and is published for the information and guidance of all concerned. As a careful compliance therewith will insure the receipt of the full ration in good condition by all troops, commanding officers are enjoined to strictly enforce the recommendations contained therein.

By command of Major-General Otis:

THOMAS H. BARRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY. 233

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF COMMISSARY,
October 28, 1898.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to request that the following be published:

It is the aim and intention of the Subsistence Department to issue to the troops of this command all stores to which they are entitled in full weight and in the best possible condition. In order that issues may be properly made, commissaries of organizations should always be present at the drawing of rations, giving this important duty their personal supervision. In view of the necessity of issuing original packages, rations are sometimes received by regimental commissaries, which, upon being opened, are found to have suffered deterioration from the trying climatic influences of this place. To correct all errors, without multiplying unnecessarily boards of survey, commissaries of all organizations (regimental and battalion) should carefully inspect all stores drawn by them not later than twenty-four hours after receipt of the same, and immediately thereafter return to the issuing commissary such of the articles as have so far undergone deterioration as to be unfit for issue, with certificate stating amounts and conditions, signed by the commissary and by two officers hereinafter indicated. Upon the return of any defective articles to the issuing commissary, that officer will replace them with other stores of the same character, but of good quality, from stock on hand.

Regimental commissaries will be assisted in their inspections by two officers (one of whom shall be of the Medical Department) to be designated by the commanding officers of organizations concerned.

Company, troop, and battery commanders should make a minute personal inspection of all rations received on issue days in order to discover any mistakes of issue either as to quantity or quality, and discovering any, should cause them to be corrected as soon as practicable by immediate application to the proper commissary.

They should also see to it that articles of the ration once received are so protected as to render loss impossible.

The messing of troops and the management of the rations should be personally supervised by the company commander, as directed in Army Regulations 280-283, and War Department General Orders, No. 94, of 1898.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. L. BRAINARD,

*Lieutenant-Colonel and Chief Commissary of Subsistence, U. S. V.,
Chief Commissary.*

EXHIBIT D.

Abstract of subsistence stores received at Manila, P. I., from July 1, 1898, to June 30, 1899.

ARTICLES OF THE RATION.

Fresh beef and mutton, pounds	3,900,000	Hominy:	
Pork	175,000	Fine	pounds.. 54,210
Bacon	1,797,800	Coarse	do.... 3,580
Salt beef	203,400	Tomatoes:	
Beef, corned 2-pound cans ..	596,900	2½-pound cans	464,424
Roast beef	1,574,569	3-pound cans	402,912
Fish:		1-gallon cans	10,104
Dried cod	34,920	Coffee:	
Pickled mackerel do	113,345	Green	pounds.. 820,774
Flour	11,357,600	Roasted	do.... 444,906
Hard bread	3,728,437	Tea, black:	
Corn meal, yellow	131,561	Eng. breakfast	do.... 6,415
Baking powder	368,607	Oolong	do.... 1,450
Beans	1,436,100	Tea, green	do.... 580
Beans, baked:		Sugar	do.... 972,067
1-pound cans	984	Molasses	gallons.. 11,344
3-pound cans	52,200	Sirup, cane	do.... 11,177
Rice	1,251,950	Vinegar	do.... 87,894
		Salt, issue	pounds.. 381,800

234 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

EXHIBIT D—Abstract of subsistence stores received at Manila, P. I., etc.—Cont'd.

ARTICLES OF THE RATION—continued.

Pepper, black..... pounds..	36,750		<i>Foods—Continued.</i>	
Soap, issue..... do.....	365,060		Shrimps..... cans..	3,912
Candles, S. A..... do.....	141,240		Soup:	
			Beef..... quart cans..	53,732
			Chicken..... do.....	63,150
			Clam chowder..... do.....	37,262
			Mock turtle..... do.....	71,808
			Ox-tail..... do.....	63,755
			Starch, corn..... pounds..	61,900
			Sugar:	
			White, cut, loaf..... do.....	77,200
			White, granu'l'd..... do.....	210,700
			White, powdered..... do.....	2,010
			Tapioca..... do.....	89,206
			Tongue, beef 2-pound cans..	2,402
			<i>Spices, seasonings, sauces, jams, jel-</i>	
			<i>lies, etc.</i>	
			Cinnamon, ground, pounds..	2,570
			Cloves, ground..... do.....	2,430
			Flavoring extracts:	
			Lemon, 2-ounce bottles..	30,388
			Vanilla..... do.....	30,388
			Ginger, ground..... pounds..	2,316
			Jam, blackberry:	
			2-pound cans.....	131,070
			1-pound jars.....	46,520
			Jelly, currant:	
			2-pound cans.....	112,744
			1-pound jars.....	42,405
			Lime juice..... quart bottles ..	51,802
			Mustard:	
			Ground..... pounds..	6,752
			French..... bottles..	13,217
			Nutmegs..... pounds..	529
			Oil, olive..... quart bottles ..	6,632
			Olives:	
			Quart bottles.....	6,174
			Pint bottles.....	4,800
			Pepper, red:	
			Cayenne..... pounds..	223
			Chile-col..... do.....	1,541
			Pickles:	
			Gherkins, dom. sweet—	
			Pint jars.....	1,736
			Quart jars.....	1,452
			Chowchow—	
			Pint jars.....	17,738
			Quart jars.....	6,237
			Gherkins—	
			Pint jars.....	8,307
			Quart jars.....	1,771
			Mixed—	
			Pint jars.....	2,376
			Quart jars.....	1,167
			Salt, table:	
			In bags..... pounds..	65,282
			In boxes..... do.....	7,920
			Sauce:	
			Cranberry, 2-pound cans	97,898
			Worcestershire, ½-pint	
			bottles.....	13,284

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY. 235

EXHIBIT D.—Abstract of subsistence stores received at Manila, P. I., etc.—Cont'd.

ARTICLES OF THE RATION—continued.

<i>Cigars, tobacco, and pipes.</i>		<i>Stationery—Continued.</i>	
Pipes, brier-wood:		Envelopes—Continued.	
No. 1.....number..	1,734	Note—	
No. 2.....do.....	1,770	Good.....do.....	33,000
No. 3.....do.....	1,700	Best.....do.....	2,875
No. 4.....do.....	2,987	Ink, black.....bottles..	7,292
Pipestems, Weichsel do....	7,276	Paper:	
Tobacco:		Letter—	
Plug.....pounds..	142,688	Good.....quires..	26,840
Smoking—		Best.....do.....	19,170
Durham.....do.....	89,426	Note—	
Lone Jack.....do.....	37	Good.....do.....	6,820
Seal North Carolina,		Best.....do.....	11,650
pounds.....	26,699	Pencils:	
Vanity Fair, pounds	85	No. 2, Am.....number..	11,152
		No. 3, Am.....do.....	1,850
		Penholders.....do.....	7,326
		Pens:	
		Fine.....do.....	63
		Coarse.....do.....	85
		Stub.....do.....	88
Toilet soaps, kitchen and laundry materials.		Sundries.	
Soap:		Basins, hand.....number	3,402
Toilet—		Blacking, shoe.....boxes..	38,643
Cashmere Bouquet,		Brooms, whisk:	
cakes.....	3,960	Large.....number..	4,988
Castile, white,		Small.....do.....	2,355
pounds.....	10,760	Brushes:	
Cuticura.....cakes..	14,668	Blacking.....do.....	54,014
Glycerin, Pears',		Hair—	
cakes.....	18,381	Large.....do.....	1,128
Lett. Coudr. do.....	6,192	Small.....do.....	1,116
Oatmeal.....do.....	23,635	Nail.....do.....	3,284
Yankee shaving do.....	18,810	Tooth—	
Kitchen, Sapolio do....	26,943	Hard.....do.....	10,649
Laundry, Ivory do.....	42,452	Soft.....do.....	11,162
Bluing, powdered.....boxes..	3,528	Buttons, collar:	
Starch, laundry.....pounds..	5,920	Hinge.....do.....	1,032
Borax.....papers.....	2,052	Without hinge do.....	5,104
Electro-silicon.....boxes..	7,456	Can openers.....do.....	5,646
Metal polish.....tins.....	13,664	Chamois skins.....do.....	548
Tripoli flour.....packages..	6,706	Clothes lines.....feet..	114,720
		Clothes pins.....number..	29,520
		Combs:	
		Coarse—	
		Medium.....do.....	947
		Small.....do.....	928
		Fine.....do.....	2,386
		Dressing.....do.....	2,148
		Pocket.....do.....	2,040
		Handkerchiefs:	
		Linen—	
		Fine.....do.....	12,912
		Medium.....do.....	7,640
		Silk—	
		White.....do.....	5,376
		Red.....do.....	1,224
		Ink, indelible.....bottles..	690
		Matches, safety.....boxes..	1,746,356
		Paper, toilet.....packages..	59,427
		Razor strops.....number..	884
Tailors' materials.			
Buttons.....dozen..	1,184		
	1,296		
Trousers—			
Large.....do.....	2,016		
Small.....do.....	1,800		
Needles.....papers.....	2,080		
Darning.....dozen..	880		
Needle books, with needles,			
number.....	832		
Pins.....papers.....	2,268		
Thread:			
Cotton—			
White.....spools..	3,864		
Black.....do.....	3,888		
Linen—			
White.....do.....	5,202		
Black.....do.....	6,414		
Stationery.			
Envelopes:			
Letter—			
Good.....number..	95,000		
Best.....do.....	66,000		

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EXHIBIT D.—Abstract of subsistence stores received at Manila, P. I., etc.—Cont'd.

ARTICLES OF THE RATION—continued.

<i>Sundries—Continued.</i>		<i>Sundries—Continued.</i>	
Shoe strings:		Farina	pounds 14, 016
Porpoise	pairs 33, 184	Assorted:	
Linen	do 34, 334	Jams	jars 324
Towels:		Preserves	do 20, 640
Linen, damask, number ..	48	Beef extract	do 6, 404
Huckaback—		Asparagus	cans 23, 730
No. 1	number 21, 470	Marmalade	jars 7, 678
No. 2	do 12, 584	Honey	bottles 12, 480
Bath—		Ginger ale:	
Cotton	do 7, 826	Domestic	do 148, 576
Linen	do 156	Imported	do 194, 560
Wash	do 9, 244	Shasta water	do 15, 000
Bleached	yards 6, 400	String beans	cans 3, 600
Unbleached	do 7, 190	Champagne	bottles 974
Beef cattle, native	head 100	Clam broth	do 5, 841
Soap, S. W	pounds 48, 200	Cocoa, powdered	cans 296
Tea:		Ginger, preserved	pounds 37
Young hyson	do 340	Imperial Granum	do 134
Japan	do 40	Mellin's Food	bottles 120
Candles, lantern	do 7, 120	Apollinaris:	
Ham, sliced	1-pound cans 14, 400	Pint bottles	17, 558
Yeast	pounds 5, 480	Quart bottles	2, 600
Milk, H. C	cans 436, 229	Hops	pounds 20
Soup:		Cigarettes, Sweet Caporal,	
Bouillon	quart cans 240	number	15, 000
Consomme	do 6, 144	Listerine	bottles 1, 200
Tomato	do 3, 312	Succotash	cans 6, 048
Mutton	do 3, 984	Tobasco	bottles 1, 440
English	do 1, 296	Tomato catchup	do 12, 400
Pea	do 480	Boston brown bread	cans 11, 600
Green turtle	do 24	Jam, imported, 2-pound	
Terrapin	do 264	cans	21, 371
Mulligatawny	do 432	Jelly, imported, 2-pound	
Assorted	do 1, 740	cans	2, 950
Chicken gumbo	do 2, 016	Fruits, assorted imported, 2-	
Maple sirup	gallons 2, 711	pound cans	8, 803
Curry powder	bottles 3, 480	Bacon, breakfast, 1-pound	
Chutney	do 3, 312	cans	92, 248
Caviare	cans 3, 468		

Total gross weights of stores received from the United States per transports and commercial liners purchased at this port, and estimated receipts of fresh beef from July 1, 1898, to June 30, 1899.

	Tons.
From United States	22, 871
Purchases	1, 019
Fresh beef	1, 950
Total	25, 840

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY. 237

EXHIBIT E.

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
OFFICE CHIEF COMMISSARY,
Manila, P. I., April 27, 1899.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL.

*Headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps,
Manila, P. I.*

SIR: In view of the permanent occupation of these islands by the United States forces, and the difficulty of obtaining suitable beef in sufficient quantities from native sources for use of the troops, I have the honor to recommend that a small cold-storage plant and ice machine be established in each of the military posts in the Visayan military district, for the storage and preservation of frozen Australian beef and other perishable subsistence stores. All reports agree that the native beef is generally disliked, it being lean, tough, and deficient in nutriment as compared with the article issued to this command. Moreover, the cost of the native product is excessively high and it is often difficult to obtain the quantity required.

The meat chambers of each plant should have a capacity equal to five months' supply for the troops there stationed, and the cooling rooms for vegetables and other stores should be of the same size.

It is believed that the Australian beef, including running expenses of the storage plant, can be furnished the troops more cheaply than the inferior article from native sources.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. L. BRAINARD,
Major, Commissary of Subsistence, U. S. V., Chief Commissary.

EXHIBIT F.

LIST OF OFFICERS OF THE SUBSISTENCE DEPARTMENT ON DUTY IN THE DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS, JUNE 30, 1899.

Maj. D. L. Brainard, chief commissary of department and corps.

Maj. R. H. Fitzhugh, chief commissary Second Division.

Capt. W. H. Anderson, chief commissary First Division, and depot commissary, Binondo.

Capt. Charles R. Krauthoff, commissary Second Brigade, First Division, charge of sales depot, Quiapo, and issuing commissary, Manila.

Capt. Seth M. Milliken, issuing commissary First Division.

Capt. James A. Logan, jr., issuing commissary Second Division, and commissary Second Brigade, Second Division.

Capt. Joseph B. Handy, commissary First Brigade, First Division, and charge of sales depot, San Pedro Macati.

Capt. C. Dupont Coudert, commissary Third Brigade, Second Division, charge sales depot, Ermita, and assistant to chief commissary.

Capt. S. B. Bootes, shipping and issuing commissary, Malolos, and charge subsistence and care of Spanish prisoners.

Capt. Daniel Van Voorhis, commissary First Separate Brigade, Iloilo.

LIST OF COMMISSARY SERGEANTS.

1. Patrick Lynch, with Captain Coudert.
2. C. F. B. Zimmerman, with Captain Anderson.
3. Garrett O'Reilly, with Captain Anderson.
4. John E. Wilson, with Captain Anderson.
5. Patrick Donnelly, with Captain Anderson.
6. C. H. A. Brooke, with commissary at Malolos.
7. John Wikander, with commissary at Malolos.
8. George P. Castle, with commissary at Iloilo.
9. William Mansie, with commissary at Cavite.
10. Anton Zimmerman, with issuing commissary at Manila.
11. Joseph A. Favier, with issuing commissary at San Fernando.
12. Charles Bader, with commissary at Cebu.
13. John C. Walser, with issuing commissary at Bacoor.
14. A. J. Merrill, in office of chief commissary.
15. John Muraszko, with commissary at Bacolod.

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HEADQUARTERS, DEPT. OF THE PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
OFFICE OF ASSISTANT TO THE CHIEF COMMISSARY,
Manila, P. I., July 29, 1899.

THE CHIEF COMMISSARY.

Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report for the fiscal year ending July 1, 1899:

On July 1, 1899, I left Washington, D. C., under orders to join General Merritt, then commanding the Department of the Pacific, for duty as assistant to the chief commissary on his staff. Upon reaching San Francisco I found that General Merritt had already sailed and, following on the next transport, I arrived at Manila, P. I., on August 21, reporting for duty the same day.

The first duty assigned me was the subsisting of the Spanish sick and wounded prisoners, which at that time numbered some 1,300, quartered in the various hospitals and convents of the city. The method employed was not entirely satisfactory, but was made necessary under the condition of affairs existing at the time. Each hospital sent a morning report, showing the number of sick and the diet recommended by the surgeon in charge. There was no fixed ration and a various lot of foods and wines were called for. These were carefully checked by me and approved by the chief surgeon of the department, and the supplies were then bought and delivered, under open-market purchase, from a business house of Manila. Later the commanding general fixed a sum to be allowed each prisoner sick in hospital, to be turned over to and accounted for by a Spanish officer appointed by the general commanding the Spanish forces. The care of the Spanish sick and wounded was then turned over to the officer in charge of issues to the Spanish prisoners.

On November 1, by direction of the chief commissary, a subsistence sales depot was opened in Ermita, a suburb of Manila, of which I have been in charge continuously up to the present time. While the storerooms and salesroom have always been inadequate, a large amount of sales were made, amounting to between \$5,000 and \$9,000 per month. These were mostly small sales to officers and enlisted men, as hospitals and canteens were directed to make their purchases directly from the depot commissary. The quality and variety of the supplies kept for sale is generally of the very best and, with few exceptions, give perfect satisfaction. Comparatively few losses from the climatic conditions and the long journeys have been suffered. Fruits and preserves in glass jars, unless packed with the greatest care, were sometimes found to be in bad condition through breakage, and it is recommended that if the same could be purchased in cans it would save a considerable loss. A larger variety of crackers, packed in small tins of 1 or 2 pounds, is recommended. In this climate crackers deteriorate so rapidly when exposed to the air that, in small families, a large part of the contents of the present size tins becomes spoiled before consumed. Other articles which it is recommended be kept for sale are cheeses in small jars or tins—such as cream cheese, French cheese, etc.—chipped beef, and tomato catsup, which is frequently asked for.

One matter I would here call attention to is the difficulty, apparently caused by the indifference of company commanders, of collecting payment for sales made to companies, detachments, etc. It was found when cash payment was required for such sales great hardship resulted to the soldiers in the field, especially when deprived of tobacco, and these sales were made on the order of the company commander, with the understanding that they would be paid for at the end of the month. In many cases payment was delayed for two, sometimes three, months, and the commissary, left without any authorized means of collecting, became personally responsible, with the consequent annoyance. With troops in the field engaged in active operations credit sales to individual men are not practicable, and commissaries selling on orders of company commanders should have some means of collecting bills for supplies sold for the company.

Besides the charge of the sales depot, I had for sometime the payment of claims for the commutation of rations; the charge of roasting and grinding coffee for troops in the field; the charge of matters pertaining to bake ovens, and numerous other small duties as assistant to the chief commissary.

On March 21, by paragraph 17, Special Orders, No. 77, headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, series 1899, I was ordered to report to the commanding-general Third Brigade, Second Division, for duty as brigade commissary, this in addition to my other duties. Gen. Robert Hall commanded, and headquarters were soon moved to the deposito at San Juan del Monte. Here I remained until June 8, when General Hall was relieved. During this time I accompanied the General in all his expeditions and engagements, acting as his aid-de-camp when my services as commissary were not required. The only expe-

dition of importance began on June 2, and lasted until the 9th. For this the commands were ordered to be supplied with three, which was afterwards increased to five, days' rations, with one day's ration in the haversack. Ample transportation was furnished, and the wagon train was to meet the column at Taytay on the evening of the day we started. The troops meanwhile were to proceed over the mountain trails to Antipolo, thence around to Taytay. But such difficulties were met with on the march, by the roughness of the trails, the excessive heat, and the resistance made by the enemy, that, as a matter of fact, we reached Taytay only at about 2 the following afternoon. The greater part of the rations carried in the haversacks had been thrown aside, the men preferring to go hungry rather than carry the extra weight, so that for nearly twenty-four hours they had been without food. The same evening the wagon train again failed to keep up, notwithstanding the splendid work done by the officer in charge, and again we went in camp without supper. The following day we reached Morong, our objective point, and in the evening I started for Manila on one of the lake gunboats to hurry up more rations. I met these on the way, returned with them to Morong, reaching there the following morning, and immediately began issuing three days' rations, corned beef being issued in lieu of fresh; in other respects it was the full field ration, including the fresh vegetables. The issue was satisfactory in every way, and no recommendations can be made; every article seemed in perfect condition; the roasted and ground coffee is of great advantage.

While I was commissary of the Third Brigade, Second Division, a commissary sales wagon, in connection with the sales depot of which I was in charge, was sent around to some portion of the lines held by that brigade twice a week and proved quite successful, especially if the troops had been recently paid.

On June 16, by paragraph 7, Special Orders, No. 161, headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, dated June 15, 1899, I took to Parañaque and Las Piñas 20,000 pounds of rice and 15,000 pounds of roast beef to issue to the destitute inhabitants of those towns. When the news was first spread a certain amount of incredulity was expressed, then a suggestion of pride in accepting bounty of this kind. But when the time for distribution arrived an immense crowd, principally of old men and women, crowded up, who were so eager in their efforts to be served first that it took nearly half a company to keep them in order. Each adult received about 2½ pounds of beef and 5 pounds of rice. While these natives did not appear to be in any immediate danger of starvation, there were many who presented a very wretched appearance from old age and disease.

Before closing this report I would like to make mention of the excellent services rendered by Com. Sergt. Patrick Lynch, who has been under me during the entire year. Besides his ability, his work has been most honest and faithful in every way.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. DU PONT COUDERT,
Captain and Commissary of Subsistence, U. S. V.

OFFICE OF DEPOT COMMISSARY,
Manila, P. I., July 31, 1899.

Maj. D. L. BRAINARD,
*Chief Commissary Department of the Pacific
and Eighth Army Corps, Manila, P. I.*

SIR: In accordance with instructions issued from your office, I have the honor to make the following brief report upon the work accomplished by this department. Excuses are made in advance for omitting many important details, but owing to lack of time entire justice can not be done to this inexhaustible subject.

The duties of this office began in July, 1898, at Camp Dewey, as issuing commissary to all of the troops stationed at that camp. After the fall of Manila, and until February 1, 1899, this office issued to the entire Eighth Army Corps, stationed at Manila and vicinity.

The troops rationed during the time reached the large figure of about 18,000, and so successful was the method of supplying troops from a central point that 180,000 to 200,000 rations could be issued during five hours. This, with the assistance of two detailed men. It is remarkable to look back upon the enormous amount of stores that were so easily handled, but there were many advantages in our favor. All of the organizations were living a regular garrison life, and the Quartermaster's Department was able to meet almost any demand made upon it for transportation. To see 400 tons of commissary supplies leave the warehouses during five hours would call for an enormous train of native bull carts, the only transportation available at that time. The usual burden being from a ton to a ton and a half, it would require over 250 carts to accomplish the work. It may be summed up that

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the work of the issuing commissary moved very smoothly, and but few complaints were ever received.

During the past six months, as depot commissary of Manila, or, practically, of the entire Philippine Islands, the work has been on a much larger scale. The growth of the depot has been surprising, and notwithstanding the present storage capacity of about 60,000 square feet, or a little less than 2 acres of area, we are now searching for additional storage room to relieve the cramped condition of the depot.

The commissary depot, at this writing, is divided into three groups of ware-rooms. Storehouse No. 1 consists of a number of storerooms formerly used as sugar godowns. Although the total area of these rooms is 23,000 square feet, still, on account of their construction, their capacity is quite limited. All articles purchased in this market, such as sugar, rice, tea, etc., are to be found in storehouse No. 1. Besides these articles, all of the fresh potatoes and onions, stationery, tailor's and miscellaneous materials and property are stored there. In addition, the depot commissary runs a small sales depot to consume packages broken in transit and accommodate persons removed from the regular sales depots. The capacity of this storehouse is from 1,000 to 1,500 tons.

At storehouse No. 2 is found all of the articles of the ration not mentioned in the list at storehouse No. 1. The area of the single wareroom is 19,000 square feet, and has a capacity for about 7,000 tons of stores.

The refrigerator ship anchored in the harbor may also be considered as one of the ration storerooms. This depot is handling a little less than 1,200,000 rations per month, representing a gross weight of 2,700 tons.

Storehouse No. 3, of 13,000 square feet area, is devoted entirely to articles of the sales list, and has a capacity of 5,000 tons.

Besides supplying all sales depots, the commissary depot runs a wholesale store for the benefit of hospitals, canteens, etc. The sales from these sources have reached \$30,000 in a single month. The value of the rations transferred amounts to about \$190,000, and the transfers of sales articles to other depots reach from \$70,000 to \$75,000 per month, of which \$20,000 is devoted to tobaccos, cigars, and pipes. The stores moved every month will exceed 3,000 tons.

Previous reports have been made covering the different articles of ration and also those of the sales list, so that further comment on this line is omitted.

In closing I wish to call your attention to the valuable services rendered by detailed men, and also point out the hard work of all civilian employees. The clerical force particularly has often worked fifteen hours a day, and the depot has never been closed, day or night, when a call was made for subsistence stores.

During the active operations of February 5 and 6 this depot assumed the duties of issuing commissary, and on February 5 dispatched 21 bull carts loaded with rations to various points on the line, and on February 6 followed up with 52 carts of provisions, and in this way relieved the first great demands occasioned by the military operations. By means of transportation, which has been permanently assigned to the Subsistence Department, commissary stores have been supplied with a greater regularity and more certainty than when the Quartermaster's Department was wholly depended upon.

If it had not been for the broad and expansive ideas of the chief commissary of this department it is thought that many obstacles would have been encountered which might have led to public criticism as severe as that which arose in Cuba. The chief commissary has spared no means in procuring rations for the soldiers, and by the personal interest manifested he has been able to run the entire department with the highest efficiency and without the slightest friction. He has always given valuable assistance to the officers of his department, and even entered into the minor details, which are more than trying for an officer in his position.

I am, very respectfully,

W. H. ANDERSON,

Capt. and Acting Commissary of Subsistence, U. S. V., Depot Commissary.

OFFICE CHIEF COMMISSARY SECOND BRIGADE, FIRST DIVISION,
EIGHTH ARMY CORPS, AND ISSUING COMMISSARY
FIRST AND SECOND DIVISIONS,
Manila, P. I., July 28, 1899.

The CHIEF COMMISSARY OF SUBSISTENCE,
Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, Manila, P. I.

SIR: In compliance with instructions from your office of recent date, I have the honor to submit the following report of duties performed as officer in charge of issues to First and Second divisions, Eighth Army Corps, to include June 30, 1899.

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY. 241

I entered upon the present duties January 31, 1899, in compliance with paragraph 3, Special Orders, No. 19, headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, January 19, 1899.

The general duties of the issuing commissary consists of supplying rations to all troops in, and in the vicinity of, Manila. At the commencement of hostilities and until the lines became too far advanced all troops were rationed by me. As many as 200,000 rations have been issued in a single day. The issuing commissary also supplies fresh beef and bread to all commissaries on the advanced lines and outlying posts. To supply officers, hospitals, etc., a depot for the sale of fresh meat is maintained. In addition, all recruits en route for Iloilo, Jolo, and Negros are supplied with the proper rations, travel or field, as depends upon circumstances. Savings vouchers are also paid upon presentation, as many as 105 being paid during a single month.

Troops on outlying posts unable to bake bread have been furnished with 132,000 2-pound loaves of fresh bread. The issues of fresh beef some days have been over 83,000 pounds, entailing an immense lot of labor for the employees.

The system used in supplying organizations with rations is worthy of consideration and study. Two hundred thousand rations have been issued in six hours. These rations are issued in bulk to regimental or battalion commissaries, and are so invoiced. To smaller organizations, companies, batteries, troops, and detachments they are issued from the ration returns. This system enables the department to promptly supply every organization with proper rations.

To show the successful operations of this system: On February 4 fresh beef was issued. The next fresh-meat day was February 6, but owing to the advance of our lines and continuous fighting and to the fact that travel rations had been issued, no fresh beef was ordered by organizations on February 6, 1899, but on February 7 fresh beef was supplied to the troops.

METHOD OF LOADING STORES.

Before the outbreak of hostilities all stores were loaded by troops, each regiment sending a detail of about 25 men. The necessity of men being on the firing line being apparent, application was made for native laborers, which were furnished by the Quartermaster's Department. This enabled a regiment to get its supplies on the lines with only a small guard to protect the stores.

METHOD OF TRANSPORTING STORES.

The Quartermaster's Department furnished transportation as follows:

Carabao carts and escort wagons for the transportation of supplies to troops stationed around line of blockhouses and advanced posts, such as Pasay, Deposito, etc. Tug and casco transportation to troops stationed at San Pedro Macati, Pasig, Pateros, Morong, and to other points along Pasig River and on Laguna de Bay. Troops at Imus, Las Piñas, and Bacoar were principally supplied by tug and casco transportation.

Troops at Malolos, Calumpit, San Fernando, and immediate points were furnished transportation by railroad (Manila and Dagupan), operated by the Quartermaster's Department.

Troops at Candaba and San Luis, by boat transportation, via railroad to Calumpit.

Troops at Balinag, railroad, wagon, and water transportation.

REMARKS ON QUALITY OF STORES ISSUED DURING PERIOD FEBRUARY 1 TO JUNE 30, 1899.

FRESH BEEF.

Frozen beef.—This was received from Australia on the *Duke of Sutherland*, which arrived with her cargo in the bay of Manila, I believe, in September, 1898, and furnished fresh meat to the army from that date to the middle of April, 1899. During the latter part of April and up to the middle of May frozen beef was received from the United States Navy supply ship *Culgoa*. The advantages of this class of meat are:

I. *Quality:* It is of a class known to trade as "export beef," and is of a quality superior in every respect to meat sold to the trade or issued to the army in the States.

II. The cattle are inspected before, and the meat after, slaughter. This insures healthy meat and the exclusion of diseased cattle.

III. The cattle are slaughtered by expert butchers and the meat cared for by experts while in storage.

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IV. The capacity of a ship is such that a large supply is always on hand, which enables the department to supply any unusual demand called for, as has been done in the past when expeditions have left Manila.

V. Frozen beef has given excellent satisfaction to the troops, not one complaint having been received by me as to the quality and freshness of the meat.

VI. The most important advantage of frozen beef is its keeping qualities. It enables the department to send meat to all parts of the lines, reaching there in a frozen state and in excellent condition. During the time meat was received from the United States Navy, a lot was drawn at 4 p. m. one afternoon and about 3 p. m. the next afternoon it was sent to Corregidor Island by boat, 36 miles from Manila, and when landed the day after was found to be just thawed out.

During hostilities, and owing to the movement of troops, organizations could not always draw their meat which had been ordered. This beef was covered with paraffin and issued next day, and was always in excellent condition. Had this been chilled beef or freshly slaughtered beef, it would have spoiled.

The quarters being covered with muslin keeps the meat clean while being handled.

FRESH BEEF SLAUGHTERED IN MANILA.

On April 27 sixteen cattle were slaughtered and the meat issued to the troops. The cattle were well-bred, fat Australian steers, weighing about 1,350 pounds. In the market they would be classed as dressed-beef steers, a class of cattle not used by the firms in the States who supply the Army with beef. The cattle were inspected by Dr. W. T. Monsarrat and pronounced healthy. This beef did not give the satisfaction that the frozen beef does. The objections are:

I. The climate here is such that the cattle must be killed during the night, issued early in the morning, and cooked at once.

II. The meat is used before the animal heat leaves the carcass: this causes intestinal disorders.

III. It does not stand transportation.

IV. Cost: The army at Manila and vicinity would require about 70 cattle (Australian) per day, or 100 if native cattle were used. In the first case it would require a number of cattle steamers, probably four, to furnish the necessary number of animals. In the second case there are not enough native cattle to supply the demand. In addition, the cost of inspectors, butchers, slaughterhouses, etc., must be taken into consideration.

CHILLED BEEF.

An attempt was made to issue a small lot of chilled beef from the U. S. transports *Grant* and *Sherman* upon their arrival at this port. The meat, while not bad if used on the transports, was not fit for issue to the troops in the city. As soon as the fresh beef came in contact with the warm air it turned green and the stench was very marked.

Remarks.—Having served in the Philippines since June 30, 1898, and having observed the native cattle slaughtered in Cavite, upon the arrival of the first expedition; and, having observed the frozen beef, chilled beef, and freshly-slaughtered Australian beef issued to the troops, I am of the opinion that frozen beef is superior in quality and more economical than any other class of fresh beef that may be supplied the Army serving in the Philippines.

BACON.

The issue bacon is not all satisfactory. The bacon is mild cured; instead of winter pack, well cured and smoked. It is wrapped in heavy paper and covered with wash cloth, and often packed in air-tight boxes instead of crates. The result is that the bacon heats and becomes rancid and unfit for use.

If bacon is properly cured, smoked, and packed, there will be no difficulty in keeping it. Unless this is done the Department will be seriously hampered by the lack of salt meats.

Excellent quality.

SALMON.

FLOUR.

Excellent quality, with the exception of a lot received from the transport *Sheridan*. Much of this was found caked and full of weavils.

HARD BREAD.

That which is now used was packed by the American Biscuit Company. No Portland Cracker Company hard bread is issued, as their entire pack is unfit for use. Had there been no hard bread on hand except the Portland bread, much suffering by the troops would have resulted.

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Excellent.

BEANS.

FRESH POTATOES AND ONIONS.

During the operations troops have had a plentiful supply of fresh potatoes and onions. They were of excellent quality and were in good condition. In case that any of the potatoes or onions were found bad, the contractor replaced them without cost to the Government.

The troops in Manila receive a better quality, in most cases, of potatoes and onions than troops receive in the States. On account of long haul and cost of transportation the contractor selects only the best for shipment. I believe the best method of supplying our troops with fresh vegetables is by the present system. It has been shown by experience that good potatoes and onions can be shipped to Manila, and that they keep in good condition until consumed. If shipped by cold storage they can only be issued to troops serving in Manila, and then they will keep only a few days after issue.

TOMATOES, CANNED.

Fairly good; yet many of the cans are bulged and the contents fermented. Gallon cans show a greater amount of bad than the 2½ and 3 pound cans. They should not be issued.

All other stores are of good quality and keep in excellent condition. The rice and sugar issued were purchased in this market and are of excellent quality, and the purchase of the same is economical, the cost of rice being about 2.9 and sugar 4½ cents per pound.

The issues of perishable articles of the ration have been very successful; 1,991,972 pounds fresh beef and 162,534 pounds fresh mutton were issued, transferred, sold, etc. In handling this large quantity of fresh meat, 1,766 pounds fresh beef and 2,502 pounds fresh mutton spoiled, and was a loss to the Government. This is remarkable, considering that the issues were made during an active campaign and troops moving from place to place.

One million nine hundred and twelve thousand two hundred and thirty-six pounds fresh potatoes and 400,735 pounds fresh onions were issued without loss to the Government, the contractor replacing all bad stock, even when returned by organizations. This has been an immense saving for the Government, as even in the States the loss on fresh vegetables is considerable.

ADAPTABILITY OF THE RATION AS NOW ISSUED.

My views are expressed in the following letter:

OFFICE CHIEF COMMISSARY SECOND BRIGADE, FIRST DIVISION,
EIGHTH ARMY CORPS, AND ISSUING COMMISSARY,
FIRST AND SECOND DIVISIONS.

Capt. W. W. WETHERSPOON.

Twelfth U. S. Infantry, Recorder Board of Officers.

SIR: In compliance with instructions contained in letter dated the 15th instant, I have the honor to submit herewith my views on the matter of a proper ration for our troops serving in the Philippines. The ration as now issued to them consists of the following articles:

Meat components:		Ounces.	Vegetable components—Continued.	
Fresh beef	20	Onions, fresh.	
Or fresh beef	16	Tomatoes.	
Evaporated fruit (apples, peaches, prunes)	2	Coffee and sugar components:	
Rice	2	Coffee—	
Or Oatmeal	2	Green.	
Bacon	12	Roasted.	
Fish (salmon)	16	Ground.	
Bread components:			Tea.	
Flour (baking powder when necessary).			Sugar.	
Hard bread.			Seasoning components:	
Vegetable components:			Vinegar.	
Beans.			Salt.	
Rice.			Pepper, black.	
Potatoes, fresh.			Soap and candle components:	
			Soap.	
			Candles.	

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Vegetables and meat are issued as follows for the period of ten days:

Vegetables:	Per cent.	Meat:	Days
Potatoes, fresh	75	Fresh beef	7
Onions, fresh	15	Bacon	2
Tomatoes, canned	10	Salmon	1

Having shown what articles of the ration are issued to our troops, let us see what use they can be put to when turned over to the company cook for preparation for food.

Fresh beef furnishes materials for soups, roasts, steaks, hash, stews, meat pies, stock, etc.

Bacon can be fried, boiled, or baked with beans. The drippings furnish lard, and is useful in many ways.

The salmon can be used cold or used for hash, baked, or as a salad.

Flour furnishes the bread and can be used in many ways by the company cook to improve the fare and give variety, such as pancakes, pies, puddings, etc.

Beans. No dry vegetable gives the same satisfaction. Baked, boiled, or used in soups, beans are always eaten with relish.

Rice, when used in posts or permanent camps, can be boiled or used in soups; makes an excellent pudding and cakes.

Potatoes, boiled, baked, fried, stewed, in soups, hash, etc., are always palatable and have no substitute.

Onions are invaluable: used in soups, stews, hash, boiled, fried, or eaten raw, are always relished by the men.

Tomatoes, canned, are used for stews, soups, gravies, besides eaten raw.

The allowance of sugar, coffee, and seasoning components is ample.

All articles of the ration give excellent satisfaction, with the exception of the canned salmon. The men are not fond of it. This is partly due to the fact that the cooks serve it without preparing it by warming and seasoning. As it is, organizations can make savings of salmon, and, as it is usually worth between 8 and 9 cents per pound, companies lose nothing by its issue, the average meat ration costing less than that. The allowance of the ration is so ample companies can make savings and purchase such extra articles as they may need.

Taking the straight ration, it affords such a great variety that troops can subsist on it without further additions thereto.

Troops do not care for a variety of articles as is shown by the additions made during the past year, viz.: Salmon and evaporated fruits, oatmeal or rice, in lieu of fresh beef. Most all organizations draw the straight meat ration, occasionally drawing the fruit and rice or oatmeal for variety.

It would be extremely difficult to find a substitute for any article of the ration as now issued. Additions or substitutions may be made and give satisfaction for awhile, but it would not be permanent.

During nearly fifteen years' service—seven years as an enlisted man, during which time I had experience in preparing the ration, and afterwards as a first sergeant in charge of the battery mess, and having served in the Philippines since June 30, 1898—I am of the opinion that the ration as now issued is well adapted to the necessities of troops serving in the Philippines.

C. R. KRAUTHOFF,

Captain and Commissary Subsistence, U. S. V.

Since the foregoing was written, 2 ounces of dried fruit has been added to the ration, which will give the troops a greater quantity of an excellent component of the ration.

In closing my report I desire to invite attention to the excellent work done by the enlisted men, volunteers and regulars, who have been on special duty at the issuing commissary. They have performed an immense amount of work. The storerooms are open for issue at 5.45 a. m., and close when no one desires rations. Sundays are not observed, and even at night rations have been supplied. I also desire to thank the chief commissary of the department and corps for the assistance and advice given me during my service in the subsistence department.

Very respectfully,

CHAS. R. KRAUTHOFF,

Captain and Commissary Subsistence, U. S. V.

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HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
OFFICE CHIEF COMMISSARY,
San Fernando, P. I., August 12, 1899.

Maj. D. L. BRAINARD,
Commissary of Subsistence, U. S. V., Chief Commissary,
Department of the Pacific, Manila, P. I.

SIR: In compliance with your recent request, I have the honor to submit the following brief statement of service rendered by the subsistence department in Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, since my assignment thereto as division commissary, October 25, 1898. Until February 5, 1899, the troops, being then quartered in the city of Manila, received the full garrison ration, as follows:

	Pounds.	Ounces.		Pounds.	Ounces.
Fresh beef (seven days in ten)	1	0	Onions	0	3½
Bacon (two days in ten) ..	½	0	(Or potatoes, 75 per cent; onions, 15 per cent; canned tomatoes, 10 per cent.)		
Salmon (one day in ten) ..	1	0	Coffee	0	1½
Fresh bread, daily	1	2	Sugar	0	2½
Beans	0	2½	Vinegar, salt, and pepper in authorized proportions.		
Or peas	0	2½			
Or rice	0	1½			
Or hominy	0	1½			
Potatoes	0	12½			

To above was added, on days of fresh-beef issue, the option of 4 ounces more of fresh beef or 2 ounces each of rice, dried fruits, or oatmeal. Also canned meats, fruits, butter, milk and cream, preserves, and a long list of delicacies, sold by the the subsistence department at cost, were purchased by organizations with proceeds of savings from the ration and profits of regimental bakery, these sources sometimes yielding over \$1,000 to an organization per month, of which nearly the whole was used in increasing the ration. The almost perfect operation of the cold-storage service enabled the subsistence department to deliver to the troops fresh beef and fresh vegetables of a quality not surpassed in any market of the United States. The bread was delivered to the troops partly from the regimental bakeries and partly from the depot bakery, and in both cases with entire satisfaction.

During the night of February 4 and 5, 1899, the troops left their city quarters, and, driving the enemy before them, took ground along the line of blockhouses; and from that date to the present have been continuously either confronting the enemy in intrenched positions or actively operating against him over a country as difficult as any ever passed by an army. I give herewith extracts from my reports forwarded to the adjutant-general, Second Division:

From report for period February 4 to March 20:

"On the evening of February 5, after hard fighting and a general advance all along the division line, the troops were given their supper promptly at the regular hour; and during all the subsequent movements, while the troops have been constantly confronting the enemy, either in line or in the trenches, the continuous supply of rations has been maintained without a break; and at all times a reserve of at least two days' of travel rations has been kept on hand. On February 5 and 6 a portion of the division subsisted on the travel ration, being:

	Pounds.		Ounces.
Canned corned beef	½	Coffee	1½
Hard bread	1	Sugar	2½

"But, with that exception, the troops have received the full garrison ration.

"The cooking and service of the ration is reported to be such as to give general and entire satisfaction. Men in the trenches receive the kind of meals usually given in quarters, and to advanced pickets at exposed points close to the enemy hot coffee and meals are carried. Much of the service of distribution has been necessarily rendered under fire, and the distributing points along the division front, including the reserve station and salesroom established by Captain Bootes at Calocan, have at times been practically on the firing line."

From report for period March 20 to May 31, 1899:

"From March 20 to March 25 the division remained in the lines occupied on the former date, and the subsistence service continued to be of the character then reported.

"From March 25, when the command moved on Malolos from the positions at Calocan and La Loma, the organizations still maintained their supply by means of the regimental transportation, drawing subsistence stores directly from the

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issuing commissary at Manila; and this continued until the arrival of the division at Marilao station, March 28. At that point supplies reached the division by rail, and it became necessary to appoint an issuing commissary for the command; Lieut. James Harkins, Tenth Pennsylvania Volunteers, commissary second brigade, being assigned to that duty. On the same date Capt. S. B. Bootes, commissary of subsistence, U. S. V., was relieved from duty as commissary first brigade, and assigned to the charge of sales of subsistence stores for the division. From that time to the present, the system then adopted has continued in practice. Stores are shipped from Manila to the issuing commissary of the division, and by him issued to the organizations, either on invoice or on ration returns, as may be desired.

"From March 25 to March 31 (the campaign from La Loma to Malolos) the troops subsisted mainly on the travel ration. From April 25 to May 6 (the campaign from Malolos to San Fernando) the ration was substantially the same, with bacon substituted for about three-fourths of the canned corned beef. During the division's occupation of Malolos and vicinity, March 31 to April 23, the troops were supplied by rail, and daily issues of fresh beef, bread, and vegetables were made, as in Manila. Since the reopening of the railway communication, after reaching San Fernando, the same character of supply has been maintained. The details as to kinds and quantities of stores furnished were fully stated in my report for the period, February 4 to March 20. During the entire period of this report, except for the march from La Loma to Marilao, March 25 to 28, a subsistence salesroom has been in operation, to the great convenience of both officers and enlisted men. An average of about 100 native laborers accompanying the division have been subsisted on the Indian ration during and since the recent movements.

"The division has lost, during the period reported for, a large number of commissary officers. From the First Brigade, Capt. S. B. Bootes, commissary of subsistence, U. S. V., brigade commissary, was ordered to Corregidor Hospital April 1; Capt. Seth M. Milliken, commissary of subsistence, U. S. V., his successor, was sent to Cavite Hospital April 14, since which date no officer has been assigned as commissary First Brigade; Capt. M. G. Krayenbuhl, commissary of subsistence, U. S. V., commissary Second Brigade, a brave and accomplished officer, was killed on Sunday, March 26, in the action near Po o.

"His successor, Lieutenant Harkins, Tenth Pennsylvania Volunteers, was ordered to the United States March 31; Lieutenant Holly, Fourteenth U. S. Infantry, next assigned, was ordered to hospital at Manila April 5, being relieved by Capt. James A. Logan, jr., commissary of subsistence, U. S. V., on duty since April 15 as issuing commissary.

"The fact that in spite of these frequent changes the satisfactory character of the subsistence supply has been maintained, while the division was covering in its operations a wide extent of extremely difficult country, speaks for itself in praise of the valuable service of the issuing commissaries to whom this duty has been intrusted.

"In particular I wish to mention Capt. James A. Logan, jr., commissary of subsistence, U. S. V., who has since his assignment on April 15 discharged the duties of his position, made difficult by the necessary separation of troops and multiplication of depots, with extraordinary ability and efficiency. From May 3 to 15 he was conducting at the same time four depots and three sales rooms with a force usually considered not too large for one station.

"And I desire to repeat the acknowledgment made in my former report of the very efficient transportation furnished by the Quartermaster's Department, which has made practicable the subsistence service rendered."

From date of above-cited report, June 10 to June 31, the subsistence service for the division continued as then reported.

And on July 7, 1899, per telegraph, chief commissary, Department of the Pacific, issues were authorized under paragraph 2, General Orders, No. 78, Adjutant-General's Office, 1899, permitting reduction of beef and substitution of sales stores of equal value, and an addition of 2 ounces of dried fruits per ration.

The issuing commissary, Capt. James A. Logan, jr., commissary of subsistence, U. S. V., maintains at San Fernando a reserve of two months' rations for the division, and at the San Fernando sales depot is kept a correspondingly large supply of sales stores in charge of Capt. Will H. Point, Thirty-sixth U. S. V., temporarily assigned.

Issues and sales to July 31, 1899, have been reported by Capt. James A. Logan, jr., commissary of subsistence, U. S. V., issuing commissary Second Division, in his report of August 1, 1899, and sales to July 31 per my report to chief commissary Department of the Pacific of July 29, 1899.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. H. FITZHUGH,
Major and Chief Commissary of Subsistence, U. S. V.,
Chief Commissary Second Division.

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SAN FERNANDO, P. I., August 12, 1899.

The CHIEF COMMISSARY,

Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor, in accordance with instructions received from the chief commissary Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, to submit the following report of work performed by me from April 10, 1899, to August 1, 1899, as brigade commissary, Second Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps; issuing commissary Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, and from April 23, 1899, until May 28, 1899, as sales commissary with the Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

Until April 24, while at Malolos, the straight ration was issued, beef and bread being sent daily from Manila. The supplies kept on hand at Malolos varied from three to four weeks, including usually seven days' travel rations. In addition to the usual stores there was an assortment of sales stores.

April 25, 1899, an issuing and sales depot was established at Bagbag, and a few days after another issue and sales depot at Calumpit. The troops during this period were subsisting on the travel and field rations.

May 6, 1899, an additional issue depot was also established at San Fernando. During the period before the railroad was built to San Fernando, and while the troops were at that point, the field ration was issued, beef and soft bread being furnished whenever possible from Manila. The remarkable keeping qualities of the fresh beef was very noticeable here, as the beef was unloaded at Bagbag, then was loaded from train on bull carts and taken to Calumpit, where it was placed on flat cars and pushed by hand some 8 miles, all the time subject to the intense heat and other climatic conditions. The time taken transporting the beef from the railroad train to San Fernando, where it was issued, usually necessitated the beef remaining unissued for twenty hours, and there was not a single complaint filed against the quality or condition when issued.

As soon as railroad communication was established through to San Fernando and suitable buildings procured for storage a month's supplies were brought from Manila and stored, and later another month's were brought, the depot always keeping two months ahead, and in addition eight days' travel rations for the division. The depots at Malolos, Bagbag, and Calumpit were abandoned and the rations taken to San Fernando.

The total money value of stores sold during this period was \$7,440.87, and the number of troops supplied with rations varied from 4,000 to 6,000 men. I wish to mention here my appreciation of the interest both Major Anderson, depot commissary, and Captain Krauthoff, issuing commissary, at Manila, took in seeing that the supplies always reached me in time, even though my telegraphic requisitions were numerous and confusing.

I am, sir, very respectfully,

JAMES A. LOGAN, Jr.,
Captain and Commissary of Subsistence, U. S. V.

APPENDIX G.

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF PAYMASTER,
Manila, P. I., August 5, 1899.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: In compliance with the instructions of the major-general commanding, I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the pay department of this army for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1899:

The following paymasters have been on duty at Manila during the year:

Maj. Charles McClure, paymaster, U. S. A., chief paymaster, arrived July 25, 1898.

Maj. Charles Whipple, paymaster, U. S. A., arrived July 25, 1898.

Maj. Charles E. Kilbourne, paymaster, U. S. A., arrived July 25, 1898.

Maj. William G. Gambrell, additional paymaster, U. S. V., arrived July 31, 1898.

Maj. H. C. Fitzgerald, additional paymaster, U. S. V., arrived July 31, 1898.

Maj. T. D. Keleher, additional paymaster, U. S. V., arrived July 31, 1898.

Maj. William B. Rochester, additional paymaster, U. S. V., arrived July 31, 1898.

Maj. H. M. Lord, additional paymaster, U. S. V., arrived July 31, 1898.

Maj. John M. Sears, additional paymaster, U. S. V., arrived July 31, 1898.

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Maj. John Demeritt, additional paymaster, U. S. V., arrived August 24, 1898.
 Maj. William B. Schofield, additional paymaster, U. S. V., arrived October 4, 1898.
 Maj. M. F. Sheary, additional paymaster, U. S. V., arrived October 4, 1898.
 Maj. Theodore Sternberg, additional paymaster, U. S. V., arrived October 4, 1898.
 Maj. Charles E. Stanton, additional paymaster, U. S. V., arrived February 23, 1899.

Maj. Eugene Coffin, additional paymaster, U. S. V., arrived April 7, 1899.
 Maj. Geo. T. Holloway, additional paymaster, U. S. V., arrived June 18, 1899.
 Maj. James Canby, additional paymaster, U. S. V., arrived June 18, 1899.

Of the seventeen paymasters, five were relieved and ordered back to the United States and sailed: Maj. Charles H. Whipple, October 26, 1898; Maj. H. M. Lord, November 14, 1898; Maj. John Demeritt, January 13, 1899; Maj. H. C. Fitzgerald, April 27, 1899; Maj. John M. Sears, June 13, 1899.

Major Demeritt was taken sick soon after his arrival and remained in the hospital until his departure.

Major Whipple was, August 18, 1898, detailed as custodian of the Spanish public funds.

Maj. T. D. Keleher was, August 31, 1898, announced as disbursing officer of the provost-marshal-general's office in Manila.

Maj. Charles E. Kilbourne was, September 5, 1898, detailed as auditor of public (civil) accounts, and entered on duty October 1, and, when Major Whipple was ordered home, was detailed, October 10, to relieve him as treasurer and custodian of public funds. These officers rendered no more duty in the pay department.

Maj. Theodore Sternberg was appointed February 22, 1899, receiver of public money at Iloilo, but continues on duty in the department and pays the troops stationed on the island of Panay.

The pay department during the year lost the services of five excellent paymasters and nine skilled clerks.

At present there are ten paymasters on duty with the troops, and two are permanently relieved from their legitimate duties by detail with the civil government.

The maximum number of troops paid at any one time during the year was about 35,000.

The following table shows the amounts of money and denominations shipped from San Francisco to me during the fiscal year:

Brought by—	Received at Manila.	Gold.		Silver.					
		Eagles.	Half eagles.	Dollars.	Halves.	Quarters.	Dimes.	Nickels.	Cents.
Major McClure	1898. July 25	\$330,500	\$500,000	\$30,000	\$10,000	\$3,000	\$12,000	\$1,000	\$800
Major Schofield	Oct. 12	400,000	500,000	70,000	10,000	6,000	12,000	1,000	1,000
Major Stanton	1899. Feb. 25	400,000	850,000						
Major Coffin ¹	Apr. 7	350,000	400,000						
Major Holloway	June 21	500,000	500,000	60,000	12,000	12,000			
Total gold		2,280,500	2,750,000						
Total silver				190,000	32,000	24,000	24,000	2,000	1,800
Major Coffin ¹	Apr. 7	290,000	220,000						
Total		2,500,500	2,970,000	190,000	32,000	24,000	24,000	2,000	1,800

¹ Treasury notes.

NOTE.—I brought also \$40,500 of special fund of general commanding in addition to above in gold.

RÉSUMÉ.

Pay department gold received	\$5,030,500.00
Pay department currency received	500,000.00
Pay department silver coin received	273,800.00
Total	5,804,300.00
In addition received from soldiers' deposits	521,119.91
In addition from checks given officers and men for cash and army and paymasters' collections	1,674,557.79
Total cash	7,999,977.70
Disbursed by pay department during fiscal year	5,850,375.79
Balance cash on hand June 30, 1899	2,149,601.91

But few checks for cash are required by the regular troops, but they make many soldiers' deposits with the paymaster. The volunteers also deposit largely and required many checks to send their pay home. For six months ending June 30, 9,801 deposits were received from soldiers, amounting to \$402,941.55.

Heavy doors of iron grating have been recently put in the treasury room, and the windows are protected by iron grating also. An electric light illuminates the room at night, permitting the guard to see the interior. At times the safes in the treasury have contained more than \$3,000,000 in gold and silver. Two sentinels guard the room day and night, and a company of soldiers are quartered in the building near by.

The banks of Manila do not receive deposits of gold without crediting the amount as its equivalent in silver, as this country is on a silver basis. The rate at present is \$2 Mexican or Filipino for 1 United States dollar, gold, silver, or Treasury note. When an officer or enlisted man wishes gold to pay his commissary bill he has to pay \$2.05 at the bank for it if his money is on deposit in one of the local banks. To avoid this loss the chief paymaster receives from officers and enlisted men packages of money for safe keeping, and the Army has availed itself of the privilege to a great extent, and two large fireproof safes in the treasury room are filled with hundreds of these deposits, amounting at present to about \$200,000, gold.

One half million of dollars in United States Treasury notes were paid to the troops in May last. Before asking for paper money I had the assurance of the agents of the chartered bank of India, Australia, and China, and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, that they would accept it at the same rate as for gold. When the troops offered the notes at the stores the shopkeepers at first hesitated to accept them as equal to gold, but in a few days they were taken by everyone at their proper valuation. Being more convenient than gold, the bankers now ask that more of them be used here in payment of the army.

When the troops first arrived in the Philippines they began to educate the inhabitants to taking our money at its proper valuation. Gold then was worth \$2.08. Gradually the people realized that all of our silver coins were worth in Mexican or Filipino coin double their face value, as the United States was on a gold basis, and that they represented gold.

Difficulty was experienced in having our dime circulated as worth a peseta (20 cents Mexican or Filipino silver piece), as it was so much smaller than the peseta. Recently the pay department needed dimes and the paymaster visited the banks and stores and gave gold in exchange for them, which at once brought them up to the value of 20 cents in other silver coins, and now the community accepts them at that rate. Our 5-cent pieces and cents circulate as 10-cent and 2-cent pieces, respectively. There has been a great scarcity of Spanish copper coins (clacos and cuartillos) in these islands, as they are above par at present in Spain, and have been shipped back to that country by speculators at a profit.

A few days since I purchased a Japanese teapot. It cost \$1. I gave the merchant an American silver dollar, and he returned me as change a Mexican silver dollar containing $4\frac{1}{2}$ grains more silver than the one I had given him. I got the teapot, apparently, for nothing, and exchanged my dollar for one containing more silver than the one I had given in payment, because our country is on a gold basis and the stamp of the United States doubled the value of our dollar in this remote quarter of the globe, but in reality the dollar I received in change only had the purchasing power of 50 cents in our money.

Merchants have expressed to me the fear that if these islands are put on a gold basis that the principal industries—sugar, hemp, and tobacco—may be ruined by the consequent increase in wages, as the laborers are now paid in Mexican or Filipino silver. No legislation by Congress in the matter is required, as it will adjust itself in time, and it will work out satisfactorily. If the matter is left to solve itself the industries will not, in my opinion, be disturbed, for while large commercial transactions will be conducted in gold, the manufacturers and planters who employ native labor will change their gold for Mexican or Filipino silver, and continue to pay laborers in the coin to which they are accustomed, and which has one-half the purchasing power at present of American gold or United States Treasury notes.

There is a difficulty and inconsistency which the mercantile community encounters at present in dealing with the United States officials. The merchant sells his goods for American money, but when he goes to the custom-house to pay the duties on the goods he imports he finds that the American officials in an American custom-house will not receive in payment American gold or American Treasury notes, but require him to pay the duties in Mexican or Filipino dollars (pesos). If the United States customs and internal revenue collectors and taxgatherers would accept United States money at the rate the banks accept it, and as it fluctuates but very little at present, it could be deposited at the intendencia (public treasury) the same day, and the United States Treasurer could have it credited to his

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account with the banks in which he keeps his funds at its value in Mexican or Filipino pesos without loss to the United States, and it would give confidence in and a stable value to our currency.

There is but one bank of issue in the Philippines, the Banco Filipino-Español, which, under its concession from Spain, which runs for twenty-one years longer, has the power to issue four million and a half dollars in paper. It never issued more than \$1,522,350 at Manila and \$259,700 at Iloilo; total, \$1,782,050, equivalent to \$891,025 gold.

Of this amount the management thinks \$400,000 have been lost or destroyed, as repeated calls have failed to bring it in for redemption. Paper money in a country on a silver basis is needed for convenience in trade, and the amount here in circulation, \$1,382,000, is inadequate for the volume of business transacted. Of the half million of dollars in United States Treasury notes put in circulation by the pay department but little remains in the islands. The two English banks sent to the United States \$200,000 of it by registered mail in one week, as the insurance against loss in transit cost only one-quarter of 1 per cent, and the postage and registration of the packages were an insignificant charge.

As it takes the present force of paymasters here nearly a month to pay the troops after muster, it is recommended that all the sick and wounded at the reserve hospitals be mustered for pay by the surgeons at the hospitals. Under existing orders (vide General Order No. 82, War Department, of June 27, 1898) the sick and wounded in the hospitals are mustered with their regiments as sick in such a hospital. After paying the regiments much time is lost by each paymaster in visiting the hospitals of Manila, Corregidor, and Cavite to find the sick and wounded on his rolls and pay them. The transportation of the Quartermaster's Department is uselessly taxed to send so many paymasters to the numerous hospitals at different times, when if each hospital had mustered on rolls its inmates it could be promptly paid by one paymaster's visit.

The paymasters on duty with this army have during the year discharged their duties with zeal and fidelity and have accounted faithfully and accurately for the money received by them. They have followed the troops in active campaign and paid them in the trenches, where they were sometimes more or less exposed to the fire of the enemy. They have found the regiments and paid them promptly, sometimes under conditions of toil and hardship, animated by the same determined and courageous spirit which has characterized the troops of this army.

As our soldiers occupy the islands of Panay, Negros, Cebu, and Sulu, besides Luzon, holding long lines and occupying this island from San Fernando to Imus, it takes the present force of paymasters nearly one month to make the payment after muster. It is recommended that more paymasters be ordered here for duty. When reinforcements arrive and the town and seaports are garrisoned the present force of paymasters will prove inadequate for the duty expected of it.

There has been no dissatisfaction expressed with the pay department of this army during the year. On the contrary, the army has been satisfied with the promptness with which it has been paid and appreciates highly the privilege extended to the officers and enlisted men of receiving paymaster's checks for their cash to make remittances to their families.

Very respectfully,

CHAS. MCCLURE,
Major and Paymaster, U. S. A., Chief Paymaster.

Appendix H.

HDQS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
OFFICE CHIEF ENGINEER,
Manila, P. I., June 30, 1899.

The ADJUTANT GENERAL,
Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of work done by the Engineer Department since the organization of the Philippine Expedition in May, 1898:

I reported for duty with the expeditionary forces to the acting adjutant-general Department of California, May 13, 1898, and later to Maj. Gens. E. S. Otis and Wesley Merritt.

Application was made at once for engineer troops, both regular and volunteer, and for funds to outfit the expedition.

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PUENTE DE ESPAÑA SPANNING THE PASIG RIVER AT MANILA



IRON BRIDGE ACROSS PASIG RIVER. MANILA.

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For troops, there came later in May, Company A, Battalion of Engineers (8 officers and 60 men, afterwards recruited to 120), and funds sufficient for all purposes.

During the month of June a complete outfit, necessary for an army of 20,000 for one year's service, including a siege, was purchased and loaded on the steamer *Morgan City*, sailing from San Francisco on June 27, 1898.

Lieut. W. D. Connor with 20 men left with the second expedition. Lieut. Charles P. Echols following with 100 on the *Indiana* on June 27, and myself on the *Newport* on the 29th. The latter vessel arrived in Manila Bay July 25, and I found Lieutenant Connor's detachment just moving from Cavite to Camp Dewey. With this party Lieutenant Connor and myself made a reconnoissance of the front around to San Pedro Macati, and Lieutenant Connor repaired roads and bridges in several places. The remainder of the company came into camp a few days before the advance on Manila, each portion being assigned to a brigade of the division under General Anderson, and coming into the city with the other troops.

In August Lieutenant Connor was assigned to duty in charge of the waterworks, and Lieutenant Echols being sick, and afterwards ordered home, the company was commanded by Lieut. W. G. Haan, Third U. S. Artillery, from that time till March 11, when Capt. F. R. Shunk reported and took command of the company.

Prior to the outbreak of hostilities the company was employed in making reconnoissances as far out as they were allowed to go (in one case a party was captured and held at Malolos as prisoners for two days) in surveying the city and repairing roads and bridges.

On February 5 the company acted as infantry, assisting the First California Volunteer Infantry in the capture of San Pedro Macati. A few days later they made a reconnoissance beyond this point and had some sharp fighting.

From the time Captain Shunk took command the company has constructed and repaired a large number of bridges, made several ferries, done reconnoissance work in many places, removed sunken cascoes loaded with stone at two points on the Pasig River, demolished walls in the town of Pasig, and repaired roads at various places. In addition to this, when General MacArthur started his advance on Malolos, two detachments were sent out, one with the right with Captain Shunk to build a footbridge over Tullahan River, and one with the left under Lieut. W. P. Wooten, to assist in repairing the railroad and remain with the command indefinitely.

After building the footbridge on the right, the detachment under Captain Shunk also (contrary to my intention) went on with the command to Malolos where the two detachments were united in one under Lieutenant Wooten. This consolidated detachment has been with General MacArthur ever since, and has done excellent work.

The company has now about the same strength with which it started out, and has three officers, Capt. F. R. Shunk, Lieut. W. P. Wooten, and Lieut. Horton Stickle, all of whom have cooperated to do rapid and efficient work.

With the assistance of enlisted men detailed from the company, and with transportation furnished by the quartermaster, I have been enabled to furnish promptly all tools and materials called for from all points of the line; have furnished such maps as could be obtained to all parties asking for them; and, by furnishing instruments and material, have gotten some very good reconnoissance by line officers.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CHAS. L. POTTER,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. V., Chief Engineer.

APPENDIX I.

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
OFFICE CHIEF ORDNANCE OFFICER,
Manila, P. I., July 26, 1899.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: Pursuant to your instructions of the 19th instant, I have the honor to submit the following report showing the operations in the ordnance department at this depot for the year ending June 30, 1899. The operations consisted in supplying the firing line in and around Manila, P. I., with ordnance, ordnance stores, and ammunition.

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Since February 4, 1899, the Quartermaster's Department, upon application being made, furnished 40 bull teams and light horse carts, which were kept at this arsenal constantly for immediate use; this number was afterwards increased to as many as 60, upon necessity.

A gang of 40 Chinamen was also kept at the arsenal day and night, and subsisted near the arsenal by the Government.

Ammunition was moved out to the firing line at a moment's notice, upon telegraphic request, note, or verbal application, under proper guard.

Quite a quantity of ammunition, arms, and military stores, captured from the insurgents, were brought into this arsenal.

Rapid-fire guns were placed on the line by order of the commanding general and seven 6-pounder naval guns have been placed on the river gunboats.

Several thousand Mausers, Remington rifles, and other stores, such as cannon with limbers and ammunition for same, have been returned to Spain.

On an average, 30 native mechanics, saddlers, armorers, and laborers have been employed in this arsenal in repairing canteens, haversacks, and cleaning and oiling small arms and field pieces.

All the demands that this department has been called upon to fill have been promptly supplied, and the supply of stores on hand is considered ample for present emergencies.

The means of transportation, such as railroad, casco, bull teams, etc., supplied by the Quartermaster's Department, have been sufficient for the delivery of ordnance stores on the firing line within a reasonably short time after the receipt of an order.

About 2,500 United States magazine rifles, caliber .30, were issued to the volunteer infantry, with 300 rounds of ammunition for each arm, and as these organizations are ordered home these rifles are returned to the arsenal and the Springfield rifles, formerly in their hands, reissued.

The following stores were fabricated and repaired:

Fabricated.

Gun covers for Gatling guns.....	7
Breech covers for Spanish cannon.....	2
Muzzle covers.....	2
Handspikes, trail for Gatling gun.....	10
Shafts for Hotchkiss mountain gun.....	4
Holsters for revolvers, caliber .38.....	173
Revolver belts, caliber .38.....	110
Slides for revolver cartridges.....	100
Breech cover for 3.2-inch B. L. rifle.....	1
Bridle reins, pair.....	1
Pony cincha.....	1
Cans for shipping oils.....	104
Shifter for band saw.....	1
V blocks for laying out work.....	2
Linchpins.....	5
Eyebolts and nuts, elevating gear for 3.2-inch B. L. rifle.....	8
Keys.....	5
Vent bushings for 3.2-inch rifle.....	12
Teeth for cog gear wheel.....	5
Bolt springs for caliber .38 revolver.....	9
Sear and bolt springs, caliber .45 revolver.....	12
Bolt rack.....	1
Mandrel for making canteen triangles.....	1
Saddlers' overstitching wheel.....	1
Spline screws for 3.2-inch rifle.....	14
Hinge-pin screws for 3.2-inch rifle.....	12
Firing pins for Gatling guns.....	3
Firing pins for Hotchkiss revolving cannon.....	3
Double harness, sets.....	1
Single harness, sets.....	1
Blacksmith's apron.....	1
Rear sight, 6-pounder gun.....	1
Gaskets for fire hose.....	12
Side lace leather converted into lacings.....	1
Hame straps.....	6
Canteen covers.....	538

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY. 253

or planer chuck.....	1
ance for stretching belts.....	1
, bolts, nuts, and set screws for elevating gear Gatling gun.....	9
er wrench, Springfield rifle.....	1
number plates.....	366
bolts for 6-pounder gun.....	4
ing bolts for shafting.....	8
assembling bolt for 3.2-inch rifle.....	1
or elevating device for 3.2-inch rifle.....	13
s for cavalry Gatling gun.....	2
assembling bolts, with nuts.....	2
s for 6-pounder gun.....	6
ight, 6-pounder naval gun.....	1
for caliber .30 bayonet scabbards.....	14

Repaired and cleaned.

REPAIRED.

and carbines.....	797
vers.....	113
ons.....	18
ons.....	1,580
sacks.....	519
as, sets.....	6
ry bridle.....	1
straps for harness.....	2
can horse equipments, sets, cleaned and oiled.....	200
olt.....	1
siege guns.....	4
ets.....	1,064
andspike for 3.2-inch rifle.....	1
for Gatling gun.....	9
lers, Springfield.....	8
iers, Springfield.....	4
iers, Colt's revolver, caliber .45.....	2
hisels.....	2
kiss mountain gun.....	1
ator heads, 3.2-inch rifle.....	10
ing screw, 3.2-inch rifle.....	1
rake, 3.2-inch rifle.....	1
ear wheel on main shaft.....	1
nor on engine.....	1
igers, 3.2-inch rifle.....	4
p.....	1
Hotchkiss mountain gun.....	1
pins.....	3
for Gatling gun.....	2
for Hotchkiss revolving cannon cleaned and oiled.....	645
for 6-pounder naval gun cleaned and oiled.....	1,982
ion 5-inch siege rifle.....	1
planer.....	1
saws.....	8
ctor for Gatling gun.....	1
driver for guard bow nut.....	1
ights, Springfield.....	15
plates, Springfield.....	10
l bows, Springfield.....	6
Springfield.....	23
for chests.....	4
siege mortar.....	2
siege rifles.....	4
er staff, 3.2-inch rifle.....	1
ge, Hotchkiss mountain gun.....	1
; pins, Hotchkiss revolving cannon.....	5
seals.....	2
for fire hose.....	1
feed pump.....	1

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Deck bolts, 6-pounder naval gun	32
Hotchkiss mountain gun	1
Obturator heads, 3.2-inch B. L. rifle	4
Prolongers	3
Rod brasses, "engine," sets	2
Belt for engine	1

CLEANED.

Rifles and carbines	1,885
Revolver	1
Cinchas, cavalry, shortened	100
Saddles	14
Carbine scabbards	12
Nose bags	8
Bayonet scabbards	966
Spare parts for rifles, re-blued	66

J. R. MCGINNESS,

Lieutenant-Colonel Ordnance Department, Chief Ordnance Officer.

Appendix K.

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
OFFICE OF CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER,
Ayuntamiento, Manila, P. I., August 20, 1899.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following summary of signal operations for the year ending June 30, 1899:

On the declaration of war with Spain all available signalmen and such supplies as could be hastily gathered from depots and posts were assembled at Tampa for the Cuban campaign in utter unconsciousness of the possibility of operations the other side of the world. In consequence, when orders were received to raise and equip a signal command for the Philippines, the raising could only be accomplished by enlistment and the equipment by purchase.

Enlistments began at San Francisco June 1, 1898, and on the 27th the First Volunteer Signal Company, commanded by Capt. Elmer A. McKenna, sailed, reaching Manila Bay July 31. The company was landed at Cavite the 1st of August, and the day following began the construction of a telegraph line toward Manila, the line reaching our troops at Camp Dewey August 5, since which date, whether engaged with Spaniards, occupying captured territory, or operating against insurgents, the army has been continuously served with wire communication between its several parts, save only on occasions of interruptions from natural causes, or when the lines have been pushed so far to the front or beyond protection as to tempt destruction.

During the action of August 13 against the Spanish position before Manila, touch was maintained by telegraph between the wings, the reserves, and general headquarters, and with the navy by flag from a station on the beach. The bombardment which opened the engagement was terminated by a signal that the army was advancing, and signal flags, displayed at the extreme left of the line, by prearrangement, gave indication to the navy of the army's position at all times during the advance, and enabled the *Callao*, that could run close inshore, to keep up a steady play on the Spanish fort and trenches until just before the position was carried.

With the advance of the army, a light wire was also run up the beach, and, while the enemy was still disputing the possession of an irregular second line, a station was opened thereon, giving General Anderson the first intimation of the temporary check of his right wing at Cingalon and opportunity to make immediate disposition for relieving the situation.

With the entrance of our troops into Manila came also several thousand insurgents, though Aguinaldo had been warned against permitting such action. The precautions taken to prevent their looting the town greatly incensed them, and, though subsequent negotiations effected their peaceable withdrawal, from this time on they showed a growing dislike and distrust, which manifested itself in the



SIGNAL CORPS TRANSPORTATION.

most arrogant and exasperating conduct toward everything army, and in such disposition of their forces as to cover every approach to town.

Our military telegraph to Cavite ran through a country held by them for about 25 miles. Maintenance of this line was effected by armed linemen, a repair station being placed at Bacoor. With the hardening sentiment against us came the injunction that they would permit no armed parties beyond our outposts and within what they pleased to term their jurisdiction. In accordance with instructions—though decidedly against the grain—they were humored in their demands, and for a time signal parties were sent out with rations and supplies, and on line duty and similar peaceable missions, entirely unarmed and at the mercy of the irresponsible rabble that held sway along the telegraph. The conditions, however, were too impossible for long continuance; conciliation was interpreted as weakness, and respect for the Government, as represented by the telegraph, soon vanished. It became impossible to keep up the wire; the whole community seemed to delight in interfering and cutting, and long stretches were bodily carried away. In anticipation of the inevitable, a small party of resolute signalmen were sent out to save what was possible. But 9 miles could be recovered, and this only by the exercise of nerve and diplomacy.

Fortunately, about this time a supply of harbor cable was received and quickly laid, so that no especial embarrassment resulted from the lack of overland wire.

Five days after the capture of Manila the Hongkong cable, which had been cut shortly after the naval action of May 1, was repaired. Admiral Dewey furnished the vessel for grappling and underrunning, the cable company a representative, and the signal corps a detachment and material. At the point of rupture, 2 miles off Cavite, the cable lay in about 10 fathoms. The wave action had drawn the severed end apart some 200 feet, to the full length of a heavy rope with which the Admiral had joined them to facilitate recovery. For lack of regular cable the repair was effected by splicing in a piece of insulated field wire, with such allowance of slack that the stay rope, which was left on, should bear the strain.

With the idea of avoiding complications, the cable company had sealed the Hongkong end after the cutting, and it was found necessary to send a dispatch boat across to that port with a letter from the Spanish governor-general assenting to the removal of the seal. On August 21 cable communications were reestablished.

The Hongkong cable formerly terminated at Bolinao, but under Spanish authorization of March 30, 1898, it was extended to Manila. The Spanish decree granting this extension also appears to concede the monopoly of cable privileges between Hongkong and Manila to the cable company until the year 1940, and, what is of still greater present moment, the decree gives the company exclusive landing rights, for a long term of years, for all cables joining the several islands or connecting them with other countries. The only escape from this monopoly seems to lie in the redemption of the privilege by purchase, which is provided for at the rate of £5,000 for each remaining year of the concession.

The Spanish Government, however, reserved to the public service the right of interisland communication, and it thus happens that the army is unhampered in the use of its cables for military purposes.

On August 24 the Eighteenth Signal Company, under command of Capt. Edgar Russel, arrived. The two companies were employed, during the period intervening between the capture of the city and the outbreak of the insurgents, in establishing and maintaining telegraphic stations at the various headquarters, depots of supplies, etc., and along the positions at the front occupied by our outposts. The construction, whenever practicable, being made permanent in anticipation of our ultimately taking possession of the old Spanish telegraph system throughout the island, upward of 1,500 miles in extent. Within town use was made of Spanish poles and such wires as were conveniently placed, the central office of our system being located in one of the buildings allotted as a barrack.

In preparation for field service the signal companies were divided into squads, each being assigned to specific territory and duties.

The outbreak of February 4 occurred after the indications of its coming had given the army ample time for preparation. All outposts and the headquarters of the larger commands had been put in close touch by wire, so that the slightest happenings at the most extreme points could be quickly made known.

The extent to which the field of operations rapidly developed after fighting began revealed such inadequacy in the number of signalmen that on February 10 the formation of an additional company, the Nineteenth, was directed to be accomplished by transfer of operators, electricians, and linemen from the several volunteer regiments serving in the islands. Within six weeks the new company was in the field under command of Capt. Philip J. Perkins.

From the necessities of the case the army turned its back on Manila and fought

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outward. This gave lines of supply and communication interior to the battle line encircling the town, and, as the inclosed space had previously been traversed by wires connecting outlying stations, the task of keeping up telegraphic communication as the army advanced consisted in simply running forward insulated wire from the nearest outpost and establishing stations from time to time. In this way the telegraph has been carried many miles to the front in all directions. In the early days of the fighting an officer could easily visit his outposts daily, but the lines have now so lengthened that to make the tour would entail a ride of something like 200 miles. Fortunately, the character and intelligence of the men obviate the necessity for close inspection.

General MacArthur's division at the north is served with two 40-mile main lines, a 12-mile branch from Malolos to Baliuag, and a 20-mile branch up the Rio Grande from Calumpit to Candaba. It has stations at Caloocan, Malabon, Polo, Meycauayan, Bocaue, Guiguinto, Malolos, Calumpit, Baliuag, Quingua, San Luis, Candaba, Santo Tomas, and San Fernando. As this division confronts the main insurgent force and requires prompt information from each point liable to become engaged, its telegraph system also embraces seven outpost stations beyond San Fernando.

South of the Pasig the First Division, under General Lawton, has stations at Pasay, Parañaque, Las Piñas, Zapote Bridge, Bacoar, Imus, San Pedro Macati, Guadalupe Ridge, Pasig, Taguig, and Calamba, the last two points being connected by cable across Laguna de Bay. It also has a cable station at Cavite, with an outpost at San Roque.

Within Manila the telegraph system embraces stations at the cable office, Engineers', Second Reserve Hospital, weather observatory, signal barracks, First Division headquarters, First Reserve Hospital, provost-marshal-general's, ayuntamiento, captain of port's, depot quartermaster's, Second Division headquarters, La Loma, Malacañan, and beyond town to the eastward the system operated in connection with troops guarding the water supply embraces a telegraph station at Deposito, with telephone stations at Block House No. 5, San Felipe, pumping station, and Maraquina outpost.

The provost-marshal-general is given a special signal telephone system, putting him in direct communication with his police about town, with stations at Tondo, Arsenal, Quiapo, provost-marshal's office, Binondo (Anloague street), Binondo (San Fernando street), Calle Real, Anda street, Santa Cruz, vaccine hospital, Sampoloc, and Ermita.

The chiefs of the supply department are also in telephonic communication with their depots and the corral over the military lines.

Over the telegraph system there were 260,489 messages handled in the ten months ending June 3.

The duties of signalmen have changed somewhat from those exercised in the earlier stages of operations. Then the flagman was much in evidence, especially in the days when the flanks of the Army rested on the bay and the Navy could cooperate. Now telegraphic communication is the rule, and every considerable expedition is held in touch with headquarters by wire.

In consequence signalmen are widely distributed and participate in all the greater and many of the minor operations of the Army. Their record, therefore, shows service in connection with an unusually large number of engagements and actions, as follows:

August 13, 1898, capture of Manila; February 4 and 5, 1899, insurgent outbreak, actions at Paco, Santa Ana, Blockhouse No. 14, La Loma, Santa Mesa, San Juan Bridge, Dalumbayan, Kansas outpost; February 6, powder magazine, Deposito, Malabon road; February 7, Pumping station; February 10, Caloocan, San Felipe; February 23, Tondo; March 13, Guadalupe, Pasig Ferry; March 15, Wheaton's advance on Pasig, also second engagement near Deposito; March 25, Hall's flanking diversion to Banloc; March 25, MacArthur's swing to the left and advance up the railroad, with actions at La Loma, Tulihan River (Wheaton), Malinta; March 26, Polo, Meycauayan; March 27, Marilao, Marilao Bridge; March 29, Bocaue Bridge, Bigaa, and Guiguinta; March 31, Malolos; March 31, Hall's advance to Rio Nonca; April 8, Lawton's Laguna de Bay expedition, with actions at Santa Cruz, Pagsanjan, and Paite; April 13, Bocaue, Bigaa, and Poanbom; April 25, Bagbag River; April 29, Calumpit; May 1 to May 20, Lawton's invasion of the provinces of Bulacan and Nueva Ecija, with engagements at Novaliches, San Jose, Norzagaray, San Rafael, Bustos, Ildefonso, San Miguel, and San Isidro; May 4, Santo Tomas and San Fernando; May 18, San Luis; May 19, Candaba; June 2, Hall's expedition beyond Maraquina; June 10 to June 20, Lawton's movements southward from San Pedro Macati, with actions between Guadalupe Ridge and Las Piñas, Zapote Bridge, Imus, and Las Marinas road.

Where field service has been so extensive there have naturally been many individual acts deserving special mention. These have been set forth in monthly reports.

In connection with operations in the Visayan Islands, a signal detachment, under command of Capt. George H. Tilly, was sent with the First Separate Brigade, December 26. On February 11 a landing was made at Iloilo, and the town taken. The detachment has since furnished signal and telegraphic communications for operations in and about Iloilo and suburbs, participating in all actions.

It has also established and maintained a telegraph system between Bacolod, Carlota, and shore towns on west Negros.

On May 27 Captain Tilly was killed by insurgents on the east coast of this island.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. E. THOMPSON,
Major and Chief Signal Officer.

APPENDIX M.

HEADQUARTERS PROVOST-MARSHAL-GENERAL,
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Manila, P. I., July 25, 1899.

The MILITARY SECRETARY,
Military Governor of the Philippine Islands, Manila, P. I.

SIR: In compliance with instructions contained in communication from your office dated July 21, 1899, I respectfully submit the following report:

The office of provost-marshal-general was established by General Orders, No. 4, paragraph 2, headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, Manila, P. I., August 15, 1898, which appoints Brig. Gen. Arthur MacArthur, U. S. V., military governor of the walled city of Manila and provost-marshal-general of the city of Manila, including all the outlying districts within the municipal jurisdiction.

He was ordered to relieve the civil governor of his functions and take possession of the office, clerks, and all machinery of administration of that office, retaining and employing the then subordinate officers of civil administration until, in his judgment, it should be desirable to replace them by other appointments.

On the 4th day of September, 1898, Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur, U. S. V., was relieved from this duty and Brig. Gen. R. P. Hughes, U. S. V., detailed in his place, by General Orders, No. 14, headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, of that date.

Brig. Gen. R. P. Hughes, U. S. V., was relieved from duty as provost-marshal-general of the city and suburbs of Manila by Brig. Gen. E. B. Williston, U. S. V., by General Orders, No. 29, headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, dated Manila, P. I., May 25, 1899.

The duties with which the provost-marshal-general has been intrusted have been enlarged from time by time by direction of the military governor until at present there are in the office the following-named departments:

1. Superior provost court.
2. Inferior provost court.
3. Board of health.
4. Department of information.
5. Department of inspection.
6. Department of streets, parks, fire, and sanitation.
7. Department of illumination.
8. Department of water supply.
9. Department of city public works.
10. Department of licenses.
11. Department of receipts and disbursements.
12. Department of cemeteries.
13. Department of public instruction.
14. Department of prisons.
15. Department of police.
16. Department of records.

For further information regarding these departments I respectfully invite attention to the reports herewith transmitted.

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PROVOST GUARD.

This force does duty as city police and provost guard and forms a separate brigade, commanded by the provost-marshal-general.

Various regiments have been detailed on this duty. When first organized the brigade consisted of the Twenty-third U. S. Infantry, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, and Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry. Since that date regiments have been assigned to duty with the guard, and relieved as circumstances required, among others the Twelfth U. S. Infantry and battalions of the Thirteenth U. S. Infantry and First Tennessee Volunteer Infantry. At present the provost guard consists of the Sixth U. S. Artillery, Twentieth U. S. Infantry, and Twentieth Kansas Volunteer Infantry.

Very respectfully,

E. B. WILLISTON,
Colonel Sixth U. S. Artillery, Provost-Marshal-General.

EXHIBIT A.

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
SUPERIOR PROVOST COURT,
Manila, P. I., August 1, 1899.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Provost-Marshal-General, Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit herewith report of the superior provost court, Manila, P. I., for the period ending June 30, 1899.

The court was established by General Orders, No. 8, headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, August 22, 1898; Lieut. Col. Charles L. Jewett, judge-advocate, U. S. V., being appointed judge of the provost court. Colonel Jewett left the islands on sick leave on November 16, 1898, and Maj. (then Capt.) R. W. Young, Utah Volunteer Light Artillery, was appointed as judge of the court and continued to act as judge until relieved by me on March 16, 1899.

The following will show the work of the court in detail (see attached schedule):

Month.	Number of cases.	Number of prisoners.	Convicted.	Discharged.	Other disposition.	Male.	Female.	Nationality of prisoners.
August	41	58	30	26	2	58	---	Native, 40; Chinese, 17; American, 1.
September	19	35	15	18	2	35	---	Native, 28; Chinese, 6; American, 2; English 1.
October	31	45	31	13	1	44	1	Native, 30; Chinese, 1; Spanish, 3; American 2.
November	25	26	23	3	---	25	1	Native, 21; Spanish, 3; American, 2.
December	37	43	35	8	---	37	6	Native, 32; Chinese, 6; French, 3; American, 1; British, 1.
January	27	53	32	20	1	51	2	Native, 28; Chinese, 20; American, 3; Spanish, 2.
February ¹	12	20	10	7	3	16	4	Native, 17; Chinese, 2; Spanish, 1.
March	24	33	20	8	5	30	3	Native, 20; Chinese, 4; American, 6; Spanish, 2; English, 1.
April	14	26	11	15	---	25	1	Native, 12; Chinese, 6; American, 8.
May	24	27	20	4	3	27	---	Native, 15; Chinese, 3; American, 8; Spanish, 1.
June	24	27	20	4	3	27	---	Native, 15; Chinese, 3; American, 8; Spanish, 1.
Total	254	366	227	122	17	348	18	Native, 252; Chinese, 59; American, 33; Spanish, 16; English, 3; French, 3.

¹ No session. Major Young, J., absent with command in the field.

Aggregate punishment adjudged, \$56,906; 139 years 6 months and 20 days.

The classification of offenses was as follows:

Larceny and theft	81
Abduction	36
Gambling	35
Burglary	29
Robbery	20
Assault	19
Counterfeiting	15
Assault to kidnap	15

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Manufacturing contraband of war.....	15
Violation of orders (sailors).....	15
Receiving stolen goods.....	10
Assault to kill.....	9
Rape.....	8
Forgery.....	8
Blackmail and extortion.....	7
Assault and battery.....	6
Impersonation of official.....	6
Arson.....	4
Fraud.....	4
Embezzlement.....	4
Smuggling.....	4
Unclassified.....	16

Very respectfully,

JNO. O. HULL,

Major and Judge-Advocate, U. S. V., Judge Provost Court.

EXHIBIT B.

HEADQUARTERS PROVOST-MARSHAL-GENERAL,
INFERIOR PROVOST COURT OF MANILA,
Manila, P. I., August 1, 1899.

The PROVOST-MARSHAL-GENERAL,
Manila, P. I.

SIR: The provost court of Manila was established by General Orders, No. 8, Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps. It was soon deemed advisable to establish an inferior branch of this court, and on September 24, 1898, the inferior provost court of Manila was constituted by General Orders, No. 18, headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, Capt. Thomas R. Hamer, First Idaho Volunteer Infantry, being appointed judge. Owing to the sickness of Captain Hamer, Maj. R. W. Young, First Utah Artillery, judge of the superior provost court, held sessions of the inferior court in the early part of December, 1898, until Capt. Frank T. Corrison, Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry, was, on December 14, 1898, by General Orders, No. 37, headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, temporarily appointed, being relieved December 26, by Captain Hamer, who continued to hold court until February 14, 1899, when Captain Corrison was again temporarily appointed judge (General Orders, No. 5, headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps). Captain Corrison has held court continuously since, having been permanently appointed March 14, 1899, by General Orders, No. 13, headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps.

Court is held at the Anda street, Santa Cruz, and San Fernando police stations daily, commencing at 9 a. m. Spanish, Tagalog, and Chinese interpreters are necessary. A record is kept of all cases showing disposition, and a monthly transcript is furnished your office. Since organization up to June 30, 1899, inclusive, there have been 3,935 cases before the court.

Such offenses as, in the opinion of the court, could be adequately punished by a \$50 fine and sixty days' imprisonment, or any lesser amount, have been summarily disposed of. Where the offense demanded a heavier penalty the cases have been referred to the provost-marshal-general, and by him sent to the superior provost court for trial or recommended for trial by military commission.

The cases brought before the court have included all classes of crimes and misdemeanors, and the summary manner of disposition has always received high commendation from the native population.

Respectfully submitted.

FRANK T. CORRISON,

*Captain, Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry,
Judge Inferior Provost Court.*

EXHIBIT C.

HEADQUARTERS PROVOST-MARSHAL-GENERAL,
OFFICE OF THE BOARD OF HEALTH,
Manila, P. I., June 30, 1899.

PROVOST-MARSHAL-GENERAL, *Manila, P. I.*

SIR: In obedience to instructions given in Circular No. 7, dated these headquarters, I have the honor to submit the following report:

This department was organized in obedience to General Orders, No. 16, dated headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, Manila, P. I., September 10, 1898. In these orders Dr. C. E. McQuesten and myself were ordered to report to the provost-marshal-general for assistance in carrying out the work. Everything had to be built up anew, owing to the disorganized condition in which Manila was found after the capitulation.

Considerable difficulty was encountered in finding qualified persons to accept positions offered by the board. This was afterwards accomplished, and by General Orders, No. 15, dated headquarters of the provost-marshal-general, Manila, P. I., September 29, 1898, the organized board was announced. This consisted of the undersigned, as president of the board; Capt. C. L. Mullins, assistant surgeon, U. S. V.; Dr. C. E. McQuesten, acting assistant surgeon, U. S. A., and two honorary members—Dr. C. H. Pardo-Tavera and Dr. Aristone Bautista Lim, both of Manila.

The city was divided into ten districts and a municipal physician appointed for each. Eight municipal midwives were also appointed and a physician for the hospital of San Lazaro, all by the same order.

Under date of October 1, 1898, rules and regulations were published by this board. Beginning with this organization this department has increased in size up to the present time, and there are, all told, 79 persons employed.

At the beginning but one hospital was under our medical control, this being the leper hospital.

Later it was found necessary to establish a venereal hospital and a smallpox hospital, and by the action of the boards controlling the insane asylum and the city charity hospital, known as the Hospital of San Juan de Dios, patients were admitted to those establishments upon the order of this board.

The general scope of the work of the board has been the supervision of all matters pertaining to the public health, not, however, including the actual execution of the work, this being done by the department of sanitation. Unsanitary conditions requiring attention were investigated by this board and reported to the department of sanitation.

One of the largest problems presenting itself after the sanitary condition of the city had been somewhat improved was that of smallpox. This disease, as we all know, is endemic in this country, and no very vigorous measures seem to have been taken to stamp it out. In November smallpox presented itself in the American Army and likewise in the Spanish army, and upon the recommendation of the chief surgeon of the department, the work of vaccination of all Spanish prisoners in the city was placed upon this board. In order to have a suitable supply of vaccine virus it was found expedient to reestablish the vaccine farm, located at No. 24 Calle Iris. This was immediately done, and in three weeks the entire Spanish army had been vaccinated. Reports on something over 2,000 of these vaccinations show that 82 per cent had been successful, and from that time up to the time when the Spanish prisoners left the island no other case of smallpox appeared among them. At the same time the corps of city vaccinators was established, at first consisting of 6 vaccinators, which was afterwards increased to 12, and later on to a still larger number. This was found necessary on account of a sudden increase in smallpox in the month of March, 1899. This increase was due to the fact that the density of the population in the central portions of the city became increased probably 100 per cent, due to the burning of the suburbs and the terror existing among the people living in suburbs not burned.

The board found it necessary to establish two additional hospitals, one of which was soon abandoned, as the third one was large enough to accommodate all persons who came. Within ten days we had isolated 100 cases of smallpox due to this sudden increase.

The statistics in regard to the district of Tondo (the place where smallpox was most prevalent) show the results of the work. There were in March 75 deaths, in April 25, and in May none. During the month of June there were but 4 cases of smallpox in the entire city of Manila, and during the month of July but 3—2 of which were brought into the city with the eruption already out.

About 80,000 people had been vaccinated by the board. We have only to recommend that these vaccinations be continued in anticipation of next season. Small-

pox is still prevalent to a large extent in the provinces, and as soon as communication with the provinces is again opened many cases will undoubtedly come into the city.

Considerable opposition was at first encountered, but during the past few months almost none was met with.

Some supervision of the venereal diseases was found to be necessary, and since November a hospital for such cases has been in operation, where those afflicted with disease are held to remain until free from danger.

The quarantine work, at first in the hands of Dr. C. L. Mullins, has been for some months past in the hands of Dr. Bruce Ffoulkes, acting assistant surgeon, U. S. A. Two months ago it was found necessary to appoint an additional health officer of the port, and for this purpose Dr. José Mascuñana, of Manila, was named.

The work of the board has included inspections of the markets, slaughterhouse, drug stores, and of the manufacturing of gaseous waters.

On account of the prevalence of glanders among horses and the importation of foot-and-mouth disease among cattle, it was found necessary to ask for the services of a veterinary surgeon; and for this purpose, on May 4, 1899, Charles N. Ferrier, a qualified veterinary surgeon, serving as hospital steward of the First North Dakota Volunteers, was appointed to this office. He has since been discharged the service of the United States and has accepted as a civil appointment the position of city veterinarian. Foot-and-mouth disease was soon under control, and a large number of horses afflicted with glanders have been destroyed. The work of this department has been steadily increasing and now includes the supervision of the slaughterhouse, the inspection of all animals imported into Manila, and the establishment of a quarantine station for afflicted animals. All meat killed at the slaughterhouse is carefully inspected at the time by Dr. Santos, meat inspector. It is then tagged and sent to the market. This department of meat inspection will have to be increased somewhat, as it has been found that the natives and Chinamen kill a considerable number of rejected animals outside of the slaughterhouse and by stealth get the meat into the markets.

All cases of leprosy, indigent sick, and insane are taken care of by order of this board.

In addition, I wish to add a word for those who have assisted in the work of this board. Especially are my thanks due to Dr. Willis E. Talbot, who was assigned to this board as hospital steward of the First Nebraska Volunteers on October 1, 1898. Later he was given the position of acting assistant surgeon of his regiment, but remained on duty at this office. During the month of June, while absent on special duty, the work of this department was carried on entirely by Dr. Talbot. He accepted his discharge from the Army and accepted a contract in order to be here up to the time of my return, inasmuch as Major Edie, who had been named as my successor, was ill at the time.

The entire office force has been very efficient and has cooperated with me in every way.

Mr. Leppen, who has been clerk in this office since September 29, 1898, has done faithful and intelligent work throughout.

The treacherous death of Dr. Harry A. Young, quartermaster-sergeant Battery A, Utah Light Artillery, was a great shock to us and a decided loss to the department.

Veterinary Surg Charles N. Ferrier has in the short time that he has been with the department organized his work in a very satisfactory way. More is still to be done in this department, as is true in other departments.

Respectfully,

FRANK S. BOURNS,
Major and Chief Surgeon, U. S. V., President Board of Health.

EXHIBIT D.

HEADQUARTERS PROVOST-MARSHAL-GENERAL,
BUREAU OF INFORMATION,
Manila, P. I., July 26, 1899.

ACTING ADJUTANT-GENERAL, Provost-Marshal-General.

SIR: Pursuant to the instructions of the provost-marshal-general, Circular No. 7, I have the honor to make the following report:

This office was established under the provost-marshal-general March 17, 1899.

The office was formerly known as a bureau of military information and was a separate department of the Eighth Army Corps, in charge of Maj. Franklin Bell. Since assuming charge of this department I have succeeded in breaking up many of

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the active insurgent organizations in the city of Manila, arresting a great number of the leaders and confiscating their books and papers in connection with such organizations.

On April 16, 1899, arrested one Lucia Lucas, colonel and organizer of the famous "Armas Blancas," an organization with 1,500 men, and which was very active during the uprising in February. On April 29 discovered a secret organization among the employees of the waterworks. The leaders of this organization were apprehended and are now confined at Fort Santiago. Have made arrests of quite a number of people who were obtaining money under false pretenses. In Binondo and Tondo a great number of these people are still at large. The insurgent government had an organized post-office in Binondo, where mail was sent to the provinces, and stamps were on sale. This was closed up by this department, and all of the employees were placed in confinement. About 15 pickpockets have been arrested by this department and convicted. Three valuable gold watches have been recovered and returned to the owners. Leo Degario Eva escaped from Bilibid February 4, 1899. He was rearrested and returned in July. Chua Tong (a chino) escaped from Bilibid in January, 1899, and was recaptured July 25, 1899. Emilio Bayona, insurgent major, escaped from Fort Santiago May 28, 1899, and was recaptured and returned to that institution in July. Pursuant to instructions of the provost-marshal-general, a thorough search was made for one Williams, an American citizen who disappeared about June 10. Upon investigation it was found that he was captured by a band of outlaws in the town of Obando. The carriage belonging to said Williams was recovered, and the leader of the band was captured and is now in confinement. The celebrated Dr. Nalda murder case was referred to this office, and one month was spent on the case, two arrests being made.

The force of this office consists of 3 enlisted men and several natives, who have been paid according to the value of the information obtained from them. These enlisted men—two of the Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry and one of the First California Volunteer Infantry—desire to remain in the service of this department as civilian employees. The total number of arrests made by this department is about one hundred and fifty—insurgents, pickpockets, blackmailers, and thieves.

The average expenses, per month, of this department has been \$65, Mexican.

It is the intention of this department to obtain photographs of every criminal in the city. A great many are already known to the members of this department, and a list is now on file in this office.

Very respectfully,

C. R. TROWBRIDGE,

Second Lieutenant, Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry, in Charge.

EXHIBIT E.

HEADQUARTERS PROVOST-MARSHAL-GENERAL,
OFFICE BUREAU OF INSPECTION,
Manila, P. I., July 25, 1899.

The ACTING ADJUTANT-GENERAL.

SIR: I have the honor to report that this bureau was established June 3, 1899. From that date to June 30 the operations consisted of the inspection of such matters under the jurisdiction of the provost-marshal-general as were referred for action by him or by the chief of police.

ALBERT TODD,

Captain, Sixth Artillery, Chief of Bureau.

EXHIBIT F.


HEADQUARTERS PROVOST-MARSHAL-GENERAL,
DEPARTMENT OF STREETS, PARKS, FIRE, AND SANITATION,
Manila, P. I., July 28, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Headquarters Provost-Marshal-General.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report, as called for in your communication of July 24, 1899:

The fire, street, and sanitary department was organized on August 23, 1899, with Capt. Lea Febiger, Twenty-third U. S. Infantry, as chief.

The department was to have charge of the cleaning, watering, and repairing of



BOMBEROS (FIRE DEPARTMENT), MANILA.

all city streets and bridges; the removal of all garbage of the municipality, and also have charge of the city paid fire department. A uniformed fire department was already found organized. It consisted of 9 officers, 11 noncommissioned officers, 11 artificers, engineers, etc., 60 firemen, and 240 peons—the latter repairing and watering streets, and also turning out to assist at fires.

No sanitary works were found in operation, and apparently none of any extent have ever existed under Spanish rule. The removal of street sweepings and kitchen waste in certain streets had been done by contract, under the supervision of the aldermen of the 11 different districts or wards. The householders were held responsible for the business portion of the city, and the markets and barracks were attended to by other small contractors. During the siege of the city the contractors' animals had been eaten and their carts scattered and broken up.

The duties of the members of the fire, street, and sanitary divisions are so intertwined that it is impossible to separate them under different heads.

The municipality was, and still is, divided into four zones and eleven districts, for administration purposes. Two steam and five hand engines were found on hand, the latter all unserviceable. By overhauling, one was made serviceable from the five. The corps consists of Spaniards and natives, and was the only organization willing to continue their services under our administration, and have ever since proved loyal and comparatively efficient. It being an organization already on hand, familiar with localities and customs, it was at once placed on sanitary work, in addition to its regular duties, using the few carts and ponies of the corps and such as could be borrowed of the captured stock and carts of the quartermaster's department, averaging about 23 altogether. On September 15 30 carts and buffaloes were hired at \$3 (Mexican) per day, each. Since the number has been gradually increased, and on the 30th of June I entered into a contract with Zacarias Concepcion to furnish 100 carts, bulls, and drivers, for one year, at \$1.70 (Mexican) per day each. Three officers have been added to the corps—two second lieutenants and a captain—and the number of municipal workmen increased from 240 to 520.

The disposal of garbage has been, and still is, a difficult problem. Under Spanish rule it was hauled out to, and dumped on, the suburbs, a most unsanitary and unsightly plan, as the suburbs really extend for miles, built up of the small nipa huts of the poorer classes and an occasional country home of an European.

Large iron dumping scows (gabarras) found in the port have been utilized to convey the garbage out into the bay to a point where the current sets offshore. There are now 7 of these in use and 6 bancas, or native open wooden scows, which are, for the receipt of garbage, placed at designated points on the numerous esteros (creeks) running through the city. All are towed out for unloading by a steam tug, under contract at \$1,025 per month. This has worked quite satisfactorily in good weather, but during the recent violent storms there were days at a time when it was impossible to get out into the bay, and garbage accumulated at the loading stations in consequence. Garbage cremation would seem to be the only natural solution.

Until their departure in February and March the Spanish prisoners of war were quartered in the various convents and churches throughout the city, and their unsanitary habits were a constant irritation. The accumulated garbage and excrement in interior courts was beyond description. These places have all gradually been cleaned out.

Except in a few houses along the Pasig River and Manila Bay, there is no sewerage system in the city, though a very elaborate system of surface drainage exists inside the walled city (all emptying into the moat) and partly in outside districts. Though strictly against the Spanish law, these drains have been connected with water-closets and latrines, not only by private parties but by the government itself, from its public buildings. The general system is that of privy vaults for the better class of houses, and nothing for the poorer, where the open ground has been used. The vaults are supposed to be cleaned out at the expense of the householder, when necessary, by certain private individuals who own proper plants for the purpose.

The new sanitation plan proposed for the city is now in vogue in most of the cities of the East—the "dry-earth" or night-soil bucket system. Already residents here are taking kindly to the change instituted early in June, and by August 1, when residents will be required to clean out their vaults at least once a week, the system, it is believed, will be in complete and successful operation.

It has been very difficult until recently to properly work the peons. They had been from the very first interfered with, maltreated, and even killed by the insurgents, or their agents, for working for the Americans. With the outbreak of hostilities, and, later, with the starting of incendiary fires by insurgents or their sympathizers, the peons became still more demoralized, being arrested night and day, right and left, as suspects. Happily all these conditions have passed, and now all work is progressing satisfactorily and without molestation.

FINANCIAL.

Under Spanish rule the pay in the department ranged from \$10 (Mexican) per month for peons up to \$83.33 for the senior officer, the officers also having a complicated system of "gratifications." These latter have been done away with and the pay raised (and duties increased) to \$12 for peons, \$15 for firemen, \$18 for non-commissioned officers, \$50 for second lieutenants, \$75 for first lieutenants, \$125 for captains, and \$200 for commandante, all Mexican.

Early in June, to increase the efficiency of the department, a civil engineer and inspector of sanitation and two inspectors of sanitation were added to the force, the former at a salary of \$160, the latter at \$140 (Mexican) each per month. All three are Americans. The average expenses of the department are \$18,000 (Mexican) per month—pay of employees, \$9,000; material for repairs to streets and roads, \$2,000; sanitation and cleaning streets, \$6,500; miscellaneous, \$500; total, \$18,000.

On February 1 the city was divided into two districts, with the Pasig River as the boundary, Captain Febiger having charge of the southern district and of the finances of the department, and Capt. C. H. Martin, acting quartermaster, U. S. V., of the northern district. On May 16 Captain Febiger, his regiment leaving for Jolo, P. I., was relieved and Capt. C. H. Hilton, First Colorado Volunteer Infantry, detailed in his stead. On May 31 Captain Hilton was relieved, and the entire department, with the city park work added, placed under charge of Captain Martin. On June 1 Second Lieut. S. F. Bottoms, Sixth U. S. Artillery, was detailed for duty in the department, and on July 7 Second Lieut. R. H. McMaster, Sixth U. S. Artillery. The former has immediate charge of all work north of the Pasig, the latter south of that river.

Very respectfully,

C. H. MARTIN,
Captain, Fourteenth U. S. Infantry,
Chief of the Department of Streets, Parks, Fire, and Sanitation.

EXHIBIT G.

HEADQUARTERS PROVOST-MARSHAL-GENERAL,
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ILLUMINATION,
Manila, P. I., July 26, 1899.

The ACTING ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Provost-Marshal-General.

SIR: I have the honor to report the following operations and expenditures by the United States Government, through this department, for the illumination by electricity of streets and public buildings in Manila, P. I., from the occupation of the city on August 13, 1898, to June 20, 1899.

The disbursements for lighting are separated into two parts:

1. The streets, buildings used for public purposes, and the provost-marshal-general's department, and paid by the department of receipts and disbursements of the provost-marshal-general's office.

2. The hospitals and quarters for troops not in the provost guard are paid by Lieut. Col. J. W. Pope, U. S. V., chief quartermaster, Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps.

Bills are charged by La Electricista (the corporation supplying light) at contract rates for length of time burned.

All bills are carefully checked in this office before being approved and forwarded for payment.

Pursuant to instructions from the provost-marshal-general, lights have been installed as follows:

December 23, 1898.—Twenty incandescent street lights on Calle Nozaleda, from Calle San Luis to Calle San Marcelino.

January 12, 1899.—Twenty incandescent street lights on Calle Comillias, from Puente Ayala to Calle Comingo.

February 27, 1899.—Forty incandescent street lights on Calle San Marcelino to juncture with Calle Nozaleda.

The above installations give satisfactory results.

New installations in Government buildings have been made as follows:

January 28, 1899.—Thirteen lights in nipa barracks on Calle Comillias.

February 17, 1899.—Seventeen lights in arsenal, walled city.

February 12, 1899.—Thirteen lights in Mercado Barracks on Calle Herran.

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March 11, 1899.—Forty-seven lights for the American commissioners, Malate residence, at their own expense.

May 22, 1899.—Two arc lights on Plaza a Santa Puacie (cavalry stables).

June 1, 1899.—Thirty-four lights in General Lawton's residence.

June 1, 1899.—Thirty-five lights at the residence of the provost-marshal-general, No. 9 Calle Cabildo.

June 3, 1899.—Sixty-four lights at the Second Reserve Hospital.

June 16, 1899.—Sixteen lights at the Sampaloc police station.

June 24, 1899.—Three arc lights at the matadero (slaughterhouse).

June 26, 1899.—Three lights at the Ermita police station.

A number of additional lights have been installed, where they were positively needed, where lights were already installed.

Attached will be found a table of the amounts of the subvouchers approved and turned over to the disbursing officer, provost-marshal-general's office, and to the chief quartermaster for payment, from August 14, 1898, to June 30, 1899.

These are divided into street lighting, lighting of Government buildings, installations and materials, and total expenditures for each month.

All material and repairs by the electrical company are ordered through this office, and no bills are paid except those so ordered.

During January and up to the 1st of March a guard was stationed at the electric plant, and from the 4th of February to the 1st of March the officer in charge and an electrician from the engineer company were on duty at the plant every night.

During the Santa Cruz fire, and also at Binondo, a number of poles and wires were burned, but were promptly replaced the next day by the electric company, the work being superintended from this office.

The Spanish custom of doing business is so slow that it requires constant watching to get repair work done, and requires both day and night trips to the plant to insure the satisfactory results, but they are gradually improving.

Respectfully submitted.

H. D. LACKORE,
First Lieutenant, Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteers.
In charge of Public Illumination.

Expense for electric lighting, provost-marshal-general's department.

[Mexican money.]

Month.	Street lights.	Government buildings.	Materials.	Total.	Grand total.
1898.					
Aug. 13-31.....	\$2,942.13	\$346.42	\$1.60	\$3,290.15	
Sept. 1-30.....	5,192.00	433.49	348.76	5,974.25	
Oct. 1-31.....	5,192.00	403.34	9.00	5,604.34	
Nov. 1-30.....	5,480.00	377.66	21.56	5,879.22	
Dec. 1-31.....	5,498.13	375.98	37.61	5,911.72	
Totals.....	24,304.26	1,936.89	418.53	26,659.68	\$26,659.68
1899.					
Jan. 1-31.....	5,578.26	340.70	32.48	5,951.45	
Feb. 1-28.....	5,617.20	335.42	4.00	5,956.62	
Mar. 1-31.....	5,723.00	340.15	72.98	6,141.13	
Apr. 1-30.....	5,723.00	243.47	19.86	5,991.33	
May 1-31.....	5,724.40	270.06	2.97	5,997.45	
June 1-30.....	5,764.60	271.62	68.86	6,105.38	
Totals.....	34,140.67	1,801.74	201.15	36,143.76	36,143.76
Total amount paid by provost-marshal-general's department.....					62,803.44

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Expenses for electric lighting, quartermaster's department.

[Mexican money.]

Month.	Light.	Installations.	Materials.	Total.	Grand total.
1898.					
Oct. 1-31.....	\$158.67	\$681.46	\$12.30	\$852.43	
Nov. 1-30.....	159.99			159.99	
Dec. 1-31.....	160.35		47.84	208.19	
Totals.....	479.01	681.46	60.14	1,220.61	\$1,220.61
1899.					
Jan. 1-31.....	163.41	919.12	176.39	1,258.92	
Feb. 1-28.....	192.83	590.62	30.00	813.45	
Mar. 1-31.....	219.86		1.60	221.46	
Apr. 1-30.....	208.80	247.01	30.00	485.81	
May 1-31.....	226.75		282.55	509.30	
June 1-30.....	236.27			236.27	
Totals.....	1,244.92	1,756.75	580.54	3,582.21	3,582.21
Total amount paid by quartermaster's department.....					4,742.82

Respectfully submitted.

H. D. LACKORE,
First Lieutenant, Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry,
in Charge of Public Illumination.

EXHIBIT H.

HEADQUARTERS PROVOST-MARSHAL-GENERAL,
 WATERWORKS DEPARTMENT,
 Manila, P. I., August 1, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL OF THE PROVOST-MARSHAL-GENERAL,
 Manila, P. I.

SIR: After the occupation of Manila by the United States forces on the 13th of August, 1898, Maj. R. B. C. Bement, U. S. Volunteer Engineers, was placed in charge of the waterworks and the water supply of the city.

The attitude of the natives holding the pumping station was such that nothing could be done for about ten days except to get together the office force, send word to the workmen at the pumping station to return, and to employ Mr. A. B. Wilson, an Englishman, who spoke both Spanish and Tagalog, as superintendent.

I was informed on the 22d of August that I was to be placed in charge when Major Bement was made collector of internal revenues, and I began work at once.

I found the pumps in a very bad condition, as they were very old, and the pistons were badly worn all around from continuous use for twenty years, and the entire plant, never too well kept in repair, had been utterly neglected for over two months.

On the 24th enough of the employees had been persuaded to return to the station and commence work, and we started the engines that day. There has been a constant supply of water since then, except for the thirty-six hours before we took the waterworks after the outbreak of the insurgents on February 4, 1899.

The pumping station is $8\frac{1}{2}$ miles outside the walled city, and the deposito (reservoir) is $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles from the same point. Both of these places were in the insurgents' territory until February 6, and this made the work very troublesome and difficult. Sometimes it was impossible to go out to the works at all, on account of the hostility of the natives, and once they marched me back to our lines in front of some 15 rifles.

As soon as the old pumps were working satisfactorily we began at once to finish setting up and connecting the new pumps, which had been partly erected by the Spanish authorities. The plant is composed of four pumps and engines combined and two sets of double boilers.

At the same time began the trouble about coal, and it has been a constant struggle since then to keep the supply of coal necessary to run the engines. The coal is shipped in cascos to the point where the pipe line crosses the San Juan River, and from there it is hauled in buffalo carts to the pumping station, a distance of 5 miles.

The road was impassable to the heavily laden bull carts, on account of the hard rains of the rainy season, then just over, and extensive repairs were made before any coal could be sent to the works.

In the city the work of repairing the public hydrants, the fire plugs, and the private water services was going on as rapidly as possible. When water was turned on probably not more than one-third of these public hydrants were in working order, but before October 1 the entire city had been gone over and repairs made. This was an important work, because 97 per cent of the inhabitants use the water from the public hydrants. For this use a tax of $1\frac{1}{2}$ cents per pound was placed on all meat used in Manila. This, with the rents collected for use of water in private houses, more than pays the expenses of the waterworks, as the funds of this system are kept separate from state or municipal funds.

The "Legacy of Corriedo," the business name of the city waterworks, has 94 shares in the Filipino-Spanish Bank, worth about \$30,000.

In addition to the free public hydrants, all the streets of the city are sprinkled free; all barracks, schools, many churches, and public buildings have their water free.

For the past quarter ending September 30, 1898, \$3,750.80 was collected and turned into the public funds, as there has been no separation of these funds from those of the state under the United States Government. Neither has the portion of the meat tax that was provided for been placed to the credit of this department.

Work on the erection of the new engines was pushed as rapidly as possible, and, on October 16, one engine was started, and the other one shortly afterwards. During this work there occurred two floods, unprecedented for years, and the river rose vertically 35 feet, flooding the engine rooms and stopping the engines.

Suddenly putting about 23,000 men in barracks in the city necessitated putting in new water service in the new barracks and in the camps occupied by our soldiers. A large force of workmen have been constantly employed to expedite this work as much as possible. The average daily amount of water used since the engines were started in August is 4,356,000 gallons; but it has increased monthly, and the daily average for January, 1899, was 4,698,600 gallons. The reservoirs east of town hold 13,200,000 gallons, and act as basins, rather than as reservoirs.

The receipts from this department for the fourth quarter of 1898 were, on February 28, 1898, \$8,447.12, and the expenditures up to January 1, 1899, were \$26,613.86; so that the 3 per cent who (making the total receipts \$11,929.02) pay for water cover, approximately, one-half of the expenses of the city waterworks.

The engine room at the pumping station has been practically restored to workmanlike condition since the installation of the new engines.

The water, which is from the San Mateo River, is of a very good quality. Owing to the unsettled state of affairs I have been unable as yet to have a careful analysis made, but from what Spanish papers I can find on the subject there seems to be practically no free ammonia, and but a slight trace of organic matter.

The individual consumption of water in Manila is smaller than in any other city that I can find record of. The average consumption per capita is about 13 gallons per day, counting the city as having 370,000 inhabitants and the daily consumption as 22,000 cubic meters (4,840,000 gallons).

When the insurrection broke out, on February 4, the pumps were not working, as all hands were engaged in cleaning out the filter galleries. Work ceased at once, and all the natives fled to the mountains. However, before they left they dismantled the engines by taking off and disposing of the low-pressure cylinders (all four), and doing the same to the high-pressure valves and the covers of the valve boxes. These parts were found, upon systematic search, buried in the coal shed, with several tons of coal piled upon the spot.

I was notified that the parts had been found about 3 o'clock p. m. of the 7th, and we had one pump running the next morning at 10 and the second one running in the afternoon. From this time until March 1 the engines were run by soldiers, who did excellent work. A new set of native employees was gotten together and but little trouble has been encountered since then in keeping all places full.

Both sections of the reservoir have been cleaned once, the northern section twice, and the other is ready for cleaning as soon as labor can be found.

The receipts for the first quarter of 1899 were \$9,176.09, and the expenditures \$19,101.26; for the second quarter the receipts were, to July 31, \$6,779.43; disbursements, \$19,205.26.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM D. CONNOR,
First Lieutenant of Engineers, U. S. A., in charge of Water Supply.

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EXHIBIT I.

HEADQUARTERS PROVOST-MARSHAL-GENERAL,
CITY ENGINEER'S OFFICE,
Manila, P. I., August 3, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL OF THE PROVOST-MARSHAL-GENERAL.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of operations in the department of city public works since its creation:

It was only on the 10th of last June that this department was created, and as no material can be bought at present, but little has been effected up to date.

All property and materials belonging to the former engineering department of Manila were gotten together by me during my service in charge of the city water-works and turned over to the department of city public works after this department was created.

All bridges about town are being repaired and put in shape. Repairs are being made to the road to Santolan, and in the penitentiary at Bilibid all buildings are being overhauled and rebuilt.

As soon as stone can be gotten, the sea wall along the Luneta will be reenforced by "ripraping" it. Other work belonging to this department will be taken up as rapidly as possible when materials for the work can be purchased.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM D. CONNOR,
First Lieutenant of Engineers, U. S. A., City Engineer.

EXHIBIT K.

HEADQUARTERS PROVOST-MARSHAL-GENERAL,
BUREAU OF LICENSES,
Manila, P. I., July 26, 1899.

The ACTING ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Headquarters Provost-Marshal-General, Manila, P. I.

SIR: In compliance with instructions contained in Circular No. 7, c. s., headquarters provost-marshal-general, I have the honor to submit the following report of this department and its operations from its inception to June 30, 1899:

The department of licenses, then known as the bureau of licenses, was established September 2, 1898, by First Lieut. C. W. Lothrop, First Colorado Volunteers, and consisted of an office force, before the end of the year, of 4 men (enlisted men), 1 special license inspector, an engineer (soldier), and 1 inspector in connection with building permits, ground rents, etc., 1 Spaniard, with a clerk, in charge of the carriage tax and licenses, and 1 general inspector of the markets. Besides these, it was necessary to use 1 man from each district police station for the investigation of applications for licenses. The present office force consists of 1 cashier and bookkeeper, 1 interpreter (also does inspection work), 1 application inspector, and 1 inspector of buildings, who looks up applications for buildings and repairs and attends to ground rents, etc. All these persons are enlisted men. One Spaniard and a native clerk are also employed, and attend solely to the carriage tax and license business, and another native who writes applications. In addition to this, a soldier of the Twentieth Infantry reports daily and investigates applications in Quiapo, Santa Cruz, and San Miguel. This office has also a concierge, clerk, and 1 helper at the matadero and concierges at the Divisoria, Arranque, Arroceros, and Quiapo markets, all natives, and working under orders from this office.

Briefly stated, from a state of extreme chaos, with practically no records to follow, and in the face of the most decided opposition on the part of the inhabitants of Manila, this office has taken hold of and cleaned out the filthy matadero; established the Spanish system of taxation by levying on all meats killed there, and permitting only such animals to be killed there as have been previously passed upon by the board of health's veterinary, and establishing a system of inspection and checks by which only meat butchered at the matadero can be brought into the public markets for sale; has taken hold of the public markets, reestablishing the old system of taxation; maintaining an espionage on all articles sold there and the persons doing business.

The department also took up the question of peddlers, and now a strict espionage of the street vendors is maintained. Only those persons are allowed to vend who hold licenses, the total number of which is limited, as is also the number for the

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vending of particular wares or articles, and our inspectors are instructed to prevent the crowding of peddlers in any locality.

All persons wishing to do business at fixed places are required to file an application, stating definitely the articles they wish to sell or manufacture. These applications are carefully looked up by inspectors and acted upon by the head of the department before a license is issued. In the case of licenses to sell liquor the application is always submitted to the officer in charge of the district where the saloon is contemplated and his recommendation solicited. The number of like places in the vicinity and the proximity of troops is also taken into consideration.

Licenses for public vehicles are also issued and the tax on vehicles and draft animals collected. Some attempt is made to maintain outside supervision of public and private vehicles, and, at the time of writing, certain regulations are about to be put in force which will give the office an almost perfect control. Much difficulty is encountered in locating vehicles, owing to the absence of old Spanish lists. Lists are, however, being prepared, and private vehicles and animals are being daily brought more and more under our control.

A very complete system of control of buildings and repairs has been installed, and only such alterations or new buildings as are suited to the locality are permitted. A fire line, following the old lines as far as practicable, was put in operation, and no light, inflammable structures are allowed to be erected inside of this line.

A strip of ground on the east side of the Aduana, in Binondo, was found to be occupied by a number of booths and kioskos, some of which were properly built and others tents of bamboo and thatch, which were a menace to the health and safety of the district. Tenants of the bamboo booths were warned to build of proper material, which was done, and the entire place put in order, cleaned, and rebuilt, and is now a source of revenue monthly. Some parcels of public land in outlying districts, particularly near Pandacan, were measured up and leased for six months for agricultural purposes. There is, in all probability, much land in the city and vicinity which should pay rent to the Government but of which, as yet, no information has been obtainable.

This report, while not going into the smaller details, covers generally the subjects taken up and indicates the character of work attempted, the amount and source of the revenues, the difficulties encountered, and the reforms inaugurated. Attached will be found a monthly recapitulation of the revenues and expenses, under three general heads.

Very respectfully,

HARRY G. BISHOP,
Second Lieutenant, Sixth Artillery, U. S. A.,
In charge of Department of Licenses.

	Revenues.	Salaries.	Supplies.
SEPTEMBER.			
Markets	\$761.96	\$96.00
Matadero	350.00	
Licenses	97.00	
Total	1,208.96	96.00
OCTOBER.			
Markets	2,807.57	68.80	\$7.90
Matadero	4,500.04		
Licenses	3,087.17	2.00	6.00
Total	10,194.78	70.80	13.90
NOVEMBER.			
Markets	4,597.45	729.00	51.75
Matadero	7,875.00	47.00	
Licenses	4,622.68	100.00	
Total	17,095.13	876.00	51.75
DECEMBER.			
Markets	6,000.00	484.82	28.40
Matadero	10,350.00	48.00	35.10
Licenses	4,159.81	125.00	10.00
Total	20,509.81	657.82	73.50

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	Revenues.	Salaries.	Supplies.
JANUARY.			
Markets	\$4,800.00	\$125.00	\$60.00
Matadero	10,350.00	48.00	
Licenses	4,766.79	125.00	
Total	19,916.79	298.00	60.00
FEBRUARY.			
Markets	3,150.00	105.00	
Matadero	6,800.00	58.00	
Licenses	2,309.50	150.85	
Total	12,259.50	313.85	
MARCH.			
Markets	1,725.00	135.00	
Matadero	3,100.00	58.00	
Licenses	1,365.60	102.00	
Total	6,190.60	295.00	
APRIL.			
Markets	3,300.00	135.00	
Matadero	3,000.00	58.00	
Licenses	3,669.89	112.00	
Total	9,969.89	305.00	
MAY.			
Markets	1,875.00	135.00	
Matadero	5,965.00	58.00	
Licenses	4,491.10	137.00	
Total	12,321.10	330.00	
JUNE.			
Markets	5,700.00	135.00	
Matadero	4,125.00	58.00	
Licenses	1,660.15	145.00	
Total	11,515.15	338.00	
Grand total	120,881.21	3,579.77	199.15
Deduct expenses	3,778.92		
Net receipts	117,102.29		

EXHIBIT L.

HEADQUARTERS PROVOST-MARSHAL-GENERAL,
DEPARTMENT OF RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS,
Manila, P. I., July 25, 1899.

The ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Manila, P. I.

SIR: In compliance with circular of this office, dated July 24, 1899, I have the honor to state that the department of receipts and disbursements is charged with the receipt of all municipal revenues and the payment of all municipal expenses. The department was organized September 1, 1898, and from that date to the close of the fiscal year, June 30, 1899, a period of ten months, has received \$321,501.58 and disbursed \$561,373.19. The money received has been deposited with the treasurer of public funds and, with the disbursements, has been accounted for as provided for by the regulations.

The work of the department is up to date.

Very respectfully,

T. D. KELEHER,
Major and Paymaster, U. S. V.,
Chief of Department of Receipts and Disbursements.

EXHIBIT M.

HEADQUARTERS PROVOST-MARSHAL-GENERAL,
DEPARTMENT OF CEMETERIES,
Manila, P. I., July 29, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Headquarters Provost-Marshal-General.

SIR: The department of cemeteries was organized in August, 1898, with Chaplain McKinnon, First California Volunteers, in charge.

The department has issued all burial permits in the city, buried paupers, and had supervision of the large cemeteries of La Loma and Paco. The receipts of the department, from burial permits (50 cents each) and the sale of niches in Paco Cemetery, has averaged about \$700 per month; expenses, \$400.

Chaplain McKinnon was relieved on June 1, and Capt. C. H. Martin, Fourteenth U. S. Infantry, placed in charge.

Very respectfully,

C. H. MARTIN,
Captain, Fourteenth U. S. Infantry,
Acting Assistant Quartermaster, in Charge of Cemeteries.

EXHIBIT N.

HEADQUARTERS PROVOST-MARSHAL-GENERAL,
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION,
Manila, P. I., July 25, 1899.

The ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Provost-Marshal-General.

SIR: I have the honor to say, in reply to Circular No. 7, July 24, 1899, that the public-school work of the city received early attention after the 13th of August, 1898.

Actual work in the reopened schools began about September 1, two of the larger schools not opening until later. The work then was merely a continuation of the Spanish instruction.

Since that time some buildings, with all their furniture, have been burned in war and other schools opened in their places, until now districts of the city are well provided with school room, unless it be the district of Binondo.

The vacation period was placed a month late this year, from May 1 to July 1. Upon June 1 Chaplain W. D. McKinnon resigned the superintendency to the present incumbent, who found the most urgent duties were to fit with furniture the new schools, to obtain more for the old ones, and to secure more teachers. Chaplain McKinnon had at work 7 American instructors of English, and was looking forward to having one hour's instruction per day in each school in that language.

Since June 1, 10 more English teachers have been secured and the children are enthusiastically learning. But this basis of one hour a day for English is not sufficient; it should be doubled in many of the schools, especially in those devoted to primary work solely.

The department now superintends 39 schools for boys and girls, mostly of ages from 6 to 12 years, in the various districts of the city.

The buildings in these districts are now well provided with furniture, books used for the Spanish studies, stationery, and all equipments, except the English books, which will soon be supplied.

The pupils enrolled during the first weeks of July numbered 3,724 less because of the severe rains.

The duties of this department embrace the proper management of the small municipal schools, in which the Spanish teaching is mostly by natives; the Ateneo, consisting of three departments—the primary, the high, and the commercial—in which the teaching is by Spanish Jesuit fathers; the high normal, with a primary department, taught also by Spanish Jesuit fathers, and the girls' municipal school, consisting of primary and grammar grades, taught by Spanish Sisters of Charity.

This department provides school necessities for these schools, hires teachers, prepares their pay rolls, and, in general, endeavors in all ways to look after the public-school interests of Manila.

Many novel and perplexing questions present themselves constantly under the conditions of to-day, but, above all, the department endeavors to establish ultimately the American common school system, although discretion suggests delays

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of many needed changes because they could not be understood now. It must be a growth.

Respectfully submitted.

GEORGE P. ANDERSON,
Superintendent of Public Instruction, Manila, P. I.

EXHIBIT O.

HEADQUARTERS PROVOST-MARSHAL-GENERAL,
CARCEL PUBLICA Y PRESIDIO DE MANILA,
Manila, P. I., July 28, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Separate Brigade, Provost Guard.

SIR: In obedience to Circular No. 7, dated headquarters provost-marshal-general, Manila, P. I., July 24, 1899, I have the honor to submit a report of this institution to include June 30, 1899. At this date the place consisted of two distinct prisons and governed accordingly. One was known as the Presidio de Manila, and the other as the Carcel de Bilibid, the former commanded by the undersigned and the latter by one Mr. M. Bonitis, with the title of alcalde, a native of the island. In addition to his other duties, the commandant of the Presidio was the inspector of the Bilibid.

The Presidio de Manila is designated as a penitentiary and the Carcel de Bilibid as a jail, and the two are separated by a high wall. The Presidio contains 457 native convicts; the Bilibid contains 335 prisoners, consisting of various nationalities—Spanish, Filipino, Chinese, and others. All (except four cases) prisoners confined in the Presidio were placed there by the Spanish authorities. The Bilibid contains still about 200 prisoners placed there by the same authorities.

The United States military prison was located on the Bilibid grounds October 8, 1898, two of the jail buildings being selected for the purpose. The average number of military prisoners is 100.

During the month of June a hospital for the treatment of the native prisoners confined in both places was established on the grounds of the Presidio, and presided over by one Manuel Xeres, a native physician.

Previous to the United States Government taking charge, in 1898, the prisons were controlled by Spanish authority. Upon taking charge the United States Government placed the Spanish authorities of the Presidio (consisting of 3 Spanish officers) in arrest and held them for trial on a charge of embezzlement. They were convicted before a military commission, and the sentence published in General Orders, No. 12, headquarters department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps. One, José Ruiz, is now held a prisoner at the Presidio, serving sentence awarded by said commission and published in orders before quoted.

May 27, 1899, I received an order from the provost-marshal-general detailing me to command the Presidio de Manila and inspector of the Cárcel de Bilibid, relieving Major Bean, Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteers, of said duties.

Previous to my taking charge I have practically no official information of the operations of the place. Since assuming charge I have continued to carry out the work then in progress and such other rules and regulations that have become necessary to adopt.

The prisoners are kept busy manufacturing bamboo cots for the Quartermaster's Department and other work, according to mechanics found among the prisoners. Articles of many different kinds are manufactured at the prison, prisoners being employed at such work as they are capable of performing.

There is at the Presidio a hand laundry for a limited amount of work. On the Bilibid side there is no work of skill performed.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WM. P. ROGERS,
Major, Twentieth U. S. Infantry, Commanding.

EXHIBIT P.

HEADQUARTERS PROVOST-MARSHAL-GENERAL,
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF POLICE,
Manila, P. I., July 24, 1899.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Provost-Marshal-General, Manila, P. I.

SIR: In compliance with instructions contained in Circular No. 7, headquarters provost-marshal-general, Manila, P. I., July 24, 1899, I have the honor to report

that prior to June 3, 1899, no records of the operations of this department are on file in this office.

The undersigned, having been appointed chief of police by General Orders, No. 15, headquarters provost-marshal-general, June 3, 1899, assumed charge of the department upon that date. Since then the operations of the department have comprised all the necessary and usual steps for the maintenance of peace and order throughout the city, and the enforcement of the laws, regulations, and orders pertaining thereto.

The assistants assigned for carrying on these operations are as follows:

First. Lieut. Arthur F. Curtis, acting adjutant, Sixth United States Artillery; Batteries C, E, L, and M, Sixth United States Artillery; and Companies A, B, D, E, I, and K, Twentieth United States Infantry.

Respectfully submitted.

JOHN L. TIERNON,
Major, First Artillery, Chief of Police.

EXHIBIT Q.

HEADQUARTERS PROVOST-MARSHAL-GENERAL,
OFFICE OF NOTARIAL AND PRISON RECORDS,
Intendencia, Manila, P. I., July 26, 1899.

The ACTING ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Headquarters Provost-Marshal-General, Separate Brigade, Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to report, as required by Circular No. 7, under date of July 24, 1899, headquarters provost-marshal-general, as follows:

The office over which I preside consists of two general departments—

First. The department of prison records, which was established during the month of August, 1898, and placed in charge of Capt. W. P. Moffitt, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry. On the 21st day of March, 1899, Captain Moffitt was relieved from duty and I assumed control of prison records.

The operations of the office consist of keeping a special record of prisoners, when and where committed, duration of sentence (or amount of fine, as the case may be), making the committals for all prisoners duly tried and sentenced, and receipting for all moneys paid as fines or forfeitures. These moneys are daily transmitted to this office from the various stations having control of the prisoners, and I receipt to the officer in charge of said station for the various amounts of money as shown by the report of the trial of the judge passing sentence. These moneys are in turn invoiced daily to Maj. T. D. Kelleher, disbursing officer of the provost-marshal-general's office, who receipts to the undersigned for the same.

The records of the office show a summary as follows:

Number of persons in Bilibid Prison, Presidio de Manila, at the time of American occupation, about 2,000, many of whom had never been sentenced, and were merely "political prisoners," and were immediately released by the order of the provost-marshal-general.

Total number of prisoners sentenced to Bilibid from August 24, 1898, to June 30, 1899, inclusive, 5,801; number of prisoners in Bilibid June 30, 1899, 394. The latter figure does not include military prisoners serving sentence of general court-martial.

Amount collected in fines is as follows:

1898—September	\$805.00
October	1,235.00
November	4,358.45
December	5,483.00
1899—January	4,034.00
February	1,814.00
March	3,710.00
April	5,829.00
May	9,467.27
June	3,779.89
Total	40,460.61

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Second. The department of public records was established on April 18, 1899, by the order of the military governor to the provost-marshal-general to seize all notarial records, which was in turn indorsed to the undersigned their acting judge-advocate of the provost guard, to make the seizure and protect said records. Considerable difficulty was encountered in gathering up all the records, as they were scattered over the city, but they have been gradually collected, until I am satisfied that all of said records, with the exception of those of Don José Engracio Monroy and Don Calixto Reyes, have been collected, both of these notaries having disappeared from the city February 4, together with the documents which they had in their possession. The undersigned is now engaged in the segregation of the various notarial documents and arranging an archive thereof, but is unable to report at this time the exact condition of said records on account of the large amount of labor necessary to perform said work.

The undersigned is intrusted from time to time in making researches in reference to legal questions which may be referred to him by the provost-marshal-general.

Respectfully,

RALPH PRATT, *In Charge of Records.*

APPENDIX N.

OFFICE OF THE CAPTAIN OF THE PORT, *Manila, P. I., July 23, 1899.*

SIR: In compliance with your instructions dated 21st instant, I have the honor to submit herewith a report of the administration of affairs in the office of the captain of the port from August 13, 1898, to June 30, 1899, inclusive.

There being no one office in the United States embracing the scope of the colonial office of the captain of the port, it has seemed almost imperative to give a list of the various departments embodied in this one office, viz:

1. The entrance and clearance of vessels.
2. Registration and licensing of vessels.
3. Recording any change of ownership of vessels.
4. Adjusting all cases of damage arising from collisions, grounding, and salvage.
- Regulating disputes on board vessels between masters and crews.
5. Shipping commissioner's duties.
6. Emigration commissioner's duties.
7. Duties of hydrographic office in connection with Manila observatory and weather bureau, storm signals, etc.
8. Light-house duties, installing and carrying on light-house service in the archipelago.
9. Public works; river and harbor works; dredging; removing wrecks; care and preservation of Government machinery; repairing same when needed; docking and undocking vessels for repairs.
10. Harbor commissioner's duties, berthing and mooring vessels.
11. Harbor pilot's department.
12. Regulating commerce in general, and fishing industries.
13. Quarantine officer's department, inspection of vessels and enforcement of quarantine regulations. Boarding of vessels, etc.
14. General police duties afloat.
15. Inspection of boilers and hulls.
16. Examinations and licensing of masters, mates, and machinists.

When it is considered that all these duties must from necessity be done in foreign languages, Spanish, German, and French, and in accordance with Spanish laws and customs, practically during a state of war, some idea can be derived of the amount of work done. The cost, when compared with the cost of the same work in the United States, will give a very fair idea of the work per man in this office, as well as of the economical administration of the same in each and every department, civil employees only doing duty in the office and being paid from the civil funds.

Respectfully submitted.

WM. BRAUNERSREUTHER,
Lieutenant, U. S. N., Captain of Port.



OFFICE OF CAPTAIN OF THE PORT.



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Financial statement of office of captain of port, Manila, P. I., from August 13, 1898, to June 30, 1899.

Apportioned by military governor from civil funds (Mexican currency) \$100,640.76

Disbursed as follows:

Office expenses, clerks, wages, printing, stationery, lights, etc	\$15,178.24
Raising wrecks, dredging, clearing channel, and dry docking	32,974.94
Repairs to Government boats and supplies for office launches	12,302.35
Lighthouse keeper's wages and supplies to lights	8,624.34
Machine shop, repairing Government machinery, etc	8,167.47
Boats' crews, launches of office	8,762.95
Undries (material and labor expended on account collections and miscellaneous work and repairs, etc.)	11,697.64
Cash on hand in bank	2,937.83
Total	100,640.76
Amount of revenue stamps used on documents issued from this office ..	14,075.50

Turned into the Treasury:

Collections on account work done in public works, Chinese immigration and emigration, and other fees, fines, etc	\$10,568.44
Seized money and proceeds of sale of seized cargoes	\$16,706.96
Tonnage of shipping transferred to the American flag from August 13, 1898, to June 30, 1899	26,793.61 tons

Movement of shipping as per entrances and clearances from August 13, 1898, to June 30, 1899.

Entrances:	Tons.	
Foreign	396,863.17	
Coastwise	191,187.88	
Total, tons		588,040.05
Clearances:		
Foreign	366,190.12	
Coastwise	196,092.57	
Total, tons		562,272.69
Grand total, tons		1,150,312.74

The MILITARY GOVERNOR, Manila, P. I.

APPENDIX O.

OFFICE OF THE TREASURER OF PUBLIC FUNDS,
Manila, P. I., August 12, 1899.

The SECRETARY TO THE MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINES.

SIR: In compliance with your instructions of the 21st ultimo, I have the honor to submit the following report of the administration of the treasury department from August 18, 1898, to June 30, 1899:

General Orders, No. 7, Headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, dated August 18, 1898, designated Maj. Charles H. Whipple, paymaster, J. S. A., to receive the Spanish public funds, and directed him to report to Brigadier-General Greene for duty. In a letter of instruction to Major Whipple, as custodian of Spanish public funds, dated August 19, 1898, General Greene informed him that the collector of customs had been directed to turn over to him daily at 5 p. m., at the intendencia general, all cash, checks, and bank notes received during the day in payment of duty. Major Whipple was further directed to open accounts, as custodian of Spanish public funds, with both the Chartered Bank of India, Australia, and China and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, to deposit about equally in both banks all funds, checks, and bank notes

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received in payment of duties, checking against these accounts in payment of warrants drawn against him by General MacArthur or General Greene for current expenses of administration of the Government of these islands and of the municipal government of Manila. Major Whipple was further instructed to present to the Banco Español-Filipino, for acceptance, a draft in his possession on that bank for about \$160,000, and, after acceptance, to keep the draft in his safe, together with other checks and bank notes of the Banco Español-Filipino, and not to present them for redemption until further orders.

General Greene furnished Major Whipple, for his guidance, a copy of a letter from the agents of the Chartered Bank of India, Australia, and China and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, guaranteeing accepted checks and bank notes of the Banco Español-Filipino, received by customs in payment of duties, to the extent of \$300,000 at any one time until further notice, and to do all in their power to assist the said bank financially to enable it to survive the crisis. This guaranty was given conditionally upon the banks being permitted to import clean Mexican dollars into Manila free of all duties.

A board of officers constituted by Special Orders, No. 25, Headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, dated August 15, 1898, consisting of Lieut. Col. Charles L. Potter, U. S. V., chief engineer; Maj. Charles E. Kilbourne, paymaster, U. S. A., and Maj. T. D. Keleher, additional paymaster, U. S. V., was directed to count the Spanish public funds at the intendencia and la Casa de la Moneda, Manila. The board met pursuant to above order August 16, 1898, but was unable to proceed with the count until August 20, owing to delay caused by the refusal of the Spanish treasury officials to turn over the funds. On August 24, 1898, the money at the intendencia having been counted by the board of officers, Major Whipple receipted to Señor Don José Luis Maury, el tesorero general de hacienda de Filipinas, for the following amounts found in the treasury:

Gold	\$4,200.00
Silver	129,632.21
Spanish Bank of Manila bank notes	194,180.00
One accepted check, Spanish-Filipino Bank, Manila	160,205.50
One accepted check, Spanish-Filipino Bank, Manila	10,000.00
162 sacks of copper, said to contain \$50 each	8,100.00
1,928 boxes of copper, said to contain \$150 each	289,200.00
	<hr/> 795,517.71

Also the following amounts in the safe known as the "reserve safe," left as special deposits:

One sack, containing silver	\$465.00
Do	241.80
Do	200.00
Do	66.82
	<hr/> 973.62

One sack, containing bank notes (Spanish-Filipino Bank, Manila), silver, and drafts, amounting to

29,230.14

The drafts were not negotiable.

On August 23 Major Whipple received from Maj. R. B. C. Bement, collector of internal revenue, \$24,077.60 and on September 1 \$450, funds belonging to the administracion de hacienda, seized by Major Bement.

On August 25, 1898, the amounts having been verified by the board of officers, of which Lieutenant-Colonel Potter was president, Major Whipple receipted to Señor Don José Pereyra y Pereyra, director of the mint, for the following amounts found at the mint:

30 sacks Mexican dollars	\$30,000.00
29 sacks Spanish "medio pesos"	29,000.00
10 packages Spanish "medio pesos"	50.00
	<hr/> 59,050.00
One bar gold, 870 fine, weight 6,310 grams; one bar gold, 999 fine, weight 313 grams—estimated value	3,806.08

On August 30, 1898, Major Whipple receipted to Señor Pompilio Jorge, tesorero del ayuntamiento de Manila, for the following sums, taken possession of by him



TREASURY BUILDING, MANILA.

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under direction of Gen. F. V. Greene, intendente-general. The amounts were first counted by the board of officers, of which Lieutenant-Colonel Potter was president:

Spanish bank notes, silver, and copper alleged to belong to the arch-bishop	\$2,815.26
Water collections, silver	189.66
Bank notes, silver, and copper—city funds	619.90
	<hr/> 3,624.82

Receipts were also given to Señor Jorge for 77 bonds of the Philippine Islands Series B, numbered from 054254 to 054330, inclusive, 100 pesos each, August, 1898, coupons attached; for 94 shares, of \$200 each, Spanish-Filipino Bank, Manila, and for one box of fire department medals, not counted.

September 2, 1898, Major Whipple applied to the director of the Banco Español-Filipino to have transferred to him the following sums belonging to the municipal government of the city of Manila, viz:

Arbitrio de un centimo de peso	\$18.02
Obra Pia de Carriedo	1,504.00
	<hr/> 1,522.02

These funds were transferred to Major Whipple, and were taken up by him on his account of "seized funds."

September 9, 1898, Major Whipple received from Señor José Bueren, gobernador civil, Juan de Mer, Conde de Gra, secretario, and Enquina Comino, oficial pagador, funds found in the safe belonging to the "Fundos Locales" amounting to \$956.02, giving the Spanish officials proper receipts.

On September 15, 1898, Major Whipple received from Señor Rafael F. Campos, presidente de la junta provincial, and the treasurer, Claveros, of said junta, two deposit warrants on the Banco Español-Filipino:

No. 5869, dated April 28, 1898, for	\$8,000.00
No. 5939, dated July 14, 1898, for	10,719.91
Both marked "Deposit Intransferible."	

September 26 Major Whipple took possession of \$950 taken from the box of the regiment of Philippine Lancers, Thirty-first Cavalry. In each case the amounts of money, checks, etc., were verified by the board of officers, of which Lieut. Col. C. L. Potter was president, before they were taken possession of and receipted for by Major Whipple. A statement of the funds, etc., receipted for by Major Whipple is appended, marked A.

General Orders, Nos. 3 and 5, office of the military governor in the Philippine Islands, dated September 5, 1898, and September 17, 1898, respectively, copies of which are appended, marked B and C, gave detailed instructions to disbursing officers of the several departments as to the manner of obtaining and accounting for public civil funds required for the expenses of their departments.

General Orders, No. 3, directed Maj. C. H. Whipple, paymaster, U. S. A., to act as treasurer of public funds, in addition to his other duties.

General Orders, No. 4, office of the military governor in the Philippine Islands, dated September 9, 1898, a copy of which is annexed and marked D, directed that all fines imposed by sentence of provost courts established by the United States authorities in the territory of the Philippine Islands in actual occupation by the United States Government be paid in to the provost-marshal-general of the command, and all such funds be turned over by that officer direct to the custodian of public funds, who will keep a separate account of the same.

Under date of October 4, 1898, the verbal orders given the treasurer of public funds to deposit all treasury funds in the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation and the Chartered Bank of India, Australia, and China, in as equal proportions as practicable, were confirmed in writing by the military governor in the Philippines.

By Special Orders, No. 4, office of the military governor in the Philippine Islands, dated October 10, 1898, I was appointed treasurer and custodian of public funds in place of Maj. C. H. Whipple, relieved. I assumed the duties of the office on October 11, 1898, and receipted to Major Whipple for all funds, records, and property for which he was responsible. In counting the notes of the Banco Español-Filipino an excess of \$190 was found. This was taken up by me and duly accounted for on my return for October, 1898. A statement of my receipts to Major Whipple is appended, marked E.

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At the time I relieved Major Whipple as treasurer of public funds there was in the vault of the treasury a large chest, said to contain canceled bonds to the amount of about 14,000,000 pesos; also a number of bonds and papers contained in an iron safe, which were not turned over to nor receipted for by Major Whipple. At the mint (casa de moneda) there were a number of ingots and sacks of copper, said by the director, Senor Pereyra y Pereyra, to belong to the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, and a number of sacks said to contain damaged silver. No receipts had been given by Major Whipple for the ingots and sacks of copper or sacks of damaged silver at the time the money at the mint was turned over to him, nor were they asked for by the director of the mint. By direction of the military governor, the ingots and sacks of copper (100 ingots and 22 sacks) at the mint were turned over to the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation on October 21, 1898, and proper receipts taken therefor.

At my request a board of officers was appointed by paragraph 4, Special Orders, No. 84, headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, dated October 21, 1898, to examine, estimate, inventory, and report upon the contents of the chest and certain papers in the iron safe in the copper vault of the treasury building, and a quantity of copper ingots and a number of sacks said to contain damaged silver in the mint, none of which were receipted for when turned over by the Spanish authorities. Also any other papers or treasure which may be found and not already accounted for. A copy of the proceedings of the board is appended, marked F. The packages, bonds, etc., found in the iron box and in the safe at the treasury were sealed by the board and placed in the large box, which was also duly sealed by the board. The box and contents were taken up by me on my accounts for October, 1898, as one box of canceled bonds. No receipts were given the Spanish treasurer, as he had left Manila. Receipts for the damaged silver, etc., found at the mint were given Senor Pereyra y Pereyra, director, on October 29, and the amounts were duly taken up on my accounts for October, 1898.

At my request, the board of officers constituted by Special Orders, No. 31, current series, headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, were directed to determine the amount of silver in bars and in finished and unfinished silver coins, found in a safe at the mint, and for which Manuel Garcia, master workman, was responsible. On March 25, 1899, the board weighed the silver, finding the amounts as follows:

	Kilos.	Grams.
Unfinished silver coins	50	585
Silver bars	39	490
Making a total of	90	75

The board estimated the value to be \$1,577.44, American gold, or thereabouts; but as the fineness of the silver was not determined, the true value is uncertain. The silver is accounted for by me by weight.

By direction of the military governor, I have transferred to the president of the American and Spanish Commission, appointed by the United States and Spanish authorities, certain bonds, papers, records, etc., stored in the treasury building. A list showing the character of the articles transferred, with the dates, is appended, marked G. Detailed receipts were taken in each case, signed by the recorder of the board.

From time to time "special deposits" have been received by direction of the military governor. A list of these is appended, marked H. The special deposit of funds and securities belonging to the Cortez estate were returned to the provost-marshal-general on April 8, 1899, by direction of the military governor. All other special deposits are still in the vaults of the treasury.

Maj. Theodore Sternberg, additional paymaster, U. S. V., was appointed assistant treasurer of public funds for Iloilo, P. I., by paragraph 2, General Orders, No. 5, office of the military governor in the Philippine Islands, dated February 22, 1899.

By direction of the military governor in the Philippine Islands, all funds received by the assistant treasurer of public funds, from any source, have been deposited to the credit of the treasurer of public funds with the branch bank of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation at Iloilo. The sums so deposited have been transferred to the credit of the treasurer with the bank in this city. The first invoices of "public funds" received from Major Sternberg were dated March 11, 1899.

Capt. W. T. Wood, Eighteenth U. S. Infantry, was appointed assistant treasurer at the port of Cebu, island of Cebu, by paragraph 6, Special Orders, No. 74, headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, dated March 17,

1899. There being no bank at Cebu, arrangements were made with the Chartered Bank of India, Australia, and China to have its agents, Messrs. Smith, Bell & Co., at Cebu, receive from the assistant treasurer all moneys collected from customs or other sources, placing them to the credit of the treasurer of public funds with the Chartered Bank of India, Australia, and China at Manila. The Chartered Bank having agreed to hold itself responsible to the United States Government for the custody, safe-keeping, and proper disposition of all public funds of said Government deposited with the said firm of Smith, Bell & Co., the guaranty of the Chartered Bank was, by direction of the military governor, accepted March 24, 1899. The first invoices of public funds received from Captain Wood were dated April 5, 1899.

Funds for disbursement at Iloilo and Cebu are placed to the credit of the proper officers through the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation and the Chartered Bank of India, Australia, and China, respectively.

This method of handling the public funds at Iloilo and Cebu has proved very satisfactory.

A statement showing, by months, the receipts and disbursements of public funds at Manila, Iloilo, and Cebu, with the grand totals, is appended, marked I.

Summary.

Total receipts of public civil funds from August 18, 1898, to June 30, 1899.....	\$6,927, 163. 58
Total disbursements during same period	6, 188, 204. 56
Surplus of receipts above expenditures	738, 959. 02
Total seized funds	890, 186. 99

Total seized and public civil funds on hand June 30, 1899.... 1, 629, 146. 01

A statement of current expenses of office of the treasurer of public funds is appended, marked K.

There are also appended statements (marked L and M respectively) of coin, bank notes, drafts, and other securities deposited at the treasury and of damaged silver, copper, unfinished coins, etc., deposited at the mint. These are accounted for on monthly returns to the auditor of public accounts, Manila, P. I., but do not appear upon my account current of public civil funds.

OFFICE FORCE.

The office force at the time I entered upon my duties as treasurer consisted of 8 enlisted men—Privates J. H. Greefkens, First Colorado Volunteer Infantry; J. L. Barrett and B. P. Libby, Thirteenth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry—Julian Villafior, janitor; Domingo Tabanero, coachman, and Juan Camara, messenger. At his own request Private Libby was relieved from duty at the treasury and ordered to join his company, by Special Orders, No. 84, headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, dated October 21, 1898. At the end of October Juan Camara, the messenger, was discharged and his duties assigned to the janitor.

On February 25, 1899, Private Barrett was discharged from the service by virtue of paragraph 51, Special Orders, No. 5, Headquarters of the Army, dated Washington, D. C., January 7, 1899, and was employed as a civilian clerk. Mr. Barrett has been faithful and reliable in every way, and is competent and trustworthy. Private Greefkens has proved himself to be an especially valuable and competent man in every way. He is accurate and rapid in his work and understands bookkeeping thoroughly. In addition to his duties as chief clerk he has acted as interpreter, saving the expense of such an employee.

Respectfully submitted.

CHAS. E. KILBOURNE,
Major and Paymaster, U. S. A., Treasurer of Public Funds.

EXHIBIT A.

Summary statement of seized funds receipted for to the Spanish officials by Maj. Charles H. Whipple, paymaster, U. S. A., custodian of public funds, of money found by Maj. R. B. C. Bement, U. S. V., collector of internal revenue, and of funds of the ayuntamiento of Manila withdrawn from the Banco Español-Filipino.

1. Received of the Spanish treasurer-general:	
Gold coin	\$4,200.00
Silver coin	129,632.21
Copper coin	297,300.00
Notes, Banco Español-Filipino	194,180.00
Accepted checks, Banco Español-Filipino	170,205.50
	<hr/> 795,517.71 <hr/>
2. Received of the treasurer-general, "special deposits" held in reserve safe:	
1 sack silver coin	465.00
Do	241.80
1 sack silver coin and bank notes	200.00
1 sack silver coin and one gold coin	66.82
1 sack drafts (nonnegotiable), bank notes, and silver coin	29,220.14
	<hr/> 30,193.76 <hr/>
3. Received of the director of the Spanish mint:	
Gold bullion, 6,310 grams, 870 fine; 313 grams, 999 fine; estimated value of gold	3,806.08
Mexican dollars	\$30,000.00
Spanish medio pesos	29,000.00
Sample coins	50.00
	<hr/> 62,856.08 <hr/>
4. Received of the treasurer of the ayuntamiento: Bank notes, silver, and copper coin	3,624.82
5. Received of the officials of the "gobernador civil:" "Fundos locales," in bank notes and coin	956.02
6. Received from the box of the regiment of Philippine Lancers, Thirty-first Cavalry: Copper coin	950.00
	<hr/>
7. Received from the president of "la junta provincial" warrants "deposito intransferible" of the Banco Español-Filipino, as follows:	
No. 5869, dated April 28, 1898, for	8,000.00
No. 5939, dated July 14, 1898, for	10,719.91
	<hr/> 18,719.91 <hr/>
8. Received from the treasurer of the ayuntamiento of Manila bonds and stocks, as follows:	
94 shares stock Banco Español-Filipino, of \$200 each.	
77 treasury bonds Philippine Islands of \$100 each.	
9. Received of Maj. R. B. C. Bement, U. S. V., collector of internal revenue: Funds found at office of the administrador de hacienda.	24,537.60
10. Withdrawn by check from the Banco Español-Filipino: Funds belonging to the ayuntamiento of Manila	1,522.02

EXHIBIT B.

GENERAL ORDERS, }

No. 3. }

OFFICE MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., September 5, 1898.

The following regulations are prescribed for the disbursement of public funds derived from customs, taxes, and other revenues in the Philippine Islands:

I. Timely requisitions for allotments from these funds to meet expenses to be incurred in the several departments of administration, setting forth in detail the several purposes for which the allotment is desired and amounts, will be submitted by the respective heads thereof to these headquarters for approval.

II. Upon these requisitions allotments of funds will be made by the military governor in the form of warrants drawn by him upon the treasurer of public funds hereinafter designated.

III. Payments for services will be made upon pay rolls and vouchers, in duplicate, following substantially Forms 12 and 13, Quartermaster's Department, U. S. A., second to be used when first impracticable; while payments for material and other supplies will be made upon vouchers, following substantially Form 10, same department.

IV. All vouchers must, in advance of payment, be approved by the head of the department in which the expense was incurred.

V. At the end of each month officers charged with the disbursement of these funds in the several departments of administration will render for that month, through the heads of such departments, to the auditor of public accounts, hereinafter designated, a statement upon authorized blanks of all receipts and expenditures.

VI. The necessary blank forms to carry out the foregoing instructions will be furnished, upon application, by the treasurer of public funds named in paragraph 7.

VII. Maj. Charles H. Whipple, paymaster, U. S. A., will, in addition to his present duties, act as treasurer of the public funds herein referred to.

VIII. Maj. Charles E. Kilbourne, paymaster, U. S. A., is hereby designated auditor of public accounts. He will carefully audit the accounts referred to in paragraph 5 and render to the Secretary of War, through these headquarters, the returns required in Executive Orders dated Executive Mansion July 12, 1898.

By command of Major-General Otis:

THOMAS H. BARRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

EXHIBIT C.

GENERAL ORDERS, }

No. 5. }

OFFICE MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., September 17, 1898.

I. Under the general directions promulgated in General Orders, No. 3, of the 5th instant, from this office, the following detailed instructions, to govern particulars in official procedure respecting matters therein referred to, are issued:

The provost-marshal-general, the collector of customs, the collector of internal revenue, the captain of the port, and the chiefs of the supply departments of the army will submit to this office for approval, at least five days prior to the end of each month, detailed estimates (prepared in accordance with General Orders, No. 3, above cited) of funds required by them in the transaction of their civil duties, and for the payment of the obligations contracted, and to be contracted, by them in the administration of the affairs of the military government of the city of Manila, and for the subsistence of the Spanish prisoners of war, with requisitions for funds to meet such anticipated expenditures.

Upon the receipt and approval of these estimates and requisitions, warrants will be drawn by the military governor on the treasurer and custodian of public funds, directing him to place the approved amounts to the credit of the officers submitting the requisitions in certain of the bank depositories of the city, against which, in liquidation of debts contracted, the credited officers will check, observing as fully as practicable the instructions contained in paragraphs 596, 597, 598 of the Army Regulations.

Every officer to whose credit civil funds are deposited will render a monthly account current of the same, in which shall be set out all receipts and expenditures (expenditures to be supported by vouchers as indicated in General Orders,

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No. 3), and which will be prepared in manner and form substantially as accounts current showing War Department expenditures under the provisions of paragraphs 626, 627, 628, 629, and 630, Army Regulations.

Accounts current of these civil funds will be prepared in duplicate, one of the duplicates to be retained by the officer rendering it and the other with vouchers will be submitted to the auditor of public accounts, appointed by General Orders, No. 3, who, after examination, will forward the same to the War Department at Washington, D. C., for official disposition. This course of action will be a compliance with paragraph 5 of the general orders referred to above.

II. The office of intendente general de hacienda, the duties connected with which are now being performed by other administrative branches of the military government, is suspended.

By command of Major-General Otis:

THOMAS H. BARRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

EXHIBIT D.

GENERAL ORDERS,

No. 4.

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Manila, P. I., September 9, 1898.

All fines imposed by sentence of provost courts duly established by United States authorities in territory of the Philippine Islands, in actual occupation by the United States Government, will be paid in to the provost-marshal-general of the command, an accurate account of which, as a special fund stated separately and apart by itself, shall be kept at the office of the provost-marshal-general; and all such funds received shall be turned over by that officer direct to the custodian of the public funds, who will keep a separate account of the same.

By command of Major-General Otis:

THOMAS H. BARRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

EXHIBIT E.

Statement of receipts given Maj. Charles H. Whipple, paymaster, U. S. A., treasurer and custodian of public funds at time of transfer of office.

SEIZED FUNDS.

MANILA, P. I., October 11, 1898.

1. Received this day from Maj. Charles H. Whipple, paymaster, U. S. A., custodian of Spanish public funds the sum of eight hundred sixty-three thousand nine hundred and four dollars and sixty-three cents of Spanish public funds, the standard of value being the Mexican silver dollar and the Spanish-Filipino peso.

These funds pertaining to the following accounts, viz:

Spanish general treasury at Manila:

Gold coin	\$4,200.00
Silver coin (Mexican and Filipino mixed)	129,632.21
Notes of the Banco Español-Filipino	194,180.00
One accepted check on the Banco Español-Filipino	160,205.50
One accepted check on the Banco Español-Filipino	10,000.00
162 sacks copper coin, said to contain \$50 each	8,100.00
1,028 boxes copper coin, said to contain \$150 each	289,200.00
Total	795,517.71

Being a total of seven hundred and ninety-five thousand five hundred and seventeen and $\frac{71}{100}$ dollars.

Spanish mint at Manila:

30 sacks Mexican dollars, \$1,000 each	30,000.00
29 sacks Spanish medio pesos, \$1,000 each	29,000.00
10 packages Spanish medio pesos, in wooden box	50.00
Total	59,050.00

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Spanish mint at Manila—Continued.

One bar and small pieces gold, 0.870 fine, weight, 6,310 grams, and one bar and small pieces gold, 0.999 fine, weight, 313 grams, all of the estimated value of \$3,806.08

Total 62,856.08

Being a total of sixty-two thousand eight hundred and fifty-six and $\frac{1}{100}$ dollars.

Funds of the "ayuntamiento:" Notes Banco Español-Filipino, copper and silver coin \$3,624.82

Being a total of three thousand six hundred and twenty-four $\frac{1}{100}$ dollars.

"Fundos locales," office of "gobernador civil:" Notes Banco Español-Filipino and coin 956.02

Being a total of nine hundred and fifty-six and $\frac{1}{100}$ dollars.

Funds of the Philippine Lancers, Thirty-first Regiment Cavalry: Copper coin 950.00

Being a total of nine hundred and fifty dollars.

Making the grand total, as indicated above, of 863,904.63

MANILA, P. I., October 11, 1898.

2. Received of Maj. Charles H. Whipple, paymaster, U. S. A., custodian of Spanish public funds, the sum of twenty-six thousand and forty-nine dollars and sixty-two cents, of the Spanish public funds. The standard of value being the Mexican silver dollar and the Spanish-Filipino peso.

These funds pertaining to the following accounts:

Funds of the Administrador de Hacienda, found by Maj. R. B. C. Bement, U. S. V., collector of internal revenue, upon taking possession of the office \$24,527.00

Being a total of twenty-four thousand five hundred and twenty-seven and $\frac{1}{100}$ dollars.

Funds of the "ayuntamiento," being amount withdrawn from Banco Español-Filipino by check 1,522.02

Being a total of one thousand five hundred and twenty-two and $\frac{1}{100}$ dollars.

Making the grand total, as indicated above, of 26,049.62

This amount, \$26,049.62, was deposited with the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation to the credit of the custodian of Spanish public funds.

Grand total, seized funds, receipts 1 and 2 889,954.25

PUBLIC FUNDS.

MANILA, P. I., October 11, 1898.

3. Received this day of Charles H. Whipple, major and paymaster, U. S. A., treasurer of public funds, the sum of two hundred eleven thousand five hundred sixty-one dollars and eighty-four cents, Mexican, on deposit in the Chartered Bank of India, etc. (\$211,561.84.)

MANILA, P. I., October 11, 1898.

4. Received this day of Charles H. Whipple, major and paymaster, U. S. A., treasurer of public funds, the sum of two hundred sixty thousand nine hundred forty-one dollars and seventy-four cents, Mexican, on deposit in the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank. (\$260,941.74.)

Grand total public funds, receipts 3 and 4, \$472,503.58.

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CONTINGENT FUND.

MANILA, P. I., October 11, 1898.

5. Received this day of Charles H. Whipple, major and paymaster, U. S. A., treasurer of public funds, the sum of five hundred sixty-five dollars and thirty-five cents, in Mexican coin.

Grand total contingent fund, receipt 5, \$565.35.

RESERVE SAFE, TREASURY BUILDING.

MANILA, P. I., October 11, 1898.

6. Received this day of Charles H. Whipple, major and paymaster, U. S. A., custodian of Spanish public funds, the sum of thirty-nine thousand one hundred and ninety-three dollars and seventy-six cents, belonging to the "reserve safe," being amounts left as deposits with the Spanish treasurer-general. The standard of value being the Mexican silver dollar and the Spanish-Filipino peso. This amount is in the packages as indicated below:

1 sack containing silver coin (mutilated).....	\$465.00
1 sack containing silver coin.....	241.80
1 sack containing silver coin and bank notes.....	200.00
1 sack containing silver coin.....	66.82
1 sack containing the following, viz:	
Draft No. 26170, chartered Bank of India, Australia, and China, for.....	\$16,666.67
Draft No. 34227, Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, for 21,882.35 pesetas, and draft No. 34235, Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, for 16,000 pesetas, making a total for the two drafts of 37,882.35 pesetas, which is reduced to.....	7,576.47
Notes Banco Español-Filipino.....	4,975.00
Silver coin.....	2.00
	<hr/> 29,220.14
Making a total, as indicated above, of.....	30,193.76

MANILA, P. I., October 14, 1898.

7. Received this day of Maj. Charles H. Whipple, paymaster, U. S. A., the following-described bonds in the reserve safe in the Spanish treasury:

1 package containing 78 bonds, obligaciones hipotecarias del tesoro de Filipinas, series B, 100 pesos each, interest 6 pesos.....	\$7,800.00
1 package containing 170 bonds, tesoro Publico de España, 200 escs. = 100 pesos each.....	17,000.00
1 package containing 13 bonds, obligaciones hipotecarias del tesoro de Filipinas, series B, 100 pesos each, interest 6 pesos.....	1,300.00
1 package containing 1 bond, obligaciones hipotecarias del tesoro de Filipinas, series B, 100 pesos each, interest 6 pesos.....	100.00
1 package containing 24 bonds, obligaciones hipotecarias del tesoro de Filipinas, series B, 100 pesos each, interest 6 pesos.....	2,400.00
1 package containing 548 bonds, obligaciones hipotecarias del tesoro de Filipinas, series B, 100 pesos each, interest 6 pesos.....	54,800.00
1 package containing 70 bonds, obligaciones hipotecarias del tesoro de Filipinas, series B, 100 pesos each, interest 6 pesos.....	7,000.00
1 package containing 22 bonds, obligaciones hipotecarias del tesoro de Filipinas, series B, 100 pesos each, interest 6 pesos.....	2,200.00
1 package containing 21 bonds, obligaciones hipotecarias del tesoro de Filipinas, series B, 100 pesos each, interest 6 pesos.....	2,100.00
1 package containing 279 bonds, obligaciones hipotecarias del tesoro de Filipinas, series B, 100 pesos each, interest 6 pesos.....	27,900.00
Making a total for receipt 7.....	<hr/> 122,600.00

8. Description of money packages found in Spanish reserve safe, treasury building.

Package No. 1, containing Spanish treasury bills, security for contract for renting opium farm, province of New Ecija.....	\$3,315.00
Package No. 2, containing check No. 1166, series 43 D, Ponciano Reyes, notary of the court of Binondo.....	£671.00

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Package No. 5, containing Spanish-Filipino bank notes, judicial deposits by Don Agapito Oloris, notary of the court of Binondo.....	\$1,000.00
Package No. 8, containing 106 treasury tickets of 200 escs. each.....	10,600.00
Package No. 12, containing tickets worth \$335, security for contract for weights and measures, province of Pagasinan.....	335.00
Package No. 13, containing treasury tickets, Don Cestic Vistal, disposition of Governor Ysabella.....	2,117.00
Package No. 14, containing treasury tickets, Don Nicolaus Fumol, security for cutting wood, etc., province of Pampanga.....	151.00
Package No. 15, containing treasury tickets, security for issuing tools, etc., province of Cebu.....	264.00
Package No. 16, containing treasury deposits, Don P. Reyes, signed Firmin Vileva.....	9,101.00
Package No. 17, contract of cockpit, district of Morong.....	289.00
Package No. 18, containing treasury bills, Felix de la Ferm, contract for transporting tobacco to Ysabella.....	5,000.00
Package No. 19, contract for opium, Quesungco, province of Cagayan.....	6,971.00
Package No. 20, contract of Matias Tirstee for opium, province of Pagasinan.....	5,570.00
Package No. 21, contract of Vy Tiatigmeng for opium.....	3,005.00
Package No. 22, contract of Joaquin for opium, Yunchanta tan Quengco, province of Batangas.....	150.00
Package No. 23, containing eight bills, \$25 each, Marano y Chengco, contract for weights and measures.....	200.00
Package No. 24, containing bills, Francisco Goyenca, opium contract, Mindoro.....	275.00
Package No. 25, Antonio Bonifacio, contract for opium, province of Albay.....	5,769.00
Package No. 26, Chino Chna.....	16,986.00
Package No. 30, containing bonds, Don Eduardo Chao, contract for printing lottery tickets.....	1,500.00
Making a total for receipt 8.....	73,269.00
Making a grand total for the reserve safe, receipts 6, 7, 8.....	226,062.76

IN SAFE OF THE AYUNTAMIENTO, TREASURY BUILDING.

MANILA, P. I., *October 15, 1898.*

9. Received this day of Charles H. Whipple, major and paymaster, U. S. A., custodian of Spanish public funds, the following:

Treasury bonds of the Philippine Islands, series B, numbered from 054254 to 054330, inclusive, 100 pesos each, total seventy-seven (77) bonds, August 1, 1898, coupons attached.

Ninety-four (94) shares of \$200 each, Spanish-Filipino Bank.

Also, a box of fire department medals, not counted.

FUNDS OF THE "JUNTA PROVINCIAL."

MANILA, P. I., *October 15, 1898.*

10. Received this day from Charles H. Whipple, major and paymaster, U. S. A., custodian of Spanish public funds, the following deposit warrants on the Banco Español-Filipino, Manila:

No. 5869, for \$8,000, dated April 28, 1898, and

No. 5939, for \$10,719.91, dated July 14, 1898.

Both marked "Deposito Intransferible."

PUBLIC PROPERTY.

MANILA, P. I., *October 17, 1898.*

11. Received this day from Charles H. Whipple, major and paymaster, U. S. A., custodian of Spanish public funds and treasurer of public funds, the following public property:

1 closed carriage, 2 horses (found at the Spanish treasury building on taking possession).

1 set double harness, purchased from public funds.

2 halters, purchased from public funds.

1 stable bucket, purchased from public funds.

1 currycomb and brush, purchased from public funds.

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EXHIBIT F.

PROCEEDINGS OF A BOARD OF OFFICERS.

Appointed to meet at the treasury building and mint, Old Manila, P. I., pursuant to the following order:

SPECIAL ORDERS, { HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
No. 84. } Manila, P. I., October 21, 1898.

[Extract.]

4. A board of officers is appointed to meet on Monday, October 24, 1898, at 10 o'clock a. m., or as soon thereafter as practicable, at the office of the treasurer of public funds, this city, to examine, estimate, inventory, and report upon the contents of a certain chest and certain papers in the iron safe in the copper vault of the treasury building; also a quantity of copper ingots and a number of sacks, said to contain damaged silver, in the mint, none of which were receipted for when turned over by the Spanish authorities; also any other papers or treasure which may be found and not already accounted for.

Detail for the board.—Lieut. Col. J. W. Pope, chief quartermaster, U. S. V., chief quartermaster of the department; Lieut. Col. D. L. Brainard, chief commissary of subsistence, U. S. V., chief commissary of the department; Capt. W. A. Nichols, Twenty-third Infantry, recorder.

By command of Major-General Otis.

THOMAS H. BARRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Official:

C. H. MURRAY, *Aid.*

OFFICE OF TREASURER PUBLIC FUNDS,
Manila, P. I., October 25, 1898.

The board met pursuant to the foregoing order at 10 o'clock a. m.

Present: Lieut. Col. J. W. Pope, chief quartermaster, U. S. V., chief quartermaster of the department; Lieut. Col. D. L. Brainard, chief commissary of subsistence, U. S. V., chief commissary of the department; Capt. W. A. Nichols, Twenty-third Infantry, recorder.

The board then proceeded to the business before it.

Maj. C. E. Kilbourne, paymaster, U. S. A., treasurer of the public funds, exhibited to the board the iron safe in the copper vault, which was sealed by Maj. C. H. Whipple, paymaster, U. S. A., late treasurer of public funds, October 15, 1898. The said seal was intact. By direction of the board it was broken and the safe unlocked. Three bundles, upon which the board was to act, were taken out. Upon examination they proved to be bonds of some description.

The board being informed that two Spanish officials would give their services at 10.30 o'clock a. m. to-morrow, October 26, to assist in the work, after replacing the papers and sealing the safe, adjourned until that time.

INTENDENCIA GENERAL, October 26, 1898.

The board met at 10.30 o'clock a. m.

Present: Lieut. Col. J. W. Pope, chief quartermaster, U. S. V., chief quartermaster of the department; Lieut. Col. D. L. Brainard, chief commissary of subsistence, U. S. V., chief commissary of the department; Capt. W. A. Nichols, Twenty-third Infantry, recorder.

Señor Angel Omana, auditor, and Señor Gaspar de Ronte, treasurer, met the board by appointment.

These officials were unable to find but two of the three keys necessary to unlock the chest. The third lock was, by order of the board, broken and the box opened. The box contained three bundles of provisional canceled Spanish bonds, exchanged for definite bonds. The smallest bundle was marked to contain 10,975 bonds of 100 pesos each. The other two bundles were much larger and contained, as per markings, 42,718 and 30,995 bonds each, respectively, of 100 pesos each.

In the box also were found one bundle and seventeen books of blank provisional deeds of 100 pesos each, amounting to 56,242 obligations.

Each one of these packages was sealed and restored to the original wooden box.

The board then opened the iron safe and took from it a package said to contain private property allotted to people who had deposited in the treasury, called provisional titles, in exchange for money they had deposited. These papers repre-

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sented \$34,700 (Mexican). A second package was taken from the iron safe. It was made up of ten smaller bundles, each said to contain 200 definite bonds of 100 pesos each.

These bonds in this package were all invalidated.

A third and last package, containing ten bundles of 200 definite bonds of 100 pesos each, and, like those in the second package, all invalidated, was all the safe contained for the board's action.

These three packages were sealed by the board and placed in the wooden box, with the packages originally found therein. The box was then locked and sealed in the presence of the board, Maj. C. E. Kilbourne, and Señor Angel Omana.

The board then, at 12 o'clock noon, adjourned to meet at 10.30 o'clock to-morrow.

INTENDENCIA GENERAL, *October 27, 1898.*

The board met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10.30 o'clock a. m.

Present: all the members.

The board then proceeded to the mint, but upon arriving and finding it impossible to transact any business, adjourned until 10.30 o'clock to-morrow.

THE MINT, *Manila, P. I., October 28, 1898.*

The board met at 10.30 o'clock a. m.

Present: Lieut. Col. J. W. Pope, chief quartermaster, U. S. V.; Lieut. Col. D. L. Brainard, chief commissary of subsistence, U. S. V.; Capt. W. A. Nichols, Twenty-third U. S. Infantry.

The board then proceeded to weigh the damaged silver and found as follows:

One thousand six hundred and eighty-two kilogramos and 585 gramos of silver, and 18 kilogramos and 90 gramos of silver dust, said to belong to D. Boltazar Marti.

Three hundred and forty-eight kilogramos and 630 gramos of silver, said to belong to Señor Escudero.

One hundred and sixty kilogramos and 890 gramos of silver, said to belong to D. Manuel de la Vega.

One kilogramo and 411 gramos of metal claimed to be gold, but the board finds it to be gold and silver mixed. This is said to belong to D. Boltazar Marti.

The board, from its inspection of the silver, found now and then an iron nail melted in with the silver, and a small quantity of other worthless matter is no doubt mixed with the silver, but no fixed amount can be determined.

The board finds the weight of the copper ingots to be 153 kilogramos and 858 gramos.

At the request of Major Kilbourne the board took note of 30 sacks said to contain \$30,000 (Mexican), 29 sacks said to contain \$29,000 (Mexican) in half dollars, 50 silver sample coins, and \$3,806.08 in gold (estimated) which was in the same vault to which the metals weighed by the board were returned.

The door to this vault was then sealed in the presence of Major Kilbourne and the members of the board.

The board then, at 12.30 o'clock p. m., adjourned sine die.

J. W. POPE,

*Lieutenant-Colonel, Chief Quartermaster, U. S. V.,
Chief Quartermaster Department of the Pacific, President of the Board.*

D. L. BRAINARD,

*Lieut. Col., Chief Commissary of Subsistence, U. S. V.,
Chief Commissary Department of the Pacific, Member of the Board.*

W. A. NICHOLS,

*Captain Twenty-third U. S. Infantry,
Recorder of the Board.*

HDQS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
November 1, 1898.

The foregoing proceedings are approved.

E. S. OTIS,

Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

A true copy:

FRED W. SLADEN, *Aid.*

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EXHIBIT G.

OFFICE TREASURER OF PUBLIC FUNDS, Manila, P. I.

List of bonds, records, papers, etc., turned over by direction of the military governor in the Philippines to the president of the board of officers convened by Special Orders, No. 31, headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, dated January 31, 1899.

March 14, 1899: Stubs of all lottery tickets and all unsold tickets; also, all papers connected with lottery tickets.

April 12, 1899: An iron box, alleged to belong to "La Sociedad de Fianzas Mutuas de Empleados."

April 24, 1899: One box and one package canceled Spanish treasury bonds.

April 25, 1899: Records, books, and documents pertaining to the Philippine loan.

April 28, 1899: All records and papers relating to the pensioners of Spain.

April 29, 1899: All personal records of Spanish officers.

April 29, 1899: Stub books belonging to the "Caja de Depositos"—230 stub books of "depositos voluntarios;" 55 stub books of "depositos provisionales;" 36 stub books of "depositos sin interes;" 45 stub books of "depositos necesarios;" 5 stub books of 1897, not specified.

May 22, 1899: All records, documents, and papers pertaining to the contracts for the lease of opium-smoking rooms.

EXHIBIT H.

Statement of special deposits left with the treasurer of public funds to await further action as to delivery.

COPIES OF RECEIPTS.

MANILA, December 22, 1898.

1. Received of the United States provost-marshal-general, Manila, P. I., to be held as special deposit to await further determination as to delivery, the following stocks, bonds, and money:

80 acciones del Banco Español-Filipino, por valor nominal de	\$16,000.00
50 acciones del Varadero de Manila, por valor nominal de	5,000.00
63 acciones de la "Electricista," por valor nominal de	1,575.00
Una cedula de fundador de la misma Sociedad, valor nominal de	25.00
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation's check for	6,341.85
(The check was cashed and the money held on deposit.)	

The same belonging to the embargoed estate of Doroteo Cortes, his son, Maximo Cortes, and the wife of the latter.

The above special deposit was returned to and receipted for by the provost-marshal-general, Manila, P. I., April 8, 1899.

MANILA, P. I., March 13, 1899.

2. Received this day of Maj. Theodore Sternberg, additional paymaster, U. S. V., assistant treasurer, Manila, P. I., the sum of two thousand five hundred seventy dollars and fourteen cents, on account of money taken from houses at Jaro, P. I., by United States Army, to be held as special deposit, awaiting further disposition of same.

MANILA, P. I., March 18, 1899.

3. Received this day of Wm. S. McCaskey, lieutenant-colonel Twentieth U. S. Infantry, the following property, seized at Pasig, P. I., March 17, 1899, to be held as special deposit to await further action as to delivery:

One (1) package (sealed) said to contain four hundred sixty-six and $\frac{1}{2}$ dollars, gold.

One file containing private papers.

MANILA, P. I., March 20, 1899.

4. Received this day from the military governor in the Philippines the sum of ninety-six dollars and seventy-five cents (\$96.75), copper coin, taken from a Chinaman.

MANILA, P. I., April 3, 1899.

5. Received this day of William S. McCaskey, lieutenant-colonel Twentieth U. S. Infantry, the following property, seized at Pasig, P. I., March 17, 1899: Two

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thousand two hundred and thirty-one dollars and forty-six cents (\$2,231.46), Mexican, now on deposit in the Chartered Bank of India, Australia, and China. (The check was cashed and the money held as special deposit at the treasury).

MANILA, P. I., April 8, 1899.

6. Received this day from Lieut. Col. Charles L. Potter, U. S. V., Capt. E. B. Pratt, Twenty-third U. S. Infantry, and Capt. L. P. Sanders, First Montana Volunteer Infantry, a board of officers appointed by paragraph 7, Special Orders, No. 92, headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, for the purpose of inventorying the contents of a safe:

Notes on Banco Español-Filipino, Manila, P. I.	\$3,265.00
Check No. 454350 Chartered Bank of India, Australia, and China	100.00
Two sight drafts in duplicate, by Compania Gral de Tabacos de Filipinas, Nos. 879 and 880, \$2,250 and \$125	2,675.00
Certificate of deposit, Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, by Florancio Antonio, nominal value	3,000.00
Billetes de Tesoro:	
7 at \$1	7.00
6 at \$10	60.00
668 at \$4	2,672.00
Contents of box:	
Silver dollars, Mexican and Spanish	105.00
Half dollars, Mexican (16)	8.00
Half dollars, American (1)	1.00
Forty-cent pieces (5)	2.00
Twenty-cent pieces (14)	2.80
Twenty-five-cent pieces (7)	1.75
Ten-cent pieces (24)	2.40
Five-cent pieces (17)	.85
Nine coins of unknown value (worth about \$1).	
7 bonds with coupons, ministerio de ultramar, tesora de Filipinas, series B, capital 500 pesos, interest annual, 30 pesos	3,500.00
16 bonds with coupons, ministerio de ultramar, tesoro de Filipinas, series B, capital 100 pesos, interest annual 6 pesos	1,600.00
52 bonds with coupons, ministerio de ultramar, tesora de Filipinas, series B, capital 100 pesos, interest annual 6 pesos	5,200.00
One 5-franc note (in box)	2.00
One Hongkong bank note (in box)	1.00
Draft (second of exchange) Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, Manila, P. I. (in box)	1,000.00
Three drafts (second of exchange) Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation at Hongkong (in box):	
First	17,800.00
Second	17,700.00
Third	11,000.00
One small notebook, two blank books, one portfolio, miscellaneous letters and papers of apparently no value, marked Exhibits 1, 2, and 24; unidentified papers marked Exhibits 3, 4, and 5.	

Also, received of the same board of officers one package of papers, probably worthless, said to have been found in another safe, marked Exhibit 6.

MANILA, P. I., April 18, 1899.

7. Received this day of Maj. T. D. Keleher, paymaster, U. S. V., disbursing officer provost-marshal-general, the sum of one hundred thousand dollars, on account of special deposit, insurgents' money, taken from Smith, Bell & Co., Manila, P. I.

Chartered bank check, No. 440406, for \$100,000, "accepted."

MANILA, P. I., May 8, 1899.

8. Received of Lieut. William Braunersreuther, U. S. N., captain of the port, Manila, the sum of eleven thousand five hundred and eighty-one dollars and eighty cents, on account of special deposit, money seized on schooner *Champaña* \$11,581.80 in coin.

MANILA, P. I., June 3, 1899.

9. Received of William Braunersreuther, lieutenant, U. S. N., captain of the port, Manila, P. I., the sum of five thousand one hundred and twenty-five dollars and sixteen cents, on account of special deposit, proceeds of sale of cargo ex schooner *Champaña*. (Check No. 428731, Hongkong Bank, \$5,125.16, "certified.")

EXHIBIT I.

Statement of receipts and disbursements of the Philippine Islands, covering the period from August 1, 1898, to June 30, 1899.

RECEIPTS.

	August.	Septem-ber.	October.	Novem-ber.	Decem-ber.	January.	Febru-ary.	March.	April.	May.	June.	Total.
SEIZED FUNDS.												
Funds seized at Manila	\$801,908.61	\$27,955.64	\$190.00									\$880,954.25
Excess found in recount												190.00
Interest on bank balances						\$42.74						42.74
Total seized funds	801,908.61	27,955.64	190.00			42.74						880,186.99
PUBLIC FUNDS.												
<i>Manila.</i>												
Internal-revenue collections	518.45	32,984.45	63,596.19	\$44,335.41	\$19,839.96	66,976.90	\$35,186.85	\$51,772.18	\$94,796.76	\$33,191.69	\$16,639.61	450,838.95
Custom-house collections	157,062.77	588,594.44	274,398.13	375,984.00	512,196.85	642,309.36	445,357.01	486,696.56	630,837.60	750,964.19	672,052.98	5,545,664.79
Captain of the port collections			465.50	221.80	1,135.94	3,199.49	1,801.27	1,807.09	632.38	517.58	854.94	10,715.99
Provost court fines			2,508.36	4,318.45	4,433.00	4,034.00	1,814.00	3,710.13	5,829.00	9,442.62	3,780.39	30,890.95
Water rents			3,353.00	4,031.81	22.01	7,056.45	1,143.49	229.98	7,723.79	1,220.31	225.99	21,900.83
Markets			3,399.53	4,597.45	6,000.00	4,890.00	3,150.00	1,725.00	3,900.00	3,875.00	5,700.00	34,516.98
Matadero			4,850.04	7,875.00	10,350.00	10,350.00	6,800.00	3,100.00	3,000.00	3,955.00	4,125.00	54,405.04
Cemeteries			2,696.29	7,064.80	881.43	783.70	568.00	541.00	859.31	658.00	811.70	8,497.14
Licenses			3,184.17	4,622.08	4,159.31	4,766.79	2,309.50	1,365.69	3,669.89	4,568.25	1,680.16	30,390.34
St. Lazare Hospital								731.44	100.00	694.70	115.77	1,436.14
Board of health								230.09				230.09
Refund of appropriation, Paymaster-General			90.16					17,000.00		25,857.97	8,634.61	17,000.16
Taxes, 1899												34,402.58
Transport quartermaster's collec-tions											79.10	79.10
Sales:												
Subsistence Department				3,150.15	58.00		962.87			320.23	379.20	4,143.02
Quartermaster's Department												757.43
Forfeit of guarantee, Quartermas-ter's Department									1,500.00			1,500.00
Dues, Australian and China cable									121.49	296.02	223.56	554.07
Refund of appropriation, Ordnance Department												11.56
Interest on daily bank balance						11.56	7.46					1,497.97
Total	157,681.72	621,578.89	358,460.28	440,174.45	359,676.50	745,778.47	460,230.44	569,118.98	701,640.22	855,390.56	715,313.00	6,390,530.51

EXHIBIT I.—Statement of receipts and disbursements of the seized and public funds of the Philippine Islands, covering the period from August 1, 1898, to June 30, 1899—Continued.

DISBURSEMENTS.

	August.	Septem-ber.	October.	Novem-ber.	Decem-ber.	January.	Febru-ary.	March.	April.	May.	June.	Total.
<i>Manila.</i>												
Office of the—												
Chief quartermaster.....		\$8,500.00	\$152,128.65	\$130,706.10	\$200,016.75	\$445,617.36	\$590,635.91		\$380,407.06	\$678,867.76	\$771,537.42	\$3,894,667.03
Chief commissary.....		115,816.22	273,578.34	147,852.18	69,750.91	62,714.86	56,218.24	\$11,361.61	63,162.80		69,091.18	737,240.36
Provost-marshal-general.....	\$1,800.00	70,027.11	69,652.24	53,494.12	79,497.86	60,759.64	58,215.82	54,479.83	13,185.72	14,790.00	9,401.57	569,170.60
Captain of the port.....		9,365.88	14,965.00	540.00	14,000.00	10,617.59	20,660.00	5,100.00	5,147.84	5,100.00	12,050.13	107,536.78
Collector of customs.....	3,000.00	10,506.00	4,245.16		5,500.00	4,600.00	4,705.19	6,100.00	6,187.61	6,100.00	12,050.13	60,277.32
Collector of internal revenue.....		4,279.24	3,965.00	2,238.00	1,863.56	1,286.00	2,737.80	1,379.25	1,962.16	4,340.43	1,687.00	23,604.44
Chief ordnance officer.....			1,200.00		1,378.50					1,170.50		6,024.50
Treasurer of public funds.....	500.00		500.00			300.00		500.00		500.00		2,300.00
Hongkong Bank, for transfer to San Francisco.....											512,295.08	512,295.08
General expense.....		337.66	158.00		245.54	360.00						1,091.20
Medical supplies, Spanish prisoners.....		94.65		1,190.36	1,422.55	1,158.49						3,865.99
Pay for Spanish troops.....					2,060.00							2,060.00
Total.....	5,300.00	218,629.80	519,060.36	345,100.66	385,085.67	587,362.97	703,748.96	72,820.66	1,033,862.07	702,768.69	1,366,062.36	5,910,182.28
<i>Iloilo.</i>												
Office of the—												
Captain of port.....							3,000.00	7,037.65		4,207.15	7,080.66	21,325.46
Collector of customs.....								400.00	540.00		2,211.82	3,151.82
Depot quartermaster.....								15,000.00	50,920.00	61,160.00	82,660.00	209,720.00
Collector of internal revenue.....									362.04	294.96		756.70
Assistant treasurer.....											40.00	40.00
Separate brigade commissary.....											20,000.00	20,000.00
Total.....							3,000.00	22,437.65	51,822.00	65,662.10	112,121.96	265,033.66
<i>Cebu.</i>												
Office of the—												
Captain of the port.....												
Collector of customs.....									2,015.00		1,781.75	3,796.75
Assistant quartermaster.....									2,524.75	1,722.50	1,103.60	5,351.85
Quartermaster First Battalion, Twenty-third Infantry.....									518.00	3,186.00	500.00	4,204.00
Total.....										9,600.00		9,600.00
Grand total disbursements.....	5,300.00	218,629.80	519,060.36	345,100.66	385,085.67	587,362.97	703,748.96	95,258.34	1,080,784.82	782,969.29	1,481,539.66	6,188,204.56

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Actual balance June 30, 1899, is as follows:

RECAPITULATION.

Total seized funds.....	\$890,186.99
Total public funds.....	6,927,163.58
Grand total funds.....	7,817,350.57
Total disbursements.....	6,188,204.56
Total balance.....	1,629,146.01

SEIZED FUNDS.

Cash on hand at treasury, Manila.....	\$801,238.55
Cash on hand at mint, Manila.....	62,856.08
On deposit with Hongkong and Shanghai Bank.....	26,092.36
	890,186.99

PUBLIC FUNDS.

On deposit with Hongkong and Shanghai Bank.....	362,852.87
On deposit with Chartered Bank of India.....	321,392.53
Cash on hand at treasury received too late for deposit.....	54,813.62
	738,959.02
Total balance seized and public funds.....	1,629,146.01

RECEIPTS OF CUSTOMS.

Manila.....	5,545,664.79
Iloilo.....	389,250.48
Cebu.....	232,369.40
Total.....	6,167,283.67

RECEIPTS OF INTERNAL REVENUE.

Manila.....	459,838.95
Iloilo.....	30,591.18
Total.....	490,430.13

The standard of value is the Mexican and the Spanish-Filipino silver peso.

CHAS. E. KILBOURNE,

Major and Paymaster, U. S. A., Treasurer and Custodian Public Funds.

EXHIBIT K.

OFFICE OF THE TREASURER OF PUBLIC FUNDS, Manila, P. I.

Statement of current expenses of office treasurer of public funds, August 18, 1898, to June 30, 1899.

Month.	Receipts, account warrants.	Disburse- ments.	Month.	Receipts, account warrants.	Disburse- ments.
August.....	\$500.00	\$234.62	March.....	\$500.00	\$275.50
September.....		183.03	April.....		289.19
October.....	500.00	149.33	May.....	500.00	256.40
November.....		126.83	June.....		277.31
December.....		132.75	Total.....	2,300.00	2,216.52
January.....	300.00	171.66			
February.....		129.90			

Actual balance on hand June 30, 1899, is \$83.48 (Mexican silver).

The standard of value is the Mexican and the Spanish-Filipino silver peso.

CHAS. E. KILBOURNE,

Major and Paymaster, U. S. A., Treasurer of Public Funds.

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EXHIBIT L.

OFFICE OF THE TREASURER OF PUBLIC FUNDS, At the Treasury, Manila.

Statement of coin, bank notes, etc., accounted for on monthly return to auditor of public accounts, Manila, but not taken up on my regular account current.

	Coin and notes. (Amount.)	Accepted check. (Amount.)	Drafts, nonnegotiable. (Nominal value.)	Treasury bills, Spanish-Filipino. (Nominal value.)	Bonds, Spanish and Filipino treasury. (Nominal value.)	Deposit warrant Banco Español-Filipino. (Nominal value.)	Bank stock, Banco Español-Filipino. (Nominal value.)	Fire department medals.	Canceled bonds.
Received of Major Whipple, paymaster, U. S. A., at the time of transfer of office, Oct. 11, 1898	\$0,950.62	\$671	\$24,243.14	\$70,098	\$131,800	\$18,719.91	\$18,800	1	
Taken up in accordance with action of American board of officers convened by S. O. 84, Oct. 21, 1898									1
Found in vaults of treasury upon examination of safes and boxes (1 package canceled bonds)									1
Found in the reserve safe, treasury building, 1 pkg. 8 bonds of the Spanish Treasury of 300 escs.=100 pesos each					800				
Total debits	6,950.62	671	24,243.14	70,098	132,600	18,719.91	18,800	1	1
Turned over to American board of officers, as per order of military governor, Apr. 4, 1899								1	1
Total balance to be accounted for	6,950.62	671	24,243.14	70,098	132,600	18,719.91	18,800	1	

CHAS. E. KILBOURNE,
Major and Paymaster, U. S. A.,
Treasurer and Custodian Public Funds.

EXHIBIT M.

OFFICE OF THE TREASURER OF PUBLIC FUNDS, At the Mint, Manila.

Statement of silver, copper, etc., accounted for on monthly return to auditor of public accounts, Manila, P. I., but not taken up on my regular account current.

	Damaged silver.	Silver dust.	Gold and silver mixed.	Copper.	Unfinished silver coins.	Silver bar.
Taken up in accordance with action of board of officers convened by S. O. 84, headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, Manila, P. I., Oct. 21, 1898	Kilogs. 2,182.105	Kilogs. 13.080	Kilogs. 1.411	Kilogs. 153.853		
Taken up in accordance with action of board of officers convened by S. O. No. 31, current series, Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, Manila, P. I., Jan. 31, 1899					50.585	30.460
Total debits to be accounted for	2,182.105	13.080	1.411	153.853	50.585	30.460

CHAS. E. KILBOURNE,
Major and Paymaster, U. S. A., Treasurer and Custodian Public Funds.

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APPENDIX P.

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
MILITARY STATION No. 1.
Manila, August 1, 1899.

Maj. Gen. E. S. OTIS.
Military Governor.

SIR: I inclose for your information a condensed report of the work of the military postal service in the Philippines for the year ended June 30, 1899.

During the eleven months to June 30, 73 mails were dispatched to the United States and 86 mails received from the United States, including mails from Tacoma, Seattle, and Vancouver.

One hundred and eighty-three dispatches were made to foreign ports, mostly to Hongkong and Singapore, and 182 mails received from foreign ports. One hundred and eighty dispatches were made to Philippine points, and 188 mails received from same, not including the double daily exchange with Cavite and the daily exchange with the clerk on the train.

MANILA OFFICE.

Money orders issued.....	13,254
Amount.....	\$428,361.52
Amount of fees.....	\$1,767.36
Amount of war tax.....	\$257.14
Total amount received.....	\$430,386.02
Advices received.....	1,734
Amount paid.....	\$46,690.14
Repaid 34, amount.....	\$1,055.60
Not issued.....	53
Money-order funds remitted.....	\$401,781.00
Amount of orders on deposit in the Manila post-office, drawn at Manila.....	\$42,782.01

Registry division.

Number registered pieces received:	
From Europe.....	17,758
From United States.....	8,283
From Asia.....	7,763
From provinces and stations.....	4,311
Total number received.....	38,115
Number registered pieces dispatched:	
To United States.....	20,105
To Europe.....	8,748
To Asia.....	7,882
To provinces and stations.....	4,738
Total number dispatched.....	31,473
Total number handled.....	69,588

Mailing division.

Three thousand and four bags of mail were dispatched to the United States, and of this number 1,045 were sent via Hongkong. There were 1,325 pouches of letter mail and 1,779 sacks of paper mail.

Letters dispatched to United States.....	1,790,400
Pieces other classes to United States.....	266,850
Letters to foreign countries.....	159,497
Other classes foreign countries.....	27,900
Letters to stations and provinces.....	173,462

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Other classes to stations and provinces.....	81,612
Local pieces handled.....	98,650
Total number pieces dispatched.....	2,598,371
Total number pieces received from all sources.....	2,928,105
Total number pieces handled.....	5,526,476

Revenues from all sources, including outside stations.

Total amount received from sale of stamps.....	\$60,076.58
Received from box rents, Manila.....	839.25
Received from sale of waste paper, Manila.....	8.59
Fees from money orders:	
Manila.....	1,767.36
Cavite.....	84.15
Iloilo.....	188.36
Cebu.....	9.42
	62,923.71

On account of the fact that the bills for safes, printing press, and outfit and supplies generally were not sent to Manila, it is not possible to state just what these expenses of the service have been. There have been \$23,156.97 expended at Manila, account of salaries, transportation, light, etc.

CAVITE STATION.

Money orders issued.....	626
Amount received.....	\$20,319.48
Amount of fees.....	\$84.15
Amount of war tax.....	\$12.52
Advices received.....	74
Amount paid.....	\$2,292.61
Orders repaid (4), amount.....	\$95.85
Not issued.....	11
Registered mail:	
Pieces received.....	663
Pieces dispatched.....	1,670
Stamp sales.....	\$2,840.63
Money orders issued.....	953
Amount received.....	\$35,690.54
Amount of fees.....	\$138.36
Amount of war tax.....	\$19.04
Amount paid.....	\$882.67
Stamp sales.....	\$3,364.19
Registered matter:	
Pieces received.....	1,510
Pieces dispatched.....	1,825

CEBU STATION.

Money orders issued.....	75
Amount received.....	\$1,702.59
Amount of fees.....	\$9.43
Amount of war tax.....	\$1.50
Advices received.....	5
Amount paid.....	\$85.87
Stamp sales.....	\$644.33
Registered matter:	
Pieces received.....	234
Pieces dispatched.....	103

BACOLOD STATION.

Registered matter:	
Pieces received.....	148
Pieces dispatched.....	197
Stamp sales.....	\$252.00

Very respectfully,

F. W. VAILLE,
Director of Posts.

APPENDIX Q.

REPORT OF ADMINISTRATION OF AFFAIRS OF INTERNAL-REVENUE OFFICE OF MANILA
AND SUBURES FROM ESTABLISHMENT TO JUNE 30, 1899.

OFFICE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE
FOR UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Manila, P. I., July 29, 1899.

The SECRETARY OF MILITARY GOVERNOR.

SIR: I have the honor to forward herewith a report of the affairs of this office since establishment to June 30, 1899, in compliance with instructions of July 21, 1899.

On August 21, 1898, Maj. R. B. C. Bement, United States Volunteer Engineers, having been appointed collector, and Lieut. C. H. Sleeper, First Colorado Volunteer Infantry, deputy collector, took possession of the office of "hacienda publica," in New Manila, and were directed to open the office for business. The office was found barren of current records and internal-revenue stamps, which were found August 23 in Old Manila, together with \$24,527.60, Spanish money, and were moved to the proper office, with office furniture and fixtures. The Spanish officials refused to accept a receipt except for funds, which was given.

The former clerical force was collected and, from over 100 clerks, about 50 were retained at their old salaries, the Spanish clerks refusing to accept positions or give any information on the methods pursued or the regulations in force. Lieut. Charles S. Haughwout, First Colorado Infantry, U. S. V., was detailed as assistant to the collector, and with three Englishmen as interpreters and fifty natives, constituted the force which was at once organized. After an examination of all books, records, and papers on file, reports were forwarded to the military governor, who thereon ordered the following revenues suspended:

Cedula personal; Chinese cedula; opium contract tax; tax of 10 per cent on railroad tariff and fares; besides abolishing the sale of Philippine postage, telegraph, and signature stamps. The industrial and Urbana taxes and the sale of internal-revenue stamps were continued under the Spanish regulations in force at the time the American authorities took possession, and have since been continued, with such modifications as the altered condition of affairs have demanded. Notifications were published in the daily papers, and on August 26 the office was opened for business.

For the first five days stamps only were sold, but on September 1, after much work by the officers and clerks, the methods of the collection and assessment of urbana and industrial taxes were learned, the Spanish officials having carried away all the regulations and decrees of the office pertaining thereto, and others had to be procured and translated. The old native collectors were first employed, but it was soon discovered that these men collected small additional fees for themselves and they were discharged, and all taxes made payable at the internal-revenue office, and taxpayers advised to that effect.

During September the inspection department was organized and four American soldiers were detailed for this work, who have been found very efficient, inspectors being assigned to districts, reporting delinquents, bringing in new taxpayers, and making a house to house canvass every two months.

During September the following amounts of taxes were collected, covering the period previous to August 13, 1898: \$5,687.21 industrial, \$1,315.24 urbana, but on a claim by Ynchausti & Co. for a rebate for the amount of taxes paid for above-mentioned period the military governor directed that all such taxes be refunded and no more accepted, which order was complied with during succeeding months on application of the taxpayers, and almost all has now been refunded.

Major Bement was taken sick in October and relieved as collector by Capt. Charles F. Mudgett, First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry, who was also relieved on account of sickness in March, 1899, and Charles H. Sleeper, first lieutenant, First Colorado Volunteer Infantry, formerly deputy collector, was appointed collector. Lieutenant Haughwout, assistant to collector, was relieved in June on account of failing health, and the vacant positions have remained unfilled.

INDUSTRIAL TAX.

The industrial tax, consisting of fixed tariffs on all industries, trades, professions, and arts, with a municipal surtax of 10 per cent, a provincial surtax of 10 per cent, and an additional surtax of 5 per cent, divided into 3 per cent for collection and 2 per cent for bankrupt entries and inspection expenses, was continued

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and the Spanish regulations enforced in so far as was possible, as the abolishment of the office of intendente general changed the methods to some extent.

Many changes have been made in the tariffs by orders of the military governor on recommendations of this office in the way of amendments to suit new industries and new conditions constantly arising.

The fires during February in the districts of Tondo and Paco and the insurrection have interfered with the revenues to some extent; but on comparison of revenues of the first six months of 1897, when \$214,220.73 was collected in the entire province of Manila, and \$193,493.13 in 1899 for the corresponding period in the city of Manila and suburbs alone, the result is favorable, inasmuch as the Government contract tax of one-half per cent on all Government contracts is included in the 1897 figures, but is now suspended.

The entire delinquent tax list, June 30, 1899, was \$20,051.69, part of which is on burned establishments and shops, or whose owners are insurgents who left Manila in January or February, and part includes all old Spanish patents in force at time of American occupation, whose owners can not be found, but whose taxes are carried over in order that they may be collected if the taxpayers are discovered by inspectors. The Chinese caused much trouble during the first few months in evading taxpaying by changing names, shops, industries, etc.; but after a few arrests and convictions for fraud they soon came to understand evasion was not to be tolerated, and although some fraud is still practiced, the inspectors have less trouble than formerly. No compulsion, except on Chinese, has yet been used in collections, and no stocks seized or sold, as the conditions have appeared not to warrant such action; but every effort has been made to collect the entire tax, and even with \$20,000 in taxes still delinquent, under the present circumstances 6.3 per cent is small for the period covered on the assessed tax. Since January, 1899, the delinquent surtax of 25 per cent has been added to all delinquent taxes not paid during the first month of the quarter, as provided for in the regulations, and although advised in the daily papers, many large taxpayers, after mildly protesting, have paid their surtax. The future promises more prompt payments, as the Spanish authorities were lax in applying this regulation.

URBANA TAX.

The collection of the urbana tax, which is a tax of 5 per cent on 75 per cent of the declared rent of buildings, or if no rent is received the yearly rental being considered 10 per cent of the value of the building, was begun on September 3, 1898, but it was soon found that much fraud had existed in the assessment of this tax, and new assessments were begun; but the regulations thereon being found too intricate for military usage, on December 13, by General Orders, No. 13, office of military governor, a modification was adopted, which materially changed and simplified the methods and reduced the surtax from 5 per cent to 3 per cent and has resulted with an increase of \$14,571.03 in the revenues for this tax for first six months of 1899 over those for the same period of 1897, and not including many buildings which had been burned during February and many insurgent taxpayers who have left the city and can not be found, making the delinquent tax list of June 30, 1899, \$325.20, or 3.7 per cent of the whole, most of which will be collected during the balance of the year and which will be increased by the delinquent penalty of 10 per cent additional. No compulsory proceedings have yet been taken, as such measures have not appeared necessary. In January a native architect was employed to make a plat of a block in the walled city, which was done under direction of this office by taking exact measurements of buildings, their plans and elevations, material and estimated value, with a view of making a block map of the city. This was forwarded to the military governor for his consideration.

STAMPS.

The internal-revenue stamps authorized by Spanish regulations and adopted by the military government comprised giro (draft) stamps, receipt stamps, fine stamps (pagos del estado), stamped paper, and loose stamps (timbre movil).

A supply of all classes and denominations was found on hand August 26 and an inventory made thereof and sales began, all stamps sold being surcharged in red ink or with a rubber stamp, "U. S. Internal Revenue." These sales continued until December, when it was evident more stamps must be procured and new designs were made in this office and new stamps printed by contract, until only stamped paper and fine stamps of the old Spanish stamps are in use. Every effort has been used to prevent fraud in printing these stamps, and an inspector has always been detailed with the printer and the plates destroyed after the issue is printed. The new design embodies the American eagle and shield, and although the printing is poor the means at hand are very limited. This office has thus far

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supplied all the internal-revenue offices and custom-houses in the islands with stamps on proper requisitions. The use of the United States postage stamp in lieu of Philippine stamps became so common that on application from this office an order was issued by the military governor prohibiting such misuse, which has greatly augmented the sales of certain classes. The closing of the civil courts in January and the general dullness in business has also affected the stamp revenues, but the following shows a comparison of stamp revenues for first six months of 1897 and the corresponding period of 1899:

	1897.	1899.
Paper and loose stamps	\$24,023.79	\$19,172.15
Draft	18,753.70	12,585.25
Receipt	15,845.70	6,976.70
Fine	19,643.50	73.90
Total	79,166.69	38,807.90

The fine stamps were used by Spanish authorities for paying fines, whereas the military courts established by military government only accepted cash up to June 30, 1899.

The following is an inventory of current internal-revenue stamps on hand June 30, 1899:

GIRO OR DRAFT.

5-cent	2,116	\$3	337
15-cent	1,653	\$3.60	295
20-cent	1,346	\$4	309
30-cent	787	\$5	320
60-cent	720	\$6	352
80-cent	1,424	\$7	373
\$1.20	1,187	\$8	353
\$1.40	274	\$9	372
\$1.80	766	\$10	266
\$2	236	\$15	347
\$2.60	282	Value	\$30,424.85

LOOSE STAMPS (TIMBRE MOVIL).

\$20	493	\$1	2,675
\$15	494	50-cent	13
\$10	491	40-cent	1,994
\$5	4,610	25-cent	15,974
\$3	474	Value	\$55,903.25
\$2	912		

STAMPED PAPER.

\$20	617	50-cent	182
\$15	755	40-cent	2,350
\$10	659	25-cent	9,964
\$5	6	10-cent	1,192
\$3	1,117	5-cent	1,590
\$2	1,704	Value	\$42,011.70
\$1	1,252		

RECEIPT STAMPS.

1-cent	176,106	10-cent	43,146
2-cent	25,900	Value	\$8,346.51
5-cent	35,057		

FINE STAMPS (PAGOS DEL ESTADO).

5-cent	1,401	\$1	1,386
10-cent	1,392	\$5	1,176
15-cent	1,960	\$25	383
20-cent	1,225	\$50	380
50-cent	1,039	Value	\$37,108.75

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CEDULAS.

During the first three months of American occupation no new cedulas were issued by this office; the old Chinese cedulas were registered and stamped without charge, in order to obtain a record of Chinese in Manila. This was accomplished by posting Chinese notices throughout the Chinese section and some 15,000 Chinese were thus registered. In February the demand for cedulas became so great that an order was issued by the military governor authorizing an issue of cedulas of one price, each 20 cents (Mexican), to all male inhabitants between the ages of 16 and 60. One hundred thousand blank cedulas were printed and record books procured and the issue began February 15, more than 3,000 being issued in a single day until, on June 30, 65,711 cedulas had been issued to inhabitants, divided as follows: Native Filipinos, 43,099; Chinese, 21,173; Spanish, 1,075; British, 135; Americans, 22; Germans, 81; Swiss, 38; other nationalities, 88; total, 65,711. Not being compulsory, whites do not care for cedulas and few Americans have applied. The gross income from this issue amounted to \$13,142.20, with expenses of clerk hire \$1,839.70, printing and stationery \$1,067.40, other expenses \$40, total \$2,947.10, leaving a net revenue in this department of \$10,195.10.

These cedulas, though perhaps of no practical value to the holders thereof except a means of identification, have satisfied the ignorant Chinese and native element in their clamor for an official document of some kind to establish their personality, and the low price of 1 peseta has further assured them that the high direct tax which, under Spanish rule amounted to an average of \$2.50 for each native inhabitant, male or female, and \$10 for each Chinese inhabitant, was not to be adopted by the United States Government.

The records of this office have followed the Spanish system in general, but doing away with their duplicate and triplicate systems, original entry-books being made permanent records and a more modern mode of cash-books adopted, each department's records checking the cashier's work daily. The Spanish records of Spanish administration were found bulky, and the records are now kept in accounts resembling those of disbursing officers of the United States Army.

Much trouble has been found with native clerks, who can not easily accustom themselves not to accept small bribes, and they demanded many holidays, but they are now doing fairly satisfactory work on average salaries of \$16 per month.

Current accounts and abstract in triplicate, with vouchers, have been forwarded before the 10th of each month to the auditor of public accounts, and statements have been forwarded to the Secretary of War and the military governor each month, besides comparisons and reports on different departments, as occasion demanded, from time to time. Besides 3 officers, from 4 to 8 enlisted men have been detailed for duty with this department, and, with 3 Englishmen and from 30 to 50 natives, have constituted the force, which, on June 30, was 1 officer, 5 enlisted men, 3 Englishmen, and 36 native clerks. The statements hereto affixed show the monthly and quarterly collections and disbursements of the different departments of this office for the period from August 26, 1898, to June 30, 1899.

Respectfully submitted.

CHARLES H. SLEEPER,

First Lieutenant, Thirty-seventh Infantry, U. S. V.,
Collector Internal Revenue.

Collections of internal-revenue office from August 26, 1898, to June 30, 1899, by months and quarters.

Department.	Third quarter, 1898.			Fourth quarter, 1898.			
	August.	Septem-ber.	Total.	October.	Novem-ber.	Decem-ber.	Total.
Seized funds.....	\$24,527.60		\$24,527.60				
Industrial tax.....		\$25,356.08	25,356.08	\$51,324.87	\$20,933.84	\$4,923.43	\$77,182.14
Urbana tax.....		5,614.16	5,614.16	18,141.55	4,866.36	2,223.39	25,231.30
Stamps:							
Stamped paper.....	148.25	473.80	622.05	747.90	778.45	739.55	2,315.90
Draft.....	429.00	1,025.90	1,454.90	2,445.15	2,525.75	3,130.45	8,101.35
Receipt.....	7.29	378.51	385.80	1,236.54	1,456.24	1,441.04	4,135.82
Loose "timbre movil".....		59.25	59.25	1,323.50	1,983.20	7,149.05	10,455.75
Fine.....		1.00	1.00	48.50	117.75	183.05	349.30
Miscellaneous.....	10.50	10.16	20.66				
Total.....	25,122.64	32,918.80	58,041.50	75,270.01	32,661.59	19,839.96	127,771.56

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Collections of internal-revenue office from August 26, 1898, to June 30, 1899, by months and quarters—Continued.

Department.	First quarter, 1899.			
	January.	February.	March.	Total
Seized funds				
Industrial tax	\$53,158.73	\$23,829.72	\$22,023.04	\$99,021.49
Urbana tax	1,736.71	5,474.57	16,684.24	23,895.52
Stamps:				
Stamped paper	732.15	159.00	122.60	1,013.75
Draft	1,812.40	1,202.70	1,712.70	4,727.80
Receipt	1,299.11	824.28	785.15	2,908.52
Loose "timbre movil"	8,164.00	1,337.00	2,259.25	11,760.25
Fine	73.80			73.80
Miscellaneous				
Cedulas:				
Chinese		1,201.20	2,296.00	3,557.20
Personal		1,098.40	5,879.20	6,977.60
Total	66,976.90	35,186.85	51,772.18	153,935.93

Department.	Second quarter, 1899.				Total incomes.
	April.	May.	June.	Total.	
Seized funds					\$24,527.80
Industrial tax	\$98,680.50	\$20,829.83	\$4,981.21	\$124,491.54	296,031.35
Urbana tax	20,887.59	5,277.90	3,059.75	29,225.24	83,966.22
Stamps:					
Stamped paper	84.50	39.75	50.40	174.65	4,126.35
Draft	1,992.10	2,804.25	3,061.10	7,857.45	22,141.50
Receipt	917.52	1,250.21	1,900.45	4,068.18	11,498.26
Loose "timbre movil"	1,352.75	2,105.25	2,765.50	6,223.50	28,498.75
Fine					424.10
Miscellaneous					20.66
Cedulas:					
Chinese	271.20	225.60	180.60	677.40	4,234.60
Cedula, personal	600.60	658.80	670.60	1,930.00	8,907.60
Total	94,796.76	33,191.69	16,639.61	144,628.06	484,377.05

¹ Not a part of regular revenues—for some waste paper sold and taken up in current expense account.

NOTE.—Totals for quarters shown, as the regulations so require.

Disbursements from office of collector of internal revenue for Manila from August 26, 1898, to June 30, 1899.

Items.	Third quarter, 1898.			Fourth quarter, 1898.			
	August.	Septem-ber.	Total.	October.	Novem-ber.	Decem-ber.	Total.
Deposits with treasurer public funds	\$25,046.55	\$32,984.45	\$58,031.00	\$75,270.01	\$32,661.59	\$19,830.96	\$127,771.56
Refunds, industrial-urbana				1,819.54	4,359.02	1,035.10	7,213.66
Pay roll, civil employees	105.63	1,064.50	1,090.13	921.00	804.17	777.00	2,502.17
Stationery and printing	10.20		10.20	147.35	10.85	4.00	162.20
Furniture and fixtures	20.75		20.75	38.12			38.12
Transportation	60.00	439.10	499.10	22.25	6.00	32.50	60.75
Telephone				12.00			12.00
Advertising		7.19	7.19	2.00			2.00
Sundry expenses	14.80	37.44	52.24	6.86	3.51		10.37
Total	211.38	1,568.23	1,679.61	1,149.58	824.53	813.50	2,787.61

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Disbursements from office of collector of internal revenue for Manila from August 26, 1898, to June 30, 1899—Continued.

Items.	First quarter, 1899.			
	January.	February.	March.	Total.
Deposits with treasurer public funds.....	\$96,776.90	\$35,186.85	\$51,772.18	\$183,735.93
Refunds, industrial-urbana.....	233.24	27.07	1.62	261.93
Pay roll, civil employees.....	795.80	1,124.83	1,105.00	3,025.63
Stationery and printing.....	254.10	922.65	20.42	1,197.27
Cost of internal-revenue stamps.....	100.00	5.00	-----	105.00
Furniture and fixtures.....	24.00	42.50	-----	66.50
Transportation.....	-----	-----	26.60	26.60
Telephone.....	24.00	24.00	-----	48.00
Advertising.....	83.32	147.75	7.20	238.27
Sundry expenses.....	9.30	-----	-----	9.30
Total.....	1,290.52	2,266.73	1,159.22	4,716.47

Items.	Second quarter, 1899.				Total.
	April.	May.	June.	Total.	
Deposits with treasurer public funds..	\$94,796.76	\$33,191.69	\$16,639.61	\$144,628.06	\$484,366.55
Refunds, industrial-urbana.....	119.43	13,222.16	-----	3,241.59	10,717.18
Pay roll, civilemployees.....	993.00	987.00	995.50	2,975.50	9,593.43
Stationery and printing.....	-----	8.15	26.50	34.65	1,404.22
Cost of internal-revenue stamps.....	180.00	125.00	-----	305.00	410.00
Furniture and fixtures.....	-----	22.00	17.50	39.50	164.87
Transportation.....	-----	35.00	3.00	38.00	624.45
Telephone.....	-----	-----	24.00	24.00	84.00
Advertising.....	-----	28.20	-----	28.20	275.06
Sundry expenses.....	7.49	3.98	6.23	17.70	89.61
Total.....	1,180.49	1,209.33	1,072.73	3,462.55	23,363.42

¹ This refund is a special one, due to overpayment by Oriente Tobacco Company.

APPENDIX R.

The MILITARY SECRETARY,

Office of the Military Governor in the Philippines, Manila, P. I.

SIR: In obedience to your letter of July 21, I have the honor to submit the following report on the work of the board of officers convened to confer with the Spanish board of liquidation, covering the period from its organization January 31 to June 30, 1899.

The board was convened by the following order:

[Extract.]

SPECIAL ORDERS, { HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
No. 31. } *Manila, P. I., January 31, 1899.*

4. A board of officers, to consist of Maj. Charles McClure, chief paymaster of the department; Maj. C. U. Gantenbein, Second Oregon U. S. V., and Second Lieut. M. A. Hildreth, First North Dakota U. S. V., is hereby appointed to meet and confer with a committee named by His Excellency Division General Diego de los Rios y Nicolau, Spanish Army, for the purpose, as stated, of clearing the accounts of the Spanish Government in the Philippines. The board will determine upon some definite course of procedure by which the Spanish committee can have access to all records and documents now in possession of the United States authorities which it may desire to consult, and will arrange therefor. No property or records can be delivered until the proposed treaty receives validity through ratification, and the board will continue its sessions anticipating that event, when definite instructions looking to a settlement of public affairs, judicial and executive, can be conveyed. The board will ascertain fully the desires of the committee as to the nature and full extent of its desired action, and give it every possible facility consistent with the present status of affairs.

By command of Major-General Otis:

THOMAS H. BARRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

On April 5, by Special Orders, No 91, headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, the membership of the board was increased to six members, the additional members being Lieut. Col. J. D. Miley, inspector-general, U. S. V.; Maj. John A. Hull, judge-advocate, U. S. V., and Capt. John G. Balance, Twenty-second U. S. Infantry.

The first session of the board was held on February 1, 1899, and up to June 30 the board has held sessions on seventy days. There was a suspension of proceedings between February 4 and 20, caused by the outbreak of hostilities between the American and insurgent forces.

With the exception of Maj. C. U. Gantenbein and Lieut. M. A. Hildreth, the members of the board have performed the duties incumbent upon them by the order above quoted, in addition to duties in the various staff departments in which they were serving.

Lieut. M. A. Hildreth, recorder of the board, has had his time well occupied in investigating and preparing matters for submission to the board.

The first subject which the board was called upon to consider in conjunction with the Spanish board was the matter of general loans, lotteries, and cash deposits. The Spanish board, upon request, had been given facilities to examine all records relating to the above matters, and, after a demand in writing on the part of the Spanish board, it was recommended and approved by the military governor that the sold lottery tickets, representing a nominal value of \$143,000, together with the records, papers, and books relating thereto, be turned over to the Spanish board. This was done at once, without waiting for the ratification of the treaty, and also in several subsequent instances, where the approval of the military governor had first been obtained.

The Spanish board was divided into two branches—the military and the civil branches.

On February 4 the military branch applied for permission to examine all the military records pertaining to Spanish military affairs in this city, which request was granted, and on the same date Señor E. M. Barretto was employed as interpreter. In conjunction with the military branch of the Spanish board this board made an examination of all the records and documents in the various barracks and quarters formerly occupied by the Spanish military forces. Those relating exclusively to military affairs were turned over to the Spanish military branch.

The message from the President of the United States transmitting the treaty between the United States and Spain, signed at the city of Paris on December 10, 1898, containing the treaty in full and all the discussions leading to the adoption of the different articles therein, has been followed by the board as a guide in determining the various questions that have arisen.

On the 26th day of February, the board having been informed that the military branch had completed its investigations of the military records, facilities were granted said branch for the inventorying and listing of all arms and materials of war in the Maestranza Arsenal, with a view of preparing for the return of all such property, as indicated in Article V of the treaty. While this work was going on the civil branch entered upon an investigation of the records relating to the opium contracts, payments made by the Spanish treasury, etc., and the work by both branches of the Spanish board continued for some time.

Demand was now made by the civil branch for the return of all the movable property in all the public schools, but this demand was refused by the board, on the ground that the same must be held pending the ratification of the treaty.

On the 21st of March, this board, in conjunction with the Civil Branch, made an examination of the mint and verified the weight of a quantity of bullion and unfinished coins, and this was taken possession of by the board and turned over to Maj. C. E. Kilbourne, treasurer of public funds.

On the 23d of March, the civil branch, acting under orders alleged to have been received from the Madrid Government, made a demand that all funds in the treasury, taxes, revenues, etc., on hand on August 13, 1898, be turned over to the El Banco Español Filipino, a branch of the Spanish Bank. This amount, which was seized by the American authorities on the 13th of August, 1898, and is now in their possession, is \$964,550.90.

This request on the part of the civil branch was prompted by a desire to reimburse the El Banco Español Filipino for loans, some of which, it is understood, were forced ones, made for the purpose of carrying on the war.

The demand was first made verbally and was subsequently reiterated in writing, but, however, was not entertained by this board, on the ground that there was no authority permitting it to act in the matter.

Coincident with the demand for the funds of the treasury, the transfer of all property and of machinery, etc., connected with the harbor works was asked for. For a few years prior to the revolution, extensive improvements in the way of

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widening and deepening the Pasig River and building a breakwater in the bay were in progress, and the machinery on hand was very valuable. Reference of this demand was made to the military governor, and by him referred to the authorities at Washington.

On the 31st of March a cablegram on this subject was received from Washington, a copy of which was furnished to the Spanish liquidation board for its information, and which is as follows:

WASHINGTON, 27th [March].

OTIS: You will disregard claim of Spanish officials to public property including treasury funds, all machinery, boats, dredges connected with harbor works, and retain possession thereof. Report by letter itemized statement of property claimed and use to which same is devoted.

MEIKLEJOHN.

Following this, a request was made by the Spanish civil branch for the return of bonds remaining in the treasury when it was taken possession of by the American authorities, these being unsold bonds belonging to a provisional issue for raising revenue to carry on the war.

On April 4 the civil branch requested the return of a deposit in the treasury, consisting of a certified check for \$10,000 belonging to a society established by Government employees for mutual benefit. The request was granted and the deposit delivered, for the reason that the United States Government had no claim whatever upon or interest in this deposit.

On April 11 the request of the civil branch for the return of the unissued provisional bonds was taken up for investigation, an expert and legal examination of the subject having been made in the meantime by Don Francisco Godinez, a Spanish lawyer of repute, who was employed as legal adviser of the board. He rendered an opinion to the effect that the United States Government had no interest, right, or title in these bonds, and that the delivery of the same would not affect the interests of the United States adversely, and the board concurring in this opinion delivered the unissued bonds found in the treasury to the civil branch.

During this investigation it appeared that many private parties had bonds belonging to the above issue deposited in the Spanish treasury. Accordingly, on the 13th instant, a notice was published requesting all owners of the same or their representatives to appear before the board at the intendencia on April 24 to establish their ownership and right to receive same.

On April 24, pursuant to the notice published on the 13th instant, the owners, or their representatives of the provisional bonds found in the treasury appeared before the board to present proof of ownership.

Witnesses were examined under oath, authority having been given this board to administer oaths and take testimony by the following order:

SPECIAL ORDERS,) OFFICE UNITED STATES MILITARY GOVERNOR
IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
No. 4.) Manila, P. I., April 22, 1899.

1. The board of officers convoked in paragraph 4, Special Orders, No. 31, of January 31, 1899, from headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, to meet a committee called by Spanish authority for the purpose of adjusting and expediting the settlement of the claims of Spain in the Philippine Islands, and the board appointed by Special Orders, No. 3, current series, from the office of the military governor, are hereby empowered to administer oaths and take testimony in matters over which they are authorized to exercise jurisdiction either by way of investigation or arbitrament.

By command of Major-General Otis:

THOMAS H. BARRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

These provisional bonds had been issued to parties who had, prior to the Philippine revolution, made deposits in the treasury in currency, at interest, and as the Government needed this money for war purposes the bonds were issued in lieu of the currency and kept in the treasury, receipts therefor being given to the owners.

In disposing of this matter the civil branch sat with this board, and the bonds were returned to all who satisfied both boards that they were the proper claimants. The few that remained unclaimed were returned to the Spanish board, a complete inventory of the same being spread upon this board's records for future reference.

On the 17th of April demand was made by the civil branch for the return of furniture, silverware, records, and effects in the audiencia (supreme court) building, and of this the silverware, consisting of inkstands, call bells, etc., as well as certain portraits, were returned to Spain, but the records were retained.

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The records and documents in the internal-revenue office were then examined by the civil branch, and a few of them, unimportant to the United States, were handed over by this board.

The next subject taken up was the records and documents in the colonial secretary's office. An examination lasting several days was made of all the records there, and the board turned over to the civil branch all records and documents which it was found did not affect the interests of the United States or the residents of the Philippines in any way.

On April 25 all the pension records and those relating to the Philippine loan were delivered.

On the same date the following order, enlarging the powers and discretion of the board, was issued:

SPECIAL ORDERS, }

No. 5. }

OFFICE MILITARY GOVERNOR
IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., April 25, 1899.

The board of officers appointed by Special Orders, No. 31, paragraph 4, current series, from headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, to confer with the Spanish liquidation committee with a view to the settlement of the affairs of Spain in the Philippines, will, in its discretion, and without previous application to these headquarters, make delivery to the Spanish authorities of all written evidences of that Government's former transactions, and of all books, records, and papers which do not concern the interests of the United States nor people resident in the islands.

By command of Major-General Otis:

THOMAS H. BARRY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

As there was no custodian of the records and documents of the colonial secretary's office on the 27th of April, the board took entire possession of all documents and records left there after the withdrawal of those returned to Spain.

These records and documents have all been removed to the treasury building, where they have been carefully sorted, classified, and indexed so that they may be easy of access to anyone seeking information among them.

On April 26, the following cablegram, in answer to inquiries on the matters mentioned therein, was received from Washington and referred to this board for its guidance and information:

OTIS, *Manila*:

Attorney-General advises furniture, hanging pictures and like property belonging to Spanish Peninsular Government, for example, in Captain-General's palace, deliverable to owner; property in public buildings used by colonial island city governments, in public schools, courts, libraries, art buildings, remain for same or like use. Archives and records useful for government history of Philippines remain, including church patronage archives. Deposits in treasury belonging to private individuals remain for them. Explain questions about Spanish bonds—how owned? Records relating credits, taxes, rents remain for use. Deliver records exclusively concerning Philippine loan, including bonds never issued. Spain probably entitled some moneys in treasury and uncollected. Cause expert or legal examination concerning moneys collected and collectible, how, when, for what objective, period, and report fully; also how said objective accomplished during period for which including tax levied, also whether there are unpaid salaries of officials to come out of said moneys.

ALGER, *Secretary of War.*

This cablegram, taken in conjunction with the President's message, already cited, has been strictly followed by the board in determining all questions coming before it.

Following the receipt of this cablegram, the board was engaged for some time in receiving from the Spanish custodians the various civil departments of public works, harbor works, department of mountains, department of mines, and department of agriculture. These five departments were put in charge of Capt. Rowan Shunk, Engineer Corps, U. S. A., and now the records of the first three departments have been transferred to rooms in the intendencia, treasury building, and under the superintendence of the board are being carefully arranged and indexed by clerks formerly familiar with the records.

In order to collect the data asked for in the cablegram last cited an expert and legal examination was made of all available books and records of the Spanish

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administration upon this subject, and a full report of the results forwarded to your office on June 12, 1899. This report was subsequently returned for other information, and the board is now engaged in collecting it.

On the 5th of May, after an examination of the records relating to the custom-house, such records of the same as did not in any way affect the interests of the United States, or parties residing here, were delivered to the civil branch.

On June 5, inventories were submitted by the military branch of all war material, arms, etc., taken possession of by the American authorities, with a request for the delivery of same to them. These inventories, covering, as they do, a vast amount of material, have required very much of the board's time in considering them. For nearly three months the military branch had been engaged in preparing these inventories, collecting the war material and making preparations for its sale or shipment to Spain, for, according to the terms of the treaty, all this material in the Philippine Islands and the island of Guam remained the property of Spain.

These inventories were prepared by a subboard of the military branch, and in forwarding them through Gen. Nicholas Jaramillo to the military governor they were accompanied by a letter which indicated that the military branch felt that many obstacles had been put in its way in the prosecution of its work by the American officers who had custody of this material.

The whole matter was referred by the military governor to this board for its consideration, and to formulate the conditions, restrictions, etc., to govern the disposition of this war material, and to supervise the work until completed. Since the reference of this matter to this board every facility has been extended to the military branch for the prosecution of its work, and it is felt that no reasonable ground for complaint can be found.

Only one point of difference has arisen, and that is in respect to the engine, boiler, and machinery in the Maestranza Arsenal. These were demanded by the Spanish authorities, but their demand was not granted, as it is considered that these are fixtures and pass to the United States with the arsenal. Exhibit A of this report sets forth the demand of the military branch in the matter of the disposition of the war material and Exhibit B the action of the board thereon.

In some instances the restrictions laid down by the board have been slightly deviated from, either to facilitate the work or to afford the Spanish authorities an opportunity for realizing the maximum amount of money from the disposition of this material; but the main idea in Exhibit B, viz, to prevent the war material from falling into the hands of the insurgents, has been strictly adhered to.

On June 17 the following cablegram from the War Department to the military governor was sent to this board for its information:

OTIS, Manila:

The Attorney-General advises that request of Spanish liquidation commission for delivery to them of the following class of property is inadmissible.

First. Movable property in public buildings formerly occupied by Spanish officers—colonial, island, and city—in all public schools, civil courts, libraries, art buildings, etc.

Second. All records constituting archives of patronage which Spain exercised over church.

Third. All records relating to right of Spain and useful in collection of credits, taxes, rents, etc., accruing prior to August 18.

Fourth. All Spanish deposits made by private individuals in treasury, except money or property deposited to secure performance of obligations distinctly due to Spanish Government in matters not connected with islands or involving rights of their inhabitants, which deposits may be delivered.

Fifth. All funds in Spanish treasury at Manila at time of capitulation. Prior records which concern Philippine loan may be delivered.

Opinion Attorney-General by mail.

MEIKLEJOHN.

This cablegram, in its instructions, is almost identical with the one of April 26, and there has been no departure from its requirements.

On the 27th of June, inventories of engineer property of the Spanish army, taken possession of by the American authorities, and also a claim for the medical supplies and furniture found at the Vaccine Institute, No. 24 Calzada del Iris, were presented to this board for consideration. These matters were still under consideration when the board adjourned on June 30, and, in addition thereto, the disposition of the effects of the nautical school, school of arts, sculpture, and painting, which at this time had not yet been turned over to the American authorities, also the disposition of the voluntary and involuntary deposits in the treasury.

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Pursuant to paragraph 2, Special Orders, No. 110, headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, April 23, 1899, Capt. John G. Ballance was relieved from duty with this board.

Pursuant to paragraph 2, Special Orders, No. 154, headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, June 8, 1899, Maj. C. U. Gantenbein was relieved from duty with this board.

Pursuant to Special Orders, No. 174, headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, Maj. Charles cClure was relieved from duty with this board, this leaving the personnel of the board on June 30, 1899, as follows: President, Lieut. Col. J. D. Miley, inspector-general, U. S. V.; member, Maj. John A. Hull, judge-advocate, U. S. V.; recorder, First Lieut. M. A. Hildreth, First North Dakota, U. S. V.

Exhibit C sets forth all records, property, etc., delivered to the Spanish authorities prior to June 30, 1899.

Very respectfully,

J. D. MILEY,
*Lieutenant-Colonel and Inspector-General, U. S. V.,
President of the Board.*

EXHIBIT A.

Brig. Gen. NICHOLAS JARAMILLO,

President of the Spanish Board of Selection and Transportation.

EXCELLENCY: The inventory of the material belonging to the Spanish Government at present in the arsenal, deposits, batteries, warehouses, and powderhouses, having been terminated, I send your excellency a copy.

At the same time this commission feels the necessity of making some observations in regard to the work which must be conducted in order to comply with the orders of the Government of Her Majesty, and submits for your approbation the plan which should be followed in order to attain our object with the least expenditure of time and money.

In the few operations which have been conducted with the intervention of the Americans, there has been noted a strong tendency to restrict our labors, which tendency is based upon reasons we understand, but which do not fail to retard our labors, especially when applied to the operations of lesser importance, and cause a loss of a great deal of time which should be employed beneficially on account of the application of the system of the Americans. If the same system is followed in the important and arduous labors which we have yet to execute, it is impossible to estimate even approximately the amount of time and money which will be needed, because, in the most trivial things, whole days are lost, and the workmen collect wages for time from which no benefit is derived.

In the operations of sale, auction, and delivery of the material which is to be sold, the Americans have adopted an attitude which it is not possible to concede them at the present time, although it is unquestionable that they may, for reasons of security or policy, permit the sale or not; and in case of permitting it, may oblige that of elements of war which may be immediately utilized against them to be carried out in a certain manner. As soon as this danger is passed, however, no intervention whatever on their part can be admitted in regard to the facultative or economic conditions to be imposed upon purchasers.

The Americans not only make use of the engines, machinery, and tools in the workshops of the arsenal which do not belong them, but also prohibit us from using them when we wish to without a series of permits which retard the operations, and which it is sometimes impossible to gain because the only person who has the power to give them is out of the building.

The plan proposed is based upon the supposition of the entire disappearance of this condition of affairs, which constitutes a series of obstacles to everything which is undertaken, and without which it is impossible to formulate any plan whatever, because the difficulties arise suddenly and it is impossible to make arrangements beforehand, and we are obliged to let things take their course.

In the supposition, then, that no difficulty of this kind will arise, we divide the material of the three groups, composed:

I. Of the material which is ready to send to Spain at once, which consists of 8,000,000 Mauser cartridges in good condition; 2,000,000 Remington cartridges, model 71-79; siege, heavy, and light artillery.

This material can doubtless be embarked, except the pieces which are mounted on the walls, and the siege guns which the commission believes are the ones

which the Americans refer to "heavy," and which they reserve the right to dispose of at some time not yet fixed.

II. Material which should be sent to Spain and which is not ready for shipment.

Mausser rifles in good condition, and those of the same class, model '79, for which there are no packing cases, and which should be sold at auction if they do not come from Spain. (?)

Machinery of the arsenal for which there are no packing cases, but which should be constructed by administration, because the boxes required will be of different dimensions, and no measurements can be taken because the machines are in operation.

Apparatus of all kinds which can be used in Spain, and for which packing cases can be made in the arsenal.

Books which should be sent to Spain as soon as the selection is made, and for which packing cases can be made.

Regulation swords, etc., for which packing cases can be arranged.

Projectiles of breech-loading artillery which must be unloaded and packed—packing cases on hand.

All bronze material, except 22 cannons of the saluting battery, which the Americans reserve until they can substitute them with others of their own at some time not fixed.

In order to dispose of this material and prepare it for shipment, the following work should be performed:

The construction of packing cases, sale of the rest, and the packing of such material as requires it.

Withdrawal of charges from loaded projectiles.

Dismounting machinery.

Dismounting guns of the city.

Selection of books and apparatus.

This work shall be carried on in the following order:

I. Dismounting the artillery of the city, for which purpose it is necessary for the Americans to deliver as soon as possible all transportation machinery, including the Decauville Tramway at Cavite, with its accessories, which should be gotten together and deposited at some place set apart and placed at our disposition, not to be used by the Americans without our authorization, and in case of their using them to be responsible for any damage caused. The guns should be placed at convenient situations for shipment, the iron gun carriages in the Plaza de Moriones, and the wooden carriages in the batteries.

II. Pack all articles which require packing, open bids for boxes as soon as possible, and make such arrangements as may be necessary in order that the carpenter shops may be put at our disposition on the same conditions as the transportation machinery.

III. Draw the charges from the projectiles and destroy the powder, which in order that it may be done as rapidly as possible should be done in the same place where these projectiles are at present, or in the immediate vicinity, in order to avoid expensive and dangerous transportation, such tools as may be necessary to be placed at our disposal.

IV. Take the machinery apart and pack the pieces in the same place.

V. Make selections of books, apparatus, and arms not regulations, which it is desired to take to Spain.

Third group.—Material which should be sold or destroyed—iron cannons, mortars, etc.; useless guns of all kinds, nonregulation models; rifle bullets; cartridges in bad condition of all kinds and all '71 model accessories; cannon balls and gunpowder; firearms and other weapons nonregulation.

For the sale of the foregoing group the Americans must inform us of the manner most convenient for the use or destruction, according to their interests; and raw materials, tools, accessory machinery, and everything not having direct application to war, and which is not per se a weapon, should be classified and sold as soon as possible.

As soon as the manner of sale is decided upon, the Americans should provide purchasers with means of informing themselves as to conditions, etc., with such precautions as they may deem convenient to their interests.

Such is the plan which should be followed in accord with the Americans in case it is approved by your excellency, in order to avoid further delay.

The inventory annexed does not agree with the account of material existing in the city when the Americans took charge, for they did so without observing the formalities established by the laws of war, they not giving the customary receipts, our requests for the same not being attended to. The Spanish officers could not



BATTERY OF OLD FASHIONED GUNS, MANILA.



BRONZE CANNON AT PASIG.



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demand them unconditionally, not only on account of the situation in which they were placed, but because under the terms of the capitulation all property was under the safeguard and honor of the American Army.

Discrepancies which have occurred from this motive I shall have the honor to lay before your excellency as soon as the lists are furnished.

COLONEL ROSALEZ.

MANILA, May 15, 1899.

EXHIBIT B.

JUNE 8, 1899.

His Excellency Brig. Gen. NICHOLAS JARAMILLO,
Spanish Army.

DEAR SIR: There has been submitted by the military governor, Major-General Otis, to this board, of which I am president, a plan proposed by Colonel Rosalez and approved by you, for hastening the labors of the commission over which you preside, with respect to the disposition of the war material which under the treaty belongs to Spain.

General Otis has directed this board to confer with you and authorize you to carry out such details as you propose in your plan, upon which both may agree, and to refer disputed points to him.

The plan you propose and your ideas upon the subject are set forth in the memorandum which has been carefully considered by the board, and I have the honor to send you now, in writing, its decision thereon.

Before discussing the plan of work arranged under the heads you have indicated, I beg to inform you that after a careful examination of the law on the subject, the board can not agree with you that Spain is entitled to the machinery permanently placed in the arsenal. The board is of the opinion, and shall adhere to its decision, that the engine, boiler, and all machinery attached to them by belting and shafting, and all tools and accessories of such machinery, under the treaty pass to the United States with the arsenal.

There is no question as to the title of Spain to all other articles enumerated in the inventories of the modern and obsolete war material which accompany the memorandum of your proposed plan.

Passing to the three heads under which you group the war material, your plan is approved with the following restrictions which I set forth, for the sake of clearness, under three heads, corresponding to those in your memorandum:

I. The plan proposed as to the first class of material, viz, that ready to send to Spain at once, can be carried out as specified, except as to the guns mounted in emplacements. These guns, under the treaty, must remain until the expiration of six months after exchange of ratifications. Also the material in this class must be shipped under such restrictions and regulations as may be imposed by the American authorities to effectually prevent its falling into the hands of the insurgents in these islands.

II. I pass to the material in the second class, viz, that which should be sent to Spain and which is not ready for shipment. The machinery mentioned above in this letter falls under this head and must remain. Further, the board will not permit any of the Mauser rifles to be sold here, or at any place adjacent, where there is the slightest chance of their falling into the hands of the insurgents.

With these two exceptions, all the material enumerated may be prepared for shipment to Spain according to the order of work specified by you in your memorandum, and this board will endeavor to afford you every facility for hastening its completion. The Decauville tramway has already been turned over to you by the military governor, Major-General Otis, and the chief ordnance officer, Colonel McGinness, will be instructed to make such arrangements that you may have at your disposal the carpenter shops at all times except when the interests of the United States will be prejudiced.

All the transportation machinery belongs to Spain and will not be used by the American Army, except by your permission, but all the machinery in the shops in the arsenal belongs to the United States, and, while every courtesy and facility in the use of it will be extended to you, the interests of the United States must always first be consulted.

III. Lastly, I come to the third group, viz, material which should be sold or destroyed.

With the exception of the lead, rifle bullets, powder, and defective cartridges enumerated in the inventory, which completely covers all material in this class,

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there is no objection to Spain selling here in these islands everything included in the inventory, subject to the following restrictions:

All cannon and mortars must be destroyed by bursting charges, the barrels of all small arms and the blades of all cutting weapons broken, all projectiles for cannon broken up, and all empty cartridge cases melted. These precautions can be taken by the Spanish authorities before sale, or, if desired, these restrictions may be made known to the prospective buyer, and carried out after the purchase under the superintendence of an American officer.

Referring to the excepted articles, the board will not permit the lead or rifle bullets to be sold here, or at any place adjacent, under any conditions, and the powder and the defective cartridges will be disposed of by taking the whole out in the bay and throwing it overboard.

A careful consideration of my letter will indicate to you that the only points of difference existing between the board of which you are president and the one over which I preside, is in regard to the machinery in the arsenal. The decision of this board will not be changed.

If you wish to protest, the matter will be referred to Major-General Otis; if not, I shall be pleased to have you or your representative come to the rooms of this board in the Intendencia, at 4 o'clock this afternoon or at 4 o'clock to-morrow afternoon, when the final arrangements for beginning the work will be made. My duties as collector of customs prevent my naming any other hour in the day.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. D. MILEY,
Lieutenant-Colonel and Inspector-General, U. S. V.,
President of the Board.

EXHIBIT C.

Inventory of documents, records, property, etc., delivered to the Spanish authorities by the board of officers convened by Special Orders, No. 31, headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, from the date of its organization to June 30, 1899.

Description.	Date of delivery.
Several tons of records, papers, books, etc., stored in the various cuartels formerly occupied by Spanish military forces in the city of Manila. These records related strictly to military affairs and were of no interest or value to the United States or residents of the islands, and were delivered in bulk.	Feb. 4
Chemicals and apparatus in the School of Arts.	
Records, etc., relating to lottery, as follows:	
Stubs of lottery tickets, drawing of May, 1888, 32,000 tickets, with the exception of the following, which could not be found—	Mar. 11
No. 4101 to 200.	
4201, 4401, and 4700, one series.	
4800, one series.	
4900, both series.	
15000.	
15201, one series.	
20000.	
20001 to 100 and 20101 to 200, both series.	
20701, one series.	
20800, both series.	
20800, one series.	
25000.	
25001 to 200, one series.	
25201 to 300, one series.	
Record of plan of drawing for month of—	
May, 1888	
June, 1888.	Mar. 14
July, 1888	
Record relating to printing contract—	
1882	
1887	
Copy of contract made for above in 1887.	
Claim of B. Roca, in re prize tickets.	
Claim of Wassamull, same nature.	
Claim of Jose Ramos, same nature.	
Claim of Don C. Silurio, same nature.	
Register of distribution of tickets to the provinces.	
Copy printed instructions in re drawings.	
1 circular block of wood upon which tickets were canceled (worthless).	
(Here follows a lengthy inventory of lottery records and tickets turned over, which is omitted from this printed copy of report.)	

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EXHIBIT C.—*Inventory of documents, records, property, etc., delivered to the Spanish authorities by the board of officers, etc.*—Continued.

Description.	Date of delivery.
Stub books of provisional bonds, series B.....	Apr. 11
1 book, Nos. 67,501 to 70,000, \$500 each.	
6 books, Nos. 7,001 to 10,000, \$100 each.	
10 books, Nos. 100,001 to 150,000, \$1,000 each.	
1 package treasury bonds, series B, 10,975 bonds, \$1,097,500. (Out of this package 73 were withdrawn and placed in another bundle.) (Provisional bonds.)	
1 package treasury bonds, series B, \$4,271,800 (provisional bonds, May 27, 1898).	
1 package treasury bonds (provisional), \$3,069,500.	
1 package treasury bonds (provisional), \$492,000.	
1 certified check on the El Banco Español-Filipino, \$10,000. (This check was the property of Sociedad de Fianzas Mutuas de Empleadas, a society for mutual benefit existing among Government employees)	Apr. 12
Records relating to payments by Spanish Government for transportation of tobacco made on Aug. 12, 1898, to Don Placida Cana.....	Apr. 17
Records, books, and documents relating to the Philippine loan.....	Apr. 21
1 bundle containing the general record.	
1 bundle containing record referring to condition of the treasury.	
31 bundles containing invoices of the subscription to the loan for the provinces of Ilocos Norte and Ilocos Sur, Isabela de Luzon, Tayubas, Morong, Bataan, Albay, Iloilo, Isla de Negro Occidental, Leyte, Jolo, Balabac, Antigue, Bobal, Tarlac, Nueva Ecija, Samar, Capiz, Cebu, Isla de Negros Oriental, Pangasinan, Sorsogon, Batangas, Mindoro, Nueva Viscaya, Union, Cagayan, Zambales, Abra and Lepanto, both Camarines, Bulacan, Manila, Cavite, Laguna, and Pampanga.	
1 bundle containing invoices from caja de deposito (savings treasure department).	
1 bundle containing paid-off invoices.	
1 register of amortization (redemption).	
1 bundle notes and incidents referring to subscriptions to the caja de deposito.	
1 bundle containing memoranda from the provinces.	
1 bundle containing accounts of the subscription in the provinces.	
1 bundle containing copies of telegrams.	
1 bundle containing sundry communications.	
1 bundle containing statements of adjudications.	
6 register books of provincial bonds.	
List of provisional bonds not called for, pursuant to advertisement published by the board, and delivered to the Spanish civil board of liquidation:	Apr. 24
7 bonds, D. Jesus Manzo de Zuniga, Nos. 128, 29, and 14916 to 14920, with balance of \$70.30.	
38 bonds, F. de P. Rodereda, Nos. 733 and 35316 to 35350, with balance of \$1.85.	
25 bonds, Don Pedro Martinez Illustre, Nos. 37986 to 38020, with balance of \$9.05.	
3 bonds, Don Teleforo Aguirre, Nos. 704 to 706, with balance of \$34.05.	
8 bonds, Don Ramon Olaviaga, Nos. 607 to 609 and 30786 to 30790, with balance of \$66.50.	
17 bonds, Don Ricardo Nouvies, Nos. 852, 853, and 38171 to 38185, with balance of \$74.	
21 bonds, Ignacio Goicochea, Nos. 855 and 856, with balance of \$81	
1 bond, Don Eustacio Torrecilla, No. 858, with balance of \$13.	
27 bonds, Don Jorge G. de Fierro, Nos. 859, 860, and 38271 to 38295, with balance of \$47.50.	
10 bonds, Don J. G. de Fierro, Nos. 38296 to 38305, with balance of \$19.85.	
2 bonds, Don Jose Gallego y Ausere, Nos. 861 and 862, with balance of \$78.50.	
1 document (carta de Pago, 11th August, 1892, \$500) delivered to representative of R. Aenlle & Co., in presence of Spanish commission.	Apr. 25
3 documents, same as above, delivered to A. Santisteben, in presence of Spanish commission.	
1 document, same as above, delivered to Bernardo Carvajal, in presence of Spanish commission.	Do.
Records and documents relating to Spanish pensioners, viz:	Apr. 24
2 packages, letter M, military pensions.	
1 package, letter M, military pensions.	
1 package, letter A, military pensions.	
1 package, letters N, O, P, military pensions.	
1 package, letter R, military pensions.	
1 package, letter D, military pensions.	
1 package, letter F, military pensions.	
1 package, letters T, R, Q, S, military pensions.	
1 package, letter L, military pensions.	
1 package, letter Y, military pensions.	
1 package, letter J, military pensions.	
1 package, letters B, C, military pensions.	
1 package, letters G, H, military pensions.	
2 packages, no letters, military pensions.	
1 package, no letters, military pensions.	
1 package, letter L, civil pensions.	
1 package, letter D, civil pensions.	
1 package, letters B, C, civil pensions.	
1 package, royal decrees, No. 1.	
1 package, containing minutes, letter A.	
1 package, containing minutes, letter B.	
1 package, containing minutes, letter C.	
1 package, containing official letters, letter E.	
1 package, miscellaneous records, letter F.	
1 package, affairs pending records, letter G.	
1 package, affairs pending records, letter H.	

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EXHIBIT C.—*Inventory of documents, records, property, etc., delivered to the Spanish authorities by the board of officers, etc.*—Continued.

Description.	Date of delivery.
Records and documents relating to Spanish pensioners—Continued.	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 package, affairs pending records, letter J. 11 register books. 1 package of papers regarding particulars of various cases. 3 packages of records in re affairs sent to colonial ministry. 10 packages of royal decrees. 	
No. 19.	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 package of royal decrees. 1 package, finished records. 1 package, finished records. 1 package, particulars regarding pensioners. 1. 1 package, particulars regarding pensioners. 2. 1 package, particulars regarding pensioners. 3. 1 package, particulars regarding pensioners. 4. 	
List of articles, pictures, silverware, etc., of the audiencia, which were delivered to the Spanish board of liquidation:	Apr. 23
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 chalice, complete. 2 maces. 12 inkstands. 7 sand boxes. 4 call bells. 1 writing tray, President's office. 1 writing tray, secretary's office. 3 portraits in oil color, with frame, of H. M. Alfonso XII. 1 portrait, same, of Dona Maria Christina, full length. 1 portrait, same, of H. M. Queen Isabel II. 1 large painting of the Holy Conception, gilt frame. 1 picture in oil, representing an open book, on the two leaves of which are copied the certificates of the baptism and death of Don Simon de Anda. 2 large portraits, full length, of Alfonso XII. 1 wooden frame or memorial tablet, in honor of S. de Anda. 2 india-rubber seals, in their boxes. <p>(Here follows list of stub books of the caja de depositos, omitted from this printed copy of report.)</p>	
* * * * *	
List of personal records (expedientes personales).	
(50 bundles of the above, marked with letters of alphabet, will not be specified in this printed report.)	
List of personal records and documents delivered to the Spanish board of liquidation, from the intervention general.	May 2
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 package, No. 12, 1450 to 1665, relating to military officials. 1 package, No. 1, 1 to 100, relating to naval officials. 1 package, No. 6, 571 to 733, relating to civil officials. 1 package, No. 1, 1 to 50, relating to civil officials. 1 package, No. 2, 101 to 280, relating to naval officials. 1 package, No. 7, 834, relating to civil officials. 1 package, No. 6, 601 to 800, relating to military officials. 1 package, No. 6, 501 to 600, relating to military officials. 1 package, No. 5, 601, relating to military officials. 1 package, No. 1, 1 to 100, relating to military officials. 1 package, No. 3, 101 to 200, relating to military officials. 1 package, No. 3, 101 to 200, relating to civil officials. 1 package, No. 5, 401 to 600, relating to military officials. 1 package, No. 3, 241, relating to naval officials. 1 package, No. 4, 279 to 410, relating to civil officials. 1 package, No. 7, 601 to 700, relating to military officials. 1 package, No. 4, 331, relating to general officials. 1 package, No. 7, 801 to 925, relating to military officials. 1 package, No. 8, 926, relating to military officials. 1 package, No. 2, 51 to 100, relating to civil officials. 1 package, No. 1, relating to civil officials. 1 package, containing papers relating to licenses officials. 1 package, containing papers relating to payments. 1 package, containing royal decrees. 1 package, containing papers relating to support of officials. 1 package, containing papers relating to compulsory service. 1 package, containing royal decrees. 1 package, containing old P. records. 1 package, containing various expedientes. 1 package, No. 2, containing personal records of pensioners, military. 1 package, No. 3, containing general records Nos. 291 to 330. 1 package, No. 1, 1 to 90, containing personal records of pensioners 	

APPENDIX S.

UNITED STATES CUSTOM-HOUSE,
Manila, P. I., September 27, 1899.

The MILITARY SECRETARY,
Office of the Military Governor, Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit herewith a report on the administration of affairs in the custom-house of the port of Manila for the period from the date of the American occupancy until the close of the fiscal year ending June 30, 1899.

The first collector of the port was Lieut. Col. C. A. Whittier, U. S. Volunteers, who was assigned to that duty by General Orders, No. 4, headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, dated August 16, 1898. Colonel Whittier was relieved on October 21, 1898, pursuant to General Orders, No. 9, office of the military governor in the Philippine Islands, by Lieut. Col. George R. Colton, First Nebraska Volunteer Infantry. During the period of Colonel Whittier's incumbency Colonel Colton was on duty as deputy collector of the port.

Pursuant to General Orders, No. 19, office of the military governor in the Philippine Islands, dated May 25, 1899, Lieut. Col. J. D. Miley, U. S. Volunteers, was appointed collector of customs for the port of Manila, relieving Colonel Colton.

By War Department orders the Philippine Islands and the island of Guam constitute one collection district, with the port of Manila the chief port of entry, and the ports of Iloilo, on the island of Panay; Cebu, on the island of Cebu, and San Luis d'Apray, on the island of Guam, as subports.

The tariff now in force in these islands is substantially the old Spanish tariff, with such modifications as were found necessary in order to make it conform to the needs and requirements of the military government now in force here.

On July 13, 1898, a translation of the Spanish tariff, with modifications made by the authorities at Washington, was, by order of the President, published, and directions were given to proclaim and enforce the same upon the occupation of any port in the Philippine Islands. This tariff was published in pamphlet form entitled "Customs Tariffs and Regulations for the Philippine Islands." Before this could reach Manila, however, this place had fallen, and in General Merritt's proclamation of August 14, 1898, based upon the proclamation of the President of the United States, appears the following paragraph:

"The port of Manila and all places in the Philippine Islands which may be in actual possession of our land and naval forces will be open, while our occupation may continue, to the commerce of all neutral nations, as well as our own, in articles not contraband of war, upon payment of the prescribed rates of duty which may be in force at the time of importation."

On August 19, 1898, it was announced, by direction of General Merritt, that the custom-house at Manila would be open for public business and that the tariff in force would be unchanged until further notice. On the following day business was resumed and the collection of the same duties, imposts, and charges that had been enacted by the Spanish Government was continued.

Early in September the tariff of duties prescribed by the authorities in Washington arrived, and on September 24 a circular was issued by direction of the military governor putting the same into effect October 1, 1898. Before this date, however, on September 29, General Orders, No. 6, office of the military governor in the Philippine Islands, was published, deferring the date when this tariff would be put into effect until November 10, 1898. This extension of time was given for the reason that many petitions and requests had been received from merchants and business men of Manila asking for modifications of certain tariffs and duties imposed. After consideration of these requests it was considered that if put into effect they would derange the trade of the port of Manila and prejudice the interests of the United States, and sufficient time was given to have the whole question thoroughly considered and the necessary changes and modifications made.

Already, on the 24th of September, 1898, by Special Orders, No. 2, office of the military governor in the Philippine Islands, a board of officers had been appointed to consider the modifications of the duties on tobacco, cigars, and cigarettes. An internal-revenue tax on these articles, a feature unknown in the Spanish tariff, amounting to \$1 per thousand had been laid upon all cigars and cigarettes which shall be manufactured or sold for consumption. It was shown by the tobacco dealers that, as between cigars and cigarettes, articles of widely different value, this tax was a very inequitable one, and that the effects of its enforcement would be to suppress the manufacture of cigarettes, or the removal of that branch of

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industry beyond the limits of the territory occupied by the United States forces in these islands.

As the prices of manufactured cigars range from \$9 to \$100 per thousand, the tax of \$1 would only slightly increase these prices; but as the prices of cigarettes manufactured in these islands range from 40 cents to \$2.25 per thousand, the tax of \$1 per thousand would, in this case, increase these prices about 50 per cent for the higher grades, and the increase for the cheaper grades would be something over 200 per cent.

It was recommended by the board that the excise taxes on these articles should be suspended, and this recommendation being approved the paragraph upon this subject was eliminated from the regulations.

NOTE.—This report this far is substantially as prepared by Colonel Miley.

On October 3, 1898, Capt. Joseph S. Evans, commissary of subsistence, U. S. V., having been sent here by the War Department as an expert on revenue matters, was ordered to report to the collector of customs for special service. He was directed to make a careful study of the trade conditions of this port and of the United States customs tariff and regulations, with a view of recommending such modifications as would put them in the best practicable shape for promulgation. Captain Evans, under the directions, and with the assistance of the collector of customs, prepared his report and submitted it on October 24, 1898. His report having been approved, the tariff regulations, which are practically a literal copy of the Spanish regulations that went in force under the royal decree of January 7, 1891, were printed in pamphlet form and issued as United States Provisional Customs Tariff and Regulations in the Philippine Islands, to take effect November 10, 1898, and which regulations are those now governing this office.

The business of the custom-house was transacted exclusively in the Spanish language until November 1, 1898, when new forms were put in use, and all business since then has been transacted in the English language.

I transmit herewith, marked "A," printed in pamphlet form, a statistical report of imports, exports, vessels entered and cleared, and tonnage of the port of Manila, and receipts and disbursements of the office of the collector of customs from date of the American occupancy to December 31, 1898, and also, marked "B," written statistical report of imports, exports, vessels entered and cleared, and tonnage of the port of Manila, and receipts and disbursements of the office of the collector of customs from January 1, 1899, to June 30, 1899.

Very respectfully,

W. F. SPURGIN,

Lieut. Col., Sixth U. S. Infantry, Collector of Customs.

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EXHIBIT A.

Statistical report of imports, exports, vessels entered and cleared, and tonnage of the port of Manila, P. I., and receipts and disbursements of the office of the collector of customs, from date of the American occupancy to December 31, 1898.

IMPORTATION.

Imports from—	Brass, bronze, and copper.	Building material.	Barley.	Cotton goods.	Crockery and china- ware.	Confec- tionery sweet- meats.
<i>August 22-31, 1898.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>
Spain				71,947		1,370
England				33,787	2,551	
Germany				3,537	63,948	
France				1,368		
China				4,050		
Japan					292	
Total				114,689	66,791	1,370
<i>September, 1898.</i>						
United States		33,640				2,340
Spain				121,369	200	
England	675	23,375		66,640	17,960	400
Germany	662	433,960		18,902	11,329	2,030
France	204			110	528	235
China		24,494		149,883	4,260	
Total	1,541	535,469		356,934	34,275	5,005
<i>October, 1898.</i>						
United States		450	8,170			960
Spain				16,275		
England		12,355		106,060	10,715	100
Germany		7,500	180	26,357	31,746	17,500
France					140	
China		61,430		24,620	2,570	
Japan					130	
Total		81,735	8,350	173,312	45,301	18,560
<i>November, 1898.</i>						
United States			15,294	145		25
Spain	195	740		214,670		7,595
England	70	5,370		14,240		656
Germany	575	27,000	7,500	11,880	1,785	10
France		6,355		925	3,880	55
China	480	433,934		17,540	20,084	7,650
Total	1,320	473,399	22,794	259,400	25,729	15,991
<i>December, 1898.</i>						
United States			24,500			4,052
Spain	3,287	1,175		169,482	478	5,427
England	350	30,839		228,225		46
Germany	93	961	37,500	29,204	1,742	2,065
France	181			274		10
China	18	53,494	424	53,656	37,214	21,008
Total	3,929	86,469	62,424	480,901	39,429	32,622

316 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

EXHIBIT A.—Statistical report of imports, exports, vessels entered and cleared, and tonnage of the port of Manila, P. I., etc.—Continued.

IMPORTATION—Continued.

Imports from—	Cigar- ette pa- per.	Drugs, medi- cines, etc.	Dairy prod- ucts.	Earthen- ware.	Elec- trical goods.	Furni- ture.
<i>Aug. 22-31, 1898.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>
Spain	4,555	18				
England		38,577				
China	1,395	4,185		280		240
Japan		215				
Total	5,950	42,995		280		240
<i>September, 1898.</i>						
United States	4,685	4,785	912		25	270
Spain		7,608	1,546	50		230
England	8,813	8,922	529	690	50	
Germany	17,532	8,952	725			
France	10,606	552	121	1,665		
China		4,731		7,080		9,440
Japan		1,290		1,115	100	
Austria	8,432					
Total	50,068	37,311	3,834	10,510	175	9,940
<i>October, 1898.</i>						
United States		1,400	1,775			
Spain		100				
England		35,125	850			6,000
Germany		28,145	173		85	3,175
France		1,600	30			
China		26,680				12,215
Japan		1,075				
Total		94,185	2,828		85	21,390
<i>November, 1898.</i>						
United States		440			30	455
Spain	6,415	2,444				
England		12,672			120	
Germany		11,109		99,470		
France	2,940	4,974		90		1,364
China		13,735		40,880		13,410
Austria	1,600				5,670	
Total	10,955	45,374		140,440	5,820	15,225
<i>December, 1898.</i>						
United States		2,080			30	
Spain	24,772	4,855				
England		35,301		10,147		
Germany	11,808	16,226		20,848		
France	2,227	1,866				
China	262	22,947		4,791		13,621
Japan				81	350	
Austria	18,088					
Total	57,217	83,275		35,867	380	13,621

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY. 317

EXHIBIT A.—*Statistical report of imports, exports, vessels entered and cleared, and tonnage of the port of Manila, P. I., etc.—Continued.*

IMPORTATION—Continued.

Imports from—	Fire-works.	Fancy and ornamental goods.	Fruits (fresh).	Fish.	Flour.	Glass-ware.
<i>August 22-31, 1898.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>
United States.....			2,548		514,806	
Spain.....		238		12,230		
England.....		116				93
Germany.....		1,304				
China.....		2,029	34	3,335		131
Japan.....		1,620				
Total		5,297	2,580	15,565	514,806	224
<i>September, 1898.</i>						
United States.....			30,100	200	1,001,984	
Spain.....				28,285		185
England.....		50		1,600		27,930
Germany.....		1,610		9,680		37,173
France.....		560				10,850
China.....	9,655	1,468	36,939	37,839		2,400
Japan.....		1,715				15,180
Total	9,655	5,403	67,039	77,604	1,001,984	93,720
<i>October, 1898.</i>						
United States.....			16,467	160	175,300	17,515
Spain.....				40		12,306
England.....		1,510				8,650
Germany.....		1,895		5,000		59,575
France.....		120				
China.....	5,305	665	16,500	8,236		16,675
Japan.....	3,740	2,350		155	216	9,160
Total	9,045	6,540	32,967	13,591	175,516	123,880
<i>November, 1898.</i>						
United States.....		2,020	67,795		462,205	26,100
Spain.....						51,205
England.....				2,500		500
Germany.....		310				28,310
France.....		1,205				6,725
China.....	4,635	3,020	44,930	9,965		25,050
Total	4,635	6,555	112,725	12,494	462,205	137,890
<i>December, 1898.</i>						
United States.....		10	25,019	1,060	665,144	512,575
Spain.....		10		900		25,330
England.....		980		2,520		20,375
Germany.....		4,430		5,000		32,400
France.....		478				3,230
China.....	5,742	4,165	170,961	25,283	248	8,650
Japan.....	850	1,618				
Total	6,592	11,689	196,970	34,783	665,392	602,500

318 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

EXHIBIT A.—Statistical report of imports, exports, vessels entered and cleared, and tonnage of the port of Manila, P. I., etc.—Continued.

IMPORTATION—Continued.

Imports from—	Haber- dashery.	Fruits (pre- served).	Hemp (manu- factured)	Hard- ware.	Jewelry.	Joos sticks.
<i>August 22-31, 1898.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>
United States		1,507				
Spain	454	3,006	5,390	16,692	24	
England	1,775			11,503		
Germany	2,240		835	1,174		
France						
China	110	1,062	742	242		94
Total	4,579	5,665	6,967	29,611	24	94
<i>September, 1898.</i>						
United States		15,420		2,340		
Spain	29,690	1,590		44,990		
England	1,650	1,880		557,122	20	
Germany	2,270	220		128,027		
France	290	220		2,134	485	
China	370	4,646		5,010		2,060
Austria				700		
Total	34,270	24,036		740,323	485	2,060
<i>October, 1898.</i>						
United States	525	705		2,925		
Spain	430			1,415		
England	1,640	70	900	81,315	20	
Germany	2,620	295		85,947	235	
France	280	15		5,005		
China	800	16,433	2,600	1,635		1,000
Japan	195					
Total	6,480	17,518	3,500	178,842	255	1,000
<i>November, 1898.</i>						
United States		905		50		
Spain		63,905	1,000	2,605	90	
England		325	340	2,800		
Germany	3,070		278	60,042		
France	3,080	290	80	1,640	1,665	
China	495	895	9,627	13,005	18	930
Total	6,655	66,310	11,275	80,142	1,773	930
<i>December, 1898.</i>						
United States		4,091		4,575		
Spain	28,151	19,120	12,450	7,092		
England	3,540	1,450		24,650		
Germany	1,782	1,703	242	121,552	843	
France	21			1,441	18	
China	556	22,325	8,187	15,958	66	3,122
Austria	50					
Total	32,100	49,688	20,879	175,268	927	3,122

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY. 319

EXHIBIT A.—Statistical report of imports, exports, vessels entered and cleared, and tonnage of the port of Manila, P. I., etc.—Continued.

IMPORTATION—Continued.

Imports from—	Leather, manu- factured.	Matches.	Machin- ery.	Meats (pre- served).	Milk (con- densed).	Musical goods.
<i>August 25-31, 1898.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>
United States.....	50	1,080	200
Spain.....	708	88	7,230
England.....	319	965
Germany.....	323
China.....	3,940
Japan.....	68,248
Total	1,027	68,248	138	12,523	200
<i>September, 1898.</i>						
United States.....	11,755	4,750	96,189	6,785
Spain.....	645	307	14,800
England.....	2,250	75	8,251	225
Germany.....	2,790	4,487	9,140	25
France.....	15	585	20
China.....	2,070	25,100
Japan.....	84,805
Total	17,455	84,880	20,450	136,089	10,150	45
<i>October, 1898.</i>						
United States.....	4,255	36,235	4,375
Spain.....	390	135	1,770	250
England.....	2,120	25	5,070	1,670
Germany.....	1,155	9,195	330	20	270
France.....	85	10,530	250	390
China.....	310	1,530
Japan.....	60,307
Total	4,060	60,307	24,140	45,185	6,515	660
<i>November, 1898.</i>						
United States.....	27	230	1,420
Spain.....	662	600	11,340	2,550
England.....	240	21,958	3,115	620
Germany.....	1,618	1,329
France.....	353	880	497
China.....	286	10,620	5,620	1,710	300
Japan.....	69,610
Australia.....	845
Total	3,169	69,610	35,414	21,150	6,300	797
<i>December, 1898.</i>						
United States.....	20	18,242	17,078
Spain.....	4,216	5,116	1,333
England.....	163	3,072	8,787	1,444
Germany.....	788	4,206	31
France.....	101	198	295
China.....	23	370	25,567	2,282
Japan.....	112,404
Total	5,291	112,404	7,956	57,743	20,804	1,678

320 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

EXHIBIT A.—Statistical report of imports, exports, vessels entered and cleared, and tonnage of the port of Manila, P. I., etc.—Continued.

IMPORTATION—Continued.

Imports from—	Illuminating oil.	Lubricating oil.	Opium.	Paints, oils, varnishes.	Provisions.	Printed matter, paper, etc.	Photographic goods.
<i>August 22-31, 1898.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>
United States	83,700				1,315		
Spain					37,316	9,907	
England				2,597		4,819	578
China		290	22	740	14,354	10,682	
Japan						33	
Total	83,700	290	22	3,337	52,985	25,441	578
<i>September, 1898.</i>							
United States	1,282,130			1,513	45,350	1,574	
Spain					15,840	38,190	
England				52,470	23,775	11,535	450
Germany	2,700			12,391	205	11,184	60
France					420	3,160	10
China	2,858			2,590	348,300	55,167	
Japan						3,177	
Total	1,287,688			68,964	433,980	123,987	520
<i>October, 1898.</i>							
United States	7,210			20,450	14,235	5,035	
Spain					35,340	4,270	
England		14,705		5,345	4,055	13,195	
Germany	25	595		17,335	3,230	51,490	20
France				185		935	
China	7,430		24,800	3,300	28,646	19,275	
Japan					6,485		
Total	14,665	15,300	24,800	46,615	91,991	94,200	254
<i>November, 1898.</i>							
United States	150,000			3,500	2,664		
Spain				2,585	133,305	14,345	
England				6,210	2,720	50	
Germany				3,130	505	7,130	
France						2,905	71
China	920	1,005	10	450	30,733	2,830	
Total	150,920	1,005	10	15,875	170,107	27,260	71
<i>December, 1898.</i>							
United States				5,700	4,341	2,367	
Spain				14,515	94,338	63,867	
England				13,051	8,669	18,376	155
Germany				11,184	1,965	23,296	
France				700	176	189	
China	5,776			2,932	59,492	48,749	
Total	5,776			48,082	168,961	161,813	155

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY. 321

EXHIBIT A.—Statistical report of imports, exports, vessels entered and cleared, and tonnage of the port of Manila, P. I., etc.—Continued.

IMPORTATION—Continued.

Imports from—	Rice.	Rubber goods.	Straw (manufactured.)	Silk goods.	Salt.	Currency, silver.
<i>August 22-31, 1898.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Pesos.</i>
Spain				11		
England				134		
China	124,830		90	455	348,588	500,000
Japan	80			143		
Total	124,910		90	743	348,588	500,000
<i>September, 1898.</i>						
Spain				70	300	
England		1,499	992			
Germany		765	280	435	225	
France		25	5	10		
China	407,648		30	2,315	1,746,109	550,000
Japan			2,068			
Total	407,648	2,279	3,365	2,390	1,746,634	550,000
<i>October, 1898.</i>						
Spain		10				
England		790	1,215	157		291,700
Germany		1,525	600	780		
China	152,115		2,880	100	368,495	250,000
Japan	890		2,455			
Total	153,005	2,335	7,150	1,037	368,495	541,700
<i>November, 1898.</i>						
Spain	37,785	50			200,000	
England					2,115	489,900
Germany		115	35	540		
France		40	278	75	25	
China	269,205	25	8,390	340	954,800	863,700
Japan			3,385			
Total	306,990	230	12,088	955	1,156,940	1,333,600
<i>December, 1898.</i>						
Spain	9,400	20		10		
England		10		60	1,114	443,400
Germany		4,514		790		
France		101		20		
China	835,770	20	2,848	1,050	1,084,978	204,300
Japan			610	65		
Total	845,170	4,665	3,458	1,995	1,086,092	647,700

322 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

EXHIBIT A.—Statistical report of imports, exports, vessels entered and cleared, and tonnage of the port of Manila, P. I., etc.—Continued.

IMPORTATION—Continued.

Imports from—	Tea.	Tinware.	Tobacco, cigars, and ciga- rettes.	Vegeta- bles (fresh).	Wax.	Wooden ware.
<i>August 23-31, 1898.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>
United States			18	6,110		
Spain			50	8,500		123
England						
Germany						
France						
China	3,111		360	97,077		1,611
Japan				6,000	7,235	
Total	3,111		418	117,687	7,235	1,734
<i>September, 1898.</i>						
United States			35	38,442		
Spain						171
England				1,720		25
Germany						736
France						
China	6,811		743	551,788		1,724
Japan				3,000		
Austria						
Total	6,811		778	594,940		2,646
<i>October, 1898.</i>						
United States			5,785	500		5,695
Spain			25			50
England		1,835	755			365
Germany		2,275	2,740	120		5,185
France		200	4,245			
China	8,780	1,025		102,630		805
Japan				685		4,025
Austria						
Total	8,780	4,835	13,650	108,985		16,115
<i>November, 1898.</i>						
United States						
Spain		150				4,320
England		1,005				25
Germany		634				1,460
France		770				230
China	14,245	180	2,770	283,894		255
Japan					12,780	
Austria						
Total	14,245	8,239	2,770	283,894	12,780	6,980
<i>December, 1898.</i>						
United States				6,042		5,189
Spain		10				48,895
England		8,511	2,023			10
Germany		510	3,908			4,369
France		339				89
China	11,657	2,547	218	343,043	2,580	4,557
Japan					17,694	
Austria						
Total	11,657	11,917	6,149	349,090	20,274	63,109

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY. 323

EXHIBIT A.—Statistical report of imports, exports, vessels entered and cleared, and tonnage of the port of Manila, P. I., etc.—Continued.

IMPORTATION—Continued.

Imports from—	Woolen goods.	Miscellaneous goods.	Cognac.	Gin.	Whisky.	Beer.
<i>August 22-31, 1898.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Liters.</i>	<i>Liters.</i>	<i>Liters.</i>	<i>Liters.</i>
Spain			1,800	5,695		905
England					55	540
Germany			2,100	240		1,788
Total			3,900	5,935	55	3,233
<i>September, 1898.</i>						
United States					6,550	6,780
Spain	400		6,305	11,130	16,055	3,360
England	950		4,905		2,470	1,627
Germany	1,319			1,960	100	10,980
France	40		3,609			
China						255
Japan		5,915				
Total	2,709	5,915	14,820	13,090	26,175	22,963
<i>October, 1898.</i>						
United States			325	129	600	11,635
Spain						7,580
England	4,750	11,296			70	1,000
Germany	3,850	364	10	3,853		28,235
France			400	27		
China	60					
Japan	100	215				
Total	8,760	11,875	735	4,009	670	48,420
<i>November, 1898.</i>						
United States			2,300		3,828	26,745
Spain	29,050	265	2,670			3,535
England					1,120	
Germany	265			2,095		6,375
France	400	965	570			
China	2,120	7,210				1,496
Total	31,835	8,430	5,540	2,095	4,948	38,183
<i>December, 1898.</i>						
United States		3,210	26	20	1,110	466,000
Spain	984	1,629	4,327	540	177	6,110
England	34		315	658	1,221	4,050
Germany	2,963	2,848	60	2,045	84	
France		2,890		230	10	
China	363	391				8,275
Total	4,294	10,968	4,728	3,493	2,602	484,435

322 REPORT OF

EXHIBIT A.—*Statistics*

Imports

August

United States
Spain
England
Germany
France
China
Japan

Total

..

United States
Spain
England
Germany
France
China
Japan
Austria ..

Total

United States
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REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY. 325

APPENDIX A.—Statistical report of imports, exports, vessels entered and cleared, and tonnage of the port of Manila, P. I., etc.—Continued.

IMPORTATION—Continued.

Imports from—	Boots and shoes.	Cattle.	Sheep.	Poultry.	Watches and clocks.	Umbrellas.
<i>August 22-31, 1898.</i>	<i>Pairs.</i>	<i>No.</i>	<i>No.</i>	<i>Pairs.</i>	<i>No.</i>	<i>No.</i>
Spain.....	600					5,580
Germany.....		81	10	144		400
Total	600	81	10	144		5,980
<i>September, 1898.</i>						
Spain.....	2,952					
Australia.....	1,543	2	26	5		
Total	4,495	2	26	5		
<i>October, 1898.</i>						
Spain.....	21					
Germany.....	156					
France.....	438				152	
China.....	652	1	42			
Total	1,267	1	42		152	
<i>November, 1898.</i>						
Spain.....	6,648					
Germany.....	96				50	
France.....	229		45	28	868	
Australia.....		36				
Total	6,973	36	45	28	438	
<i>December, 1898.</i>						
Spain.....	23,726					1,200
Germany.....	2,062		116	56	21	
Total	25,788		116	56	21	1,200

324 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

EXHIBIT A.—Statistical report of imports, exports, vessels entered and cleared, and tonnage of the port of Manila, P. I., etc.—Continued.

IMPORTATION—Continued.

Imports from—	Cham- pagne.	Claret.	Sherry.	Eggs.	Hats.	Sacks (hemp).
<i>August 22-31, 1898.</i>	<i>Liters.</i>	<i>Liters.</i>	<i>Liters.</i>	<i>No.</i>	<i>No.</i>	<i>No.</i>
Spain.....	1,298	23,623	294			
Germany.....		694				
France.....				11,200		
China.....						
Total.....	1,298	23,517	294	11,200		
<i>September, 1898.</i>						
Spain.....		41,884	3,150			
England.....	1,324					
Germany.....	289					
France.....	436					
China.....				27,800		
Total.....	2,049	41,884	3,150	27,800		
<i>October, 1898.</i>						
United States.....	1,360	1,460				
Spain.....	100	136	567		24	
England.....	470				718	
Germany.....	440	210	365		1,224	783
France.....		365				
China.....		2,190		60,500		
Total.....	2,360	4,361	962	60,500	1,966	783
<i>November, 1898.</i>						
United States.....	2,184	26,664	10,000			10,900
Spain.....	5,000	126,225	5,560		1,345	75
England.....	560					
Germany.....	360	240			18	
France.....	2,185	135			13	
China.....			100	109,860	285	8,520
Total.....	10,269	153,264	15,660	109,860	1,610	19,495
<i>December, 1898.</i>						
United States.....	6,357	7,493	6,200			26,645
Spain.....		254,400	4,680		1,457	50
England.....	80	185	90			736
Germany.....		35			1,508	
France.....	192	270				
China.....				79,040	2,001	12,633
Total.....	6,629	262,338	10,960	79,040	4,964	40,254

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY. 325

EXHIBIT A.—Statistical report of imports, exports, vessels entered and cleared, and tonnage of the port of Manila, P. I., etc.—Continued.

IMPORTATION—Continued.

Imports from—	Boots and shoes.	Cattle.	Sheep.	Poultry.	Watches and clocks.	Umbrel- las.
<i>August 22-31, 1898.</i>	<i>Pairs.</i>	<i>No.</i>	<i>No.</i>	<i>Pairs.</i>	<i>No.</i>	<i>No.</i>
Spain	600					5,580
England						400
China		81	10	144		
Total	600	81	10	144		5,980
<i>September, 1898.</i>						
Spain	2,952					
China	1,543		26	5		
Australia		2				
Total	4,495	2	26	5		
<i>October, 1898.</i>						
Spain	21					
England	156					
Germany	438					
France		1	42		152	
China	652					
Total	1,267	1	42		152	
<i>November, 1898.</i>						
Spain	6,643					
Germany					50	
France	96				388	
China	229		45	28		
Australia		36				
Total	6,973	36	45	28	438	
<i>December, 1898.</i>						
Spain	23,726					1,200
Germany					21	
China	2,062		116	56		
Total	25,788		116	56	21	1,200

326 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

EXHIBIT A.—Statistical report of imports, exports, vessels entered and cleared, and tonnage of the port of Manila, P. I., etc.—Continued.

EXPORTATION.

Exports to—	Coffee.	Cigars.	Hemp (raw).	Hemp (rope).	Old metals.	Ajonjol.
<i>August 22-31, 1898.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>
United States.....			253,550			
Spain.....			126,000			
England.....			128,011			
France.....	450					
China.....				2,308	4,710	10,183
Japan.....		88,435				
Australia.....		35,400				
British India.....		42,400				
Total.....	450	111,235	506,961	2,308	4,710	10,183
<i>September, 1898.</i>						
United States.....			4,250,150	2,301		
Spain.....	500		1,515,000			
England.....		98,100	2,208,808			
France.....	600					
China.....		20,595			143,150	12,650
Japan.....		20,200				
Australia.....		20,100				
Total.....	1,100	158,905	7,982,958	2,301	143,150	12,650
<i>October, 1898.</i>						
United States.....			2,000,809			
Spain.....	315		1,880,080			
England.....		111,000	1,004,920			
France.....	400					
China.....		32,150			67,572	38,301
British India.....		22,053				
Total.....	715	165,183	4,165,809		67,572	38,301
<i>November, 1898.</i>						
United States.....			3,951,816			
Spain.....	800		2,040,550			
England.....		190,000	1,459,450			
France.....	480					
China.....		19,805			25,442	28,980
Japan.....		65,605				
Australia.....		105,117				
Total.....	1,280	380,522	7,451,816		25,442	28,980
<i>December, 1898.</i>						
United States.....			2,739,791			
Spain.....	650		1,899,880			
England.....		114,100	1,890,920			
China.....					33,858	39,277
Australia.....		90,363				
British India.....		10,000				
Total.....	650	214,463	5,479,591		33,858	39,277

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY. 327

EXHIBIT A.—Statistical report of imports, exports, vessels entered and cleared, and tonnage of the port of Manila, P. I., etc.—Continued.

EXPORTATION—Continued.

Exports to—	Oil of cocoa- nut.	Shells (black).	Sapan wood.	Hides, horns, and hoofs.	Sugar.	Tobacco leaves.
<i>August 22-31, 1898.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>
United States.....	308,544
Spain.....	1,100,000
England.....	310,260
Germany.....	118,477
China.....	2,304	6,483	4,490	160,060
Japan.....	133,060
Total.....	2,304	6,483	4,490	906,944	1,218,477
<i>September, 1898.</i>
United States.....	1,560,185
Spain.....	224,808
England.....	12,600	712,415
China.....	7,783	1,600	50,015	43,722
Total.....	7,783	1,600	12,600	50,015	2,316,322	224,808
<i>October, 1898.</i>
United States.....	400,000
Spain.....	37,311
England.....	44,000	405,000
China.....	2,101	10,395	36,532	196,025
Total.....	2,101	54,395	36,532	1,000,025	37,311
<i>November, 1898.</i>
United States.....	375,000
England.....	1,510,100
China.....	11,780	2,525	52,881	650,450
Japan.....	217,790
British India.....	8,164
Total.....	11,780	2,525	52,881	3,253,340	8,164
<i>December, 1898.</i>
United States.....	915,600
Spain.....	300,780
England.....	400,000
Germany.....	88,000
China.....	4,744	50,349	380,955
Japan.....	526,311
British India.....	6,608
Total.....	6,608	4,744	50,349	2,222,866	388,780

328 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

EXHIBIT A.—*Statistical report of imports, exports, vessels entered and cleared, and tonnage of the port of Manila, P. I., etc.—Continued.*

EXPORTATION—Continued.

Exports to—	Ylang- ylang (essence)	Becho de mar.	Coco- nuts.	Leather gum.	Alma- ciga.	Coprax.
<i>Aug. 22-31, 1898.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>	<i>Kilos.</i>
United States.....	1,366					
Germany.....	500					
France.....	500					
Total.....	2,366					
<i>September, 1898.</i>						
Spain.....						75,000
England.....					37,730	80,000
France.....	645					75,000
China.....		27,586	66,690	22,048		
Austria.....						28,706
Total.....	645	27,586	66,690	22,048	37,730	258,706
<i>October, 1898.</i>						
United States.....	1,915					
Germany.....					9,361	
France.....	500					
China.....			6,152	28,842		
Total.....	2,415		6,152	28,842	9,361	
<i>November, 1898.</i>						
United States.....	545					
Spain.....						71,000
England.....					19,815	70,000
France.....	200					60,000
China.....			24,800	1,900		
Japan.....				850		
Austria.....						40,745
Total.....	745		24,800	2,750	19,815	241,745
<i>December, 1898.</i>						
United States.....	1,500					
Spain.....						665,500
England.....						882,100
France.....	130					303,488
China.....			12,220			
Austria.....						448,800
Total.....	1,630		12,220			2,299,888

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY. 329

EXHIBIT A.—Statistical report of imports, exports, vessels entered and cleared, and tonnage of the port of Manila, P. I., etc.—Continued.

EXPORTATION—Continued.

Exports to—	Straw goods.	Rice husks.	Miscella- neous. ¹	Currency.		
				Gold.	Silver.	Copper.
	Kilos.	Kilos.	Kilos.	Pesos.	Pesos.	Pesos.
<i>Aug. 22-31, 1898.</i>						
Australia.....	1,254					
Total	1,254					
<i>September, 1898.</i>						
Spain.....			21,824			
England.....				145,000		
Germany.....	2,881					
China.....		139,130	10,328		292,100	
Total	2,881	139,130	32,152	145,000	292,100	
<i>October, 1898.</i>						
Spain.....			123,290			
England.....				275,000		
China.....		1,675				19,000
Total		1,675	123,290	275,000		19,000
<i>November, 1898.</i>						
United States.....					9,000	
England.....				247,000		
Germany.....	2,775					
France.....	1,000					
China.....		94,875	86,567		24,724	
Total	3,775	94,875	86,567	247,000	33,724	
<i>December, 1898.</i>						
Spain.....						700
England.....				496,250		
China.....	698	18,469	55,992		223,009	
Total	698	18,469	55,992	496,250	223,009	700

¹ Consisting principally of second-hand furniture, personal effects, empty liquor bottles, etc.

330 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

EXHIBIT A.—*Statistical report of imports, exports, vessels entered and cleared, and tonnage of the port of Manila, P. I., etc.—Continued.*

RECAPITULATION.

Imports from—	Brass, bronze, and copper.		Building material.		Barley.	
	Kilos.	Pounds.	Kilos.	Pounds.	Kilos.	Pounds.
United States.....	34,090	74,309	47,964	104,550
Spain.....	3,482	7,579	1,915	4,182
England.....	1,085	2,380	81,939	178,598
Germany.....	1,330	2,886	469,441	1,023,474	45,180	98,537
France.....	385	854	13,550
China.....	498	1,078	583,353	1,272,227	424	920
Grand total.....	6,790	14,757	1,177,092	2,566,620	93,568	204,007
Estimated values, pesos.....	3,500	176,500	4,700

Imports from—	Cotton goods.		Crockery and china-ware.		Confectionery.	
	Kilos.	Pounds.	Kilos.	Pounds.	Kilos.	Pounds.
United States.....	145	315	7,377	16,062
Spain.....	593,773	1,184,977	673	1,463	14,362	31,368
England.....	448,852	978,400	31,226	68,067	1,202	2,629
Germany.....	89,940	196,942	110,530	241,022	21,625	47,120
France.....	2,677	5,827	4,546	9,892	300	647
China.....	249,749	545,452	64,128	139,781	28,653	62,473
Japan.....	422	908
Grand total.....	1,385,236	2,910,914	211,525	461,133	73,549	160,299
Estimated values, pesos.....	1,900,000	155,000	22,000

Imports from—	Cigarette paper.		Drugs and medicines.		Dairy products.	
	Kilos.	Pounds.	Kilos.	Pounds.	Kilos.	Pounds.
United States.....	4,635	10,207	8,705	19,358	2,687	5,851
Spain.....	36,742	77,710	15,025	33,745	1,546	3,380
England.....	8,813	19,210	130,597	279,678	1,379	3,001
Germany.....	29,400	63,993	64,433	140,382	999	1,951
France.....	15,773	34,470	9,052	19,715	151	335
China.....	1,657	3,699	72,278	157,534
Japan.....	3,050	6,634
Austria.....	28,120	61,291
Grand total.....	124,190	270,480	303,140	655,646	6,662	14,498
Estimated values, pesos.....	25,000	200,400	6,000

Imports from—	Earthenware.		Electrical goods.		Furniture.	
	Kilos.	Pounds.	Kilos.	Pounds.	Kilos.	Pounds.
United States.....	85	184	725	1,576
Spain.....	50	109	220	486
England.....	10,747	23,420	170	367	6,000	13,080
Germany.....	120,318	262,280	85	180	3,175	6,917
France.....	1,755	3,817	1,364	2,970
China.....	53,031	115,579	48,926	106,636
Japan.....	1,196	2,699	450	981
Austria.....	5,670	12,357
Grand total.....	187,097	407,804	6,460	14,069	60,420	131,674
Estimated values, pesos.....	18,700	10,000	60,000

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY. 331

EXHIBIT A.—*Statistical report of imports, exports, vessels entered and cleared, and tonnage of the port of Manila, P. I., etc.—Continued.*

RECAPITULATION—Continued.

Imports from—	Fireworks.		Fancy goods.		Fruits (fresh).	
	Kilos.	Pounds.	Kilos.	Pounds.	Kilos.	Pounds.
United States.....			2,090	4,421	269,354	587,191
Spain.....			238	508		
England.....			2,656	5,780		
Germany.....			9,449	20,800		
France.....			2,361	5,140		
China.....	26,187	55,229	11,447	24,781	141,827	312,376
Japan.....	3,740	10,006	7,303	14,813		
Grand total.....	29,927	65,232	35,484	76,193	411,281	899,548
Estimated values, pesos.....	500		88,700		100,000	

Imports from—	Fish.		Flour.		Glassware.	
	Kilos.	Pounds.	Kilos.	Pounds.	Kilos.	Pounds.
United States.....	1,440	3,132	2,819,439	6,146,361	556,190	1,212,487
Spain.....	41,455	90,343			89,025	194,060
England.....	6,620	14,428			57,548	125,442
Germany.....	19,680	42,897			157,460	343,252
France.....					20,836	45,196
China.....	84,988	184,572	248	532	52,908	115,325
Japan.....	155	337	216	468	24,340	53,054
Grand total.....	154,038	335,709	2,819,903	6,147,361	958,304	2,088,816
Estimated values, pesos.....	20,000		320,006		30,000	

Imports from—	Haberdashery.		Fruits (preserved).		Hemp (manufactured).	
	Kilos.	Pounds.	Kilos.	Pounds.	Kilos.	Pounds.
United States.....	525	1,140	23,528	51,273		
Spain.....	56,715	123,623	87,720	191,197	18,490	41,048
England.....	8,606	18,745	3,725	8,108	1,240	2,702
Germany.....	11,882	26,071	2,368	5,151	1,365	2,920
France.....	3,681	8,010	515	1,113	30	65
China.....	2,531	5,067	45,361	98,857	21,156	46,101
Japan.....	196	417				
Austria.....	50	109				
Grand total.....	84,084	183,182	163,217	355,699	42,621	92,834
Estimated values, pesos.....	210,000		82,000		8,500	

Imports from—	Hardware.		Jewelry.		Joss sticks.	
	Kilos.	Pounds.	Kilos.	Pounds.	Kilos.	Pounds.
United States.....	9,890	21,547				
Spain.....	72,794	158,665	114	250		
England.....	677,360	477,383	40	88		
Germany.....	396,742	864,872	1,078	2,336		
France.....	10,830	23,572	2,143	4,675		
China.....	36,850	78,136	84	189	7,206	15,697
Austria.....	700	1,526				
Grand total.....	1,204,186	2,625,701	3,464	7,528	7,206	15,697
Estimated values, pesos.....	472,000		155,500		720	

332 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

EXHIBIT A.—*Statistical report of imports, exports, vessels entered and cleared, and tonnage of the port of Manila, P. I., etc.—Continued.*

RECAPITULATION—Continued.

Imports from—	Illuminating oil.		Lubricating oil.		Leather (manufactured).	
	Kilos.	Pounds.	Kilos.	Pounds.	Kilos.	Pounds.
United States.....	1,523,040	3,320,020	11,755	25,616
Spain.....	6,621	14,412
England.....	14,705	32,056	5,032	11,085
Germany.....	2,725	5,996	595	1,299	6,351	13,932
France.....	564	1,222
China.....	16,984	37,019	1,304	2,842	619	1,343
Grand total.....	1,542,749	3,387,407	18,604	36,187	31,002	67,511
Estimated values, pesos.....	60,766	12,458	25,000

Imports from—	Matches.		Machinery.		Meats (preserved and salted).	
	Kilos.	Pounds.	Kilos.	Pounds.	Kilos.	Pounds.
United States.....	9,102	19,832	151,956	331,018
Spain.....	1,130	2,456	40,256	87,716
England.....	75	160	35,308	72,563	17,937	39,086
Germany.....	19,307	42,061	699	1,491
France.....	12,193	26,561	250	545
China.....	13,060	28,460	61,757	134,609
Japan.....	365,374	871,911
Australia.....	845	1,835
Grand total.....	395,449	872,071	88,098	191,963	273,690	596,300
Estimated values, pesos.....	80,000	88,000	55,000

Imports from—	Milk (condensed).		Musical goods.		Opium.	
	Kilos.	Pounds.	Kilos.	Pounds.	Kilos.	Pounds.
United States.....	29,858	65,070
Spain.....	2,800	6,105	1,383	3,009
England.....	4,159	9,049
Germany.....	9,160	19,961	295	639
France.....	1,302	2,898
China.....	3,992	8,290	300	654	24,532	54,133
Grand total.....	49,969	108,475	3,180	6,900	24,532	54,133
Estimated values, pesos.....	25,590	25,000	273,150

Imports from—	Paints, oils, and varnishes.		Provisions.		Currency (silver).
	Kilos.	Pounds.	Kilos.	Pounds.	Pesos.
United States.....	31,163	67,933	67,905	147,924
Spain.....	17,100	37,269	316,229	699,347
England.....	79,673	173,672	39,219	85,485	1,205,000
Germany.....	44,040	95,972	5,995	13,043
France.....	885	1,926	596	1,292
China.....	10,012	21,812	481,615	1,049,161	2,868,000
Japan.....	6,485	14,131
Grand total.....	182,873	398,583	918,044	2,000,363	3,573,000
Estimated values, pesos.....	91,400	1,000,000

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY. 333

EXHIBIT A.—*Statistical report of imports, exports, vessels entered and cleared, and tonnage of the port of Manila, P. I., etc.—Continued.*

RECAPITULATION—Continued.

Imports from—	Printed matter, paper, etc.		Photographic goods.		Rice.	
	Kilos.	Pounds.	Kilos.	Pounds.	Kilos.	Pounds.
United States.....	8,976	19,546	-----	-----	-----	-----
Spain.....	130,579	278,103	-----	-----	47,185	102,867
England.....	47,975	104,559	1,203	2,508	-----	-----
Germany.....	98,069	213,763	294	634	-----	-----
France.....	7,189	15,647	81	171	-----	-----
China.....	136,703	297,965	-----	-----	1,789,568	3,901,237
Japan.....	3,210	6,992	-----	-----	970	2,100
Grand total.....	432,701	936,595	1,578	3,313	1,837,723	4,006,194
Estimated values, pesos.....	20,000	-----	15,000	-----	110,500	-----

Imports from—	Rubber goods.		Straw (manufac- tured).		Silk goods.	
	Kilos.	Pounds.	Kilos.	Pounds.	Kilos.	Pounds.
Spain.....	80	174	-----	-----	91	194
England.....	2,289	4,976	2,207	4,801	351	756
Germany.....	6,919	15,071	915	1,988	2,545	5,530
France.....	166	360	281	611	105	225
China.....	45	96	14,238	31,011	4,280	9,372
Japan.....	-----	-----	8,508	18,537	208	449
Grand total.....	9,499	20,677	26,149	56,948	7,560	16,526
Estimated values, pesos.....	10,000	-----	2,600	-----	75,600	-----

Imports from—	Salt.		Tea.		Tinware.	
	Kilos.	Pounds.	Kilos.	Pounds.	Kilos.	Pounds.
Spain.....	200,300	436,654	-----	-----	60	130
England.....	3,229	7,034	-----	-----	11,451	24,954
Germany.....	225	486	-----	-----	3,419	7,441
France.....	25	55	-----	-----	1,309	2,843
China.....	4,442,970	9,685,653	44,584	96,942	3,752	8,161
Grand total.....	4,646,749	10,129,882	44,584	96,942	19,991	43,526
Estimated values, pesos.....	92,700	-----	44,500	-----	5,705	-----

Imports from—	Tobacco, cigars, and cigarettes.		Vegetables (fresh).		Wax.	
	Kilos.	Pounds.	Kilos.	Pounds.	Kilos.	Pounds.
United States.....	5,938	12,938	51,094	111,368	-----	-----
Spain.....	75	164	8,500	18,530	-----	-----
England.....	2,778	6,061	1,720	3,746	-----	-----
Germany.....	6,648	14,434	120	258	-----	-----
France.....	4,245	9,246	-----	-----	-----	-----
China.....	4,061	8,832	1,878,427	3,004,939	2,590	5,619
Japan.....	-----	-----	9,685	20,135	37,709	82,136
Grand total.....	23,765	51,765	1,449,546	3,158,976	40,289	87,905
Estimated values, pesos.....	24,000	-----	72,500	-----	31,500	-----

Report of Major-General E. S. Otis, U. S. V., Commanding Department of the Pacific, covering correspondence with Insurgent leaders.

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., September 12, 1898.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL UNITED STATES ARMY,
Washington, D. C.

SIR: I have the honor to inclose herewith copies of all correspondence by and between the United States military authorities and General Aguinaldo, commanding the insurgent forces of the Philippines, which are of record. I am of the impression that certain notes have passed between the parties of which no record was made, and I conclude thus from expressions in the letters of Aguinaldo, copies of which are inclosed. To my long communication, in which I make demands upon the insurgents to evacuate the city of Manila and its defenses by the 15th instant, I have not yet received any response. I am informed that Aguinaldo's advisers are quite evenly divided in sentiment—the one strongly advocating a compliance with the demands, the other urging refusal. I can not as yet reach any decided opinion as to which party will prevail. Should I promise them that in case of the return of the city to Spain, upon United States evacuation, their forces would be placed by us in positions which they now occupy, I thoroughly believe that they would evacuate at once. But, of course, under the international obligations resting upon us by reason of the articles of capitulation, no such promise can be given.

The insurgents are very strong, estimated by some to number 30,000 troops. They have been receiving a good many arms and much ammunition within the last few weeks, and, I am informed, have contracted with the Japanese Government for a considerable supply. I shall not yield to any of their requests or make any concessions which affect in any way our international obligations to Spain. Should war result, more troops will be required, for which I shall make request by telegraph. Admiral Dewey approves thoroughly of my action and heartily unites in the course which I am pursuing. I continue in the hope that hostilities can be avoided. It is reported to me that the best legal talent which the insurgents possess—and they have among them some able men—state that the argument used in my communication is unanswerable. But the difficulty lies in their inability to control their irresponsible military organizations. They want the argument coupled with requests, and not demands, so that Aguinaldo can make proclamations in his paper which will appeal to their sense.

I send these papers in care of Maj. W. A. Simpson, assistant adjutant-general, U. S. A., who has been directed to proceed to Washington by War Department orders.

Very respectfully,

E. S. OTIS,
Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, U. S. EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
Cavite Arsenal, P. I., July 4, 1898.

Señor Don EMILIO AGUINALDO Y FAMY,
Commanding Philippine Forces, Cavite, Luzon.

GENERAL: I have the honor to inform you that the United States of America, whose land forces I have the honor to command in this vicinity, being at war with the Kingdom of Spain, has entire sympathy and most friendly sentiments for the native people of the Philippine Islands.

For these reasons I desire to have the most amicable relations with you, and to have you and your people cooperate with us in military operations against the Spanish forces.

In our operations it has become necessary for us to occupy the town of Cavite as a base of operations. In doing this I do not wish to interfere with your residence here and the exercise by yourself and other native citizens of all functions and privileges not inconsistent with military rule.

I would be pleased to be informed at once of any misconduct of soldiers under my command, as it is the intention of my Government to maintain order and to treat all citizens with justice, courtesy, and kindness.

I have therefore the honor to ask your excellency to instruct your officials not to interfere with my officers in the performance of their duties and not to assume that they can not visit Cavite without permission.

Assuring you again of my most friendly sentiment and distinguished consideration, I remain, with all respect,

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

True copy:

J. F. BELL, Major of Engineers, U. S. V.

L. R. No. 34. Received July 5, 1898. From Aguinaldo, Emilio. No date or place.

Brief.—Expresses an interpretation of sentiments of the natives of the Philippine Islands toward the great North American nation and announces his agreeable relations with the United States military authorities, etc.

Action.—Forwarded to General Merritt, July 27, as an inclosure to L. S. 45.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, U. S. EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
Cavite Arsenal, P. I., July 6, 1898.

Señor Don EMILIO AGUINALDO Y FAMY,
Commanding Philippine Forces.

GENERAL: I am encouraged by the friendly sentiment expressed by your excellency in your welcome letter received on the 5th instant to endeavor to come to a definite understanding, which I hope will be advantageous to both.

Very soon we expect a large addition to our forces, and it must be apparent to you as a military officer that we will require much more room to camp our soldiers, and also storeroom for our supplies. For this I would like to have your excellency's advice and cooperation, as you are best acquainted with the resources of this country.

It must be apparent to you that we do not intend to remain here inactive, but to move promptly against our common enemy. But for a short time we must organize and land supplies, and also retain a place for storing them near our fleet and transports.

I am solicitous to avoid any conflict of authority which may result from having two sets of military officers exercising command in the same place.

I am also anxious to avoid sickness by taking sanitary precaution. Your own medical officers have been making voluntary inspections with mine and fear epidemic diseases if the vicinity is not made clean.

Would it not be well to have prisoners work to this end under the advice of the surgeons?

I again renew my assurances of distinguished consideration.

I am, with great respect,

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

True copy:

J. F. BELL, Major of Engineers, U. S. V.

336 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

[Extract.]

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, U. S. EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
Cavite Arsenal, P. I., July 9, 1898.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL UNITED STATES ARMY,
Washington, D. C.:

General Aguinaldo tells me he has about 15,000 fighting men, but only 11,000 armed with guns, which mostly were taken from the Spaniards. He claims to have in all 4,000 prisoners.

When we first landed he seemed very suspicious, and not at all friendly, but I have now come to a better understanding with him and he is much more friendly and seems willing to cooperate.

But he has declared himself dictator and president, and is trying to take Manila without our assistance. This is not probable, but if he can effect his purpose he will, I apprehend, antagonize any attempt on our part to establish a provisional government.

* * * * *
THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

True copy:

J. F. BELL, *Major of Engineers, U. S. V.*

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, U. S. EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
Cavite Arsenal, P. I., July 14, 1898.

Señor Don EMILIO AGUINALDO,
Commanding Philippine Forces.

GENERAL: Wishing to get complete information of the approaches to Manila from every direction, I therefore have the honor to request that you give my officers all possible assistance in making reconnaissance to the lines and approaches and that you favor them with your advice.

Officers coming from me will have a note to that effect.

With great respect,

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

True copy:

J. F. BELL, *Major of Engineers, U. S. V.*

L. R. No. 122. Received July 20, 1898. From Aguinaldo, Emilio, general Philippine forces. Dated at Bacoor, P. I., July 15, 1898.

Brief.—States that his government has seen necessity of adopting form and organization more adequately popular. Expresses friendly and harmonious relations with "the great North American nation."

Action.—Forwarded to General Merritt, July 27, as an inclosure to L. S. No. 45.

HDQRS. EXPEDITIONARY FORCES TO THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
CHIEF QUARTERMASTER'S OFFICE,
Cavite, P. I., July 17, 1898.

General EMILIO AGUINALDO,
Addressed.

SIR: General Anderson wishes me to say that the second expedition having arrived, he expects to encamp in the vicinity of Paranaque from 5,000 to 7,000 men. To do this, supply this army and shelter, will require certain assistance from the Filipinos in this neighborhood. We will want horses, buffaloes, carts, etc., for transportation, bamboo for shelter, wood to cook with, etc. For all this we are willing to pay a fair price, but no more. We find so far that the native population are not willing to give us this assistance as promptly as required. But we must have it, and if it becomes necessary we will be compelled to send out parties to seize what we may need. We would regret very much to do this, as we are here to befriend the Filipinos. Our nation has spent millions of money to send

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY. 337

forces here to expel the Spaniards and to give good government to the whole people, and the return we are asking is comparatively slight.

General Anderson wishes you to inform your people that we are here for their good, and that they must supply us with labor and material at the current market prices. We are prepared to purchase 500 horses at a fair price, but can not undertake to bargain for horses with each individual owner.

I regret very much that I am unable to see you personally, as it is of the utmost importance that these arrangements should be made as soon as possible.

I will await your reply.

Very respectfully,

S. R. JONES,
Major and Quartermaster, U. S. V., Chief Quartermaster.

[Indorsement.]

FIRST BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS,
July 17, 1898.

The request herein made by Major Jones, chief quartermaster, was made by my direction.

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

The within communication was delivered to me personally by a staff officer of General Aguinaldo's, who stated that General A. requested to know whether it was sent by my authority. The above indorsement was placed on the paper, which was then returned to the staff officer.

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Brigadier-General, Volunteers, Commanding.

A true copy:

J. F. BELL, *Major of Engineers, U. S. V.*

L. R. No. 137. Received July 22, 1898. From Jones, Sam R., chief quartermaster, First Brigade. Dated at Cavite, P. I., July 20, 1898.

Brief.—States that it is impossible to procure transportation except upon Senor Aguinaldo's order, in this section who has an inventory of everything. The natives have removed their wheels and hid them.

Action.—Filed.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, U. S. EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
Cavite Arsenal, P. I., July 18, 1898.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY.

GENERAL: Since reading the President's instructions to General Merritt, I think I should state to you that the establishment of a provisional government on our part will probably bring us in conflict with insurgents, now in active hostility to Spain.

The insurgent chief, Aguinaldo, has declared himself dictator and self-appointed president. He has declared martial law and promulgated a minute method of rule and administration under it.

We have observed all official military courtesies, and he and his followers express great admiration and gratitude to the great American Republic of the north, yet in many ways they obstruct our purposes and are using every effort to take Manila without us.

I suspect also that Aguinaldo is secretly negotiating with the Spanish authorities, as his confidential aid is in Manila.

The city is strongly fortified and hard to approach in the rainy season. If a bombardment fails we should have the best engineering ability here.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

True copy:

J. F. BELL, *Major of Engineers, U. S. V.*

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338 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, U. S. EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
Cavite Arsenal, P. I., July 19, 1898.

Senor Don EMILIO AGUINALDO,
Commanding General Philippine Forces.

GENERAL: The bearer, Maj. J. F. Bell, U. S. A., was sent by Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt, U. S. A., to collect for him, by the time of his personal arrival, certain information concerning the strength and positions of the enemy and concerning the topography of the country surrounding Manila.

I would be obliged if you would permit him to see your maps, and place at his disposal any information you may have on the above subjects, and also give him a letter or pass addressed to your subordinates which will authorize them to furnish him any information they can on these subjects and to facilitate his passage along the lines, upon a reconnoissance around Manila, on which I propose to send him.

I remain, with great respect, your obedient servant,

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

True copy:

J. F. BELL, *Major of Engineers, U. S. V.*

L. R. No. 47 (new series). Received August 8, 1898. From Aguinaldo, Emilio. Dated at Bacoor, P. I., near Manila, July, 18, 1898.

Brief.—Relative to the assistance of his people to us in furnishing supplies and transportation. Retains his great admiration for the great North American nation. No action recorded.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, U. S. EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
Cavite Arsenal, P. I., July 19, 1898.

Senor Don EMILIO AGUINALDO,
Commanding Philippine Forces.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 18th instant. Your offer of assistance is appreciated and your assurances of good will are most gratifying. The difficulty of collecting supplies, referred to by you, is apprehended and will be considered in fixing compensation.

As a medium of communication with your people, we will be pleased to have you assure them that there will be no confiscation of their property, that our requisitions will be reasonable, and that a fair compensation will always be given.

I remain, general, with all respect, your obedient servant,

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

True copy:

J. F. BELL, *Major of Engineers, U. S. V.*

[Extract.]

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, U. S. EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
Cavite Arsenal, P. I., July 21, 1898.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL UNITED STATES ARMY,
Washington, D. C.:

Since I wrote last, Aguinaldo has put in operation an elaborate system of military government, under his assumed authority as dictator, and has prohibited any supplies being given us, except by his order. As to this last, I have written to him that our requisitions on the country for horses, ox carts, fuel, and bamboo (to make scalin ladders) must be filled, and that he must aid in having them filled. His assumption of civil authority I have ignored, and let him know verbally that I could, and would, not recognize it, while I did not recognize him as a military leader.

It may seem strange that I have made no formal protest against his proclamation as dictator, his declaration of martial law, and publication and execution of a

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY. 339

despotic form of government. I wrote such a protest, but did not publish it, at Admiral Dewey's request, and also for fear of wounding the susceptibilities of Major-General Merritt, but I have let it be known in every other way that we do not recognize the dictatorship.

These people only respect force and firmness. I submit, with all deference, that we have heretofore underrated the native. They are not ignorant, savage tribes, but have a civilization of their own; and although insignificant in appearance, are fierce fighters, and for a tropical people they are industrious. A small detail of natives will do more work in a given time than a regiment of volunteers.

* * * * *

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

True copy:

J. F. BELL, *Major of Engineers, U. S. V.*

HDQRS. FIRST BRIGADE, U. S. EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
Cavite Arsenal, P. I., July 21, 1898.

Señor Don EMILIO AGUINALDO,
Commanding General Philippine Forces.

GENERAL: I have the honor to request that passes and such other assistance as practicable be given to the bearer, Lieut. E. J. Bryan, and party, who are making a reconnoissance of the surrounding country.

Thanking you for assistance given on previous occasions,
I remain, with great respect, your obedient servant,

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

True copy.

J. F. BELL, *Major of Engineers, U. S. V.*

L. R. No. 138. Received July 22, 1898. From Aguinaldo, Emilio, general commanding Philippine forces. No date or place.

Brief.—Objects to United States troops occupying warehouse No. 1, Calle Colon, as it is property of a Filipino named Don Antonio Osorio, and is under insurgents' protection. Requests the removal of same.

Action.—Forwarded to General Merritt July 27 as an inclosure to L. S. No. 45.

L. R. No. 166. Received July 25, 1898. From Aguinaldo, Emilio, general Philippine forces. Dated at Bacoor, P. I., July 24, 1898.

Brief.—Makes a statement as to the house of Osorio in Cavite, and also makes full statement of his connection with the revolution and the United States forces.

Action.—Forwarded to General Merritt July 27 as an inclosure to L. S. No. 45.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, U. S. EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
Cavite Arsenal, July 22, 1898.

Señor Don EMILIO AGUINALDO,
Commanding Philippine Forces.

GENERAL: Replying to your excellency's letter in relation to the property of Don Antonio Osorio, I have the honor to state that if he transferred the property to you personally, before the capture of Cavite by our forces, it will give me great pleasure to transfer the property to you, in question. If, however, the property was not transferred to your excellency until after the capture of Cavite, the property would appear to have been public Spanish property or contraband of war and subject to capture.

This property will be held subject to investigation, but Don Osorio must make his claim and offer his proof to the commanding officer of the American army.

I observe that your excellency has announced yourself as a dictator and proclaimed martial law. As I am here simply in a military capacity, I have no authority to recognize this assumption. I have no orders from my Government on the subject; and so far as I can ascertain, your independent status has not

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been recognized by any foreign power. Your fine intellect must perceive that. Happy as I am to see you fighting so bravely and successfully against a common enemy, I can not, without orders, recognize your civil authority.

I remain, with great respect,

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

True copy:

J. F. BELL, *Major of Engineers, U. S. V.*

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, U. S. EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
Cavite Arsenal, P. I., July 23, 1898.

SEÑOR DON EMILIO AGUINALDO,
Commanding Philippine Forces.

GENERAL: When I came here three weeks ago I requested your excellency to give what assistance you could to procure means of transportation for the American Army, as it was to fight the cause of your people.

So far we have received no response.

As you represent your people, I now have the honor to make requisition on you for 500 horses and 50 oxen and ox carts.

If you can not secure these, I will have to pass you and make requisition directly on the people.

I beg leave to request an answer at your earliest convenience.

I remain, with great respect,

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

True copy:

J. F. BELL, *Major of Engineers, U. S. V.*

L. R. No. 167. Received July 25, 1898. From Aguinaldo, Emilio, general Philippine forces. Dated at Bacoor, P. I., July 24, 1898.

Brief.—States that he misunderstood the desires of the United States forces before, but now he will assist in supplying all requisitions for transportation if given reasonable notice and time.

Action.—Forwarded to General Merritt, July 27, as an inclosure to L. S. No. 45.

HDQRS. FIRST BRIGADE, U. S. EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
Cavite Arsenal, P. I., July 24, 1898.

SEÑOR DON EMILIO AGUINALDO,
Commanding Philippine Forces.

GENERAL: Your favor of the 26th ultimo in relation to requisitions for cattle, horses, etc., is satisfactory. I regret that there should have been any misunderstanding about it. The people to whom we applied, even for the hiring of carriages, etc., told our people that they had orders to supply nothing except by your orders. I am pleased to think that this was a misapprehension on their part.

We are not so unreasonable as to suppose that all we want can be supplied at once or from one place. We may even have to send to other islands. Our quartermaster will establish a depot near the American camp, where he will receive and pay for supplies and from which he will send out parties to whatever places your excellency will indicate, to transact business with your people.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

True copy:

J. F. BELL, *Major of Engineers, U. S. V.*

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY. 341

HDQRS. FIRST BRIGADE, U. S. EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
Cavite Arsenal, P. I., July 27, 1898.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL U. S. EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
Manila Bay.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit the last letter I received from the insurgent chief, Aguinaldo, dated Bacoar, July 24, 1898. This letter has not been answered by me.

My whole correspondence with him is also inclosed.

Very respectfully,

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

True copy.

J. F. BELL, *Major of Engineers, U. S. V.*

HDQRS. FIRST BRIGADE, U. S. EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
Cavite Arsenal, P. I., July 27, 1898.

Señor Don EMILIO AGUINALDO,
Commanding Philippine Forces.

GENERAL: Referring to your letter of the 24th instant, relative to the alleged property of Don Antonio Osorio, I have the honor to inform you that it has been forwarded to Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt, commanding United States expeditionary forces, for his action.

Very respectfully,

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

True copy.

J. F. BELL, *Major of Engineers, U. S. V.*

HDQRS. SECOND DIVISION EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Cavite Arsenal, P. I., August 5, 1898.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC, ETC.:

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that General Aguinaldo, through a staff officer, complains that the Signal Corps, U. S. A., in putting up wires has interrupted his communications; that he was promised that this interruption would not last more than one day, but that it has now been out of working order for three days; that he is very glad to have the army use his telegraph poles, but it is so important to keep his communication that he earnestly requests prompt action in the matter.

Very respectfully,

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

True copy.

J. F. BELL, *Major of Engineers, U. S. V.*

AUGUST 10, 1898.

INSTRUCTIONS FROM GENERAL MERRITT BROUGHT BY GENERAL BABCOCK.

1. No rupture with insurgents. This is imperative. Can ask insurgent generals or Aguinaldo for permission to occupy their trenches, but if refused not to use force.

2. No extensions of lines, as proposed in memorandum of August 9, which will bring partial engagement, resulting in loss prior to general assault.

3. One gun can be placed within two hours after receiving the order in the insurgent emplacement on the road facing No. 14; not as good a position as farther to the front and right. Three more guns can be placed behind trench near the beach without precipitating an engagement. Embrasures can be cut through trenches to-night.

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4. Troops can occupy trenches on two hours' notice, but are not prepared to make a determined assault without carrying out memorandum of August 9, requiring three days. We can hold trenches against any possible attack and bring 8 field guns into action in front of enemy's lines.

True copy.

J. F. BELL, *Major of Engineers, U. S. V.*

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, U. S. EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
Cavite, P. I., July 30, 1898.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
*Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps,
S. S. Newport, Manila Bay, P. I.*

SIR: Referring to verbal instructions in relation to an issue of rations to Spanish prisoners, I have the honor to state that I have just received a verbal message from General Aguinaldo, conveyed by Capt. Marti Burges, aide-de-camp, to this effect: That he, Aguinaldo, appreciates the kindness that prompts the offer, but fears that if this should become known in Manila the Spaniards would regard it as an indication that resources were exhausted and would consequently take heart and make renewed resistance.

He will therefore endeavor to increase their rations, but reminds us that prisoners always complain. I made answer verbally that if their prisoners were kept here they would have to be well fed, but that he could of course remove them if he saw fit to do so.

Very respectfully,

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

[Telegram.]

CAMP DEWEY, near Manila, 8—10—'98.

Gen. EMILIO AGUINALDO,
Commanding Filipino Forces, Bacoar:

Will your excellency consent to my occupation of the intrenchment facing Blockhouse No. 14, on the road from Pasay to Cingalon? Our object is to place artillery to destroy the blockhouse. If you consent, please issue necessary orders to-night. I shall highly appreciate a prompt reply.

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.

[Telegram.]

BACOR, August 10, 1898.

Brig. Gen. THOMAS M. ANDERSON, U. S. V.,
Camp Dewey.

SIR: Replying to your note of this date, in which you ask me the occupation by your troops of the intrenchments facing Blockhouse No. 14 only, on the road from Pasay to Cingalon, I have the pleasure to tell you that I [am] giving the necessary orders so that your troops may occupy the mentioned intrenchments, and my troops will pass to the immediate intrenchment or to any other place where they think convenient to intrench themselves.

I remain, most respectfully, yours,

E. AGUINALDO.

[Telegram.]

MANILA, P. I., August 13, 1898.

General AGUINALDO,
General in Chief, Filipino Forces:

Serious trouble threatening between our forces. Try and prevent it. Your forces should not force themselves in the city until we have received the full surrender. Then we will negotiate with you.

ANDERSON.

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY. 343

[Most urgent—Pineda received from Bacoar 10.50 a. m., 13th.]

General Aguinaldo, Ermita, president of revolutionary government, to General Anderson, Ermita.

I received a telegram. My interpreter is in Cavite. In consequence of this I have not answered until now. My troops are forced by yours, by means of threats of violence, to retire from positions taken. It is necessary to avoid conflict, which I should lament, that you order your troops that they avoid difficulty with mine, as until now they have conducted themselves as brothers to take Manila. I have given strict orders to my chiefs that they preserve strict respect to American forces and to aid them in case they are attacked by a common enemy.

I do not doubt that the good relations and friendship which unite us will be continued if your soldiers correspond to the conduct imposed upon mine.

E. AGUINALDO.

[Telegram.]

BACOOR, August 14, 1898.

General ANDERSON:

My troops, who have been for so long besieging Manila, have always been promised that they could appear in it, as you know and can not deny, and for this reason, and on account of the many sacrifices made of money and lives, I do not consider it prudent to issue orders to the contrary, as they might be disobeyed against my authority. Besides, I hope that you will allow the troops to enter because we have given proofs many times of our friendship, ceding our positions at Paranaque, Pasay, Cingalon, and Mytubig. Nevertheless, if it seems best to you, and in order to enter into a frank and friendly understanding and avoid any disagreeable conflict before the eyes of the Spaniards, I will commission Don Filepe Buen Camino and others, who will to-day go out from our lines to hold a conference with you, and that they will be safe during the conference.

E. A. AGUINALDO.

[Memoranda without date, in General Anderson's handwriting.]

If you apparently have been treated harshly, it is from military necessity and not for want of confidence. We had to take Manila to effect the purpose of our war.

While we may admit the justice of your insurrection, to prevent all possible complications, still it is thought judicious and necessary to have only one army in Manila at once.

[In General Merritt's handwriting.]

The Government of the United States, you may be assured, which as its agent I can make no promises, will deal fairly with the Filipinos, but we must now insist, for the good of all, there shall be no joint occupation of Manila.

NOTE.—This is apparently the draft of a telegram sent in reply to General Aguinaldo's message, dated 10.50 a. m., August 13, and marked "Most urgent."

[Telegram.]

BACOOR, August 14, 1898.

General ANDERSON, Manila.

DEAR GENERAL: Not being able to leave government, have conferred special powers to Buencamino, Araneta, and others, who left here for you at 8 o'clock this morning.

E. AGUINALDO

From Aguinaldo, Emilio. Dated at Bacoar, P. I., August 15, 1898.

Brief.—Mis comisionados me dicen que v ha prometido enviarme antes el plans del radio que quieren ustedes solos ocupar sin embargo iran alli manana mismo mis Comisionados para hacer arreglos despues de los enales vere si conviene la retirado de mis tropas desersco siempdo de conservar la amistad y un a burao inteligencia.

[Memorandum.]

General Merritt remarks, in relation to the telegrams you sent us, that it would be well to inform General Aguinaldo as follows:

We can not permit joint occupation of the city. The city surrendered to the United States forces, and all the headway that you have been able to make was

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due entirely to the assistance furnished you by the United States. We now hold the city, which includes all the outlying districts of the city properly within the city limits. We most earnestly and sincerely hope and trust that there may be no conflict between us, but we are prepared to enforce our orders in this matter and expect from time to time large additions to our strength. We desire most sincerely to remain friendly with the Filipinos, and have nothing but their best interests at heart in all our dealings with them.

We have given orders to our troops as well as to General Aguinaldo that there shall be no violence whatsoever.

NOTE.—Apparently a memorandum prepared for General Anderson by General Babcock.

True copy.

J. F. BELL, *Major of Engineers, U. S. V.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS. *Manila, P. I., August 15, 1898.*

Brig. Gen. T. M. ANDERSON, U. S. V.,
Commanding Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: The commanding general directs that in any arrangement made with the insurgents in regard to retiring from the vicinity of the city care will be taken to make them understand that they must not hold a line encircling the city. The commanding general will not tolerate a line of troops or works which would give the appearance that our troops were hemmed in by a besieging force. The insurgents may billet their commands in villages in the vicinity, but under no circumstances will they be allowed to hold a line as above indicated.

Very respectfully,

J. B. BABCOCK,
Adjutant-General.

True copy.

J. F. BELL, *Major of Engineers, U. S. V.*

NOTES TO GENERAL ANDERSON.

1. We concede the military disposition of the town of Manila, always that there be understood by said town the jurisdiction of the old municipal limits or walled city and its suburbs, Binondo, Tondo, Santa Cruz, Quiapo, Sampaloc, San Miguel, Concepcion, Hermita, Malate, and Paco or San Fernando de Dilao.

2. We concede the source of potable water, always that (i. e., on condition that) the Ayuntamiento of Manila bear the cost of repairing the machinery and piping, and the current expenses of the machinery, such as coal and the pay of the working force. We will be responsible for order and security at that place.¹

3. We ask free navigation for the *Patria*, with entrance and exit to the port and River Pasig, and that our products be admitted free of duty, and free entrance to and departure from the city to all the Filipinos, the arms of our chiefs and officers being respected.

4. The sacrifices that we have made in contribution to the siege and capture of Manila being notorious, it is just that we should have a part of the booty of war.

5. We ask for our use that palace at Malacanan and the convents at Malate, Hermita, and Paco or San Fernando de Dilao.

6. We ask that the civil offices of Manila be filled by North Americans and never by Spaniards; but if General Merritt should have need of the Filipinos we would be pleased that he concede to our president, Gen. Don Emilio Aguinaldo, the right of nominating those Filipinos who would be most energetic and apt. The jurisdiction of the authorities of Manila will not be recognized outside of the municipal radius (limits).

7. The American forces can not (will not be permitted) to approach nor pass through our military positions without permission of the respective commander, and all positions outside of the municipal limits shall be evacuated. Spaniards

¹Both the pumping station (at Santolan) and the reservoir (at San Juan del Monte) had been taken from the Spaniards by and were in the hands of the insurgents prior to our entry into Manila.

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who pass through our lines without permission of the commander will be considered as spies.

8. We ask the return of the arms of the 150 military (men) who were disarmed by American officers.

9. All arrangements (negotiations) must be made in writing and ratified afterwards by both generals in chief.

10. We are pleased, lastly, to be certain (to affirm) that our own commissions and petitions do not signify acknowledgment on our part of North American sovereignty in these islands any more (or longer) than the necessity of actual war (demands).

NOTE OF EXPLANATION.—This is presumably a memorandum drawn up and submitted to General Anderson by the commissioners (of Aguinaldo) mentioned in the preceding telegram.

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., August 20, 1898.

The COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE FORCES.

SIR: The commanding general of the American forces has received a memorandum addressed to General Anderson, which purports to contain a statement of certain desires on the part of the Filipinos.

As most of them seem to be reasonable, it gives him much pleasure to say that he agrees to the following:

The forces of the Filipinos are to withdraw entirely beyond the jurisdiction of the old municipal limits or walled city and its suburbs Binondo, Tondo, Santa Cruz, Quiato, Sampaloc, San Miguel, Concepcion, Ermita, and Paco or San Fernando dilo (*sic*). The Filipinos will repair at once whatever may be needed in order that the water may be turned on to the city, and the expenses of the repairs and current expenses of the works will be paid by the city. The commander of the Filipinos agrees to be responsible for order and security at the pumping station.

Permission for the free navigation of the *Patria* to entrance and exit of the port and river passage, and that country products for sale be admitted free of duty, is granted.

Free entrance and departure from the city for all Filipinos without arms is granted. Chief and officers of the Filipinos army may, as a matter of courtesy, wear their side arms, though this is deprecated as possibly leading to disturbance of quiet of city.

No pistols should be carried. The major-general having taken for his own use the palace at Manacanan, the request that it be turned over to the Filipinos can not be granted, and the convents at Malata, Ermita, and Pacos can not be turned over and must be evacuated. The civil offices at Manila are being filled as rapidly as possible by Americans, and the commanding general will be glad to receive recommendations for appointments to office of such Filipinos as may be considered fitted for the duties of subordinate officers.

American soldiers without arms are to be allowed to pass through the Filipinos' positions outside of the city, just as the Filipinos without arms are permitted to enter the city.

The return of the arms of the 150 men will be granted by the general in immediate command.

The opening of the waterworks at once and the retirement of your soldiers from the positions now occupied within the municipal jurisdiction will be sufficient notice on your part that everything is satisfactorily arranged on the terms of this letter.

With the sincere hope that it may be speedily accomplished, I am, very respectfully,

W. MERRITT,
Major-General Commanding.

NOTE OF EXPLANATION.—I delivered this letter the day it was written, and was to verbally convey the contents of the memorandum which follows the answer thereto at the same time, but Aguinaldo was absent from his headquarters at the time the letter was delivered, and I did not mention the contents of the memorandum, except that portion relating to opening the waterworks immediately. His associates claimed that General A. had already ordered this done (and I feel certain that he had). They promised that it should be done at once and sent a message to again order it done at once while I was there. I made an engagement to see General Aguinaldo at 11 a. m. the next day.

J. F. BELL.

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BAKOOR, August 21, 1898.

The COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE AMERICAN FORCES IN THE PACIFIC.

SIR: The commanding general of the Philippine forces has been favored by your excellency with a letter of the 28th instant, containing the conditions that you will accept from the Filipinos, provided the latter abandon the posts that they now occupy within the suburbs of Manila. The aforesaid letter speaks of permission for the free navigation of the *Patria*, and as the Filipinos have no boat of that name, the undersigned takes the liberty of clearing up that point, as he considers it understood that the Filipinos desire the protection of the American squadron for the free navigation of all their boats, and free entrance and exit in the ports that are in charge of the same.

Moreover, in substitution for the conditions proposed (in a previous communication) which the aforesaid letter does not mention, the Filipinos desire to go on occupying that part of the suburbs of San Fernando de Dilao, or Paco, adjacent to the east side of the bridge and creek of the same name, the undersigned answering for the foreign interests which exist in that district. They also desire that if in consequence of the treaty of peace which may be concluded between the United States of America and Spain, the Philippines should continue under the domination of the latter, the American forces should give up all the suburbs to the Filipinos, in consideration of the cooperation lent by the latter in the capture of Manila.

With these conditions and others which you have already accepted in the before-mentioned letter, the undersigned promises in the name of the Filipinos to evacuate the positions they now hold in the suburbs; and the acceptance of the same on the part of your excellency will be one proof more that you have in consideration the innumerable lives sacrificed in the siege of Manila, and that you are able to appreciate the unqualified friendship which he, the undersigned, will try to preserve at all costs.

Very respectfully, yours,

EMILIO AGUINALDO.

NOTE OF EXPLANATION.—This answer was already prepared and was handed me on my arrival at 11 a. m. Therefore it was prepared before the contents of the memorandum which follows was made known to Aguinaldo and his associates.

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR BELL.

1. In case you find Aguinaldo inclined to be generous in his arrangements with us, you may communicate to him as follows:

(1) That if a meeting between himself and the commanding general here could be arranged, I would be very glad to meet him and have a talk with him upon the general situation.

(2) That it is of the most importance to us that the water supply of the city be at once turned on, as, the rainy season having suspended, it is important that the sewers be flushed and the city gotten in fair sanitary condition.

(3) That I have every disposition to represent liberally the Government at Washington, which I know is inclined to deal fairly with him and his people; but not knowing what the policy of that Government will be, I am not prepared to make any promises, except that in the event of the United States withdrawing from these islands care will be taken to leave him *in as good condition as he was found by the forces of the Government*.

(4) That I agree with Mr. Williams, the consul, in thinking that it would be well for him and some of his leaders to visit Washington and represent the case to the American authorities. I feel sure that good would result from this course. However, it is not considered necessary.

(5) It is my intention to depose the Spanish officials from all important positions hitherto held by them, and this already has been done to a considerable extent. I will be very glad to receive recommendations from him for Filipinos who are especially trustworthy, though I can not agree to make any appointments in the immediate future. The American officers and men will be employed as far as is practicable in conducting the affairs of the municipality.

(6) I expect daily a considerable accession to the forces which I now have here, and it is my design to lodge them in Cavite, provided room can there be found. In conclusion, I sincerely trust that there will be no friction in the future between our commands and that the good feeling that we have made every attempt to foster will

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be encouraged by Aguinaldo and his chiefs. For myself and the officers and men under my command I can say that we have conceived a high respect for the ability and qualities of the Filipinos, and if called upon by the Government to express an opinion, it will be to that effect.

WESLEY MERRITT, *Major-General.*

NOTE OF EXPLANATION.—Aguinaldo told me to thank General M. for his kind offer and to say that just as soon as his health would permit of such a thing (he had been sick) he would send a staff officer to General M. to ascertain when it would be convenient to meet him. He had not sent the staff officer, as far as I know, when General M. left. Soon after General M.'s arrival he sent a staff officer on board the *Newport* to arrange for an interview with him, but the General sent back word that he was exceedingly pressed by business just then, but as soon as he could he would send him word when he could see him.

I was pressed to explain further just what meaning General M. meant to convey by the underscored [italicized] portion of this remark, but I replied that I had repeated the language General M. had used to me and I preferred they should seek any further explanation from him, lest I might unwittingly fall into error if I undertook to explain his meaning myself. Their lack of definiteness and my unwillingness to comment upon the language seemed to arouse their apprehensions and suspicions. They have been trying ever since to obtain in writing some definite promise on this subject.

Without losing a moment you will proceed to open (start) the machinery of the waterworks, being sorry that up to the present my orders have not been completed (fulfilled) for said object, and I expect that the present will be immediately completed (fulfilled).

I inform you that this order will be carried to you by Majors Bement (engineer) and Bell, accompanied by an assistant, Mr. Infante, with the object of examining said machinery.

E. AGUINALDO.

BACOR, *April 21, 1898.*

NOTE OF EXPLANATION.—Aguinaldo and his associates seemed much gratified when I made known to them the contents of the preceding memorandum. I asked for a written order to the officer in charge of the forces holding the reservoir and pumping station, to be delivered by myself. The above was prepared and handed me. Captain Infante, one of Aguinaldo's adjutants, was also sent with me to make sure his object (the immediate opening of the works) was accomplished. On arriving at the pumping station next day I found that the delay had been due not to official obstruction, but to the inability of these manana people to overcome the inertia incident to starting up machinery which had lain idle for some months.

OFFICE MILITARY GOVERNOR AND
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,
Manila, August 24, 1898.

General EMILIO AGUINALDO, *Bakoor, P. I.*

SIR: The commanding general of the American land forces has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of August 21, and in reply to inform you as follows:

The error which you speak of which needs clearing up as to the navigation of the *Patriu* seems to have arisen from a request on your part that the Filipinos of the country should be permitted to trade freely and navigate without obstruction the streams and bays surrounding Manila. So far as the products of the country are concerned, this has been acceded to, and there will be no obstruction placed by the American land forces in the way of a free trade in the products of the country between the residents of this island and the city of Manila.

The protection which you ask from the American squadron rests with Rear-Admiral Dewey, and it is for him to determine whether it can be granted or not.

A commission of your appointment which had an interview with the undersigned about the 15th instant agreed that if a line were designated by a proper commission on my part that the armed Filipinos should retire beyond it. While this has been done in some instances it has been neglected in others, and it is now

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desired to call your attention to the fact that the occupation of the suburbs of Manila or any part of them can not be acceded to by the undersigned. It has already been pointed out to you that dual occupation of Manila was impossible in the interests of either party; and as the troops of the United States are in possession of Manila I must insist upon the carrying out of the original agreement between your commission and myself. I am the more insistent in this particular because recent instructions from my home Government contemplate this course.

So far as any promises as to what should be done in the event of a conclusion of a treaty between the United States and Spain is concerned, it is utterly impossible for me as the military representative only of the United States to make any promises such as you request. As you have already been informed, you may depend upon the good will of the Americans out here, and the Government, of which you already know the beneficence, to determine these matters in the future.

This answer to your communication has been delayed by a press of business which could not very well be neglected.

I thank you in the name of my country for the good will expressed toward it, and feel assured that nothing will occur to mar the friendly feeling that now exists. It is for the interests of all that the good feeling that now exists between us should be carefully fostered and maintained.

Very respectfully,

WESLEY MERRITT, *Major-General.*

[Telegram received from Aguinaldo, 5.13 a. m., August 25, 1898.]

General MERRITT:

Concerning trouble between Philippine and American forces at Cavite, I have received notice of the death of 1 American soldier and 3 wounded. It is said that this happened by their being drunk. They fired in the air in the beginning, but afterwards fought among themselves. General Anderson says death has been occasioned by my people, on account of which I have ordered investigations to ascertain the truth and demonstrate that the Filipinos try to be in harmony with the Americans. If I shall find any one of my people guilty, I shall order severe punishment.

Yours, respectfully,

AGUINALDO.

[Reply to telegram received from Aguinaldo 5.13 a. m., August 25, 1898.]

[Telegram.]

MALACANAN, August 25, 1898—8.05 a. m.

General AGUINALDO, *Commanding Philippine Forces, Bakoor:*

Thanks for your telegram. I am glad to learn of your intention to investigate fully. I am desirous with you that harmony should prevail, and request you always, in event of trouble, to communicate directly with me, as you have so wisely done this time.

MERRITT.

REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Presidencia, Bakoor, August 27, 1898.

General WESLEY MERRITT, *Manila.*

MY DEAR SIR: Knowing the contents of your letter of the 24th instant, I can not do less than manifest my surprise at knowing that you have formed the idea that my commissioners compromised themselves in the conference of the 15th, to retire my troops outside of the line that you would designate.

I understood, and still understand, as well as the commissioners, that the evacuation of my troops of the posts that they occupy to-day on the outskirts of the city would take place when the proposed conditions were accepted by you, among which figured the condition that the agreement (treaty) should be in writing to be valid; for which reason, not having yet accepted some of the propositions made at the time, nor those that were substituted in my previous communication, I do not think that up to now I have contracted said obligation.

If I have permitted the use of the water before the formalization of the treaty, it was more to demonstrate that I am disposed to sacrifice to friendship everything that does not prejudice too much the rights of the Philippines. I comprehend as

well as yourself the inconvenience of a double occupation of the city and its suburbs, given the condition stipulated in the capitulation with the Spaniards; but you ought to understand that without the long siege sustained by my force you might have obtained possession of the ruins of the city, but never the rendition of the Spanish forces, who could have retired to the interior towns.

I do not complain of the disowning of our help in the mentioned capitulation, although justice resents it greatly, and I have to bear the well-founded blame of my people; I do not insist upon the retention of all the positions conquered by my forces within the city limits at the cost of much blood, of indescribable fatigues and much money; I promise to retire them to the following lines:

In Malate the continuation of the Calzada of Singalon to the bridge that joins that road; from this bridge in straight line to that of Paco; from this last bridge following the creek Paco and leaving outside the suburb of Tanque to the River Pasig; following this river and entering by the creek that goes to the bridge of Aviles; from this bridge following the road (calzada) of the same name, and that of Santa Mesa that are the dividing lines between Sampaloc and the village of Pandacan to the jurisdictional limit of the suburbs of Sampaloc, Trozo, and Tondo.

But before I retire to this line I pray you to reclaim from Admiral Dewey the protection of our ships from free navigation, and permit me to insist, if you wish, upon the restitution of the position that we are now going to leave if in the treaty of peace to be celebrated between Spain and the United States they acknowledge the dominion of Spain in the Philippines. I expect as well that you order the American forces outside of the above line to retire within the city, as already agreed to. I do not believe that the acceptance of the conditions proposed will prejudice the smallest right of your people, as it signifies nothing more than the acknowledgment of a part of the rights of a friendly people.

I am now compelled to insist upon the said conditions to quiet the complaints of my chiefs and soldiers, who have exposed their lives and abandoned their interests during the siege of Manila. I hope that this time you will manifest the spirit of justice that pertains to such a free and admirably constituted government as that of the United States of America.

Very respectfully,

EMILIO AGUINALDO.

NOTE OF EXPLANATION.—No positions whatever, with a possible exception of Paco (San Fernando de Dilao), were conquered within the city limits by Aguinaldo's forces. Definite information can be procured of General MacArthur as to whether the insurgents or our forces forced the Spanish to retire from that place.

The Calzada a Aviles merges at the crossroads (where there is really a round, open space, with a fountain in the center, and called the Plaza de Rotondo) into the road to Santa Mesa, marked on the map "A Mariquina," to which place it also goes. The First Colorado Regiment has a picket post on this road a half mile beyond the limit mentioned by Aguinaldo.

I gather from the statements of many naval officers that Aguinaldo was invited here and given much assistance and encouragement by Admiral Dewey, who, of course, did not anticipate any complication and probably never supposed Aguinaldo would at once assume an independence of American control. He has been much concerned and displeased by Aguinaldo's course of conduct, and told me several days ago that he had ceased to recognize him in any way and had refused to any longer receive his representatives. This prayer to you to "reclaim" Admiral Dewey's protection is doubtless due to this change of attitude on the Admiral's part, who, if permitted to follow his own inclinations, will not only grant Aguinaldo no protection, but will seize his boats and launches at the first overt act.

Attention is invited to General Merritt's promise (page 11, par. 3) made known to Aguinaldo by me verbally, namely, that in the event of the United States withdrawing from these islands, care would be taken to leave Aguinaldo in as good condition as he was found by the forces of the Government. From a remark the General made to me I inferred he intended to interpret the expression "forces of the Government" to mean the naval forces, should future contingencies necessitate such an interpretation. At the time of the entry of the American forces into Manila, which was accomplished without assistance from the insurgents being either needed, requested, received, or desired, the insurgents held the following lines: Joining onto the American trenches facing Mytubig (the Indian name for the locality at the south end of Malate, in the vicinity of the old fort and bridge), their trenches extended in a large circle around and outside of the Spanish line of blockhouses. The Spanish held Santa Ana, Concordia, Paco, Cingalon, and Malate: then the line dropped back to blockhouse No. 8, to Macleod's house in Santa Mesa, and continued on around to the bay at

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Bancu Say, including within it all the suburbs on the northern side of Manila. The lines are indicated in map accompanying my report of July 27. Paranaque, Pasay, San Pedro Macati-Mandaloian, Pasig, Guadalupe, Partero Santalon (where is situated the pumping station), San Juan del Monte (where the reservoir is located), Kabao, Santol, San Francisco del Monte, Caloccan, and Malaben are the villages, towns, and places (immediately in rear of the insurgent trenches and positions) where the insurgent forces were generally located. After our entry to the city they all advanced their positions and encroached upon our outposts without anyone's authority or permission save their own, and in the face of repeated objections on the part of General Merritt. They can lay no just claim to having conquered from the Spanish the positions now held except those at the pumping station and reservoir. Prior to the 13th of August they had for weeks been straining every resource in an effort to capture Manila without the assistance of Americans, and before they got ready, without making the slightest progress. Of course, they could never have made the progress they did in investing the city had it not been for the destruction of the Spanish fleet by Admiral Dewey; but they did do much hard fighting and did drive the Spanish from positions in the provinces immediately surrounding Manila into the confines of the city itself. This credit they are entitled to.

OFFICE MILITARY GOVERNOR AND HDQRS. OF THE PACIFIC,
Manila, August 30, 1898.

Colonel BARRY,
Adjutant-General, Eighth Army Corps.

DEAR COLONEL: Inclosed you will find a letter from General Aguinaldo and a blue print of Manila. The letter was brought by his aid two days ago, and he was informed that a reply would be sent within four days. The matter should have immediate attention, as General Merritt has not been able to take it up, owing to his hurried departure. The letters referred to by Aguinaldo from General Merritt will be found in the press-copy book at the department headquarters and here.

The demand now made by Aguinaldo is to retain his people just outside of the interior—black pencil mark on the map. The outside pencil marks indicate the positions that General Merritt desired to have the insurgents withdraw to. I inferred from what the aid said that what Aguinaldo particularly desires is that in case his requests are not granted that reasons are to be given, which he can use to satisfy his people. The trouble seems to be that he does not think it prudent to give positive orders for his people to withdraw from the city.

Very respectfully.

Chief of Staff.

[Telegram.]

OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL,
Manila, P. I., August 31, 1898.

General AGUINALDO, *Bacoor, P. I.:*

Referring to promise made by General Merritt to reply to your letter of August 27 within four days, I desire to state that General Merritt was unexpectedly ordered away and had not opportunity to reply. Being unacquainted with the situation, I must take time to inform myself before replying, which I will do at earliest opportunity.

OTIS, *Commanding.*

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Manila, P. I., September 8, 1898.

The COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE FORCES.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 27th ultimo, addressed to General Merritt, my predecessor, and by him transferred to me on the eve of his departure from Manila. By telegram of the 31st ultimo I informed you of General Merritt's hurried departure, in obedience to orders of my Government; that his necessarily hurried preparations did not permit him to make

reply to the communication and that such duty devolved upon me, which I would perform at the earliest opportunity and as soon as I could acquaint myself with the condition of affairs, of which (as I had but recently arrived) I had slight knowledge. To my telegram you made a most courteous response. Having now carefully considered the situation, I have the honor to make reply as follows:

And first, in your note of the 27th ultimo, you are pleased to manifest surprise that the late United States military governor should have reached an erroneous conclusion as to the result of a conference with your commissioners on August 15, as apparently manifested by his letter to you of August 24. I do not know the extent of any conversation which may have been indulged in at that conference and the nature of the impression which may have been conveyed. Referring to a written memoranda in my possession, which purports to contain the substance of propositions discussed at the time, I find that certain concessions were made by the commissioners in expected return for specific privileges to be conferred, and as there has not been a mutual agreement in these matters between the interested parties I do not understand that any obligations have arisen by reason of that conference.

Second. I note with pleasure your allusion to your very friendly disposition toward my Government, as manifested by your prompt attendance to our request for a supply of water; also your expression as to the inconvenience of a dual occupation of the city of Manila, and I do not forget that the revolutionary forces under your command have made many sacrifices in the interest of civil liberty and for the welfare of your people, and to this I will be pleased to allude hereafter.

Third. In connection with your remark as to the injustice of the United States in not properly appreciating your assistance in the capture of Manila, I beg a full consideration on your part of the mandatory conditions which accompany the occupation, which I am sure you fully appreciate, but to which I will respectfully invite your attention in a subsequent portion of this reply.

Fourth. You designate certain lines within the suburbs of the city of Manila to which you promise to retire your troops, and name as conditions precedent, first, protection to your shipping by the United States Navy and the free navigation of your vessels within the waters in United States occupation; second, restitution to your forces of all positions which are now occupied by your troops in the event that treaty stipulations between the United States and Spain surrender to the last-named Government the territory occupied by the former; and thirdly, that United States troops now occupying positions beyond the lines which you name shall retire within the same.

A discussion of your proposition to hold jointly with the United States Government the city of Manila involves consideration of some of the other concessions you desire to be made, and to that I will at once refer. I wish to present the matter, in the first instance, in its legal aspect, although from remarks contained in former correspondence I am of the opinion that you are fully aware how untenable the proposition is. The United States and Spain were and are belligerent parties to a war, and were so recognized by the civilized world. In the course of events the entire city of Manila, then in full possession of the Spanish forces, was surrendered to the first-named belligerent power. The articles of agreement and capitulation gave to the United States Government full occupancy of the city and defenses of Manila, and that Government obligated itself to insure the safety of the lives and property of the inhabitants of the city to the best of its ability. By all the laws of war and all international precedents, United States authority over Manila and its defenses is full and supreme, and they can not escape the obligations which they have assumed.

By the able representatives who have charge of the interests of the Philippine revolutionary forces this conclusion will be admitted to be incontrovertible, and argument on the point is unnecessary. Can they who seek civil and religious liberty and invite the approval and assistance of the civilized world afford to enter upon a course of action which the law of nations must condemn?

But conceding, as you do, the strictly legal right of my Government to hold and administer the affairs of the city of Manila and all of its suburbs (I thus conclude from expressions contained in former correspondence and from my appreciation of your intellectual attainments), you base your proposition of joint occupation upon supposed equitable grounds, referring to the sacrifices your troops have made and the assistance they have rendered the American forces in the capture of Manila. It is well known that they have made personal sacrifices, endured great hardships, and have rendered aid. But is it forgotten that my Government has swept the Spanish navy from the seas of both hemispheres, sent back to Spain the Spanish army and navy forces recently embarked for your destruction and for the secure holding of its Philippine possessions; that since May 1 last its Navy

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has held the city of Manila at its mercy, but out of considerations of humanity refused to bombard it, preferring to send troops to demand surrender and thereby preserve the lives and property of its inhabitants? Is it forgotten that the destruction of the Spanish navy and the retention of Spanish armed men in its European possessions has opened up to you the ports of the island of Luzon and held Spain helpless to meet its refractory subjects?

As between my Government and the revolutionary forces of the Philippines, I fail to discover on what principle of common justice a joint occupation of Manila can be maintained. Equity, in the legal acceptance of the term, would most assuredly condemn it. A sense of justice should, in my opinion, have prompted the revolutionary forces to aid those of my country in every way possible in return for the great assistance they have received. You remark in substance that had you not prevented the Spanish forces from retreating from the city the United States would have received naught but its ruined streets and buildings. Possibly, but had all Spanish subjects elsewhere and here been the contented subjects of Spain, war between it and my Government would not have been waged. It was undertaken by the United States for humanity's sake, and not for their aggrandizement or for any national profit they expected to receive, and they have expended millions of treasure and hundreds of the lives of their citizens in the interest of Spanish suffering colonists.

Apart from all legal and equitable considerations and those having their origin in personally conceived ideas of justice, I wish respectfully to call your attention to the impracticability of maintaining a joint occupation of Manila and its suburbs, and in this I know that I shall have the approval or your excellent judgment. It would be extremely difficult to prevent friction between our respective forces, which might result in unfortunate consequences, labor as we may for continued harmonious relations. Located in close proximity, irresponsible members of our organizations by careless or impertinent action might be the means of inciting grave disturbances, and in this connection I cite the recent shooting affair at Cavite, which still requires investigation. There might also arise conflict of authority between our respective officers. Even now within precincts in entire actual possession of our troops I find that permits are given to citizens, who are styled local presidents, to make arrests, to carry arms, etc., in violation of our instructions and authority, and that several cases of kidnaping have taken place. In pursuance of our obligations to maintain, in so far as we can, domestic tranquillity, our officers have arrested suspected parties, and they have asserted (with what element of truth I know not) that the insurgent forces are the offenders. I have declined to accept their statements, as I prefer to believe the contrary, although it would appear that officers connected with those forces have issued the permits to which I allude. Such interference with our administration of civil affairs must, eventually result in conflict.

Again (reverting to a legal aspect of the subject), the affairs of the entire city corporation must be administered from a common center. The trust accepted by my Government from those who surrendered actual possession confers a discretionary power which can neither be shared nor delegated. The validity of this conclusion will be readily understood by yourself and associates as a well-established legal proposition and does not require argument. And here permit me to remark upon a view of the subject you have advocated in support of the plea for dual occupation of the city's suburbs. Your forces, you say in substance, should have a share in the booty resulting from the conquest of the city on account of hardships endured and assistance rendered. The facts on which you base your conclusion granted, the conclusion, under the laws of war which are binding on my Government, does not follow. It has never recognized the existence of spoils of war denominated booty, as have many European governments. No enemy's property of any kind, public or private, can be seized, claimed, or awarded to any of its officers and men, and should they attempt to appropriate any of it for their individual benefit, they would be very severely punished through military tribunals, on which have been conferred by law very sweeping jurisdiction. The enemy's money and property (all that is not necessary to be expended in administering local affairs in the enemy's surrendered territory) must be preserved for final arbitrament or settlement by and between the supreme authorities of the nations concerned. My troops can not acquire booty nor any individual benefits by reason of capture of an enemy's territory. I make this comment believing that you hold erroneous opinions in respect to individual advantages which occupation bestows.

I request your indulgence while I briefly consider the concessions you ask us to make as conditions precedent to the retirement of your forces to the lines indicated by your note of the 27th ultimo. The first is:

Protection to your shipping and free navigation to your vessels.—Neither the extent of protection nor the limit of free navigation you request is understood.

Certainly you could not mean protection on the high seas or in ports not in the rightful possession of the United States. That, as you are fully aware, could only be effected by a treaty of guaranty following international recognition of the belligerent rights of a Philippine revolutionary government. While the existing armistice continues the United States are in rightful possession, in so far as the navigable waters of the Philippine Islands are concerned, only of the Bay of Manila and its navigable tributaries. Within the same all vessels of trade and commerce and the war vessels of recognized national powers sail freely as long as the sovereignty of my Government is not assailed, nor the peace of the locality threatened. In this respect, whatever concessions are extended by way of relaxation of trade restrictions, incident to war, to citizens of these islands will be extended to all alike; no discrimination in this regard is intended or will be permitted. Admiral Dewey exercises supervisory jurisdiction over all navy matters, and they are in no way related to the duties conferred upon me by law. Nor would it avail should I seek his consent for greater latitude of action, for even if disposed to grant special concessions he could not do so, and I doubt if the supreme authority of my Government could now, under the prevailing truce with Spain, invest him with the requisite powers to do so and at the same time preserve its international obligations.

The second concession named by you is restitution of positions in the city of Manila to your forces in case a treaty of peace remands to Spain the territory surrendered by her in the late capitulation articles, and the third, and last, is a promise to retire our troops within the lines indicated by you as the lines on which you desire your troops to remain permanently. These propositions, having a kindred nature, may be considered together, and, indeed, have already been impliedly answered. From previous statements of facts and logical conclusions made and stated in this communication concerning the nature of the obligations resting upon the United States with regard to the territory to which they have the legal right of possession under contracting articles with Spain, it is evident that neither in law nor morals can the concessions be made. I would be powerless to grant them in any aspect of the case, being nothing more than an agent to carry out the instructions of the executive head of my Government and not being vested with discretionary power to determine matters of such moment. In the present instance I am not only powerless to accede to your request, but have been strictly enjoined by my Government, mindful of its international promises and national honor, which it has never broken nor sacrificed, not to concede joint occupation of the city and suburbs of Manila, and am directed specially to preserve the peace and protect persons and property within the territory surrendered under the terms of the Spanish capitulation. These mandates I must obey.

Thus have I endeavored, with all candor and sincerity, holding nothing in reserve, to place before you the situation as understood by me, and, I doubt not, by the Republic which I represent. I have not been instructed as to what policy it intends to pursue with regard to its legitimate holdings here, and hence I am unable to give you any information on the subject. That it will have a care and labor conscientiously for the welfare of your people I sincerely believe. It remains for you, beneficiaries of its sacrifices, to adopt a course of action which will manifest your good intentions and show to the world the principles which actuate your motives.

You and your associates could not regret more than I any conflict between our forces, which would tend to excite the citizens of my country, who are always a unit in action when its sovereignty is attacked or when its right to fulfill its international obligations is called in question. Then they never count cost, and, as you are fully aware, resources are abundant. Rather than see the ships of the Navy of the United States controlling the navigable waters of these islands and its armies devastating their territory, I would greatly prefer to advise my Government that there is no longer need to send more of its troops to this section of country, and that those whom it holds waiting on its Pacific slope can be remanded to their homes or employed elsewhere as it may determine.

It only remains for me to respectfully notify you that I am compelled by my instructions to demand that your armed forces evacuate the entire city of Manila, including its suburbs and defenses, and that I shall be obliged to take action with that end in view within a very short period of time, should you decline to comply with my Government's demands, and I hereby serve notice upon you that unless your troops are withdrawn beyond the lines of the city's defenses before Thursday, the 15th instant, I shall be obliged to resort to forcible action and that my Government will hold you responsible for any unfortunate consequences that may ensue.

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Permit me to believe that my confidence in the sound judgment and patriotism of yourself and associates is not misplaced.

You will please pardon me for my apparent unnecessary delay in replying to your communication of the 27th ultimo, but the press of duties connected with the administration of the affairs of the city is my excuse.

In conclusion, I beg to inform you that I have conferred freely with Admiral Dewey upon the contents of this communication, and am delegated by him to state that he fully approved of the same in all respects; that the commands of our Government compel us to act as therein indicated and that between our respective forces there will be unanimity and complete concert of action.

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

E. S. OTIS,
*Major-General, U. S. A.,
and United States Military Governor in the Philippines.*

Report of Major-General Otis from September 2, 1898 (including documents not published in the report of Major-General Merritt), to February 4, 1899 (the date of breaking out of the insurrection).

NOTE.—The foregoing instructions of the President dated December 21, 1898, upon which all subsequent acts of administration were predicated, was published in Circular from War Department, A. G. O., under date of August 1, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, December 21, 1898.

Maj. Gen. E. S. OTIS, U. S. V.,
*Commanding Department of the Pacific and
Military Governor of the Philippine Islands, Manila.*

SIR: By direction of the Secretary of War, I have the honor to transmit herewith instructions of the President relative to the administration of affairs in the Philippine Islands.

"EXECUTIVE MANSION,
Washington, December 21, 1898.

"To the SECRETARY OF WAR.

"SIR: The destruction of the Spanish fleet in the harbor of Manila by the United States naval squadron commanded by Rear-Admiral Dewey, followed by the reduction of the city and the surrender of the Spanish forces, practically effected the conquest of the Philippine Islands and the suspension of Spanish sovereignty therein.

"With the signature of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain by their respective plenipotentiaries at Paris on the 10th instant, and as a result of the victories of American arms, the future control, disposition, and government of the Philippine Islands are ceded to the United States. In the fulfillment of the rights of sovereignty thus acquired and the responsible obligations of government thus assumed, the actual occupation and administration of the entire group of the Philippine Islands becomes immediately necessary, and the military government heretofore maintained by the United States in the city, harbor, and bay of Manila is to be extended with all possible dispatch to the whole of the ceded territory.

"In performing this duty the military commander of the United States is enjoined to make known to the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands that, in succeeding to the sovereignty of Spain, in severing the former political relations of the inhabitants, and in establishing a new political power, the authority of the United States is to be exerted for the securing of the persons and property of the people of the islands and for the confirmation of all their private rights and relations. It will be the duty of the commander of the forces of occupation to announce and proclaim in the most public manner that we come not as invaders or conquerors, but as friends, to protect the natives in their homes, in their employments, and in their personal and religious rights. All persons who, either by active aid or by honest submission, cooperate with the Government of the United States to give effect to these beneficent purposes will receive the reward of its support and protection. All others will be brought within the lawful rule we have assumed, with firmness if need be, but without severity, so far as may be possible.

"Within the absolute domain of military authority, which necessarily is and must remain supreme in the ceded territory until the legislation of the United States shall otherwise provide, the municipal laws of the territory in respect to private rights and property and the repression of crime are to be considered as continuing in force, and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals, so far as

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practicable. The operations of civil and municipal government are to be performed by such officers as may accept the supremacy of the United States by taking the oath of allegiance, or by officers chosen, as far as may be practicable, from the inhabitants of the islands.

"While the control of all the public property and the revenues of the state passes with the cession, and while the use and management of all public means of transportation are necessarily reserved to the authority of the United States, private property, whether belonging to individuals or corporations, is to be respected except for cause duly established. The taxes and duties heretofore payable by the inhabitants to the late government become payable to the authorities of the United States unless it be seen fit to substitute for them other reasonable rates or modes of contribution to the expenses of government, whether general or local. If private property be taken for military use, it shall be paid for when possible in cash, at a fair valuation, and when payment in cash is not practicable receipts are to be given.

"All ports and places in the Philippine Islands in the actual possession of the land and naval forces of the United States will be opened to the commerce of all friendly nations. All goods and wares not prohibited for military reasons by due announcement of the military authority will be admitted upon payment of such duties and other charges as shall be in force at the time of their importation.

"Finally, it should be the earnest and paramount aim of the military administration to win the confidence, respect, and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines by assuring them in every possible way that full measure of individual rights and liberties which is the heritage of free peoples, and by proving to them that the mission of the United States is one of benevolent assimilation, substituting the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule. In the fulfillment of this high mission, supporting the temperate administration of affairs for the greatest good of the governed, there must be sedulously maintained the strong arm of authority, to repress disturbance and to overcome all obstacles to the bestowal of the blessings of good and stable government upon the people of the Philippine Islands under the free flag of the United States.

" WILLIAM MCKINLEY."

Very respectfully,

H. C. CORBIN, *Adjutant-General.*

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., January 12, 1899.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL UNITED STATES ARMY,
Washington, D. C.

SIR: Some time since I forwarded by cable information that conservative men of the revolutionary government of the Filipinos had withdrawn from its councils, stating that they were unable to exert any further beneficial influence. I am of the impression that they were also influenced by apprehensions of personal danger.

The cabinet of President Aguinaldo resigned in a body, as it was not able to come to an agreement upon the terms of the proposed constitution. Aguinaldo's chief adviser, a man of very radical views, undertook to form a new cabinet, but found it impossible to secure the services of representative men. He finally succeeded in forming a provisional cabinet, composed of men of limited importance, and Aguinaldo called his congress, to which call the conservative members failed to respond, and therefore it was controlled by its radical element. Although many of the members who put in an appearance greatly desire to avoid any difficulty with the United States, and so declare themselves in private conversation, they fear to give public expression to their views. There were, however, a number who were unremitting in their secret endeavors to maintain peace. They approached me, asking that I assist them to secure a conference with the United States authorities in order that they might work upon their congress in the interests of harmony. I replied through a civilian (an American citizen) that I would gladly meet any of the representative men of the Filipinos and Aguinaldo himself in their individual capacities, but was powerless to recognize the "de facto" government of which they boasted, or to receive any of its members in an official capacity.

I further informed them that I would appoint a committee to meet a similar committee appointed by General Aguinaldo, commanding the revolutionary

army, if such was their desire. They appealed to me to make some concessions which they could use with their people in the interests of peace. Conditions were very fully explained to them, and while I discovered that they had a very fair understanding of affairs, they urged the difficulty of making their ignorant people understand them. The people had gone wild on the words "protection" and "independence," whereas the words "sovereignty," "annexation," and "United States control" served to excite them greatly. These gentlemen worked faithfully with the Malolos people, and finally I received a letter from Aguinaldo, of which the inclosed, marked Exhibit 1, is a translation, and to which I made reply, a copy of which is inclosed, marked Exhibit 2. I appointed General Hughes, Colonel Smith, of the First California, and Lieutenant-Colonel Crowder, of the judge-advocate's department, as members of the commission, and General Aguinaldo appointed two officers and a civilian of considerable judicial ability. A long conference ensued in which the Filipino gentlemen failed to establish a single proposition for which they contended. The most amiable exchange of views was had and the result of the conference was beneficial. These Filipino gentlemen are still laboring for desired results and I think that another conference will be called.

In the meantime affairs here are much strained. The insurgent army and city mobs view the quiet conduct of United States troops as a sign of weakness or fear and are very boastful of their prowess. In this lies the danger of the situation, and should these insurgents, defying the orders of the Malolos government, bring on a conflict, a slaughter of their people will result. The troops are on the alert and well in hand.

I am of the opinion that some of our worst foes are those of our own household. I inclose an article cut from the Singapore Free Press of December 12 (Exhibit 3), which the insurgents declare was written by United States Consul Pratt, now on duty in that city. The better class of insurgents have complained of this article, as it has had quite an exciting effect upon their people. The active intermeddling of other United States consuls has also given us considerable trouble. I inclose also copies of two proclamations issued by Aguinaldo. One was prepared and withdrawn by advice, I understand, and the second sent out, both of same date. A few copies of the one first prepared got into circulation after the second one was posted. I think that Aguinaldo was as pacific as he had the courage to be under the circumstances in which he found himself placed. He does not desire war, but finds it difficult to stem the dangerous current of excitement which he and his advisers have set in motion.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. S. OTIS,
Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

EXHIBIT 1.

MALOLOs, January 9, 1899.

Maj. Gen. E. S. OTIS,

General of the American Forces of Occupation in Manila.

GENERAL: I have been informed after the interview between the commissioners of my government and Mr. Carman that there will be no inconvenience on your part in naming, as commanding general, representatives that will confer with those whom I will name for the same object.

Although it not being explained to me the reason why you could not treat with the commissioners of my government, I have the faculty for doing the same with those of the commanding general "who can not be recognized." Nevertheless, for the sake of peace I have considered it advisable to name, as "commanding general," a commission composed of the following gentlemen: Mr. Florentino Flores, Eufrasio Flores, and Manuel Arguelles, that they may together represent me and arrive at an accord with those whom you will name, with the object of using such methods as will normalize the actual situation created by the attitude of your Government and troops.

If you will deign to attend to said commissioners and through these methods come to some understanding, "if only temporary," that will insure the peace and harmony amongst ourselves, the Filipino public would reach a grateful glory.

I am yours, General, with the highest consideration, your most respected servant,
EMILIO AGUINALDO.

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EXHIBIT 2.

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., January 9, 1839.

General EMILIO AGUINALDO,
Commanding Revolutionary Force, Malolos, P. I.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of to-day and am much pleased at the action you have taken. I greatly regret that you have not a clear understanding of my position and motives and trust that my explanation, assisted by the conference I have invited, will make them clear to you.

In my official capacity I am merely the agent of the United States Government to conduct its affairs under the limits which its Constitution, laws, precedents, and specific instructions prescribe. I have not the authority to recognize any national or civil power not already formally recognized by my Government, unless specially authorized so to do by the instructions of the Executive of the United States. For this reason I was unable to receive officially the representatives of the revolutionary government, and endeavored to make that inability clear to the distinguished gentlemen with whom I had the pleasure to converse a few evenings since. You will bear witness that my course throughout my entire official connection with affairs here has been consistent, and it has pained me that I have not been able to receive and answer communications of the cabinet officers of the government at Malolos, fearing that I might be erroneously charged with lack of courtesy.

Permit me now briefly, General, to speak of the serious misunderstanding which exists between the Filipino people and the representatives of the United States Government, and which I hope that our commissioners, by thorough discussion, may be able to dispel.

I sincerely believe that all desire peace and harmony, and yet by the machinations of evil-disposed persons we have been influenced to think that we occupy the position of adversaries. The Filipinos appear to be of the opinion that we meditate attack, while I am under the strict orders of the President of the United States to avoid conflict in every way possible. My troops, witnessing the earnestness, the comparatively disturbed and unfriendly attitude of the revolutionary troops and many of the citizens of Manila, conclude that active hostilities have been determined upon, although it must be clearly within the comprehension of unprejudiced and reflecting minds that the welfare and happiness of the Filipino people depend upon the friendly protection of the United States. The hand of Spain was forced, and she has acknowledged before the world that all her claimed rights in this country have departed by due process of law. This treaty acknowledgment, with the conditions which accompany it, awaits ratification of the Senate of the United States; and the action of its Congress must also be secured before the Executive of that Government can proclaim a definite policy. That policy must conform to the will of the people of the United States, expressed through its representatives in Congress. For that action the Filipino people should wait, at least, before severing the existing friendly relations. I am governed by a desire to further the interests of the Filipino people, and shall continue to labor with that end in view. There shall be no conflict of forces if I am able to avoid it, and still I shall endeavor to maintain a position to meet all emergencies that may arise.

Permit me to subscribe myself, General, with the highest respect,

Your most obedient servant,

E. S. OTIS,
Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

EXHIBIT 3.

[Editorial in Singapore Free Press, December 12, 1898, opposing annexation of the Philippine Islands by the United States.]

If we are to accept a statement made through the Times by its Washington correspondent, President McKinley is again displaying vacillation over the future disposal of the Philippines. The treaty of peace has been signed provisionally, of course, but the final ratification of its terms will have to issue with all due formality from the respective Governments concerned. As between Spain and the United States, the Philippine Islands are ceded to the latter power. As between the revolutionary government of the Philippines and the United States, all that Spain validly has to cede are the very few square miles on which her military remnant stands. Spain may cede, the United States may nominally acquire, but possession

by such officers as wish to accept the assistance of the United States, chosen in so far as it may be practicable from the inhabitants of the islands; that while the management of public property and revenues and the use of all public means of transportation are to be conducted under the military authorities until such authorities can be replaced by civil administration, all private property, whether of individuals or corporations, must be respected and protected.

If private property be taken for military uses it shall be paid for at a fair valuation in cash,

administración civil y municipal residirán y serán desempeñados por aquellos funcionarios que deseen aceptar la ayuda de los Estados Unidos, elegidos hasta donde sea factible de entre los habitantes de las islas; que mientras el manejo de la propiedad pública y rentas y el uso de todos los medios públicos de transporte se llevarán á cabo bajo la dirección de las Autoridades Militares hasta que puedan ser sustituidas por la administración civil, toda la propiedad particular perteneciente á individuos ó corporaciones se respetará y protegerá debidamente,

quinatawán ng bayán na tunay nilang pinagcaratinalaan sa canilang ca gustuhan sa pagmanasá nila ng mabuting gobierno; na ang mga funcionario ó magsisipamahala at ang mga cautangang nau-ucol sa administración civil at municipal ay pangangasiwaan ng mga oficiales na may ibig tumanggap ng saculolo ng Estados Unidos na ihahalal sa mga pulóng ito, sa lahat ng macacaya at magacaya: samantala, i, ang pamamanahala ng ayamanan ng bayan, mga impuesto at ang pag kumit ng lahat ng mga panghatid at mga sasac-van ng Estados ay

nine points of the law. And at this moment the Filipino government possessed of their own soil, subject only to the exercise of foreign force. Spain had been practically expelled out of doors by the revolution. Dewey comes round and knocks Spain off the doorstep, but the Filipino is in actual occupation of so much of the premises as to practically control the whole. American statesmen still grope about in the gloom of conflict-ansels. Obviously the United States, which has yet been unable at this of the country's history to establish a stable, effective, incorruptible, per- civil service, does not possess and can not for many years hope to train competent in character, aptitude, and qualification to aid in the responsible stration of her new dependencies. A colonial service will have to be leed, just as the last campaign saw-war supply and transport departments leed—with what sorry result we all know. But these novel and delicate such as the relations of the Filipino government to the United States pro- te, can not be safely left to a batch of amateurs whose self-confidence, prob- s only equal to their incapacity.

can not profess to be surprised that President McKinley, even now, is d to be harking back to the contemplation of an arrangement that would , by a few dozen islands in the Philippine group, the responsibilities about live on the United States. But Mr. McKinley is wrong. He does not yet lack of the seeing eye, what hundreds of Englishmen, accustomed to con- se methods of British imperial administration, could tell him, that safety cess for America lies in treading the straight, beaten path of British prec-

If Mr. McKinley and his advisers only knew it, fortified by those prece- they have only to follow their noses. And it so happens, thus guided, that e and easy way indicated is just that way that simplifies everything for the ing power and most fully will secure the good will and cooperation of the ed. The first step to be taken is the open declaration of an American pro- te over all Spanish dependencies connected with the Philippines. Secondly, recognition of the Filipino government to the status of the organized gov- nt of a protected state, such, practically, as Egypt is to-day, or such as many Indian protectorates are; the Filipino government to settle its own fiscal ements, its legislation, its administration of justice, its police, its education , but always, where misadventure may be possible, guided by professional as, selected, if necessary, by itself, but subject to the approval or disapproval American resident-general; the relations between the United States and Filipino government to be fully defined by treaty such as we have with our protectorates. The American plan, or no plan, of refusing recognition to Filipino government is a counsel of sheer downright stupidity, or, let us call tical inexperience. The United States representatives in the Philippines one perilously near to convincing the Filipino people and the Filipino ment that they are but exchanging King Log for King Stork.

saving of the situation has lain in the prudence and wise restraint, wonder- such a people, that has characterized the Filipinos. If good relations are orth to be created between the United States authorities and the people of ntry, it will be mainly due to the forbearance and patience, under system- ight and snub, of the revolutionary government, which has a full and re control over the population. It is unpleasant to hear of President McKin- ing at the knees, if the fact be so. The pity of it is that he does not seem ize what an easy and honorable duty lies before him. Let the Filipino gov- nt be honored, recognized, encouraged. Let it make its experiments. Mis- may be made, but it is best that they should come to see in what they may ng, and how they may themselves repair the error. It is strange that Amer- s not seem to grasp it, but they have only to do to the Filipinos what over rry ago they desired that Britain should do unto themselves. It will mean trouble if the United States forgets the lessons of her own history and ors to "bahadur" the Filipinos into serfdom.

EXHIBIT 5.

[Aguinaldo's first proclamation, which was withdrawn, and second proclamation of same date issued and posted.]

government of the Philippines has considered it its duty to set forth to the ed powers the facts determining the rupture of its amicable relations with my of the United States of America in these islands, to the end that they hereby reach the conviction that I, for my part, have done everything e to avoid it, although at the cost of many rights uselessly sacrificed.

After the naval combat, which occurred on May 1 of last year, between the Spanish squadron and that of America, the commander of the latter consented to my return from Hongkong to this beloved soil, and he distributed among the Filipinos some rifles found in the arsenal at Cavite, doubtless with the intention of reestablishing the revolution, somewhat quieted by the convention of Biacnabato, in order to have the Filipinos on his side.

The people, influenced by the declaration of war between the United States and Spain, understood the necessity of fighting for its liberty, feeling sure that Spain would be destroyed and rendered incapable of leading it along the road to prosperity and progress. The Filipinos hailed my advent with joy, and I had the honor of being proclaimed leader on account of the services which I had rendered in the former revolution. Then all the Filipinos, without distinction of classes, took arms and every province hastened to expel from its frontiers the Spanish forces. This is the explanation of the fact that, after the lapse of so short a period of time, my government rules the whole of Luzon, the Visaya Islands, and a part of Mindanao.

Although the North Americans took no part in these military operations, which cost no little blood and gold, my government does not disavow the fact that the destruction of the Spanish squadron and the gift of some rifles from the arsenal to my people influenced the progress of arms to some extent. It was also taken for granted that the American forces would necessarily sympathize with the revolution which they had managed to encourage and which had saved them much blood and great hardships, and above all, we entertained absolute confidence in the history and traditions of a people which fought for its independence and for the abolition of slavery, which posed as the champion liberator of oppressed peoples: we felt ourselves under the safeguard of the faith of a free people.

The Americans, seeing the friendly disposition of the Filipino people, disembarked forces at the town of Paranaque and took up positions all along the line occupied by my troops as far as Maytug, taking possession of many trenches constructed by my people by the employment of astuteness not unaccompanied by violence. They forced a capitulation on the garrison of Manila, which, inasmuch as it was invested by my troops, was compelled to surrender at the first attack. In this I took a very active part, although I was not notified, my forces reaching as far as the suburbs of Malate, Hermita, Paco, Sampaloc, and Tondo.

Notwithstanding these services and although the Spaniards would not have surrendered but for the fact that my troops had closed every avenue of escape to the towns of the interior, the American generals not only ignored me entirely in the stipulations for capitulation, but also requested that my forces should retire from the port of Cavite and the suburbs of Manila.

I represented to the American generals the injustice done me and requested in friendly terms that they should at least expressly recognize my cooperation, but they utterly declined to do so. Nevertheless, being always desirous of showing friendliness and good feeling toward those who called themselves liberators of the Philippine people, I ordered my troops to evacuate the port of Cavite and the suburbs of Hermita, Malate, Sampaloc, and Tondo, retaining only a portion of the suburb of Paco.

In spite of these concessions not many days passed before Admiral Dewey, without any reason whatever, arrested our steam launches, which had been plying in the bay of Manila with his express consent. Almost at the same time I received a letter from General Otis, commander of the American army of occupation, demanding that I should withdraw my forces beyond the lines marked on a map which he also sent me, and which showed within the lines the town of Pandacan and the hamlet of Singalong, which never have belonged to the municipal area of Manila and its suburbs.

In view of this unjustifiable attitude of both American leaders, I summoned a council of my generals and asked the advice of my cabinet, and in conformity with the opinion of both bodies I named commissioners, who placed themselves in communication with these Americans. Although Admiral Dewey received in an insolent manner and with aggressive phrases my commissioners, whom he did not permit to speak, I yielded to the friendly suggestions of General Otis, withdrawing my forces to the desired line for the purpose of avoiding contact with his troops. This gave rise to many misunderstandings, but I hoped that once the Paris Conference was at an end, my people would obtain the independence promised them by the consul-general in Singapore, Mr. Pratt, and that the friendship formerly assured and proclaimed in manifestos and speeches would be established by the American generals who have reached these shores.

But it did not turn out thus. The said generals accepted my concessions in favor of peace and friendship as indications of weakness. Thus it is that, with rising ambition, they ordered forces to Iloilo on December 26, with the purpose of

acquiring for themselves the title of conquerors of that portion of the Philippine Islands occupied by my government.

Such procedures, so foreign to the dictates of culture and the usages observed by civilized nations, give me the right to act without observing the usual rules of intercourse. Nevertheless, in order to be correct to the end, I sent to General Otis commissioners charged to solicit him to desist from his rash enterprise; but they were not listened to.

My government can not remain indifferent in view of such a violent and aggressive seizure of a portion of its territory by a nation which has arrogated to itself the title champion of oppressed nations. Thus it is that my government is disposed to open hostilities if the American troops attempt to take forcible possession of the Visaya Islands. I denounce these acts before the world, in order that the conscience of mankind may pronounce its infallible verdict as to who are the true oppressors of nations and the tormentors of humankind.

Upon their heads be all the blood which may be shed.

EMILIO AGUINALDO.

MALOLO, January 5, 1899.

EXHIBIT 6.

[General Aguinaldo's second proclamation, the one publicly posted.]

SUPPLEMENT TO THE HERALD OF THE REVOLUTION—OFFICIAL.

Proclamation from the president of the revolutionary government to my brothers, the Filipinos, all the honorable consuls, and other foreigners.

Maj. Gen. E. S. Otis's proclamation published yesterday in the Manila papers obliges me to circulate the present one, in order that all who read and understand it may know of my most solemn protest against said proclamation, for I am moved by my duty and my conscience before God, by my political obligations with my beloved people, by my official and private relations to the North American nations.

In the above-mentioned proclamation General Otis calls himself "Military governor in the Philippines," and I protest one and a thousand times, with all the energy in my soul, against such an authority.

I solemnly proclaim that I have never had, either at Singapore or at Hongkong or here in the Philippines, any verbal or written contract for the recognition of American sovereignty over this cherished soil.

On the contrary, I say that I returned to these islands, conveyed by an American man-of-war, on the 19th of May of last year, with the firm and clear purpose of fighting the Spaniards in order to reconquer our liberty and independence, and so I expressed myself in the declaration made on the 24th of said month of May. Thus I published it in a proclamation directed to the Philippine people on the 12th of last June, when, in my natal town, Kawit, I for the first time unfurled our sacred national flag, as a holy emblem of that sublime aspiration; and, lastly, the American general, Merritt, predecessor of Mr. E. S. Otis, has confirmed that same thing in a proclamation addressed to the Philippine people days before the surrender of the town of Manila was proposed to General Jaudenes, which proclamation clearly and decisively stated that the land and naval forces of the United States came to give us our freedom and to displace the bad Spanish Government.

In a word, our countrymen and foreigners are witnesses that the land and naval forces of the United States existing here have recognized by act the belligerency of the Philippines, not only respecting but also doing public honor to the Filipino banner, which triumphantly traversed our seas in view of foreign nations represented here by their respective consuls.

As in his proclamation General Otis alludes to some instructions issued by His Excellency the President of the United States relative to the administration of affairs in the Philippines, I solemnly protest in the name of God, root and source of all justice and all right, who has visibly acceded me the power to direct my dear brethren in the difficult task of our regeneration, against this intrusion of the United States Government in the administration of these islands.

In the same manner I protest in the name of the Filipino people against the referred-to intrusion. For when they gave me their votes in confidence, electing me, although unworthy to be so, president of the nation, they imposed upon me the duty of sustaining unto death its liberty and independence.

And, in conclusion, I protest against such an unexpected act which treats of American sovereignty in these islands in the face of all the antecedents that I have in my possession referring to my relations with the American authorities, which

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are unequivocal testimony that the United States did not take me out of Hong-kong to make war against Spain for their own benefit, but for the benefit of our liberty and independence, to which end said authorities verbally promised me their active support and efficacious cooperation.

So that you all may understand it, my beloved brothers, it is the principle of liberty and absolute independence that has been our noble ambition for the purpose of obtaining the desired object, with a force given by the conviction, now very widespread, not to retrace the path of glory that we have passed over.

EMILIO AGUINALDO.

MALOLOS, January 5, 1899.

COPY OF CABLEGRAM RECEIVED.

MANILA, February 21, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, Washington:

Following issued by an important officer of insurgent government at Malolos, February 15, 1899, for execution during that evening and night in this city.

OTIS.

"First. You will so dispose that at 8 o'clock at night the individuals of the territorial militia, at your order, will be found united in all of the streets of San Pedro, armed with their bolos and revolvers or guns and ammunition if convenient.

"Second. Philippine families only will be respected; they should not be molested, but all other individuals, of what race they may be, will be exterminated without apprisement (or) compassion, after the extermination of the army of occupation.

"Third. The defender of the Philippines in your command will attack the guard at Bilibid and liberate the prisoners and 'presidarios,' and accomplished this, they will be armed, saying to them: 'Brothers, we must avenge ourselves on the Americans and exterminate them, that we may take our revenge for the infamy and treachery which they have committed upon us; have no compassion upon them; attack with vigor, all Filipinos en masse will second you.' 'Long live Filipino independenta.'

"Fifth. The order which will be followed in the attack will be as follows: The sharpshooters of Tondo and Santa Ana will be the attack from without, and these shots will be the signal for the militia of Trozo, Binondo, Quiapo, and Sampaloc to go out into the street and do their duty. Those of Pako Ermita and Malate, Santa Cruz, and San Miguel will not start out until 12 o'clock unless they see that their companions need assistance.

"Sixth. The militia of Tondo will start out at 3 o'clock in the morning; if all do their duty our revenge will be complete. Brothers, Europe contemplates us. We know how to die as men shedding our blood in defense of the liberty of our country. Death to the tyrants! War without quarter to the false Americans who have deceived us! Either independence or death!"

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS, *Manila, P. I., April 6, 1899.*

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL U. S. A.,
Washington, D. C.

SIR: I have the honor to forward herewith reports of recent military operations in the city of Manila and vicinity, submitted by the commanding generals of the two divisions of the corps and by members of the department staff.

The reports received from the First Division detail the work of the troops during February 4 and 5, commencing with the outbreak of active hostilities between the insurgents and our forces, while those of the Second Division, herewith submitted, cover the period from February 4 to the 1st day of March.

These military operations are fairly well presented in the reports, and I have little to add thereto, but desire particularly to call attention to the rise and development of conditions and circumstances which resulted finally in war. This I deem to be essential in order to correct the somewhat prevailing impression that the Government of the United States is responsible through deceit or wrongful action for the present existing hostilities.

It is well-known that a small band of men, natives of Luzon, and leaders of the rebellion of 1896 against Spain, were induced by the latter country, through a money consideration, to remove permanently from the islands. It is also well-known that after the destruction of the Spanish fleet in the harbor of Manila, and the blockade of that city by the United States naval forces, a number of these men returned to the vicinity of Manila, and undoubtedly with the aid and consent of the agents of the United States Government. They were doubtless encouraged by citizens of the United States, and others, acting without authority, to attempt the organization of what they were pleased to denominate an independent government for the Philippine people, they themselves to become its controlling element.

The widespread animosity which a great majority of the inhabitants of southern Luzon entertained against the continuance of Spanish domination made these people eager to assist any demonstration which promised deliverance. Aguinaldo and his associates landed from

American vessels in Cavite (the province of his nativity), supplied by United States agents with arms and ammunition in small quantities for the purpose of raising a native force to assist the American troops to keep back from the shore of Manila Bay the scattered Spanish troops giving annoyance in that vicinity. Availing themselves of the zealous cooperation of the people of the southern provinces to terminate Spanish supremacy, they took advantage of the active hostilities then existing between the United States and Spain, by which the great bulk of the Spanish army was held at Manila, to drive out or capture the Spanish army detachments stationed at southern points, thus increasing their war munitions and being enabled thereby to add numerical strength to their forces. In May, shortly after landing at Cavite, Aguinaldo issued a proclamation forecasting an independent Filipino government with himself as its chief executive. Early in August the establishment of the independence of the insurgent government was officially proclaimed by him to the world, and as early as June he warned the United States authorities against the landing of its military forces on Philippine soil without first obtaining his consent, because, as he expressed it, "The Filipino people might consider the occupation of Philippine territory by North American troops a violation of their rights."

When the United States forces landed from their transports near and to the south of Manila for the purpose of attacking the city, the fiction that they were acting as allies of the insurgents and in furtherance of Philippine independence appears to have been conveyed by insurgent leaders, and thus when the city was surrendered by Spanish authorities the insurgent troops entered the city to the number of several thousand at the same time the United States was securing possession.

The subsequent efforts on the part of the United States to comply with the articles of capitulation with Spain, by occupying the city of Manila and its defenses, and the demands of Aguinaldo to be placed in possession of public buildings and to nominate for office all city functionaries, has been fully shown in correspondence which has been already submitted. He released his hold of such portions of the city as were in possession of his troops, thereby permitting the United States to carry out its agreement with Spain only after he had peremptory commands to do so, and then he established his military lines in close contact with the city limits—this on the plea that should Manila revert to Spain he desired to be in position to take the offensive, and he even asked that his troops might be permitted to return to the positions evacuated by them in case Spanish authority should be reestablished. Not yet prepared to declare hostility against the United States, he busied himself with strengthening his lines about the city, confining our forces strictly within its limits, while he and other rebellious subjects of Spain busied themselves with the formation of what they were pleased to call a republican form of government for the Philippine Islands.

In the absence of Spanish authority without adequate power to forcibly assert itself, many able and conservative men gave adherence to this seemingly *de facto* government, and continued to cooperate with it until the latter part of November, when the determination of Aguinaldo and his confidential advisers for absolute political independence and their declared hostility against the United States caused them to

withdraw their adherence. Affairs thereafter were controlled by that radical element which from the first had manifested an unfriendly disposition, and which, securing additional arms and ammunition from the Asiatic coast, organized, equipped, and partially uniformed a military force, strengthened its lines around Manila, and boasted of its ability to place 80,000 armed men in the field. Its established newspapers, printed in Manila, indulged freely in falsehood and abuse of American authority, insulting officers and men. The condition of affairs continued to grow more threatening daily, aided possibly by the quiet, undemonstrative attitude which the United States troops had assumed, and their apparent disregard of the disparaging remarks of insurgent officers, both military and civil, who were permitted full freedom to circulate throughout the city at their pleasure.

Finally, early in January, a few of the leading conservative Filipinos of the section, marking the critical condition of affairs and fearing war, which appeared inevitable unless some pacific measures could be adopted, waited upon me and desired that I appoint a committee of army officers to meet a committee appointed by the insurgent government for the purpose of effecting some compromise by which peace might be maintained. The gentlemen were informed that I was ready at any time to open negotiations with the general of the insurgent army, but could not recognize in word or deed an insurgent government; that I would be pleased to appoint a commission to confer with one which General Aguinaldo, as chief of the insurgent forces, might be pleased to name. This reply, made in written memoranda, was conveyed to Malolos and elicited the following response:

MALOLOS, January 9, 1899.

Maj. Gen. E. S. OTIS,

General of the American Forces of Occupation in Manila.

GENERAL: I have been informed, after the interview between the commissioners of my government and Mr. Carman, that there will be no inconvenience on your part in naming, as commanding general, representatives that will confer with those whom I will name, for the same object.

Although it not being explained to me the reason why you could not treat with the commissioners of my government, I have the faculty of doing the same with those of the commanding general, "who can not be recognized." Nevertheless, for the sake of peace I have considered it advisable to name as "commanding general" a commission composed of the following gentlemen: Mr. Florentino Flores, Ambrosio Flores, and Manuel Argueles, that they may together represent me and arrive at an accord with those whom you will name, with the object of using such methods as will normalize the actual situation created by the attitude of your Government and troops.

If you will deign to attend to said commissioners, and through these methods come to some understanding, "if only temporary," that will insure the peace and harmony amongst ourselves, the Filipino public would reach a grateful glory.

I am yours, General, with the highest consideration,

Your most respectful servant,

EMILIO AGUINALDO.

To this letter I replied as follows:

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., January 9, 1899.

General EMILIO AGUINALDO,

Commanding Revolutionary Forces, Malolos, P. I.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of to-day and am much pleased at the action you have taken. I greatly regret that you have not a clear understanding of my position and motives, and trust that my explanation, assisted by the conference I have invited, will make them clear to you.

In my official capacity I am merely the agent of the United States Government to

conduct its affairs under the limits which its Constitution, laws, precedents, and specific instructions prescribe. I have not the authority to recognize any national or civil power not already formally recognized by my Government, unless specially authorized so to do by the instructions of the Executive of the United States. For this reason I was unable to receive officially the representatives of the revolutionary government, and endeavored to make that inability clear to the distinguished gentlemen with whom I had the pleasure to converse a few evenings since. You will bear witness that my course throughout my entire official connection with affairs here has been consistent, and it has pained me that I have not been able to receive and answer communications of the cabinet officers of the government at Malolos, fearing that I might be erroneously charged with lack of courtesy.

Permit me now briefly, General, to speak of the serious misunderstanding which exists between the Filipino people and the representatives of the United States Government, and which I hope that our commissioners, by a thorough discussion, may be able to dispel. I sincerely believe that all desire peace and harmony, and yet by the machinations of evil-disposed persons you have been influenced to think that we occupy the position of adversaries. The Filipinos appear to be of the opinion that we meditate attack, while I am under the strict orders of the President of the United States to avoid conflict in every way possible. My troops, witnessing the earnestness, the comparatively disturbed and unfriendly attitude of the revolutionary troops and many of the citizens of Manila, conclude that active hostilities have been determined upon, although it must be clearly within the comprehension of unprejudiced and reflecting minds that the welfare and happiness of the Filipino people depends upon the friendly protection of the United States. The hand of Spain was forced, and she has acknowledged before the world that all her claimed rights in this country have departed by due process of law. This treaty acknowledgment, with the conditions which accompany it, awaits ratification by the Senate of the United States; and the action of its Congress must also be secured before the Executive of that Government can proclaim a definite policy. That policy must conform to the will of the people of the United States expressed through its representatives in Congress. For that action the Filipino people should wait, at least, before severing the existing friendly relations. I am governed by a desire to further the interests of the Filipino people and shall continue to labor with that end in view. There shall be no conflict of forces if I am able to avoid it; and still I shall endeavor to maintain a position to meet all emergencies that may arise.

Permit me to subscribe myself, General, with the highest respect,

Your most obedient servant,

E. S. ORIS,

Major-General, U. S. A., Commanding.

Two members of the commission appointed by Aguinaldo were officers of his army, the third being a distinguished lawyer not a member of the Malolos government. On behalf of the United States, Gen. R. P. Hughes, Col. J. F. Smith, of the California Volunteers, and Lieut. Col. E. H. Crowder, judge-advocate of the department, were detailed. The joint commission had several sessions extending over a period of some three weeks, but no conclusions were reached, as the insurgent members could not submit any formulated statement which they were able to maintain. They presented as the desire of the insurgents absolute independence under the protection of the United States, but the nature and scope of the protection wished for they could not explain and the conference resulted in failure.

During the latter part of January the insurgents, along their established lines and within the city, exhibited increased aggressiveness, assuming a defiant attitude, so much so that our troops were gathered well in hand to meet any demonstrations which might be attempted. Insurgent armed parties entered far within our lines and defied our troops to resist their approaches. To arrest these proceedings our officers, and citizens of Manila connected with the insurgent government, were sent to insurgent general officers at various places along their lines to request that they keep their men in check, which the latter invariably promised to do, paying, however, little heed to their

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promises. On February 1 a small detachment belonging to our engineer company was arrested within our territory and sent to Malolos. This act brought on the following correspondence:

HQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., February 2, 1899.

Gen. EMILIO AGUINALDO,
Commanding Filipino Revolutionary Forces, Malolos.

GENERAL: I have the honor to inform you that a small party of engineers, consisting of a sergeant and four privates, who were engaged in making surveys for the completion of the map of Manila, which the Engineer Corps is now busy in perfecting, has been missing for two or three days and is reported to be confined in Malolos. The detachment was sent out to do work within the city, with directions to confine itself to the city and suburban lines. Why they were arrested I do not understand, nor can I imagine for what reason they are held at Malolos. I am also informed that a citizen connected with Harper's Weekly newspaper of New York, engaged in taking views for that paper, has also been arrested and held as a prisoner. I know nothing of this except from report, nor do I know who the man is. I am also informed that a private soldier who went beyond the lines without authority, with what motive I do not know, is also held as a prisoner.

I send my staff officer, Lieutenant Haan, of the Engineer Corps, to make inquiry and request your action in this matter.

I am doing everything possible to preserve the peace and avoid all friction until the Filipino people can be made fully acquainted with the sentiments and intentions of the American Government, when I am confident that they will appreciate the endeavors of the United States and will again look upon that country as their friend and protector. I also fully believe that the present unrest is the result of machinations of evil-disposed persons.

I am, General, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. S. OTIS,
Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

[Translation.]

MALolos, February 4, 1899.

Major-General OTIS,
Chief of the Forces of Occupation of Manila and Cavite.

GENERAL: In reply to your letter of February 2 I have the honor to state that the sergeant and the four American soldiers of the Engineer Corps, to-day liberated, were detained within our territory, beyond our advanced lines on Solis street, examining our intrenchments and defenses at a distance of less than 200 meters.

The said individuals carried a revolver, knives, a compass, plans of Manila and its suburbs, a book with topographical notes, a measuring tape, a machete, two pen-knives, scales, etc.

I deeply regret that these soldiers have been taken within our lines, according to the testimony of our officers, witnesses of their detention, inasmuch as there exists a decree, dated October 20, which prohibits all foreigners from approaching our defensive works, taking photographic views of the same, drawing plans, or entering our territory with arms, although free transit is permitted all who are unarmed.

The correspondent of Harper's Weekly has been detained in San Juan del Monte taking photographic views, and the proof of this is that in care of Colonel Miguel he has been sent his camera and his horse.

I must state that in consideration of the friendship of the Filipino people for the Americans the said soldiers have not been imprisoned, but detained, in accordance with the spirit of the decree of October 20 last. They have been lodged in the gobierno militar, and have been issued the daily rations of our officers. If they have been uncomfortable it is due to the excessive sobriety of our race and of our soldiers, who are accustomed to eat but little and to sleep on the hard ground.

With these explanations, I believe, General, you will understand the motive for the detention of your soldiers to-day liberated, and who have been treated with all due consideration.

I therefore hope that your determination may be another motive on which to base our friendly relations with the great American Republic, and in consideration of this I also decree the liberty of the correspondent referred to.

I am, General, as ever, your obedient servant,

EMILIO AGUINALDO.

It will be observed that the insurgent Government insisted that this engineer party was arrested outside of our small field of operations, which I am confident was not the fact, but the correspondence is given to show the efforts of the American authorities to maintain the peace. During all this time our officers and men were insulted and openly proclaimed to be cowards; our outposts were attacked at night, and the impression became general that the insurgents, notwithstanding our efforts, would indulge soon in open attack and in the belief, apparently entertained by them, that they would meet with feeble resistance.

During the entire month of January they had labored incessantly to strongly intrench their lines and place their artillery in position, and boasted freely of their intentions to soon drive the American forces out of Manila. On the night of February 2 they sent in a strong detachment to draw the fire of our outpost, which took up a position immediately in front of and within a few yards of the same. The outpost was strengthened by a few of our men who silently bore their taunts and abuse the entire night. This was reported to me by General MacArthur, whom I directed to communicate with the officer in command of the insurgent troops concerned. His prepared letter was shown me and approved, and the reply received (both papers found in General MacArthur's accompanying report) was all that could be desired. However, the agreement was ignored by the insurgents and on the evening of February 4 another demonstration was made on one of our small outposts which occupied a retired position at least 150 yards within the line which had been mutually agreed upon—an insurgent approaching the picket and refusing to halt or answer when challenged. The result was that our picket discharged his piece, when the insurgent troops near Santa Mesa opened a spirited fire on our troops there stationed.

The insurgent army had thus succeeded in drawing the fire of a small outpost, which they had evidently labored with all their ingenuity to accomplish in order to justify in some way their premeditated attack. It is not believed that the chief insurgent leaders wished to open hostilities at this time, as they were not completely prepared to assume the initiative. They desired two or three days more to perfect their arrangements, but the zeal of their army brought on the crisis which anticipated their action. They could not have delayed long, however, for it was their object to force an issue before American troops then en route could arrive at Manila.

The movement of troops during the protracted engagement which followed and their success at every point are described in the accompanying reports of the commanding generals of division. I transmit herewith copies of the most important telegraphic instructions sent from these headquarters to the different organizations of the command, from which the progress of events can be quite accurately traced. I can not speak too highly of the efficiency displayed by the troops under the most trying ordeals, and where all organizations engaged conducted themselves so courageously it would be difficult to undertake special mention. My adjutant-general, my aids, and other members of my staff conveyed many verbal instructions during the day to points most hotly contested and assisted materially in the repeated successes of the battle.

During the night of February 4 and the following day the insurgents of the city were greatly agitated, fearing for their personal safety. A portion, to the number of about 8,000, had been enrolled in a secret society for the purpose of attacking our troops within the city and performing incendiary work while the insurgents pressed us from without. This purpose was well known and an attack upon our forces, both in front and rear, was anticipated. So admirably, however, had General Hughes, the provost-marshal-general, disposed of 3,000 troops of his command that the rising was suppressed wherever attempted. His action was quick and decisive. Early on the morning of the 5th the police companies so effectively delivered their fire upon these assembling organizations that they were dispersed and discouraged. Their loss in killed and wounded could not have been above 50 or 60. They made no further very dangerous demonstrations until the night of February 23, when they suffered a most severe punishment.

The movement on Caloocan, February 10, was made with the intention of placing our northern line in better tactical condition and consisted in swinging the left of General MacArthur's division to the front. That officer had requested to do this shortly after the 5th instant, but was informed that we would await an anticipated concentration of the enemy on our left, where their activity was daily increasing. It was expected that if we remained quiet for a short time that the enemy would collect its routed forces, which we could not pursue, and would place them in position on our northern front. Our expectations were partially realized and when he had massed his forces on our left, which we were informed numbered some 4,000 but which in fact did not exceed 2,500, the movement was made and was attended with our accustomed success.

A reference to the accompanying copies of telegrams indicates quite clearly the intent and character of this movement.

I transmit here with reports of several of my staff officers, submitted by my direction.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. S. OTIS,
Major General, U. S. V., Commanding.

[Inclosure 1.]

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., February 18, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: In submitting this report of the operations of the First Division, in the battle of February 5 on the south side of the Pasig River, I beg leave to make this preliminary statement.

A line of delimitation had been agreed on between the department commander and the insurgent Filipino authorities, extending from the confluence of the Concordia Creek, on the left of my line, to the mouth of the estero San Antonio into Manila Bay, just below Fort Malate, an approximate distance of 4 miles. On the left of my line the American and Filipino pickets confronted each other on either side of Concordia Creek. At the Concordia bridge, near Blockhouse 11, they were only a few paces apart. On the right of our line our picket line was established some distance back from the line of delimitation, following closely the old Spanish line of defense, except that the important position of Blockhouse 14 was not occupied, our advance post being at the site of Blockhouse 13, some distance back, in thick growth of bamboo.

Finding that we did not hold our line of delimitation, the Filipino military forces advanced beyond this line and began to throw up a formidable line of intrenchments. They also constructed a number of detached earthworks along the left of our line, and prepared a number of strong stone houses and churches in Santa Ana and San Pedro Macati for defense. On the extreme left of our line, between Blockhouse 11, occupied by our advance on the Paco Macati road, and the Pasig River, lies the suburb of Pandacan, which is on an island made by a number of tidal estuaries and the river. By occupying this position the insurgents could bring a flank fire on our forces in the suburb of Paco. On the other hand, if our forces held it they could enfilade the insurgent line in front of Paco. To prevent our crossing Concordia Creek to their side, and to secure a crossing to our side, they erected an earthwork on the east side of the creek on a bit of high ground. As the Pasig River makes a sharp reentering bend just above Pandacan and below Santa Ana, a sudden and successful advance of our line from Paco would force their troops stationed on their extreme right into this bend, as a cul-de-sac.

To prevent this the insurgents constructed an inclosed bastioned earthwork on the neck of this peninsula, the fire from which would also sweep the plain between Paco and Santa Ana. All these preparations we witnessed without authority to prevent, as Sumter was surrounded by batteries thirty-eight years ago.

As the insurgents saw their formidable works approaching completion they became more insolent day by day, and finally did everything they could, in insolence and insults, to provoke us to begin the conflict. As they were permitted to go and come through our lines at will, they knew just what troops we had, where they were located, and that we were making no visible preparations for defense. It seems proper to make these statements in order to justify the assertion that no troops ever behaved better under intense provocation, showing excellent discipline and self-control.

The first brigade of this division, under Brig. Gen. Charles King, was made up of the First California Volunteer Infantry, under Col. James F. Smith, 3 battalions; the First Washington Volunteer Infantry, under Col. J. H. Wholley, 3 battalions; and the First Idaho Volunteer Infantry, 2 battalions, under Maj. Daniel W. Figgins. To this force was added during the progress of the battle one battalion of Wyoming Volunteer Infantry, under Maj. Frank M. Foote.

Two companies of the California regiment and one company of each of the other regiments were left in Manila to combat insurrection in the city, if that should be attempted. This brigade held the left of our line, south of the Pasig, and faced in a general way to the eastward.

The second brigade, under Brig. Gen. Samuel Ovenshine, was made up of the Fourteenth Regular Infantry, 10 companies, under Maj. C. H. Potter; 8 companies of the First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry, and 6 troops of the Fourth Regular Cavalry, acting as infantry, under Maj. Louis H. Rucker. This brigade held the right of the line from Blockhouse 12, on the Tripa de Gallina, to Fort Malate, on the bay, and faced south.

There were in the division 2 batteries of artillery—one of six 3.2-inch B. L. guns, under Capt. A. B. Dyer, Sixth Artillery, and 4 mountain guns, left by the Astor Battery, under Lieut. H. L. Hawthorne. Dyer's battery had no horses. The artillery was under the orders of the division commander and under the general direction of Captain Dyer. Besides these, there was one company of Regular engineers, acting as infantry, under Lieut. W. G. Haan, Third United States Artillery.

The only preparations which could be made for battle, in view of orders to stand on the defensive, were the assignment of the different organizations to places on the firing line and the selection of positions for the artillery. Nothing more could apparently be done, as our Government had to preserve a waiting policy until the treaty of peace with Spain was signed. Nevertheless, as an attack from the front might be followed by an uprising in the city, this procrastination placed the army under a great disadvantage. The only preparation I could make was to select a point I considered the key point of the battlefield, on a slight knoll on the right of King's line, beyond Paco bridge. To this point I had approaches prepared and sand bags provided for protection for the guns. I also had two of Dyer's guns placed on Fort Malate and arranged signals with the monitor *Monadnock* to direct its fire.

On February 4 hostilities began on the north side, but no firing took place on our front that day or the succeeding night. At 3.40 a. m. of the 5th the insurgents opened fire on Blockhouse 11 with Mauser rifles. I had just ridden up to my headquarters in the city, from which I had telegraphic communications with every part of my command. I first telegraphed corps headquarters for permission to take the offensive when it became light enough to do so.

At 7 o'clock I directed General Ovenshine to open artillery fire on Blockhouse 14 and the wood near by, and to be prepared to drive the enemy from the Malate front,

and if they yielded easily to turn to the left with part of his command and sweep the enemy from his entire front. If successful, to be ready to reinforce King's right and turn the left of the insurgent force operating from Santa Ana. This project was not carried out until later in the day, as permission was not given to assume the offensive until 8 o'clock.

In the meantime the firing on King's line became heavier as the day advanced. The Washingtonians, the Idahoans, 6 companies of the California regiment, and Hawthorne's mountain battery were put on the firing line on the Paco front. Four guns of Dyer's battery and 4 companies of Californians were sent to Battery Knoll, on the right. A battalion of Wyoming volunteers, which had reported the night before, was brought up to the intersection of the Paco and Singalon roads, so that it could reinforce either brigade, as occasion required. The troops of the Fourth Cavalry were also kept in reserve. The artillery soon began to do effective service, and drove the insurgents from several strong positions near our line. Toward 8 o'clock I learned that neither the fire from the Navy nor our guns on Malate had shaken the hold of the enemy on Owenshine's front, and the volume of fire beyond Singalon and the demand for ambulances showed that a desperate battle was being waged there.

At last, at 8 o'clock, a telegram came from Major-General Otis, authorizing an advance, if not made too far. I went at once to Battery Knoll, taking with me the Wyoming battalion. Finding there 3 companies of Californians, I placed there 7 companies under the command of Colonel Smith, of the First California, and directed him to deploy and advance in line with the rest of King's brigade, substituting this for the intended cooperation of Owenshine. Smith's right was a little later reinforced by Company A, Battalion of Engineers, under Lieutenant Haan.

General King was present and was ordered to advance as soon as Smith deployed. These officers received this order with delight and their troops with enthusiasm. The movement began at 8.20 a. m., with a rush over the creek in our front; a cheer and rattling volleys as the whole line advanced, not by rushes, but with a rush. The insurgent line fell back before our advance, fighting, however, with spirit. The rice fields in our front were intersected by little irrigating dikes, and behind each of these a stand was attempted, the Filipinos firing from behind them. Our men disdained these shelters and moved steadily on until raking fire was opened on them from the redoubt on the neck of the bend between Pandacan and Santa Ana.

The Idaho regiment then made a turn to the left, charging the redoubt, carrying it at the point of the bayonet and driving a regiment of insurgents to the bank of the river. The California companies in Pandacan at the same time crossed Concordia Creek and captured the smaller earthwork on the farther bank. On the lower side of Santa Ana, on the river, was another earthwork in which two Krupp guns were placed, bearing on the river; but with embrasures also on the land side, and to one of these one of the Krupp guns was transferred when an advance was made. To its fire Hawthorne's battery replied with good effect until its fire was masked by the advance of our line. This earthwork was also carried and both Krupp guns captured. At the redoubt the Filipinos made a brave defense. As the Scotch guard at Flodden Field formed an unbroken line around their king, so these misguided insurgents fell where they fought, filling the trenches with an unbroken line of killed and wounded. Apparently a whole battalion was driven to the bank of the river. They attempted to cross in boats and by swimming, but not a man was seen to gain the opposite bank. Their bodies have been floating down the stream ever since. Major Figgins, commanding the Idahoans, estimates the enemy's loss in this movement at 700 killed, captured, wounded, and drowned.

At the same time the California battalion charged and drove the enemy out of Santa Ana, driving them from stone walls and convents, churches, and houses, and fighting their way through blazing bamboo huts, from which the natives were firing. This could not have been accomplished had not Colonel Smith's command broken the left of the insurgent line and carried the English cemetery, which was inclosed with a strong stone wall. The Regular engineer company, under Lieutenant Haan, volunteered for this service and did yeoman work. The Wyoming battalion, on the right of the line, did not advance with the energy of the rest of the line. Had they done so, the enemy's forces might have been captured in Santa Ana. Retreating on San Pedro Macati, they attempted to make a stand. A number attempted to hold the church and cemetery of San Pedro Macati. Then the Wyomings came up at last and did good service. By a skillful, tactical movement of the engineer company this strong position was taken in reverse and carried. The insurgents finally broke and ran, and our forces advanced and captured the church and monastery of Guadalupe, a mile beyond. Many prisoners were taken in San Pedro Macati, and a well-supplied arsenal.

Brigadier-General Owenshine, commanding the Second Brigade, had the North Dakota regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Treumann, occupying the old Spanish

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trenches from Fort Malate on the bay to an almost impassable swamp, which divided his line into two sections. From the farther (east) side of this swamp to Blockhouse 12 on the Tripa de Gallina his line was held by 9 companies of the Fourteenth Infantry, under Maj. C. H. Potter, and 3 dismounted troops of the Fourth Cavalry, under Capt. F. Wheeler, on the extreme left. There our men had to fight in dense woods and bamboo thickets. The enemy had strong entrenchments and fired on us also from ditches and tree tops. The fight raged here more fiercely than anywhere else. The left of our line could not advance because the enemy had a flank fire upon it. When I sent Smith's improvised command echeloned to the left of King's line, I kept only 1 company in reserve in support for the artillery at Battery Knoll, but finding that 2 companies which had been out on outpost duty during the night had been left behind in the advance, I ordered them over to the right to support Wheeler. This gave him 1 battalion of the Fourteenth Infantry, his 3 troops of cavalry, and 1 company each of Washingtons and Californias.

At about 10 o'clock Owenshine ordered an advance. The North Dakotas drove the enemy from their front back to the Carmelite convent.

Major Potter, with Matile's battalion Fourteenth Infantry, advanced through the woods to the right of Blockhouse 14, and Capt. John Murphy, with his battalion of the Fourteenth Infantry, charged Blockhouse 14 and the adjoining trenches. After a desperate fight the enemy were driven out, but not without inflicting serious loss upon us. Captain Mitchell was mortally wounded leading his company. Lieutenant Miles, of the Fourteenth Infantry, was first in the enemy's trenches, and, followed by only 6 men, charged into the smoking ruins of the blockhouse. This was a daring and brilliant feat of arms. At the same time Captain Wheeler advanced from Blockhouse 13, but after coming in view of the enemy's trenches fell back. A gun of Dyer's battery was sent to him, but on account of the dense bamboo thickets that masked the enemy's line it could not do satisfactory service. Shortly before 2 p. m. Major Rucker, Fourth Cavalry, joined the cavalry battalion and relieved Captain Wheeler of command.

Hearing of the successful advance of the North Dakotas, I telegraphed General Owenshine to carry out the project I had arranged with him, to attempt to roll up the enemy by a movement from right to left. As there was a long delay in carrying out this order, I repeated it several times by telegraph and aides sent with oral orders. It was at last found that he was under a false impression that he had received other orders from the corps commander. When this misapprehension was removed, he made the movement with complete success.

In the meantime I had sent a battalion of First Tennessee, under Lieut. Col. Gracey Childers, to the Singalon front. They reached that point just as the North Dakotas were clearing the front and driving the enemy into the woods beyond the Tripa. The Tennessee battalion, crossing the same stream, opened on them, as also Dyer's guns on Battery Knoll. Owenshine then advanced with his brigade to Pasai, which he found abandoned. Leaving part of his command there, he marched with the rest up the Pasai-Macati road and opened communication with General King, at San Pedro Macati, and, returning, picketed the road.

This ended the fighting at the front; but soon after King's brigade had advanced beyond Paco a number of insurgents who had lain concealed in the town began to fire on the ammunition carts and hospital ambulances going to the front. Anticipating the possibility of this treachery, a small force had been left in Paco under Lieutenant-Colonel Deboce. For a time there was a lively contest in the town. The insurgents were so persistent that nearly all their nipa houses in the town had to be burned to dislodge them. Fifty-three prisoners were taken, all in ordinary clothing, but unquestionably participants in the savage warfare. While this was going on in the town a sharp musketry fire was opened on us from a large stone church near the Paco bridge. I directed Dyer's battery on the knoll to reverse its guns and open on the church. It was soon in flames, yet a number of desperate men took refuge in the church tower. It was several hours before they could be dislodged, and they kept up their resistance to the last.

During this engagement the telegraph men of the Signal Corps did effective service, carrying their lines to the extreme front at San Pedro Macati, Fort Malate, and Pasai. Lieutenant Kilbourne, who was with my headquarters party, did a brave act in climbing a telegraph pole at the Paco bridge to string a broken wire, under a cross fire between desperadoes in the tower and our artillery.

New troops are generally demoralized by firing from flanks and rear. In this contest bullets seemed to come from all directions, but our men continued unconcerned. When I had my headquarters on Artillery Knoll, the artillerymen and my staff officers and orderlies were subject to this cross fire during the entire engagement, and as the enemy used smokeless powder it could only be surmised from what direction the fire came.

At 2 o'clock I rode to King's front and found his lines satisfactorily established. I then went to the Singalon front and found everything satisfactory there.

In this engagement we lost 2 officers and 26 men killed, and 4 officers and 95 soldiers wounded; 1 enlisted man injured. We can only estimate the enemy's loss. Our burial parties interred in their own trenches 238 insurgent dead. We took about 306 prisoners and 2 very fine Krupp guns, besides a large number of small arms, ammunition, and ordnance stores.

The coolness, energy, bravery, and elan of the officers and men of this division are worthy of the highest consideration. Beginning on the left, the Idaho regiment, under Major Figgins, did splendid service. Major McConville, who served under my command in the war of the rebellion, was killed leading his battalion, like the brave and faithful officer that he was. Captain Whittington is especially commended by his brigade commander.

The Washington regiment, under Colonel Wholly, received its baptism of fire. Its men fought like veterans. From the California regiment I expected excellent service. Col. James F. Smith showed the very best qualities of a volunteer officer. His services in every position in which he has been placed have been most valuable and efficient. I cordially recommend him as a brigadier-general of volunteers. Major Sime, of the same regiment, proved he is a natural-born soldier. He is not only brave, but cool and discreet.

Captain Haan, lieutenant, Third Artillery, in command of the engineer company, showed especial efficiency. The Wyoming battalion, although not well handled at first, when it got into action showed the bravery I have seen before in Wyoming men.

In the Second Brigade the North Dakotas made a dashing charge. The part of the Fourth Cavalry under fire fought as well as they always have in their many battles. The fighting of the Fourteenth Infantry, under the trying surroundings in which they were placed, was little less than heroic; certainly it was most effective. They were well led by Major Potter, Capt. John Murphy, a well-tried veteran, and other efficient company officers—Matile, Eastman, Hasbrouck, Lasseigne, Biddle, and, in fact, all present, including Captains Martin and Krauthoff, who, although on staff duty, went to the front with their own regiment, performing excellent service.

Captain Dyer, Sixth Artillery, directed the artillery operations for me with rare skill and judgment. The platoon of Battery D, Sixth Artillery, placed in Fort Malate, was most effective, and Lieutenant Scott managed the platoon under his command in a most satisfactory manner. In fact, the work of this battery made a victory assured. Lieutenant Hawthorne, in command of the battery of mountain guns (Astor Battery), gave proof of rare ability. From Paco to San Pedro Macati this battery was far to the front, and did really splendid service.

To the skill, energy, and bravery of our two brigade commanders, Brig. Gen. Charles King and Brig. Gen. Samuel Ovenshine, the credit of success is largely due. I am grateful to them for their energetic and loyal support.

The medical department of the division in its chief surgeon, Maj. H. W. Cardwell, did everything that skill and energy could do in the care of the wounded, extending their aid also to the wounded Filipinos.

The entire division staff was with me at the front, and I am indebted to its members for patient, energetic, and most efficient service. Capt. H. C. Cabell, adjutant-general, and Capt. C. C. Walcutt, chief quartermaster and acting ordnance officer, performed their important duties most effectively. Capt. W. E. Birkhimer, Third Artillery, inspector and judge-advocate, gave valuable assistance by his untiring energy and marked ability. My personal aides were Lieut. R. H. Allen and Thomas M. Anderson, jr. Lieut. A. P. Hayne, California Heavy Artillery, was with me as a volunteer aide, and Maj. Samuel Jones, quartermaster's department, also gave his assistance. These officers carried orders and made observations on all parts of the firing line, in a number of instances correcting misapprehensions and leading organizations to their proper positions. Lieutenant Anderson, although ill from fever contracted at Santiago, insisted on performing his share of duty. The division clerks and orderlies also deserve high commendation.

This division had on the firing line in the battle of the 5th instant about 3,850 officers and men. We were opposed, as I believe, by about 5,000 insurgent Filipinos. Of these I estimate that 2,000 were killed, wounded, captured, or scattered. Within two days we had captured Pasig and Pateros, and our scouting parties had gone to the Laguna del Bay.

I remain, sir, with great respect,

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding Division.

A map showing the disposition of troops on the battlefield will be forwarded as soon as completed. Also a supplemental report showing recommendations for promotion.

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[Inclosure 2.]

HDQRS FIRST BRIGADE, FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., February 14, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIRST DIVISION.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by the First Brigade, First Division, during the recent engagements with hostile Filipinos beginning with February 4:

After several nights of promised attack I was again riding to our night station at East Paco when overtaken by the division commander's dispatch directing me to have my brigade in readiness for action. Orders were instantly sent to the First Idaho and First California to move up to the points designated in event of attack. On arriving at Paco I found the General's letter, and the usual night supports at Blockhouse 11 were reinforced by the full battalion (First Washington) called for in his order. Lively firing was heard across the Pasig, but up to midnight not a shot was heard on our front. Just at 2.40 Sunday morning, February 5, the rattle of rifle fire broke out along my line. All had been so quiet that the Californians had been sent back to their quarters. The Idahos were also taking a rest, but now both commands were marched well forward. The line of the Washingtons extended from Captain Fortson's position along the bend of the Concordia on our left to Battery Knoll on our extreme right, and the eastern (opposite) bank of the Tripa de Gallina was thickly covered by insurgents, visible only by the incessant flash of their Mausers, many of the bullets of which flew high and spattered into both East and West Paco, wounding two men of the Idaho halted on the Calle Real.

A reconnoissance along the line, just after Captain Dyer reached the knoll with his guns, convinced me that the sooner I could get the order to advance the quicker we could sweep the front and wind up the entire business. This led to my appeal to you to be permitted to attack at dawn, which was necessarily refused, but, omitting minor incidents, such as the firing on our officers and men from many a nipa hut and from Paco church itself, I at last, at about 8.30, received from General Anderson in person the long-prayed-for order, and who added to this the caution to advance no farther than Santa Ana.

While the division commander himself supervised the advance from Battery Knoll, which was made by several companies of Californians, supported by the Wyoming battalion, I hastened over to Paco and led the Idaho regiment to the front. Two companies of the California regiment had been thrown in on Wholley's right, near Blockhouse 11, owing to the heavy fire the Washingtons were receiving and their many casualties. These swept, with the Washingtons, with eager impetuosity, waist deep through the boggy Tripa and were speedily deployed in long line, continuing to the left the advance of Colonel Smith's line from Battery Knoll. Here it was comparatively plain sailing, but to our left of the Santa Ana road it was hard pounding indeed. Hawthorne with his little Astor guns had reached Concordia Bridge and was replying with calm precision to the enemy's Krupps over toward the river, while the bridge was heavily swept by a fierce fire that seemed to come from every direction on our left and front. Fortson had earlier reported that his two companies were outflanked and galled by sharp fire, which I felt convinced must come from the redoubt in front of Pandacan. This, the Krupps, and the hostile trenches between the Pasig and the Santa Ana road became the objects of solicitude to me. Many of the Washingtons were lying down behind the road firing coolly to our left and front, and directing Major Figgins with his first three companies to support the right attack, I sent everything else, including the "university" company of the First California, in to the assault of the village and the trenches on the river side, giving orders to Major McConville to take the remaining three companies, First Idaho, and attack the redoubt from the south. It was his last order, for this gallant old soldier fell leading his men.

But that redoubt lasted only a short time longer. Fortson dashed in across the Concordia from Pandacan and, aided by one company of the Idahos (the other two having had to charge a sharply firing line to their right) they completely carried it, leaving the insurgents lying in heaps in the trenches and whirling their survivors into the river, where many were drowned or shot.

By this time, fearful that the right advance under Colonel Wholley was going straight east instead of wheeling to half left to "round up" insurgents attempting to escape, I left the left attack and joined his line. There was no time to be lost, so I personally ordered the left to halt and, galloping along the line, by dint of much shouting, swung it around, pivoting on the left, until our right center broke through the native huts and entered the town to the south of the old church. It was between 10 and 11 when Santa Ana was won. Meantime Colonel Smith with his command

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had pushed on eastward, and to his graphic reports and those of the regimental commanders—all of which I send herewith—I beg leave to refer you for further particulars.

Next in order, I beg leave to call the attention of the division commander to the fact that, though our losses in killed and wounded are greater than that of any brigade in the corps, the damage inflicted on the enemy far exceeds that to which any other lays claim. This in itself is evidence of our severe and stubborn fight. The two Krupps we had the honor to send in to you cost us the life of Major McConville and the loss by wounds of many a gallant man.

I had reported to you 110 of their dead as buried on the field in front of our left wing, but in reaching out toward San Pedro Macati Colonel Wholley found many more and gave them burial, making a total of 153. Even such of their wounded as could not be carried away fought hard, and many of them, in uniform, were taken in charge by our surgeons.

I beg leave to call attention to the fact that this is the only exclusively volunteer brigade in the corps and that it fought with all the steadiness, dash, and discipline of their comrades, the regulars.

And now there devolves on me a duty that I falter in attempting. I saw no instance of shirking—I saw many of daring leadership on part of the officers and of devoted following on part of the men. I shrink from discriminating, yet I should not deserve the faith of the command of which I am so proud were I to fail to publicly mention the officers who, acting under my orders, were most conspicuous. My regimental commanders, Colonel Smith, First California; Colonel Wholley, First Washington, and Major Figgins, First Idaho, bore themselves with marked bravery and ability, Wholley being under the heaviest fire for the longest time—his maiden fight at that. Major McConville died proudly heading his men in the dash on a dangerous line. Major Weisenburger, First Washington, was an example of soldierly bearing throughout. Captain Fortson was in command on Pandacan Island, constantly exposed, and he and Captain ———, First Idaho (the name of this Idaho officer can not at this moment be given, but will be forwarded later), won my admiration for their daring assault on a fiercely defended position—the redoubt across the Concordia. Captain Otis, First Washington, with his cheek and ear scored by a Mauser, led his company from start to finish. Their loss of 25 killed and wounded in one company shows what they had to fight through. Lieutenants Erwin and Luhn, First Washington, the former severely wounded, were notably cool. Captain Dyer and Lieutenant Hawthorne, of the artillery, won the plaudits of the men for consummate skill and coolness, and for the commendation of others in the line, whom I did not see, I must refer you to their reports as to the bearing of their officers and men.

Every man on my staff, from the senior in rank, Brigade Surgeon-Major Shiels, down to our mounted orderlies, won my thanks and admiration. Major Shiels was constant in his attendance to the wounded at the extreme front and under heavy fire. Lieutenants Merriam, Third U. S. Artillery, and Hutton, First California, were time and again compelled to risk their lives in carrying orders along the line. Captain Saxton, assistant adjutant-general, was systematic in the field office. His horse and Lieutenant Merriam's gave out at Concordia bridge, but they followed me afoot across the field. Captain Handy, brigade commissary, carried out his duties under the fire of the enemy instead of the roof of his office, and the three orderlies, Privates Clay G. Mills, Company D, First Washington; Edward C. Hanford, Company K, First Washington; and Spencer G. Lane, First California, were constantly under heavy fire and are soldiers their States should be proud of.

One more name, that of Lieutenant-Colonel Duboce, First California, must not be omitted. He had a difficult and hazardous task in wiping out the cowardly gang that, under the sanctity of a church roof and from within the walls of apparently peaceful homesteads, for a time kept up a treacherous fire on officers and men hurrying by with orders or messages. I saw his work long hours after it was finished, and it was well done.

Commending these men to your favorable consideration, I have the honor to be,
Very respectfully,

CHARLES KING,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

The Engineers, under Captain Haan, were too far to my right for me to see them, but they and the Signal Corps did capital work. The list of casualties has already been sent.

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For report of later operations, following Sunday, the 5th, I am compelled to wait for further reports from regimental commanders. The Wyoming battalion did not act under my eye, though it was temporarily attached to the brigade and followed Colonel Smith's wing.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, FIRST DIVISION,
San Pedro Macati, February 17, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
First Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: In my report of the action of this brigade on Sunday, February 5, I left a blank opposite the "Captain" whom I desired especially to commend for his participation in the capture of the redoubt in front of Pandacan Island; the name is Whittington.

One feature of that Sunday's fight deserves especial mention. I did not see it myself, but various accounts agree. Captain Cunningham, First California, with his fine company, had pushed forward under my personal direction to get a cross-fire on the trenches to the left of the Santa Ana road, from which so sharp a fire assailed us. After the trenches were outflanked, he pushed on through the so-called convent; heading off fugitives from the captured redoubts downstream he found himself assailed by a fire across the Pasig. There was a large house apparently filled with insurgents, but this was close range, where the Springfield outweighed the Mauser, and five minutes' vigorous work resulted in the hoisting of the white flag across the river. Ferrying in cascos, he found an insurgent captain dead, with a dozen others beside him. He brought back 17 wounded, buried the dead, and strove to do whatever was possible for certain mortally wounded of the enemy. Coupling what I have heard of Captain Cunningham's conduct with what I myself saw on the field of battle, I beg to add his to the list of names of officers entitled to recognition.

Very respectfully,

CHARLES KING,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

[Inclosure 3.]

AT THE FRONT, CONVENT OR MONASTERY ASILO DE HUEFANAS.
San Juan, February 13, 1899.

Brig. Gen. CHARLES KING,
Commanding First Brigade, First Division, Eighth Army Corps, Manila, P. I.

SIR: In compliance with telegraphic instructions from Major-General Anderson, I have the honor to submit herewith a report of the movements of the First Wyoming Infantry while attached to your brigade, February 5 and 6, 1899.

Sunday, February 5, we left our barracks at Malate at 6 o'clock a. m. (having arrived there the night before from Cavite) and proceeded to Paco bridge where we halted at 6.10 a. m. to await orders.

At 6.22 a. m. General Anderson and staff led us through a narrow lane to the front, where we were ordered to support a battery of artillery, but the orders were immediately changed and I was sent forward with my battalion to support Colonel Smith, of the First California, who was then engaged in an attack on Santa Ana. (About this time Sergeant Rogers, of Company C, was shot in head and killed near Paco, while preparing to join his company.)

I passed Blockhouse No. 12 and encountered three fires coming from the right, left, and front. I then ordered my troops into line and began to advance with Lieutenant Haan's Engineers on my right. I advanced as rapidly as circumstances would permit until about three-quarters of a mile from the English cemetery, when seeing an open space in the firing line large enough for two companies, I ordered Company C (Captain Millar) and Company H (Captain Holtenhouse) to join the firing line, which they did, and helped to dislodge the insurgents from the English cemetery.

About this time an orderly from the First California Infantry arrived with a request for my troops to take the firing line, as Colonel Smith's men were running short of ammunition.

I then ordered Company F (Captain O'Brien) and Company G (Captain Wrighter) forward, but they did not succeed in reaching the firing line until after we had passed the English cemetery, as the two companies of the California Infantry, under Major Simes (on our left), were advancing so rapidly.

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On the brow of the hill we encountered a terrific fire, and my companies on the line were pouring a succession of well-directed volleys at San Pedro de Macati, the buildings to the left, and sharpshooters in trees.

At this place I had two men wounded, Private Ray F. Weidmer, of Company C, shot in the left breast, who died a few hours after, and Private Harry R. Crumrine, of Company F, shot in left foot.

We continued to fire by volleys, rushing forward 10 to 15 rods, firing more volleys, and again rushing forward, etc.

After the first fire from my troops, after passing the top of Cemetery Hill, Colonel Smith, who was on the right of the line with one company of the First California Infantry, gave way to the right and disappeared in the timber; Captain Haan's Engineers also moved to the timber on our right, where a few volleys were fired at the enemy's flank. We did not see them again until we reached San Pedro de Macati.

The two companies of California Infantry, under Major Simes, on our left were very hard pressed until the enemy's fire was diverted from them to the Wyoming Infantry. After leaving the English cemetery, Major Simes's companies strung out in our front, and I had to stop the fire of my left company.

We reached San Pedro de Macati at about 11 a. m. without further losses, having been under fire for four hours.

About noon, by command of Colonel Smith, I sent out Companies F and G to clear the woods of remaining insurgents, which they did by firing a few volleys.

At 7 o'clock p. m. I sent Company C (Captain Millar) to report to Major Simes, and that company held the Pasai road along with the companies of the California Infantry until 6.30 a. m., February 6.

At 9.30 p. m. Company F (Captain O'Brien) took possession of Guadalupe, and remained there until the morning of February 7.

On February 6 I left Company C to hold San Pedro de Macati, and supported Major Simes, of the First California Infantry, with companies G and H in the skirmish up the river.

At 9 o'clock p. m., February 6, I received telegraphic instructions to return to Manila immediately. I started with Companies C, H, and G at 9.30 and reached our quarters at midnight, Company F not returning from Guadalupe until toward noon the next day.

I have the honor to further report that it would be impossible for me to designate any particular officer or enlisted man for special mention, as every man of my command was ready and more than willing to do everything he was called on to do, regardless of hunger or want of rest.

Respectfully submitted.

FRANK M. FOOTE,

Major, Commanding First Battalion Wyoming Infantry, U. S. V.

[Inclosure 4.]

CALOOCAN, February 11, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
First Division, Eighth Army Corps.
(Through brigade headquarters.)

SIR: I respectfully submit the following report of the fighting around Blockhouse 13, on February 5, 1899.

Being on outpost duty I was placed there by General Ovenshine the night before, and all was quiet until soon after 8 o'clock the next morning, when the insurgents opened a lively fire soon after the naval guns opened. General Ovenshine rode up between 8.30 and 9 a. m., I judge, and informed me that a force would be sent to take the enemy's trenches to my front and right, and Lieutenant Field, with a company of the Fourteenth Infantry, reported to me. I ordered him into the woods to the right; to advance toward the enemy; to attack him or to support any attack made by our line. After some heavy firing I learned he had been driven back and was off to my right. I had been ordered by General Ovenshine to keep one-half of Troop E at the blockhouse until it was perfectly safe to abandon this shelter.

In less than an hour, I judge, Captain Eastman, with Companies A and C of the Fourteenth Infantry, reported to me as reinforcements. I determined to take this force toward the enemy's trenches to clear the piece of woods and judge whether the enemy's lines were sufficiently shaken by the fire of the fleet and that from 1 field-piece which had reported a short time previously. I went out with this line myself and advanced through the brush with considerable difficulty, as it was difficult to keep

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a line owing to the many obstructions. When in the thick brush, about 50 or 100 yards from the trenches, it seemed almost certain from the position of the line to the trench that we would be overlapped on each flank, and I knew the enemy then had a fire on my left flank. I then determined to withdraw before the action reached a state where this would be impossible. We were not forced to withdraw, but as I knew almost nothing of what was happening on either side and could see nothing, and especially not seeing where my right would connect, I considered it my duty to try and improve our position. After a slight withdrawal on the right and much more on the left, my line was nearly all along the old Spanish trenches. I reported this and was reinforced by 1 company First California, 1 platoon First North Dakota.

Owing to the naval fire my lines could not advance, and just before it ceased a battalion, First Tennessee, came up to consult about acting with me. I thought they could only act to the left, and while waiting for them to get in position a general advance was made, in which all the troops who had reported to me participated. The conduct of the officers and men in Companies A and C, Fourteenth Infantry, was good. Troop E, no casualties.

Respectfully,

F. WHEELER,
Captain Fourth Cavalry.

[Inclosure 5.]

HDQRS. FIRST REGIMENT CALIFORNIA U. S. VOLUNTEER INFANTRY,
San Pedro Mercati, P. I., February 7, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

First Brigade, First Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to report that on the morning of the 5th, about 5 o'clock, the regiment, under orders from the brigade commander, proceeded to East Paco under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Duboce, the colonel commanding having been placed by order of major-general commanding the division in charge of the district south of the Pasig River and the reserve therein contained, for the purpose of preventing and suppressing insurrection.

At about 8.30 o'clock the undersigned, however, by virtue of orders directly issued by the division commander, assumed command of Companies A, E, and H, First Regiment California U. S. Volunteer Infantry, and a battalion First Wyoming U. S. Infantry, and was directed to make an attack on the left flank of the enemy located at Santa Ana, and endeavor to turn it. Companies A, E, and H were under the immediate command of Major Sime, First Regiment California U. S. Volunteer Infantry, and Companies C, F, G, and H, First Battalion Wyoming U. S. Volunteer Infantry, were under the immediate command of Major Foote, constituting a support and reserve for the advance of Companies A, E, and H, First California Volunteers.

The entire command hereinbefore designated forded waist deep a little stream known as the Tripa de Gallina, and under a heavy fire from the enemy, about 1,200 yards distance, advanced to the front without firing a shot save at a small knot of the enemy who opened fire on the flank and who were driven off. Fire on the enemy at Santa Ana was opened at about 600 yards distant. The fire of the enemy becoming heavier and casualties beginning, the advance was made by rushes of companies, two companies keeping up the fire while one rushed forward. Left flank of enemy at Santa Ana was driven into Santa Ana, well within the flank of the Washington regiment and Companies M, F, and K, I believe, of the First Regiment California Volunteers, who were engaged in the attack on Santa Ana and driving the enemy before them toward the river. At this point a force from San Pedro Mercati, who were apparently advancing to the relief of the enemy at Santa Ana, opened fire.

From the direction of the advance of the enemy at San Pedro Mercati, the right flank of Companies A, E, and H was in danger of being turned, and orders were shouted back to the support to come up on the right flank so as to extend it and meet the threatened danger. The order was not heard and motions were then made which evidently were misunderstood. A messenger was then sent back, but evidently did not reach his destination. Intervals were then extended to the right, and Company A of the First California Volunteers on the right flank reverted to meet as far as possible the threatened attack upon the flank, so that a safe advance might be made, but at this moment Captain Haan with a company of engineers came up on the right flank, and with splendid volleys and magnificent steadiness drove back that portion of the enemy who were seeking a clump of trees to make a flank attack, at the same time dislodging a small detachment already there who had previously

retreated to that point under the fire of Captain Dyer's battery. This obviated the necessity for any advance of the support. The enemy were driven out of their position at the English cemetery, where they occupied an old Spanish earthwork and were taking advantage of the stone wall around the cemetery. The company of engineers and Major Sime's command, composed of Companies A, E, and H, California Volunteers, steadily pressed the enemy back into the pueblo of San Pedro Mercati. The enemy occupied intrenchments in front of the town and a churchyard surrounded by a low stone wall. The enemy's fire was very heavy, but our men continued to advance until a distance of about 400 yards was reached, when, seeing the strength of the enemy's position, the company of engineers and a platoon of Company A, First California, from the right flank were detached and ordered to proceed along a row of trees striking our flank at right angles and running toward the Passay road, which, once reached, would carry them concealed to the enemy's left and rear.

The support under Major Foote came up at this point in splendid style and quickly filled the place of the company of engineers and the platoon of Company A, First California, under Lieutenant Ballinger, sent to make the flank and rear attack. The company of engineers and the platoon of Company A, First California, keeping under cover of the trees, advanced to a position where a clear view of the left flank and rear of the enemy was had and opened fire with telling effect. During all this time a heavy fire was kept up by Major Sime's and Major Foote's battalions in front. Within ten minutes after the flank movement and the combined fire from the front and left and rear, the enemy were driven in disorder out of the town seeking escape over the hills and along the Pasig road. San Pedro Mercati was fully occupied by our troops at 10.30 o'clock. The towns of Guadalupe and San Perillo were also occupied by our troops. Guadalupe is about 1 mile east of San Pedro Mercati, and San Perillo is immediately across the river from it. It was necessary to burn a portion of the town of San Perillo in order to clear the front and protect us against the shots of sharpshooters. Burned no more than was necessary in San Perillo. The sparks crossing the river, however, caught in the thatch of some Nipa huts, constituting the western portion of the Pueblo San Pedro Mercati, and burned quite a number of the Nipa structure. It gives me very sincere pleasure to highly praise and specially commend the coolness, bravery, and good judgment displayed by Major Sime in command of Companies A, E, and H, and the coolness, bravery, and sound discretion of Captain Haan, of the Engineers. Neither can I say too much for the intrepidity of the company officers on the fighting line; Captain Connolly, of Company A, Captain Robertson, of Company E, and Lieutenant Davis, commanding Company H, I desire to specially commend. Major Foote and his battalion did good service in front of San Pedro Mercati, and I desire to commend him for work done at that point.

Capt. A. J. Kelleher, regimental adjutant, was sent back from the firing line to bring up the Wyoming battalion from Battery Knoll to act as support and reserve. This work was performed by Captain Kelleher, and he reported to the front in time for the final assault on San Pedro Mercati.

Dr. G. H. Richardson worked hard and energetically in the care of the wounded close to the firing line, dressing the wounded on the field, and sending them back for further attention at the medical stations to the rear.

I can not give too much praise to the conduct of the enlisted men engaged in this operation. The movement forward was steady, fearless, and eager, and they were compelled to march considerable distances under fire without being permitted to return it.

We had hardly got settled in San Pedro Mercati until the Signal Corps had established its field-service telegraph station, and had the instruments working in a very short time. They are entitled to warm praise for their promptness and the efficient work done.

Companies I and C of the First California Volunteers were left in Manila in charge of Major Boxton, and during the battle on the 5th were engaged in suppressing disorders in town. Company B held Pandacan with one company of Washingtons for the purpose of preventing disorders and the crossing of Concordia Creek by the enemy at that point. After the withdrawal of Companies A, E, and H from Battery Knoll, Company D, First California, acted as one of the supporting companies for the battery.

As to the operations of Companies M, K, F, G, and L, I respectfully refer you to report of Lieutenant-Colonel Duboce hereto annexed.

The following is a list of the organizations and officers engaged in the movement against the left flank of the enemy and the assault on San Pedro Mercati:

Battalion First Regiment California United States Volunteer Infantry, commanded by Maj. Hugh Sime, composed of Companies A, E, and H. Company A: John F.

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Connolly, captain; George T. Ballinger, first lieutenant. Company E: William E. Robertson, captain; W. H. Jordan, first lieutenant. Company H: E. F. Davis, first lieutenant, commanding company; T. P. O'Brien, second lieutenant. Regimental adjutant, Capt. A. J. Kelleher; battalion adjutant, First Lieut. J. J. West; assistant surgeon, First Lieut. G. H. Richardson.

Company A, engineers, Captain Haan, commanding.

First Battalion First Wyoming United States Volunteer Infantry, commanded by Maj. M. F. Foote, composed of Companies C, F, G, and H. Company C: Thomas Millar, captain; Lorin Chuon, second lieutenant. Company F: John D. O'Brien, captain; H. D. Coburn, first lieutenant and adjutant; W. H. Rouse, second lieutenant. Company G: D. C. Wrighton, captain; H. P. Howe, first lieutenant. J. W. Morgenridge, second lieutenant and quartermaster. Company H: E. P. Holtenhouse, captain; H. Ohlenkamp, first lieutenant. J. S. Morrison, first lieutenant and surgeon.

The following is a list of all property captured by us, so far as known, up to this time:

- 35 cases ammunition, marked C. R. 37 M. M.
- 8 cases ammunition, marked A. N. 25 M.
- 16 cases ammunition, marked P. P. 1 50 K.
- 1 case steel-pointed brass-coated bullets, 1-inch caliber.
- 161 5-pounder shells.
- 145 solid shot.
- 7 cases solid shot.
- 21 6-inch shells.
- 10 6-inch solid shot.
- 6 6-inch cannister.
- 1 6-inch grape.
- 10 4-inch cannister.
- 54 2-inch cannister.
- 75 5-pounder shot.
- 8 5-inch shells.
- 16 cases miscellaneous ammunition.
- 2 boxes bayonets.
- 2 boxes frogs.
- 15 bundles bolos.
- 1 case Remington ammunition.
- 7 Remington rifles.
- 500 sacks rice.
- 25,000 rounds Mauser ammunition, in addition to shells, powder, fuse, sulphur, etc., sent in to chief ordnance officer by Lieutenant-Colonel Duboce.

He still has two vessels of nitroglycerin under guard.

Captain Banollas, a Spanish prisoner held by insurgents at Pasig, reported 60 wounded brought into hospital at that place Sunday night. Captain Banollas was acting as attendant in hospital.

Very respectfully,

JAMES F. SMITH,

Colonel First Regiment California U. S. Volunteer Infantry, commanding Companies A, E, and H, First California Volunteers; Company A, U. S. Engineers, and Battalion Wyoming Volunteers, on February 5, 1899, during engagement.

SAN PEDRO MACATI, February 5, 1899.

ADJUTANT FIRST REGIMENT CALIFORNIA U. S. VOLUNTEER INFANTRY.

SIR: I have the honor to report that, pursuant to orders, at 4.30 a. m. marched in command of Company A, Captain Connolly; Company E, Captain Robertson, to the station of Battery D, Sixth Artillery, U. S. A., and escorted them to Battery Knoll, near Blockhouse 12, where I was joined by Company K, Captain Cunningham, and Company H, Lieutenant Davis, and the command was placed in support of artillery. Company K was detached and sent to General King.

At 8.30, by orders of Colonel Smith, First Regiment California U. S. Volunteer Infantry, advanced with Companies A, E, and H as a firing line, and attacked the enemy on the left flank of Santa Ana; the enemy began firing at about 1,200 yards; pressed on, and at 600 yards commenced firing and rushing the position. The enemy showing on our right flank, Colonel Smith took Company A and faced them. We rushed the bushes and swung in the flank of Santa Ana. Companies H and E, being with me, opened fire, taking the insurgents in reverse, killing and driving them across the river. The enemy giving way before our men coming in on their front. I

stopped firing and marched to the river bank. We then faced up the river and cleared a force that was in front of us, until we reached at about 1,200 yards of San Pedro Macati, when the enemy commenced a regular and heavy fire. Seeing two lines of American troops to our right and rear, whom I afterwards found to be Company A, First California, and the First Wyoming, advanced to about 400 yards, keeping up fire by companies until we were prevented by the fire from our rear. Had the men cheer so as to define our position, as I found it impossible to flank the force in front as long as the fire kept up on my right and rear. After waiting and finding it did not cease, and seeing a company of regulars come out to the top of a knoll and fire volleys, which I found was the Engineer Company, Captain Haan, then with Companies H and E charged to the front by rushes and took the place. We were soon joined by Company A, and one-half an hour afterwards our reserve, First Wyoming, Major Foote commanding, joined us. Took command of the entire force, and as no insurgents could be found in front, placed the troops to prevent surprise and awaited orders.

I wish to commend the gallant way in which all the men and officers did their duty; no shirking; and with their heavy loads kept up a pace that was simply heartbreacking.

Captain Connolly, Captain Robertson, and Lieutenant Davis did all that any man could do, and handled the commands well. Lieut. J. J. West, as battalion adjutant, did good service. Soon after arriving, Private Swift, of Company E, arrived with a supply of 3,000 rounds of ammunition, which we needed, and he is entitled to great credit for the intelligent and brave way in which he followed us up all alone, under fire at times.

Very respectfully,

H. T. SIME,
Major, First Regiment California U. S. Volunteers.

SAN PEDRO MACATI, *February 18, 1899.*

SIR: I have the honor to report that on February 14, as per order from Colonel Smith, I took command of Company H, Lieutenant Davis, and Company A, Captain Connolly, and marched across the country from Guadalupe to Patero by the country trails; met Captain Miller with 15 men of Company F and 14 men Troop K, Fourth Cavalry, posted on a knoll commanding the country to the east and south as far as the bluffs; marched to the line of bluffs overlooking the river, and, after consulting Lieutenant-Colonel Duboce, who promised to support me, advanced into the valley, one platoon of Company H, under Lieutenant Davis, in reserve on the bluffs, and afterwards guarding my right flank, which was done in a very efficient manner; deployed the line in extended order and advanced across the cultivated land, upon which the enemy opened a heavy and continuous fire upon us from the portion of the town across the river; swung to the right, drove them by our fire from one position where the river bends around to the east; halted Second platoon Company H, Lieutenant O'Brien commanding, and faced them south to protect my right from any force that might advance from Taging, where I was advised a large number was stationed. Company C then rushed to the front to the river, where we found them stationed behind a line of stone walls and in the stone basements of the houses on the other side of the river, with no boats on our side. Our men took position on the bank and actually beat their fire down, so that they did not show themselves at all, except by poking their rifles over the wall and firing aimlessly, and the men even drove them from the windows and gratings. The supporting force from Lieutenant-Colonel Duboce did not report and only showed up at a distance, where they were useless to me. Lieutenant Davis reported a larger force than ours advancing on my right in regular formation, and, as I could not with my small force risk too much by attempting to cross the river, fired the houses and retired to the bluffs and started to return; while retiring was fired upon. We faced about, returning their fire, and were driving them back when a battalion of the First Washington, extended, joined my right, and the enemy ceased firing and retired.

I wish to compliment Lieutenant Davis and Lieutenant O'Brien for their good judgment and gallantry, and Captain Dumbrell for his great coolness and splendid bearing under a hot fire. The men of companies C and H did well, and as those of Company C had at one time the greater opportunity, they stood up like men and did splendidly.

On February 15 took command of Company H, Lieutenant Davis, and Company C, Captain Dumbrell, afterwards joined by Company F, Captain Miller, at first supported and finally took command of the right of the supporting line on the attack on Patero. Withdrew when ordered.

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On the 16th and 17th in command of the line of the Pasay road, and have been under fire almost continually.

The casualties on the 14th were: Wounded—Company C, Privates Allen Brant, Albert Egger, R. L. Hursh, H. W. Fawke, and O. C. Nelson; Company H, Sergt. W. F. Dunne, Corpl. H. Ribber, Privates W. A. Cornish and W. C. Walsh.

I wish to commend the corporal and three privates of the cavalry detachment of Troop K, that accompanied me, for their coolness and bravery, one of whom was grazed slightly on the cheek.

Very respectfully,

H. T. SIME,
Major, First Regiment California U. S. Volunteer Infantry.

HQDQs. FIRST REGIMENT CALIFORNIA U. S. VOLUNTEER INFANTRY,
San Pedro Macati, P. I., March 17, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL UNITED STATES ARMY,
Washington, D. C.

SIR: I have the honor to herewith forward the official reports of the field officers of this command, showing the action from February 4, at 9 p. m., up to and including February 20, and in explanation I desire to state that Col. James F. Smith was suddenly called away before the same could be properly prepared, our command being in the field without office facilities, he having been appointed military governor for the island of Negros, and having departed for that station.

Very respectfully,

VICTOR D. DUBOCE,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BATTALION,
FIRST REGIMENT CALIFORNIA U. S. VOLUNTEER INFANTRY,
Camp Guadalupe, near Manila, February 9, 1899.

REGIMENTAL ADJUTANT.

First Regiment California U. S. Volunteer Infantry.

SIR: I have the honor to report as follows reference to my command since leaving quarters on Saturday night, February 4, 1899:

At 8.30 p. m., on the above date, the first "call to arms" was sounded, and after holding the command under arms for half an hour or more the men were permitted to return to quarters and the companies were dismissed. At the second "call to arms," at 9.30 p. m., I formed the First Battalion, consisting of companies M, F, G, and L, and accompanied by companies K and H moved to the Paco crossroads, and after waiting at that point for orders returned to quarters at midnight, rested on arms until 4 a. m. Sunday, February 5, and after a light breakfast marched the same command, consisting of 6 companies, to the Paco bridge, arriving there at 5.15 a. m. Companies K and H reported to Major Sime, and at 5.45 I marched First Battalion to General King's headquarters in Paco, throwing companies M and F on the right under protection of the stone basement of the houses on the side street, and companies L and G on the left, as that position was in the zone of fire from the Santa Ana front. About 6 a. m., by direction of General King, I sent Company M, Capt. Thomas F. O'Neil, and Company F, Captain Miller, forward to Blockhouse 11 to support the firing line of the First Washington Regiment. I then directed Lieutenant Sparrowe, commanding Company G, to send one platoon under Lieutenant Swasey forward to clear out insurgents from the houses on each side of the road from which they were firing upon our passing troops, having killed one driver of an ambulance wagon and wounding several. Afterwards sent balance of company under Lieutenant Sparrowe to assist in this work as the cross firing became general from both sides of the road and houses along the side streets. Also directed Captain Eggert, commanding Company L, to send squads down side streets for the same purpose under Lieutenants Curzons and Adler. Ten or more insurgents were killed and many wounded during this cross-street fight, which extended one block back of the road on the right and two or three blocks back of the road on the left.

By authority of General King I ordered all houses burned from which shots had been fired or was known to be occupied by insurgents, and found it necessary in order to protect the main road, which was the only one practical to use for troops, ammunition, supplies, and ambulances, to burn all shacks on both sides of the road to

Blockhouse 11, being careful not to let the fire come back to the Washington quarters or the houses of several Europeans. Company K, Captain Cunningham, reported to me for duty, and by General King's orders I sent him forward to support the left flank of the Washington and Idaho regiments on the firing line. This cross-street firing continued for nearly two hours, when reports came to me that the insurgents had been firing from the Paco church and convent in front upon the main road, and a platoon of Company L, under Lieutenant Curzons. Gathering together platoons and squads of both companies L and G, assisted by a portion of an Idaho company and the members of the Washington Guard, we surrounded the church on three sides and for half an hour exchanged a continuous and lively fire with the armed party in the second story of the convent and church. I sent word to Captain Dyer, of the Sixth U. S. Artillery, and he opened with shot and shell on the church from Battery Knoll for some twenty minutes, firing about twelve shots. Insurgents kept up a fire across the main road, not only firing upon General King and staff, at troops and supply wagons, but drivers of our ambulances with the red cross plainly displayed had to run the gauntlet of this fire in order to return with the wounded to the Reserve Hospital. At this point I took the stand that the church and convent was an insurgent fortification, and ordered our men to burn out the insurgents, as there seemed to be at least a hundred of them, judging from the firing and movements at the windows. Part of the roof of the church proper was already on fire from a bursting shell and our men got together coal oil, lard oil, and other combustibles from the surrounding stores, and running into the lower portion of the convent, under the firing from the second story, quickly distributed the said combustibles, and within ten minutes the church and convent were in flames. Two natives were killed in running out while the church was burning, while many escaped to the huts in the rear of the church under cover of smoke. While the convent was burning a continuous report of discharging cartridges could be heard within the building, showing conclusively that it was a prearranged plan to use the church for fighting purposes, and as no natives were seen to enter the place with arms, the rifles and ammunition must certainly have been previously placed there for the purpose used. In nearly all houses burned the same condition seemed to exist, reference to having ammunition, and in several such shacks not less than 500 to 1,000 cartridges must have exploded during the fire. After driving the insurgents out from both sides of the road and well down to the north side, matters quieted down about noon.

In addition to the bodies in the church and convent we buried 10 natives, and several dead and a large number of wounded were carried away by their own people. Fifty-three prisoners were taken as captives of war, being the ones firing from houses upon us, and were deemed insurgents, while not less than 500 men, apparently peaceable, and 2,000 women and children were sent back over the Paco bridge toward Manila, with instructions, through interpreters, not to return until matters were quiet. No house was burned that was not considered a military necessity, and in every case consideration was given the peaceable men, women, and children.

Upon receiving an urgent order from General Anderson for a company to support the Fourteenth United States Infantry on the firing line toward Malate, I sent Company L, Captain Eggert commanding, to report, under directions of an aid.

Company A, Washington Volunteers, Captain Otis commanding, returned with prisoners from the front about 1 p. m., and through him I sent the 53 prisoners taken at Paco back to the walled city.

During the forenoon Lieutenant Tobin, ordnance officer, sent to the front all the ammunition it was possible for our limited transportation to get out from headquarters, and ordered it distributed, regardless of commands, where it would do the most good.

Commissary supplies were forwarded to the various companies of this regiment by Commissary Sergeant Clifford, as I had up to this time managed to keep track of the positions of the several companies, which included positions at Pandacan, Santa Ana, San Pedro Macati, and Battery Knoll.

The Medical Corps, under the personal supervision of Major McCarthy, established a field hospital at Paco and all wounded were promptly treated and returned by ambulance to the Reserve Hospital.

During the afternoon matters were comparatively quiet, although I had squads in every direction throughout Paco, in addition to the regular guards, as trouble was still expected from the north of Paco in the direction of Pana Francia, the direction in which we had driven the insurgents.

About 5 p. m. three insurgents were discovered in the tower of the burned church firing periodically on the road, and, by authority of General Anderson, I sent word to Captain Dyer, who fired several shots, but could not get the exact range of the tower.

At dusk a battalion of three companies of the Washington Volunteers, commanded by Captain Fortson, reported to me for duty, viz: Company A, Captain Otis; Company

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E, Captain Scudder; Company G, Captain Ellrich, and during the night I established double guards throughout Paco, with two continuous patrols, but no event occurred worthy of mention, everything being quiet.

I desire to commend the prompt and willing manner in which the officers and men of companies M, F, and K responded to their orders to the firing line, and especially commend the officers and men of L and G companies for their personal bravery in fighting two and three lines of cross fires simultaneously, by squads, and singly entering and driving out insurgents from their houses in the face of Mauser rifles and knives.

Respectfully submitted.

VICTOR D. DUBOCE,

*Lieutenant-Colonel First Regiment California U. S. Volunteer Infantry,
Commanding First Battalion.*

HQRS. FIRST BATTALION, FIRST CALIFORNIA U. S. VOLUNTEER INFANTRY,
Camp Guadalupe, near Manila, February 9, 1899.

REGIMENTAL ADJUTANT,

First Regiment California U. S. Volunteer Infantry.

SIR: I have the honor to continue my report as follows:

Monday morning, February 6, by direction of General King, two of the Washington companies reported back to their quarters for rest, and were subsequently sent to Santa Ana to reinforce their command. During the day patrols were sent out, but very little occurred worthy of note, other than a few prisoners having been sent in from the front and suspicious natives taken prisoners in Paco.

Company D, Captain McCreagh, reported to me for duty, having been relieved from the support of the artillery at Battery Knoll, and by him I sent in 27 prisoners to the walled city. At 5.45 p. m. General King directed me to report to San Pedro Macati with companies B (on outpost duty at Pandacan), D, and G that night, and arrangements were made to leave after supper. Orders were sent to Captain Filmer at Pandacan, and at 8.15 p. m. the three companies took up the line of march, arriving about 10 p. m. at San Pedro Macati, and troops were quartered in church.

Monday, February 7.—At 8 a. m. I was directed by Colonel Smith to occupy Guadalupe with the First Battalion, consisting of companies M, L, F, and G, and took up quarters in the convent adjoining the church. During the day I sent out two scouting parties under Lieutenants Sparrowe and Nippert up the river some two miles or more and well across the country toward the bay. Lieutenant Nippert's party captured 18,000 rounds of ammunition and one large box of shells back of the line of native huts, near the river. This ammunition was promptly removed to headquarters, and, upon telegraphic requests sent in, the chief ordnance officer sent out for same. A fire was started late in the afternoon surreptitiously, and, notwithstanding a thorough investigation was made, no information could be obtained in reference to its origin. Owing to the high wind this fire burned some twenty or more shacks and two or three native houses along the river bank. After dark double guards were posted and extra vigilance maintained throughout the night without note.

Wednesday, February 8.—At 9 a. m. I personally conducted a scouting party up the river, consisting of Company L, accompanied by Captain Eggert, Lieutenant Curzons, and Lieutenant Harting. We carefully advanced, with an advance guard ahead, along the river bank through the native village of St. Nicholas, which we found deserted, to a position opposite the point of the island of Pasig, at which place we arrived at 10.30 a. m. and carefully noted crude earthworks thrown up on two sides, and after close observation with a glass we discovered the same entirely deserted and a number of white flags on the huts near the river bank. Upon our showing ourselves and making friendly overtures to the natives, two of them came out with white flags and in answer to our questions stated there were no soldiers on the island and that they "no quiere combate." This I interpreted as a willingness on their part to negotiate a peaceable surrender and managed to make them understand that they must send for the officials of the town of Pasig, which they agreed to do, and at 11 a. m. Doroteo Jose and Mr. Valentine Ruez, representing the president and council of Pasig, crossed over the river and informed me that Pasig was a peaceable town, with no soldiers, but from what I could understand they were not desirous of surrendering. This, I informed them, was not consistent, and that they must surrender peaceably. After some conversation, through an interpreter, they verbally tendered me the surrender of Pasig at 11.16 a. m., and I immediately informed them that they must return to the president and the council and have them certify the same in writing, which they also agreed to do and return within an hour. At 11.45 report

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came to me that the gunboat was coming up the river, and I reported through Lieutenant Curzons to Colonel Smith the action I had taken in receiving the verbal surrender, and was expecting the written surrender momentarily. A few minutes before noon Mr. Jose and Mr. Ruez returned, and while they were waiting on the opposite bank for a boat to cross, General King's aid arrived (at 12.02), and a few minutes later I received the written surrender of Pasig, which I had read to me by the interpreter and found the same duly signed by the president and several members of the council, in accordance with the instructions I had previously given, and personally reported back, together with the Pasig commissioners, to General King, who was a quarter of a mile back on the road. I made a verbal report to the general and handed him the surrender, and after a consultation with Colonel Smith I was directed to occupy Pasig and establish one company at that point. I immediately sent back to Guadalupe for the balance of Company L, who arrived at 2.15 p. m. A large boat was sent for, and after some difficulty in crossing the river, which included drifting downstream a half mile or more, the tugboat stuck in the mud, etc., we managed to get over to Pasig, and at 3.30 p. m. headquarters were established at the convent adjoining the church, with a wire which the Signal Corps had connected up. I sent a dispatch to General King to that effect and notified Colonel Smith afterwards that patrols had been sent out, the country round surveyed from the church tower, and other details arranged for, the guards, etc. Leaving Pasig under the command of Captain Eggert, I returned to Guadalupe at 6.30 p. m. Nothing further worthy of note other than that general care was taken in reference to the Cossack posts and strong guards established.

Thursday, February 9.—About 1.30 a. m. dispatches were received in reference to the firing on General MacArthur's line and all officers were notified and cooks called and every detail arranged for a quick turn-out if same was necessary. At 9.30 a. m., in accordance with instructions, Company M, Captain O'Neil, relieved Company K outpost guard on the river bank running from here to San Pedro Macati, and Company F, Captain Miller, relieving Company C of the First Idaho Regiment on duty as outpost guard at the cemetery and vicinity back of San Pedro Macati.

Up to the time of making this report there has nothing further occurred to-day worthy of mention.

In making this report I have confined myself as nearly as possible to the military movements and operations of the troops under my command, making no report on casualties, which will be reported by the company commanders.

Respectfully submitted.

VICTOR D. DUBOCE,
Lieutenant-Colonel First Regiment California U. S. Volunteer Infantry,
Commanding First Battalion.

GUADALOUPE, *February 16, 1899.*

ADJUTANT,

First Regiment California U. S. Volunteer Infantry.

SIR: I have the honor to report as follows in reference to details of attacks on the outpost opposite Pasig, and the subsequent engagements.

On Monday, February 13, about 11 a. m., the extreme outpost on this side of the river just above the Pasig ferry was fired upon by several natives in a hut some 200 yards distant, and upon my receiving the report thereof I sent Company G, Lieutenant Sparrowe commanding, to their support. After reporting same to headquarters and receiving orders from General Anderson direct, who rode up to Guadalupe, Company F, Captain Miller, was called in from the cemetery outpost, and accompanied by Company D, Captain McCreagh, I went to the Pasig ferry, where Company L, previously stationed at Pasig, was directed to retire to. By 3 p. m. I had these three companies distributed on the bluffs opposite Pasig ferry with strong outposts over the hills to the west and south, and advanced Company D on road toward the point where Company G's outpost had been fired upon, and when approaching near this place the retreating insurgents, numbering 8 or 10, fired upon the advance guard of Company D, and they immediately intrenched themselves behind road in a natural line of intrenchments running down to the creek, driving natives in the bushes across the creek to the town of Patero. Some 40 or 50 shots were exchanged. This was about 5.30 p. m. After routing these insurgents, the hut from which they had fired was burned, and under cover of darkness I retired the company to a better line of natural intrenchments on a line with the other outpost running up the southern portion of Pasig Bluffs. The gunboat, under Captain Randolph, anchored a little inside the ferry point, and I had a consultation with him in reference to possibilities of attack during the night. Nothing, however, occurred worthy of mention

other than constant vigilance was sustained. I established my headquarters at Pasi Ferry, where the signal corps had also established a telegraph station.

Tuesday, February 14.—At daylight Captain Randolph retired his gunboat to San Pedro Macati. At 6.44 a. m. Colonel Smith wired me that Major Sime would advance over the middle country to the bluffs to the south of Patero to aid me in gathering in any insurgents in that vicinity, and I replied that in my judgment I had ample force to scout as far west as advisable, but from my experience of the previous day was quite confident that an engagement would be brought on if more action was taken, it being my opinion that an insurgent force was at Patero ready for a fight. Shortly after this Colonel Smith directed me to take a company on to Patero to see if the insurgents were there. I advanced with Company L, Captain Eggert, sending forward a section under Lieutenant Curzons, and after marching down the road a little less than a mile we arrived opposite the town of Patero, and the moment that the advanced section of Company L showed themselves through the opening across the creek they received a volley, fired by at least 20 insurgents on the opposite bank. The fire was returned, and after an exchange of not less than 100 shots I withdrew Company L to the bluffs and under cover of same retired to our original position and wired Colonel Smith these facts, and established my command in a defensive position to hold Pasi bluffs, and suggested gunboat and more troops if further action was required. At 11.45 the cavalry was sent through the interior country, and about a half mile east of our lines routed up several insurgents, whom they gave chase to for some 3 miles to the south of our position, Captain Miller taking 20 men of Company F to their support. About 2.15 p. m. Major Sime, with Companies C and H, reported on bluffs about 1 mile south of my extreme outpost and I rode over to consult with him in compliance with orders, explaining to him that the only insurgents that might be termed guerrillas were being chased by the cavalry southerly, and from my experience that morning at Patero I advised him that he would likely bring on a general engagement if he advanced, but he having orders to do so providing insurgents were there, decided to carry out his instructions and informed me that in his opinion he would find Patero deserted. I agreed to give him what support I could and returned to my position, he going down the bluffs toward Patero, and about 3 p. m. he was fired upon from his right flank and in a few minutes from his front. I sent the remaining portion of Company F, under Lieutenant Nippert, around the bluffs to his support, and Company L, Captain Eggert, along the road, advancing Company D, Captain McCreagh, to the forward line of trenches, but on account of the shrubbery and low growth of trees very little assistance could be given. Major Sime's two companies, notwithstanding the fact that they were under a continuous fire for over an hour, replying in sharp volleys and advancing nearly to the creek bank opposite Patero. Companies L and D fired as far along the river bank as any evidences of insurgents were and as would be safe for our own troops. After one hour's spirited firing it quieted down, and for an hour and half following the main fire continued at intervals, Major Sime retreating to the bluffs. At 5.30 I sent word, through Bugler Anderson and Mr. Ike Sweitzer, late of Company K, to cease firing, with instructions for Companies D, L, and F to return to their old positions, and for Major Sime to retire to bluffs on right of Company F's extreme outpost. The three companies ceased firing and returned to positions as directed. Captain Miller reported through Bugler Anderson that Major Sime had retired entirely from the field of action across the country, and about 8 p. m. a messenger from Major Sime reported to me that he had returned across country, together with 2 companies of the Washingtons, which were retired by his orders without reporting to me, and at 8.05 I reported by wire to Colonel Smith. In the meantime the gunboat had arrived, and after two attempts to get around bend drifted downstream with paddle wheel disabled, but from that position fired three shots toward Patero about 6.30 p. m. About an hour or so later the boat got in excellent position behind bend, and in trying to land a rapid fire gun in a small boat the same capsized. Lost gun and 2 men overboard, one being Lieutenant Harding, of the South Dakotas, who was drowned in the rapid current. The other one was rescued through the personal bravery of Private Leroy C. Bunker, of Company L, who stripped off his shirt and jumped into the rapid current at the bend and with his assistance the second man was rescued. A search party was sent down the river on this side for nearly a mile without success in trying to find Lieutenant Harding, and one of the other lieutenants from the gunboat swam over and went down the other bank with a like result. About 9.30 p. m. Colonel Smith arrived with 4 companies of the Washingtons, which were posted on the bluffs for the night. After a restless night of ceaseless vigilance nothing occurred worthy of mention.

Wednesday, February 15.—Colonel Smith notified me early in the morning that he would advance from San Pedro Macati, with several companies of infantry and a detachment of the Fourth Cavalry, up through the interior and swing around on the left flank of bluffs to attack Patero. Two of the Astor guns were brought up the

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road by Lieutenant Keeler and placed in position on point, and at about noon the troops had arrived across country and the battery opened fire on the town of Patero. For four hours or more these guns, together with the gunboat, which arrived later in the afternoon, and two more like guns on the road, under command of Lieutenant Hawthorne, bombarded the town of Patero and suburbs, with more or less firing by the infantry from the bluffs and the companies under my command from their old positions. About 4.30 p. m. Colonel Smith issued orders to retire our lines, and Company F was returned to quarters, and by 6 p. m. Companies I and G had returned to Guadalupe, where, in addition to Company M, I found Companies C and D of the First Idaho, and after establishing an extra strong chain of double outposts, the night was passed without further note.

Thursday, February 16.—At 5.30 a. m. our outposts were fired upon, and I immediately dispatched a strong patrol to ascertain the particulars, and it being so near the time for reveille I had first call sounded immediately, and ten minutes later reveille, and got the men out quickly, sending a platoon of Company G to strengthen their outpost which had been fired upon. Reports came in that the insurgents had fired several shots from up the river, and Company M, Captain O'Neil, was sent down on the road to strengthen that important point, with half of Company L between his position and the rear of the church wall. Company C, Lieutenant Hartman, and Company D, Lieutenant Gage, of the First Idaho, under the command of Captain McRoberts, were placed in the rear and south of the church, covering up to the southwest corner, with Company G and the balance of Company L on the extreme right.

With these positions a complete semicircle was formed, reaching from the river around the church to San Pedro Macati, and from 6.45 a. m. a number of shots were exchanged with the advancing insurgents on the river road and from the south, and our men replied with volleys to such an extent that it turned the insurgents to our extreme right, where most of them passed over the hill toward our lines running from San Pedro Macati to Pasay. The fire quieting down breakfast was sent out to the men on the line and for the next two and a half hours matters were comparatively quiet, although we were receiving a few shots from the insurgents, who could be plainly seen from the tower of Guadalupe church, which controls a fine view to the southwest up to our lines. A number of insurgent troops in squads of from 10 to 50 were coming up over the ridge of the hills, and with field glasses their uniforms could be distinctly seen and three officers on horseback easily recognized by their swords and uniforms. They were continually yelling and at short intervals sounded their bugles. The largest body noticeable included fully 100 men, nearly all of whom were in the regulation uniform. Most of these troops moved slowly forward toward the cemetery, but upon being fired upon as well as shelled they retreated somewhat and moved toward the sky line in a southwesterly direction. At about 10.30 a. m. some 200 of these insurgents came up toward Guadalupe on the right center of our lines and opened fire upon us, and about 11 o'clock a general engagement was brought on which lasted some twenty minutes, being an almost ceaseless continuous fire with squad and platoon volleys by our troops. Several sharp volleys being fired successively turned their advance and they moved back slowly, retreating from hill to hill under cover of the brush to the southwest. A few remained in sight until about 2.30 p. m. A little after 1 p. m. I drew in the lines to a short distance in rear of the church with 8 double outposts on the same line running from the river around to the San Pedro Macati road. This attack was a deliberate one for the reason that from our outlook in the tower we could discern the consultations and maneuverings of two separate parties that advanced together and fired almost simultaneously. Many shots were fired into us during the afternoon, while very few were returned, and by dark the firing had entirely ceased. All the companies were placed on the line for the night and every precaution taken to defend an attack, with positive orders to draw no fire even though we were fired upon. The night passed quietly with nothing further to report under this date.

Respectfully submitted.

VICTOR D. DUBOCE,
Lieutenant-Colonel First California U. S. Volunteer Infantry.

GUADALOUPE, *February 17, 1899—12 p. m.*

ADJUTANT,
First Regiment California U. S. Volunteer Infantry.

SIR: I have the honor to report that at dawn this a. m. the insurgents directly in our front and to the rear of church began firing, and at 6.30 a. m. quite a brisk fire was aimed at the two Idaho companies, also L and M companies' position. The fire has

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been kept up off and on all day by their sharpshooters and small volleys. I have controlled our fire as much as possible and only permitted firing by our sharpshooters at insurgents plainly seen or volleys at more than one. The insurgents are plainly visible in the open spaces at distances of 50 to 200 yards. My lines have been well drawn in and form a continuous chain from river to extreme right. The men of M, L, and G companies have been on almost continuous duty now for three days and nights, and under this strain behave nobly although dead tired. Many have had to be retired on account of exhaustion, and I have recommended that 2 rapid-fire guns be sent me in order to stop this straining fire and constant tour of duty for all hands. While the companies relieve each other somewhat during the day, at night none can rest under nervous strain and almost constant firing. At 10 a. m., 10.30 p. m., and 11.30 p. m. heavy firing lasted from twenty minutes to half hour each.

Respectfully submitted.

VICTOR D. DUBOCE,
Lieutenant-Colonel First Regiment California U. S. Volunteer Infantry.

SAN PEDRO MACATI, P. I., February 19, 1899.

ADJUTANT,

First Regiment California U. S. Volunteer Infantry.

SIR: I have the honor to report as follows on the occurrences of yesterday, the 18th instant, and up to the arrival of Companies M, L, and G of my command at this place after the evacuation of Guadalupe.

The insurgents kept up a ceaseless fire upon us from midnight of the 17th instant until 3 a. m. Saturday, February 18, and from that hour up to dawn at intervals.

During the forenoon little firing occurred other than a few sharpshooters, who never missed an opportunity to fire at parties showing themselves in tower or on road. About 4.30 p. m. I received orders from General King to be prepared to evacuate Guadalupe upon receiving orders, and to immediately send to San Pedro Macati all ammunition and heavy baggage. This was promptly done, and about one hour later I notified the General that all heavy baggage had gone and all men of M, L, and G were in trenches with full equipment, and I could retire in ten minutes from time of receiving orders. I conveyed orders to Captain McRoberts, and he reported to General King with his two Idaho companies about 6 p. m. Subsequently I received orders to burn church and convent upon retiring and awaiting orders; all men were on duty in trenches all night. Off and on from 7 p. m. until 3 a. m. brisk firing from insurgents from our front near river, which was answered by our lines. At 5.30 a. m. the signal word "quit" was sent by General King, and in accordance with prearranged plan I quietly retired firing line under cover of trenches and fired convent in several places, and by 5.50 a. m. my command was safely on road and church in flames. At 6.10 a. m. I reported at San Pedro Macati with my three companies.

I desire to commend the officers and men of my command for their long, patient, and continuous duty in trenches, as last night completed the fourth consecutive night that all hands were on duty with little or no opportunity to rest during the days between. Insurgents were plainly seen within 100 yards or less of our lines, and the surrounding brush and bamboo made it possible for them to approach to a very uncomfortable and dangerous proximity before being seen, and only by the most vigilant watch and good execution on firing line were they kept at bay. Our sharpshooters picked several off, to say nothing of results of volleys fired. All last night an attack was momentarily expected in numbers which would exceed ours by many times.

Respectfully submitted.

VICTOR D. DUBOCE,
Lieutenant-Colonel First California U. S. Volunteer Infantry.

SAN PEDRO MACATI, P. I., February 20, 1899.

ADJUTANT,

First Regiment California U. S. Volunteer Infantry.

SIR: I have the honor to report that at 5 p. m., under orders from General King, I sent two companies, M and L, out from the cemetery in column of files, and when about 500 yards advanced in the direction of Guadalupe they marched by the left flank and, advancing in line of skirmishers toward the river, they closed in on the

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insurgents, who were intrenched on the stone bridge on road, and ruins of burned house, completely routing the enemy from their position and killing not less than a dozen, 6 of whom were found dead behind their fortifications at stone bridge. The engagement was brisk for about forty minutes, our men firing continuously with telling effect. Company G was held under arms to act as support, but their assistance was not required. At 6:20 p. m. I sent word to cease firing and retire, by order of General King.

This coup was under the personal direction of the General, and Companies M and L can not be complimented too highly for the efficient manner in which same was carried out.

At 7 p. m. I had a detail of 10 men each from Companies M, L, F, and G report to Captain O'Neil to go out and bring in the 6 dead insurgents at stone bridge. This was accomplished without firing.

I refer you to the reports of Captain O'Neil and Captain Eggert for further detail.

Very respectfully,

VICTOR DUBOCE,

Lieutenant-Colonel First Regiment California U. S. Volunteer Infantry.

[Inclosure 6.]

HEADQUARTERS FOURTEENTH INFANTRY,
Pasay, Manila, P. I., February 10, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL UNITED STATES ARMY,
Washington, D. C.

(Through military channels.)

SIR: I have the honor to report that about 10 p. m. February 4, 1899, heavy firing was heard on our advanced lines. The Fourteenth United States Infantry was immediately posted, as had been previously directed in case of an attack, on the Cingalon road as follows: First Battalion, Companies G, I, and K, Capt. Leon A. Matile, Fourteenth Infantry, commanding, on the right; Second Battalion, Companies D, F, and M, Capt. John Murphy, Fourteenth Infantry, commanding, in the center; Third Battalion, Companies A, C, and E, Capt. Frank F. Eastman, Fourteenth Infantry, commanding, on the left. Company L, Fourteenth Infantry, was directed to remain as a guard over the quarters and property at Cuartel de Malate. The three battalions covered the Cingalon road from Blockhouse No. 12, on the left, to near Calle Nueva, on the right, and remained in this position during the night.

About 7 a. m. February 5, 1899, the First and Second battalions were ordered to advance to the Spanish trenches, and two companies of the Third Battalion were designated to advance on receipt of orders from the brigade commander. This battalion became separated from me at this time and joined about 3.30 p. m. at Pasay, after the flank movement in front of Blockhouse No. 14 was made. This movement, driving the enemy quickly from our front, ended the fighting for the day.

Immediately after this the regiment was formed on the road leading to Pasay, in front of Blockhouse No. 14, expecting to again meet the enemy at Pasay, where it was understood they were to make a stand. After reaching Pasay and finding the enemy did not make the expected resistance, the Second Battalion was directed to remain. The First and Third battalions advanced to San Pedro de Macati, a distance of about 3 miles northeast, and where connection was made with our troops on the left. A line of outposts was then established from a point about one-half mile southwest from San Pedro de Macati till connection was made with our troops on the right, the line of outposts being about 2 miles long. This was accomplished about dark on the evening of the 5th of February, 1899.

I inclose the reports of the different battalion commanders, showing the part each took in the engagement which followed the advance made from the Cingalon road.

The fighting was very severe all along the line, especially in the Second Battalion, commanded by Capt. John Murphy, his advance being made toward Blockhouse No. 14, a point the enemy had evidently considered of great importance to hold, having made a perfect line of intrenchments in front of the intrenchments held by the Spanish troops against the insurgents. Captain Murphy's advance is deserving of great credit, and he should be rewarded. It was during this advance that the gallant Lieutenant Mitchell fell, having received a mortal wound from which he died February 7, 1899; the last words of this brave and exceptionally fine officer on the battlefield being, "Forward men! Advance! Don't mind me."

Words can not express the cool behavior and fearless conduct of both officers and men of the Fourteenth United States Infantry during the battle of February 5, 1899,

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in front of Manila, P. I. The battalion commanders and company officers had good control of their men throughout the engagement, and the men responded to their orders with a will and obedience, the result of which caused the enemy to evacuate their position on a run—all who were so fortunate as to be able to do so. The battalion commanders—Captain Matile, Captain Murphy, and Captain Eastman—deserve credit, also all their company officers—First Lieut. William S. Biddle, jr., commanding Company C; First Lieut. Alfred Hasbrouck, jr., commanding Company K; First Lieut. James Mitchell, commanding Company M; First Lieut. Armand A. Lasseigne, commanding Company D; Second Lieut. Perry L. Miles, commanding Company I; Second Lieut. Robert Field, commanding Company E; Second Lieut. Frank M. Savage, Fifteenth Infantry, now on duty with the Fourteenth Infantry, commanding Company G; Second Lieut. P. H. Mullay, commanding Company F; Second Lieut. J. L. Gilbreth, commanding Company A, and Second Lieut. J. B. Kemper, who commanded Company D during the first part of the engagement. I am very much indebted to Capt. Charles H. Martin, assistant quartermaster, United States Volunteers, who rendered most valuable assistance throughout the night and day, many times being exposed to the heavy fire of the enemy; also to Lieutenant Lyle, of the Eighteenth Infantry, who reported to me during the night and rendered valuable service throughout the engagement.

I also inclose the report of Assistant Surgeon Kemp, U. S. A., on duty with the Fourteenth Infantry, who was untiring in his efforts to relieve the wounded, and his work was so effective and quickly done that nothing but praise for it can be given by the Fourteenth Infantry.

Second Lieut. William A. Burnside, acting regimental quartermaster, Fourteenth Infantry, was left in command of Cuartel de Malate. His service in supplying the regiment with ammunition, rations, and whatever was needed from the cuartel was perfect.

All the praise for the very effective work done by the Fourteenth United States Infantry on February 5, 1899, is due to the battalion commanders, company commanders, and enlisted men of the regiment.

The following is a tabulated statement of the regiment as it was on February 5, 1899:

Company.	Number engaged.	Number wounded.	Number killed.
A.....	81	3	2
C.....	71	2
D.....	70	3
E.....	72	11
F.....	68	23
G.....	86	1
I.....	82	10	2
K.....	82	5
L.....	15
M.....	80	6	6
Total.....	707	34	10

¹Since died.

²Includes 1 officer since died, while in command of Company M, Fourteenth Infantry.

I acquiesce entirely in Captain Murphy's recommendation regarding Second Lieut. Perry L. Miles, Fourteenth Infantry.

Very respectfully,

CARROLL H. POTTER,
Major, Fourteenth Infantry, Commanding.

[Inclosure 7.]

ON PICKET NEAR SAN PEDRO MACATI, *February 9, 1899.*

ADJUTANT FOURTEENTH INFANTRY.

SIR: I have the honor to report that on the night of February 4, at about 10 o'clock p. m., the First Battalion, commanded by me, consisting of Companies K (First Lieut. Alfred Hasbrouck), G (Second Lieut. F. M. Savage, Fifteenth Infantry), and I, under command of First Sergt. John M. Averitt, took position on the Cingalon road, to the east and west of bridge near Malate, as ordered.

There was no firing on our front during the night. About 7 o'clock a. m., February 5, the battalion received orders to move at once and occupy a line of Spanish

works in our immediate front. During the early part of the advance quite a spirited fire was kept up by the insurgents. When within about 400 yards of the works a charge was made and the enemy withdrew. At about 10.30 a. m. the battalion again moved forward and charged across a piece of cleared ground to a narrow strip of timber from which the enemy were pouring a heavy fire upon us. The move was successfully accomplished without a loss of any killed and but three wounded. The loss of the enemy was quite heavy, 30 being reported as found dead near one place.

The brigade commander then gave orders to retire to our previous position.

At about 12.30 p. m. the battalion was ordered to make a turn to the left to flank the Philippine trenches which had been pouring a heavy fire on Blockhouse No. 14 for more than three hours. This move was made on a most difficult ground, through thick chapparal, bean patches, and over a good deal of thick swampy ground, and across two deep, muddy streams, the battalion being all the time under a very severe fire for nearly half an hour. It was a complete success, forcing the enemy from their trenches and driving them from their last stronghold. Our loss was 3 killed and 16 wounded. The command then joined the regiment and marched to Pasay, where the enemy was supposed to be strongly intrenched. No further fighting occurred during the day, and the battalion was posted as pickets, guarding the road between San Pedro Macati and Pasay.

Both the company officers and men are entitled to the highest praise for their gallantry and bravery displayed by them during the entire battle, but especially so during the last engagement, which ended so disastrously to the enemy.

Very respectfully,

L. A. MATILE,
Captain, Fourteenth Infantry, Commanding Battalion.

[Inclosure 8.]

PASAY, P. I., *February 8, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, United States Army,
Washington, D. C.

(Through commanding officer, Fourteenth Infantry.)

SIR: About 7 o'clock a. m. the 5th instant, pursuant to instructions from the brigade commander, I was ordered by the regimental commander to take two companies of my battalion, advance and occupy the old Spanish works, distance about 1,000 yards from the Singalong road, along which the regiment had been lying under arms during the preceding night. I advanced with Companies M and F, under command of Lieuts. J. Mitchell and P. Mullay, respectively, and when within about 500 yards of the Spanish works Company M was joined in the advance by about 20 men of Company I, who were on outpost duty under command of Lieut. P. L. Miles. These troops advanced up the swamp, which was about 50 yards in width, to about 300 yards from the insurgent line to a thin hedge, and upon advancing from this position met a severe fire from the front and left flank. At about 200 yards from the enemy's trenches Lieutenant Mitchell fell from a fatal wound in the stomach. Lieutenant Miles assumed command of the company, and the advance was continued and the old Spanish trenches to left of Blockhouse No. 14 and insurgent trenches in front of blockhouse were carried, after which the troops entered Blockhouse No. 14, driving out insurgents, part of whom retreated across the road into the underbrush, and others on the left retired to their intrenchments on Pasay road. During this advance Company M and the detachment of Company I on outpost duty lost 8 men killed and 19 wounded. Company F in the advance was on the right of the line, and when within about 200 yards of the trenches the insurgents opened a heavy fire in our front from the bamboo thickets and underbrush in which they were concealed, wounding 2 men. Our men returned the fire, which was continued for a few minutes, after which the insurgents retreated and we advanced and occupied the works. Lieutenant Lyle, of the Eighteenth Infantry, accompanied Company F and rendered efficient service, there being but one officer with the company, and for which he has my thanks.

The conduct of the officers and men during this advance was splendid, and great credit is due to the cool and efficient manner in which the officers performed their duty, especially so that of Lieutenant Miles, whose coolness and intrepidity inspired great confidence in the men, he leading the advance and being the first to enter the old Spanish works, and for which he certainly should receive some recognition. About half an hour after the taking of the works Company D, commanded by Lieutenant Kemper, reported to me and I placed it in position on the right of the line.

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About 10 o'clock Lieutenant Lasseigne, the permanent commander, who was on sick report, arrived and assumed command of the company.

After the capture of the Spanish works a desultory fire was kept up by the insurgents from their intrenchments, which was returned by our men at intervals and which continued until about 2 o'clock p. m., when a flank movement was made and the insurgent works captured. The battalion then joined the regiment and proceeded to Pasay, where my battalion was ordered to remain.

Very respectfully,

JOHN MURPHY,
*Captain, Fourteenth Infantry, Commanding Second Battalion,
Fourteenth Infantry, composed of Companies F, D, and M.*

[Inclosure 9.]

PASAY, NEAR MANILA, P. I., *February 9, 1899.*

ADJUTANT FOURTEENTH UNITED STATES INFANTRY.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by the Third Battalion, Fourteenth Infantry, in the battle of February 5, 1899, in the outskirts of Malate, south of Manila, P. I.

At about 4 o'clock a. m. I joined and assumed command of the battalion. At that time Company C, under Lieutenant Biddle, was in the immediate vicinity of Blockhouse No. 12, which was occupied by a detachment of the Fourth Cavalry as an outpost. Company A, under command of Lieut. J. L. Gilbreth, and Company E, under Lieutenant Field, were in reserve, under the immediate orders of the brigade commander.

At about 8.30 a. m. I was ordered to send Lieutenant Field with Company E to Blockhouse No. 13, to connect with other companies of the regiment then hotly engaged west of blockhouse.

Company E did not come under my command again till about 3 o'clock in the afternoon, after the capture of the insurgent trenches. On reaching Blockhouse 13 Lieutenant Field succeeded in connecting with the Second Battalion, Fourteenth Infantry, and remained on the left of said battalion, taking part in the turning movement to the left in the afternoon, which resulted in the capture of the Filipino trenches. The company had one man wounded, Corp. Guy V. Soden, who died the next day.

At about 8.45 a. m. I was ordered to take Company A to Blockhouse No. 13 and report to Captain Wheeler, Fourth Cavalry, commanding a detachment of his troop in said work. On reporting a few minutes later Captain Wheeler ordered the company to occupy the blockhouse with his detachment.

About 9.10 a. m. Lieutenant Biddle reported with his company, and was deployed in line to the right of the blockhouse facing south.

About 11 a. m. Captain Wheeler ordered me to advance against the trenches in front of me. Fortunately, Sergeant Hutchings, of Company E, reported at this time from the front and volunteered to act as right guide of the line during the advance. He performed this duty well, and probably prevented our right from firing into the left of the troops in advance.

Company A formed line on the left of Company C, with its left near the Cingalon road, holding two squads in support with orders to watch the left flank. I notified the companies that owing to the dense jungle the advance and firing would be regulated by the bugle, the latter at will when commence firing sounded.

The battalion moved forward promptly at the signal, without a single straggler, through a dense undergrowth interspersed with small patches of beans and bananas, each patch surrounded with a very close bamboo fence. The men forced their way through the jungle necessarily without any pretense to a line formation, but when halted to fire each man got a place in time and did his share of the firing.

The fire of the enemy was very warm, but being high we did not suffer much until within about 100 paces.

When within 30 paces on the left and 50 paces on the right from the trenches of the enemy, Captain Wheeler, after having given personal orders to Lieutenant Biddle to fall back and connect with the other portion of the Fourteenth Infantry, came to me and personally ordered me to fall back. I stated to him that "there was the enemy's trenches and that I could capture them." He insisted, as the left flank was exposed and I had no support, so I passed the word along the line, and it fell back in good order to the position indicated by Captain Wheeler, with my left resting

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about 40 paces to the right and front of Blockhouse No. 13. Had I been allowed to continue the advance I believe I could have captured the trenches in my front and held them.

After taking the position designated by Captain Wheeler, the battalion was partially protected by a bank of earth in front of Company A, and the old Spanish trenches in front of Company C. While in this position, about 2.30 p. m. I noticed the sound of rapid firing crossing our front; and recognizing it as firing by our own troops in a turning movement to the left, I reported the fact to Captain Wheeler, and asked for orders to advance. These were given, and the battalion advanced, followed by some volunteers, but before moving I cautioned both my battalion and the companies from First California and Washington Volunteers in support, that the trenches had been captured and that they must not fire a shot.

The battalion then advanced to the road running east and west just in front of the Filipino trenches on our left, there re-formed, and about 3 p. m. joined the other battalion of the Fourteenth Infantry at Passay.

The following is a list of casualties:

Company A.—Killed: Privates Jesse A. Hale, Maurice L. Seeman. Wounded: Privates Dickson A. Everett, Frank L. Gordon, Hans P. Jenson.

Company C.—Wounded: Privates Ollie B. Wright, Herbert W. Foulks.

Company E.—Wounded: Corp. Guy V. Soden (mortally).

During both the advance and retreat Lieut. W. S. Biddle, jr., handled his company with much skill. In falling back he executed a change of direction half left without confusion, proof of a well-disciplined company. I mention his good conduct with much pleasure.

Lieutenant Gilbreth, under fire for the first time, showed marked coolness. He was on sick report, but joined his company when it was ordered out the night before the battle.

Noncommissioned officers and men of both companies went forward willingly and cheerfully, and were ready to do and dare anything required of them; no soldiers could have done better. All doing so well, it would be unjust to mention any one individual.

Captain Wheeler, Fourth Cavalry, exposed himself fearlessly by accompanying the battalion and passing along the entire front when in closest proximity to the trenches of the enemy and while the fire was most effectual. It seems to me he improperly assumed command over my battalion, as no part of his troop or detachment took part in the forward movement.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

FRANK F. EASTMAN,
Captain, Fourteenth U. S. Infantry, Commanding Third Battalion.

[Inclosure 10.]

HQRS. FIRST BRIGADE, FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., February 9, 1899.

SURGEON-GENERAL UNITED STATES ARMY:
(Through military channels.)

At about 9.30 p. m. Saturday, February 4, General King, First Brigade, First Division, Eighth Army Corps, established headquarters at 23 Calle Real, Paco, and the various organizations of the brigade were arriving or had arrived at this point. Here the brigade surgeon met the various regimental surgeons of the brigade, Major McCarthy, First Regiment California U. S. Volunteer Infantry, Major Dawson, First Regiment Washington Volunteer Infantry, Major Springer, First Regiment Idaho Volunteer Infantry, and their assistants. It was arranged that the brigade hospital should be established at this point, and the wounded after having received first attention at the dressing stations near the firing line should be further attended to at the brigade hospital and sent thence to one or other of the reserve hospitals. The gentlemen mentioned, with their assistants, then joined their regiments, going with them to the extreme front. As night passed the firing in the vicinity and along the road leading to the front became so active that it was decided to do away with the brigade hospital and to send the wounded directly from the dressing stations to the division hospital, a practice which was made possible by the excellent ambulance service. From about 2 a. m. Sunday, February 5, frequent visits were made to the various dressing stations, and the brigade surgeon superintended the transportation of the wounded. At daybreak the action seemed to have concentrated itself in the

neighborhood of Blockhouse 11, in front of the town of Santa Ana, so the brigade surgeon remained in this vicinity with his staff of hospital corps men during the remainder of the engagement. When the battery in charge of Lieutenant Hawthorne left the road and bridge, slightly in advance of the dressing station, the fire from the insurgent forces seemed to have concentrated itself upon the site of this station, and it became necessary to force an entrance into the neighboring convent, where, after an explanation, the sisters not only gave us the privilege of bringing in the patients, but gave us every aid in attending to their wants.

During the hours of firing both American and insurgent soldiers were brought in and treated, the only distinction being that the American wounded were first sent to the reserve hospital. By nightfall the last of the American and portion of the insurgent wounded had been removed. During Sunday it was found necessary to place certain of the insurgent wounded in a house in the town of Santa Ana, where we moved forward with the troops. By the afternoon of Monday the last insurgent in our charge was in the division hospital, thereby practically ending the work of the brigade surgeon. It might be added that the brigade surgeon superintended the burying of the enemy's dead on Monday (153 in number).

It is desired to call special attention to the following points:

1. The excellent work done by the regimental and assistant surgeons; they were all cool, collected, and careful at their work, most of the primary dressing requiring no change en route to the division hospital. The name of Major Dawson, First Regiment Washington Volunteer Infantry, might be especially mentioned in this regard.
2. The steady, calm, and brave conduct of the various members of the hospital corps when bringing in and caring for the wounded of both sides.
3. The work in bringing in wounded done by Company K of the First Regiment California U. S. Volunteer Infantry, under the supervision of Captain Cunningham.
4. The excellent ambulance service given our brigade at all times during the engagement.

The following hospital corps privates came under my personal observation:

P. J. Gompertz, W. Body, D. Oliver, H. Blackman, of the First California Volunteers; Private Bleke, of the second reserve hospital; Byrne, Sperling, Golden, Farrell, Gorman, Carter, Nugent, and Wall, of the first reserve hospital, and others whose names I could not get.

Very respectfully,

GUY FRANKLIN SHIELDS,
Major and Brigade Surgeon, U. S. V.

[Inclosure 11.]

HQRS. DEPT., PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila P. I., February 6, 1899.

Maj. Gen. E. S. OTIS,
Commanding Eighth Army Corps and Department of the Pacific.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following for your information:

At my request and by your authority I left your headquarters about 2 p. m. February 5, 1899, accompanied by Lieutenant Sladen, Fourth Infantry, your aid, and Private Bates, Fourteenth Infantry, and proceeded to join the Second Brigade, First Division. Upon reaching Fort San Antonio Abad, Malate, I found the brigade formed in line ready to advance. I reported to the brigade commander, informed him of the orders that had been sent by you to his division commander and your general plan as to the operations of the First Division. As Captain Murphy, commanding his company of the Fourteenth Infantry, had been held in check by a considerable force of the enemy in a fortified position in his front, and as it was necessary to drive them from their position before proceeding to Pasay, the brigade commander immediately advanced the Fourteenth Infantry and North Dakota Volunteers and executed a flank movement on the enemy's position, which was a veritable jungle of the tropical growth characteristic of this country, the ground itself being a mesh-work of sloughs, ditches, rice fields and entrenchments, partaking of the nature of entanglements. General Owenshine had his force well in hand, handled it with ability, and was on the firing line during the engagement. In approaching the position taken, many troops of the brigade waded in water and mud waist deep, without apparent break in the continuity of the line or undue shortening or lengthening of intervals between files.

The fire of the enemy was fierce and constant, and their dislodgment was only accomplished by the great fighting ability and utter fearlessness of our officers and

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men, and the effective handling of the brigade and the units thereof by their respective commanders. General Owenshine is entitled to substantial recognition for the successful operations of the brigade. I happened in the immediate vicinity of the Fourteenth Infantry, and cheerfully bear testimony to the gallantry and efficiency of its officers and men, which applies also to the Fourth Cavalry on the left and the North Dakota Volunteers on the right. My party was on the firing line during the engagement, and it is a pleasure to report the coolness of Lieutenant Sladen under fire.

My desire to go to General Owenshine's brigade was prompted by my knowledge of your orders to the division commander and your general plan of operations for the entire force south of the Pasig River, and the importance of and the necessity for the dislodgment of the Filipino force in the jungle, and the thought that such knowledge might be the means of avoiding possible misunderstandings. It may be of interest to add that the treatment of the wounded Filipinos by our men of the firing line and hospital corps, in aiding and cheering them by words and deeds of kindness and sympathy, was most beautiful and touching, though it is believed that conviction was there that similar treatment would not be accorded them under reverse conditions. The enemy's wounded received every care and attention from the hospital corps after our own wounded had been cared for.

Such characteristics go hand in hand with those of courage, fearlessness, and devotion to the flag and country which but a short time before our men had so thoroughly displayed.

Very respectfully,

THOMAS H. BARRY,
Adjutant-General Eighth Army Corps and Department of the Pacific.

[Inclosure 12.]

HDQS. SECOND BRIGADE, FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Pasay, Manila, P. I., February 13, 1899.

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
First Division, Eighth Army Corps, Manila, P. I.

SIR: On February 4, 1899, the following organizations were on outpost duty at Singalong: Troop E, Fourth Cavalry; Company I, Fourteenth Infantry; Company I, First North Dakota Infantry, U. S. V.

On the night of February 4 heavy firing was heard on the north side of the city. As the firing continued and seemed to increase, I ordered the Second Brigade, First Division, Eighth Army Corps, to move to the positions assigned it in case of hostilities with the insurgents and went with the brigade staff officers to Singalong.

Early on the morning of February 5 I received orders from division headquarters to open with the guns on Blockhouse 14 and to make the attack on the insurgents in front of the brigade. At this time the Fourteenth Infantry, Companies A, C, D, E, F, G, I, K, and M, under Maj. C. H. Potter, Fourteenth Infantry, was on the Singalong road. Company C, Fourteenth Infantry, at Blockhouse 12, half of Troop E Fourth Cavalry, in Blockhouse 13 under Captain Wheeler. Company I, First North Dakota, was in the old trench south of the church and between Blockhouses 12 and 13. First North Dakota Infantry, Companies B, G, and H, in the old Spanish trenches near Malate Fort and at Malate Fort. Lieut. D. L. Fleming, Sixth Artillery, with 2 guns of Dyer's Battery D, Sixth Artillery, were at Malate Fort. After sending word to Lieutenant Fleming to commence firing, I ordered the Fourteenth Infantry, then on Singalong road, to advance to the trenches, and went with them. Captain Murphy's battalion, Companies F and M, and part of I, Fourteenth Infantry, being on the left, and the other companies, D, G, and K, Fourteenth Infantry, under Major Potter, on the right. This connected the left of this line toward Blockhouse 13 and the right of it with the North Dakota Regiment already in the trenches.

On the way into the trenches Captain Murphy, Fourteenth Infantry, with his battalion of that regiment, Companies F, M, and part of I, met with strong resistance from the insurgents and with heavy loss. From Captain Murphy's report it shows that a detachment of Company I, Fourteenth Infantry, under Lieutenant Miles, Fourteenth Infantry, was on the left of the battalion, did most gallant service, and suffered severely from the enemy.

After the firing from the Sixth Artillery had ceased, and also the firing from the *Monadnock* in the bay, Maj. Frank White, First North Dakota Infantry, with a battalion of his regiment, Companies G, H, and part of Company D, left the trenches

and made a gallant and effective charge on the insurgents entrenched and concealed in thickets in front of his position, killing many insurgents and suffering no loss. As soon as this North Dakota battalion left the trenches a general fire from the insurgents, also entrenched in the jungle in front of the part of the line held by the Fourteenth Infantry, except Captain Murphy's battalion, opened on our men. At this the Fourteenth Infantry, Companies D, G, and K, left the Spanish trenches and also charged the insurgents in their front in most gallant style, silenced them, and drove them from their position in front.

During this time there was continuous firing in Captain Murphy's front. I sent several times to him to find out if he needed assistance, and each time received reply that though he had suffered many casualties he needed no more troops.

After the Fourteenth Infantry, under Major Potter, and the North Dakota battalion, under Major White, had cleared their front, I sent a telegram from Fort Malate to the division commander to ask for instructions.

Here I consider an explanation necessary. Lieut. Col. E. H. Crowder, of the corps commander's staff, was on the firing line, and in conversation with him about the situation, he said he could say that he knew that Major-General Otis wished the troops—I understood those in my brigade—to go and occupy Pasay as soon as the situation in front of Captain Murphy was cleared up, but that I would soon get detailed instructions through the division commander. This I misunderstood, and imagined I was to get some detailed instruction from Major-General Otis. Very soon Capt. W. E. Birkhimer, Third Artillery, of the division commander's staff, came on the line and stated General Anderson wished me to clear the trenches in front of Captain Murphy. I do not remember the exact words of Captain Birkhimer. I replied that I felt myself between two fires as I was awaiting instructions from Major-General Otis, and hardly knew just what was wanted of me. I believe Captain Birkhimer then left to see Major-General Anderson. Soon Lieutenant-Colonel Crowder again came on the line, and I explained to him how I stood. He regretted that I misunderstood him, and said my instructions were to come from Major-General Anderson and not direct from Major-General Otis. Believing I knew what the division commander wished, I advanced the Fourteenth Infantry, under Major Potter, and the North Dakota Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Treumann, changed front to the left, thus clearing the jungle in front of us and connecting the left of this line with Captain Murphy's battalion, Fourteenth Infantry. The men moved in fine style through swamp and jungle, perfectly in hand and under control of their officers, charged and cleared the insurgent trenches that were holding the troops at Singalong in check. This accomplished, I received an order from the division commander to move on to Pasay, and, if possible, occupy the road from there to connect with our troops at San Pedro Macati, but not to advance beyond the San Pedro Macati road. The brigade present, with one company First Washington Infantry, one company First California Infantry, Troops C and L, Fourth Cavalry (Captain Gale), and 1 gun under Lieutenant Scott, Sixth Artillery, was re-formed and took up the march to Pasay. On reaching Pasay it was found the insurgents had evacuated it. Captain Murphy's battalion, Fourteenth Infantry, was left at this point, and the rest of the brigade marched to San Pedro Macati. Finding Colonel Smith, First California Infantry, there, I placed outposts along this road and returned with such part of the brigade as had not been left on the road to Pasay, and there took post.

Much that occurred on the left of the Second Brigade and near Singalong Church after the Second Brigade became engaged was not visible to me, and I respectfully refer you to the accompanying reports for detailed accounts, particularly the report of Capt. W. H. Sage, Twenty-third Infantry, who remained by my direction at Singalong.

Inclosed with this are the reports of the several regimental and battalion commanders. All recommendations made by them for special recognition of services of officers and men are approved by me. I wish to call particular attention to the report of Captain Murphy, Fourteenth Infantry, and to particularly commend his services and the services of those under him. It was with Captain Murphy's battalion that the gallant Lieut. James Mitchell, Fourteenth U. S. Infantry, lost his life.

All troops under my command were in excellent discipline and readily handled, firing being stopped at command in several instances.

I wish to commend the services of Maj. George H. Penrose, U. S. V., brigade surgeon; Capt. W. H. Sage, Twenty-third U. S. Infantry, acting assistant adjutant-general; Capt. C. R. Krauthoff, commissary, U. S. V., and first lieutenant Fourteenth U. S. Infantry, brigade commissary, and First Lieut. F. W. Hunt, First Idaho Infantry, U. S. V., brigade quartermaster, for valuable aid all through the engagement. Lieutenant Hunt rendered excellent service under fire. Much responsibility rested on Captain Sage, and he met the requirements of his position.

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I commend particularly to superior authority the gallant conduct under fire of Second Lieut. M. C. Kerth, Twenty-third U. S. Infantry, aid-de-camp. He twice placed himself in charges in advanced and dangerous positions, setting a splendid example to the men, and his services as an aid were most valuable.

On the field Second Lieut. W. D. Connor, Corps of Engineers, U. S. A., reported to me and volunteered his services as aid. His services were most acceptable and valuable, and he did gallant duty under fire.

Second Lieut. A. S. Fleming, Sixth U. S. Artillery, with his guns and detachment, did excellent service.

The work of the vessels of our fleet were valuable on my front.

First Lieut. W. G. Haan, Third U. S. Artillery, with his Company, A, U. S. Engineers, reported for duty with the brigade at Singalong Church on the morning of February 5. The Wyoming Battalion was held in reserve, but was sent for duty early on the 5th instant with the First Brigade, First Division, and was not under my command.

Except Captain Wheeler's Troop E, Fourth Cavalry, which was on outpost duty, the Fourth Cavalry squadron was held in reserve in Manila, but part of it afterwards came on the line, as will show from accompanying reports.

Lieut. Col. T. H. Barry, assistant adjutant-general to the corps commander, and First Lieut. F. W. Sladen, Fourth U. S. Infantry, aid to the corps commander; Lieut. Col. E. H. Crowder, judge-advocate Eighth Army Corps; Lieut. Col. R. E. Thompson, chief signal officer Eighth Army Corps, were present on the firing line with the Second Brigade, First Division, Eighth Army Corps, during the day.

The work of the Fourteenth U. S. Infantry is worthy of the highest praise.

Very respectfully,

SAM'L OVENSHINE,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

[Inclosure 13.]

HQRS. FIRST NORTH DAKOTA INFANTRY, U. S. V.,
Manila, P. I., February 12, 1899.

Gen. SAMUEL OVENSHINE,

Commanding Second Brigade, First Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to submit this my report of the operations of my command on the 4th and 5th of February, 1899.

The regiment fell in under arms shortly after 7 o'clock p. m., on the 4th, caused by a false alarm and rumor of an attack by the insurgents. The men were sent back to quarters with orders to hold themselves in readiness to move promptly. I reported at brigade headquarters and was directed to remain and await further developments. Telegraphic reports were being received indicating hostile movements on the part of the insurgents.

About 9.15 o'clock p. m. firing was heard in the direction of Blockhouse 11, and a few minutes later I was ordered to move my regiment to the front and occupy the position previously assigned. The regiment was under arms in a very short time. Our inner guard was relieved by details from Companies A and E of the First Idaho, Lieutenant Castle, of that regiment, being officer of the day. Prisoners in the guard-house were sent to their respective commands. I ordered Major White to proceed to Fort San Antonio Abad and occupy the Spanish trenches with Companies B and G, Company H to follow later; the former companies being quartered at the south end of Calle Real and Calle Nueva, respectively, and were nearest the outposts. These companies consequently were the first on the line. They were ordered to extend as far east, toward Blockhouse 14, as they could, and to protect their left flank, as there were no troops on the left. Later I ordered a screened light placed on the left flank of this line as a guide and to guard against fire from the Fourteenth Infantry, who occupied the Calzada de Cingalon with outposts in the swamp to the rear of our line.

On the regiments first "falling in," Company A, of the First Battalion, First Lieut. S. H. Newcomer commanding, was ordered to Ermita Convent on Calle Real and to report to Colonel Smith, of the First California. Company I, Second Battalion, Capt. William R. Purdon commanding, was at Cingalon Church as a reserve. The remaining companies of the Second Battalion, D, C, and K, occupied a position extending from the fort and across to Calle Nueva and along the latter street in the order named, Company K's left connecting with the Fourteenth Infantry.

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The troops occupied these positions all night without firing a shot.

At daybreak large numbers of insurgents could be seen in their trenches and on the road leading to Blockhouse 14 and in screened positions behind the cemetery. The *Monadnock*, lying in the bay about 1,000 yards to our right and a little to the rear of our line, signaled that they could see the enemy in the trenches and asked if they could open fire. I informed the officer that we had no orders yet to open fire. Shortly after this, about 7.30 a. m., on the 5th, the following order was received:

CINGALON, February 5.

Lieutenant-Colonel TRETMANN:

Open on anything in sight.

SAGE.

I communicated the order to the firing line and to Lieutenant Fleming, commanding two pieces of the Sixth Artillery at the fort. The artillery opened with good effect on Blockhouse 14 and a detachment of insurgents in the road this side of the blockhouse. The firing now became general all along our line, the enemy replying vigorously. The *Monadnock* and *Charleston*, which had joined her, kept up a steady fire at the insurgent trenches and convent, occasionally using their 10-inch guns. The fire in front of our right flank, near the beach, soon lessened.

There being no need of keeping all of the Second Battalion on the line occupied by them, I ordered Major Fraine to send Companies D and C to the fort, leaving K behind on the Calle Nueva, which disposition I communicated to brigade headquarters at Cingalon. I ordered part of Company D into the trenches to reinforce the firing line.

After the brilliant charge of the Fourteenth Infantry, they returned to the trenches, joining the left of our line.

About 10.15 o'clock a. m. I wired to Cingalon asking permission to advance, as the enemy's fire in our front had almost ceased, but was ordered not to do so. A number of insurgents posted behind a well-masked intrenchment to the left of, and others in, the cemetery and among banana trees were keeping up a scattering fire on our lines and annoying the battery and men on the fort. It seemed impossible to dislodge them with our fire. I ordered Major White to take sufficient force and drive the insurgents from that position, to burn the huts at the corner of the road and return to his position in the trenches.

The charge was made by Companies G and H of the First Battalion and part of Company D of the Second. The line went forward rapidly, officers and men being eager to close with the enemy. To protect the advance as much as possible I ordered every rifle on the top of the fort to be brought to bear on the insurgents in their masked position. The charge was a brilliant one and in every way successful. The object was accomplished without the loss of a man, although many returned with holes through their hats and clothing. The enemy was routed, about 25 being killed and a number wounded; the huts on the road were fired and the column returned by way of the road, bringing back 5 prisoners, 2 of them wounded. The latter were cared for by Major Pease, surgeon of the regiment. The prisoners were sent back to our guardhouse and later to the provost-marshal-general in Manila.

Great credit is due to Major White and the officers and men who took part in the charge. All of them behaved splendidly and went forward fearlessly and in perfect order. I desire to also call attention to the encouraging example of Lieutenant Kerth, of the Twenty-third Infantry, who participated in the charge and aided with advice and in other ways.

About 2 o'clock p. m. a general advance was ordered, the Second Battalion on the right, the extreme right of the line on the beach, the First Battalion on the left, the Fourteenth Infantry on its left. I had the flank on the beach marked by a detachment of the Signal Corps with a flag, as a signal for the *Monadnock* and *Charleston*, who slowly advanced with our line, occasionally sending shells into the thickets in the direction of Passai.

We met with but little resistance; houses were searched as we advanced, and where ammunition or arms were found they were set on fire. About 4 p. m. we were ordered to assemble at Passai. The First Battalion, with Company D of the Second, were ordered on outpost duty along the road extending east of Passai in the direction of San Pedro Macati. Companies C and K performed similar duty on road from Passai to the beach.

The Hospital Corps, under Major Pease, was at all times with the line. Steward Patten, Acting Steward McIntyre, and 5 privates of the Hospital Corps participated in the charge above mentioned.

Lieutenant-Colonel Robe, of the Seventeenth U. S. Infantry, being without command, asked permission to accompany the regiment, which was gladly given. He

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aided me with advice and made himself generally useful. I lost sight of him for a while and found him with a firing squad behind the trenches west of the fort, near the beach, rifle in hand, firing at the enemy coolly and deliberately, an excellent example for the men around him.

I can not close this my report without expressing my admiration for the conduct of all officers and men of my command. They were ever ready to execute any order and displayed good judgment and great courage.

Inclosed herewith, and to be made a part hereof, are the detailed reports (or copies thereof) furnished me by Majors White and Fraine, and of Major Pease, of the Hospital Corps.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. C. TREUMANN,
*Lieutenant-Colonel First North Dakota Infantry, U. S. V.,
Commanding the Regiment.*

[Inclosure 14.]

Lieut. Col. W. C. TREUMANN,
Commanding First North Dakota U. S. Volunteer Infantry.

SIR: I have the honor to report the following operations of the Second Battalion, First North Dakota U. S. Volunteer Infantry, for the 4th and 5th days of August (February), A. D. 1899:

At about 9.30 p. m., February 4, 1899, the battalion was ordered under arms and to the previously appointed position of the battalion in case of an attack by the insurgents upon the city of Manila. Within ten minutes after receiving the order the companies of this battalion were disposed as follows:

Company D in the trenches running from Fort Malate or San Antonio de Abad north to the cable office on Calle Real; Company C deployed as skirmishers behind stone walls and like protection directly east of Calle Nueva, to the right of Company K, which was deployed as skirmishers in like manner to and along the old Spanish intrenchments on Calle de Anders; Company I had been designated as reserve company at Cingalon Church. Companies C, D, and K maintained these positions until 7.30 a. m., February 5, at which time Company D was ordered into the Spanish trench running east from Fort San Antonio to Blockhouse 14, and constituted part of the firing line at that point; Company C was at the same time moved up to take a position at Fort San Antonio, to be used as a support; Company K was extended at the same time to occupy the position theretofore held by Company C. These changes were made under a heavy fire with perfect steadiness and coolness. At 10.30 a. m. a charge was ordered, by which the insurgents were routed, with heavy loss, from the cemetery and trenches at Neutebig.

Company D participated in this charge, which was a brilliant and well-executed movement. After routing the enemy from the trenches and cemetery, the company was ordered back to the position occupied before the charge, and there remained on the firing line until about 2 p. m., when Companies K, D, and C were ordered, with Major White's battalion, to advance as skirmishers, clearing the country before them to a line running east and west through Passai. This was done and a line of outposts established on said line from the beach east to Passai about 7.30 p. m. by Companies C, I, and K, Company D, being attached to Major White's battalion on the left, being posted at the Bamboo bridge east of Passai, the companies camping for the night on the line occupied. Company I, having reported at Cingalon Church, was ordered to an intrenched position between Blockhouses 12 and 13 at about 10 p. m., which position they occupied with the effect of protecting that flank from the assault of the insurgents when they advanced at about 2 p. m., this company waiting until they were in plain sight advancing, then using volleys with such good effect that the insurgents were driven off and took position in a point of timber and jungle about 400 yards to the southeast of Company I's front, where they seemed to be intrenched, and from which position they frequently fired on Blockhouses 12 and 13, Company I on each occasion replying thereto with the effect of silencing their fire. Between 12 and 1 o'clock midday a platoon of the company was ordered to Blockhouse 13 to support a gun of the Sixth Artillery.

After the rout of the insurgents Company I was ordered to rejoin the regiment.

The conduct of all the men and officers during this time was beyond praise, the officers cool, brave, vigilant, and looking well after their various duties, seeing to it that there was no useless expenditure of ammunition and that the men fired aiming and not carelessly; the men steady and determined, executing all orders with

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promptness and perfect order, and all officers and men exposed to a heavy fire for more than four hours, making a showing that proves to me that the Second Battalion of the First North Dakota U. S. V. is a force that can be depended upon.

Very respectfully,

JOHN H. FRaine,
Major, First North Dakota U. S. V.

A true copy:

H. G. PROCTOR,
First Lieutenant and Adjutant, First North Dakota Infantry U. S. V.

W. C. TREUMANN,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding First North Dakota Infantry U. S. V.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the duty performed by the troops in my command on the 4th and 5th of February, A. D. 1899:

The companies composing the First Battalion on February 4, 1899, were quartered as follows: Company H, commanded by Capt. P. W. Eddy, and Company A, commanded by Lieut. S. H. Newcomer, in bamboo barracks, opposite cuartel; Company B, commanded by First Lieut. E. C. Gearey, jr., in large house on the beach opposite the south end of Calle Real Malate, and Company G, commanded by First Lieut. C. W. Getchell, in large house at the foot of Calle Nueva Malate.

About 9.20 p. m., upon hearing heavy firing, the companies were ordered to form, H and A in front of their barracks to await orders, and G and B, on previous order, moved as soon as formed to Fort San Antonio Abad. Being ordered by the commanding colonel, I went immediately upon the sounding of the alarm to the fort, where I found Company G, having arrived first, deployed on the east side of the fort, one platoon across the bridge and the other in the old Spanish trenches; Company B with one platoon on the west side of the fort and one in the rear. I immediately ordered Company G farther east in the Spanish trenches and Company B to deploy across the bridge and into the trenches to connect with Company G's right, and ordered the sergeant of the guard at the fort to take up the line west of the fort with his guard. At about 10 o'clock Company H reported and were deployed into the Spanish trenches, their right resting on Company G's left, their left extending just across a bamboo hedge about 350 yards from the fort. A squad was here placed in a transverse trench to protect their flank, a screened light was placed just to their left to indicate where our left rested to the posts of the Fourteenth Infantry, advanced from the Cingalon road.

In this position we remained until about 7.40 a. m., February 5, when we opened fire upon the insurgents in the trenches and pits in our front. Up to this no shots had been fired by them in my command or by the insurgents in our front. From 7.40 the firing was continued in an intermittent manner until 10.30. At this time, having been joined by a part of Company D, of the Second Battalion, Company G on the right, Company D in the center, and Company H on the left, were ordered to charge on the trenches in our front. The charge was rapidly made and we came upon the trenches before the insurgents were aware of our approach and were able to drive them out without loss to ourselves, killing about 25 and taking 5 prisoners.

Following our orders, after taking the insurgent trenches we immediately returned to our former position, where we remained until 1.30, when we were ordered to advance as skirmishers, our left touching on the Fourteenth Infantry, and to gradually swing around to the left, the purpose of the movement being to flank the trenches in front of the left of Blockhouse 14. The other companies, B and D, did not get around in time and were too much in advance to take part in the fighting here. They came up to the marsh just west of the Passai road and remained deployed along the marsh with one platoon of the right Company turned to the right toward the beach to protect their right flank. At about 2.30 companies G and H were formed in column on the Passai road, Company G acting as vanguard for the column, Companies B and D to the right and toward the beach advanced as skirmishers to Passai.

After reaching Passai the battalion was formed and made a part of the column which advanced to San Pedro Macati, which place was vacated by the insurgents upon our arrival. We then marched back on the road and went on outpost guard for the night about halfway from Passai to San Pedro Macati.

The officers and men under my command performed every duty called upon to perform in a very satisfactory manner. I desire to especially mention the eager and spirited manner in which the officers and men made the charge on the pits in our front on the morning of the 5th.

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I desire also to acknowledge the able advice and encouraging example of Lieutenant Kurth, who went with us in this charge.

Company A soon after being formed on the evening of the 4th were ordered to Ermita church to form a part of the inner guard. Soon after, on orders from Colonel Smith, First California, one platoon, under command of Second Lieutenant McLean, went to the Second Reserve Hospital. From these two points the company did patrol and police duty during Saturday night, Sunday, and Sunday night.

Dated at Manila, February 10, 1899.

I am, very respectfully,

FRANK WHITE,
Major First Battalion, First North Dakota Infantry, U. S. V.

A true copy:

H. G. PROCTER,
First Lieutenant and Adjutant, First North Dakota Infantry, U. S. V.

[Inclosure 15.]

OFFICE OF REGIMENTAL SURGEON,
FIRST NORTH DAKOTA INFANTRY, U. S. V.,
February 12, 1899.

Lieutenant-Colonel TREUMANN,
Commanding First North Dakota Infantry, U. S. V.

SIR: I have the honor to report as follows upon the part taken by the Hospital Corps, U. S. A., with this command, in the engagement of February 4 and 5, 1899:

About 8.30 p. m. February 4, we were ordered to Fort San Antonio, where we were until 7.30 a. m. February 5, when the firing commenced in the trenches leading east from the fort, and we were in the trenches until 10 o'clock a. m., when Steward Patten, Acting Steward McIntyre, and 5 privates of the Hospital Corps, U. S. A., followed up a charge made by a portion of the First North Dakota Infantry, U. S. V., on the insurgent trenches. There were no casualties in the First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry, and the only wounded dressed were insurgents.

Very respectfully,

F. D. PEASE,
Major and Surgeon, First North Dakota Infantry, U. S. V.

A true copy:

H. G. PROCTER,
First Lieutenant and Adjutant, First North Dakota Infantry, U. S. V.

[Inclosure 16.]

SANTA ANA, NEAR MANILA, P. I., February 7, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
First Brigade, First Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to report that firing was heard by me to the north of my position on the other side of the Pasig River at 9.30 p. m., February 4, 1899; the firing continued during the night and followed south along the line. At about 2.40 a. m., February 5, 1899, firing was commenced by the insurgents opposite my front. As soon as a number of shots fired by the insurgents made it evident that it was their intention to keep up the firing, the command was given by me for my regiment to fire, volleys being fired if not impracticable. Fire was continued on both sides, the insurgents' fire affecting principally the center of the command, particularly Company A. About 6 o'clock reinforcements were requested by me, and companies of the California regiment were sent to the front by the brigade commander and supported the left of the right wing. A battery of mountain howitzers of the Sixth U. S. Artillery were sent to the firing line at about the same time. The howitzers fired on different strongholds in front, opening the way for the troops to advance. Between 9 and 10 o'clock orders were given by the brigade commander to advance; the advance was made, the troops fording the estuary in our front. During all this time, and since the commencement of the firing at 2.40 in the morning, firing was continuous. The arms used by the insurgents were principally of the Mauser pattern. At the beginning of the advance the firing line was reinforced by companies of the Idaho regiment. The advance was made steadily into the town of Santa Ana, the firing

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being kept up on both sides. Our troops moved over open ground in front of the town of Santa Ana, in which the insurgents, on going to the rear, located themselves. All insurgents were driven out of the town of Santa Ana, and about 11 o'clock the town was occupied by American troops, consisting of the First Washington Regiment, almost entire, and companies of the First Idaho and First California regiments, and a battery of the Sixth U. S. Artillery.

All did their duty well and as they found it, and my mention of particular persons will be the names of those who came personally to my notice as occupying positions unusually dangerous, even for the strong fire that prevailed throughout our lines. The names of the officers I wish to bring to your attention are: Maj. J. J. Weisenburger, Capt. G. H. Fortson, Capt. A. H. Otis, and Lieut. William L. Luhn, and I wish also to mention the names of enlisted men who acted as messengers for me to different parts of our line. Their names are: Sergt. Maj. Thomas W. Lemon, Principal Musician William E. Nickerson, Musician Roy Eldridge, Company B, Musician Charles A. Hasson, of the band, and Private L. L. Lawson, Company B. I recommend these officers and men to such consideration as is necessary for the best interest of the service.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN H. WHOLLEY,
Colonel Commanding First Washington Infantry, U. S. V.

[Inclosure 17.]

[Extract from record of events, etc., made on "return of casualties" in First Idaho, U. S. V., in action at Paco and Santa Ana, February 5, 1899.]

Companies B, C, D, F, G, and H of this command were ordered to Paco churchyard at 9.15 p. m., February 4, 1899, remaining there till 10 p. m., then moving up to No. 23 Calle Real, Paco, where the companies were lined up along the street, remaining about one hour. Companies F, H, B, and C then returned to quarters for blankets, Companies D and G remaining in Paco churchyard. After securing blankets, Companies F, H, B, and C returned to Paco churchyard, remaining there till about 2.30 a. m., when desultory firing commenced and the command was moved to No. 23 Calle Real, Paco, where they were halted. While waiting for command to move forward several volleys were fired down the street by the insurgents, wounding Private George W. Hall, Company B, in the abdomen, and Sergt. Ernest Scott, Company B, in left arm. The command was then moved into side streets, out of line of fire, remaining there until 6 a. m., when the entire command returned to quarters for breakfast. After breakfast the command returned to Paco churchyard, remaining until 8.30 a. m. On orders by brigade commander to advance to the front the command was fired upon by insurgents concealed in the upper stories and tower of Paco church. This fire was very severe, but fortunately no man in the command received an injury. Fourteen men were detailed from two companies to remain and dislodge the insurgents, remaining there for one and one-half hours, and were unable to accomplish their object. On battery from Artillery knoll opening fire on the church, this detail came forward under heavy fire and joined their respective companies. Companies F, H, and D were deployed in the field on the right of Blockhouse No. 11, commanded by Maj. D. W. Figgins, regimental commander. Companies B, C, and G advanced forward across the bridge and deployed to the left of Blockhouse No. 11 in rice fields, commanded by Maj. Ed. McConville (the 3 companies deployed in the right of Blockhouse No. 11 being designated as First Battalion and the 3 companies on the left of Blockhouse No. 11 as the Second Battalion). Never did a command enter into an engagement with more vigor than the First Idaho.

The First Battalion deployed as ordered and opened fire, pressing to the front at all times. They were under a heavy fire from the direct front and left flank from the time the line formed in the field until the Second Battalion formed in the field on the left of Blockhouse No. 11. The First Battalion never halted once from the first advance until they reached the Pasig River, where they were unable to cross, which they reached at 11.30 a. m. For two hours they were under a steady fire from sharpshooters perched in trees on the opposite side of the river. Using smokeless powder, they were hard to locate, but two of the best shots were sent out directly in front of each company, and by patient watching they were enabled to locate and kill their man in every instance, getting 5 men from one tree. Again, an insurgent located in a large tree escaped all individual shots, but was brought down by volley firing. The

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Second Battalion, after crossing the bridge, deployed on the left around the canal in rear of Swedish clubhouse, and advanced about 40 yards; from behind a ridge directed several volleys into the insurgents, who had taken well-chosen positions behind the ridges in the rice fields and garden, pouring a steady fire into the command, who returned the fire, driving them from their positions and following them to the next ridge, where, after several volleys, the command to charge was given by Major McConville, who fell mortally wounded while leading his command to victory. The command of the battalion here devolved upon Capt. William E. Whittington. Two Krupp guns and 23 prisoners were captured. Each and every officer and enlisted man of this command is entitled to full praise and merit for their magnificent courage and daring throughout the entire engagement. In the First Battalion, after dislodging the insurgents from their fortified positions in the rice fields, it was noticed on the charge that a great many threw away their guns and in running divested themselves of their insurgent uniforms (coat and trousers), coming out completely dressed in white. The estimated casualties inflicted on the insurgents are about 700 on our front, most of them being killed on the bank of the river and swimming across in boats. The command would have suffered more of a loss if the enemy had not fired too high.

D. W. FIGGINS,
Major, Commanding.

SAN PEDRO MACATI,
Manila, P. I., February 8, 1899.

[Inclosure 18.]

HDQRS. SECOND BRIGADE, FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., February 12, 1899.

COMMANDING GENERAL,
Second Brigade, First Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: In compliance with orders, I have the honor to report movements of troops in vicinity of Singalong.

On alarm, February 4, 1899, all the troops of our brigade took the positions previously assigned them. Captain Wheeler, Troop E, Fourth Cavalry, had Blockhouses Nos. 12 and 13; 1 company (I, First North Dakota) was sent to old Spanish trenches between Blockhouses 12 and 13, and 1 company (C, Fourteenth Infantry, Lieutenant Biddle) was sent to Blockhouse 12. Men slept in street until morning. There was practically no firing on Second Brigade until between 7 and 8 o'clock a. m., 5th instant, when the guns and troops on the right of our line and in Fort Malate were ordered to fire. Some shots were fired on old Spanish trenches between 12 and 13, and on 13 before this, but no systematic attack was made. When firing was ordered Companies M, F, and part of I, Fourteenth Infantry, under Captain Murphy, went down road back of 13 to occupy 14, and extend to the right along Spanish trenches. One company, E, Fourteenth Infantry, Lieutenant Field, was sent to report to Captain Wheeler at 13; later Company A, Fourteenth Infantry, under Lieutenant Gilbreth, was sent to connect Blockhouse 13 with Captain Murphy, and Company C, Fourteenth Infantry, Lieutenant Biddle, was withdrawn from 12 and sent on same mission.

After the last of the Fourteenth Infantry had gone to the front, I directed 2 troops of the Fourth Cavalry to report at Singalong as support; Troops C and L, Captain Gale and Lieutenant Parker, reported.

Captain Murphy having reported that a gun was necessary to drive insurgents from trench at end of road in front of 13, one was sent. He also stated he had enough troops with him. After the gun under Lieutenant Scott, Sixth Artillery, was placed in front of 13, Captain Birkhimer said they had no support on their left. I assured him one company, I, North Dakota, was in Spanish work on the left of the gun and that 13 could not be flanked; to give confidence I ordered the North Dakota company at Spanish trench to extend to the gun. Two companies from the First Brigade, First California and First Washington, reported. I sent one to report to Captain Wheeler at 13, and one to form on left of gun. I then received notice from General Ovenshine that he had instructions from General Otis to await detailed instructions; he expected to go to Pasay, and to send one company, Fourteenth Infantry, to go with him.

The two troops Fourth Cavalry then reported to Captain Wheeler. Major Rucker, Fourth Cavalry, joined them.

A battalion of Tennessee troops, under Lieutenant-Colonel Childers, reported to aid in carrying trenches at end of road in front of 13. They went to 13, but returned and said it had been decided to cross the Tennessee troops to the other side of stream and flank the insurgents' right. Before they came back I received notice from General Anderson that General Ovenshine was to take command of operations on the left of his line. I sent these directions to General Ovenshine, also sent Captain Krauthoff to inform Colonel Childers and Captain Wheeler that General Ovenshine would be there soon to direct movements.

Soon after this I received notice from General Ovenshine that the trenches were carried and that he waited on Passay road for instructions. This message was received before Colonel Childers had arrived near the place assigned him on left of stream. On the return of this battalion from the front (with the consent of the department commander) I assigned them to outpost duty at Singalong and vicinity, there being none of the Second Brigade left for that duty.

Lieut. W. G. Haan, Third Artillery, reported at Singalong with his company, A, Engineer Battalion, crossed the stream to Blockhouse 12, and joined in charge of First Brigade across Santa Ana flats.

It was reported a number of times that the guns of Fort Malate or fleet were firing too close to our lines.


Captain Eastman, Fourteenth Infantry, reported from sick and went forward with his battalion.

I wish to mention Private Hans P. Jensen, Company A, Fourteenth Infantry. He was shot in the head and came back to have it dressed. He then returned to his company which was on the firing line.

Very respectfully,

W. H. SAGE,

Captain Twenty-third U. S. Infantry, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.



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[Inclosure 19.]

[Memorandum of what took place at No. 13 and to its front on February 5, 1899, by Capt. W. E. Birkhimer, Third Artillery, acting inspector-general.]

Early in the morning part of Troop E, Fourth Cavalry, was in No. 13, under Captain Wheeler. It held No. 13 all day. Soon in day Company I, Fourteenth Infantry, Lieutenant Field, went into woods to front and right of No. 13, where it remained. Afterwards, A and C, Fourteenth Infantry (Eastman and Biddle) entered woods to left of I, Eastman nearest road.

About 9 a. m. Capt. John Murphy, Fourteenth Infantry, sent word that a field piece was needed at 13 to drive enemy out of trenches at angle and other positions about the angle, whence they were enfilading his line beyond (west of) 14. Lieutenant Scott, Sixth Artillery, put 1 gun in at 13, drove enemy out of trees and houses at *b b* (on map), compelling them to seek carefully cover of intrenchments at A. What relief this furnished Murphy is not known. While Scott was doing this, Captain Wheeler formed A, C, I, Fourteenth Infantry, in woods between 13 and 14 and advanced toward enemy's line. A and C got about 200 yards out in front of old Spanish redoubts toward enemy's line, when Captain Wheeler ordered them back to line of said redoubts. There they remained for some hours.

About 1 p. m. I received word from General Anderson, while I was at Scott's gun, asking why enemy was not being driven out of works at angle. I replied that there was no one that I could see to move forward to our left of road to flank them while our troops moved to front against enemy. I sent diagram explaining situation. I went in person to do same thing soon after, and also get more ammunition for Scott. General Anderson explained to me that he had sent 1 company or part thereof to the desired place (38 men, I think), and I said that would not be sufficient, and, indeed, think he so suggested.

General Anderson directed me to go to General Ovenshine and explain what he was doing to get troops to put in on left of road at No. 13 to flank enemy out of his intrenchments at angle.

Found General Ovenshine on old Spanish line, about 800 yards east of Fort Malate. Explained what was desired; also asked for some officer of rank to go and command all forces against this part of the enemy's line. All this from Major-General Anderson. General Ovenshine explained that he was there awaiting orders; that Colonel Crowder had been to him from Major-General Otis saying that his (Ovenshine's) brigade would advance and hold Pasay road, and that soon Major-General Otis would send "detailed instructions" governing this movement. General Ovenshine remarked, "I am between two fires," or words to that effect, referring, as I understood, to the inharmonious instructions of General Anderson and Major-General Otis. I saw his position and evident embarrassment, or something akin to it, but said: "Well, the line can not in any event advance to the Pasay road until the enemy is routed from in front of No. 13," to which the General assented; and then he authorized me to take Troops C and L, Fourth Cavalry, in reserve near Singalon Church, up to No. 13 and use them to put in on left of road at 13 to outflank enemy; of course, Captain Wheeler to command whole. These troops were got into column on road to No. 13, when Major Rucker arrived and took command. Soon after this Lieutenant-Colonel Childers, First Tennessee, with 1 battalion, arrived. He assumed command.

Meantime, while I was gone to see General Ovenshine, 1 company First California, Company K, First Washington, and 1 platoon First North Dakota had arrived and had been placed in woods, with Fourteenth Infantry, in front of 13, by Captain Wheeler.

The Fourth Cavalry, Troops C and L, now entered the woods, to right and front of No. 13, all the forces there being under command of Major Rucker, by virtue of his rank.

It was arranged, to carry out turning movement against enemy's intrenchments and force at angle, that Colonel Childers should envelop the enemy's right flank, when the troops in the woods would advance.

Childers, for some reason, countermarched, and crossed Estero Tripa de Gallina at No. 12. As a result, before he got into position on enemy's right flank, the troops in woods under Major Rucker moved forward, and the enemy was driven from the angle. This ended the fighting.

At the time I did not know why Rucker's troops moved to the front without waiting for Childers, unless their patience gave out at his long delay; but from what I hear from General Ovenshine I have no doubt that this movement of Rucker's command to the front and left was simply the impulsion imparted to the whole line when a turning movement on the right of the brigade started by General Ovenshine, after

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my last interview of the day with him, had progressed until it affected the troops to the left of No. 14, and Rucker's troops.

I was not aware until some time after this (i. e., after the enemy's position was carried, that General Owenshine was making this turning movement from his right. The thick woods prevented our seeing it. Therefore, I knew of no reason, originating in that direction, why Rucker's troops should not wait for Childers, as previously arranged. When I saw General Owenshine the last time before this at Spanish trenches, as before mentioned, he evidently had no idea of turning by his right. Why he changed his mind I do not know; of course that was his affair. But the result was that two turning movements were going on at the same time, which would have terminated at the same point—the angle in front of No. 13—and that on the right got there first owing to Childers's long detour.

A true copy.

CHAS. C. WALMET, JR.,
Assistant Quartermaster, U. S. V.

[Inclosure 20.]

HEADQUARTERS FOURTEENTH U. S. INFANTRY,
In the Field, Manila, P. I., February 7, 1899.

THE ADJUTANT.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the work of the medical department and hospital corps attached to this regiment, during the engagement of February 4 and 5, 1899:

After waiting under arms all of the night of February 4 along the Cingalon road, which runs from the Calle Real to the Cingalon Church, the regiment was ordered to advance against the insurgents, who were strongly intrenched in our front.

I had under my command Acting Assistant Surgeon Lowell, U. S. A., 2 acting stewards, Hospital Corps, U. S. A., and 5 privates of the hospital corps, augmented by a number of convalescent patients from the regimental hospital.

I assigned Acting Assistant Surgeon Lowell with half of the men to the right half of the regiment, with his dressing station at the church where the Cingalon road joins the Calle Real, while I with the remaining men attended to the left half of the regiment, with my dressing station at the Cingalon Church.

For some time after the advance began I was busy attending to the wounded along the Cingalon road.

I then advanced with my men and litters to Blockhouse 14, which our troops had succeeded in capturing and destroying, and subsequently held for about three hours, under a severe fire from our front and left.

During this period I remained in the vicinity of Blockhouse 14, dressing the wounded and sending them back to the Cingalon Church.

About 2 p. m. a flank movement was executed, a "charge" made upon the insurgent trenches, and the enemy routed.

I can not speak too highly of the work of my men during the entire engagement. They performed their tasks cheerfully and well, under a most galling fire in and about the trenches, and carried the wounded over a mile to the rear through an open space swept constantly by the enemy's bullets.

At no time during the engagement was the Red Cross respected, and the enemy's sharpshooters seemed to take particular pains to hit the wounded and those that were attending them.

Acting Assistant Surgeon Lowell, U. S. A., was cut off from the main body of the regiment early in the day, but advanced with the troops that he was with, staying with them throughout the day and doing excellent work.

I wish to particularly call your attention to the heroism and unflinching loyalty to their duty of Acting Stewards Laymon and Fiege, Hospital Corps, U. S. A. These men were conspicuous for their gallantry, and in my opinion deserve some substantial recognition.

The beneficial results of instruction in "first aid" to the enlisted men was demonstrated by the fact that to my knowledge not a single man died of primary hemorrhage, all of them being intelligently treated before they could lose much blood.

Very respectfully,

FRANKLIN M. KEMP,
First Lieutenant and Assistant Surgeon, U. S. A.

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[Inclosure 21.]

LIGHT ARTILLERY BATTALION, FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., February 6, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Headquarters First Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the work done on the 5th instant by this battalion, which composes the artillery of this division. A short explanation regarding its composition is first necessary.

Light Battery D, Sixth Artillery, of which I have the honor of being captain, has been recently temporarily organized into two batteries, with the assistance of 20 men from the Fourteenth United States Infantry and 10 men from the First Washington Volunteers attached.

The original center and left platoons and the men of the Fourteenth Infantry form the personnel of the 6-gun battery (3.2 inch, D, Sixth Artillery), the platoons being commanded by Second Lieut. A. S. Fleming, Sixth Artillery, Second Lieut. E. D. Scott, Sixth Artillery, First Sergt. Joseph Keller, Light Battery D, Sixth Artillery, while the original right platoon and the First Washington Volunteers man the separate mountain battery, consisting of four 3-inch Hotchkiss mountain howitzers. This battery is commanded by First Lieut. H. L. Hawthorne, who has with him Second Lieut. B. M. Koehler, Sixth Artillery, and Sergt. Edgar I. Shively, Light Battery D, Sixth Artillery, as platoon commanders.

Some days ago Lieutenant Fleming was sent with his platoon to old Fort Malate, on the extreme right of our line, and took station in that work to command the ground from the intrenchment near Blockhouse 14 around to the water front.

At no time during the battle was I an observer of his work, but knowing the man I am confident that everything possible for an artilleryman to do he did, and did it well. His report is appended hereto.

Lieutenant Scott with his platoon was sent a few days ago to Paco, and took station with the First Washington Volunteers. On the night of the 4th instant he moved out to the knoll beyond Paco, put his guns in position, and built sand-bag epaulements.

I remained at our quarters at the head of Nozaleda with Hawthorne's separate mountain battery and First Sergeant Keller's platoon until 5.15 a. m., the morning of February 5. We then moved down the street and I reported to the division commander. Then on our arrival in Paco Hawthorne's battery turned to the left and was sent to report to General King, commanding First Brigade. Lieutenant Hawthorne's report follows below. I was not with his battery, but I know of no more able, zealous, and intrepid officer in the artillery service, and am sure that his work was magnificently done. I know Lieutenant Koehler to be a brave and able officer and entitled to all said of him by Lieutenant Hawthorne. Just before I reached the position where Lieutenant Scott's guns were, he opened fire with shrapnel on the insurgent outpost, 480 yards distant, firing two shots, and then a projectile at the insurgent intrenchments to the right and beyond Blockhouse 12, 800 yards distant. On arriving in position near the knoll with Sergeant Keller's platoon, we at once took sand bags, previously placed in rear of knoll, and built an epaulement some 50 yards to the front, as I wished to be sheltered from fire of insurgent intrenchments above referred to, and fire in the sector between this position and Santa Ana. The insurgents, 800 yards distant, at once opened a heavy infantry fire on us, but we built the epaulement without mishap. Feeling that it would subject us to considerable loss if I at once moved to this position, I prepared for action where we stood. One epaulement interfering slightly, some men rushed forward and tore it down, and First Sergeant Keller opened fire at 6.17 a. m.

Lieutenant Scott had already started to work and the fire of the battery was beautiful, the shrapnel bursting just where he wished. We soon silenced the fire from the intrenchments for a time, but several times after it started again, and each time we soon stopped it, and eventually we completely drove them out. A shrapnel fire made their trenches in that position absolutely untenable and they were abandoned entirely.

Lieutenant Scott then turned his guns on the long shed, about 1,900 yards distant, and got the range so that he was prepared for shrapnel fire along that road in event of insurgents in Santa Ana retreating up it.

General King visited us at 7.45 a. m. It was my intention to subject Santa Ana to a heavy artillery fire, but General King's brigade swept most beautifully across the line, and as I did not care to fire over the heads of our troops for fear of accidents, three defective fuses having already been found, I was unable to carry out my original intention.

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We had up to this time been supported by a battalion (Major Sime's) of the First California Volunteers and two companies of the Washingtons, and the Wyoming battalion had recently arrived on the scene.

The division commander at 8 a. m. came to the position and sent forward all of the above infantry troops excepting Company D, First California, and K, First Washington, to sweep across the plain to the right of General King's other troops on the advance line.

It was just after this that we finished our work on the insurgent trenches beyond Blockhouse 12. The large church and convent in Paco, 600 yards distant, was filled with insurgents, who were firing on our infantry, and the division commander desired that I silence their fire. First Sergeant Keller's platoon was turned on it and did handsome work, riddling it with shell and percussion shrapnel, setting it on fire and burning it down.

Shortly after 10 o'clock Lieutenant Scott opened fire on the redoubt, 1,800 yards distant, on a line between Blockhouse 12 and Santa Ana, and fired four shells at it, and at once completely silenced its fire. An officer of the command that moved over that part of the line in the forward movement soon after told Lieutenant Scott after the fight that they were not fired on from that redoubt, but on arriving there they found the bodies of 17 insurgents in the work, evidently killed by the artillery fire.

At 10 a. m. a request came for artillery to use against the insurgents occupying the trench near blockhouse 13 and commanding a flank fire on the troops of Captain Murphy, Fourteenth Infantry.

By direction of the division commander, I sent Lieutenant Scott, with 1 gun, to Captain Murphy, 16 men of the Washington Infantry assisting his men in pulling it. Soon after I heard his gun at work, and information received from several officers regarding him was most gratifying. While he was on the knoll with me his work was all that could be desired, and he proved himself a gallant and efficient officer.

At noon the division commander sent Company K, First Washington Volunteers, from my support to Cingalon to help the Fourth U. S. Cavalry drive out the insurgent sharpshooters, who were still keeping up a heavy fire. Soon after this I sent Private J. T. Clarke, D, Sixth Artillery, over to that part of the line to obtain information for the division commander. At about 2.40 p. m., it being evident that the troops of the Second Brigade had taken the insurgents in the flank and were driving them back toward the intrenchments beyond blockhouse 12, I opened fire with the guns at ranges varying from 800 to 1,000 yards to hasten their flight, and continued the fire until I thought it might interfere with our own infantry.

About 4.20 p. m. I received word from the division commander to stop the fire of a few insurgents who had gotten into the belfry and tower of the Paco church—that were still standing—and were annoying our troops by their fire. This we soon did completely, one shot, aimed by Corporal Butler, passing into the belfry through the long, open window, and two, aimed by First Sergeant Keller, bursting directly in the opening in the tower, and that settled it.

There was no more work for the battery, and at 5.30 we withdrew and returned to quarters. Lieutenant Scott, with his gun, did not rejoin us, and continued on with our infantry troops to Pasai, where he remained until the afternoon of the 7th. His report is appended hereto.

I heard him spoken of in terms of highest praise, which simply confirms my opinion that he would do all that was possible.

I am unable to report the number of projectiles used, but a rough calculation shows that there must have been about 200 from the 3.2-inch guns.

Acting Assist. Surg. Clarence Quinan, attached to the battalion as medical officer, and his 2 enlisted men were with me. He is a brave, earnest, and thoroughly able man, and his coolness under heavy fire showed that should his services be in demand we could confidently trust to him for any surgical work that might be required.

It is with supreme satisfaction that I report that other than the two men wounded in the mountain battery, Privates Jesse G. Lowenburg and Robert V. Ostrom, D, Sixth Artillery, there were no casualties in the battalion. This is a matter of great surprise, as we were under a very heavy fire at times and under constant fire from early morning until about 2.30 p. m., the bullets lodging everywhere except in the bodies of the men.

As regards the personnel, I can only say that they are all brave men. I did not see a man who was not brave, earnest, and cheerful, and they all did their duty nobly.

I desire to mention especially First Sergt. Joseph Keller, D, Sixth Artillery, for the cool and able manner in which he worked his platoon. He is an excellent soldier and well worthy of praise. Q. M. Sergt. Elmer Wolf, on duty bringing supplies, volunteered to hunt up and kill an insurgent sharpshooter concealed in a hut 500 yards

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distant, who was making it most uncomfortable for us. He did it at the voluntary risk of his life and is entitled to a medal of honor.

We were under the immediate observation of the division commander for some time and I know that he can appreciate how honored I feel in being commander of such a gallant body of men.

Very respectfully,

A. B. DYER,

Captain, Sixth U. S. Artillery, Commanding.

SANTA ANA, February 6, 1899.

COMMANDING OFFICER,

Light Artillery Battalion:

SIR: I have the honor to report that the mountain battery left barracks for the front about 5.20 a. m. February 5, under your orders, and was subsequently reported at Brigadier-General King's headquarters in Paco. About 6.30 a. m., under orders from General King, after a reconnoissance by myself, the battery moved up toward blockhouse 11 under a warm fire, and after crossing some very rough ground to the left it went into battery to the right and rear of Concordia Convent in a paddy field. The battery opened fire at 600 yards against the house of the Belgian consul, at the time occupied by the enemy, using shell and percussion shrapnel. The advance of the infantry compelled the battery to cease firing after having been engaged about half an hour. At this point the battery was subjected to a hot fire, but the guns were well protected by an embankment and horses placed behind the convent. The battery then limbered and crossed back to the road near Blockhouse 11 and immediately went into battery on the Santa Ana road and opened fire at 1,200 yards at the shed in rear of the Philippine lines to the right of the road. In order to avoid firing over the infantry, the battery was moved beyond Blockhouse 11 after firing about ten rounds. The battery went into action on the flank of the infantry near the bridge and fired at the same target. This fire seemed to relieve the pressure on the infantry, which then rapidly advanced and again masked the fire of the battery.

Colonel Wholley, of the First Washington, came to me at this time with a request to relieve the pressure on his men to the left of the Santa Ana road, and in compliance therewith a platoon under Lieutenant Koehler was sent to take position at the bridge to open on a battery and a line of infantry of the enemy strongly intrenched, and to sweep the village of Santa Ana. The other platoon was moved to the left of the blockhouse and opened on the Belgian consul's house and the village beyond. Lieutenant Koehler's platoon was subjected to a very heavy fire, but opened vigorously and did fine execution.

After half an hour's firing the platoon near the convent was moved to the bridge, relieving Lieutenant Koehler, who moved forward with the infantry, going into battery on the left of the road, about 300 yards beyond the bridge. After a few shots at the shed and village of Santa Ana the battery was brought together at the junction of the Santa Ana and San Pedro roads, and our infantry having penetrated the village and captured the battery of the enemy, it was impossible to open without danger to them.

The battery here waited, and, while getting a platoon in position to rake the main street of Santa Ana, Privates Lowenburg and Ostrum, 1st, were wounded. At this point there was a heavy fire and continuous hostile fire. The battery remained here about twenty minutes and then moved up the road, and at 9.45 entered the plaza, appearing there almost with the infantry, and in company with the brigade commander.

Santa Ana was partly destroyed by fire; and here we remained the rest of the day, and on receiving notice that there was to be no further advance that day, the battery was put into barracks in a house formerly occupied by the insurgents.

The ammunition proved very disappointing, particularly the shell. A number of times the primers failed to explode the powder charge, and on several occasions the shell fell far short of the actual range. Their penetrating power, however, seemed to be good, although a number were known not to have exploded, although passing through thick stone walls. Many shrapnel, set to explode on percussion, were found unexploded, but much of this was due undoubtedly to the slight stopping power of many of the targets. Considerable difficulty was experienced in seating some of the shell and shrapnel. This happened in spite of every care taken to keep the ammunition free from grit, and the free swabbing of the chamber with water. One wheel-brake rope broke, but this gave only the inconvenience of excessive recoil.

Just before going into action at the first position Sergeant Baker was ordered to empty the wagon containing the field kits and send the wagon back for ammunition.

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He misunderstood these orders, although distinctly given; emptied all the wagons and sent them all in for ammunition. This mistake compelled us to carry all the ammunition by hand from position to position until the belated return of the wagons. As soon as it was learned that the wagons had been sent away Sergeant Baker was ordered to remain with the field kits until their return and then reload them. He forgot to do so, and when the house near which they were piled was set on fire this equipment was destroyed. This was the only unsatisfactory occurrence of the day.

Lieutenant Koehler acted throughout with cool courage and perfect judgment, and it was largely due to his personal direction that the fire against the insurgent redoubt, their strongest position, enabled the infantry to effect its capture without great loss. He responded to every call with cheerful alacrity, and was under an almost unceasing fire until we entered Santa Ana.

The men acted well after the first excitement had passed away. Especially noticeable was the steadiness of Corporal Pfahl, Acting Corporal Seith, Private Lowenburg, and Blacksmith Winters.

One horse slightly wounded on his upper lip.

Very respectfully,

H. L. HAWTHORNE,
First Lieutenant, Sixth U. S. Artillery,
Commanding Mountain Battery.

MANILA, P. I., February 6, 1899.

COMMANDING OFFICER,
Light Battery D, Sixth Artillery.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report on the part taken by my detached platoon of your battery in the action of yesterday between our troops and the insurgents.

In obedience to your verbal instructions, I had taken position in Fort Malate on the 24th ultimo. Between that date and February 4 nothing of note occurred.

About 9.30 p. m. on the latter date heavy infantry firing was heard on the north side of Manila, and soon a general alarm must have been given, as an infantry column reached the fort. My 2 guns were located in the southeast bastion and I at once cleared them for action, preparatory to night fighting by means of improvised bull's-eye lanterns. There was no firing on our front during the night. About 4 a. m. on the 5th instant I received the following telegram:

"Following instructions just received. In case you are fired on as soon as there is light enough have a few shots fired from Fort Malate on Blockhouse No. 14. Do not waste much ammunition on it except to prepare for an attack. If fire is kept up, direct a few shots on Camalita Convent. (Signed.) Cabell, A. A. G.

"SAGE."

Soon after daylight several parties of insurgents were seen moving westward from the vicinity of Blockhouse No. 14 toward the bay. This movement was reported to the division commander by Lieutenant Kelly, Volunteer Signal Corps, on duty in the fort. About this time I located among the trees and undergrowth a portion of the enemy's trenches hitherto unknown, some 300 yards distant and just to the southwest of one I had previously located. This trench I saw was occupied. At about 7.20 a. m. I received from the same source (Second Brigade headquarters) this telegram:

"Open on No. 14 and any insurgents in sight. Must open on No. 14."

I accordingly opened fire at 7.25 a. m., devoting gun No. 2 to the blockhouse and gun No. 1 to the trenches in my immediate right front, using shell on the former and shrapnel on the latter for the first round. My first shot was the signal for the infantry on our extreme right to open fire.

A very hot fire was at once returned from the trenches just beyond the cemetery, some 300 or 400 yards distant, and from the woods and houses in front of the extreme right of our line. There was no firing in the vicinity of Blockhouse No. 14, and I could only surmise what the result of my first shot was, although it proved that the range assumed (from maps) was accurate. Gun No. 2 then fired one or two shrapnel at the same point, when I directed its fire to be changed to the nearer trenches, which still responded warmly to the fire of our infantry and gun No. 1. Under the fire of both guns the enemy's fire rapidly grew less. In the meantime (some ten minutes, since only two or three shots were fired from each gun) I closely watched developments near the blockhouse, as also did Lieutenant Kelly at my request. There was still no firing in its immediate vicinity and no indication of the presence there of the insurgents. At 7.30 a. m. I sent to brigade headquarters a telegram asking to be informed when to cease firing on blockhouse, and shortly afterwards, as stated, temporarily directed all my fire on the nearer trenches to relieve both the infantry

on the right and my own men from a close and galling fire. About 7.55 a. m. I received a telegram directing me to cease firing on Blockhouse No. 14, as an advance was contemplated. This was within half an hour of the time of opening fire. I answered "O. K." to this telegram at 8 a. m. Had I been permitted to open fire earlier, or had a longer time been allowed, I feel confident that the trenches in the vicinity of Blockhouse No. 14 and beyond it to the northeast could have been much more thoroughly cleared, as I had reconnoitered them some two or three days previously and knew their exact location and ranges. I regret exceedingly that more time could not have been allowed for this purpose. The contemplated advance was made somewhat after 8.30 a. m., when I heard firing near the blockhouse.

About this time I received a telegram as follows:

"If *Monadnock* is not firing on convent, put one gun on it."

This was at once done, and every shell fired at this time (some 6 or 7) burst in the convent. By this time the fire from the trenches beyond the cemetery and the woods beyond had all but ceased, and an infantry charge would have met little or no resistance, but no advance was made, orders having been given (so I was informed by Lieutenant-Colonel Trueman, First North Dakota Volunteers, the senior officer present at any time during the engagement) not to advance without orders. Captain Birkhimer, Third Artillery, inspector-general of the First Division, was at this time at the fort, and left me to consult Lieutenant-Colonel Trueman concerning the charge. I then slackened the fire on the trenches and fired a couple of shots at Passai, which I had previously located.

Some little time later, about 10 a. m., Lieutenant-Colonel Trueman requested me to cover the advance of an attacking party. This I did by firing two or three shrapnel as his men charged. They had only 300 yards to go, and took the trenches without the slightest resistance or loss, pursuing the fleeing insurgents some distance toward Camp Dewey, and then returning. It was a signal proof of the value of artillery fire, first silencing the fire on an intrenched position and then covering the successful charge of our infantry, in which the latter did not suffer a single casualty.

Shortly afterwards part of our infantry (I think the Fourteenth) was observed moving out from the old Spanish trenches and across an open field to the westward of Blockhouse No. 14 and between Fort Malate and the blockhouse. Their advance unmasked a heavy fire in the edge of a thick wood some 350 yards in front of them. The insurgents were, many of them, in partial view at a point whose range was well known. Two shrapnel were fired which passed about 150 yards in front of the right of the advancing line, making an angle of about 30 degrees with it, and both burst just in front of the insurgents, who appeared fairly to melt away. No further opposition was observed to the advance of this infantry until they were lost sight of in the woods.

At 10.15 a. m. I ceased firing and wired to this effect. About this time (between 10.15 and 10.30 a. m.) I received a telegram from brigade headquarters which read:

"Shells from fort are coming into men near Blockhouse No. 14."

I answered that "no shells had been thrown within 350 yards to the right of blockhouse since 8 a. m." None had been thrown to the left of blockhouse since the order to cease firing on it over two hours before, and only 2 had been fired to the right of it (the shrapnel just mentioned), both of which exploded in plain sight 200 yards in front of our infantry and in the midst of insurgents who were exchanging a warm fire with the advancing line of the Fourteenth Infantry. I am thus explicit to show how impossible it is for my shells to have been the ones referred to. Two ships of the Navy were firing during this time, and it is possible that some of their shots went wild. It was reported to me that two of their shells burst prematurely—one not very far from my position.

Shortly after I had ceased firing Lieutenant-Colonel Trueman moved forward again, meeting no resistance so long as I could see his entire line—some 300 yards. I did not fire over his head, as I could see neither his troops nor the enemy on account of the trees. At about 11.10 a. m. the insurgents were located in the old American trenches. I could distinctly see a number of them moving about just behind the breastwork, a short distance east of the convent, 1,000 yards from the fort. I fired three more shells into the convent and laid a gun loaded with time shrapnel on the spot where the insurgents were seen. I was observing with a glass and gave the order to fire just as some 8 or 10 insurgents passed the spot. The shrapnel burst on the crest of their works immediately in their front. This was my last shot, and it was fired at 11.15 a. m.

The *Monadnock* and *Charleston* continued for some time further to throw shells along the old American lines, and, observed from my position, much of their fire was effective in flanking them. About 10 a. m. the executive officer of the *Monadnock* came ashore to identify points beyond our lines and to decide upon a system of signals.

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This latter he did with Lieutenant Kelly, Volunteer Signal Corps. I had no casualties in my platoon. There were 13 shrapnel and 14 shell fired, nearly all of which were effective. The projectiles and fuses were entirely satisfactory and showed beautiful results when these latter could be observed. The friction primers were occasionally troublesome, the wire coil straightening out without discharging the primer. The lower end of the elevating screw (with bolt) of one gun was broken off.

The signal service at the fort was in charge of Second Lieutenant Kelly, Volunteer Signal Corps, and was highly satisfactory. For three hours the men were under a most disagreeable fire; bullets passed overhead, struck the walls of the fort, and burst open many of the sandbags of the revetment. How they failed to enter the embrasure is a mystery.

During this time the cannoneers were frequently exposed for some moments down to their waists while running the pieces forward through heavy sand after recoil, yet all were willing, alert, and after the first few moments under fire perfectly cool.

I specially desire to commend Corporal Miller, of my platoon, for his prompt, quick, and efficient work. Cool, collected, and attentive to his duties, he contributed largely to whatever good the platoon may have accomplished.

Very respectfully,

ADRIAN S. FLEMING,
Second Lieutenant, Sixth Artillery.

MANILA, P. I., February 8, 1899.

COMMANDING OFFICER,
Light Battery D, Sixth Artillery.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the detachment and piece which were sent under my command to Blockhouse No. 13 to assist the line in that quarter.

After leaving you I proceeded to Cingalon via Paco, the gun being hauled by 16 men from the Washington Volunteers. From Paco to Cingalon we were continually receiving the fire of sharpshooters from both flanks and in front, besides the many shots from the lines. At Cingalon the hauling detail was relieved by an equal number of men from the Fourth Cavalry, and I proceeded to Blockhouse No. 13, stopping once and rushing a hut a little back from the road, from which one or two shots had appeared to come. We found nothing and quickly resumed the march. At Blockhouse No. 13, Captain Birkhimer, inspector-general, First Division, Eighth Army Corps, met me and directed me to take position on the left of the road, just to the left and rear of the blockhouse, indicated the enemy's position, and gave an estimate of the range as between 400 and 500 yards. The angle of fire was limited by the extreme right of the enemy's position and the left of the blockhouse to about 25 degrees, and only about 10 yards of their trench was visible, and that not from the position of the gun, all the rest being screened by dense undergrowth and nipa huts, thus making it impossible to observe the effects of my fire.

I opened with shell and followed, with several shrapnel; then ceased firing and awaited developments, as I felt, from my previous knowledge of the ground, that my fire was not reaching the stronger part of the enemy's trenches, which lay farther to the right, out of my angle of fire, and from the continuous, though light, return fire I was convinced that our front was held only by a few skirmishers.

I then left the piece in charge of Sergeant Quigley and went alone to reconnoiter the ground to the west of the blockhouse in the hope of finding a more advantageous position and finding just where our own lines were. I found the country entirely impracticable, and covered with trees and undergrowth, so that it was impossible to see anywhere or to haul the gun through. Returning, I threw a few shrapnel at different points in front, silencing their skirmishers for the time. I then requested Captain Wheeler, Fourth Cavalry, in command at the blockhouse, to send a skirmish line through the fields on either side of the road to engage their skirmishers, while I would move my piece along the road to a new position, if possible, on the right of the enemy's trenches and enfilade them. His instructions would not permit him to make an advance until ordered to do so. I think it proper to state that about this time a shell of large caliber from a war vessel dropped about 50 yards to our rear and right and exploded. No one was injured.

While the order to advance was being waited for, I moved my piece to the left near the small stream, which position gave me a wider field but less command. From this position I fired 6 shrapnel, so directing the fire that the projectiles fell at about 20 yards interval along their trenches. I then returned to the road, limbered up, refilled the limber with ammunition, and prepared to move forward. Soon an officer appeared in the road in front and signaled that the trenches were taken.

By General Ovenshine's order, I went with a column to Pasai, where the hauling

detail was relieved by a detail from the Fourteenth Infantry, and I was ordered to start for San Pedro Mercati, but found an impracticable bamboo bridge about half a mile from Pasai. While engaged in strengthening this I received a verbal order from General Ovenshine to return to Pasai, where the detachment bivouaced on the plaza until the afternoon of the 7th of February, when I received a telegraphic order from the division commander to return to the battalion headquarters in Manila. A mixed detail from the Fourth Cavalry and Fourteenth Infantry assisted in hauling the piece there, and then returned to their respective commands.

In the action about 30 projectiles were used, 9 of them being shell.

As to the behavior of the men, it left nothing to be desired. They never were more cool and confident at drill than they were when the fire was the hottest. The chief of section, Sergeant Quigley, verified the cutting of every fuse and withdrew the safety pin himself. For coolness, courage, and intelligence, I can not but believe that he has no superior among artillery sergeants.

The gunner, Corporal Sparrevehn, is Sergeant Quigley's equal, and his work as gunner was perfect. His pointing was done as deliberately and accurately as though at drill.

Very respectfully,

E. D. SCOTT,
Second Lieutenant, Sixth Artillery.

[Inclosure 22.]

HEADQUARTERS FIRST TENNESSEE INFANTRY, U. S. V.,
Camp Hughes, Manila, P. I., February 6, 1899.

COMMANDING OFFICER,

First Division Eighth Army Corps, Manila, P. I.

SIR: I beg to report that, pursuant to orders from Brigadier-General Hughes, to report to you with the First Battalion, First Tennessee Infantry, I started at 11.30 a. m., from the Bridge of Spain, where the regiment was formed, accompanied by Maj. A. B. Bayless and Companies A, C, E, and F, with instructions from your aid-de-camp to proceed to Blockhouse No. 13 in the Paco district, and confer with Captain Wheeler, commanding Troop E, Fourth U. S. Cavalry, who held this point and was familiar with the topography of the district. Upon my doing this it was decided that Captain Wheeler with troops under himself would conduct a flank movement on the right of the road running past the blockhouse, while the four companies of the First Tennessee Infantry would advance by the left flank down the other side of the road, with the understanding that on hearing his guns my troops would push on and attack the enemy by the left flank.

I then immediately formed the battalion along a pathway to the left of the road, sending Company A, under Captain Reed, to drive back some sharpshooters who had taken position in a bunch of trees and bamboo thicket in our front; the other three companies in two lines, extended order, were advanced farther to the left, making a drive through the rice field and a narrow strip of woods and occupying a good position somewhat sheltered by an embankment, with instructions to there wait the appearance of Company A after they had driven the sharpshooters out of aforementioned woods. The battalion then in two lines, extended order, on left commanded by Major Bayless, the right by myself, proceeded to change direction to the right with the view of making an attack on the enemy's works in concert with an attack we now heard being made from the other side, and which we supposed was by Captain Wheeler. I have since learned, however, it was by General Ovenshine with the Fourteenth Infantry. Soon after we were met by an orderly, who informed us that the enemy were abandoning their position. Shortly afterwards a considerable body of insurgents were seen about 1,800 yards distant, who were evidently a portion of those who had occupied the blockhouse; we changed direction and drove them about 2 miles. It being now after 4 p. m., and considering it useless to go farther, we returned, crossing the creek beyond the works recently occupied by the Filipinos; then on up the road past Blockhouse No. 13 to a point where we were met by an officer of your staff with orders to remain at the outpost. This we did until relieved by your orders at 9 a. m. to-day, with instructions to return to our camp and report to Brigadier-General Hughes.

I am pleased to report that none of our battalion was killed or wounded, and beg to speak in the highest terms of the conduct of both officers and enlisted men, who executed all orders promptly and with perfect coolness.

I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,

GRACEY CHILDERS,
Lieutenant-Colonel First Tennessee Infantry, U. S. V.

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[Inclosure 23.]

HEADQUARTERS FIRST TENNESSEE VOLUNTEER INFANTRY,
Collegio, de St. Augustin, Iloilo, P. I., February 22, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, Manila, P. I.

SIR: Pursuant to instructions in attached message, I beg to submit herewith the following information as to position of this regiment prior to and after the engagement around Manila.

At the outbreak of hostilities, Saturday night, February 4, this regiment was mobilized near the Bridge of Spain, outside the walled city, where they remained until 7 o'clock a. m., February 5, 1899, returned to Camp Hughes near Paseo de Santa Lucia for breakfast.

By order of Major-General Otis, through Brigadier-General Hughes, the Second Battalion, First Tennessee Infantry, U. S. V., Companies B, D, L, and M, under Col. William C. Smith, accompanied by First Lieut. and Adjutant James K. Polk and Maj. B. F. Cheatam started from Camp Hughes at 9 a. m., February 5, with orders to report to Brigadier-General Hale in the Santa Mesa district. It was just after passing the Santa Mesa hospital that Col. William C. Smith died from apoplexy. His remains were taken in charge by Capt. and Asst. Surg. R. M. Kirby-Smith, who placed same in the Santa Mesa hospital and returned to the command. This battalion first came into action at the San Juan bridge, and under command of Maj. B. F. Cheatam participated with the Nebraska regiment in the engagement of February 5, going into camp for the night at San Felipe Neri. On the morning of February 6, leaving 20 men at San Felipe Neri, they moved on in extended order to the pumping station, arriving there at 5 p. m. On reporting to General Hale at the pumping station, the battalion was ordered to return to Camp Hughes, Manila.

At 9 o'clock a. m. on February 5, the First and Third Battalions, First Tennessee Infantry, U. S. V., under Lieut. Col. Gracey Childers, were formed under arms near the Bridge of Spain to await orders. At 11 a. m. the First Battalion, Companies F, A, C, and E, under Lieut. Col. Gracey Childers and Maj. A. B. Bayless, was ordered by Gen. R. P. Hughes to report to Maj. Gen. Anderson for service in the Paco district. Pursuant to instructions from General Anderson's aid-de-camp, and after conference with Captain Wheeler, who held Blockhouse No. 13, it was decided that this battalion should make a movement on the left flank in concert with a right flank movement, which was made by General Ovenshine with the Fourteenth Infantry and troops under Captain Wheeler. Having deployed to the left of the road between the Singalong church and Blockhouse No. 13, Company A, under Capt. George Reed, was sent to drive a squad of the enemy's sharpshooters, who had given considerable annoyance to our troops, out of a clump of trees and bamboo thickets near the road. The battalion then moved down through the thickets and rice fields on the left of the road, coming in on the enemy's flank. About this time an orderly reported the enemy were evacuating their intrenchments, and shortly afterwards, seeing them in large numbers in the edge of a woods about one-half mile distance, we reformed and started in pursuit, they going toward the hills. After following them for about 2 miles through rice fields and strips of wood, without being able to bring them to a serious engagement, the battalion returned, crossing a small stream out beyond Blockhouse No. 14, proceeding up the road to the Singalong church, where we arrived at 5.30 p. m., and were assigned to outpost duty until relieved at 9 a. m., February 6, 1899, when we returned to Camp Hughes.

The Third Battalion, Companies G, H, I, and K, under Maj. John G. McGuire, remained under arms near the Bridge of Spain until 3.45 p. m., when by orders of Gen. R. P. Hughes, having detached Company K, under Capt. S. O. Murphey, for service in the Tondo district, Major McGuire reported with Companies H, G, and I to Major-General MacArthur on the Nipa road; at 9 p. m. was ordered by General MacArthur to detach 1 company as guard for the Chinese hospital. Company G, Capt. Hu. B. Myers, was assigned this duty. Remained under General MacArthur until 2 p. m., February 6, when the battalion was ordered to report to regimental commander at Camp Hughes.

Second Lieut. Pat. L. Stacker, assistant quartermaster, reported for duty and was assigned to Company H. Asst. Surg. and Capt. Percy L. Jones was assigned to duty with Third Battalion. Surg. and Maj. Richard A. Barr was assigned to duty with First Battalion. Chaplain and Capt. Lewis J. Leland also accompanied this battalion.

In conclusion, I beg to report that the action and conduct of officers and men were highly satisfactory; their coolness under fire and promptness in execution of all orders being highly commendable.

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On February 7, 1899, being ordered to prepare for sailing on the U. S. transport *St. Paul*, our heavy baggage was stored in barracks and left under guard in charge of Second Lieut. S. Morgan Williams. Pursuant to verbal orders, this command went aboard transport *St. Paul* at 1 p. m., February 8; received orders to sail February 9 at 9 a. m., arriving at Iloilo at 11 p. m., February 10. Commanding officer reported to Brigadier-General Miller on board U. S. transport *Newport* at 11.30 p. m., February 10. On the morning of February 11, action being hastened by the insurgents taking the offensive, this regiment was landed and assisted in driving the insurgents from the city, the First Battalion, First Tennessee Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, being the first troops to land.

Respectfully,

GRACEY CHILDERS,
Lieutenant-Colonel Commanding Regiment.

[Inclosure 24.]

HEADQUARTERS SECOND BATTALION, FIRST TENNESSEE INFANTRY,
In the field, Convent de San Filipe, near Manila, February 5, 1899.

Gen. R. P. HUGHES,
Commanding Independent Brigade, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following hasty report of part taken by my battalion in to-day's battle around Manila:

I received the orders to report to Brigadier-General Otis at Palace of Malacanang at 9 a. m. We left camp at 9.15 and proceeded by way of Suspension Bridge. Col. William C. Smith, First Tennessee Infantry, had preceded me and had received orders for me from General Otis, but unfortunately when I reported to Colonel Smith at forks of road above creek, and before I could receive his instructions, he (Colonel Smith) fell dead of apoplexy at 10.30.

Not having received instructions, and seeing a battery of 2 pieces engaging the enemy below us across the bridge (I do not know the names of the different places), I moved to its support and crossed the stone bridge at about 10.50. The bridge at that time was swept by a steady fire from Mauser rifles, fired at about 800 yards. My men crossed in gallant style and, to my surprise, without a scratch. We formed on the left of the road, and leaving two companies (D and L) to support the battery I moved forward with Companies B and M and assisted the Nebraska regiment drive in the enemy from his position in the brush near the top of hill and then proceeded to the reservoir; but in the meantime Company B had been placed at forks of road at top of hill to prevent our flank from being turned, and Companies D, L, and M were held at reservoir until canteens could be filled.

At the reservoir I reported to General Hale, and from that time on my operations were conducted under his personal observation.

We left the reservoir at 1 p. m., and from that time on my battalion acted alone. We moved in extended order through the entire country between the Pasig River and a small stream that runs near the Nebraska camp. We took possession of three churches and the Convent of San Filipe and drove the enemy, who appeared from time to time in small parties, from the neighborhood.

We returned to San Filipe at 4.30, and by orders from General Hale went into camp and began the preparation of the first meal since 6 a. m.

Comment upon the action of the officers and men under me is not necessary at this time, except to say that in every particular they justified my great expectations of them. What they were told to do they did well and without a moment's hesitation. Not one instance of shirking or looking for a soft place came under my notice. The fire upon us was mostly from cover and from long range, but in the cases of several insurgents killed in my sight the marksmanship of our men was excellent.

A more complete report will follow. Insurgents known to have been killed by us, 10. We escaped without a scratch.

B. F. CHEATHAM, *Major.*

[Inclosure 25.]

FIRST COMPANY, VOLUNTEER SIGNAL CORPS,
Manila, P. I., February 18, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
First Division, Eighth Army Corps, Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of operations of the First Company, Volunteer Signal Corps, in the maintenance of communications in the First

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Division during the battle of February 4 and 5 and the extension of telegraph lines to the advanced positions of the troops after the battle:

Before the opening of hostilities the headquarters, offices, and outposts of the First Division were connected by about 9 miles of telegraph line, with stations at the following points: Headquarters First Division, central office of military telegraph system, Ayuntamiento, office of provost-marshal-general, hospital, observatory, headquarters Second Brigade, First Division, cable office, Cingalon, and Blockhouse 11. The First Company, Volunteer Signal Corps, had available for duty in the operation of these stations 39 men and 4 officers. For active service the men not detailed in the various offices were divided into 5 squads, one of which, under the company commander, was to report at the headquarters of the division, to be under the direction of the commanding general. The others, under Lieutenants Rudd, Gibbs, and Kelly, and First-Class Sergeant Knapp, were to take charge of the stations at the central office, Blockhouse 11, Fort Malate (where an emergency station was to be established), and at Cingalon, respectively. They were to send, receive, and deliver messages as long as the telegraph line was intact, and in case communication failed were to act as couriers until the lines could be repaired. At Fort Malate, in addition to the telegraph office, communication with the *Monadnock* was to be maintained by flag and torch. The lines had been so arranged that in case they were destroyed at any point the stations on that end could be cut out, leaving the rest of the system intact until the defective section had been repaired.

On the opening of hostilities, at 8.41 p. m. of the 4th, the signal squads were equipped and sent to their posts. They were relieved at midnight, but between 3 and 4 a. m. of the 5th were called out again. During the action the officers and men, acting on the plans outlined above, maintained the telegraph system and the communication with the monitor. From Fort Malate the position of our troops was flagged the *Monadnock*, and in the advance Sergeant Howser and Private Biebel, of this company, marked the right flank of the attacking troops, carrying signal flags, so that the fire of the monitor might be directed beyond our lines. The telegraph lines were cut by bullets and shells and burned down by fire several times during the day, but only once was more than one station out of communication at the same time, and repairs were made quickly, twenty-one minutes being the longest interruption.

Lieutenant Gibbs, by using some old telephone lines, cut in a station at Santa Ana about two hours after the occupation of that town.

On the day following the battle 5 signal parties were at work. One made permanent repairs from Paco Bridge to Blockhouse 11; another ran an iron loop from Santa Ana to connect with the system at Blockhouse 11; a third repaired an old line to San Pedro Macati; a fourth extended the line from Cingalon to Passai, and a fifth went to the junction of the Calle Real and the Passai road and cleared an old line back to Passai. At 7.15 p. m. the work had been completed and the most advanced positions were connected with the headquarters by telegraph lines, all working clear.

Up to the evening of the 6th the offices at the provost-marshal-general's, the observatory, General Ovenshine's residence and headquarters in town, Blockhouse 11, and Cingalon had been cut out, as they became unnecessary, and new stations established at Santa Ana, San Pedro Macati, Passai, and Colonel Treumann's headquarters, at the junction of the Calle Real and Passai road, besides the temporary stations at Paco Bridge and Fort Malate, which were cut in and out as needed. The telegraph lines had been added to by about 8 miles of wire. A flag-and-torch station on the beach at the right of the advance kept up communication with the *Monadnock*, which had moved south as the land forces advanced.

Total number of messages recorded sent in First Division from 8.41 p. m. of the 4th to 6 p. m. of the 5th, 520; estimated number sent by word of mouth and not recorded, 200; making a total of 720 during the battle. Of these probably one-tenth were not delivered, the rapid movement of the troops, the small number of men in the squads for courier work, and lack of horses making it impossible always to find the one addressed; but every effort was made to have as efficient a service as possible under the existing conditions, and the men did their best with an indifference to danger and a devotion to duty excelled, I am sure, by the troops of no other branch of the service.

Casualties in action, none.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CHAS. E. KILBOURNE, JR.,
First Lieutenant, Volunteer Signal Corps.

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[Inclosure 26.]

HEADQUARTERS COMPANY A, BATTALION OF ENGINEERS,
Malate, P. I., February 17, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS.

(Through the chief engineer.)

SIR: I have the honor to forward herewith report of the operations of Company A, Battalion of Engineers, on February 5, 1899:

I had no orders except verbal instructions from the adjutant-general, Eighth Army Corps, that in case I received no orders to use my own judgment, and kept my company in barracks till daylight, when breakfast was served and canteens filled with coffee. Each man had 200 rounds of ammunition. I left 2 noncommissioned officers and 13 men in barracks, with transportation and directions to fill orders for engineer supplies that arrived from division or brigade commanders, who had been informed that they could obtain supplies from me.

I moved my company to Cingalon church, where I left it and proceeded to Blockhouse 12, at about 8 a. m. Here I found the left wing of the Second Brigade (Oven-shine's). The First Brigade (King's) was advancing. Its right flank was enfiladed by a flank fire from the woods on its right. I observed that the right wing seemed unable to advance, and in fact seemed practically stationary for nearly half an hour. I sent for my company, consisting of 85 men, crossed the stream at Blockhouse 12, and advanced on the right of First Brigade, dislodging the insurgents in the woods on the right and moved up to the front line of First Brigade, deploying my whole company in one line of skirmishers, reserving my right to protect the right flank. When I arrived on the line I found the First California Infantry commanded by Colonel Smith, who promptly gave the order to advance.

At the English cemetery were quite a large number of insurgents behind intrenchments indicated on map hereto annexed. Their fire was considerable in volume, but was all too high and did not annoy us very much. The line advanced to about 700 yards, when I halted my company with orders to lie down behind dikes, and with the aid of sharpshooters obtained the range as follows: I directed Sergeant Nihill to begin at less than the range and gradually increase, while with field glass I watched the insurgents behind the trenches, who were firing at us and had their heads and shoulders exposed to view. At about 750 yards when the sergeant fired, they all ducked, showing that his bullet had gone over their heads. I then gave the order to set sights at 50 yards less and when their heads appeared again fired a volley and repeated twice while they were running to get behind the wall of the cemetery.

I moved promptly forward to a line of the English cemetery position indicated on map, 9.30 a. m. Here I was joined by a detachment from First California Infantry, and under the direction of Colonel Smith advanced to a knoll near San Pedro church, where our fire enfiladed the trenches on the road from Santa Ana to San Pedro, and the insurgents were driven out with some precipitation. We then moved by the right flank to the San Pedro cemetery and heights beyond, attempting to cut off their retreat; but our march was too long and they retreated too fast up to the road to Pasig. After driving some insurgents out of San Perillo across the river, we moved down to the river and entered the town from the east at 10.10 a. m. Under Colonel Smith's directions, I placed an outpost to the east of the town on the road near Guadeloupe.

The excellent conduct of the men under fire and the promptness with which the latter part of the flank movement was carried out, I believe was largely due to the presence of Colonel Smith, First California Infantry, who, with superior energy, good judgment, and excellent knowledge of the ground, shoved the line forward mostly at double time.

All the firing was by volleys—about 110 rounds per man were fired. The fire discipline of the company was very good.

To show more fully the behavior of my company, I add the following extract from report of Colonel James Smith, First California, which he furnished me:

"A force from San Pedro Macati who were apparently advancing to the relief of the enemy at Santa Ana, opened fire. From the direction of the advance of the enemy at San Pedro Macati the right flank of Companies A, E, and H, was in danger of being turned and orders were shouted back to the support to come up on the right flank so as to extend it and meet the threatened danger. The order was not heard and motions were then made which evidently were misunderstood. A messenger was then sent back, but evidently did not reach his destination. Intervals were then extended to the right and Company A of the First California Volunteers on the right flank reverted to meet as far as possible the threatened attack upon the flank, so that a safe advance might be made, but at this moment Capt. W. G. Haan with a com-

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pany of engineers came up on the right flank, and with splendid volleys and magnificent steadiness drove back that portion of the enemy who were seeking a clump of trees to make a flank attack, at the same time dislodging a small detachment already there who had retreated to that point under the fire of Captain Dyer's battery. * * * The company of engineers and Major Sime's command composed of Companies A, E, and H, California Volunteers, steadily pressed the enemy back into the Pueblo of San Pedro Macati. The enemy occupied intrenchments in front of the town and a churchyard surrounded by a low stone wall. The enemy's fire was very heavy, but our men continued to advance until a distance of about 400 yards was reached, when, seeing the strength of the enemy's position, the company of engineers and a platoon of Company A, First California, from the right flank were detached and ordered to proceed along a row of trees striking our flank at right angles and running toward the Passay road, which once reached would carry them concealed to the enemy's left and rear. * * * The company of engineers and platoon of Company A, First California, keeping under cover of the trees, advanced to a position where a clear view of the left flank and rear of the enemy was had and opened fire with telling effect. * * * Within ten minutes after the flank movement and combined fire from the front and the left and rear, the enemy were driven in disorder out of the town, seeking escape over the hills and along the Pasig road. * * * It gives me very sincere pleasure to highly praise and specially commend the coolness, bravery, and sound discretion of Capt. W. G. Haan, of the engineers."

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. G. HAAN,

First Lieutenant Third Artillery, Commanding Company A, Battalion of Engineers.

[Inclosure 27.]

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., March 4, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to forward herewith a true copy of a communication received yesterday from the chief ordnance officer, Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, containing a list of ordnance stores captured from the insurgents and turned in by the First Division.

I would respectfully request that it be treated as part of my report of active operations dated 18th ultimo.

Very respectfully,

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,

Major-General U. S. V., Commanding Division.

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
OFFICE CHIEF ORDNANCE OFFICER,
Manila, P. I., March 1, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

First Division of Eighth Army Corps.


SIR: I have the honor to report the following list of ordnance stores captured from the insurgents, turned in by the First Division to date:

CANNON.

- 2 Krupp B. L. rifles, caliber 8 cm., condition fair.
- 2 Hontoria B. L. rifles, caliber 3-inch, dismantled, condition unserviceable.
- 1 mountain B. L. rifle, caliber 3-inch, dismantled, condition unserviceable.
- 1 field B. L. rifle, caliber 2½-inch, dismantled, condition unserviceable.
- 1 Nordenfolt rifle, rapid fire, dismantled, condition unserviceable.

CARRIAGES.

- 3 carriages, rifle, small, incomplete.
- 1 tripod, rifle, small, incomplete.



SOUTHERN SUBURBS OF THE INSURGENT TRENCHES

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RIFLES.

56 rifles, Mauser, serviceable.
3 rifles, Mauser, unserviceable.
17 rifles, Remington, serviceable.
2 rifles, Remington, unserviceable.

CARTRIDGES, RIFLE BALL.

23,500 Mauser.
11,000 Remington.

CARTRIDGES, MISCELLANEOUS.

537 Maxim-Nordenfelt, caliber 57 mm.
547 shells, brass, caliber 57 mm., for reloading.
389 projectiles, caliber 57 mm., for reloading.
2,504 Hotchkiss, caliber 1.50.
200 Gatling, caliber 1 (steel bullet, foreign make).
600 projectiles for reloading same.

PROJECTILES, MISCELLANEOUS.

2,969 different sizes, unclassified, uncrated.
256 different sizes, unclassified, crated.

POWDER.

1,700 pounds prismatic.
80 pounds fine grain, black.
7 boxes, unopened, 60 pounds to box.
1 box fine grain, black, unserviceable.
2 cans fine grain, black, unserviceable.
28 charges for 3-inch rifle.

MISCELLANEOUS.

2 sacks charcoal.
6 large rolls sheet lead.
468 bayonets, incomplete.
50 pounds sulphur.
2 pigs lead.
66 knives.
29 infantry equipments, incomplete.

Very respectfully,

W. T. Wood,
Captain, Eighteenth Infantry, Chief Ordnance Officer.

A true copy.

W. H. ALLEN,
Aid-de-Camp.

[Inclosure 28.]

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., March 1, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to forward herewith a map showing the positions of the troops of this division during and after the battle of February 5, 1899, to be forwarded to the Adjutant-General of the Army with my report dated the 18th ultimo.

Very respectfully,

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding Division.

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[Inclosure 29.]

HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., February 28, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: Report of the military operations of the Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, from the evening of the 4th of February to include the 28th of the same month, is herewith respectfully submitted.

At the commencement of hostilities the division was organized as follows:

Regiment.	Commanding officer.	Distribution.	Effective strength.	
			Offi- cers.	Men.
<i>Artillery.</i>				
Battalion Utah Artillery	Maj. R. W. Young.....	Cuartel de Melic.....	8	302
<i>First Brigade—Brig. Gen. H. G. Otis, commanding.</i>				
Third U. S. Artillery.....	Maj. W. A. Kobbé.....	do.....	14	650
First Montana Infantry	Col. H. C. Kessler	1 Gunao street; 6 San Miguel street.	48	846
Tenth Pennsylvania Infantry.	Col. A. L. Hawkins.....	Corregidor Island; 22, 42, and 44 Calle de Iris; Plaza Santa Cruz.	28	713
Twentieth Kansas Infantry..	Col. F. Funston	La Rosa Tobacco Warehouse; Aldecoa & Co.'s godown; Administracion de Hacienda.	37	976
Total First Brigade.....			127	3,185
<i>Second Brigade—Brig. Gen. Irving Hale, commanding.</i>				
First Colorado Infantry	Col. H. B. McCoy.....	86, 46, 1, 20, and 66 Calle Alix; 25 San Sebastian street; 12 Plaza Santa Ana; San Sebastian convent.	41	1,034
First South Dakota Infantry.	Col. A. S. Frost	2 and 10 Malacanan; 1 Concepcion; 5 Concepcion.	40	798
First Nebraska Infantry.....	Col. J. M. Stotsenburg.	Camp Santa Mesa.....	37	886
Total Second Brigade..			118	2,718
Aggregate of division..			253	6,200

In addition to the foregoing the river gunboat *Laguna de Bay* was attached to the division, the personnel and armament being as follows:

Capt. B. H. Randolph, Third U. S. Artillery, commanding, with a detachment of 2 noncommissioned officers and 27 privates of Battery G, Third U. S. Artillery; Second Lieut. R. C. Naylor, 2 noncommissioned officers and 8 privates of the Utah Light Artillery, U. S. V.; and First Lieut. Edwin A. Harting and Second Lieut. Samuel G. Larson, 5 noncommissioned officers and 20 privates of the First South Dakota Infantry, U. S. V. Engineers and deck force, 5 noncommissioned officers and 12 privates.


The armament of the gunboat consisted of two 3-inch naval rifles, two 1.65-inch Hotchkiss rifles, and four Gatling guns. The infantry detachment was armed with Springfield rifles.

On February 27 the Navy furnished a Colt's automatic gun, taken from the U. S. S. *Helena*, in charge of Lieut. Cleland Davis, U. S. N., and 3 enlisted men of the Marine Corps.

One battalion of 3 companies of the Second Oregon Infantry, U. S. V., under command of Major Eastwick, joined the division on February 7 and is still on duty with it, being attached to the Second Brigade.

The First Battalion, Wyoming Volunteer Infantry, joined the division on February 8 and is still on duty with it, being attached to the Second Brigade.

A squadron of 3 troops of the Fourth U. S. Cavalry, under command of Major Rucker, joined the division on February 9 and remained on duty with it until February 18, part of the time under the immediate orders of the division commander and part of the time attached to the First Brigade.



oon of the Sixth U. S. Artillery, under command of Second Lieut. A. S. joined the division on February 10 and is still on duty with it.

ersonnel of the division staff on February 4 was as follows:

Lieut. Pegram Whitworth, Eighteenth U. S. Infantry, aid-de-camp; Maj. Bradley Strong, assistant adjutant-general, U. S. V., adjutant-general; Capt. Eckett, Fourth U. S. Cavalry, acting inspector-general; Capt. Charles McClure, th U. S. Infantry, acting judge-advocate and mustering officer; Capt. Charles lle, jr., assistant quartermaster, U. S. V., chief quartermaster; Maj. Robert igh, chief commissary of subsistence, U. S. V., chief commissary; Maj. Henry chief surgeon, U. S. V., chief surgeon. Maj. John S. Malloy, inspector-U. S. V., inspector-general, returned to duty February 15, and thereafter Lockett became an aid.

Edgar Russel, of the Volunteer Signal Corps, joined on the night of February effect, from that time acted as a staff officer throughout the time of this ad is now so acting.

Richard W. Young, Utah Light Artillery, in addition to commanding his , also acted as chief of artillery, and in that capacity was a useful member of of the division.

ation in the city of the barracks of the various organizations may be seen nce to the accompanying map, and also, by the same reference, the outpost ch regiment, which, by a general understanding in the premises, was also upied as a fighting line by the respective organizations upon signal by wire ision headquarters, through brigade commanders, to "carry out the pre-plans."

rtinacity of the insurgents in passing armed parties over the line of delimi- American territory at a point nearly opposite the pipe-line outpost of the regiment induced a correspondence which, in the light of subsequent events, ting, as indicating with considerable precision a premeditated purpose on of somebody in the insurgent army to force a collision at that point. The note from these headquarters, which was prepared after conference with the mt commander, was carried by Major Strong, who entered the insurgent placed the paper in the hands of Colonel San Miguel. The answer of Colo- Miguel was communicated in an autograph note, which was written in the of Major Strong, who also saw Colonel San Miguel write an order to his the outpost in question, directing him to withdraw from the American side ne. This order Major Strong saw delivered to the officer on the outpost. espondence referred to is as follows, the original of Colonel San Miguel's ich was written in the Spanish language, being inclosed herewith.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., February 2, 1899.

ING GENERAL,
ppine Troops in Third Zone.

he line between your command and my command has been long established, ell understood by yourself and myself. It is quite necessary, under present is, that this line should not be passed by armed men of either command.

ned party from your command now occupies the village in front of Block- 7, at a point considerably more than a hundred yards on my side of the is very active in exhibiting hostile intentions. This party must be with- your side of the line at once.

his date if the line is crossed by your men with arms in their hands they regarded as subject to such action as I may deem necessary.

ry respectfully,

ARTHUR MACARTHUR,
Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

SAN JUAN DEL MONTE, *February 2, 1899.*

meral MACARTHUR.

RY DEAR SIR: In reply to yours dated this day, in which you inform me that ers have been passing the line of demarcation fixed by agreement, I desire at this is foreign to my wishes, and I shall give immediate orders in the that they retire.

uly, yours,

L. F. SAN MIGUEL,
Colonel and First Chief.

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At about half past 8 p. m., February 4, an insurgent patrol, consisting of 4 armed soldiers, entered our territory at Blockhouse No. 7 and advanced to the little village of Santol, which was occupied from the pipe-line outpost of the Nebraska regiment. This, it will be observed, was precisely the point referred to in the correspondence above quoted. The American sentinel challenged twice, and then, as the insurgent patrol continued to advance, he fired, whereupon the patrol retired to Blockhouse 7, from whence fire was immediately opened by the entire insurgent outpost at that point.

At 9 p. m. Colonel Stotsenburg, First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. V., reported considerable firing at his outposts, which extended gradually along the entire front of the division. At 10 p. m. it was evident that hostilities had been commenced in earnest by the insurgents, and accordingly an order issued from these headquarters to put everything on the firing line, according to a programme which had been prearranged for such an emergency.

The fire fight continued throughout the night with great ferocity, but no attack was made at any point on the line until daylight of the 5th, when a series of combats occurred along the entire division front which, by 12 o'clock noon, resulted in the possession by the Second Brigade of the entire insurgent line from Blockhouse 4 through 5, 6, and 7, San Juan Bridge, Polvorin, Deposito, San Juan del Monte Church, San Felipe Convent, and Mandaloya, to the Pasig opposite Santa Ana. About 11 a. m. of the 5th a battalion of the Tennessee regiment joined the Second Brigade as a reinforcement, and thereafter rendered efficient service in connection with the occupation of all positions to the east of the Deposito.

Particular details touching all these events are carefully set forth at length in the inclosed reports of the brigade and regimental commanders and the commanding officer of the Utah Light Artillery, U. S. V., to which, in this connection, attention is respectfully invited.

In consequence of the decided success on the right it seemed expedient to conform thereto by a general advance of the First Brigade. Accordingly, orders issued to the Montana regiment to occupy the Chinese hospital and Lico, and the Third Artillery and Kansas regiments to occupy the road west from Lico, crossing the Caloocan road and as far to the left thereof as necessary.

The movement commenced about 2 o'clock, and was conducted with great spirit. The momentum of the advance, however, carried the several regiments beyond their designated objectives and resulted in an impetuous rush to the front, in which the Kansas regiment and 2 guns of the Utah Light Artillery operated directly along the Caloocan road, and the Third Artillery, 2 guns of the Utah Light Artillery, and the regiments of Montana, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota converged upon the Chinese church. The South Dakota regiment belonged to the Second Brigade, and was brought into the fight through the presence of mind and good judgment of Captain Lockett, Fourth U. S. Cavalry, acting inspector-general of the division, who, being on the ground and seeing the manifest importance of supporting the First Brigade, assumed the necessary authority to order the regiment to advance and connect with the Pennsylvania regiment and join the action.

The combat was characterized by a fine display of initiative on the part of the troops engaged, all of whom were essential to the final success achieved, as it is probable that none of the regiments would have reached the church had it not been for the cooperation of all concerned.

By reason of a general tendency, arising from the character of the ground, the First Brigade inclined somewhat toward the bay, and Second Brigade, in like manner, inclined toward the Pasig River—that is to say, one inclined to the west and the other to the east, the effect of which was to create a gap between the two. It therefore became very important to arrest the forward movement and to concentrate and connect the division line before dark. The connection between the two brigades was successfully accomplished at Blockhouse No. 4, and the line established, as indicated on the accompanying map, from which it will be seen that the Third Artillery and the Montana regiments changed relative positions, so as to place the artillery on the right instead of the left of the Montana regiment, which position it occupied at the commencement of hostilities.

For the tactical details of these movements, reference is respectfully made to the accompanying subreports of the brigade, regimental, and artillery commanders.

By signal during the night connection was established with the U. S. S. *Charleston*, and, by arrangement, fire from the fleet commenced at daylight and continued, with apparently excellent effect, until about 11 o'clock a. m., when it was suspended on request from these headquarters, as the rapid advance from the right had placed it in the line of fire. At about 8.30 p. m., of the evening of the 5th a battalion of three companies of the Tennessee regiment, under Major McGuire, reported for duty

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with the division. One company was stationed as a guard at the Chinese hospital, which was being used as a dressing station for our wounded, the other two companies being placed as a reserve at the corner of Dulumbayan street and the Calle de Iris. Early on the morning of the 6th Major McGuire's battalion was relieved and returned to duty with the regiment.

On February 6 General Hale supervised the capture of the pumping station of the water-works in the vicinity of Mariquina, the details of which operation were successfully carried out by Colonel Stotsenburg, of the First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. V., with a command composed of the following troops: Two companies of the Colorado regiment, Major Grove, commanding; one battalion of the First Tennessee Infantry, U. S. V., Maj. B. Frank Cheatham, commanding; one battalion of the Twenty-third United States Infantry, Maj. G. A. Goodale, commanding; one battalion of the First Nebraska, under the direct orders of Colonel Stotsenburg; one battalion of the First Nebraska, Major Mulford, commanding; one battalion Second Oregon Infantry, U. S. V., Maj. P. G. Eastwick, jr., commanding, as reserve at the Deposito; four guns, Utah Light Artillery, U. S. V., Maj. R. W. Young, commanding.

The tactical work was accomplished in the most inspiring manner, a full narrative of which is embodied in the report of General Hale and the officers who conducted the several organizations.

Aside from the foregoing, and the rectification of alignments at several points on the division front, nothing further of note occurred on this day.

The event of the 7th was an outpost affair on the front of the Kansas regiment, which originated in a wrangle between the opposing sentinels, successively supported from our side until Colonel Funston, with the sanction of the brigade commander, personally advanced with three and one-half companies, under the command of Major Metcalf, and engaged an insurgent force of something more than 200 men. The insurgents stood firmly, and the combat terminated in a hand-to-hand fight, in which bayonets and clubbed muskets were freely used, the result being the complete routing of the enemy, with a very considerable loss to them, 28 of their dead being counted within a space of about 75 square yards. The Kansas regiment lost First Lieut. Alfred C. Alford, killed, and 6 soldiers wounded.

The various positions, as indicated on the accompanying map, which had been protected by hasty intrenchments, were maintained until the afternoon of the 10th instant, when the town of Caloocan was occupied by a premeditated movement, in which the Third United States Artillery and the regiments of Montana and Kansas, reinforced by the Idaho regiment, under Major Figgins, three troops of the Fourth United States Cavalry, under Major Rucker, seven guns of the Utah Light Artillery, under Major Young, and a platoon of Battery D, Sixth United States Artillery, under Lieutenant Fleming, from the first division, were employed.

The tactical scheme, which was carefully explained to the brigade and regimental commanders, was to the following effect: An artillery preparation of thirty minutes by the combined action of the Navy and field guns, to be followed immediately by the infantry advance, which involved a wheel to the right on Blockhouse No. 2, as a pivot, until the left reached a point in front of the town, as indicated on the map by the present lines occupied by the division. The troops advanced as posted in the trenches, a battalion of Idaho supporting Montana and Kansas, respectively. The Fourth Cavalry was deployed, facing the rear, to insure protection in the event of an uprising in the city.

The combined artillery preparation commenced at 3.09 p. m. and the infantry advance at 3.59 p. m., after which the programme as prescribed was executed with almost exact precision, and the American flag was raised in the town at 5.15 p. m. The tactical execution of the necessary movements was exemplary, and the resistance was such as to require the best efforts of all concerned. Full details will be found by reference to accompanying reports of subordinate commanders.

In connection with the occupation of Caloocan, Company M, of the Montana regiment, Captain Hallahan commanding, was placed under the orders of Major Bell, United States Volunteer Engineers, in charge of the office of military information, Headquarters Department of the Pacific, with a view to utilizing a ravine for a concealed advance, in the hope of deriving advantage from the sudden and unexpected appearance of troops on that part of the field. This duty, which was special in its nature and also involved the possibility of extra hazard, was well performed. A detailed account thereof is set forth in the inclosed report of Major Bell.

From the 10th instant to date the lines of the opposing armies have been in close contact, which has afforded scope for the characteristic sharpshooting methods of the natives, and has resulted in considerable loss to us, especially in the Kansas and Montana regiments. The disposition of the natives in this respect has been considerably abated and very effectually controlled by the skillful placing of shrapnel from the guns of the Sixth Artillery and the Utah batteries.

In consequence of its advanced position at the pumping station, as shown on the map, the Nebraska regiment has been engaged since the first occupancy thereof in a series of minor operations, which have resulted in a large amount of arduous and dangerous work, all of which has been cordially and well performed by this excellent regiment, and which is well described in detail in the accompanying reports from the commanding officer of the regiment, who skillfully conducted all the operations.

On the 23d instant a formidable uprising was undertaken in the city by the combined efforts of the natives, assisted by insurgent soldiers, who apparently passed our lines for the purpose of encouraging their friends in the city. Information of a successful attack by natives on the Tondo car shed, of the tramway line connecting Manila and Malabon, was reported at these headquarters at the Caloocan Church, by a member of the guard of the Twentieth Kansas, who had been stationed thereat, and who had, with his party, been driven therefrom. The situation, thus disclosed, was quite embarrassing, and all the more so as it was not clearly elucidated by the meager report of the soldier referred to; but it was quite apparent that the enemy, in some numbers, had successfully occupied ground between the city and the troops in the trenches; that is to say, the enemy had occupied a position directly in the rear of and about 3 miles distant from the left of the division.

Under these circumstances, a company of the Montana regiment was directed toward the city by rail, utilizing that part of the Manila and Dagupan Railway within our lines. Major Mallory, inspector-general of the division, accompanied the command, and, under advice from these headquarters, conducted the operations thereat, and thereby materially aided in suppressing the demonstration. Attention is respectfully invited to the narrative embodied in Major Mallory's official report, especial reference being made to his remarks in connection with the death of Second Lieut. E. S. French, First Montana Volunteers.

From the 4th to the 16th instant the gunboat *Laguna de Bay* nominally formed part of the division, but, owing to remoteness and inaccessibility, strict control of the boat from these headquarters was impracticable, and as a consequence she passed directly to the custody of the department commander, and after the 16th instant was in effect detached from the division. The admirable and efficient service rendered by this craft during the twelve days mentioned, especially during the fighting of the 5th instant, is well described by Captain Randolph in his report, which is respectfully forwarded as an inclosure hereto.

The Volunteer Signal Corps detachment, under Capt. Edgar Russel, has, since the commencement of hostilities, rendered not only important, but indispensable service. By means of the wires of this detachment precision and uniformity of action have been insured throughout a line which in the first instance was about 4 miles in extent and has gradually been extended to nearly, if not quite, 10. In addition to direct contact with the firing line at all important points, these headquarters have been kept within almost instant advice and orders of the department commander, and also, by flag and torch, in communication with the navy.

As a means of tactical control, wire service in the hands of trained, skillful, and fearless men may be regarded as an indispensable adjunct of modern war, in which light it is a great privilege to speak in behalf of the future development of the signal corps of the regular establishment to the full limit of essential military usefulness. During the twenty-four days of hostility covered by this report there have been dispatched and received at these headquarters 1,116 messages communicating orders and information of vital importance relating exclusively to the military situation.

The accompanying detailed reports of Captain Russel are commended to the perusal of all concerned, from which the following extract is quoted at length, as illustrating the possibilities of developing a system of cooperation whereby the fire of ships can be effectually controlled for the purpose of land operations:

On February 19 Admiral Dewey's courtesy made it possible to arrange a complete scheme of firing by aid of signals, whereby points inshore, whether visible from the ship or not, could be reached by the guns of the navy when appropriate signals from shore were given. Caloocan church tower had been successfully experimented with as a point for signaling to the navy. The system adopted required a good map and an angle-measuring instrument. In this case use was made of the sextant kindly loaned by the captain of the *Monadnock*. By observations from ship and church tower and the angle signaled from ship the position of the ship is accurately determined on the map and a north-and-south line drawn through it. Having selected the point which it is desired to strike on shore, the scale of the map at once gives the range, and a small protractor gives the bearing from north-and-south line. Thus complete firing directions either by day or night would be given by such a message as this from shore: "Thirty-eight degrees six thousand two hundred yards." This message was the one sent February 21, and the effect of the *Monadnock's* 10-inch shells

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on the village selected as the point, about 1 mile in front of the Kansas regiment, was terribly impressive. Three other shots varying, from 5,000 to 6,500 yards, were equally successful, thoroughly convincing all of the efficiency of this method of fire control.

The service of the quartermaster's and subsistence departments, under the general supervision of their respective chiefs at these headquarters, was, immediately after the fighting commenced, placed in the hands of regimental commanders, who were required to open communication with their city quarters and thereafter maintain a line of supplies between those points and their front. The complete success of this arrangement and the satisfactory results attained thereunder are set forth in most gratifying detail in the admirable reports of the chief quartermaster and chief commissary of the divisions, herewith inclosed.

The service of the subsistence department has been exceptionally good in every respect, and has attracted the favorable attention of everybody informed in the premises, including many foreign officers who have visited the lines. The supply of American soldiers engaged in active field operations on these distant shores with choice fresh beef from Australia, the very best quality of fresh vegetables from the United States, and condensed water, together with all other parts of the ration in abundant quantity and good quality, is certainly a just cause for warm congratulation to all concerned. Especial attention is invited to the remarks of the chief quartermaster in respect of the employment of coolies for the purpose of transportation, in the event of a prolonged struggle in these islands.

The accompanying report of the chief surgeon, to which especial attention is respectfully invited, discloses the intelligent and efficient service rendered by the medical department in caring for the dead and wounded of the division. The commendable manner in which the work of this department has been performed attracted favorable attention from the first, and all impressions to that end have been confirmed by the subsequent excellent results attending the hospital treatment of the wounded. In this connection attention is invited to the special report of the inspector-general of the division, made after a personal visit to the sick and wounded under treatment at the first reserve hospital.

The punishment inflicted by the division may be estimated from the fact that official report has been made of the actual burial of 374 insurgents killed in action during the month. The enemy's wounded were, as a general rule, successfully removed, so that it is impossible to speak with any precision in that respect; but it is assumed that three wounded to one killed would be a reasonable estimate.

A return of casualties for the month is herewith inclosed, of which the following is a recapitulation:

	Officers.		Enlisted men.	
	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.
Utah Light Artillery, U. S. V.		1	3	4
<i>First Brigade.</i>				
Third U. S. Artillery		1	4	83
First Montana Infantry, U. S. V.	1	4	2	41
Tenth Pennsylvania Infantry, U. S. V.		1	1	7
Twentieth Kansas Infantry, U. S. V.	2	2	7	31
Total First Brigade.....	3	8	14	112
<i>Second Brigade.</i>				
First Colorado Infantry, U. S. V.		1	3	5
First South Dakota Infantry, U. S. V.			4	14
First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. V.		2	4	32
Total Second Brigade.....		3	11	51
Total division.....	3	12	28	167

The enthusiasm and military spirit of the enlisted force and subordinate officers of the division during the operations of the month have been a constant source of inspiration and confidence. Hurried from one state of danger and exertion to another, these splendid men have responded in every instance with alacrity and that soldierly simplicity and directness of action which have always been the best characteristics of the profession.

The difficulties attending the execution of tactical operations on an extended line,

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The difficulties attending the execution of tactical operations on an extended line,

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such as that occupied by the division during the month, involve great presence of mind and endless exertion on the part of brigade and regimental commanders. The decision and sustained vigor of these officers insured such unity and strength throughout the command that every obstacle was quickly overcome and every pre-arranged scheme carried out precisely as planned.

The force and effect of command depend largely upon the assistance of staff officers, who to natural ability and experience join the spirit of enterprise. In respect of these essential qualifications the staff service at these headquarters has been greatly favored, and the highest appreciation of the zealous and intelligent work of these officers is cordially expressed.

At some appropriate time in the future recommendations will be submitted embracing the entire division, with a view to suitable special rewards for individual boldness in action and meritorious services throughout the campaign.

Very respectfully,

ARTHUR MACARTHUR,
Major-General, U. S. Volunteers.

[Inclosure 30.]

HDQRS. FIRST BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field near Caloocan (north of Manila), February 15, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report upon the operations of my brigade, posted on the left of the division line in front of Manila, from Saturday night, February 4, 1899, to date:

On that night, about 9 o'clock, an alarm was given, caused by an insurgent attack upon the position of the First Nebraska Infantry of the Second Brigade of this division, holding the San Juan River bridge in front of the right center of the division line.

Within a few minutes after the firing began shots commenced to fall near my headquarters, on Santa Mesa street, in the Sampaloc district, and I at once issued the necessary orders for meeting the expected attack upon my brigade outposts, acting in accordance with a previously arranged plan.

These outposts were located in the following order, from left to right: The Twentieth Kansas Infantry held the left of the line, extending from the bay, at the block-house on the peninsula at Vitas Creek, to and beyond the tramway line. Next on the right were outposts of the Third United States Artillery, extending from the Kansas right to and beyond the track of the Manila and Dagupan Railway. Then came the First Montana Infantry, extending to and across the Caloocan road, just north of St. Lazaro Hospital, and covering the crossroads beyond, with forks leading, one toward Caloocan and the other to the Chinese hospital. On the right of the Montana outposts were those of the Tenth Pennsylvania, occupying the ground to the left of the Second Brigade and joining its outpost line.

The then existing order for reinforcing this line involved the following movements: Two battalions of the Twentieth Kansas, 2 battalions of the Third U. S. Artillery (serving as infantry), and 1 battalion of the Tenth Pennsylvania, were to be sent to the front from their city barracks without delay, in case of alarm, to support their respective outposts and also the Montana outpost, while that regiment was held in reserve within the city to meet any emergency that might arise. Early in the operations, however, all the troops of the brigade, with the exception of light barrack guards, absolutely required to be kept in the rear, were drawn to the firing line.

The prescribed preliminary movements having been initiated through orders from my city headquarters, I moved out, with my staff, about 10 o'clock p. m., and took position, temporarily, on the extension of the Calle de Iris at the crossing of the tramway running northward on Lemery street. After remaining there about half an hour, I continued in the direction of the firing line, with the approval of the division commander, Maj.-Gen. Arthur MacArthur, whose temporary headquarters had been established in the vicinity of the Presidio de Manila (Bilibid Prison).

The left regiment of the line, the Twentieth Kansas Infantry, under Colonel Funston, was compelled, in order to reach suitable ground for deployment into line of battle and clear the numerous natural obstructions, such as dikes, sloughs, and thickets, on its front, to advance beyond its former outpost line near the stone bridge in front of the tramway round house, and take position on a new line well up toward the

isolated blockhouse on the peninsula at the mouth of Vitas Creek, near the bay shore; the line extending thence eastwardly to a connection with the outpost line of the Third U. S. Artillery, in the dikes, rice fields, and bamboo jungles on the right and left of the steam-railway line.

In front of the position occupied by the Third U. S. Artillery was a thick bamboo jungle, in which were concealed rebel sharpshooters, whose fire inflicted much loss upon that command during the night of Saturday and the day of Sunday, without the troops being able to return the fire effectively, it was rare that a Filipino sharpshooter could be seen in the jungle. In order to reach the concealed rebel sharpshooters, I directed that a number of shots from the 3.2 gun, and also from the Nordenfeldt stationed in the road to the left, be fired at a safe oblique angle into this wood; and also directed Major Kobbé, commanding the Third Artillery, to resort more to volley firing, even though the enemy could not be seen in any numbers. These measures had the desired effect, in part, and the insurgent fire at that point was thereafter materially slackened. The heavy losses of this gallant regiment in Sunday's fight (5 killed and 19 wounded) show the destructive character of the enemy's concealed fire, which was much more damaging than his fire from the open.

The first action with the enemy on the Kansas front continued throughout the night of Saturday, February 4, with intervals of comparative quiet, the enemy being concealed in the thick woods in front and using smokeless powder, so that his positions were not revealed to our firing lines. Much volley firing was also resorted to here.

During the night hasty intrenchments had been constructed along the left front, and a stone, dirt, and sandbag barricade built across the road near the gate leading to the blockhouse on the peninsula. Behind this barricade were posted 2 guns of Grant's battery of the Utah Light Artillery, under Lieutenant Seaman, but directed throughout the night by Major Young, the battalion commander, himself.

During the same night Major Cooke, of the First Montana, reported to me on the left with one company of that regiment, and was placed in support of the Kansas firing line. Later this company was moved to the extreme left flank, placed in an intrenched position near the large warehouse located there, and faced directly west, to meet a concealed sharpshooting fire which had been opened from that direction. Subsequently this company was relieved, and Major Cooke was sent with it to its proper place in his own regiment.

Another company of this regiment was dispatched on Sunday to strengthen the Third Artillery, and was placed in position at the stone blockhouse (No. 2) on the right of Major Kobbé's command.

The first advance of about 200 yards was made on Sunday afternoon, and when the line again moved forward from this position, on the same day, one Kansas company was left to occupy the intrenched position facing west, and guard details numbering some 60 men continued to hold the blockhouse on the peninsula. Still later both of these small bodies were relieved, at my request, by a company of the Twenty-third U. S. Infantry, sent out from Manila through the courtesy of the major-general commanding the corps, and were thus enabled to join their respective regiments on the firing line farther to the front.

The general advance ordered for Sunday was participated in by all the regiments of the brigade, namely, the Twentieth Kansas, Col. Frederick Funston; the First Montana, Col. Harry C. Kessler; the Third U. S. Artillery (serving as infantry), Maj. W. A. Kobbé; and the Tenth Pennsylvania, Col. A. L. Hawkins, posted from left to right in the order named.

The forward movement was conducted with skill and gallantry and was successful at every point. The particular and detailed movements executed by each command on this occasion are described in the reports of the several regimental commanders submitted herewith, and to which I call attention, on account of the special recommendations contained in some of them.

By night the new positions had been reached, the whole line having been carried forward several hundred yards.

During the forward movement of that afternoon the Twentieth Kansas Infantry had impetuously advanced, under a severe fire, nearly 500 yards beyond the point intended for it by the division commander, and had gallantly captured the two strong earthworks built by the enemy months before across the Caloccan road, besides taking two adjacent blockhouses, losing several men in the operation, but punishing the enemy severely. Fearing that these troops had advanced within the zone of fire previously agreed upon for the Navy, and had thus jeopardized that part of our line, the division commander sent a peremptory order to the commander of the Kansas regiment to withdraw to the Gagalangin Church, in the hamlet of San

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Jose, on the Caloocan road, which he did, reaching his retired position shortly before dusk.

Upon examining the ground, however, I was convinced that the left should again be thrown forward in order to correct the brigade alignment. This was accordingly done early on the following day, with the approval of the division commander, after proper representation had been made to him as to the true situation.

On the same morning (having advanced my headquarters the evening before to the point just described) I had the honor to receive a telegraphic inquiry direct from Maj. Gen. E. S. Otis, commanding the Eighth Army Corps, asking, in effect, whether I required assistance. I responded that I felt able to handle the situation in my front unless there should be a formidable renewal of the night attacks of the enemy, in which event it might possibly be found desirable to supply me with another battalion, or even a regiment. The necessity for this measure did not, however, arise.

Later in the same day (Monday) still another advance was made and a new line established, resting a little in advance of Blockhouse No. 1, situated on the railway, and I located my headquarters between the wagon road and the railway line, a few rods in rear of the new position. This line, already partially intrenched, being part of the old Spanish position, was further strengthened by our troops and rendered as nearly impregnable as possible. The right and center of the line also having been advanced, a substantial alignment was made from left to right, extending from the bay eastward to the stone blockhouse (No. 2), near to and in advance of the Church de la Loma on the high open mesa, where division headquarters had been established after the victorious advance of Sunday on that part of the line by the Pennsylvania and Montana regiments and the Third U. S. Artillery.

In establishing the fighting positions at the stone blockhouse and at the Church de la Loma, respectively, the division commander had directed the placing of two companies of the Tenth Pennsylvania Regiment within the walls of this churchyard, and the company of the Twentieth Kansas, which I had previously sent to the right center, was posted in support of the guns at the stone blockhouse. Subsequently this company was relieved by a company from the First Montana (Jensen's) and permitted to return to its proper place in the regimental line.

These unavoidable drafts upon the Pennsylvania regiment left Colonel Hawkins with but 4 companies on the fighting line, as the regiment, a 2-battalion organization, has 2 companies on duty at Corregidor Island. For this reason, and with the approval of the division commander, I ordered, on the night of the 7th instant, 2 reserve companies of the First Montana, under Major Drennan, to march from their barracks in the city to the support of the Tenth Pennsylvania. These troops arrived on the ground about 11 o'clock p. m., took position in the intrenchments already constructed by Colonel Hawkins on the left of his thin line, and still occupy the position then assigned them.

The new line thus established was held without any considerable resistance from the enemy until late in the afternoon of Tuesday, the 7th, when a sharp fight was suddenly brought on by one of the Kansas captains in front of Blockhouse No. 1. Acting upon his own motion, he advanced with half his company into a thick wood to the left of the railway line, where a body of insurgents was concealed and firing upon our outposts. I was near the spot at the time, and the gun fire from the wood having satisfied me that a sharp combat was in progress, and that it was necessary to silence the enemy at that point, or encourage him unduly by our own silence, I directed Colonel Funston to go forward, in person, with two companies to the support of the detachment engaged in the wood. This he proceeded to do with alacrity, with the result that the enemy's fire was completely silenced, after a furious combat of twenty minutes, in which the Kansas regiment lost 1 officer killed and 6 enlisted men wounded, while the enemy's loss was vastly out of proportion, nearly 30 dead Filipinos having been counted at the close of the combat there. The enemy was driven out, and as soon as the firing ceased the Kansas men were withdrawn by my order to their proper position in line.

Firing continued with more or less intensity throughout that night, the scattering shots of the insurgents being replied to at will from the Kansas and Montana fronts, with an occasional terrific volley thrown in. The enemy appeared to have returned during the night to the wood where they met their defeat the evening before, as it was subsequently discovered that an effort had been made by the rebels to gather up their dead, as many as 18 bodies having been found ranged in a row, but left unburied.

On the 8th and 9th comparative quiet reigned along the entire line both day and night. On both days, however, there was some shelling of the town of Caloocan from both the ships and the land batteries, the town being in full view from the

high, open ground in front of the stone blockhouse, where 5 guns of the Utah Artillery were concentrated.

On the 10th instant a general advance upon the insurgent position in and about Caloocan was ordered by the division commander. The execution of the forward movement was begun at 3.30 p. m., after thirty minutes of rather a desultory shelling of the insurgent position by the land batteries and the guns of the *Charleston*, *Concord*, and the *Callao*, lying in the bay, which had been moved up for that purpose to an advantageous position on the left.

Immediately before the movement against Caloocan was begun, 2 battalions of the First Idaho Infantry, under Major Figgins, reached the front from the First Division, and reported for temporary duty with my brigade during the impending conflict. The battalions were placed in position, one in support of the Montana, the other in support of the Kansas regiment, and fought well throughout the battle. They remained upon the outpost line during the succeeding night, took part on the following morning in repelling an insurgent flank attack from the direction of Malabon, and on the 12th were relieved by 3 troops of the Fourth U. S. Cavalry, under Major Rucker, and marched back to their position at Paco, Manila. The report of Major Figgins, commanding these Idaho battalions, is forwarded herewith.

The advance upon Caloocan was a careful, well-considered, tactical movement, planned in advance, and fully explained by the division commander to his brigade, regimental, and battery commanders an hour before the movement was to be undertaken. It was clearly understood by all the officers immediately concerned, and they proceeded with confidence and alacrity to the duty of executing their respective parts in the general scheme of battle. The movement was to be a simple right half-turn, using the stone blockhouse (No. 2) as a pivot, with the principal turning movement to be made by the Twentieth Kansas Regiment posted in the woods to the left; the First Montana, next on the right, to make its turning movement at a less acute angle, partly in the woods and partly in the open, and the Third U. S. Artillery, still farther to the right and entirely in the open, with instructions to conform its turning movement to the general direction of the line to the left, so that when the new positions should be established they would bear a general course from northwest to southeast, reaching from a point just north of the town of Caloocan to the original pivot at the stone blockhouse on the right center, already described.

In the advance of the Third Artillery, however, I found it most expedient and effective, as this portion of the line neared Caloocan, to swing the regiment somewhat to the left, in order, if the enemy should stand, to pinch him up as in a vise, a tactical movement which had the desired effect. He failed to stand.

The remaining organization of the brigade, the Tenth Pennsylvania Infantry, which occupied the right of the long line, some $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles to the eastward of the bay shore, was to stand fast in the impending operations, which it did, thus being cut off from the privilege of participating in the second brilliant and successful advance of the brigade.

Upon the conclusion of the preliminary artillery bombardment, the agreed signal for the infantry advance was given and the forward movement was promptly begun by the Kansas regiment on the extreme left, followed, respectively, by the First Montana and the Third Artillery to the right, in quick succession, each command advancing from its own position, according to the well-understood plan.

At this juncture I went forward, with part of my staff, from my former headquarters position in the ravine to the left of Blockhouse No. 2, to Blockhouse No. 1 on the railroad; to which the Signal Corps also advanced with a telegraph wire, enabling me to promptly reestablish communication with division headquarters at the Church de la Loma. From Blockhouse No. 1 I again shortly advanced, following the firing line into Caloocan, part of the time on foot, owing to the rough nature of the ground and the uncertain quality of the small native horses at my disposal. On my way to the front I encountered a party of soldiers bearing Lieut. Col. R. B. Wallace, of the First Montana Regiment, to the rear, wounded. I spoke to him hurriedly, finding his spirits good and his voice strong, and I am hopeful that this valuable officer will not be permanently disabled. He had been shot through one lung while gallantly advancing with his regiment in the open.

The onset of the entire line was superb; the advance of the left was concealed from view by the woods, but the center and right (part of the Montana regiment and all the Third Artillery) was in the open and made an inspiring battle picture. The resistance of the enemy in the wood, in numerous intrenchments on both sides of the railway track leading northward, and in the edge of the town of Caloocan, was determined, and the firing was spirited along the entire front, but the impetuous advance of our victorious troops could not be stayed, and the demoralized enemy was steadily driven before us at every point.

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Caloocan was entered just before dark, the enemy driven out on the run, and the railway shops, roundhouse, warehouses, 2 engines, and 1 cannon captured, together with considerable other material of various sorts.

The left of our line, in its impetuosity and enthusiasm, had advanced beyond Caloocan, in the direction of Malolos, in pursuit of the fleeing insurgents, until it had exceeded somewhat the limits prescribed in the orders of the day. The ardent volunteers were halted with some difficulty and brought back to the new line, which had been determined upon in advance. It was found impossible, however, to completely establish the new position before night closed down, and for that reason the line, as first established, was only approximately true, though it was rendered secure for the night, and I prepared to correct the alignment with the coming of daylight.

I made my headquarters for the night in the Higgins House, at Caloocan, and on the following day removed them to my present position in the wooded ravine in the rear of the center of the brigade line.

The night passed without further fighting or serious incident, but early on the following morning, as already stated, an annoying fire from insurgent sharpshooters was opened upon our left flank, coming from the direction of Malabon, a mile away toward the bay, and separated from Caloocan by wide lagoons and marshes, crossed by a single line of road. To support the troops who were meeting this flank fire, I ordered up two companies of the First Idaho, with good results, but the incident had delayed me somewhat in the more essential work of reestablishing the new general alignment.

In the meantime the division commander had arrived upon the field, and the work of reforming the new line was carried out under his own eye.

This line was hastily but strongly intrenched, and is the one still held by our forces. An advantageous position for the artillery was selected near the railroad track, a temporary earthwork constructed, and emplacements built for guns. In these were placed two guns of Captain Dyer's battery of the Sixth U. S. Artillery and one piece of the Utah Light Artillery. Later in the day a rifled mortar was located in good position on the opposite side of the railway track, near the Higgins House.

The days and nights of the 11th, 12th, 13th, and 14th passed with no demonstration by the enemy more serious than an occasional sputtering fire from his concealed sharpshooters lodged in the church at Malabon and the adjacent chapparal. To silence this fire, which caused a number of casualties on our side, reaching 4 wounded on the 13th instant, it became necessary to use the artillery on several different occasions, which was done effectively, resulting in silencing the bushwhackers in each instance.

I have thus narrated briefly the principal operations of my brigade since the outbreak of this armed conflict with the Filipino rebels. The infantry troops enumerated in this report, together with the artillery named, constituted the entire force engaged in the battle of the 10th instant. In previous affairs the number of men engaged was even less. The highest aggregate of infantry in the brigade proper at any one time present at the front during these operations was 103 officers and 2,690 enlisted men.

Besides the brigade proper (infantry and artillery serving as infantry), there were engaged in the action of the 10th of February, as already stated, the following cooperating troops:

	Officers.	Men.
First Idaho Infantry.....	20	530
Utah Light Artillery.....	4	90
Sixth U. S. Artillery.....	1	25
U. S. Volunteer Signal Corps.....	3	14
Total.....	28	659

Swelling the entire force of all arms engaged in the battle of Caloocan, including brigade headquarters (7 officers and 5 enlisted men), to 138 officers and 3,354 enlisted men, with 9 guns.

It is a sincere and deep pleasure for me to be able to bear personal witness to the good conduct of the troops under my direct command throughout the various operations and conflicts here described. The regiments, battalions, companies, and batteries have, without exception, borne themselves like good soldiers, showing conspicuous steadiness, ardor, determination, and intrepidity, and the only infractions

of discipline on the battle lines which warrant even mention here have been due to the restless desire of the victors to pursue the fleeing enemy beyond the limits of present orders. Without exception all the organizations engaged have proved themselves worthy of the proud name of American soldiers.

The conduct of the regimental commanders was all that could be desired by the most exacting general officer. In the nature of the case, with a line of battle so extended and covering ground so varied in its conformation and character, it was necessary, after the general plan of action had been settled and well understood, to repose large discretion in the several regimental commanders in their work of carrying out the details, each for himself. This, happily, could be done in the instance here narrated. All these officers performed their several parts with distinct and distinguished success, and I count it a fortunate thing for the army, as well as my personal good fortune, that the regiments of my brigade were commanded throughout these operations by skilled veteran officers like Kessler, Kobbe, Funston, and Hawkins.

While it is not my proper province to report in detail upon the operations of the divisional artillery, which acted for the time being in conjunction with my brigade in the various movements described, I wish to acknowledge the invaluable service rendered by that arm. During the battle of the 10th instant there were 9 pieces of artillery posted on the line at suitable points from right to left, contributing greatly to its strength and effectiveness, and assisting materially in achieving the series of brilliant victories won by the brigade. The artillery engaged in the battle of Calocan consisted of 5 guns of Captain Grant's battery of Major Young's battalion of Utah Light Artillery, 2 guns of Captain Dyer's battery of the Sixth U. S. Artillery, an extra Nordenfeldt from the Manila arsenal, and a rifled mortar brought into use for the occasion.

The enemy's losses were not slight. The insurgent Filipino soldiers killed, counted, and buried in my front number thus far 199, as follows:

Buried by the Tenth Pennsylvania Infantry (including the dead collected on the ground covered by the advance of the Third United States Artillery)	42
Buried by the First Montana Infantry	45
Buried by the Twentieth Kansas Infantry	112
Aggregate	199

This degree of mortality among the enemy on this brigade front alone involves, in my belief, aggregate casualties of not less than 1,000 at the hands of the soldiers of the First Brigade, Second Division. The result leads me to conclude that the insurgent force in our front was much larger than we at first anticipated.

The members of my staff present during the campaign, viz, Lieut. P. W. Russell, First Nebraska Infantry, acting assistant adjutant-general; Capt. S. B. Bootes, commissary of subsistence; Maj. F. L. Adams, First Montana Infantry, acting brigade surgeon; Lieut. Clad Hamilton, Twentieth Kansas Infantry, acting assistant quartermaster; Lieut. Edward Kimmel, Third United States Artillery, aid, and Lieut. William B. Ritchie, Tenth Pennsylvania Infantry, aid, each rendered me valuable assistance from first to last. Captain Bootes has proved his skill, experience, and efficiency in bringing commissary supplies for the troops to the front at the proper times and in sufficient quantities, and Acting Brigade Surgeon Adams was close up to the firing line and present in the field hospitals when and where duty called. The wounded were promptly and tenderly cared for and the dead reverently placed in decent coffins for burial.

Throughout all the operations the U. S. Volunteer Signal Corps, under Capt. Edgar Russel, rendered prompt, effective, and valuable aid, showing notable celerity in the making of new telegraphic connections with each of my headquarter positions as I advanced toward the firing line from time to time.

It is my sad duty to report a list of casualties in the brigade from the beginning of operations on the 4th instant to this date numbering 100 men, 15 killed or mortally wounded, 31 severely wounded, and 54 slightly wounded. Included in the list are 2 unfortunate casualties in the Third U. S. Artillery, by accident; and in addition to the aggregate, but not properly included in my brigade, were 5 casualties in the Utah Light Artillery, including 1 officer (Lieutenant Seaman) wounded. The official report of these casualties, as well as the entire operations of the artillery in the several combats described in my report, will doubtless be made direct to the division commander by the proper artillery officers concerned.

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Following is the table of casualties:

Report of casualties in First Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, in front of Manila, from February 4 to February 25, 1899, inclusive.

Organization.	Date.	Killed or mortally wounded.	Severely wounded.	Slightly wounded.	Missing.	Total.
Third U. S. Artillery	Feb. 5, 1899	5	7	12	-----	34
	Feb. 10, 1899	-----	4	4	-----	
First Montana Infantry	Feb. 13, 1899	2	-----	-----	-----	2
	Feb. 5, 1899	-----	2	3	-----	
Tenth Pennsylvania Infantry	Feb. 10, 1899	2	7	12	-----	21
	Feb. 12, 1899	-----	-----	3	-----	
Twentieth Kansas Infantry	Feb. 5, 1899	1	4	3	-----	8
	Feb. 7, 1899	1	1	5	-----	
Twentieth Kansas Infantry	Feb. 10, 1899	2	4	1	-----	7
	Feb. 11, 1899	-----	2	4	-----	
Aggregate		15	31	54	-----	100

NOTE.—In the list of killed is 1 officer (First Lieut. Alfred C. Alford, Twentieth Kansas Infantry). In the list of severely wounded are Lieut. Col. R. B. Wallace, First Montana Infantry, and Capt. William L. Hill, of the same regiment. In the list of slightly wounded are Maj. Everhart Bierer, Tenth Pennsylvania Infantry; Capt. Charles M. Christy, Twentieth Kansas Infantry; Second Lieut. William C. Gardenhire, First Montana Infantry, and Second Lieut. Robert S. Abernethy, Third U. S. Artillery.

The dead fell like soldiers at their posts of duty, defending the laws of the Republic, and the wounded suffer that the flag may continue to float triumphant over territory fairly won by the national arms from a foreign foe.

I am, sir, very respectfully,

HARRISON GRAY OTIS,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

[Inclosure 81.]

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT.

HQDQrs. FIRST BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field near Caloocan, P. I., February 22, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following supplemental report. It is in the main a synopsis of the several regimental reports, describing more particularly the movements of the several regiments of my brigade in the recent operations about Manila, commencing February 4. I make this additional report for the reason that when my first report was rendered some of the regimental commanders had not completed theirs, and it is only just that the separate movements of the several commands should be set out more exactly and in detail. The organizations are named here in the order of their posting in line of battle, from right to left, and the accounts are necessarily presented without any special reference to the continuity of the whole narrative.

TENTH PENNSYLVANIA INFANTRY.

When the alarm was given on the night of the 4th instant Colonel Hawkins, commanding the Tenth Pennsylvania Infantry (18 officers and 470 men), whose troops occupied the right of the advance line, in rear of the Chinese hospital, moved out 4 companies of his command from their city barracks to support his outposts, then occupied by 60 guards. He left 1 company as a patrol on Calle de Iris and another at brigade headquarters, to guard the same. As previously stated, 2 companies were on special duty at Corregidor Island.

When the Pennsylvania troops arrived on the line they found that the outposts had sustained a considerable oblique fire from Blockhouse No. 4, and from a force stationed at the Chinese hospital directly in their front. No advance had, however,

been made by the enemy and no casualties had been caused by his fire, the outpost being well protected by dikes in the rice fields. Shortly thereafter the cross fire from the blockhouse ceased, and a heavy fire was opened on the line from the Chinese hospital and other buildings on its flanks. The regimental commander sent out a line of skirmishers and established his main line behind dikes to the rear.

During the night the enemy made two advances in considerable force, but were easily checked by the line of skirmishers without the main line firing a shot. At dawn the enemy made another and more determined advance, which was also checked by the outpost line.

After daylight Colonel Hawkins requested Captain Grant, commanding the Utah battery, stationed near the Chinese cemetery on the Bulum-Bayan road, to shell the enemy's position at and about the hospital on his front, preparatory to an advance of the infantry. After one-half hour's firing of shell and shrapnel, Colonel Hawkins advanced his entire line rapidly against the enemy's position. He was met with heavy volley firing, but when within 200 yards of the insurgent line the enemy made a precipitate retreat. His fire had been high and wild, and the only casualties at that time and point were 2 men wounded in the Pennsylvania command.

After taking possession of the Chinese hospital, Colonel Hawkins ordered the burning of the "shacks" which the enemy had occupied on each flank of the hospital.

Observing the direction from whence came the fire of the enemy and the strong position held by him, and considering that his own position was not the best one to hold, Colonel Hawkins ordered his battalions to continue their advance to a valley in front of the hospital. After advancing some 600 yards, the Pennsylvanians were met with a heavy fire from the insurgents in and about the red church to the left of the Chinese cemetery and in the bushes and old Spanish breastworks in the ridge to the right. A stand was made at this point, and here Major Bierer, commanding the Pennsylvania left, was wounded and compelled to retire. At this juncture Colonel Hawkins realized that his right was not sufficiently protected, the interval between it and the left of the Second Brigade (First South Dakota Infantry) was too great. He accordingly sent Lieutenant-Colonel Barnett with two companies to extend his right, but this force was found insufficient to close the interval.

Captain Grant, with 2 pieces of the Utah Artillery, had arrived on the Sangleyes road a few minutes before and opened on the red church, firing over the heads of the infantry, but without checking the insurgent fire. Shortly thereafter both of the Utah guns were moved about 100 yards from the Sangleyes road up the road leading to the red church. About the same time Colonel Hawkins moved his command by the flank from the valley to the ridge, and posted his men along the walls of the Chinese cemetery. Here he found the enemy in strong force in his front at and near the Church de la Loma and along the brow of the ridge to the left and southeast of that building, his line between the white church and the red church connecting. His line showed here in heavy force, being much the strongest in the vicinity of the Church de la Loma and on the ridge to its left.

The artillery was now directing a heavy fire against the white church (de la Loma) and the ridge to the left, which fire was continued for half an hour. At this time Colonel Hawkins moved his command inside the Chinese cemetery, forming a new line facing the church and ridge to its left, and ordered an advance. Here Major Bell, of the Engineer Corps, reported to Colonel Hawkins, and was assigned by him to the command of his left wing, where he rendered valuable service. This officer is highly commended by Colonel Hawkins.

The line advanced firing, our fire being replied to with spirit by the enemy, and when within about 300 yards of the insurgent line the Pennsylvania troops, by a brilliant charge, swept them from their position, forcing them to retreat in a northerly direction, by way of the stone blockhouse (No. 2) in front of the Church de la Loma. The center of the Pennsylvania line reached the wall inclosing this church and advanced inside the inclosure, only to find that no troops were lodged in the building. Hawkins then divided his force, the left passing around to the west side and the right to the east side of the building.

At this time Lieutenant-Colonel Barnett, in command of 2 companies of the Pennsylvania regiment and 1 company of the First Montana, together with a detachment of the First South Dakota, under Colonel Frost, marching obliquely to the left, arrived on the east side of the church wall. Colonel Hawkins then pushed his right around the east side of the walled inclosure, and with the remainder of his battalions surrounded the stone blockhouse, from which the enemy was just retreating. He then formed a line to the north of the blockhouse, facing Calocan, this line being prolonged to the right by a detachment from the First South Dakota. This line, still firing at the enemy, was halted by the division commander, and no further advance was then made by the regiment. A new line was then established, run-

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ning in an easterly direction, which was promptly intrenched and is still held. Colonel Hawkins speaks in terms of high praise of the conduct of the officers and men of his command, and in his report gives special commendation to several of his officers by name.

On the 5th instant this command buried 42 of the enemy's dead found in the line of advance, this number including the number of dead killed in front of the Third Artillery. The insurgent dead included 1 field officer and 2 company officers. Three insurgent wounded and 1 unwounded were captured. The Pennsylvania regiment lost in these operations 1 man killed and 6 wounded, including 1 officer wounded.

THIRD U. S. ARTILLERY.

The Third U. S. Artillery (10 officers and 446 enlisted men) marched out, about 10 p. m. on the night of February 4, from its city barracks in the Cuartel de Meisic, over a previously designated road, to the support of its outpost guard line, there deploying in the darkness behind a line of dikes situated among rice fields and bamboo thickets, its left resting on the railroad track and its right on the leper hospital. The troops at that point had already been engaged and a hostile advance repelled by our force, after which this command was not seriously disturbed during the night and expended little or no ammunition until the following day, though an almost continuous fire was kept up throughout the night by the Montana and Kansas regiments, to the right and left, respectively. Soon after midnight Major Kobbé, upon the request of Colonel Funston, of the Twentieth Kansas, sent Battery K up the railroad as a precautionary measure to protect Funston's flank.

When daylight came, the difficult nature of Kobbé's position was fully apparent, with two dikes and the railroad track in his front, these obstacles lying perpendicularly to his line. The dikes were heavily wooded, bamboo thickets and swamps intervened, and rice fields dotted with numerous native huts extended as far as Calle Solis. The concealed fire of the enemy had already become annoying and casualties began to occur, largely in Battery G. At this juncture a company of the Twentieth Kansas Infantry, under the veteran Captain Elliott, which I had sent to the support of Kobbé, appeared upon the scene and was ordered on his right, to connect with the First Montana.

At 1 p. m. Kobbé ordered an advance of his line, having previously notified Colonel Kessler, commanding the First Montana, of his intentions.

All three of the regiments went forward at about the same time, sweeping the ground before them, driving the insurgents from their cover and killing a number of them. These movements resulted in reestablishing the line on the better ground beyond, in accordance with the agreed plan.

Major Kobbé having prepared to join in the attack on the insurgent position at the Chinese cemetery on his flank, discovered a continuous firing line of insurgents posted among the bushes and along the wall of the Chinese church, the enemy directing his shots against our line in front. He forthwith ordered volley firing to begin from two of his batteries, driving the enemy in considerable numbers back past the open gate in his front, despite the efforts of their officers to stay the flight.

The Third Artillery line again advanced, this time almost entirely unopposed, Battery H occupying the church and sweeping the graveyard, while Battery L drove out the enemy, losing 5 men in the operation and continuing its forward movement as far as the stone blockhouse, which position was taken, being finally occupied, however, by Company G of the Twentieth Kansas, which company is highly praised by its then immediate commander, Major Kobbé.

Battery H was then recalled from the church, and, by direction of the division commander, the alignment at this point was rectified and the line halted for the night.

At 5 o'clock on the afternoon of the 8th instant Captain Jensen's company of the First Montana relieved Company G of the Twentieth Kansas at the stone blockhouse.

In the action of February 10 the Third Artillery advanced, according to orders, deploying on the ground in front of its original position and opening fire by command only. As the right cleared the ravine, upon which it had previously rested, Major Bell, of the Engineers, was seen leading a company of the Montana regiment forward out of the ravine, almost at right angles to Major Kobbé's right front, whose flank then practically rested "in the air." The Montana men were firing as they advanced upon the insurgent intrenchments, by this movement rendering timely aid to the Third Artillery's forward movement.

Major Kobbé states that he placed one wing of his regiment temporarily in charge of Major Bell, while he himself took command of the other wing, and his whole line continued to advance, both wings pouring in volleys after the retreating enemy at long range.

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The commander of this regiment calls attention to the fact that there were present on the field, on the day of the last battle, a superabundance of volunteer aids, causing needless confusion and doubt in the execution of orders.

The Third Artillery line was 1,600 to 2,000 yards long at times, and "never less than 800 or 1,000," to employ the language of its commander. The casualties of this regiment were given in my first report.

FIRST MONTANA INFANTRY.

Upon receipt of information that his outposts, consisting of 2 companies, had been attacked and had fallen back to St. Lazaro cemetery, the commanding officer of the First Montana Infantry, Col. Harry C. Kessler, proceeded, about 9.30 p. m., to reenforce the same with 2 other companies. One company was sent to the support of the Twentieth Kansas, 3 companies held in reserve on Calle Iris, near Bilbid prison, and 1 battalion (4 companies) were held in quarters.

Firing was kept up throughout the night, but with small effect, and on the following morning a detachment made an advance from St. Lazaro cemetery, fired the houses in its immediate front, and retired to the cemetery under heavy fire. Shortly thereafter a detachment of the regiment, acting in conjunction with a detachment of the Tenth Pennsylvania, reconnoitered and captured the Chinese hospital, a short distance to the right.

In the general advance of Sunday forenoon the regiment had at first 3 companies on the firing line and 4 companies in support, but at the foot of the ridge approaching the Chinese cemetery the entire support came upon the firing line, and the advance continued until, in conjunction with other troops, the cemetery was taken. Here a new front was established at 6 o'clock p. m. As stated elsewhere, Company G was on the left of the Twentieth Kansas and advanced with that regiment.

On the following day, Monday, February 6, 2 more companies joined from the city barracks and 1 company was returned to quarters. Early in the day the regimental front was advanced about half a mile, without resistance from the enemy, and this position was maintained until Friday, the 10th instant, when a general advance of the brigade upon Caloocan was ordered and made. The enemy in front of the First Montana occupied the railway building in the edge of the town, and was intrenched in and in front of the cemetery to the right. The advance of the regiment was stubbornly contested, but the Montana men drove the rebels from their positions as they advanced. The enemy continued his retreat to the woods about a mile beyond the town of Caloocan, and, darkness coming on, the regiment was halted and put into a new alignment, which had been previously decided upon, and remained in that position throughout the night. On the following morning the alignment was rectified, the new line intrenched, and is still held. Nine companies took part in this action, making 39 officers and 769 enlisted men of the regiment as the highest number engaged at any one time. The casualties in the regiment, among which were Lieut. Col. R. B. Wallace, wounded, are given in my consolidated tabular list contained in my first report.

TWENTIETH KANSAS INFANTRY.

The outpost of this regiment, located near the tramway car station on the Caloocan road, was fired upon by insurgent patrols about 10 p. m. on the 4th instant. An alarm instantly put the entire regiment under arms at its barracks in the city. The First Battalion was held in quarters, according to the understood plan, while the Second and Third battalions, under Colonel Funston, marched to the support of the outpost line, which by that time was sharply engaged.

On the way to the front the two battalions were joined by a detachment from the Utah Light Artillery, with 1 gun, under Lieutenant Seaman. Arrived at the outpost, the regimental commander found that his advance was making a stand in the road some 400 yards north of the car station. The gun was immediately placed in position in the middle of the road, and the Second Battalion deployed to the left and right, where it made reply to the enemy's fire with occasional volleys, the insurgent fire being concealed and coming from the woods about 200 yards in front. By daylight another gun of the Utah Battery had arrived and been placed in position, and 2 companies of the Third Battalion were brought forward to the firing line.

At noon Colonel Funston, by direction of the brigade commander, who was on the ground, advanced his line without difficulty, the wood in front being first cleared of the enemy by a number of well-directed volleys. The 2 field pieces were placed in the road at the Gagaluquin Church, and opened fire on the insurgent barricades and trenches, distant only about 500 yards. This fire became so galling that the commander of the regiment deemed an advance imperative, and having sent 3 companies

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to the left flank to patrol, he led 7 companies on a charge up the road and through the gardens and bamboo thickets, flanking it and advancing directly upon the enemy's strong positions. The charge was gallantly made, the men firing as they advanced. The insurgents stood until the Kansas line had come within 60 or 70 yards of them, when they gave away. The victors advanced and occupied both barricades and were preparing to assault the small blockhouses, when the regiment, by order of the division commander, was recalled and ordered to fall back to the position at the church from which it had just advanced. This was done and the night passed there without notable incident. This combat resulted in a small loss to the regiment and much more serious mortality to the enemy.

On the following morning, February 6, Colonel Funston received orders from the brigade commander to advance to the insurgent barricades, which had been taken the previous night, and to occupy them. This was done without opposition, as the enemy had flown. During the day the regiment found and buried the bodies of 31 insurgents killed in its charge on the previous day. The new line was intrenched, facing the north, the right resting on the railway, where it joined with the First Montana, and the left resting on the impassable bayous making out from the sea. That day and night passed without incident, save for an occasional exchange of shots with the insurgents.

On the afternoon of the 7th, the enemy having become bold and aggressive, kept up a fire from behind cover some 500 yards in front of the Kansas line. One of the company commanders having become involved with half of his company in the timber in front of the regimental line, it became imperative to support him and to dislodge the enemy, permission to do which was given to Colonel Funston by the brigade commander. He promptly led three companies to the support of his men engaged in the wood, attacked the insurgent position, and carried it at the point of the bayonet.

The combat lasted less than half an hour, but was exceedingly sharp. One officer, Lieut. A. C. Alford, was killed outright and six enlisted men wounded in this engagement, and 26 insurgents were counted dead on the ground where they fell. The companies then fell back, under orders, to the intrenched line, reaching it shortly before dark. This line was left undisturbed throughout the night and held until the 10th, when, in conjunction with the First Montana Infantry and the Third U. S. Artillery, the regiment was ordered to advance on the town of Caloocan. The advance of this regiment, holding the left of the brigade line, was made through dense woods and in the face of a hot though badly directed fire from the enemy. The regiment lost on this day 2 enlisted men killed and 1 officer and 8 enlisted men wounded, and did not stop its advance until it had passed through some distance beyond Caloocan, where it was halted, a new line made, and the position intrenched, with the left on the water and the right, as before, joining the First Montana.

Colonel Funston bears testimony to the good conduct of his officers and men generally, especially singling out Maj. Wilder S. Metcalf, who was his strong right hand during all the operations. The entire losses of the regiment are given in the tabulated list of casualties. Forty officers and 925 enlisted men were engaged.

FIRST IDAHO INFANTRY.

Two battalions of this regiment, under Maj. D. W. Figgins, numbering 20 officers and 530 enlisted men, were ordered to the support of the brigade, on the 10th instant, in the advance upon Caloocan. The battalions arrived from the First Division about 2.15 p. m. The First Battalion was ordered to support the Twentieth Kansas and the Second Battalion to support the First Montana regiments, respectively. These troops advanced with the regiments just named, the First Battalion on the firing line and the Second Battalion in support, until the insurgents had been driven out of and beyond Caloocan, when the recall was sounded. The Second Battalion was placed upon the outpost line in front of the graveyard about 8.30 p. m., but was later relieved by a battalion from the First Montana. Three companies camped in the rear of the line for the night and 2 companies were marched back to support the guns of the Sixth U. S. Artillery on the former line, camping there for the night, and on the following morning moving the guns forward to the church at Caloocan, where they remained about two hours, when they were again moved forward and placed in position in a hastily constructed work, in a commanding position, to the right of the railroad track. These companies then returned to the car shops, where they joined 2 other companies of this command, and remained there during the night.

The First Battalion, which had been ordered to support the Twentieth Kansas, advanced on the firing line on the afternoon of the 10th, remaining in that position all night and being under heavy fire from the afternoon of the 10th to nearly noon

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of the 11th. During this fire Capt. Thomas R. Hamer was wounded. Two companies of this battalion remained on the firing line to the left, facing Malabon, until 2 p. m. of the 12th instant, when they were relieved by companies of the Twentieth Kansas. The other companies of the First Battalion were also relieved and retired to the car shops, joining the Second Battalion at 6 p. m. of the 11th.

The battalions having rendered willing, gallant, and arduous service to the First Brigade of the Second Division, were relieved on the afternoon of the 12th and returned to their quarters at Paco, Manila. The losses of the battalions were 1 officer wounded, 1 enlisted man killed, 2 enlisted men wounded, and 5 slightly wounded.

This concludes the reports of the infantry troops engaged. I have made them thus detailed for the additional reason that the movements and actions described were part of the initial operations against the Filipino rebels, possessing peculiar importance on that account.

The services of the divisional artillery, which cooperated with my brigade in the various operations, are acknowledged, without being narrated in detail, in my main report.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

HARRISON GRAY OTIS,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

[Inclosure 32.]

REPORT OF OPERATIONS AGAINST PHILIPPINE INSURGENTS FROM FEBRUARY 4 TO 15, 1899, BY TWO BATTALIONS THIRD UNITED STATES ARTILLERY, MAJ. WILLIAM A. KOBBE, COMMANDING.

Active force.—First Battalion, Capt. James O'Hara, commanding: Battery H, 124 men, Second Lieutenant Abernethy, commanding; Battery K, 104 men, Second Lieutenant England, commanding. Second Battalion, Capt. Charles W. Hobbs, commanding: Battery G, 96 men, Second Lieutenant Overton, commanding; Battery L, 122 men, Second Lieutenant Kessler, commanding. Second Lieutenant Lanza, acting adjutant; Second Lieutenant Boutelle, attached to Battery H; acting assistant surgeon, G. W. Mathews, U. S. A. Total, 10 officers, 446 men.

Barracks in Manila.—Cuartel de Meisic, where a "convalescent" guard and a supply depot had been previously organized, which has since worked admirably without requiring assistance from the staff departments.

During the entire time covered by this report the command has had from two to three hot meals daily, 250 rounds ammunition immediately available on the firing line, three days' emergency (travel) ration near by, some extra shoes and stockings. Supply force, 2 sergeants and 8 or 10 prisoners; 2 to 8 teams.


About 10 p. m. February 4 marched from Cuartel, the firing being heavy in front—G and K via the railroad, H and L on a road to the right—to outpost line and deployed behind line of dikes in the dark and in the wet muck of rice fields; left at railroad, right near wall of leper hospital. Lieutenant Overton had been in charge of outposts and (see his report) had repelled or silenced an undoubted hostile advance. This is further confirmed by the wounding of 1 man in the right battalion as we came up and by many bullets—Mauser and Remington—cutting through the timber. This fact (the attack on our outposts), the excellent working of the supply department, and the perfect fire discipline of the command, instilled by much insistence in many drills, appear to me the most important parts of this report.

The command was not disturbed, excepting by occasional bullets, during the night, and expended no ammunition. There was almost continuous firing on our left (Kansas) and on our right (Montana), and about 12.30 a. m. I sent Lieutenant Lanza to ask Colonel Funston if he required assistance. He asked to have a force sent up the railroad to cover his left, which was complied with. (Battery K; see Lieutenant England's report.)

The position and situation after daylight were most difficult—at the "entrance" to three defiles (the railroad and two dikes) perpendicular to our front—the dikes heavily wooded, with many native huts, with rice swamps in between as far as Calle Solis, and an increasing fire of sharpshooters from the wooded dikes, which was only partially kept down by selected marksmen on our side. To judge from firing on right and left, the advance there was slow and an advance on my part premature. Casualties began to occur, when at 11 o'clock a. m. Captain Elliott, G, Twentieth Kansas, reported to me and was sent to the extreme right to endeavor to connect

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with the Montanas. About this time Lieutenant Abernethy was wounded there severely. He was rejoined from the dressing station in time to resume command of his battery and advancing with it. From Battery G the wounded and dead were being sent to the rear fast. At 1 p. m., tired of losing men, I sent word to Colonel Kessler and ordered an advance, the firing from the Kansas indicating that they were going forward. K and G moved up the railroad under opposition (see reports England and Overton), L unopposed on the central dike. H and Company G, Twentieth Kansas, on the right-hand dike, sweeping across Calle Solis, driving insurgents from houses and trees, the line was soon reestablished on the better ground beyond and connection established with the main line on the right. I ordered K and G over from the railroad, the Kansas firing indicating an advance on their part and an approach toward us, and held the command in readiness to attack Binondo (Chinese Cemetery) from that flank.



Lieutenant Kessler discovered and pointed out to me a continuous line of firing (smokeless powder and barely discernible) from along the bushes and wall of the Chinese church, directed against the troops in front—probably, I thought, the Pennsylvanias, Dakotas, or possibly Montanas—and asked permission to fire volleys. I sent word to O'Hara on the right to fire also. At the first volley some insurgents ran back past the open gate in our front and were soon followed by a large number, probably over 200, 2 officers very neatly uniformed gallantly attempting to stop them and pointing to our fire. The advance began along the whole line almost unopposed, Battery H occupying the church and continuing over through the graves, where Battery L drove out the enemy, losing 5 men, and toward the stone blockhouse.

At this time I met General MacArthur, who directed me to recall Battery H from the church, rectify my alignment, and halt for the night. Company G, Twentieth Kansas, had advanced coolly and gallantly on the right, did excellent service, and finally occupied the blockhouse.

The fact that the Chinese churchyard was cleared of insurgents by the flank fire of this battalion, delivered in volleys by tactical commands and from a position of entire safety, can be established by an infinite number of witnesses.

I have reported so far with perhaps unnecessary detail, the movement inaugurated on February 4 being of a national, and perhaps international, importance.

On the 8th lines were rectified, extending from Blockhouse No. 2 nearly east and west. At 5 o'clock Company E, First Montana (Jansen's), reported to me and was placed in blockhouse, where it has since been. Copy of President's telegram received.

On 10th about 4 p. m. ordered to execute advance against Calocan, previously described to regimental commanders and brigade commanders in detail by General MacArthur. After one-half hour's artillery preparation, which appeared to me to be much too intermittent to do more than advertise the movement, the command advanced in line of squads successively from the left, deploying successively as each squad reached the crest, and beginning to fire, by order only, soon afterwards.

As the right cleared the head of ravine I could see Maj. J. T. Bell, engineers, leading a company of Montana troops in front of the right, almost at right angles to my front, and advancing, firing, toward intrenchments, natural or made. He was on a black horse to the last, evidently leading and encouraging the men. His work was most gallant and was especially cheering to me, my right flank being "in the air." As he soon masked my right in part, and as some of his men came past me to the rear, out of ammunition, I ordered the two right batteries, G and K, to reinforce him; G,

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under Lieutenant Overton, succeeded in doing so, K taking up his alignment. I soon joined him personally, requested him to lead that wing forward, and I took charge of the other, both wings pouring in volleys after the retreating enemy at long range.

There were too many volunteer aids after the action, but I finally obtained definite orders from Captain Lockett, Fourth Cavalry, and conducted my command back through the dark to a line which I knew the division commander wished occupied. This was not done without losing Battery K, detached by orders concerning which I have no information. The line then occupied is essentially the one now held.

TACTICAL NOTE.—My line was 1,600, sometimes 2,000, yards long; never less than 800 or 1,000. To control such a line without a large staff of orderlies or adjutants is impossible. Unless the commanding officer is mounted and has the aids or orderlies mounted he is not a factor in the attack, and he may as well remain behind. If mounted, on the other hand, he is a target for the enemy, who can not see the men lying in the grass, excepting occasionally. Our only loss, 6 wounded, occurred immediately around me, one man falling almost under my horse. This is a serious tactical problem.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

For the cool, gallant, and most efficient performance of his professional duty under a galling fire, rendering first aid on the firing line, February 5, 1899, Acting Asst. Surg. G. W. Mathews, U. S. A., to be surgeon.

For coolness under fire as mounted orderly, intelligence in carrying orders, and untiring devotion to duty night and day, from February 4 to 15, 1899, in operations against hostile insurgents, Private G. H. Kelch, Battery H, Third Artillery, to be second lieutenant of infantry.

The rest of the command did its whole duty, as was to be expected, and fearlessly, as our losses (between 7 and 8 per cent of effective force) indicate.

Reports of battery commanders are inclosed.

W. A. KOBBE,

Major, Third Artillery, Commanding.

IN BIVOUAC, NEAR CALOOCAN, P. I., *February 15, 1899.*

[Inclosure 33.]

BATTERY H, THIRD ARTILLERY,

Caloocan, P. I., February 14, 1899.

ADJUTANT BATTALIONS THIRD ARTILLERY.

SIR: In compliance with orders from headquarters First Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, I have the honor to submit the following report of operations of Battery H, Third Artillery, from and including February 4, 1899:

The battery was formed under the undersigned at about 10 p. m., February 4, 1899, and marched to the place of battalion formation on Calle Reina Regente, whence it was marched under Capt. James O'Hara, the battalion commander, via Paseo de Azcarraga and Calle Antonio de Riviera, to the outposts of this command. At the outpost line the battery formed right front into line of squads, and under fire deployed along the dike occupied by the outpost. Private Arthur D. Philo was wounded slightly in left knee at commencement of this movement. During night of February 4 battery held position from wall of San Lazaro Hospital grounds on right, connecting with Montana outpost, to Battery L on left. No firing was done on this line during night, but early in morning of February 5 battery was exposed to considerable fire from enemy's sharpshooters, during which battery commander was slightly wounded in left forearm, but not disabled. At about 11 a. m. Second Lieut. F. A. Pearce, Sixth Artillery, volunteered his services, which were accepted. At about noon battery moved forward to dislodge sharpshooters from front of Battery L. This was accomplished without loss, and battery was returning as ordered when a general advance was made. Battery remained in rear of Company G, Twentieth Kansas, U. S. V., until ground permitted connection to be made with Battery L, which was done by a flank movement to the left under fire. The battery then advanced over varied ground, offering many obstacles and under constant fire, in three lines, the firing line commanded by Second Lieut. H. M. Boutelle, Third Artillery; support, Lieutenant Pearce; reserve, First Sergt. D. P. Quinlan, Battery H. This movement was continued for about 1½ miles, enemy being driven before us and the support being brought up just before a right half turn was executed, in order to move on Chinese chapel near La Loma Church. As soon as the artillery fire on this chapel

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ceased, the battery moved forward and took the position at about 3 p. m., the enemy falling back to La Loma Church and Blockhouse No. 2. This position was held until about 5 o'clock, when the battery moved forward and occupied without resistance crest of hill overlooking Blockhouse No. 1. From earthworks on this hill a flank fire was had on No. 1 Blockhouse, and the insurgents driven out by this fire and advance of the Twentieth Kansas Regiment. The battery made slight advances from this position on the 6th and 7th, and an intrenched position on line between Blockhouse No. 2 and a point in advance of Blockhouse No. 1 was taken up on February 8.

On Friday, February 10, battery moved out of the trenches and charged across the open plain, under heavy fire, upon Caloocan.

The Caloocan cemetery was taken by flank attack and the battery advanced about one-half mile beyond Caloocan.

During charge Privates Cramer, Cleaveland, and Heisler were slightly wounded. After dark battery returned to original position and then took present position on line between Blockhouse No. 2 and Caloocan. Battery was advanced about half a mile from present position on February 11 to assist Lieutenant Boutelle's squad; when enemy ceased firing battery returned. Fifteen prisoners were captured by battery—7 on February 5, 1 on February 6, 7 on February 10.

Special mention is made of work of Lieutenant Boutelle, who handled his platoon well and exposed himself fearlessly to the enemy's fire when necessary. First Sergeant Quinlan was always cool and never lost control of his platoon. The fire control in both platoons was perfect at all times, and every formation was perfectly carried out. This was due to Lieutenant Boutelle and Sergeant Quinlan, and to Lieutenant Pearce, who left the battery February 6, but whose conduct during the time he was present deserves special mention. Among the other noncommissioned officers and privates it would be hardly fair to mention anyone, as all the men were steady and composed under fire, and there was no firing without command.

Casualties.—Slightly wounded, 5—Second Lieut. R. S. Abernethy, February 5; Private Arthur D. Philo, February 4; Privates Jerry R. Cramer, Jermy R. Cleaveland, and Leo Heisler, February 10.

Appended hereto is report of Lieutenant Boutelle of his operation on February 11, and a note written by Major Shields, which speaks for itself.

Strength of battery.—February 4, 10 p. m.: Two officers, 16 noncommissioned officers, 108 privates, etc., for duty; total, 126. February 15: Two officers, 16 noncommissioned officers, 116 privates, etc., for duty; total, 134.

Very respectfully,

ROBERT S. ABERNETHY,
Second Lieutenant, Third Artillery, Commanding Battery H.

I desire to call the attention of the commanding officer of Battery H, Third Artillery, to the excellent work done by Private F. Crossett in assisting the Hospital Corps in their work under fire.

GEORGE FRANKLIN SHIELDS,
Major and Brigade Surgeon, U. S. V.

IN THE FIELD BEFORE CALOOCAN, LUZON ID., P. I., February 15, 1899.

COMMANDING OFFICER,
Battery H, Third Artillery.

SIR: Pursuant to your instructions, I respectfully submit the following report of a reconnoissance made by myself and a detachment from Battery H, Third Artillery:

About 9 o'clock on the morning of the 12th Major Kobbé ordered me to take 16 men and scout the edge of a line of timber, to ascertain if it was occupied by insurgents. I accordingly took two squads and Sergeant Hatcher and moved forward with one squad on firing line and the other 150 yards in rear as support. One thousand two hundred yards from our line I discovered two badly decomposed bodies of First California Volunteers. They were mutilated and stripped of valuables by insurgents some time before.

I viewed the country carefully and observed a man in woman's disguise trying to draw us to a line of brush. I ignored him until my right had entered the woods. Just here a mortar sent a shell over our heads, so I decided to return. Immediately upon our turning about 25 Mausers opened a terrific fire on us, but the grass afforded excellent cover and we retreated by running 75 yards and firing. At first we were so close that I used my revolver to good advantage. There were no casualties.

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Every man behaved splendidly, but I desire especially to mention the conspicuous gallantry of Private William L. Higber, whose conduct has attracted my attention, not only in this fight, but throughout the campaign.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. M. BOUTELLE,
Second Lieutenant, Third Artillery, Commanding the Detachment.

[Inclosure 84.]

IN THE FIELD, NEAR CALOOCAN, P. I., February 14, 1899 ADJUTANT BATTALIONS THIRD ARTILLERY.

SIR: In compliance with instructions from headquarters First Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by the artillery outpost guard and by Battery G, Third Artillery, from February 4, 1899, to the present date:

On February 4, 1899, I was in command of the outpost guard, which connected with the Montana guard on our right and that of the Kansas on our left. At about 8.30 p. m. on February 4 several shots were heard on our right and quite a distance off. About 9.30 p. m. the firing recommenced and became very heavy. I had previously been instructed to hold the railroad track and the road leading into the city, if attacked. I posted the guard to defend these entrances to the city and to guard our flanks. The patrols and sentinels were instructed to remain on post until attacked, and then to fall back on the main guard and to warn it. Very heavy firing was going on on both sides of us, but as I could see no enemy, and as our patrols were still out, I held my fire. Soon a few bullets began to come over our heads, but as the guard was lying down no harm was done. In about fifteen minutes the patrols fell back with word that they had seen the insurgents advance and had fallen back as ordered. Just then a hail of bullets came around us, and I commenced firing volleys up the road. After firing about a dozen to fifteen volleys the enemy's fire had almost ceased altogether, with the exception of now and then a high bullet. The artillery battalions under Major Kobbé came up and the outposts were reestablished.

I thought, and still believe, that the enemy pushed forward upon our front because we had been silent while the others around us were firing, but that our sudden volley fire apprised him of the fact that the guard was alert and ready to receive him. When the artillery battalions came up I took command of Battery G of the Third Artillery.

During the remainder of the night of February 4 the battery was protected by a dike between the rice fields from the few bullets that came in our direction now and then, but mostly too high to have done any damage. The battery fired no shots during the night.

On the morning of Sunday, February 5, the enemy's fire became more annoying, because of its greater accuracy, and I asked permission to silence their sharpshooters. This was granted, and of the men that volunteered I selected 4, who were said to be superior marksmen. The 4 men were Sergeant Cheatham, Battery K; Private Barton, Battery G, and Privates Aeberly and Wuster, Battery H. These men were very cool and calm under trying circumstances. With these men and several others we advanced by rushes between the dikes, which were parallel to our front. Here we would wait until the enemy would fire, and then we would fire at the puffs of smoke. Several times a hat held above the dikes would draw their fire and enable us to fire at the smoke. As this did not seem to stop his fire, we left the squad of Battery G, which had come up behind the dike, and with the 4 men mentioned we entered the woods on our right and crawled up to within about 400 yards from the enemy, who were firing at the squad which was behind the dike. From the position a fire to the left oblique was delivered into the enemy's sharpshooters, and this fire seemed to surprise them, for they did not return it, and in fact they ceased firing for a short time. Not deeming it safe to remain with so few men so near the enemy, the squad was withdrawn to our lines. After our return the fire from the enemy seemed less brisk, but in a short time he opened again and I took post with a squad from Battery G in a clump of woods a short distance to the front and left of the battery. Here the squad was replying to the enemy when I saw Battery G advancing and deploying into the woods on the right under First Sergeant O'Connor, who was in command of the battery during my absence. I drew back my squad and asked Sergeant O'Connor what his orders were, and he said, to advance to the front and deploy into the woods on our right. Just then firing was heard in the woods, and I went with the sections in there. Just as I came up Private Haag fell, shot in the heart. The men were

posted behind clumps of trees and in a ditch, and were ordered to keep under cover as well as possible, consistent with being able to fire at the enemy in the woods opposite and distant about 200 yards. Fearing that the Montanas might be firing at us because they might take us to be insurgents, we called out "We're Americans, Third Artillery," but were answered by a hail of bullets, one of which a soldier tossed to me. It was a brass-covered Remington, and removed all doubts as to who was in the woods opposite. We fired volleys until the enemy's fire would diminish, and then we would lie quiet to avoid drawing the fire. Then he would open again and we would try again to silence him. The least exposure of our men was sure to bring a storm of bullets around him. I sent word back that we were losing quite heavily and asked for instructions. Just then the order to withdraw a few men at a time came, and this was promptly obeyed; we retired with the remainder of our dead and wounded. We lost 3 killed and mortally wounded and 3 wounded here. About 1 p. m. I was ordered to take my battery up the railroad track and to report to Captain Hobbs, who was up there, and who was in command of the Second Battalion.

Captain Hobbs ordered me to form my battery in extended order and to advance up the right of the railroad track. The ground was broken, and the line was extended as well as the ground would permit. Volleys were fired at every halt and the advance again taken up very quickly. A platoon of Battery K, under Second Lieut. Conrad Lanza, was on the left of my battery during the first part of the advance. As we advanced we saw the insurgents firing at us from behind straw breastworks, a large tree, and the tall grass in front of us. A few volleys, followed by a charge, killed ten to a dozen insurgents. Those who tried to run were also shot, for they tried to escape into the long grass in front, retaining their rifles. The rifles were broken in two, as we did not wish them to be of future use to the insurgents and we could not carry them with us. In this advance and charge Sergt. William McQuade was wounded, as was also Acting Hospital Steward F. L. Hempsted, who was with us. We had been going at a very high rate of speed, and after passing a short distance farther were halted until the line of batteries was reestablished.

We then moved forward on the right of the track to about 1,000 yards from Blockhouse No. 1. While making this advance Corpl. Arthur L. Dean was shot in the head and in the heart and instantly killed. The battery took shelter behind a clump of trees and remained here by order of Captain Hobbs for about half an hour under an annoying but not heavy fire from Blockhouse No. 1. A picked few men were allowed to return the fire, but only when they could see a man to shoot at. This was because we wished to spare ammunition. Soon orders came to move off to the right and to form line on the left of Battery L, and to assist in taking the hill upon which Blockhouse No. 2 is built. The battery was moved as ordered, but had little to do in the taking of the hill, as Captain O'Hara (the First Battalion) had done about all that there was to do before Battery G got on the hill. The night was passed by the battery with the other batteries of the Third Artillery upon the hill, near the Chinese chapel. Slight advances were made from this position February 6 and 7, and on February 8 the battery was moved forward about 50 yards on about a line between Blockhouse No. 2 and Blockhouse No. 1. Intrenchments were started on February 8 and completed on February 9, nothing of any importance taking place until Friday, February 10, at about 3 p. m., when the battery was moved forward with the battalions upon Caloocan. Battery G formed the right of the line until orders were given for me to leave the line with Battery G and to go forward to assist the Montana company under Major Bell, who were in front of us and distant about 400 yards. With all possible speed the battery was moved forward. Each man of the battery commenced firing as soon as he came on the line, under my supervision. The insurgents broke as we advanced upon them.

After advancing about 400 yards from this place we came upon a commanding hill where the ground was quite open but for two clumps of woods about 600 yards distant, with an opening of about 100 yards between them. A squad of insurgents would dash across this open space, being evidently driven by some troops on our left. As they would dash across the battery would shoot them down. The range was well gotten and the fire seemed to be very effective. Then the battery would cease firing for a moment, with their guns aimed upon the open space, and as soon as a dash would be made the triggers would be pulled. I think we shot quite a large number this way, for a great many could be seen to fall as they dashed across. At dusk the battery was moved back with the remainder of the battalion on a line between Caloocan and Blockhouse No. 2, where it has remained until the present date, having intrenched its position. To praise individuals of the battery would be unfair, for it would necessitate praise for each man. The spirit, morale, and courage of the battery has been of the very best from the first to the last.

Total enlisted men present on the night of February 4, 1899, 96.

Casualties, February 6, 1899.—Killed or mortally wounded: Corpl. Arthur L. Dean;

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Privates Otto A. R. Barany, William C. Haag, John W. Niemeyer. Wounded: William McQuade; Privates Eli E. Clappitt, Roscoe L. Mitchell, and Albert J. Colbert.

Casualties on February 10, 1899.—Wounded: Oscar Portwick (shot himself by accident).

Total killed and mortally wounded.....	4
Total wounded.....	5
Total casualties.....	9

WINFIELD S. OVERTON,
Second Lieutenant, Third Artillery, Commanding Battery G.

[Inclosure 35.]

IN CAMP NEAR CALOOCAN, P. I., *February 14, 1899.*

ADJUTANT BATTALION THIRD ARTILLERY.

SIR: In compliance with directions from Headquarters First Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, I have the honor to submit herewith a report of the operations of Battery K, Third Artillery, from and including February 4, 1899.

On February 4, 1899, the battery left the Cuartel de Meisic, Manila, P. I., about 10 p. m., and under the orders of the commander of the Second Battalion (Captain Hobbs) moved out the Dagupan Railroad until we reached the line of outposts of the Third Artillery.

Under direction of Major Kobbé, the battery took a position on the right of the railroad and remained there until about 12.30 p. m. on February 5, 1899. There was considerable firing during the night by the Kansas regiment, on my immediate left, and this was returned by the Filipinos. My position did not permit this fire to be returned, so the battery did no firing, although they were under fire during the whole time until they advanced. Under the orders of Captain Hobbs, the battery moved up the railroad to Calle Solis, driving the Filipinos from their position. In taking this position the battery came under a heavy fire, having 1 man killed and 6 wounded. The battery was halted at Calle Solis, as orders from Captain Hobbs were to go only this distance. Finally, Battery G was seen ahead and on the right of the railroad, so the battery moved forward until we reached this battery. There was some firing ahead from Blockhouse No. 1; the battery returned a few volleys and the fire from the blockhouse was silenced until just as the battery was moved across the railroad, when the firing began again. Major Kobbé had sent word to keep in contact with Battery G, on my right, and so the battery moved to the right, finally reaching a position on the east of the church (La Loma), that later was used as a field hospital. The night of the 5th was spent near here. The next day the line was changed a little. There was no action on this date. Until the 10th was spent in rectifying line and strengthening position. On the night of the 8th a few rounds were fired by order of the commanding officer and the battalion commander after our outpost had come in.

On the 10th an advance on Caloocan was ordered. Battery K was on the right of Battery H, and was placed under the orders of Captain O'Hara. It was directed to maintain connection with Battery H on the left and move so as to keep on the line (the line was supposed to wheel on the stone blockhouse as a pivot). After moving about half a mile it became evident that the pivot or the line had to be abandoned. I maintained connection with Battery H throughout the movement, finally reaching a position about a half mile to the northwest of Caloocan. From this position the battery was ordered to the rear by Major Kobbé after all firing had ceased in its front. After marching about a quarter of a mile it was halted by the battalion commander (Captain O'Hara) and told to take a position along the right of the Idaho regiment and extending in the direction of the stone blockhouse. This was done. The night was passed without any firing. On the morning of the 8th the battery was ordered by the division commander to withdraw and to join the other batteries of the Third Artillery. I joined, taking position on the left of Battery H, and have held this position up to date.

The strength of the battery on February 4, 1899, in the field, was 104 enlisted men and 2 officers.

Casualties.—Sergt. Edw. Whittaker, killed, February 5, 1899; Private C. B. Ploeger, wounded, February 5, 1899; Private D. W. Krider, severely wounded, February 5, 1899; Private George Schulemire, wounded, February 5, 1899; Private John Shackleton, slightly wounded, February 5, 1899; Private E. W. Hawkins, wounded, February

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5, 1899; Private Andrew Johnston, wounded, February 5, 1899; Private J. A. Grey, wounded, February 5, 1899; Corporal D. C. McKeloy, wounded, February 10, 1899; Corporal R. B. Blume, wounded, February 10, 1899; Private Williams, slightly wounded, February 10, 1899; Private Leonard, seriously wounded, February 10, 1899; Private Dorton, wounded, February 10, 1899; Private Strieb, slightly wounded, February 10, 1899.

I have stated opposite the names of the wounded as near as I can the severity of the wounds. In most cases I have not had an opportunity to learn of the nature of the wounds, as all the wounds were received while the battery was advancing.

On the morning of the 11th, through accident, the following casualties occurred: Private F. Good, killed; Private B. L. Putzker, mortally wounded.

Respectfully submitted.

LLOYD ENGLAND,
Second Lieutenant, Commanding Battery K, Third U. S. Artillery,

[Inclosure 36.]

BATTERY L, THIRD U. S. ARTILLERY,
In the field near Calocan, February 15, 1899.

ADJUTANT BATTALIONS THIRD U. S. ARTILLERY.

SIR: In compliance with instructions, I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by Battery L, Third Artillery, in engagements with the enemy from February 4, 1899, to date.

Serious firing having been heard in the direction of the outposts on the night of February 4, 1899, I was directed by the commanding officer, Major Kobbé, to have the battery formed and await further instructions. About 10.30 p. m. the first battalion, under command of Captain O'Hara, left the Cuartel de Meisic and proceeded in a column of fours, with Battery L in the lead, up the road by the La Minerva cigar factory to the outposts furnished by the Third Artillery, located about midway between the Manila and Dagupan Railroad and the leper hospital. The battery took position behind a dike and passed an uncomfortable night standing or sitting in mud and water. Occasional shots were fired by the enemy, but in no case was the fire returned. My battery remained in the vicinity of the outposts until about noon on Sunday, February 5, 1899. During Sunday morning occasional volleys were fired by sections or by platoons, and a few of the best shots were selected to fire as opportunity offered. This firing was for the purpose of clearing the woods of sharpshooters, who were very annoying.

About noon on Sunday I was ordered by Major Kobbé to take my battery forward. The stretch of country over which we were to advance was a narrow strip of about 30 to 50 yards wide, with muddy rice swamps on either side of it. It was generally densely wooded, but contained here and there houses and small gardens. These gardens were frequently surrounded by hedges with but one or two practicable openings. A small detachment of Battery G having made a slight advance up this strip earlier in the morning, and having met with serious resistance, losing 3 killed and 3 wounded, my advance was made at first with considerable caution. A few men were sent ahead as scouts and then followed the battery in a column of sections, each deployed as skirmishers, a distance of about 50 yards between sections. The width of the strip of dry land did not admit a more extended line. No serious resistance was encountered on the advance. None of the enemy were seen, but occasional halts were made while the leading section raked the undergrowth in its front with well-disciplined volleys. A perceptible diminution of the enemy's fire was noticeable after each of these volleys. Thus the advance was made until a position was reached almost west of the Chinese chapel on the hill. Here the country to our right was entirely clear and that to our front more open than that over which our advance had been made. I halted the battery here and examined the country to my right. Battery H, with which we had lost touch during the advance on account of intervening rice swamps, was to my right, and a few yards in rear. Several hundred yards in rear, steadily advancing, was a long line of skirmishers. I was informed later that they were the First Montana Infantry. They were moving directly upon the hill on which the Chinese chapel was situated. This hill was an admirable place for defense and a considerable number of the enemy, probably several hundred, had taken advantage of the position and were sending their fire toward the troops advancing in their front. The enemy apparently had not discovered my position on their flank. Having accurately located their position by the puffs of smoke, I pointed it out to Major Kobbé, who had come up in the meantime, and obtained permission from him to open fire on the hill. I sent two sections,

under First Sergeant Read, so that a fire could be secured directly in the flank of the enemy and slightly in his rear. After but a few volleys the enemy broke and ran to the rear. Most of their retreat was covered, but there was one wide gateway where they could all be seen during their flight. It was here that was seen the only conspicuous act of bravery that I have known in connection with the insurgents. Two of their officers, apparently surprised by the attack on their flank, and unable to check the flight of their men, paused in this gateway and calmly surveyed the country in front of them. At least a hundred rifles were cracking away in their direction at not over 500 yards, but they remained for probably a half minute in their perilous position before they passed on with their retreating troops. A few of these latter lingered for a moment in the chapel to fire from its windows, but our fire soon silenced them and they joined their comrades in flight.

Joining now with Battery H, the battalion (Batteries H and L), under command of Captain O'Hara, charged up the hill, but no resistance was encountered. Battery H entered the Chinese chapel, while I swung my battery to the left and continued the pursuit, making my objective the stone fort known as Blockhouse No. 2. The enemy were in full retreat down the road and across the fields, but apparently none had taken refuge in the fort. The pursuit was continued until the battery was about 200 yards from the stone fort and about the same distance north of the Chinese chapel. The enemy had reached a new line and were pouring back at us a considerable fire, but my men were well protected by tombstones. This was about 3.30 p. m. At this point in the advance General MacArthur sent an officer to me and came a few minutes later in person and directed me to fall back to a line that he pointed out, which line was occupied for the night. My men were very much exhausted, having had nothing to eat since breakfast, and the water in their canteens had given out.

The total casualties for the day were as follows: Severely wounded: Sergt. Bernard Sharp, shot through right knee while directing the fire of his section; Sergeant Sissenguth, through left arm; Private James Gleason, through left knee; Private Edward Lindstrom, through left forearm; Private Arin F. Ryan, through back of head.

Where everyone has done his whole duty and has done it well, praise of individuals seems almost out of place, but I wish to invite attention to the fact that as there was no officer besides myself with the battery, which numbered 122 men present on the day of the engagement, great dependence was necessarily placed upon the noncommissioned officers for the proper and effective control of such a number. The first platoon was commanded by First Sergt. W. C. Read, the second platoon by Sergt. William Edgar, and the sections as follows: The first by Sergt. James Barrett, the second by Sergt. Edward Mytton, the third by Sergt. Alexander Goehn, the fourth by Sergt. Bernard Sharp until he was wounded, when the command was taken by Sergt. Peter Fanning. The work performed by these noncommissioned officers was of the very best. They all fearlessly exposed themselves to the fire of the enemy, and managed the fire discipline of their respective subdivisions, which was entirely in their hands, with the greatest intelligence and effect. Not a man was missing from his place at the end of the fight whose absence was unaccounted for.

The interval between February 5 and February 10 was passed in building trenches and making a comfortable camp, the lines having been advanced on the 6th about 300 yards in front of the position occupied on the night of the 5th.

On the 7th Private James T. Leahy was severely wounded in the back by the premature explosion of a projectile fired from a gun of the Utah Battery. The gun was located on the hill near the stone fort and was firing over the battery toward Calocan. Several other men and a number of officers had very narrow escapes from this explosion.

On the 10th instant, at the beginning of the engagement, Battery L was in reserve in rear of the right flank of the Third Artillery, from which position I expected to advance up the ravine, but shortly after the advance of our lines began (about 3 p. m.) I was ordered by Major Kobbé to take my battery to the left flank. Marching the battery across the field in a column of fours, I deployed it a short distance in rear of the firing line, which was overtaken before the line reached Calocan. The advance was made for a considerable distance without firing, notwithstanding the fact that the enemy's bullets whistled uncomfortably close, though from a very great range; but few of the enemy were seen and these were in retreat. Volleys were sent after them with generally good results. The battery suffered no casualties. Every well man of the battery was on the firing line, including Corporal Fox, the cook, and his assistant, who were supposed to remain behind. Corporal Golvin, though so ill that he should have gone to the hospital, to which he had to be carried the next day, was also on the firing line. Platoon and section commanders were the same as on the 5th, except that Sergt. Charles A. Fuller commanded the third and Sergt. Peter Fan-

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ning the fourth sections. The conduct of the battery was not less praiseworthy than on the 5th. The enemy having been driven beyond Caloocan, we were ordered to return to a line running from the stone fort toward Caloocan. Since the 10th this line has been intrenched and carried across the ravine to the right. The battery is now comfortably located in shelter tents along this line.

Very respectfully,

P. M. KESSLER,
Second Lieutenant, Third Artillery, Commanding Battery L.

[Inclosure 37.]

HEADQUARTERS FIRST MONTANA INFANTRY, U. S. V.,
Caloocan, P. I., February 14, 1899.

Brig. Gen. H. G. OTIS,
Commanding First Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following statement regarding the part taken by First Montana Infantry, U. S. V., in the recent operations against the Filipinos in the province of Manila.

At 9 p. m. Saturday, February 4, word was received that our outpost had been attacked and fallen back to Lazaro Cemetery. About 9.30 p. m. I proceeded to reinforce the outpost, consisting of Companies I and M, with Companies C and L. Company G was ordered to the support of the Twentieth Kansas, leaving Companies B, E, and H in reserve at Calle Iris, the other four companies being in quarters.

I arrived at the Lazaro Cemetery about 10.30 p. m. Firing was kept up all night, but as far as I could learn with very little effect on the enemy. Early Sunday morning a detachment of Company C made an advance and fired the houses in our immediate front and retired again to the cemetery under heavy fire. Shortly after this, under instructions from division commander, a detachment of Company F reconnoitered the Chinese hospital, and, with the assistance of a detachment of the Tenth Pennsylvania, captured same.

At 10 a. m. the general advance commenced with Companies I, M, and L on the firing line and Companies C, F, H, and K in support. At the foot of the ridge where the Chinese cemetery is located the entire support came on the firing line; the advance continued until the cemetery was taken. A new front was established about 6 p. m.

Company G was on the left of the Twentieth Kansas, and advanced with that regiment.

The casualties reported in this engagement were 6 wounded.

Monday, the 6th, Companies A and D came out from town, and Company H was returned to quarters.

Early in the day our front was advanced about one-half mile without resistance from the enemy. This position was maintained until Friday, the 10th. About 4 p. m. on that day an advance on the village of Caloocan was ordered. The enemy in our front occupied the railway buildings, and were intrenched in a cemetery. Our advance was stubbornly contested, but we drove them from their positions as we advanced. They continued to retreat to a line of woods about 1 mile beyond the village. Darkness coming on, we fell back a short distance and established our line, which has been changed but little since.

Nine companies took part in this engagement. The casualties reported were 1 killed and 23 wounded, 3 of the wounded being officers.

Very respectfully,

HARRY O. KESSLER,
Colonel First Montana Infantry, U. S. V.

[Inclosure 38.]

HDQRS. TENTH PENNSYLVANIA INFANTRY, U. S. VOLUNTEERS,
In the field, near Caloocan, February 17, 1899.

Lieut. PHIL. W. RUSSELL,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General,
First Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: In compliance with instructions from headquarters First Brigade, dated February 10, 1899, I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of this command from the evening of the 4th to that of the 10th instant, inclusive:

At 10.15 p. m., on the 4th instant, I was notified by the brigade commander that

an attack was being made by the insurgents on our line of outposts, and I was directed to move 4 companies of my command, namely, D, E, H, and K, and place them on the line previously selected and which was occupied by 60 of my men, under Lieutenant Buttermore, as an outpost. This was promptly done, Company C being left on Calle de Iris to patrol same, and Company I, by order of the brigade commander, was sent to brigade headquarters to guard the same and streets adjacent thereto. Companies A and B were on special duty at Corregidor Island at this time, under command of Maj. H. C. Cuthbertson. When my troops arrived on the line I found the outposts had sustained a heavy oblique fire from Blockhouse No. 4 and from a considerable force stationed at the Chinese hospital directly in our front. At this time no advance had been made by the enemy and no casualties resulted from his fire, the outpost being well protected in the rear of dikes in the rice fields. Soon after our arrival the cross fire from the blockhouse ceased and a heavy fire was opened from the Chinese hospital and other buildings on its flanks. I sent out a line of skirmishers in command of Lieut. Blaine Aiken and disposed of my main line in rear of dikes behind the advanced line. During the night the enemy made two advances on our lines in considerable force, but they were easily checked by our line of skirmishers. Just at the gray of dawn the enemy made a somewhat determined advance in force, which was also checked by the advance line. Our main line did not fire a shot during the night. After daylight I asked Captain Grant, commanding the Utah battery stationed at or near the Chinese cemetery on the Bulumbayan road, to shell the hospital and line in my front, as I desired to make an advance. After a half hour's firing of shell and shrapnel, I signaled "cease firing" and advanced my entire line rapidly on the enemy's position. He replied with heavy volley firing, but when within 300 yards of his line I ordered a charge, and when our troops were within 200 yards of his line he made a precipitate retreat. The fire of the enemy was very high and wild, and the only casualties at this time were 1 man slightly wounded in the hand and 1 man shot through the right lung.

After our possession of the Chinese hospital and Sangleyes road, I believed that our line was too far to the right and extended it about 150 yards to the left, which I subsequently found to be a mistake, as there was an interval between the right of our line and the left of the First South Dakota. I ordered all the "shacks" which the enemy had occupied burned on each flank of the Chinese hospital. After observing the direction of the fire of the enemy and the strong positions held by them, and believing that this position was not a safe one to hold, I ordered my regiment to continue its advance to the front through a valley immediately in front of said hospital. We advanced about 600 yards and were met by a heavy fire from the insurgents from the red church to the left of the Chinese cemetery and from the bushes and old Spanish breastworks on the ridge to the right. A stand was made at this place. Major Everhart Bierer, who was in command of my left wing, was wounded here and forced to retire. At this time I realized that my right was unprotected and the interval between my right and the left of the First South Dakota was too great. I sent Lieut. Col. James E. Barnett, with Companies E and H of this command, to extend our right, who in a few minutes sent an orderly notifying me that his force was insufficient to close the interval. Captain Grant, with 2 pieces of the Utah Artillery, a few minutes before this had arrived on the Sangleyes road, and with 1 piece from the road opened fire on the red church over our heads, but failed to check the fire. In a few minutes both pieces were moved about 100 yards from the Sangleyes road up the road leading to the red church.

About this time I moved my command by the right flank from the valley to the ridge on the right and posted them along the wall of the Chinese cemetery. A survey of the situation disclosed the enemy in strong force in our immediate front at and near the Chinese white church (de la Loma) and along the brow of the ridge to the left and southeast of same. This line was also connected from the right of the Chinese white church to the red church above referred to. The enemy appeared to be in strong force, but much stronger at the Chinese white church and on the ridge to its left than on the line extending to the right and ending at the red church. The artillery now opened a heavy fire on the Chinese white church (de la Loma) and ridge to the left and continued for fully a half hour. I then moved my command inside the Chinese cemetery, formed a new line facing the church and ridge to its left, and ordered an advance. Maj. J. F. Bell, of the Engineer Corps, reporting to me on the line, I assigned him to command of my left wing, and during the subsequent advance and operations of my command he rendered most valuable service, and I desire to say that for the conspicuous gallantry and bravery displayed by him he is entitled to the highest commendation. Our line advanced, firing, in the face of a galling fire from the enemy, and when within about 300 yards of their line a charge was ordered which swept him from his position and he retreated rapidly to the north by way of the

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stone blockhouse north of the Chinese white church (de la Loma). The center of our force reached the wall, *passing this church, advanced inside the inclosure sufficiently far to discover that no troops were lodged in the building, and I then divided my force, the left passing around to the west side and the right to the east side.* At this time Lieutenant-General Barnett, in command of our right, composed of Companies E and H of the Tenth Pennsylvania and I company of the First Montana, together with a detachment of the First South Dakota under command of Colonel Frost, marching obliquely to the left, arrived on east side of the church wall. In command of my right I passed around the northeast corner of the walled inclosure and with my left wing surrounded the blockhouse above referred to, from which the enemy was just retreating. I then formed a line north of the blockhouse facing Calooca, this line being prolonged to the right by Colonel Frost with a detachment of First South Dakota. At this point we were ordered to halt by the division commander, and while firing at the retreating enemy. No further advance was made by this command. Major-General MacArthur, commanding Second Division, indicated a line to be occupied by the troops of this command, which extended from the tower in the rear of the church in an easterly direction, slightly inclined south, which has been strongly intrenched, and since the evening of the 5th instant we have remained passive in this position.

I desire to speak in the highest terms of praise of the gallantry displayed by the officers and troops of this command. They were subordinate and obeyed every order with intelligent alacrity. I especially desire to commend the gallant conduct of First Lieut. Blaine Aiken, Company H, and First Lieut. George L. Gordon, Company K, of this command, who, during the operations to this date, were in command of the advance firing line of my command. Their cool, courageous conduct and cheering words were an inspiration to the troops under their command. Capt. H. J. Watson, whose company (B) is stationed at Corregidor Island, arrived in Manila on business in the afternoon of the 4th instant, and when this command was ordered to the front, he desired an assignment for duty. First Lieut. James Harkins, Company E, being acting quartermaster and commissary, and Second Lieut. John G. Thompson being sick, he was assigned to duty with Company E, and performed most excellent service.

On February 5th instant we buried 42 of the enemy's dead found in front of our line, including 1 field officer, 1 captain, and 1 first lieutenant. In addition, 3 wounded insurgents were captured and taken to the rear where they received the care of our surgeons, and 1 unwounded insurgent was taken and turned over to our authorities in the walled city.

The casualties in the Tenth Pennsylvania in the operations to this date are as follows:

Killed.—Corp. Jacob Landis, Company C, shot through bowels.

Wounded.—Maj. Everhart Bierer, gunshot through left shoulder; not serious. Private Allen W. Rockwell, Company C, gunshot through abdomen; serious. Private Carl W. Deholt, Company C, flesh wound of back; serious. Private Edward C. Caldwell, Company D, gunshot through right lung; serious. Private John A. Kessler, Company D, gunshot in right thumb; not serious. First Sergt. Joseph W. Shidler, Company G, gunshot through thigh; not serious. Private Hiram C. Conger, Company H, gunshot through abdomen; serious.

Very respectfully.

A. L. HAWKINS,
Colonel, Commanding.

[Inclosure 39.]

CALOOCAN, P. I., February 15, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

First Brigade, Second Division.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by the Twentieth Kansas Infantry, U. S. V., in the operations against the Filipino insurgents from the beginning of the outbreak on February 4 until the present day.

The outpost of this regiment in the car station of the Caloocan road was fired upon about 10 p. m. by insurgent patrols. Before this time the outposts of various other regiments had been fired upon, and the general alarm had been given. The whole regiment was under arms in a few moments, and leaving Companies A, B, F, and L, under Captain Buchan, to guard the quarters, the remaining companies, constituting the Second and Third battalions, under Majors Whitman and Metcalf, marched to the relief of our outpost, now fighting valiantly under Capt. A. G. Clark. We were joined on the way by a detachment from the Utah Light Artillery with 1 gun, under Lieutenant Seaman.

Upon arrival at the outpost I found that our men were making a stand in the road

400 yards north of the car station. The gun was placed in position in the middle of the road and the 4 companies of the Second Battalion deployed in the gardens to the left and right, and an occasional reply made to the enemy's fire, which appeared to come from the woods about 800 yards on our front. With the coming of daylight another gun of the Utah battery, which had arrived, was placed in position and 2 companies of the Third Battalion placed on the firing line.

During the day Major Whitman was taken ill and returned to the city, where he has remained ever since. At noon I received orders from the brigade commander, who was on the ground, to advance the line 500 yards. This was done without difficulty, the woods being first cleared of the enemy by a dozen well-directed volleys. The 2 fieldpieces were placed in the road in front of the small church and fired a few well-directed shots. The insurgent barricades and trenches were distant only 500 yards and the fire from them was so galling that an advance was imperative. Major Metcalf had gone to protect our left flank with Companies C, D, and K, and did excellent service. Companies F and L had come out from the city under Captain Buchan, and with these two and Companies E, H, I, L, and M, I ordered a charge up the road and through the gardens and bamboo thickets that flanked it. This charge, which I led in person, was most gallantly made, the men firing as they advanced. The insurgents stood until we were within 60 yards, when they gave way. We occupied both lines of barricades and were preparing to assault the small blockhouse when Major Strong, adjutant-general of the division, arrived and ordered me to retire for the night to the position that we had just left. This was done, and the night was passed without incident.

Our casualties in the desultory fighting of the day were 1 enlisted man killed and 6 enlisted men wounded.

On the morning of the 6th I received orders to advance to insurgent barricades that we had taken the previous evening and occupy them. This was done without difficulty, as the enemy had fled. During the day we found and buried the bodies of 31 insurgents, killed in our charge of the previous day.

The regiment was intrenched facing the north, the right resting on the railway, where it joined with the First Montana, and the left on the impassable bayous from the sea. The day and night passed without incident except for an occasional exchange of shots with the enemy.

On the afternoon of the 7th the enemy became so bold, firing from behind a dike 500 yards in front of our line, that it became imperative to dislodge them; so after obtaining permission from the brigade commander, I led 3½ companies in an attack on this position, carrying it at the point of the bayonet. Our loss was First Lieut. A. C. Alford, of Company B, a most bright and promising young officer, killed and 6 enlisted men severely wounded.

I counted 26 dead insurgents on the ground where they made their stand. In accordance with our original orders, we fell back to the trenches before dark and remained there during the whole night undisturbed.

There were no further incidents of note until the 10th, when in conjunction with the First Montana and Third Artillery we were ordered to advance on the town of Caloocan. The attack, so far as this regiment was concerned, was made through dense woods and in the face of a hot though badly directed fire from the enemy, our loss being 2 enlisted men killed and 1 officer and 8 enlisted men wounded. We are now intrenched on the north side of the town of Caloocan, with our left on the water and right as before on the First Montana.

Where everybody did so well it is impossible to make distinctions, but I wish to bring to your notice the splendid conduct of Maj. Wilder S. Metcalf, who has been my right hand during the trying operations of the past ten days.

Our entire losses have been 5 killed and 27 wounded.

Respectfully,

FREDERICK FUNSTON,
Colonel Twentieth Kansas, U. S. V.

[Inclosure 40.]

HDQRS. SECOND BRIGADE,
SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., February 9, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of operations of Second Brigade on February 4th and 5th.

About 8.30 p. m. February 4, an orderly from Colorado headquarters reported that firing had been heard from front, and about the same time the operator from my house

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caught part of a message from Colonel Stotsenburg to division headquarters that there was firing at pipe-line outpost (opposite Blockhouse 7) and his regiment had gone out.

It was afterwards found that the Nebraska patrol fired on some insurgents coming this side of line near Blockhouse 7, who did not halt when repeatedly challenged. Insurgents at blockhouse returned fire and a few volleys were exchanged, when Nebraska patrol and advanced post in village retired to main post at pipe line. Firing ceased for a time, but was reopened later by insurgents all along the line. Our troops did not reply until insurgent firing had continued for a considerable time.

It was impossible to get either Nebraska camp, Balic-Balic outpost, or division headquarters by telegraph on account of condition of lines, and telegraphic communication was practically worthless throughout the entire operations. This, with the extended front of the brigade (5,300 yards, or 3 miles) and nature of country (bamboo thickets and rice fields) made it difficult to keep in close personal touch with entire front, but by liberal use of staff officers and orderlies it was fairly well accomplished.

On receipt of messages mentioned in second paragraph the Colorado and South Dakota regiments were put under arms in quarters, and Colorado, being nearest, was directed, in case of a call from front, to send 2 companies to support either Colorado or South Dakota outposts as required until arrival of South Dakota.

When renewed firing was heard (insurgent attack) 8 companies of South Dakota and 4 additional companies of Colorado (2 were already on outpost) were sent to the front, South Dakota forming in rear of its outpost, 1 company Colorado reinforcing Sampaloc cemetery hill and the other 3 deploying on right to connect with Nebraska left.

I went to Sampaloc cemetery (which was brigade headquarters during the operations), sending Lieutenant Perry, aide, to South Dakota front and an orderly to Nebraska camp to ascertain conditions at these points.

On reaching firing line on Sampaloc hill found a lively skirmish in progress, but as it was desirable to prevent a general engagement, especially at night, ordered all firing to cease. The insurgents stopped almost immediately.

The orderly sent to Nebraska reported that matters were fairly quiet there, but that Colonel Stotsenburg thought that the Deposito had been burned and water-works were burning. This proved to be a mistake.

The officer sent to South Dakota reported that when the insurgents attacked, the main outpost had fallen back toward Colorado (Sampaloc cemetery hill) and the farthest Cossack post toward Pennsylvania (all of which was in accordance with instructions in case of serious attack), and outpost commander thought the insurgents had occupied the vacated ground.

I immediately went to South Dakota line and found that Colonel Frost, who had just arrived with his 8 companies, had taken 2 companies forward and retaken the entire outpost line, which had apparently not been occupied by the insurgents. As these 2 companies, with the regular outpost, were sufficient to hold the line, and the others were in an exposed position, they were ordered back of Sampaloc hill. Later, everything having quieted down, they were sent back to quarters, as it was not desirable to allow a greater number of our troops than necessary to be kept up and worn out on account of desultory night firing by the insurgents.

I then inspected the line from Sampaloc Cemetery to Nebraska camp, finding the troops well placed. Everything being quiet, I returned to town and reported to General MacArthur at his temporary headquarters near Bilibid Prison.

While there the firing reopened at the front, and, in accordance with General MacArthur's directions, the 5 South Dakota companies and 2 more Colorado companies of Third Battalion, under Major Grove, were ordered to the front. They were held in reserve in rear of Sampaloc Hill. This left 4 companies of each regiment in city.

Soon afterwards, about 4 a. m., a telegram came from Colonel Stotsenburg, First Nebraska, requesting reinforcements, as the insurgents were closing in on him. There being none available in the city I sent Lieutenant Perry to order Major Grove, with the 2 Colorado companies (D and I), just sent out, to move across country in rear of line to Santa Mesa road, and thence through race-track district toward Blockhouse 8 (the only place where the insurgents could possibly get in), to catch them if they had succeeded in getting around Nebraska right flank; if nothing there, to move up behind camp and report to Colonel Stotsenburg. Proceeded with remainder of staff to Nebraska camp, but could not find Colonel Stotsenburg there or along the line; learned afterwards that he was with company down by the river southeast of camp. There was considerable firing down by San Juan Bridge and the Filipinos were cheering, but scouts sent to companies there and along pipe line reported that they had had no trouble and needed no support. Left the 2 Colorado companies on Santa

Mesa road this side of Allison's, where they could promptly reach any part of line, and notified battalion commanders to call on them whenever needed.

We then rode across country to Sampaloc Cemetery, where Colorado, and also South Dakota, on the left opposite Blockhouse 4, were engaged in lively firing, which continued without much intermission until the final assault.

At daylight the 2 Utah guns at Sampaloc Cemetery, under Captain Wedgewood, opened on Blockhouse 5, earthworks, and village in front of hill, at ranges varying from 300 to 500 yards, and also at intervals on Blockhouse 4, in front of South Dakota, at 1,200 yards, and earthwork under large tree, between Blockhouses 5 and 6, at 750 yards. Their fire was accurate and effective, and the guns were served without hesitation under the close range infantry fire from Blockhouse 5 and vicinity. The Utah batteries did splendid work throughout the day.

At 8.10 a. m., the enemy's infantry fire being about silenced, the force on Sampaloc Hill, consisting of companies B, K, and L, First Colorado, under Major Anderson, with Colonel McCoy in general command, was ordered to charge Blockhouse 5, earthworks, and village, halting and advancing by alternate rushes in case the enemy's fire should become too strong. They made the charge in fine style, and when half way to the blockhouse the insurgents broke from the earthworks, bushes, and houses in surprising numbers and ran for the hills, the Americans picking them off as they ran. Thirty-five were gathered up in the immediate vicinity—24 dead and 11 wounded.

This movement having broken their center and shown that they could not stand a charge, Captain Brooks was dispatched to Lieutenant-Colonel Moses, commanding First Battalion Colorado, on the right opposite Blockhouse 6, and Captain Krayenbuhl to Colonel Frost, commanding South Dakota, on left opposite Blockhouse 4, to charge their portions of the line after a short preliminary bombardment. A telegram was sent to Colonel Stotsenburg, First Nebraska, on the extreme right (the first time I had been able to catch his station), to shell Blockhouse 7 from McLeods Hill and capture it.

Captain Brooks found that Lieutenant-Colonel Moses, seeing the advance on his left, had followed suit and was already in possession of Blockhouse 6 and line toward Blockhouse 5.

Colonel Stotsenburg had also taken the initiative, and his left, which connected with the Colorado right, had taken Blockhouse 7 and line toward Blockhouse 6, and, in fact, some of his men were the first into the latter blockhouse.

Colonel Frost and the South Dakota regiment, after five artillery shots each at Blockhouse 4 and earthwork between 4 and 5, as specified in message sent him, attacked and charged in excellent form, capturing this part of the line. In the afternoon, in compliance with instructions from division commander, he also cooperated with the Tenth Pennsylvania in the capture of Chinese cemetery and church, 1½ miles northwest of Blockhouse 4, and the South Dakota troops were the first inside the church inclosure.

Thus, by 9.30 a. m. we were in possession of the entire insurgent line in front of the Second Brigade from Blockhouse 4 to San Juan Bridge, a distance of 2 miles. The enemy still held the Deposito, San Juan del Monte, and San Felipe, on the high hill across the San Juan River, opposite McLeods Hill, and the Nebraska camp on our extreme right.

Our horses being about used up, and weak from lack of food since previous evening, they were left at Sampaloc Hill to be fed and rested, and Captain Brooks, an orderly, and myself took a quilez and went to McLeods Hill (via Rotonda), where we fortunately found and appropriated two horses belonging to officers of the Tennessee battalion, which had gone forward to reenforce Nebraska in the attack on San Juan Hill, and proceeded across San Juan Bridge, finding 2 Utah guns, under Lieutenant Gibbs, on the road, and the Tennessee battalion, under Major Cheatham, alongside it, firing toward San Juan del Monte church and hills to the right, from which the enemy was firing on the Nebraskas and 2 attached companies of Colorado, under Colonel Stotsenburg, who were just reaching the top of Deposito Hill. When we arrived at the latter they had captured the Deposito and were firing from its banks against the insurgents retreating to the east and south. This was a little after 12 o'clock.

In the hope of capturing the insurgents who had been firing from vicinity of San Juan del Monte church and San Felipe convent, southwest of Deposito, in the peninsula between San Juan and Pasig rivers, I ordered up the Utah guns and Tennessee battalion, placing the former near southwest corner of Deposito, commanding San Juan del Monte church, and extending latter in line of skirmishers encircling the church. The first intention was to shell the church and vicinity before the infantry advanced, but finding by a patrol that the church was apparently unoccupied, and wishing to make the advance as quietly as possible, so as to capture the troops at San

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Felipe, we dispensed with the preliminary artillery fire and proceeded with the line of skirmishers, carefully sweeping the entire district, exploring and taking in succession the church of San Juan del Monte, ropewalk, convent, and town of San Felipe, town of Mandaloyon, and sending a strong patrol through the narrow tongue of land to junction of San Juan and Pasig rivers and another up the north bank of the Pasig about half a mile. No resistance was met throughout the movement, although a number of insurgents were seen, beyond rifle range, escaping to the east up the Pasig. Only one was killed. The Tennessee battalion acted with excellent coolness and discretion throughout this movement, in which resistance from the ropewalk, convent, and woods was expected, although not actually encountered. On the completion of the work the battalion was quartered in San Felipe convent and San Juan del Monte church, to guard the country from Deposito south to Pasig River.

This gave us a continuous line from the Pasig, opposite Santa Ana, north to San Juan del Monte and Deposito, thence northwest through the Pulverin, San Juan Bridge, and Blockhouses 7, 6, 5, and 4, to Blockhouse 3 (so called, merely a small earthwork), where South Dakota, on our left, connected with Pennsylvania on the right of the First Brigade.

We then returned to the Tennessee officers their horses, took a quilez back, and, meeting an orderly with our horses at San Juan Bridge, rode along the line of blockhouses, finding the troops well placed and outposts established, to Blockhouse 3, and thence into the city via Chinese hospital and Bulumbayon road, arriving about 7.30 p. m.

The casualties during night of February 4 and all of February 5 were as follows:

	Killed.	Wounded.	Total.
First South Dakota Infantry, U. S. V.....	3	18	11
First Colorado Infantry, U. S. V.....	3	6	9
First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. V.....	5	16	21
Total.....	11	30	41
Final (1 wounded died).....	12	29	41

¹ Includes 3 sprains.

² Includes 1 who afterwards died.

All are enlisted men, excepting one officer, Lieutenant Haughwout, First Colorado, who received slight leg wound in quarters from a high shot soon after firing began.

As every organization in the brigade, including those temporarily attached, drove the enemy in its front from intrenched positions and did all the work set before it energetically and gallantly, special mention would be inappropriate. The foregoing report indicates fully the service performed by each.

The members of the brigade staff, Capt. A. McD. Brooks, Capt. M. S. Krayenbuhl, Lieut. F. L. Perry, Lieut. W. S. Connor, who volunteered his services, and also my personal orderly, Private H. B. Kerr, First Colorado (who practically performed the duties of a staff officer), rendered arduous and efficient service carrying messages along our extended front, frequently under fire. Maj. S. O. L. Potter, brigade surgeon, did valuable work in connection with the regimental field hospitals.

Very respectfully,

IRVING HALE,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

HDQRS. SECOND BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., February 10, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of operations of this brigade on February 6 to 9, inclusive, 1899:

The operations of Sunday, February 5, as given in separate report, resulted in capture of insurgent positions and establishment of our line through Blockhouses 4, 5, 6, 7, San Juan Bridge, Pulverin, Deposito, San Juan del Monte Church, San Felipe Convent, and Mandaloyon, to the Pasig opposite Santa Ana.

Monday, February 6.—On Monday forenoon, February 6, 1 battalion Twenty-third U. S. Infantry and 1 battalion (3 companies) Oregon Volunteer Infantry were ordered to Deposito to cooperate with the Nebraska regiment, two attached companies of Colorado, and Utah guns, under Colonel Stotsenburg, in the capture of

the waterworks on Mariquina River, $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles east of Deposito. The Tennessee battalion was ordered back to provost guard in city, but when the messenger reached Deposito they were already in the field and the message did not find them. When they reached the waterworks I notified them of the order and they returned to the city.

When I arrived at Deposito, just after the Twenty-third and Oregon battalions, Colonel Stotsenburg had started for the waterworks with the following troops: Two companies Colorado, as advance guard, in extended order; battalion Tennessee on extreme right, in extended order; battalion Nebraska on extreme left, in extended order; battalion Nebraska as reserve on road; four Utah guns following advance guard and used to clear road and woods to right and left.

Instructions were sent back for the Oregon battalion to remain as guard at Deposito and along road toward waterworks, and for the Twenty-third Battalion to proceed along road from Deposito to Mariquina, about a mile north of waterworks, to cover the movement on latter against attack from north. Captain Brooks, adjutant-general of the brigade, accompanied the Twenty-third Battalion. I followed the main body toward waterworks, catching it about halfway, where it was engaged in a lively skirmish, especially on the left, where considerable resistance was met, a number of insurgents killed and 2 taken prisoners. Nebraska had 1 killed and 3 wounded in this movement.

A short distance back the body of Assistant Surgeon Young, of the Utah Battery, had been found, with a powder-stained bullet hole in his head, indicating that he had been captured by the insurgents and killed after capture. He had intended to meet Major Young at Deposito, but apparently missed his way and went beyond.

The bluff overlooking the waterworks was found unoccupied and the advance guard proceeded down the hill in extended order, wheeling to left to meet insurgent fire from the hills and brush to north. After silencing this they advanced to the works, finding them unoccupied and uninjured excepting removal of cylinder heads and valves, which could be replaced in a week or two. The insides of cylinders were carefully greased to prevent rust. These missing parts were found next day buried in the ground of the coal-room floor under a pile of coal. The discovery was made by Artificer Hays, Company I, First Colorado, whose suspicions were aroused by noticing a little dirt mixed with the coal at edge of pile. It is surmised that the engineer may have done this, telling the insurgents that they had crippled the pumps and thus preventing more extended damage.

The Tennessee battalion, on its arrival, was returned to city in accordance with orders, as explained above.

Two Oregon companies were distributed along the road to patrol it.

The Nebraska battalions were disposed along top of bluff commanding the waterworks and surrounding country.

The Utah guns were placed at stone blockhouse on same bluff. As a number of insurgents were seen in vicinity of Mariquina, across and up the river, and the location of their headquarters was known, a few shots were fired in that direction to impress on them the fact they were covered by artillery and deter them from attacking the Twenty-third Battalion, moving toward Mariquina. It was learned next morning that this was very fortunate, as it had the effect of stopping the lively fire by which this battalion was met as it approached the bluff overhanging the river opposite Mariquina.

The Twenty-third Battalion, under Major Goodale, proceeded as directed from Deposito along Mariquina road, but its progress was slow on account of difficulty of skirmish line, encumbered with blanket rolls, getting through the cane fields and bamboo brush and fences. Just before reaching the high ground this side of the river, the advance guard was met by a hot fire from insurgents 200 or 300 yards in front, which was returned, resulting in a lively skirmish for a few minutes, which stopped with the artillery fire from the waterworks mentioned above. Our troops then took up an excellent position in a ready-made trench along a ridge, and as it was dark and the position and force of the enemy were not known it was decided to wait there until morning.

Lieut. A. P. Hayne, California Heavy Artillery, who had voluntarily accompanied Major Goodale as aid, expressing a desire to return to the city, was allowed to do so, and on his arrival went to the department commander with a grossly exaggerated report of the situation, on the strength of which the department commander directed the withdrawal of the battalion. Captain Krayenbuhl and Lieutenant Perry of the brigade staff, with a platoon of Oregon as escort and carrying two canteens of water per man, with a larger supply on a cart, were therefore dispatched to the relief of the Twenty-third Battalion. An orderly was sent to the waterworks to notify Colonel Stotsenburg of the withdrawal of this covering force on his left, so that he could take

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other means for protection. It was found that the report was practically groundless; that the position was a strong one; that there was no firing and no apparent danger, and that Major Goodale was reluctant to withdraw, especially at night. They therefore left the platoon there and returned, Lieutenant Perry reporting the facts to the department commander, who authorized me to leave the battalion where it was and proceed according to my best judgment in the morning. This was about 3.30 a. m., February 7.

Tuesday, February 7.—At 6 a. m. I sent word to the remaining platoon of the Oregon company to join the Twenty-third Battalion, with another supply of water, and to Colonel Stotsenburg to send two companies across country as additional reinforcements, with a view of surrounding the insurgent force, if still in their front, and driving it back on the river, destroying or capturing it. I accompanied the Oregon platoon, and soon after our arrival Colonel Stotsenburg reported with 2 companies, which he left and returned to waterworks. Two companies of the Twenty-third were sent in extended order to circle around to north, cut off retreat of insurgents in that direction, and take them in flank, forcing them south in front of our other troops or back into the river. When they had swung around on the north the entire line, in extended order, moved forward, closing in toward Mariquina and sweeping the country. No resistance was encountered, and on crossing the river into Mariquina it was found deserted, with white flags on all the houses.

While we were there the natives began to flock in from the hills with white flags. On being informed that their houses and property had not been molested, and that we were friendly to them as long as they remained friendly to us and kept the insurgents out, but would destroy the town if it was again occupied by the insurgents, they shouted, "Viva Americanos," and assured us that they wanted to be good American citizens.

An inspection of the insurgents' headquarters disclosed nothing of especial importance or value excepting some surveying instruments, which were taken, as they would doubtless be looted if left. They are at these headquarters, subject to orders.

We then marched down the east side of the river to Santolan and forded the stream to the waterworks.

Wednesday, February 8.—Wednesday afternoon, February 8, the battalion of the Twenty-third was relieved and returned to the city and the Wyoming battalion was sent out in its place. It was quartered for the night in the Pulverin, beyond San Juan Bridge, but on the following morning was located in San Juan del Monte Church and San Felipe Convent to guard line from Deposito south to Mandaloyan, on the Pasig.

The Oregon battalion was stationed at Deposito, forks of Mariquina and waterworks roads and Pulverin, with a detachment at Blockhouse 7.

Thursday, February 9.—The line of South Dakota and Colorado regiments from Blockhouses 3 to 6 was readjusted along high ground beyond blockhouses and intrenched.

Two Utah guns were placed behind earthworks in commanding positions on the ridge northeast of Blockhouse 5.

The brigade now covers the following lines:

	Miles
Front of Blockhouses 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, to San Juan Bridge	2½
San Juan Bridge to Deposito	1
Deposito south to Mandaloyon, on Pasig River	2
Deposito east to waterworks, on Mariquina River	3½
Total	8½

Very respectfully,

IRVING HALE,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

[Inclosure 41.]

HDQRS. SECOND BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., February 27, 1899.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to inclose copies of reports of Colonel Stotsenburg, First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. V., Captain Barber and Lieutenant Murphy, Second Oregon Infantry, U. S. V., on expedition consisting of Hotchkiss revolving cannon and gun detachment with escort of 25 men to drive insurgents out of a position near Mari-

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quina road, from which they were delivering an annoying fire on the Nebraska camp and outpost. This movement was based on the following telegraphic correspondence:

DEPOSITO, February 24, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL, SECOND BRIGADE:

Want General Hale's approval to send 1 Hotchkiss and 25 Oregon men out Mariquina road to shell insurgents southwest of our outposts. They can reach our camp occasionally from the rocks. Is the General coming out here this evening?

STOTSSENBURG, Colonel.

HQRS. SECOND BRIGADE AND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
February 24, 1899.

Colonel STOTSSENBURG, *Deposito*:

Approve sending gun and Oregon detachment as support as recommended, but avoid any infantry engagement if possible. You had better go with them or send some officer familiar with location of insurgents. Be as economical of ammunition as possible. Will probably stay at B. H. 5 again to-night unless something special out your way. Insurgents in considerable force 800 to 1,000 yards in front of South Dakota and Colorado.

HALE, *Brigadier-General*.

I supposed that the insurgents could be driven out with the gun from the road or immediate vicinity, and that the infantry detachment would be required only as escort and support; but it appears from the development of circumstances and failure of Hotchkiss gun, as specified in reports, that considerable infantry fire was necessary. The general effect on the insurgents seems to have been good.

Very respectfully,

IRVING HALE,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

FIRST NEBRASKA U. S. VOLUNTEER INFANTRY,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER,
Pumping Station, February 25, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Second Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to state that yesterday morning about 4 a. m. a company of sharpshooters in the fields west of Mariquina and others in the rocks about 800 yards north of the Mariquina road began firing into our camp. This had stopped the night before about 11. Several of their shots came into our tents. The insurgents are occupying a position about 400 yards from our outpost on the Mariquina road. After daylight we drove them out of the fields near Mariquina with the artillery, and they got into the rocks north and northwest of the Mariquina road and made it very unpleasant for us. About 12.30 p. m. I came in to the Deposito, intending to get permission to dislodge them from there. When I arrived Major Eastwick, Second Oregon, asked for permission to send about 20 men out the Mariquina road to make a reconnoissance and dislodge some insurgents who seemed to be northeast of the Deposito. I told him that, with the approval of General Hale, he could do it. I waited until nearly 2 o'clock, and as the firing of the sharpshooters seemed to increase, the movement to begin, which I had suggested in my telegram to General Hale, having been approved, was ordered. The detachment of twenty-five selected men of Major Eastwick's battalion started out, and after marching in line of skirmishers about a mile and a half on the Mariquina road, and this continued until they nearly reached the Nebraska outpost, the Hotchkiss gun became disabled, and besides the moral effect was of little use to us. This was no fault of the gunners, as they did hard work. One of the Utah battery guns came over and drove the insurgents out toward Mariquina. They remained away until this morning, when they returned again in small bodies, but up to the present have done no firing. Last night was the quietest one we have had on our outpost. The entire Second Oregon detachment under Captain Barber did good work, and as we did not get in until late, remained all night.

The only casualty was Corp. William Ponath, Company G, Second Oregon, slightly wounded in chest and muscle of the arm. I inclose a copy of Captain Barber's report.

Four insurgents are known to have been killed.

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A Spaniard who was with us informed me that 3 battalions of insurgents were at San Mateo and that this was their advance guard.

Very respectfully,

JOHN M. STOTSENBERG,
Colonel First Nebraska U. S. Volunteer Infantry.

IN THE FIELD,
Powder Magazine, February 25, 1899.

ADJUTANT,

Third Battalion, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry.

SIR: I have the honor to report that I received orders at 1 p. m., February 24, to prepare to advance with 25 picked men from Companies C, K, and G, Second Oregon Infantry, along Mariquina road. Left Pulverin with detachment from Company G to cross-roads, where I received written orders from Major Eastwick, commanding Third Battalion, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, to proceed along Mariquina road in company with a detachment with Hotchkiss gun under command of Lieutenant Murphy, Company K, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry. Threw out line of skirmishers north of road. Marched along Mariquina road, and reaching stone barricade the detachment was thrown out as skirmishers along north side of road, keeping touch with Hotchkiss gun, which joined our right flank. No obstruction was met with until after passing native village and reaching row of huts some 300 yards from village, when we were fired upon by sharpshooters stationed in native huts and trees. They seemed strong in number, and our fire failing to dislodge them, and there being a favorable position, fire from the Hotchkiss was opened on the village; but the shells failed to explode on striking the grass huts. We advanced and the enemy retreated toward our left flank, where a heavy fire was encountered from a strong body of the enemy, who were posted in that vicinity. Changed direction to the left and took up position behind hedge, which afforded fair cover, and endeavored to locate the enemy, who were now firing upon us with volleys. We replied briskly and the enemy retreated to probably 1,000 yards, leaving behind them sharpshooters, who annoyed us until they were disposed of.

The enemy divided into two large bands, one going to the right and the other to the left, in an apparent endeavor to flank us. The gun was brought up and put into a favorable position, and shelling began in the places where the enemy were hidden, especially in a house where some 50 or 60 were seen to congregate, at range of 1,400 yards. The shells burst close to the house and the enemy evacuated it. A rapid fire of shells seemed to work damage, the shells falling among them and exploding. The enemy continued a heavy fire from the right, which was situated on a ridge screened by brush. A few shells were thrown there and the gun jammed. A company of First Nebraska Infantry came up and formed on our left, supplying us with ammunition, which was needed, and fired volleys at various ranges. The enemy retreated beyond range and we changed direction to the right. Leaving the Nebraska company to cover our right, we took gun to the road and advanced slowly while repairs were made to gun. Having advanced one-fourth or one-half mile, we were fired on by a number of the enemy, who were concealed in the cane fields and trees and on the surrounding heights. The fire was chiefly volleys and well directed, sweeping all the open ground, and came from the left front and left entirely. We could locate but few of the enemy, owing to the fact that they used smokeless powder, while we were at a disadvantage, having the black-powder shells. As we were exposed we advanced the right and swung back the left, so as to avoid the flanking fire and afford better protection. The men sheltered themselves and we endeavored to drive the enemy back, but they gave way very little and did not relax their fire. The gun being repaired now came up and we opened on the position of the enemy, but after a few rounds the Hotchkiss gun again jammed, owing to the breaking (rottenness) of the shells. The gun being useless and the enemy having our range, we communicated with the Nebraska company at the outpost and endeavored to withdraw to the road, which afforded a certain amount of protection. Here Corporal Ponath, Company G, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, was wounded in the chest. He was carried to a disused sugar-cane mill, which afforded some protection. I went to him and ordered his removal to the road, having in the meantime sent for a litter. This was done under a heavy fire.

The enemy having accurately located the mill, I received order from the outpost to withdraw to the road and come to outpost. The useless gun having gone ahead, we withdrew as quickly as possible to the road, advancing under cover of the bushes, and reached outpost. I would venture to suggest that black powder is dangerous as

betraying our position, while the enemy, using only smokeless, can only be located by the noise or a quick eye, and that is uncertain, while each time we fired black powder they immediately sent a volley toward the smoke. Their firing was controlled by bugle, heard at intervals, and they evidently had the range, as in the second fight the bullets were well aimed and not too high, as is usual. Our only casualty was Corporal Ponath, Company G, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry. The men were cool and obeyed orders promptly. As regards the loss of the enemy, we could only locate them by sounds; those we saw we left there. I can give no accurate statistics, as it is impossible to estimate the damage done by the shells or our volleys in the brush. The sharpshooters who stayed too long behind the main body of the enemy we could locate, and as we had picked men we had no difficulty in disposing of them. After reporting to Colonel Stotsenburg at the outpost we were sent to the Nebraska camp for supper. We returned to the outpost and took up at midnight outpost work there. We were supplied with food by the Nebraska Volunteers, and at 9.30 February 25, the men having breakfasted, we started to return to camp (Pulverin). I desire to draw attention to the fact that when Corporal Ponath was wounded he was at the left of the line. He was promptly carried to the shelter of the mill by Sergeant Lane, Privates William A. Shoemaker, Albert A. Eide, and John J. Maxwell, all of Company G, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, under a heavy fire. On my request for volunteers to carry him to the road, as there was a raking fire across the open, these men promptly responded and carried the wounded man gently across the road, the bullets meanwhile spattering all around them.

Distance traveled, 7 miles.

Respectfully submitted.

R. H. BARBER,

Captain, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry.

CROSSROADS, SAN JUAN DEL MONTE, *February 24, 1899.*

Maj. P. G. EASTWICK, Jr.,

Commanding Third Battalion, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry.

SIR: I beg to report as follows:

Received verbal orders from Major Eastwick to report—with 1 Hotchkiss gun and 5 men—to Captain Barber, in command of detachment. Gun to be pulled by 10 prisoners. Left crossroads at 1.30; proceeded to point on Mariquina road about 2½ miles; when, on order of Captain Barber, gun was put into action, firing at native houses where the enemy was stationed. Enemy's fire ceased. Hotchkiss shells penetrated houses, but failed to explode. After firing 10 or 15 shots the gunner reported that the gun was disabled. On examination I found that the swivel plate controlling elevation gear was broken. I took the plate off and turned it in such manner that the gun could be used (with care). I was compelled to work under great difficulties on account of not having the tools that belong to the gun. The gun having been prepared, Captain Barber ordered me to place gun at a point one-fourth mile from road to the left and shell a rocky ridge where there was a body of insurgents in force. Opened fire at 1,500 yards, shells landing in the midst of them and exploding, with the effect that they were driven from their position after some resistance.

(NOTE.—Shells exploded by striking rocks; would not explode by striking bamboo houses or ordinary soil.)

After firing 100 or more shots cleaned the gun, and shortly afterwards a shell stuck, and Captain Barber ordered me to the road, where I found firing pin bent, which I hammered into shape, and removed broken shell from gun. Proceeded on up the road, per order Captain Barber, and opened fire on hedge row, from which the enemy were pouring in a hot fire. After firing two shots the gun again jammed and we succeeded in withdrawing the shell under a severe fire.

I then reported to Captain Barber, who ordered me to report to captain of Nebraska company, who sent me back to Captain Barber (after I had made a verbal report to him of the condition of the gun) with orders for him to withdraw his skirmish line to the road and advance to his position; also for me to bring up the gun to his position. On arrival at his position (about 4 miles from crossroads on top of hill overlooking Mariquina) with gun, Colonel Stotsenburg being present, I reported to him in person. He directed me to place the gun at point to be designated by him. I placed the gun, and after firing 2 shots the gun jammed again and we could not dislodge the shell, as there were no tools for the purpose at hand. Colonel Stotsenburg then ordered the gun to be taken to the pumping station to be repaired and for me to await further orders. On arrival at the pumping station I made a hollow-shaped tool that fitted the bore of the gun and could be rammed against the explosive shell

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without touching the cap, thereby removing the jammed shell from the gun. I carry this tool on the gun now, and it can be used in the field in case of future trouble. I also repaired plate on elevation gear by using heavy iron washers and new machine bolts. Finished repairs 11.30 p. m., with gun in much better and stronger condition than when we left camp.

I received telegraphic orders from Colonel Stotsenburg at 7.40 p. m. to proceed to Deposito and place gun in former position on south wall of Deposito. Above order was carried out, and I reported to Colonel Stotsenburg at 10 a. m. this 25th day of February, 1899.

Respectfully submitted.

CHARLES A. MURPHY,
*Lieutenant, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry,
Commanding Hotchkiss and Galling Battery.*

[Inclosure 42.]

HDQRS. SECOND BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., February 16, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to inclose copies of reports of operations of the following organizations of this brigade (including battalion of Twenty-third U. S. Infantry, temporarily attached), to accompany my report of operations of the brigade dated February 9, 1899: First South Dakota Infantry, U. S. V.; First Colorado Infantry, U. S. V.; First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. V.; battalion Twenty-third U. S. Infantry.

The battalion of the First Tennessee did good work supporting the attack on San Juan Hill, clearing San Juan del Monte, San Felipe, and Mandalayan on February 5, and cooperating in the movement on waterworks on February 6, immediately after which the battalion was returned to the city to embark for Iloilo; consequently no report from it has been received. Its operations were explained, however, in my report of February 9.

The battalion of Second Oregon Infantry, U. S. V., which was attached to this brigade February 6, guarded the Deposito and vicinity during advance on the waterworks and has since occupied the line from the Deposito to Pulverin on San Juan River above bridge. No report in addition to the above.

The Wyoming battalion relieved the Twenty-third U. S. Infantry battalion February 8, and occupies the line from Deposito south to San Felipe on the Pasig River. No special report submitted or required.

Detachments of the Utah Light Artillery, under Captain Wedgewood, Lieutenant Gibbs, and Lieutenant Webb, rendered effective service throughout the operations, as more specifically explained in my original report. Their report has presumably been submitted direct to the division commander.

Very respectfully,

IRVING HALE,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST SOUTH DAKOTA INFANTRY, U. S. V.,
Blockhouse No. 4, Manila, P. I., February 7, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations in which this regiment was engaged on the night of February 4 and during the day of February 5, 1899:

At about 11 o'clock p. m. February 4, pursuant to instructions from Major-General MacArthur, I moved 8 companies of my regiment to the position assigned me on the left of Sampaloc Cemetery Church. Halted under the slope of the hill.

A report reaching me that my outpost had been partially driven in, I extended Companies F and I as skirmishers and pushed them through the brush lining the footpath leading to the outpost and followed them by Company H in column of fours as a support. The remaining 5 companies were held at the foot of the pathway in reserve.

I accompanied the advance and found the main party of the outpost extended as skirmishers near the ford of the small branch of the Esetero. Pressing all forward

we passed the line of observation of the outpost without meeting with opposition or firing a shot.

Placing Companies F and I and the outpost guard of 50 men along the pathway, I started for the telegraph office to inquire whether offensive action was contemplated. Meeting the brigade commander on the way I returned with him to the position held by the 2 companies above mentioned. He confirmed my dispositions and directed me to march the other 6 companies to the telegraph station and await orders. I did so, leaving Lieutenant-Colonel Stover and Adjutant Lien with the detachment.

At the telegraph station General Hale directed me to take the 6 companies back to their quarters, which I did about 1.45 a. m.

At about 2.45 a. m. the enemy opened a heavy fire on the position occupied by Companies F and I and the outpost detachment, killing Privates William G. Lowes and Fred E. Green and wounding Private Arthur E. Haskell, all of Company I. The fire was returned, but as the position of the enemy could not be clearly discerned it was soon stopped. The men were set at work intrenching themselves, using the tools furnished the outpost for policing purposes and their bayonets and meat cans. The working parties were frequently fired upon, but without effect. By daylight their position had been materially strengthened.

At 3 o'clock a. m., the firing at the outpost increasing, the 6 companies that had returned to their quarters were again turned out, and, by command of Major-General Otis, they returned to the place they had occupied a few hours before. I threw Company H along the pathway as a reenforcement to the troops already there. Major Howard accompanied this company and relieved Lieutenant-Colonel Stover, who, with the adjutant, reported back to me.

Company M was then extended, facing the blockhouse, behind a dike along the slope of the Sampaloc Cemetery Hill. Company A was extended along the front of the small plantation, and on the right of Company M. Company G was extended across the angle between the pathway leading to the outpost and the slope of the cemetery hill. Companies K and L were held in reserve under the slope of the hill.

The firing on the companies posted on the cemetery hill commenced as soon as they took their positions, and continued until the enemy was driven from the blockhouse.

The fire on the companies and the outpost at the end of the pathway was also continued, but no further casualties were sustained during the morning.

At 9.15 a. m., Captain Krayenbuhl, commissary of subsistence, U. S. V., brought an oral message from the brigade commander to the effect that if I thought it advisable he would drop 5 shells into the earthworks and 5 more into the blockhouse beyond, and that I might then order an attack on these two positions of the enemy if I thought such a course of action expedient. I replied that I thought it advisable to do so.

I placed Company L in the gap between Companies M and A and ordered Company K to cover the flank of the line in echelon on the right as soon as the advance should be made, and take the intrenchments as its objective.

After the seventh shot from the artillery I ordered the advance. The men charged the promontory, took the intrenchments, and continued across the swamp upon the blockhouse. Companies H, F, and I here cooperated and attacked the blockhouse on the flank. Moving steadily forward, we took the blockhouse and fired several volleys at the enemy, who was retreating through the undergrowth on the right front. This fire wounded four of the enemy, who were brought in and cared for by the surgeon. One afterwards died, and the other three were sent to the Reserve Hospital.

A Spaniard, who gave his name as Gabriel Fernandes Cespedes, was found in the blockhouse at the time of its capture. He was sent to the regimental guardhouse, Malacanan, his effects and correspondence being turned over to the governor-general.

Having received orders not to advance beyond the blockhouse, I placed 2 companies at the end of the pathway (the position occupied by Companies F and I and the outpost detachment during the night), kept 4 with me at the blockhouse, and sent 2 to hold the intrenchments on the promontory.

At 3 p. m. I received orders from Major-General MacArthur to form on the right of the Tenth Pennsylvania and attack.

I left Companies A, F, and L to cover the flank, and, placing Companies G, H, I, K, and M in extended order, began to advance. We moved forward some distance under fire without returning it, and it was not until we had crossed the sunken road in front of the old Spanish intrenchments, where the enemy's fire became more intense, that we seriously opened fire ourselves.

I made the halts of short duration and kept a steady advance, guide center, the center squad moving on the white dome of the Chinese Cemetery Church. I ordered a charge on the hurdled earthwork at the foot of the hill, where we dislodged a con-

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siderable number of the enemy. Our men went over it with cheers, driving the Filipinos before them and following so fast that they did not have time to get behind the cemetery walls. We killed over 40 of the fugitives. Our line ran up to the cemetery wall, part of the men going over it and part going around the flanks.

In this charge we lost 1 man killed (Private Horace J. McCracken, Company H) and 2 wounded (Private Frank T. McLain, Company G, and Private Hiram Fay, Company I).

The enemy having been driven from the church and cemetery, quickly evacuated the stone fort beyond.

I now formed the line on the right of the cemetery wall and advanced over the ravine, following the fleeing enemy with fire and halting under the slope beyond. During this advance we had 2 men wounded, Corpl. Eugene E. Stevens and Private Benjamin Phelps, Company K.

I then allowed the men to rest under the protection of the ridge for some minutes. Receiving word from Colonel Hawkins that he had orders to fall back, I fell back also.

The companies assembled on the right of the cemetery wall. Here I met Major-General MacArthur, who directed me to post my command as a strong line of outposts between the Pennsylvania and Colorado regiments.

The Major-General afterwards rode along the line and approved the dispositions. During these attacks every officer and man had the true spirit of the offensive, moving forward at command without hesitation, men and officers vying with each other in fearlessly exposing themselves. Most of the advance was made in quick time.

Where all showed gallantry, it is difficult to single out individuals for commendation. I can scarcely recall an example of gallantry on the part of one that I can not parallel on the part of another.

Very respectfully,

A. S. FROST,

Colonel First South Dakota Infantry, U. S. V.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST SOUTH DAKOTA INFANTRY, U. S. V.,
Blockhouse No. 4, Manila, P. I., February 14, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Second Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of this regiment since February 5, 1899.

On February 8, owing to the advance of the Colorado regiment, the front was corrected and all companies thrown from 50 to 150 yards to the front. The new positions were intrenched, lines of communication opened in rear, field of fire cleared, and ranges marked in front.

On February 10, 3 companies were moved to the left and occupied the intrenchments of the Pennsylvania regiment near the Chinese church, while 3 Pennsylvania companies were engaged in a demonstration toward the enemy's left flank. The companies returned to their places the same night.

On the afternoon of February 13, 2 companies of the Idaho regiment relieved 2 of the companies that had been left in the city as guards. These latter took position on the right of the regimental line, relieving the 2 left companies of the Colorado regiment.

In all other respects the regiment has performed the usual duties incidental to occupation of an intrenched line since the night of February 5, 1899.

Very respectfully,

A. S. FROST,

Colonel First South Dakota Infantry, U. S. V.

FIRST NEBRASKA U. S. VOLUNTEER INFANTRY,
Office of Commanding Officer, February 6, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

(Through military channels.)

SIR: I have the honor to report as follows respecting the action of the night of February 4, and morning, February 5, 1899:

At about half past 8 p. m., the guard in the village of Santol, about 200 yards southwest of Blockhouse No. 7, challenged 4 armed Filipinos, and ordered them to
Instead of doing so the Filipino patrol cocked their pieces. The sentinel

challenged again, and then, as the natives did not halt, but continued the advance, he fired. This was immediately replied to from Blockhouse No. 7, and in about fifteen minutes fire was opened on our camp. By this time we occupied the line of battle as previously arranged. Twelve men, under First Sergeant Curtis of Company C, were placed on a knoll east of camp to prevent crossing the river. Though a gallant fight was made here, it was impossible to prevent the crossing on the advance of the Filipinos, who were secreted in village west of the San Juan. Seeing that the camp was surrounded, I moved Company L, Captain Taylor, and M, Captain Wilson, back from the pipe line to the south of camp. Afterwards I sent for Company E, under Lieutenant Naracong, and asked for reinforcements, as our lines were too long. Here these Companies (L, M, and E) did most gallant work, penetrating the village and driving the men out of the convent. The Utah artillery, Lieutenant Webb's platoon, were stationed at McLeod's house, and went into action in the morning at daybreak, doing great execution, silencing the guns and driving back the enemy from the bridge, the powder magazine, blockhouse, and the convent. The work of this platoon and the one under Lieutenant Gibbs, with the Nordenfelt guns at the bridge, was very fine.

Our line had previously advanced, taking Blockhouse 6 and 7, where a great many Filipinos were killed by the splendid work of Companies K (Captain Kilian) and D (Captain Herpolsheimer). I then ordered the line to make a half turn to the right, where we could flank the powder magazine and roads. In the meantime Company B, under Lieutenant Wadsworth, Company G (Captain Forby), and Company H (Captain Eager), protected the advance of Company F, commanded by Lieutenant Gegner, across the San Juan River bridge. This work was executed with the coolness and precision of drill, and Major Mulford's entire battalion followed and cleaned the powder magazine. After this charge the center of their line was broken, although they fired on us and the Tennessee from the huts and bamboo, which was very gallant.

We made a last charge up the San Juan del Monte Hill and put the whole of their forces to flight. We occupied this place and raised our flag. They still did some firing from the bamboos and huts on our men, and I ordered Company I, under Lieutenant Smith, to occupy the eastern end of the wall of the Deposito and drive them off. This he did with the loss of 1 man.

Every man in this regiment rendered magnificent service. Besides the companies mentioned, Company C (Captain Hollingsworth) fought hard during the night.

The battalion of 2 companies of Colorado, under the command of Major Grove, did excellent and timely service, especially in the village southeast of camp. I inclose a copy of their report; also one of the officer in charge of the outpost where the first shot was fired, as well as copies of his orders, which he seems to have carried out.

The gunboat lent valuable assistance and seemed to be effective. Supplies were forwarded promptly and without friction. Medical attention excellent.

After we had occupied this place and were preparing for anything further, General Hale arrived and took command.

Very respectfully,

JOHN M. STOTSSENBERG,
Colonel First Nebraska, U. S. Volunteer Infantry.

CAMP SANTA MESA, February 3, 1899.

Lieutenant NARACONG, *Officer of Outpost:*

Do not make any trouble with armed Filipinos in the village. They have no right there, however. Our line is the line of blockhouses. Let matters rest until further orders. I wanted a written report from you that we could not occupy village with armed men without force. I want to send your report in.

JOHN M. STOTSSENBERG,
Colonel First Nebraska, U. S. Volunteer Infantry.

CAMP SANTA MESA, February 4, 1899.

Lieutenant STORCH, *Officer of Outpost:*

Replying to note just received. Your orders are to hold the village. If any armed men come into our lines order them out. If they persist in coming, summon enough men to arrest them. In case an advance in force is made, fall back to pipe-line outpost and resist occupation of village by all means in your power, calling on these headquarters for assistance. I have sent Sergeant Beahr over to arrange for a system of signals.

JOHN M. STOTSSENBERG,
Colonel First Nebraska, U. S. Volunteer Infantry.

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WATERWORKS DEPOSITO, *February 10, 1899.*

ADJUTANT, *First Nebraska, U. S. Volunteer Infantry.*

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of what occurred at Nebraska Outpost No. 2 on the evening of February 4, 1899:

On Saturday evening, February 4, 1899, at 7 o'clock, I took charge of Outpost No. 2, as ordered. From this outpost, about 100 yards down the road which passes it, is the town of Santol. Here we had a Cossack post of 8 men stationed at the junction of 3 roads, one leading from Outpost No. 2, another leading to Blockhouse No. 7, the third to Blockhouse No. 6. At 7.30 I instructed all the men of this post in their orders, a copy of which is hereto attached. They were to allow no armed insurgents to enter the town or the vicinity. They were to halt all armed persons who attempted to advance from the direction of the insurgents' lines, which lay between Blockhouses 6 and 7 and the San Juan Bridge, and order them back to their lines. If they refused to go, to arrest them if possible, or if this was impossible, to fire upon them. I also ordered them to patrol each of the roads leading to Blockhouses 6 and 7 for 100 yards every half hour. Shortly before 8 o'clock a patrol of 3 men advanced from Santol toward Blockhouse 7. After proceeding about 100 yards they halted at the side of the road and waited to see if there were any insurgents in the vicinity. Private William Grayson, Company D, was a short distance in advance of the other two. After waiting about five minutes, Private Grayson saw 4 armed men suddenly appear 5 yards in advance of him. He immediately called "Halt!" as did also Private Miller, Company D, who was in rear of him and saw the men at the same time. At this command the 4 men cocked their pieces, whereupon Private Grayson called "Halt!" again and fired at them. Our 3 men then retreated to the town of Santol, where I met them, being at the town when the shot was fired.

Immediately after the shot was fired we could hear the insurgents coming down the road from Blockhouse 7. I sent a man back to the outpost to signal the Nebraska camp that the insurgents were coming from the blockhouse. I remained with the man in Santol and in about three minutes from the time our man fired the shot several armed men emerged from the trees in our front across the road and the houses on our right and fired toward us where we were kneeling in the opposite side of the road. We returned their fire with a volley and then fell back along the road to the pipe line which lies near Outpost No. 2, the enemy keeping up a rapid fire along the road for about five minutes. We fired no more after leaving Santol until later in the evening.

About ten minutes after the skirmish at Santol the insurgents opened up a general fire on the Nebraska camp and outposts, and also on Colorado's outpost, on our left.

On the morning of February 4 the insurgents ordered our men to move out of town (Santol), and upon their refusal to do so the former said that they would bring a body of men and drive them back when night came.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

BURT D. WHEEDON,

Second Lieutenant Company C, First Nebraska, U. S. Volunteer Infantry.

FIELD ORDERS, }
No. 1. } CAMP AT DEPOSITO,

February 5, 1899.

All burning of buildings, without authority, is strictly prohibited. No looting will be permitted under any circumstances.

JOHN M. STOTSENBURG, *Colonel.*

FIELD ORDERS, }
No. 2. } CAMP AT DEPOSITO,

February 6, 1899.

Following is disposition of troops of this command in case of an advance:

I. Tennessee battalion leave 1 company at river and occupy position on line opposite San Pedro Macate, on south side of Pasig River. One company will flank the town on this side. Other 2 companies to get on line of advance guard in line of skirmishers. Signal for advance given.

II. Colorado will be on your left; use caution; no looting.

STOTSENBURG, *Colonel.*

(Major CHEATHAM.)

II. Colorado will connect with Tennessee on its right and form part of the advance guard, deployed in line of skirmishers. They will cover and protect the right of the plumn, at about 400 yards.

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY. 465

This battalion will connect on its left with advance guard of the First Nebraska, and in case of no resistance will occupy line of hills west of waterworks. Use caution; no looting.

(Major GROVE.)

III. The First Nebraska Regiment will be disposed as follows:

(a) First Battalion, except Company A, will form the support and will advance along the waterworks road, at 400 yards' distance from the advance guard. Flankers will be thrown out to the right and left.

(b) The Second and Third Battalions will form a reserve at a distance of 600 yards from the support. Companies K and D will deploy to left of advance guard in line of skirmishers.

(c) The artillery will be between the Second and Third Battalions, First Nebraska.

(d) Intrenching tools will be taken along with the advance guard.

(e) The hill west of the waterworks will mark the general line of resistance.

IV. It is reported that the enemy is intrenched on the hills west of the waterworks. Company L will march in column of fours in rear of advance guard.

In case severe resistance is encountered, the hills west of the waterworks will be intrenched and the enemy will be shelled.

I will be with the reserve.

STOTSENBURG, Colonel.

SANTA MESA, February 5, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Second Division, Eighth Army Corps:

We can not possibly help General Anderson as far up as San Pedro Macate. Only thing can help there is gunboat.

STOTSENBURG, Colonel.

CAMP AT DEPOSITO, February 6, 1899.

Captain WILSON:

Telegraph provost-marshal-general about these prisoners. You had better keep them tied together. Do not hurt them.

STOTSENBURG, Colonel.

CAMP AT DEPOSITO, February 6, 1899—6 a. m.

COMMANDING OFFICER TENNESSEE BATTALION:

Have 3 companies get ready for an advance. Leave 1 company on guard where you are. Put on strong Cossack between your position and this place. Please report to me here in person, at your earliest convenience, for fuller instructions.

JOHN M. STOTSENBURG, Colonel.

This is merely preliminary to a further advance, if made.

CAMP AT DEPOSITO, February 6, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Second Brigade, Second Division:

Should have waterworks before they can concentrate. Believe can take and hold waterworks and have command of Mariquina with troops I now have. Respectfully suggest trial. Part of Tennessee regiment to hold point opposite San Pedro Macate, in river. Main body hold hill above waterworks, left hold hill overlooking Mariquina. Leave 40 men here, 1 company at convent, 1 company at forks of road; take 8 companies on. Have men who can handle machinery if necessary.

STOTSENBURG, Colonel.

CAMP AT DEPOSITO, February 6, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Second Brigade, Second Division:

Have 4 pieces of artillery—two 3.2-inch guns, 2 Nordenfelts; 2 companies of Colorado infantry; battalion of Tennessee; 10 companies, my regiment.

STOTSENBURG, Colonel.

CAMP AT DEPOSITO, February 6, 1899.

Captain WILSON:

Your company will guard camp. Put a guard over canteen if necessary. Relieve present guard and, if they are able, have them follow us and join at once here.

J. M. STOTSENBURG, Colonel.

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CAMP AT DEPOSITO, *February 6, 1899.*

Captain HOLLINGSWORTH:

Your company will join here at once. Leave sick and disabled in camp.

J. M. STOTSENBURG, *Colonel.*

CAMP AT DEPOSITO, *February 6, 1899.*

COMPANIES A AND M:

Following disposition of troops: M remain in camp and keep up small outpost at river and on road; patrol to Blockhouse No. 7. A hold Blockhouse 7 and remainder here.

STOTSENBURG, *Colonel.*

FEBRUARY 6, 1899.

Major EASTWICK:

You will remain on our line of communications. Put 1 company at Deposito, 1st powder magazine, and other 2 on guard along the line. You will find water and camping places outdoors on road. Patrol and guard the pipe.

STOTSENBURG, *Colonel.*

PUMPING STATION, *February 6, 1899.*

Major GOODALE:

Please advance along Mariquina road to hill above Mariquina. If necessary, intrench the hill. Try to keep touch with our left. Do not commit your men to mercy of town after dark on account of fire from houses.

STOTSENBURG, *Colonel.*

CAMP DEPOSITO, *February 6, 1899.*

Captain WILSON:

Send out search party and bury all Filipino dead. Deploy a platoon in line of skirmishers and have ground thoroughly hunted over. Number and mark graves; count all their dead.

STOTSENBURG, *Colonel.*

PUMPING STATION, *February 6, 1899.*

Captains KILLIAN and HERPOLSHEIMER:

Companies K and D are to occupy convent, where Tennessee are now, by General Hale's order.

STOTSENBURG, *Colonel.*

PUMPING STATION, *February 6, 1899.*

CAMP OFFICER, *Deposito:*

Let Tennessee have coffee and lunch. Send us out things to carry water in.

STOTSENBURG, *Colonel.*

GUARD AT BRIDGE:

Order to prevent men passing bridge is revoked.

STOTSENBURG, *Colonel.*

FEBRUARY 6, 1899—4.45 o'clock p. m.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Second Brigade, Second Division:

Captured waterworks. Seem to be all right.

STOTSENBURG, *Colonel.*

WATERWORKS PUMPING STATION, *February 6, 1899.*

Engines and pumps here disabled. Cylinder heads gone.

STOTSENBURG, *Colonel.*

PUMPING STATION, *February 6, 1899.*

CAMP OFFICER, OREGON COMPANY:

You will patrol out the road to Mariquina as far as you can reach safely.

STOTSENBURG, *Colonel.*

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY. 467

PUMPING STATION, *February 7, 1899.*

Captain TAYLOR:

Have your company ready to move down here. Report to me at once, yourself. Send me 2 men.

STOTSENBURG, *Colonel.*

CAMP AT PUMPING STATION, *February 7, 1899.*

CAMP OFFICER, *Oregon:*

Get your companies ready to move. Await orders.

STOTSENBURG, *Colonel.*

PUMPING STATION, *February 7, 1899.*

Major GROVE, *First Colorado:*

Please have your men stop all shooting at chickens or anything but known enemy. Do not allow them to destroy any private property under any circumstances.

STOTSENBURG, *Colonel First Nebraska.*

CAMP DEPOSITO, *February 7, 1899.*

All foraging and unnecessary shooting will be stopped immediately. Battalion and company commanders will see that this order is obeyed strictly.

STOTSENBURG, *Colonel.*

PUMPING STATION, *February 8, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Second Brigade, Second Division:

Large bodies of Filipino insurgents, armed and equipped, moving toward Pasig. Recommend sending gunboat to Pasig to prevent crossing. Seem to be concentrating south of Pasig.

STOTSENBURG, *Colonel.*

FIELD HEADQUARTERS FIRST REGIMENT COLORADO INFANTRY, U. S. V.,
Manila, P. I., February 14, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Second Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: In compliance with your instructions of this day, I have the honor to submit herewith a report of the operations of this regiment since February 4.

On the evening of February 4, at the hour of about 9 o'clock, our attention was directed to the heavy fire which was apparently from our line of outposts near the Balic Balic burying ground. The regiment was hastily formed, but before a formation could be effected the firing ceased. Just about this time Lieut. Charles Haughwout was slightly wounded in the right knee at the regimental headquarters, No. 68 Calle Alix. He had gone upstairs to get ready to accompany the troops to the front and was standing by his bed near the front door when the shot came in and struck him. He was only slightly wounded, and is again on duty with collector of internal revenue. As no message came in from the officer in command of the outpost for that night no movement was made at this time, but orders were given to the company commanders to remain in readiness for any emergency. About an hour later firing was again resumed, and 2 battalions, of 6 companies, of the regiment were hurried forward to our line of outposts to the east and west of the Calle Balic Balic and about 50 yards in front of the Balic Balic burying ground. The First Battalion, consisting of Companies F, G, and E, were posted to the right of the Calle Balic Balic, in front of Blockhouse No. 6. The Second Battalion, consisting of Companies B, K, and L, were posted to the left of the Calle Balic Balic, in front of Blockhouse No. 5, and extending to the brow of the hill toward Blockhouse No. 4. These troops were in position about 10.30 o'clock. In the meantime the firing had practically ceased, and no offensive movement was made by either of the battalions at this time. Shortly after these positions were taken up, however, the firing was again resumed by the insurgents and was replied to by all of the companies on the line.

About 2.30 o'clock in the morning Companies I and D, under Major Grove, reported to me at the telegraph station on the Calle Balic Balic, where they remained until about 3 o'clock in the morning, when, by direction of the brigade commander, they were sent to reinforce Colonel Stotsenburg, of the First Nebraska. About 4 o'clock in the morning heavy firing was resumed by the insurgents all along the front of this regiment, which fire was replied to at intervals by the companies on the

line. Two guns of Battery A, Utah Light Artillery, had reported for duty at this portion of the line and were posted in the nearest corner of the Balic Balic burying ground. The firing was kept up steadily by the insurgents from about 4 o'clock a. m. until daylight, when I directed Captain Wedgewood, who was in command of the battery, to open fire on their posts at Blockhouses 4 and 5. This fire was maintained at intervals by the battery until about 7.45 a. m., and we succeeded in dislodging the insurgents from several well-chosen positions, both at Blockhouse No. 4 and No. 5. Early in the morning it was decided to make an advance on Blockhouse No. 5, and Companies L, K, and B of the Second Battalion were put in position for the charge. At 8.10 a. m. this battalion, with Major Anderson in command, was sent forward against Blockhouse No. 5, I personally accompanying the line. Company E, of the First Battalion, which had been stationed on the high knoll just to the right of the Calle Balic Balic, went forward at the same time and assisted materially in driving the insurgents out of the village just in front of the blockhouse, and then turned to the right and flanked Blockhouse No. 6. Companies F and G, under Lieutenant-Colonel Moses, advanced shortly after the movement of the Second Battalion and assisted the troops of the First Nebraska in capturing Blockhouse No. 6. After the insurgents had been driven out of Blockhouses Nos. 5 and 6, we moved steadily forward about half a mile and drove the remaining insurgents from the hill and into the brush, when both battalions were withdrawn to the line of the blockhouses, according to the orders I had previously received from the brigade commander. At Blockhouse No. 5 we found 27 dead and 11 wounded Filipinos; 24 were buried in one trench to the rear and right of Blockhouse No. 5, 2 were buried in separate graves along the Calle Balic Balic in the rear of Blockhouse No. 5, and 1 in separate grave to the front of Blockhouse No. 5, near brow of the hill, close to the Calle Balic Balic. At Blockhouse 6, 15 Filipinos were buried in one trench.

Our casualties in this charge were Private Charles Carlson, Company L, killed; Private Boyce, Company L, wounded in left knee; Private Weaver, Company B, wounded in left hip; Private Morrison, Company B, slight wound in left hand; Private Parkhurst, Company B, slight wound in stomach.

The position on line of blockhouses was maintained by this regiment until Monday afternoon, when we moved forward about 800 yards to the brow of the hill and occupied a much stronger position. Our left rests about midway between Blockhouses 4 and 5 and about 800 yards in advance of the line of blockhouses. From here we follow the brow of the hill to the Calle Balic Balic, where we swing back again to the line extending along to Blockhouse 6 and to a point midway between Blockhouses 6 and 7. The 2 guns of Battery A, Utah Artillery, were moved forward at the same time, and are now posted at a point about 800 yards in advance of Blockhouse 5 and slightly to the right of it, just to the left of the Calle Balic Balic.

Companies I and D, under Major Grove, reported promptly to Colonel Stotsenburg and were in position on the right of his line close to the Pasig River. Here they remained under heavy fire from the insurgents on the other side of the river until about 9 o'clock in the morning. At this point Private E. F. Doran, Company I, was killed about 8 o'clock a. m., and Corpl. William H. Erle, of Company I, was slightly wounded in the face. At 9 o'clock Colonel Stotsenburg directed Major Grove to move his 2 companies to the left of his line in front of Blockhouse No. 7 and assist in the capture of this blockhouse. The companies arrived, however, just after the blockhouse had been captured. Major Grove moved forward with these two companies and joined Colonel Stotsenburg in the attack on the Pulverin across the San Juan River, and in crossing the river at the bridge at the Pulverin Private Cass White, Company D, was shot through the head and fell into the river. His body was not recovered until Tuesday morning. Five other men went through the bridge at this point, which gave way, and there being no other way to cross Major Grove advanced with 14 men and assisted in the capture of the Deposito. The remainder of Companies I and D rejoined Major Grove at the Deposito about 12 o'clock.

On Monday, at 1 o'clock p. m., Major Grove advanced with these 2 companies toward the waterworks, which were reached and captured about 4.30 o'clock in the afternoon. Search was at once instituted by Major Grove to locate the missing parts of the engine, which had been removed by the insurgents, and these were found Tuesday morning by Artificer Hays of Company I. The men of these two companies at once commenced cleaning up the engines and missing parts and late in the evening had the engine ready for operation and fire under the boiler. Major Grove remained at the waterworks with Companies I and D until Wednesday afternoon, when he was relieved and rejoined his regiment.

The position taken on the afternoon of February 6 remained the same until the morning of February 14, when 2 companies were withdrawn from the left of the line, and our lines extended to include the country between our right and the San Juan River, on a line extended southeast from Blockhouse 7. We relieved 1 company of

the Second Oregon on the right, being relieved by 2 companies of the First South Dakota on the left. The line now established commences at a point about one-third of the distance from Blockhouse 5 to Blockhouse 4 and about 800 yards in advance of the line of blockhouses. We follow the brow of the hill from this point to where the Calle Balic Balic intersects our line in front of and to the right of Blockhouse No. 5. From this point the line swings back to the southwest until we intersect the line of blockhouses, which line is followed through Blockhouses 6 and 7 and to the San Juan River. The position or the line occupied by the regiment has been strongly entrenched throughout its entire length.

No offensive movement has been made by the regiment since February 5. The country between our front and the San Juan River as far to the north as San Francisco del Monte has been thoroughly reconnoitered, no armed insurgents being found in this portion of the territory. On February 13 I, in company with Majors Kimball, Anderson, and Grove, crossed the San Juan River and followed the course of this river north to San Francisco del Monte, for the purpose of locating open country through which troops might be moved. After leaving the road which leads to the waterworks, we went off through the country and found it almost impassable on account of the thick and heavy undergrowth. However, in case of necessity the regiment might be moved in this direction.

Ten companies of the regiment are now located on the line which we are holding, each company in the rear of that portion of the line which they are expected to defend. This leaves 2 companies of the regiment in reserve in barracks and the companies on the line are frequently changed, in order to allow the men to rest up, bathe, and change clothes. The manner in which the work given them to do was performed by the officers and men of this regiment is highly satisfactory to myself. The men showed the courage and dash of veterans and the work was done quickly and well. I also desire to express my appreciation of the service of the 2 guns of Battery A under Captain Wedgewood.

Our list of casualties is as follows: Killed: Privates Charles Carlson, Company L; E. F. Doran, Company I, and Cass White, Company D. Wounded: First Lieut. Charles Haughwout; Privates Boyse, Company L; Weaver, Company B; Morrison, Company B, and Parkhurst, Company B; Corpl. William G. Erle, Company I.

Very respectfully,

HENRY B. MCCOY,
Colonel First Regiment Colorado Infantry, U. S. V.

MANILA, P. I., February 8, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Second Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to report the movements of the First Battalion Twenty-third U. S. Infantry, under my command, during the past three days, as follows:

At about 10 o'clock a. m., February 6, I received instructions from Lieutenant-Colonel French, commanding the regiment, to have the battalion formed at noon with "200 rounds of ammunition and three days' rations on the person of each man, and blankets rolled with shelter tents inside."

Company B, Lieut. R. R. Stevens, was substituted for Company C.

At 1 o'clock p. m. we were conducted by Captain Brooks, of General Hale's staff, to the Deposito, about 1 mile beyond the camp of the First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. V., where I arrived at about 2 o'clock, where I received the following from Colonel Stotsenburg:

"Major GOODALE:

"Please advance along Mariquina road to hill above Mariquina. If necessary intrench the hill. Try to keep touch with our left. Do not commit your men to mercy of town after dark on account of fire from houses."

Learning that General Hale was on the road and soon to arrive I waited a short time for him. I received no change of instructions from the general, and got away at 3 o'clock p. m., still under the guidance of Captain Brooks. Captain Sulzer, quartermaster's department, and Second Lieutenant Haine, First California Heavy Artillery, overtook me on the road and offered their services for anything I might have for them to do. I proceeded with an advance and rear guard, and 1 company in skirmish line on each side of the road, well extended to cover as much ground as possible, and as rapidly as the nature of the ground would admit, examining houses to see that no armed Filipinos were concealed.

About 2 miles beyond the Deposito an occasional Filipino was seen in the distance. One was certainly shot, as he fell and was seen to be carried off by two comrades. At 6 o'clock it was about dark and we were about 1½ miles from the Mariquir--

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River. At 6.30 o'clock, as we were descending a gentle slope about one-half mile from the river, we suddenly received a volley from about 100 rifles at 300 yards. Most of my men were under fire, but less than half could return the same. I ordered the line to lie down and fire at will, which they lost no time in doing. The firing on both sides was very brisk for about ten minutes. As a part of my line was in a very exposed position, I used the first hill in retiring to a strong position I had observed about 75 yards back.

Owing in part to the darkness, and still more to poor marksmanship, there were no casualties in my command. Even then it is very strange there were not, as many bullets struck the ground along the line, and especially so on the road where I was located. Two men were barely scratched and several had hat or clothing cut.

It being dark and not knowing the ground, I awaited in a strong position until day. During most of the night the enemy could be heard throwing up intrenchments. I requested Lieutenant Haine to go in and represent the situation to General Hale and ask for more ammunition, as considerable had been expended during the afternoon and evening, and, if practicable, a field piece and some reinforcements. A prisoner had informed me that there were 200 soldiers in front and 300 a short distance down the river. In the course of the night one platoon of Captain Barber's company, Second Oregon Infantry, under Second Lieutenant Sutton, reported to me, and the remainder of the company next day.

At about 2 o'clock a. m., February 7, Lieutenant Perry, of General Hale's staff, arrived with instructions to fall back to the Deposito. Learning that these instructions were given upon wrong impressions obtained from Lieutenant Haine as to the situation, Lieutenant Perry took the responsibility of permitting me to remain until General Hale could be heard from. During the night there were several alarms, not all false, as 1 armed Filipino was killed by the rear guard.

General Hale arrived at about 10 o'clock a. m., just before the receipt of a letter of instructions, of which the following is a copy :

HDQRS. SECOND BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., February 7, 1898.

Major GOODALE,
Commanding Battalion, Twenty-third Infantry :


This will be handed you by commanding officer of Oregon company, of which 1 platoon was sent you last night, who will take out remainder of company with a supply of water on cart or otherwise, and report to you. Can not spare any more.

Use your own judgment as to how to use this company, but would prefer that instead of extending at once to right to connect with Stotsenburg you envelop the right of insurgents in front of you and cut off their retreat to north, forcing them toward Stotsenburg and the river. Am sending him orders to send 2 companies toward you to assist in this capture, keeping well to west so as not to fire into you. Caution your troops against firing into them. See sketch below. Will get out there soon as possible. This will be given to Oregon officer for his instructions and handed by him to you.

IRVING HALE,
Brigadier-General Commanding.

Will telegraph your regiment to send 10,000 rounds additional ammunition to Deposito for you to draw on if necessary, but think you have plenty for anything that will arise.

I. H.



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From this time the General took personal direction, and the plan as indicated in letter was followed. Stevens, Company B, and Stritsinger, Company M, were sent to the north by a detour to envelop the enemy's right, while Lieutenant Moore, with Company K, and Schley, with Company I, went to the right. Barber's company, Second Oregon, acted as reserve, and 2 companies of the First Nebraska, which had arrived, were sent to extreme right. The movement was successfully executed, but no enemy other than a few stragglers could be found.

The command advanced up the river with an extended skirmish line to and through the town opposite Mariquina, crossed by ford and footbridge, and then down through Mariquina to a ford opposite the waterworks, where the battalion remained for the night. Nearly every house was deserted and showed a white flag. No armed Filipinos were seen on the east side of the river. It was reported they had fled to the mountains near by. But 3 Filipinos were known to be killed and 1 captured. If any were killed or wounded during the skirmish of the previous evening they were removed.

My battalion remained at the waterworks until 2 o'clock p. m. to-day, when orders were received from the brigade commander to return to Manila, where we arrived at 5.15 o'clock p. m.

I wish to mention the valuable services of Captain Brooks, who remained with me throughout.

The officers and men—few, if any, of whom had ever before been under fire—behaved in an admirable manner.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. A. GOODALE,
Major, Twenty-third Infantry, Commanding First Battalion.

[Inclosure 43.]

HDQRS. SECOND BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., February 17, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

STR: I have the honor to inclose copies of reports of Colonel Stotsenburg, First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. V., on operations of his regiment and attached troops on February 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10, to accompany my report of operations of the brigade dated February 10.

In connection with the report on the advance to waterworks on February 6, the following additional correspondence and circumstances are submitted:

Considering it desirable to get possession of the waterworks at the earliest possible moment I sent the following telegram to General MacArthur, commanding Second Division, on the morning of February 6:

"Recommend that remainder of Tennessee regiment be assigned to my brigade. Regiment to be used to take and hold waterworks. The road between Deposito and waterworks can be thoroughly guarded by Tennessee and Nebraska."

Soon after sending the above message, Colonel Stotsenburg's telegram "A," attached to this report, was delivered to me, and I replied as follows:

"Have already recommended assigning remainder of Tennessee regiment to brigade to be used in taking and holding waterworks and road to same. We might do it with present force, but it would make a weak line. Will advise you later if authority obtained."

Learning that General MacArthur was at the Chinese hospital, I started for that place to confer with him on this and other matters, but finding that he had gone to department headquarters, followed him there, found him in consultation with General Otis, was informed that a battalion, Twenty-third U. S. Infantry, and a battalion, Second Oregon Volunteer Infantry, had been detailed to assist in the waterworks movement, and was instructed to take charge of same. I therefore sent Captain Brooks, adjutant-general of the brigade, to conduct these battalions to the Deposito, and telegraphed Colonel Stotsenburg as follows:

"One battalion, Twenty-third, 1 battalion, Oregon, will report to you at once to be used with 1 battalion of your regiment and 2 guns to take and hold the waterworks. Have your battalion and guns ready by the time they arrive, so as to proceed at once. I will be at the Deposito within an hour. Colonel Barry will not go out."

I then started for the Deposito, going via the Chinese hospital and South Dakota and Colorado portion of the line to inspect their positions. Arrived at Deposito just after the 2 battalions and found that Colonel Stotsenburg had already started with his

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other troops, and that, as he had left no instructions for the Twenty-third and Oregon battalions, Captain Brooks had gone after him to ascertain his wishes. In a short time Captain Brooks returned with the notes of instruction to Major Goodale and Major Eastwick, attached to Colonel Stotsenburg's report. As Major Goodale, of the Twenty-third Battalion, was not familiar with the country, I explained it to him on the map, directed his advance guard to extend well to the right of the road to keep in touch as far as practicable with Colonel Stotsenburg's left wing, and sent Captain Brooks with him. I followed Colonel Stotsenburg's command, catching it about halfway to the waterworks.

The remaining incidents of the advance on the waterworks and the occupation of Mariquina next day by the Twenty-third Battalion, with 2 companies Nebraska and 1 company Oregon, were fully given in my report dated February 10.

Very respectfully,

IRVING HALE,
Brigadier-General Commanding.

FIRST NEBRASKA U. S. VOLUNTEER INFANTRY,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER,
Waterworks, Deposito, February 7, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Second Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to report that early Monday morning, February 6, 1899, I sent the telegram appended, marked "A," to brigade and division headquarters. Having had no reply, I again urged the importance of the movement. I was then instructed by General MacArthur, who was then on the extreme left of the line, to forward my communications to the department commander direct, a copy of which is inclosed and marked "B." In reply to this I received a note from Colonel Barry stating that he would be out with 2 battalions and that we would then proceed to the waterworks.

As nothing seemed to be done and it was impossible to get into communication with higher authority, and the insurgents were intrenching and massing in our front, I ordered the troops prepared for an immediate advance, hoping to have every preparation made before the enemy could get into position. A copy of this order is inclosed, marked "C." At about 1 o'clock I received a message from Colonel Barry saying that he would not be out, and about the same time the enemy's sharpshooters began firing upon us. Here I ordered the Utah battery to open fire on intrenched position north of road and about three-fourths of a mile from the Deposito. The action then began to be general all along our entire front, and the infantry fire was terrific on our left, near the Mariquina-Manila road. We charged on them and took hill after hill all the way to pumping station. About three-fourths of a mile from the Deposito a horse with a broken leg was found, which proved to have been the one ridden by Dr. H. A. Young, of the Utah battery. His body was found horribly mutilated a mile farther on the road.

On our left, about 2 miles from the Deposito, Company L, Captain Taylor, made a very gallant charge on a stone intrenchment and could not take the position at first. I thought the Twenty-third Infantry was up, but as Company L seemed to be falling back I ordered over 3 companies, B, G, and H, of this regiment to reinforce the line. They all charged a quarry, our troops losing 1 man killed and 4 wounded. The enemy broke and as they retreated out of the cover into the open they were severely handled, 17 being killed. After that they were shelled and flanked out of every position and kept on the run. The line of their retreat was the direction of Mariquina. At 4.45 we arrived at the pumping station and found the machinery intact, except the cylinder and valves, which had been hidden under the coal.

Companies D and I of the First Colorado, under Major Grove, did valuable service on the right during the advance.

The Tennessee battalion, under Major Cheatham, formed our right flank and was slightly refused.

As usual, the Utah battery (A) did most excellent service.

The battalion of the Twenty-third Infantry on our left followed the general direction of the Mariquina-Manila road and protected our left flank. I inclose copy of the order I sent Major Goodale, who received it near the powder magazine.

We threw outposts to the front, left, and right and put one company at the pumping station.

Very respectfully,

JOHN M. STOTSENBURG,
Colonel First Nebraska U. S. Volunteer Infantry.

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY. 473

A.

FIRST NEBRASKA,

Camp at Deposito, February 6, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Second Brigade, Second Division:

Should have waterworks before they can concentrate. Believe can take and hold waterworks and have command of Mariquina with troops I now have. Respectfully suggest trial. Part of Tennessee regiment to hold point opposite San Pedro Macati, on river. Main body hold hill above waterworks; left hold hill overlooking Mariquina. Leave 40 men here, 1 company at convent, 1 company at forks of road, take 8 companies on. Have men who can handle machinery there, if necessary.

STOTSENBURG, *Colonel First Nebraska.*

B.

FIRST NEBRASKA INFANTRY, *February 6, 1899.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Department of Pacific.

SIR: Having been directed by General MacArthur, who is on extreme left of line, to forward communication direct, I have the honor to report that I think should have waterworks before they concentrate. Believe can take and hold waterworks and have command of Mariquina road with troops I now have. Respectfully suggest trial. Part of Tennessee regiment to hold point opposite San Pedro Macati, on river. Main body hold hill overlooking Mariquina. Leave 40 men here, 1 company at convent, 1 company at forks of road, take 8 companies on. I have men who can handle the machinery there, if necessary.

Very respectfully,

J. M. STOTSENBURG,

Colonel First Nebraska U. S. Volunteer Infantry.

FIELD ORDERS, }
No. 1. }

FIRST NEBRASKA U. S. VOLUNTEER INFANTRY,
Camp at Deposito, February 6, 1899.

All burning of buildings without authority is strictly prohibited. No looting will be permitted under any circumstances.

JOHN M. STOTSENBURG, *Colonel.*

C.

FIELD ORDERS, }
No. 2. }

PUMPING STATION, *February 6, 1899.*

The following is the disposition of the troops of this command in case of an advance:

I. The Tennessee battalion leave 1 company at river and occupy position on line opposite San Pedro Macati on south side of Pasig River. One company will flank the town on this side. Other 2 companies to get on line of advance guard in line of skirmishers. Signal for advance given.

II. The Colorados will be on your left. Use caution. No looting.

III. Colorados will connect with the Tennessee on its right and form part of the advance guard deployed in line of skirmishers. They will cover and protect the right of the column at about 400 yards. This battalion will connect on its left with the advance guard of the First Nebraska, and in case of no resistance will occupy hills west of the waterworks.

IV. The First Nebraska Regiment will be disposed as follows:

(a) First Battalion, except Company A, will form the support and will advance along the waterworks road at 400 yards distance from the advance guard. Flankers will be thrown out to the right and left.

(b) The Second and Third battalions will form a reserve at a distance of 600 yards from the support. K and D will deploy to left of advance guard in line of skirmishers.

(c) The artillery will be between the Second and Third battalions, First Nebraska.

(d) Intrenching tools will be taken along with the advance guard.

(e) The hills west of the waterworks will mark the general line of resistance.

V. It is reported that the enemy is intrenched on the hills west of waterworks. Company L will march in column of fours in rear of advance guard on left of road and 300 yards from it. In case of resistance the hills west of the waterworks will be intrenched and the enemy shelled.

I will be with the reserve.

By order:

JOHN M. STOTSENBURG,

Colonel First Nebraska U. S. Volunteer Infantry.

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FIRST NEBRASKA INFANTRY, U. S. V.,
Pumping Station, February 6, 1899.

Major GOODALE:

Please advance along Mariquina road to hill above Mariquina. If necessary, intrench the hill. Try to keep touch with our left. Do not commit your men to mercy of town after dark on account of fire from houses.

STOTSENBERG.

FEBRUARY 6, 1899.

Major EASTWICK:

You will remain on our line of communications. Put 1 company at Deposito, 1 powder magazine, and other 2 on guard along this line. You will find water and camping places outdoors on road. Patrol and guard the pipe.

STOTSENBERG.

CAMP AT DEPOSITO, *February 6, 1899.*

Captain WILSON:

Your company will guard camp. Put a guard over canteen if necessary. Relieve present guard and, if they are able, have them follow us and join at once here.

J. M. STOTSENBERG.

CAMP AT DEPOSITO, *February 6, 1899.*

Captain HOLLINGWORTH:

Your company will join here at once. Leave sick and disabled in camp.

J. M. STOTSENBERG, *Colonel.*

PUMPING STATION, *February 6, 1899.*

Captains KILLIAN and HERPOLSHEIMER:

Companies K and D are to occupy convent, where Tennessee are now by General Hale's order.

STOTSENBERG.

FIRST NEBRASKA U. S. VOLUNTEER INFANTRY,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER,
Pumping Station, February 7, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Brigade, Second Division.

SIR: I have the honor to state that I reported with 2 companies (B and L) to Brigadier-General Hale, and we scouted from the northwest down through Mariquina. I also sent 2 companies (H and E) to the rear, between the Mariquina and pumping-station road, to hunt out sharpshooters and bury the dead. This was done without any further incident.

Very respectfully,

JOHN M. STOTSENBERG,
Colonel First Nebraska U. S. Volunteer Infantry.

FIRST NEBRASKA U. S. VOLUNTEER INFANTRY,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER,
Pumping Station, February 8, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Brigade, Second Division.

SIR: I have the honor to report that I took 3 companies of my regiment and followed the trail of the retreating insurgents through Cainta and beyond Tay Tay, both of which places surrendered to me. The insurgents had passed through these towns the day before and had executed the president of Cainta because he desired to surrender to our forces. No insurgents were seen, but there was every indication that they had continued their retreat to the mountains near Antipolo. Many men, women, and children were returning toward Pasig. All their homes in Santolan Valley.

The road was generally good. Telegraph line to Pasig. The stream shown on the map was found to be very deep, but narrow. Crossed on roads by stone bridges; otherwise impassable. People seemed friendly.

Very respectfully,

JOHN M. STOTSENBERG,
Colonel First Nebraska, U. S. V.

FIRST NEBRASKA U. S. VOLUNTEER INFANTRY,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER,
Pumping Station, February 9, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Brigade, Second Division.

SIR: I have the honor to report that I sent Captain Taylor and 12 men to make reconnaissance from this place north to Mariquina and thence to Taytay. They have

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY. 475

seen nothing of armed insurgents, but met a great many natives, especially old men and women and children carrying white flags. They claim that their army has gone to the mountains.

Very respectfully,

JOHN M. STOTSENBURG,
Colonel First Nebraska U. S. Volunteer Infantry.

PUMPING STATION, February 9, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to state that I ordered two reconnaissances, one to San Mateo and one east to foothills.

Very respectfully,

JOHN M. STOTSENBURG,
Colonel First Nebraska U. S. Volunteer Infantry.

FIRST NEBRASKA U. S. VOLUNTEER INFANTRY,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER,
Pumping Station, February 10, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Brigade, Second Division.

SIR: I have the honor to state that this regiment did usual reconnaissance duty toward the north and east, but did not find any signs of insurgent troops. People were moving in every direction on the plain with household goods, etc., in their possession. Some were going away and some returning to their homes.

Very respectfully,

JOHN M. STOTSENBURG,
Colonel First Nebraska U. S. Volunteer Infantry.

[Inclosure 44.]

HDQRS. SECOND BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., February 19, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to inclose reports from Colonel Stotsenburg, First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, on operations of his command on February 12, 14, and 15.

Very respectfully,

IRVING HALE,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

FIRST NEBRASKA U. S. VOLUNTEER INFANTRY,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER,
Pumping Station, February 12, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to report that last night I had reports of a train of caromettas going toward Antipolo from the northwest. I sent out a scouting party of 12 men and an officer, and then followed it up with 3 companies, as the distance when first seen was underestimated. We went to a large stream which was impassable for our commands. Three small parties crossed it, but although they went a mile farther they could not reach the road in the dark on account of another stream which we could not ford or cross. The train was composed of caribou carts, caromettas, and quileses, and were from about 9 p. m. until 2 a. m. There seemed to be no armed escort with them.

Very respectfully,

JOHN M. STOTSENBURG,
Colonel First Nebraska U. S. Volunteer Infantry.

FIRST NEBRASKA U. S. VOLUNTEER INFANTRY,
OFFICE OF COMMANDING OFFICER,
Pumping Station, February 14, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to report that everything has been quiet in this vicinity to-day. The troops have been employed in strengthening our position with intrenchments.

This regiment is distributed as follows: (See diagram on sheet attached. Company M is in the old camp at Santa Mesa.)

IN THE FIELD,
Deposito Pumping Station Road, February 15, 1899.

Sir: I have the honor to submit the following report:
About 8 a. m. I sent Lieutenant Moore with 15 men of my company to return to place where he had seen a Filipino force yesterday and find out its probable strength and what they were doing. En route they were joined by 5 more men, who asked to go with them. Lieutenant Moore states that he was advancing carefully in advance-guard formation, when they ran into about 20 insurgents, at 10 o'clock. They exchanged several shots, when the insurgents were reinforced by a company of 50 or 60 insurgents. The patrol retreated slowly about 80 rods, when the patrol found a secure position and forced the natives to retreat. At that time I came up with a support. As the insurgents were then retreating and had gone so far, and had disappeared, I did not deem it well to pursue them farther. As we advanced we found 2 natives mortally wounded and secured a Remington rifle and a sword from them.

I would mention the following men of Company H, First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. V., for very meritorious conduct, viz:

Very respectfully,

A hand-drawn map of a desert landscape. A winding road starts at a 'Pumping Station' (a small square with a vertical line) on the right, goes left, then turns north and then west. Along the road, there are labels for 'Cal.' (California) and 'Co.' (Colorado). A 'Bluff' is marked on the road. A dashed line represents a boundary, with 'Oregon' and 'Idaho' labeled above it. A 'Deposito' (a small square with a circle) is labeled near the top left. A 'Meriquina Road' is labeled on the right. A north arrow points upwards at the top center.

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY. 477

[Inclosure 45.]

HDQRS. SECOND BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., February 19, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to inclose copy of report from Colonel Stotsenburg, First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. Volunteers, on engagement between a portion of his command and a party of insurgents which attacked a patrol sent out from his outpost.

Very respectfully,

IRVING HALE,
Brigadier-General Commanding.

FIRST NEBRASKA, U. S. VOLUNTEER INFANTRY,
OFFICE OF COMMANDING OFFICER,
Pumping Station, February 17, 1899.

Captain HOLDEMAN, Commanding Outpost:

Send Sergeant Todd and 3 to 6 men out to make reconnoissance about 2 or 3 miles to northwest.

They should find the beginning of a road here going to Naraliches and watch it for four or five hours. To do this properly men should travel in brush and ravines and not be seen. This last very important.

J. M. STOTSENBURG,
Colonel First Nebraska, U. S. Volunteer Infantry.

A true copy.

H. L. ARCHER,
First Lieutenant and Adjutant.

PUMPING STATION, February 17, 1899.

ADJUTANT FIRST NEBRASKA, U. S. V.

SIR: I, Sergeant Poor, Company A, First Nebraska, in charge of the outpost upon the Mariquina road, at a point commanding the hills west of that town, have the honor to make the following report of an encounter with a band of some 50 armed natives, at about 11.30 o'clock this morning:

Pursuant to orders from the officers in command, I, with Corporal Boynton and 4 men, all of Company A, proceeded for a distance of 3½ miles northwest of the outpost for the purpose of making a reconnoissance. We advanced with the utmost caution, but were discovered by several natives in white, and also carrying a white flag. Upon seeing us they turned from their course and ran to a house in a clump of trees, from which we were subsequently fired upon. We halted under cover to consider their unusual actions, while I advanced to reconnoiter. I saw that a hostile line of natives was being extended to cover us, with the bamboo as a center. They advanced under cover of bushes and the ridges of the fields as though to flank us. As I hurried back to my detachment the natives opened fire, but we, without reply, retreated, bearing to our right. At this time the line, which was firing upon us, was not more than 200 yards distant. In a few minutes we encountered two squads of insurgents, who, at a distance of 200 yards, had effected a blockade of our retreat. We charged across the open of the rice fields toward them, pausing behind the ridges to give them volleys in reply to the fire which gallingly crossed us. Our fire was to such good effect that we scattered the flanking party, killing or wounding 3 or 4, and broke through the surrounding line. With this we made to the Mariquina road, and thanks to our use of cover, without loss or injury. At the road we met the advance line of the regiment coming to our support.

While the party which attacked us was not large, its disposition and action seemed to indicate a vanguard to a greater command. We saw no women or noncombatants in the vicinity. Nearly every bamboo shack or domestic inclosure floated a white rag.

Obediently, your servant,

WALTER POOR.

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FIRST NEBRASKA INFANTRY, U. S. V.,
OFFICE OF COMMANDING OFFICER,
Pumping Station, February 17, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to report that at about 11.40 a. m. I heard heavy firing north-west of this place about 2 miles; it seemed to be principally Mausers.

I ordered Companies C and F to go at once to the outpost on the Mariquina road and reenforce the company on duty there if necessary. I followed immediately with Companies E and G and left orders for Company I to follow.

About three-fourths of a mile north of the Mariquina road I found Company A deployed and a large force of Filipinos in a strong position in their front. I should estimate there were about 200 insurgents in the position. Seeing that it was impossible to carry the place by a direct attack, it was turned with Company F and part of Company G. This movement was successfully executed, bringing us out in rear of the insurgents, who were lying on the rocks firing at the remainder of our line. We killed 1 officer and 8 men here and the enemy retreated. Although we flanked their position, their line overlapped ours and they had a flanking fire on some of our men. They made two more stands after this, but we drove them out. We followed them through a deserted village and then San Francisco del Monte and broke up their organization. Part of their forces returned to Mariquina afterwards without arms.

We had 2 officers and 6 men wounded. I saw 8 men and 1 officer of the insurgents killed in one place. Four were severely wounded and took 2 prisoners.

We could not take their wounded in, but dressed their wounds, hung a white flag over them, and left them water. We did not get in with our wounded until dark.

I especially invite attention to Sergeant Poor's report. I gave him his orders when I inspected the outpost at 10 a. m.

The movement seemed to be either a concentration on the part of the insurgents to attack our outpost or make a night attack on the Deposito or our line.

Very respectfully,

JOHN M. STOTSENBURG,
Colonel First Nebraska, U. S. Volunteer Infantry.

[Inclosure 46.]

HDQRS. SECOND BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., February 22, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to inclose report of Colonel Stotsenburg, First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. V., concerning threatened attack on his outpost, consisting of 1 company on the Mariquina road about a mile north of the camp at water works.

The following are the principal telegrams that passed on the subject:

CAMP STOTSENBURG, February 19, 1899—10.30 p. m.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL SECOND DIVISION:

Company on Mariquina road report insurgents trying to surround them.

STOTSENBURG.

DEPOSITO, February 19, 1899—10.40 p. m.

Colonel STOTSENBURG, Pump Station:

Take two or three companies and go yourself with them to support company on Mariquina road. Important to hold position, but avoid as far as practicable a serious engagement at night, and if you drive them off, do not pursue farther than necessary.

HALE, Brigadier-General.

CAMP STOTSENBURG, February 19, 1899—10.45 p. m.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, SECOND BRIGADE:

Insurgents trying to surround our outposts on Mariquina road. I advise bringing up one of the Oregon, as it can be done under cover and we might be able to deceive them. Have given orders for my company to withdraw slightly.

STOTSENBURG.

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY. 479

DEPOSITO, February 19, 1899—10.50 p. m.

Colonel STOTSENBURG, *Pumping Station*:

Second message received. Hardly consider it desirable to bring up Oregon company along Mariquina road at night to attack insurgents who are surrounding your company, as our troops might fire into each other. Object is not so much to capture insurgents to-night as to safely hold position.

HALE, *Brigadier-General*.

The above correspondence was repeated to division headquarters with inquiry as to whether it was satisfactory, to which the following reply was received:

CALOOCAN, February 19, 1899—11.15 p. m.

General HALE:

Your instructions to Stotsenburg entirely satisfactory to General MacArthur.

STRONG, *Assistant Adjutant-General*.

CAMP STOTSENBURG, February 19, 1899—11.05 p. m.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL SECOND BRIGADE:

Have ordered out 2 Nordenfelts and platoon to support them. Have also sent to investigate fully. Will take 3 companies soon as I hear fully how situation is.

STOTSENBURG, *Colonel*.

The latter telegram was repeated to division headquarters.

CAMP STOTSENBURG, February 20, 1899—10.06 a. m.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL SECOND BRIGADE:

Everything quiet here. It was between here and Mariquina road that advance was reported.

STOTSENBURG, *Colonel*.

This telegram was repeated to division headquarters.

DEPOSITO, February 20, 1899—6.55 a. m.

Colonel STOTSENBURG, *Pump Station*:

Telegraph full particulars cause last night's scare on Mariquina road.

HALE, *Brigadier-General*.

PUMPING STATION, February 20, 1899—7.36 a. m.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL SECOND BRIGADE:

Scare last night caused by outpost reporting natives from Mariquina trying to cut them off from this camp. Three shots were fired by natives, probably sharpshooters. Couldn't see anything further. Just before that large parties of insurgents formed east of Mariquina and between there and Cainta. If anything was intended last night I suppose they were reconnoitering our position. Are you coming out?

STOTSENBURG, *Colonel*.

This telegram was repeated to division headquarters.

While this demonstration did not result seriously, the insurgents will probably annoy this outpost frequently in this manner, and it is very desirable to stop it without having to turn out a force at night whenever they attempt it. I therefore told Colonel Stotsenburg, with the consent of the division commander, that whenever the insurgents make any demonstration against the Mariquina outpost he can throw a few shrapnel into Mariquina around the insurgent headquarters, which is visible from our battery. It is hoped that the insurgents will notice the coincidence of events and cease these demonstrations.

Very respectfully,

IRVING HALE,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

FIRST NEBRASKA U. S. VOLUNTEER INFANTRY,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER,
Pumping Station, February 20, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Second Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to report that last night about 10.20 the outpost on the Mariquina road reported that there was an armed body of Filipinos north of their posi-

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tion, and also that a force was trying to penetrate between their outpost and camp. I reported the fact and at the same time sent out 1 company and 2 Nordenfolt guns. We could not see any further advance, but in a short time after I had returned to camp I heard six shots. Three were in our direction. After that there was no further disturbance by shooting; but in the morning about 75 armed Filipinos withdrew from the front of our outpost and went toward Mariquina. These men wore white uniforms generally.

All day yesterday large parties of Filipinos in white gathered green corn from the field near Mariquina and carried it toward the mountains.

Toward evening about 600 native troops in uniform and armed were seen near Cainta, evidently resting or going into bivouac. We fired four times at them with the artillery. What effect it had we could not see.

Very respectfully,

JOHN M. STOTSENBURG,
Colonel First Nebraska U. S. Volunteer Infantry.

[Inclosure 47.]

HDQRS. SECOND BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., February 23, 1899.

ADJUTANT GENERAL,
Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to inclose report of Colonel Stotsenburg, First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. V., and report of Captain Eager, same regiment, on skirmish with a body of insurgents south of road from Deposito to pumping station on February 20. It is quite probable that these were the insurgent troops driven out of this district across river from Guadalupe by troops of the First Division on this day.

Very respectfully,

IRVING HALE,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

FIRST NEBRASKA U. S. VOLUNTEER INFANTRY,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER,
Pumping Station, February 21, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to inclose herewith the report of Capt. Frank D. Eager, Company H, First Nebraska U. S. V.

Please note the size of the force, and also the fact that 2 insurgents were killed and their arms secured, instead of 1, as reported by the regimental adjutant.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN M. STOTSENBURG,
Colonel First Nebraska U. S. Volunteer Infantry.

FIRST NEBRASKA U. S. VOLUNTEER INFANTRY,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER,

In camp between Deposito and Pumping Station, February 20, 1899.

ADJUTANT FIRST NEBRASKA U. S. V.:

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report:

At about 2.30 p. m. Captain Ough, First Nebraska U. S. V., reported a body of insurgents in force moving in a direction southwest of my camp, and that he had moved Company B, First Nebraska U. S. V., southward to encounter them. I immediately formed Company H, First Nebraska, U. S. V., and moved southwest, connecting with the left of Company B. A small body of insurgents were seen in our front and the two companies were moved forward for nearly half a mile, when a large body of insurgents was encountered. Several volleys were exchanged, when another body of the enemy opened a vigorous volley fire upon our left flank.

As we were in an open field, without shelter, we withdrew for about 50 yards, up a ravine, to a higher and more commanding position. Several volleys were fired from this position. The insurgents then withdrew in a southeasterly direction. It was too late and the men were exhausted, both companies returned to camp.

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On the point to which H and B withdrew Company E, First Nebraska U. S. V., were formed in line of skirmishers, occupying the right of the position.

The number of insurgents encountered was probably 200, with a much stronger force along a bamboo hedge, nearly half a mile farther south. In this encounter it was noticeable that the insurgents fired by volley. Their bugle sounded two calls.

Two insurgents were found dead and two Remington rifles, a bolo, and about 200 rounds of ammunition were secured.

No injuries on our side.

Very respectfully,

FRANK D. EAGER,
Captain, First Nebraska U. S. Volunteer Infantry, Commanding Company H.

[Inclosure 48.]

HDQRS. SECOND BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., February 24, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to inclose reports of Colonel Stotsenburg, First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. V.; Major Foote, First Battalion Wyoming Infantry, U. S. V.; and Captain and Assistant Surgeon Black, First North Dakota Infantry, U. S. V., in charge of ambulance, concerning a combined movement to drive out and if possible capture a body of insurgents which had been located south of waterworks road for a couple of days and was evidently intending some demonstration against our troops along the road.

The following are some of the principal telegrams concerning plan and preliminary arrangements:

BLOCKHOUSE, NEBRASKA HEADQUARTERS,
February 21, 1899—6.52 p. m.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL SECOND BRIGADE:

Report just received from Company H outpost, stating that the same party, about 200 strong, are in bamboo about 1 mile south of our post, where they were yesterday. They are about 2 miles front of San Felipe.

STOTSENBURG, Colonel.

HDQRS. SECOND BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION,
February 21, 1899—7.45 p. m.

Colonel STOTSENBURG:

Better watch party of insurgents closely during night, and if remain there move before daylight 4 companies and 2 Nordenfelts if practicable on their east side, driving them back toward San Felipe, where, with cooperation of Wyoming and your company at Deposito, they can be destroyed or captured. Keep me informed of developments during night.

HALE, Brigadier-General.

CALOOCAN, February 21, 1899—9.15 p. m.

General HALE:

Your dispatch regarding insurgents in front of Colonel Stotsenburg received, and your action very satisfactory. Can you reach the gunboat and give them information so that they can cooperate intelligently?

MACARTHUR.

DEPOSITO, February 21, 1899—10 p. m.

Colonel STOTSENBURG, Pump Station:

Just arrived. Find telegram from General MacArthur approving proposed plan. Are there any new developments? What arrangements have you made? If you will have your Companies H and B move south and attack while your 4 companies on east take them in flank, causing them to retreat, probably southwest toward Guadalupe, I will have Wyoming companies move forward and catch them as they come. Caution all companies to be careful not to fire into each other, and to be sure what they are shooting at.

HALE, Brigadier-General.

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DEPOSITO, *February 21, 1899—11.30 p. m.*

Major Foote, *Wyoming, San Felipe:*

Planning to capture insurgents south of waterworks road about daybreak. Have your companies breakfasted and ready to move by 4 a. m. sharp. Your 4 companies are to move forward toward Guadalupe, toward which Stotsenburg will drive them, and take them as they come. Will send staff officer at 4 a. m. with map and full instructions.

HALE, *Brigadier-General.*

BLOCKHOUSE, CAMP STOTSENBURG, *February 21, 1899—11.55 p. m.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL SECOND BRIGADE:

Sergeant just reports reconnoiter their main position, which is about 2½ miles south of road. Their outposts are out now about where ours are in daytime. All he is sure of seeing there is 2 companies. He saw these in uniform and moving about.

STOTSENBURG, *Colonel.*

The captains of Nebraska Companies B and H on road, and E and G near Deposito (latter 2 in reserve), were sent for and carefully instructed by myself at Deposito.

BLOCKHOUSE, CAMP STOTSENBURG, *February 22, 1899—3.45 a. m.*

General HALE:

We are just starting now.

STOTSENBURG, *Colonel.*

SAN FELIPE CHURCH, *February 22, 1899—4.25 a. m.*

General HALE, *Deposito:*

Have seen Major Foote and his 3 left companies. Everything seems to be understood. Captain Young said to be at end of road, so I will be able to see him.

PERRY, *Aid.*

SAN FELIPE CHURCH, *February 22, 1899—5.25 a. m.*

General HALE:

Gunboat crippled. Can not cooperate.

PERRY.

At 6.15 a. m. firing began in Wyoming battalion, southwest of Deposito. (See Major Foote's report for particulars).

At 6.35 a. m. heavy firing began in Nebraska companies southeast of Deposito, and continued with slight intermissions until 7.30 a. m. (See Colonel Stotsenburg's report for particulars.)

Although the design of surrounding the insurgents, cutting them off from Pasig, forcing them toward Guadalupe and the Wyoming battalion and destroying or capturing them was not accomplished on account of their change in position and attack (apparently by another party) on Colonel Stotsenburg's left, compelling him to attack them in front instead of in flank, they were, nevertheless, severely defeated and scattered, and this locality has been practically free from any hostile demonstrations since; whereas if they had been let alone they would undoubtedly have greatly annoyed, and, perhaps, seriously attacked our thin line along the waterworks road. The result of the expedition was, therefore, very satisfactory.

Very respectfully,

IRVING HALE,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

FIRST NEBRASKA U. S. VOLUNTEER INFANTRY,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER,
Pumping Station, Manila, P. I., February 22, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Second Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the action in which part of the First Nebraska U. S. Volunteer Infantry, consisting of Company K (Captain Kilian), Company D (Captain Herpolsheimer), Company L (Captain Taylor), Company F (Captain Jens), and Company H (Captain Eager) was engaged this morning in accordance with General Hale's instructions. We left camp at 3.30 a. m. and

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reached the position we expected to occupy and to find the Filipinos at daylight, about 6 a. m.

We started to occupy our supposed proper position, when Wyoming, I suppose, opened fire. Thinking this was Companies B and H of the Nebraska regiment, we moved toward the southwest by the flank and tried to get in rear of the insurgents, as planned. As the firing did not seem to get nearer and the fog was quite heavy in the draws we could not find the two companies from the road, but continued to work toward the southwest, hoping to envelop party who were firing that we decided must be in the quarry. As we moved in this direction we came out on a plowed field. Three volleys from Mausers were fired at us at about 200 yards range. Luckily they were high or we would have been ambushed. I ordered the men to lie down and then tried to extend to the right by moving on right into line and envelop their flank and turn them toward the Deposito. I found this to be impossible, and as they tried to charge us, giving the command "Sigae," "Sigae," they started to charge, but after two volleys from us the charge failed. We had either to retire under heavy fire or drive them toward the Santalon River. This we did without the loss of a man, and forced them across the river, and they seemed by the men in the camp fleeing across the flat toward Taytay and Cainta.

As we retired toward camp fire was opened on us from the village of Santalon and the bamboo across the river and by others on this side in houses and on the stacks.

In this fire Private John Alley was shot in the neck and probably mortally wounded. The other men were merely scratched and came into camp by themselves.

The Filipinos followed our litter bearers almost into camp and had to be kept off by the litter bearers and hospital attendants. (See inclosed report.)

We would not have had a man hurt if the men in white had not opened fire from the village and houses on this side which are decorated with white flags.

We killed 19 insurgents, including 1 lieutenant.

Very respectfully,

JOHN M. STOTSENBURG,
Colonel, First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. V., Commanding.

—

AMBULANCE STATION, Waterworks, February 22, 1899.

Col. J. M. STOTSENBURG,
Commanding First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. V.

SIR: I have the honor to respectfully submit the following report of the courage and coolness displayed by members of the Ambulance Corps and enlisted men of your regiment assisting them in carrying the wounded from the field under a very severe fire directed upon them by our humane (?) enemies, who were dressed in white and to all intents—and evidently purpose—the so-called "amigo."

Retiring during yesterday's fight from a thick growth of bamboo with two wounded men, we were fired upon on coming into the open by a party of natives dressed as above stated. They were not more than 150 yards from us and advancing, and we were the only Americans in that immediate vicinity. I had two Hospital Corps privates and my orderly, and they were assisted by enlisted men. There was no way to get out except in the direct line of fire and over an open rice field for about 250 yards before cover could be found. Eight men not carrying litters were ordered to lie down and hold the advancing natives until the litters were in safety, and I ordered the litters across the field at double time. These eight held the position and kept the natives until the litters were under cover, and then came across the fields themselves under a terrific fire. The natives were then within 75 yards of them, and I counted 15 of them.

I would respectfully recommend for your favorable consideration the following men:

Privates Coleman, Vallery, and Carter, Hospital Corps, U. S. A.; Sergeant Hedgecock, Company H, First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. V.; Sergeant Thomas, Company K, First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. V.; Private Bates, Company D, First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. V.; Private McIlnay, Company D, First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. V.; Private Tucker, Company D, First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. V.; Private Grayson, Company D, First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. V.; Private Boyle, Company D, First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. V.; Private Brown, Company H, First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. V.

Several men whose names are unknown to me are entitled to great praise.

I am, sir, very respectfully and obediently,

NELSON M. BLACK,
*Captain and Assistant Surgeon, First North Dakota Infantry, U. S. V.,
In Charge of Ambulances.*

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SAN FELIPE CHURCH, *February 22, 1899.*

Brigadier-General HALE.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the action taken by the Wyoming battalion on February 22, 1899:

The battalion left the church at 4.30 a. m., and arrived in position indicated by your map at daybreak. About 7 o'clock I advanced the line about one-quarter of a mile farther up the river to occupy a ridge. At this place Companies C, F, and H were fired upon by quite a body of insurgents (50 or more) to our right and front, as well as from sharpshooters in our front. Company G was on extreme right near the river, and in this advance suddenly came upon the insurgents, about 50 in number, who opened fire on them at 30 yards. The fire on both sides was extremely sharp for a half hour. There were 3 insurgents killed and several wounded; unable to know definitely on account of thick underbrush. Companies C, F, and H were fired on by about 12 or 15 sharpshooters from a house on the opposite ridge from that occupied by my men. Quite a number of well-directed volleys fired by these companies dislodged them and drove them farther up the river. At 11.45 received your order to return to headquarters. Arrived at 12.30 p. m.

Very respectfully,

FRANK M. FOOTE.

Major, First Wyoming Infantry, U. S. V.

[Inclosure 49.]

HDQRS. SECOND BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., February 25, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to inclose copy of report of Colonel Frost, First South Dakota Infantry, U. S. V., concerning engagement of his command northeast of Blockhouses 3 and 4 with insurgents from vicinity of San Francisco del Monte, who attacked his line on the forenoon of February 23.

In the afternoon of same date, it being reported that the insurgents were again massing in the woods in front of South Dakota and left of Colorado, and were placing outposts opposite ours, I directed Colonel Frost to place 1 Utah gun southeast of sunken road, and Colonel McCoy, First Colorado, to move one of his Utah guns to left of his line, from both of which places San Francisco del Monte church can be plainly seen, and throw a few shrapnel into the woods occupied by the insurgents (which would probably drive them back into San Francisco del Monte, known to be a rendezvous for a considerable force), and then fire shrapnel into the vicinity of the church. This was done with apparent good effect, as insurgents did scarcely any firing during that night or since.

Very respectfully,

IRVING HALE,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

HDQRS. FIRST SOUTH DAKOTA INFANTRY, U. S. V.,
Blockhouse No. 4, Manila, P. I., February 24, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the engagement of the 23d instant, when this regiment repulsed an attack by Filipinos.

At 7.30 a. m., hearing heavy firing upon my left, I hurried in that direction and met an orderly who brought a report that about 500 of the enemy were advancing in a skirmish line.

I went to the left and, seeing that the enemy's left flank was exposed, sent Companies A, B, and the band up the valley opposite Blockhouse No. 4 to deploy along the crest of the ridge on its left, thus taking the enemy in flank. This movement was successfully executed, and the enemy soon fell back and began to move toward his left behind the fringe of woods.

Companies A, B, and the band were then withdrawn to the intrenchments. After a short lull the enemy renewed his fire, this time on my right front, sweeping the ground formerly occupied by the flanking companies. He made an advance of a few hundred yards, but soon retired and at noon had withdrawn from the field.

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At about 9 a. m. Company G, on my extreme right, was withdrawn and placed in my left center, a company of the Colorado regiment taking its place. Company G returned to its old place about noon. The Colorado company fired a number of volleys at the enemy during his second attack.

The left of my line was commanded by Maj. Charles A. Howard, this regiment, who displayed coolness and good sense in his control of the fire. At the second attack he moved 1 gun of the Utah battery to the right of the sunken road, where it was able to do some effective work. The artillery in the front of the Colorado regiment also did good work in the second attack.

Capt. A. L. Fuller and A. B. Sessions, and Adjutant Jonas H. Lien, who commanded the flanking party deserve commendation for the promptness with which they grasped the situation and took advantage of it.

In the first attack 3 men of Company M—Private Eide, Musician Hultberg, and Sergeant Smith—and 1 of Company B—Private Tobin—were wounded.

In the second attack Private Felker, Company C, was killed.

Very respectfully,

A. S. FROST,

Colonel First South Dakota Infantry, U. S. V.

[Inclosure 50.]

HDQRS. SECOND BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., February 26, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to inclose copy of report of Major Mulford, First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. V., with indorsement by Colonel Stotsenburg, concerning reconnaissance in the vicinity of Mariquina, attack by insurgents and natives dressed in white from Mariquina and village south of same, and burning of latter.

Very respectfully,

IRVING HALE,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

FIRST NEBRASKA U. S. VOLUNTEER INFANTRY, *February 26, 1899.*

ADJUTANT, FIRST NEBRASKA INFANTRY, U. S. V.

SIR: I have the honor to report that about 1.30 p. m. to-day the sentry on lookout reported that he had noticed a body of a dozen Filipinos stop and turn back 3 carromatos in succession on the road leading from the south into Mariquina. I took about a dozen men, under Sergeant Murdock, and went down with the intention of investigating the occurrence. Upon reaching the corner of the village where the road runs into the village I left 3 men, with instructions to watch the village, and if any insurgent soldiers were seen in the village to report same, and also sent Sergeant Murdock up through the village for the same purpose, with instructions to come out at the north end of the village. Taking the rest of the party I went along north up the western edge of plain, and when about half way up the village struck out east across the plain, having waited a while for Sergeant Murdock to report, and he having reported that although a great number of natives were sitting around in the houses no soldiers had been seen. The party continued east until the creek was reached, and having seen nothing suspicious north or south struck out to work back, but noticing a house half a mile southwest with several men moving around it, first went over there and were about to sit down and rest a while when Filipino soldiers, were observed crossing the plain from north end of Mariquina, and also coming down the plain from the north, as well as coming west from the foothills across the creek. Almost at the same time a large number of natives dressed in white came out from Mariquina and ran for the stacks of straw in the vicinity.

Suspecting that an attempt was to be made to cut off the party, I at once directed that we move back toward camp, but as soon as we started fire was opened upon us from the stacks, from the village, from ridges north of us, and from the edge of the creek northeast of us. We at once returned the fire, at the same time working over to the west and kept up a scattering fire, at the same time working west and keeping as much under cover as possible. The enemy advanced at one time to about 500 yards, when the artillery from the hill opened fire and the enemy at once ceased to advance and began to retire. Our party then began to advance, as we saw a company in the distance coming to our support. The enemy by this time had got about 1,000 yards away, and our party then advanced to Mariquina again, where the three

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men reported that a large number of natives had run out from the village dressed in white, had gone to the straw stacks and then opened fire, evidently having had arms concealed in the stacks. The scouting party again went through Mariquina up to the northeast corner and found a small party of insurgents about 400 yards distant and opened fire and drove them back out of range, after which the party started south again through the village.

When reaching the southern end of the village it was found to be in flames, and upon inquiry it was reported to me that the natives had set fire to it themselves.

I have the honor to state that our party did nothing to provoke any attack and did not fire until fired upon; also that at least of about 200 advancing upon us from three sides 100 were all in white; also that a great many shots were fired out of houses along the eastern edge of the village, from which are floating white flags.

Very respectfully,

H. B. MULFORD,

Major, First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. V.

NOTE.—Colonel Stotsenburg says that "village" mentioned throughout report refers to the village of native huts at south edge of Mariquina.—I. H.

[Inclosure 51.]

HEADQUARTERS BATTALION UTAH LIGHT ARTILLERY,
Caloocan, P. I., February 15, 1899.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Headquarters Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to submit a report of artillery operations in this division since the night of February 4, 1899.

At that date there were under my command Batteries B and A, Utah Light Artillery, commanded, respectively, by Captains Grant and Wedgwood. Each had 4 3.2-inch B. L. steel rifles (model 1891), and 2 57 mm. Maxim-Nordenfeldt guns (1897), captured from the Spanish August 13, 1898. This was the only artillery in the division.

At the opening of hostilities on the night named I was directed by the division commander to carry out the prearranged plan; accordingly, I dispatched Captain Wedgwood with 2 3.2-inch rifles to the Sampaloc cemetery, there to cooperate with the Colorado regiment; Captain Grant with 3 3.2-inch rifles to Calle San Lazarus, there to cooperate in the forward movement of the Tenth Pennsylvania Regiment up that street with 2 guns, and to leave the third gun at Bilibid prison in reserve; and Lieutenant Seaman, Battery B, with 1 3.2-inch rifle, to the Caloocan road, Tondo, to cooperate with the Kansas regiment. Lieutenant Webb, Battery A, was stationed at the time at the Nebraska camp with 2 3.2-inch rifles. Lieutenant Naylor, with detachment, was stationed on board the river gunboat *Laguna de Bay*, in charge of the Gatlings. I personally reported to the division commander on Calle Iris, and was soon ordered to send a second gun to support Lieutenant Seaman on the Caloocan road. I conducted this gun personally to the position then occupied by our forces, which was about 1,000 yards in advance of our previous outpost position. The gun was one of the Maxim-Nordenfeldts. These guns were served throughout the night from their position in the road—the only available site.

A heavy fire was poured in by the enemy at frequent intervals during the night, their advance approaching occasionally to within 150 yards of our position. They used some artillery from an intrenched position farther up the road, and fired about 15 solid shots into our lines. One of their shots struck down a couple of banana trees 10 feet in rear and immediately to the right of our right gun. Our guns used shell and shrapnel, most of the latter being punched at short ranges. Corporal Wardlaw and Private Peter Anderson were wounded at this position in the road while serving their guns, neither very seriously. On the succeeding day these guns advanced under Lieutenant Seaman along with the firing line of the advancing infantry, and were served under a galling fire. They were of great value in the charge on the insurgent intrenchments near the Spanish Blockhouse No. 1. After the enemy was driven from this position the 3.2-inch gun was advanced to a position on the Caloocan road opposite the blockhouse named, on the firing infantry line. There it was intrenched and remained until the advance on Caloocan February 10, frequently being brought into action to assist the Kansas regiment in repelling the insurgent attacks on their position. The Maxim-Nordenfeldt was moved February 6 to a position at Blockhouse No. 2, near the Binondo cemetery. The 3.2-inch gun under

Lieutenant Seaman was employed during the attack on Caloocan as long as possible and until it was imprudent to fire longer on account of the advancing infantry. It would have been impossible to take the gun along the road at the time of the advance on account of the flames from the burning houses on both sides of the road. About 9 p. m. February 10, however, the gun was pulled forward through the town of Caloocan to an advanced position on the Kansas line; subsequently, February 11, the gun was drawn back, placed in position on a hillside near the residence of Mr. Higgins, north of Caloocan, so as to command the causeway between Caloocan and Malabon. Here the gun, with a platoon of the Sixth Artillery, and a 3.6-inch mortar, under Corporal Boshard, Battery B, Utah Light Artillery, all under immediate command of Lieutenant Fleming, Sixth U. S. Artillery, remained heavily intrenched.

I am satisfied that no troops during this advance have performed more dangerous service than these detachments under Lieutenant Seaman in their perilous progress up the Caloocan road; too much, therefore, in my judgment, can not be said in praise of their intrepidity and efficiency. (Lieutenant Seaman's detailed report is appended).

Two guns of the Sixth United States Artillery under Second Lieut. Adrian S. Fleming, Sixth United States Artillery, reported for duty with the division early in the afternoon of February 10, and were assigned a favorable position on the Montana line, with a view up the railroad track of a number of railroad buildings in Caloocan, of a section of the insurgent trenches, and of a gun which the insurgents had disembarked from the cars, but had not prepared an emplacement for, the gun being situated near the railroad shops.

During the advance on Caloocan this platoon did very accurate and effective work under a heavy small-arm fire from the enemy. The morning of the 11th the guns were moved to the intrenchment in Caloocan previously mentioned, where they now remain.

In addition to these two guns, the Utah gun, and the mortar, a fifth gun (Hotchkiss mountain cannon, caliber 1.65) has been placed near the Higgins residence with a command of the railway track for about 2,500 yards to the north. It has been necessary to use these guns on several occasions to suppress annoying sharpshooters; in each instance their use has proven to be very effective.

During the construction of the larger intrenchments at Caloocan Private C. S. Hill, Battery B, and Lieut. George A. Seaman, Battery B, were wounded by the enemy, the former being shot in the back, the latter through the flesh of the calf, neither wound being serious. Hill was sitting down within the work when shot and Lieutenant Seaman was outside directing a party who were strengthening the parapet. (Detailed report of Lieutenant Fleming annexed.)

Captain Grant (with Lieutenant Critchlow) and 2 pieces advanced with the Tenth Pennsylvania regiment on the night of February 4 to a position near a small cemetery near the San Lazarus Hospital. Here he intrenched and awaited daylight, firing during the night only a few shots as occasion seemed to demand. From this position he shelled the Chinese hospital, the Chinese cemetery, and the Binondo cemetery, where the insurgents were making a stubborn resistance to the advance of the Montana and Pennsylvania regiments. Excellent shooting was done, the enemy dislodged, and the advance of the infantry rendered comparatively easy. From advanced positions on the crossroad to the Chinese hospital at Lico, and at the Chinese hospital, the 2 guns, now supplemented by the third gun from Bilibid, under First Sergeant Hines, rendered valuable aid in dislodging the enemy from the high ground occupied by the cemeteries.

After the Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Montana regiments, and the Third United States Artillery (armed as infantry) had, with Grant's assistance, dislodged the insurgents from the ridges the guns were hurried forward to an advanced position near the Binondo cemetery, where they were serviceable in driving the enemy from scattered positions beyond the infantry skirmish line. These 3 guns were placed in position at an angle of the cemetery wall (Binondo cemetery) behind embasures constructed and formerly occupied by the Spanish.

February 6 the Nordenfeldt, from Lieutenant Seaman's command, with a second from the barracks, manned by a section of Battery A, were intrenched near the Spanish stone Blockhouse No. 2 and placed under command of Lieutenant Critchlow. A 3.6-inch rifled mortar was procured from the arsenal, Manila, and placed in position near Captain Grant's 3.2-inch rifles. These 6 guns were employed at various times, February 6 to 9, in repelling attacks on the Kansas regiment, shelling groups of sharpshooters, etc.

The advance on Caloocan, February 10, was preceded by thirty minutes' cannonading by the navy and the 9 guns on the left of our position. Grant's and Critchlow's guns had as targets the woods in advance of the Kansas and Montana regi-

ments, the insurgents' trenches near the railway track south of Calocan, the Calocan church and convent, the railway shops and station, the cemetery, the town generally, the rifle pits in advance of the town, and the woods on the right of the open plain. Extremely accurate work was done; one of the best shots of the campaign was at a party throwing up earthworks at the cemetery gate, the left side of the gate having been destroyed at an estimated range of 2,600 yards by the first shell.

Shrapnel fire proved to be very efficacious at a range of 2,000 yards in driving back a party which advanced fearlessly from the right to attack a flanking party under command of Major Bell, U. S. Volunteer Engineers.

The 3.2-inch rifles remain at the Binondo Cemetery church, the 2 Nordenfeldts, under Lieutenant Critchlow, having been placed in a new position to the front of the South Dakota position near Blockhouse No. 4.

Corporal Peterson, Battery B, was shot through the flesh of the leg at Binondo Church February 9. (Captain Grant's report is appended.)

Captain Wedgwood, with 2 guns of his battery, reached Sampaloc Cemetery in good time on the night of February 4, the men having dragged the guns for 3 miles without assistance from any other organization. They took position near the Sampaloc Cemetery and were constantly engaged from about half-past 5 until half-past 8 of the morning of February 5, the enemy being strongly intrenched and posted at ranges varying from 300 to 700 yards. The practice on Blockhouses Nos. 5, 6, and 4 was very effective, causing the enemy to retire in great numbers, and paving the way for the infantry advance. The guns were served under a heavy cross fire, the cannoners having little or no protection. From personal observation I am able to concur in Captain Wedgwood's estimate and commendation of his men. I call attention to his mention of Hospital Steward Shelby B. Cox, U. S. A.

Captain Wedgwood's 2 guns mentioned have now been posted on the line of the Colorado trenches, about three-fourths of a mile beyond Blockhouse No. 5. (Captain Wedgwood's report is appended.)

The 2 guns under Lieut. W. C. Webb were moved at the call to arms, February 4, to their previously selected position at McLeods Hill, near by. These guns were not fired until daylight. Two field guns of the enemy were successively silenced, the one near the San Juan Bridge being dismounted and overturned. The field of fire from this position was very large, extending through an arc of nearly 180 degrees.

Throughout this wide extent of country these guns were directed at buildings and trenches occupied by the enemy and at their stronghold, Blockhouse No. 7, most successfully in every instance, the effect being to silence the enemy's fire almost without exception. Gunner Corpl. John C. Young was shot in the chest and died about 4 p. m. of the same day. Private Wilhelm I. Goodman was shot in the head and instantly killed. Both casualties occurred while serving their guns at McLeods Hill.

These 2 guns were moved forward to the Deposito during the night of February 5. Monday (the 6th) these 2 guns, with 2 Nordenfeldts, commanded by Lieutenant Gibbs, took part in the advance on the pumping station. During the advance the artillery was substantially on the skirmish line at all times. The 4 guns were brought into action four times, and in each instance with marked success, the result being to clear the way for an almost bloodless advance by the infantry. The enemy was not merely shelled from successive positions in the front of the advance, but was followed with shrapnel over the ridges on the flanks. The village of Mariquina was shelled during the evening, and a number of long-range shots fired at retreating insurgents on the plain across the San Juan. The 4 guns mentioned remain in position on the bluffs above the pumping station. The 2 Nordenfeldts have been advanced on several occasions to the outposts.

Just previous to the advance toward the pumping station Q. M. Sergt. Harry A. Young, who had passed his examination as assistant surgeon for the battalion, and no doubt had been commissioned as such by the governor of Utah, and who was under appointment to meet me at the Deposito, advanced under some misapprehension into the insurgent lines and was killed, his remains being found about 1½ miles from the Deposito, near the road.

Under orders from the division commander the remaining 2 Nordenfeldts, under Lieut. G. A. Gibbs, manned by one section of Battery A and one of Battery B, moved forward early on the morning of the 5th to report to Colonel Stotsenburg at Santa Mesa. The platoon was ordered to advance to the San Juan Bridge under cover of a Tennessee battalion, but the latter had not arrived, and with a few flanking skirmishers the 2 guns were moved at double time down the 500-yard slope to the bridge in the face of a heavy fire from the wooded slopes beyond, coming into action near the bridge and advancing with the infantry firing lines up the hill leading to the Deposito. The guns were handled with great skill and efficacy. This movement, in

the open view of the enemy under close range, was one of the most bold and commendable of the campaign. The platoon moved to the vicinity of the Deposito, and on the 6th took part in the advance to the pumping station, as previously described.

My own movements during the time covered by this report were as follows:

I was present with Lieut. G. A. Seaman's platoon on the Caloocan road the nights of February 4 and 5; on the 5th I spent the morning with the detachment of Captain Wedgwood and Lieutenants Webb and Gibbs during part of their cannonading, and the afternoon with Captain Grant's guns during the advance on the cemeteries; on the 6th, the morning, in replacing Captain Wedgwood's guns to conform to the new infantry lines, and the afternoon was present in command of the artillery during the advance from the Deposito to the pumping station; from the 7th until this date I have been almost constantly with the guns on the left of our position and commanded the several detachments in the attack on Caloocan.

I have not the accurate figures at hand, but may approximately state our expenditure of ammunition during the operations above detailed to have been 600 rounds.

In conclusion, I desire to commend most heartily and without distinction the officers and men in the organization under my command; the amount of labor done by them in dragging guns and constructing earthworks has been prodigious, and it has always been done cheerfully. All have been fearless. Compelled to advance along open roads, usually in plain view of the enemy without the opportunity of concealment, they have unshrinkingly served their guns. It has, too, been a feature of these operations that in every advance the guns have gone forward practically on the line of skirmishers. Their willingness to work and their intrepidity have not been more conspicuous than the skill with which they have handled their guns and their accuracy of aim.

Dr. J. S. Kellogg, battalion surgeon, has been tireless in his attention to the medical and surgical needs of the men.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

RICHARD W. YOUNG,
Major Utah Light Artillery, Commanding Battalion.

FIRST RESERVE HOSPITAL, *Manila, P. I., February 14, 1899.*

Maj. R. W. YOUNG,
Utah Light Artillery.

SIR: Following is the report I have to make of the movements of my command from February 4 to 13, inclusive:

I was assigned with the Kansas regiment, on the Caloocan road, with 1 gun. After the call to arms, Saturday, February 4, I started out with my detachment, arriving at the road before the troops did. I moved with them up the road about 300 yards beyond the steam tram station, where we stayed for the night, protected by a wall around an inclosure. You soon joined us with a Nordenfeldt gun.

About 1.30 a. m. of the 5th a heavy infantry fire commenced. Our guns were moved out in the open street, where the men worked them under a most galling fire. Corpl. G. B. Wardlaw was wounded slightly in the leg, just above the ankle, and Private Peter Jensen in the thigh. Firing did not last long. By daylight we had intrenchments thrown up across the road. There was scattering firing during the forenoon.

Brigadier-General Otis directed me to move the 3.2-inch guns some 150 yards west into the field to clear some rifle pits. Three well-directed shrapnel stopped the insurgent fire.

Before the general advance in the afternoon we shelled the woods in front and to the right of us. We advanced with the line to a small church about 600 yards farther. A heavy fire was opened from the insurgent trenches 600 yards away. I placed my 3.2-inch gun in the open street. Too much credit can not be given the cannoneers, who worked the gun in a regular hail of bullets.

The Nordenfeldt was directed across the lagoon to the left, where it did excellent work in the insurgent rifle pits. When the fire became so heavy that my men could no longer work the gun effectively the infantry made an advance, driving the insurgents from two lines of trenches, but they received orders to draw back 1,000 yards, because they were that far ahead of the line. On the morning of the 6th the lines moved forward to the intrenchment carried the day before without opposition. In the afternoon I moved my Nordenfeldt along the railroad track to the right of Block-house No. 1, where there was an excellent view of Caloocan station and a portion of the insurgent trenches. We fired a few shots only, and when night came were ordered

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to return with the guns. Tuesday, the 7th, I moved the Nordenfeldt by a circuitous route about a quarter of a mile to the right, where Captain Grant took command. February 8 I moved my gun some 200 yards beyond the bridge spanning a small stream, and fortified in the road. About 11 p. m. there was some heavy firing, some twenty minutes, in which I joined.

The next night, February 9, was more quiet. I fired only 3 shots.

February 10, at 3.20 p. m., I joined in the bombardment of Caloocan, and at dusk, after the infantry had stopped chasing the insurgents over a half mile beyond the town, I took my gun and train up to the firing line, and by 12.30 a. m. of the 11th had an embrasure and protection thrown up, and moved my ammunition and stores back half a mile. After breakfast, the line where we were, being in the form a V, was drawn back half a mile. I was joined by Lieutenant Fleming, of the Sixth Artillery, with 2 guns, and together, on a hill just west of the railroad track, we built "Fort MacArthur." We had to stop in the middle of our work and drop a few shell and shrapnel in the insurgent rifle pits to stop their disagreeable fire. At 11.30 a. m. Private C. S. Hill, of my detachment, was wounded in the back while sitting in the fort.

During the afternoon a detachment of 5 men from Battery B, with the 3.6 mortar, joined us in the fort. The 12th was quiet. The forenoon of the 13th I was furnished a detail of 20 men by Colonel Funston, of the Twentieth Kansas Regiment, to strengthen our fort and build its walls higher. We were nearly through when, at 11.15 a. m., the insurgents opened a light volley on us. I was wounded in the calf of the right leg. The Mauser entered on the left side and ranged down to the right, down and back just enough to miss the bone and to make the wound slight. I was removed to the First Reserve hospital, where I received every attention, and from which place I send the above detailed report.

Your most obedient servant,

GEO. A. SEAMAN,

Second Lieutenant, Utah Light Artillery, U. S. V.

IN CAMP NEAR CALOOCAN, P. I., *February 14, 1899.*

Maj. R. W. YOUNG, *Utah Light Artillery,*
Chief of Artillery, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report on the work done by my platoon of Light Battery D, Sixth Artillery (Dyer's), since I was ordered to join the division:

In obedience to the verbal instructions of my battery commander, my platoon, comprising two 3.2 field guns and a personnel of 1 officer and 25 enlisted men (2 of whom belong to the Fourteenth Infantry and are attached to Light Battery D, Sixth Artillery), was put in readiness on the 9th instant. At 11.25 a. m. on the 10th I was personally directed by the commander of the division to proceed at once to Ayala Bridge, where an aid would meet me and direct my movements. Infantry was to be there to assist in hauling the guns. Accordingly I left barracks at 11.55 a. m. The infantry had not yet arrived, and by direction of Lieut. Pegram Whitworth, Eighteenth Infantry, aid-de-camp to division commander, I moved on through Santa Cruz to Calle Dulumbayan. Upon reaching Calle Bilibid I was directed to await the arrival of the infantry, which reached that point some ten minutes later. From this infantry (First Idaho) a detail of 28 men was made to assist the cannoners in hauling the guns. At 1.25 p. m. the platoon reached the fork of the road leading to the Chinese church, where I was directed to halt and await orders. These came back half an hour later, and were the written directions of the division commander to go forward with the bearer, Lieutenant Critchlow, Utah Light Artillery, who would direct me to my position, and as soon as my guns were in position to report to him at the Chinese church. The guns followed me, and after looking at the position to which I was directed, I rejoined them and found that the infantry support was no longer with them, although the men detailed from it to assist in hauling the guns were still present. After leaving the main road it was found necessary to stop twice to corduroy, etc., yet the guns were in position and opened fire in less than four hours after leaving barracks. The difficulties attending their movement during the last mile were enormous.

The position selected for me was near Blockhouse No. 1, just southeast of the railroad, in the trench occupied by part of the First Montana Volunteer Infantry, and commanded the railroad toward Caloocan. The visible field of fire was limited to the railroad, the station of Caloocan, and part of the railroad sheds located near the station. Lieutenant Critchlow gave me the range of the sheds as 1,700 yards, and

showed me the approximate position of an insurgent gun quite near them, but not visible. He also informed me that the insurgents had a trench 200 yards nearer my position and on my left of the railroad.

About 3.20 p. m. Captain Sawtelle, assistant quartermaster, U. S. V., arrived and informed me that the division commander desired me to open fire as soon as possible, and that I need not report to him as I had been directed. At 3.25 p. m. I opened fire with shell on the station at Caloocan and on the railroad shed nearest the track, where I had been told the gun was located. The results were good and the range quickly established at 1,600 yards. The insurgents made no response. Their gun (afterwards found a little to the left of the designated position) was never fired. About 4.05 the infantry advanced and with it went the Montana company whose commanding officer I had been informed was to act as my support, so that I was left with no support whatever.

Just before the advance I fired (very much at random and at close range) several shrapnel into the dense woods beginning about 250 yards in front. These shots, however, at least developed the position of the insurgents. The firing at once became general, and I located the trench occupied by the insurgents on the left of the railroad. Two shots gave me its range as 1,000 yards, and one or two more silenced its fire. I then ceased firing at points nearer my position than the station, as our infantry was rapidly advancing, but continued to throw projectiles into the station and such of the adjacent buildings as could be seen from my position. Just at this time Captain Sawtelle again visited me, and, informing me that the town of Caloocan extended for some considerable distance beyond the station, directed me to throw shell and shrapnel beyond that point; this was at 4.30 p. m. At 4.40 I ceased firing, and at 4.50 the most advanced of the infantry were observed at the station.

The Idaho detachment which had assisted in hauling the guns was attached to a Montana company when I was informed that a company of the First Montana Volunteer Infantry was to act as my support. These men advanced with the Montana regiment and afterwards rejoined their own regiment.

At 5.30 p. m., all firing having ceased, I reported to the division commander at the Chinese church and was directed by him to send an immediate request to the First Brigade commander for a support. Upon my return to my platoon I met the chief of the artillery of this division, who instructed me to supplement my request for support with one for orders.

About 10 p. m. 2 companies of the First Idaho Volunteer Infantry, commanded by Major Figgins, arrived and I received the brigade commander's orders to use my judgment as to whether the guns should be moved forward at once or at daybreak. I considered the task impracticable in the darkness and moved forward at a few minutes past 6 o'clock the following morning, finally taking the position now occupied by my platoon.

The thorough skill of the gunners, Sergeant Pharius, Corporal Miller, and Acting Corporal Jones, all of Light Battery D, Sixth Artillery, is evidenced by the number of shots taking effect in the targets in the vicinity of the station of Caloocan. I counted 20 unmistakable hits—practically all the shots fired at them. In the trench above referred to were found the bodies of 8 or 10 insurgents, and infantry officers who saw them informed me that they were unmistakably the victims of shrapnel.

The ammunition again proved all that could be desired, yet it is remarkable that one building in which was stored a quantity of lumber, barrels, etc., which was struck by at least half a dozen shells that exploded in it was not set on fire.

About 8.30 a. m. on the 11th instant I received orders from the brigade commander to move my platoon forward to the firing line. This order reached me at Caloocan church, where I had been directed to halt and await further instructions. Upon arriving on the line, the division commander directed me to report to Captain Grant, Utah Light Artillery, who indicated to me the position my guns were to occupy. I at once began extending the epaulement, already commenced in front of a gun of the Utah Light Artillery by its commander, Second Lieutenant Seaman, Utah Light Artillery, so as to secure the greatest field of fire possible. This work has been strengthened from day to day until it is quite a formidable field fort. It was located in its present position in order to enable the Utah gun referred to to sweep the approach to Malabon, but for fire to the northeast and for more effective cover it is a little too far down the slope of the hill on which it is situated.

During the afternoon of the 11th instant an annoying fire was kept up on the fort and adjacent trenches from the nearer suburbs of Malabon, but a few shrapnel from my 2 guns and Lieutenant Seaman's quickly silenced it.

I also endeavored to get the range to the cathedral in Malabon, but it was found impossible to observe the effect of the shells from my position. Since then this range has been quite accurately determined, and I am of the opinion that the shells

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fired at the cathedral fell a little short of it and beyond a large building about 500 yards this side of it, where their bursts could not be seen.

Several times small bodies of insurgents have annoyed us by long-range firing, but one or two shrapnel has each time caused them to desist promptly, yet a member of the Kansas Volunteer Infantry who was assisting in the construction of the fort was slightly wounded in the hip by it. Private Hill, of Lieutenant Seaman's section, was struck in the back by a spent ball and slightly hurt, and yesterday morning Lieutenant Seaman was shot through the calf of one leg while superintending the strengthening of the work. I now have command of his guns as well as my own.

In addition to the 3 field guns referred to, there is a 3.6 mortar (field), under the immediate charge of Corporal Boshard, Battery B, Utah Light Artillery, located in the fort, and a 1.65 Hotchkiss occupies a position near the division headquarters and is manned by men of my detachment. This gun commands an insurgent position of unknown character about 1,800 yards distant on the railroad.

In the action of Friday last I had command of 2 guns and 25 cannoneers, 10 of them being attached from the Fourteenth Infantry. The men were under a heavy fire for nearly an hour. At one side of the battery Captain Hill, First Montana Volunteer Infantry, was wounded within a few feet of the guns, and on the other side a wounded corporal was shot a second time as he climbed the bank of the railroad some 6 feet from my left gun, yet my command suffered no casualties.

All did their full duty and all did it promptly, accurately, and well.

Very respectfully,

ADRIAN S. FLEMING,
Second Lieutenant, Sixth Artillery.

DE LA LOMA, NEAR MANILA, February 14, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken against the insurgents by Light Battery B, Utah Light Artillery, commencing on 4th instant.

At 10 p. m., February 4, Major Young ordered me to send Second Lieutenant Seaman out on the Caloccan road with one 3.2-inch gun, and to take three 3.2-inch guns to Bilibid prison, leaving two Nordenfelt guns at the barracks. Having complied with this order, I arrived at the Bilibid prison and was ordered to leave 1 gun there, and to proceed out Dulumbayan road with 2 guns. I reached the little cemetery 100 yards north of the Lazaro hospital, finding that our outpost had been drawn in to that point. I had the first section tear down two houses that obstructed our view and build an emplacement for their gun, and ordered First Lieutenant Critchlow to construct an emplacement for No. 2 gun in the field to the right of the cemetery.

With the exception of an occasional shot to keep down the enemy's fire, we waited for daylight, and having measured the exact distance on my field maps to the Chinese hospital, the Binondo church and graveyard, I opened fire and was not long in driving the enemy out of the above places. From my position 1 gun completely covered the advance of the Tenth Pennsylvania and Montana Infantry until they reached the cemetery. Then I limbered up, and Sergeant Hines having arrived with No. 3 gun, I advanced with the 3 pieces. After going 300 yards the burning houses fired by infantry compelled me to wait about twenty minutes. Upon reaching the fork of the road I turned to the Chinese hospital and advanced 400 yards, where I was in plain view of our infantry in the flat to my left. Here we encountered a heavy infantry fire, gave the command "Action left," and commenced firing at the Chinese and Japanese cemeteries. After firing about thirty minutes, Major Bell reported some of our infantry in a close place beyond the Chinese hospital, and asked me to move up. This request I complied with, after sending First Lieutenant Critchlow out the Lico road with 1 gun to assist Colonel Wallace, who had asked me for help.

I advanced with 2 guns 300 yards north of the Chinese hospital, from which position the guns shelled the woods to the eastward across the front of our infantry, making it possible for the right wing of the Tenth Pennsylvania and the South Dakotas to advance (as they did) with small loss in killed or wounded.

I then changed the direction of fire toward the Loma church and continued firing until our infantry was within 200 yards of it. In the meantime First Lieutenant Critchlow had been shelling the cemetery farther to the left, with splendid results, his guns being planted on the Lico road.

As the Tenth Pennsylvania approached the church from in front and the South Dakotas from the east, I limbered up and moved forward, being joined by Lieuten-

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ant Critchlow at the Chinese hospital; continued to a point 200 yards north of the above-mentioned building, halted and shelled the woods to our left and in front of the Third U. S. Artillery and Twentieth Kansas until ordered to cease firing by Major Young. I was then ordered to advance my 3 guns to the Loma cemetery. On the 9th instant, 1 Nordenfelt and 1 section of my battery, and 1 Nordenfelt gun with 15 men from Battery A were ordered up and placed in position to the left of Blockhouse No. 3. First Lieut. J. F. Critchlow was placed in command of the platoon by order.

Friday, the 10th, these 5 guns shelled the woods in front of the Kansas infantry and also Caloocan, continuing the firing until compelled to cease by the advance of our infantry.

Yesterday, February 13, I moved the 2 Nordenfelt guns, under command of Lieutenant Critchlow, from Blockhouse No. 3 to a position 1,200 yards east of Loma church, and in front of the left battalion, South Dakota infantry.

Corporal Peterson, who was shot through the leg on the 10th instant, is the only man with the above-named sections who has been wounded.

First Lieut. J. F. Critchlow, noncommissioned officers, and men under command deserve great credit, not only for their fine gunnery, but for the cheerful way in which they pulled their 6-horse guns and ammunition to the front, part of the time under fire and up hill, keeping up on the firing line.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

F. A. GRANT,

Captain and Brevet-Major, Commanding Battery.

IN CAMP NEAR BLOCKHOUSE No. 5,
Philippine Islands, February 15, 1899.

Major YOUNG,
Commanding Utah Light Battery.

SIR: In obedience to your telegraphic instructions of February 14, I have the honor to report upon operations to date.

On the night of February 4, at about 10.30 o'clock, in obedience to your order, and in accordance with the prearranged plan in case of an attack, I left Curatel Meisio, taking sections 1 and 2 of Battery A, consisting of about 30 men and 7 noncommissioned officers, and proceeded to Sampaloc cemetery, the men taking with them blankets, ponchos, and rations for about two days. These, with the 200 matting sacks, were loaded upon the gun and limber, drag ropes were attached to the guns, and they were hauled to the cemetery by our own men, the distance being approximately 3 miles. We came up with Company L, First Colorado, at the position known as the "Colorado Reserve," and followed in their rear to the cemetery. The gun of the second section was placed in position at the northeast corner of the cemetery within the wall, the gun of the first section on a line with it about 2 rods to the right and outside the wall, in order to command the country lying to the left. Sand bags were immediately filled and placed so as to afford some slight protection at No. 1 gun. At the time these positions were taken the heavy firing had ceased, and I received instructions from General Hale to retire with the guns to the reserve before daylight. About 3.30 o'clock Sunday morning, February 5, the insurgents opened fire, which was heavy and continuous for perhaps twenty minutes, but as the night was too dark to admit of sighting the guns or judging distance with any accuracy their fire was not returned by us.

At 4.45 we started to move No. 1 gun to the rear to the gate in the east wall of the cemetery. The noise apparently attracted the enemy's attention and they at once commenced firing heavily, and from that time on the firing was practically continuous until the close of the engagement at that point, about half past 8 o'clock. After establishing No. 1 gun at the gate of the cemetery, the old Spanish earthworks there were strengthened somewhat by sand bags. Orders were then received from General Hale to hold our positions. At daylight we opened fire on Blockhouse No. 5, and both guns were in action from that time until 8.30 o'clock. During the action No. 1 gun was moved inside the cemetery to a position about 2 rods to the left of No. 2 gun, and a portion of the cemetery wall knocked down to enable this gun to be used. This movement was made in order to gain command of the country to the left. Four companies of the Colorado infantry occupied a position a little in front on a line with our guns to the right, and one company of the regiment and the South Dakota regiment a similar position on our left. The enemy occupied a deep slough or swale—a perfect natural protection and defense—300 yards distant, and Blockhouse No. 5, 500

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yards distant to our front: a native village and stone church, 300 yards distant on our right, and a strong position under large trees 700 yards distant on our left. Blockhouse No. 4 was about 1,200 yards distant on our left. Our fire was directed mainly at the positions of the enemy at the trees, their line along the slough, Blockhouse No. 5, and the stone church and native village, and some few shells were thrown at Blockhouse No. 4. I think I can say our fire was effective, that it caused large numbers of the enemy to retire from their positions during the engagement, and properly paved the way for the charge of the Colorados, which was made at half past 8 o'clock.

After the enemy's position was taken by the Colorados several shots were fired at Blockhouse No. 4 and the tree before mentioned, prior to the advance of the South Dakota regiment.

We expended 63 rounds of ammunition, about equally divided between shrapnel and percussion shells. We had none of our detachment killed or wounded.

Of our men, each and all of them, I can speak in terms of highest praise; every duty was performed promptly, cheerfully, and well; and until the tree, stone church, and native village were shelled they were out under a heavy cross fire from both the right and left, as well as under fire from front, all the time with no protection whatever above the hips.

The charge of the Colorado troops was under my personal observation, and of the judgment used and courage displayed by Colonel McCoy and his gallant officers and men, too much in the way of commendation can not be said.

I desire to mention Shelby B. Cox, a hospital steward of the Regular Army stationed at Corregidor; he reported to me and joined our detachment on Calle Iris, while on our way to the cemetery. On the way out he procured bandages and other necessities. He remained with us until Monday morning, February 6; throughout the engagement he was unremitting in his efforts to render aid to the wounded, exposing himself to heavy fire in the early part of the engagement, and following the charge of the Colorados across the open field.

On Monday, February 6, at 1.30 p. m., together with all the Colorado regiment, we advanced to a point about three-quarters of a mile beyond Blockhouse No. 5, to the point we now occupy. The guns are planted on the crest of the hill about 150 yards distant from each other; one commanding the country to the north, the other to the east. Both are fairly well protected by earthworks. We have shelter tents, a comfortable camp, and plenty of good water. We have on hand 96 shrapnel, 162 percussion shell, 216 charges of powder. I have at this point 28 men and 6 non-commissioned officers; at Blockhouse No. 7, First Sergeant Nystrom, Corporal Rogers, and 2 enlisted men. In response to your telegram to Captain Grant this a. m., by him forwarded to me, I have detailed Corporal Hesburg to instruct infantrymen in the use of the Hotchkiss gun at the Deposito, at which place he now is. I have on hand sufficient transportation to move me a short distance, with the exception of one bull (I have the cart). If a move is to be made over a rough country, I would like, for that purpose, at least two bulls and carts, preferably four.

Respectfully

E. H. WEDGWOOD,
Captain, Commanding Battery A, Utah Artillery.

WATERWORKS, February 13, 1899.

Maj. R. W. Young,

Commanding Utah Volunteer Artillery, Colocan, P. I.

SIR: In accordance with your telegram of this date I have the honor to report the following operations of the third platoon of Light Battery A, Utah Volunteer Artillery, from February 4 to date.

At the call to arms the guns were immediately placed in the position assigned to them on McLeod's Hill. The rest of the night was spent in digging gun pits and building breastworks, most of the time under infantry fire.

My orders were to open fire as soon as I could find anything to open fire on.

At daylight Sunday the enemy opened a heavy rifle fire, and a few minutes later they began to fire with two cannon, supposed to be smooth bores. The cannon fire was quickly silenced. Later it was found that the gun on the San Juan bridge was dismounted and the carriage smashed.

Later in the morning the other gun opened up again, but was soon silenced. Infantry fire was seen coming from several large buildings. The shell fire was directed against all of these and the enemy's fire ceased.

Shrapnel fire was then sent against the San Juan bridge and several other places along the line of the enemy where the fire seemed heavy. I was then directed to

shell Blockhouse No. 7. About 10 percussion shells were fired at it, all seeming to take effect.

In this action the platoon fired: Shrapnel, 23; percussion shell, 58.

Loss.—Killed, Gunner Corp. John G. Young, and Cannoneer William T. Goodman. Wounded, none.

At 9 p. m. received orders to move to the Deposito; arrived there about 11 p. m. At 1.30 Monday advanced with the command, consisting of the First Nebraska and second platoon Light Battery A, to the waterworks. During this advance the artillery was with the skirmish line and opened fire three times on the road and once on the waterworks.

The artillery was then ordered into position on the hill near the stone blockhouse. At sundown General Hale ordered the village of Mariquina shelled. About 8 shells were thrown into it.

On this day the platoon fired: Shrapnel, 21; percussion, 20; total, 41

Loss, none.

Since that time no change has been made in the location of the platoon, and no firing has been done.

All the enlisted men behaved splendidly under fire, and at all times did their duty to the very best of their ability.

Respectfully submitted.

WM. C. WEBB,

Second Lieutenant, Utah Volunteer Artillery, Commanding Platoon.

WATERWORKS, February 15, 1899.

Maj. R. W. YOUNG,
Commanding Utah Artillery, U. S. V.

SIR: In compliance with your message of 14th instant, I have the honor to report the operations engaged in by that part of the battalion placed in my charge. On the 4th instant was left in charge of barracks. On the morning of the 5th but two sections remained in quarters, section 4 of Battery A and section 6 of Battery B. By your order at 8.45 a. m. these two sections were ordered to report to Colonel Stotsenburg, First Nebraska United States Volunteers. I took command of the two detachments and arrived at the First Nebraska at 9.45 and reported to Colonel Stotsenburg, who immediately advanced the platoon toward the San Juan bridge. The Tennessee regiment was ordered to support us, but failed to come up on time. The colonel asked me if I could advance without them. I replied that I could defend my own front if he would place a few men on the flanks. This arrangement being satisfactory, the platoon advanced at double time under a severe infantry fire, taking position on the bridge. We opened fire on the enemy and fired, advancing until the enemy broke and the infantry charged, driving them out of that vicinity. We advanced to the storage station of the waterworks, where Brigadier-General Hale took command and placed the platoon in position 400 yards beyond the station. We remained in position until 5 p. m., when the platoon was ordered to return to the station for the night. I was ordered to return to the position occupied by Lieutenant Webb on McLeod's Hill and inform him to report with his platoon to the waterworks immediately. Lieutenant Webb arrived at 11 p. m. and parked his pieces with mine.

February 6, 1899.—Did not move until the following order was promulgated by Colonel Stotsenburg:

"The artillery will advance between the Second and Third battalions First Nebraska."

Immediately on receipt of the above order the two platoons took position in the order prescribed, you in person taking command of the artillery. We had proceeded but a short distance when the insurgents opened fire on our troops. All four guns took position and opened fire on the insurgents, who shortly retired. The advance was resumed; Lieutenant Webb's platoon went forward, I remaining in position to cover the advance until you notified me to advance and resume my position in column. Action was resumed at intervals, firing and advancing until the blockhouse above the pumping station was reached, where we took position and under direction of Brigadier-General Hale bombarded the village across the San Mateo River. Rested on arms until daylight, when a large body of insurgents were seen moving toward Pasig. We fired 2 shots with 3.2-inch piece by order of Major Mulford. They showing white flags, ceased firing.

February 7, 1899.—By direction of Field Orders, No. 3—

"The following will be the disposition of First Nebraska and Utah Battery:

"I. Two platoons, Lieutenants Gibbs and Webb, Utah battery, will build gun banks at place indicated."

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By verbal order of Colonel Stotsenburg the work was discontinued at noon. Remained on arms until the 8th, at 3 p. m. Received orders to maintain lookout, keep two days travel rations on hand and complement of ammunition.

February 9.—Ordered by Colonel Stotsenburg to cover his line while scouting at the east side of the river. Prepared ford for crossing pieces.

February 10 and 11.—Rested on arms.

February 12.—Colonel Stotsenburg gave verbal order to have platoon of rapid-fire guns ready for an immediate advance in case his reconnoitering party was fired on. Detachments lay by the pieces from 10 p. m. until 3 a. m. of the 13th instant.

February 13 and 14.—Strengthened gun emplacements. Rested on arms.

Casualties, none with my detachment.

Very respectfully,

GEO. A. GIBBS,
First Lieutenant, Utah U. S. V.

[Inclosure 52.]

HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
OFFICE OF MILITARY INFORMATION,
Manila, P. I., February 11, 1899.

Maj. Gen. ARTHUR MACARTHUR,

Commanding Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to report that in the fight at Caloocan yesterday, in order to carry out the instructions previously given me by you, I proceeded with Captain Hallahan's company (M), of the First Montana Volunteer Infantry, by the ravine which headed northward from your headquarters at the cemetery of Binondo. My instructions contemplated striking in its flank a line of insurgent intrenchments which commanded the extensive plain over which it was necessary for a portion of our command to advance upon Caloocan, but I was cautioned to keep a sharp watch for the force of insurgents which was well known to be concealed in the forest along the road leading from San Francisco del Monte and behind the position I would occupy if I placed the company on the flank of the intrenchments referred to.

Proceeding at the commencement of the artillery firing, we reached a very advanced position in concealment and waited for the infantry fight to begin. From a lookout in a tall tree I had an excellent view of the entire prospective field of battle, but at that time nothing could be seen of the insurgents concealed in the forest.

However, when the proper moment arrived we further proceeded to the execution of our orders, and Captain Hallahan had just deployed his company as skirmishers, with a view to making a forward movement on the flank of the intrenchments, when the above-mentioned insurgent force, having observed us plainly, came out of the woods in our rear at a run in two separate detachments, each of which looked as if it might be a small company of from 40 to 50 men. They came out, deployed, and immediately attacked us, and we facing about quickly, engaged them at about 800 yards. These Montana men are all experienced riflemen, and the range was soon so well determined by the small flecks of dust kicked up by the bullets that the insurgents took to cover and never advanced afterwards to my knowledge.

Our firing had hardly begun before a third detachment, consisting of 20 or 30 men, came out of the forest at a point considerably closer to us, on our left and front. The company had naturally fallen into three divisions, under command of the captain, lieutenant, and first sergeant, respectively, and each section, picking out that division of the enemy which it found in its front, poured volley after volley into them and keeping them under cover thus prevented their advance.

When we first started to take our position and while sneaking along in the high grass in a column of files we developed a patrol of 5 men in our immediate front, at a distance of less than 500 yards. After honoring us with two wild shots (which we did not return) they took to their heels and ran northward up over the hill to the right of Caloocan cemetery. They evidently did so to report our position, for shortly after, a fourth force, which could not be correctly estimated because they could not be seen, appeared at from four to five hundred yards, slightly in rear of our left flank, in an excellent position behind bamboo thickets on the crest of the Caloocan ridge and opened fire upon us. As something had then to be done, and done promptly, the left section of the company was advanced 50 yards to the front and at the same time the right section was retired 50 yards to the rear for the purpose of echeloning the company to prevent the insurgents enfilading it as a whole. The fire was still kept up at those in our front during the movement. Then the middle section of the company was ordered to cease firing, face to the left, and

execute column left, thus bringing it immediately facing the enemy on our flank at which it now directed its fire.

About this time the firing from the insurgents who had originally attacked us materially slackened, and the left section was retired to a position on the same line as the middle section and both poured a rapid and heavy fire into the insurgents on the hill now in their front. As the fire from our original antagonists now practically ceased, the position of the right section was also promptly changed (under cover of the fire from our other sections) by facing it to the rear and wheeling around to the right, bringing it in its original relative position, but facing in the same direction as the rest of the company. It was very fortunate for us that the fire from those who first attacked us had ceased, for it enabled us to devote our undisturbed and exclusive attention to those on the hill who had a much better position and at a much closer range than those who first attacked us.

Seeing that the line of intrenchments now almost directly on our left flank was hotly engaged with our troops rapidly advancing upon it, and that the Third Artillery was steadily advancing in a magnificent line in our immediate rear, it was decided to press forward on the insurgents (who were pouring a hot fire into us) because as they held a position on the high ground they had a slightly plunging fire, and the banks of the paddy fields were not sufficiently high to afford protection to the line. Calling upon the men to look behind them so that they might be encouraged by the sight of reinforcements ready at hand, we rushed forward alternately by sections and kept up so hot a fire that the enemy's fire was weakened. We also ran from 6 to 8 men out of the ravine in our front who had been taking pot shots at us from very close range. I saw only 2 of these men escape alive behind the thickets in our front, as they were all apparently killed while running up the hill.

Though our rushes by sections had been so fast and rapid as to resemble charges more than tactical rushes, after clearing the ravine, which was almost simultaneously done, the entire line joined in a splendid enthusiastic charge and ran the enemy from behind the first line of thicket and hedge to one farther in the rear, a hundred yards and more back of the crest of the hill. By the time we had reached this crest the men were completely out of breath and a portion of them out of ammunition, the rest having still a little left. This was made known to me and I galloped to the rear, reported our condition to the commanding officer of the Third Artillery and asked for prompt assistance.

This splendid body of men, under command of Major William A. Kobbé, Third Artillery, had been advancing in our rear in a line as fine as is ordinarily seen on a parade ground, and was still coolly maintaining a steady advance in quick time to our support, only a few hundred yards to our rear. As the insurgents were firing wildly, they were in much greater danger than we. When I asked for assistance they came forward with a rush, and by many splendid advances soon had the insurgents scampering in wild confusion over the hills in our front. A great number of them were killed, and those who were not very soon disappeared.

I joined the artillery when it advanced, and Company M, of Montana, advanced with them, but the artillery line being much more extensive than that of the company, I lost touch with Captain Hallahan, and was unable to find him after the fight. I am consequently not informed as to the number of casualties in the company, but 1 man was wounded in the arm and sent to the rear by me early in the fight.

Throughout the entire engagement both the officers and men of the company behaved in a magnificent manner. They were cool and calm, many of them joking on the line and seeming to enjoy the whole performance immensely. I particularly observed that Captain Hallahan never sought cover, maintaining an erect position all the time, but requiring his men to keep under cover. When we charged the insurgents up the hill he went in the advance with his men. During the difficult change of front under fire it was his coolness and steadiness that enabled the men to execute the movements as well as they would have done it on the parade ground. He is a brave and courageous man, and, I understand, an experienced veteran soldier. He has a company that could not possibly be excelled in fighting qualities, and one which any officer might be proud of. Though the final result of the contest would undoubtedly have been the same, no matter where the insurgents who came out of the forest went, still it is a fact that the position assumed and occupied by this company effectually prevented the reenforcement of Caloocan by two small companies and a detachment.

At the time the insurgents from the forest ceased firing I did not understand what had led to this action, for I could not see them retire, but I afterwards learned that the Utah Light Artillery had turned their battery upon them, and I consider that the battery thus rendered us a most valuable service at a critical time.

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I constantly observed throughout the engagement that the insurgents were rattled and terrorized by the shrieking and bursting of shells in their vicinity. They seemed much more afraid of this arm than of any other, and at the very first shot of the battle from the navy every man working on the trench outside the cemetery immediately scampered within it and I never saw them again.

Captain Hallahan's gallant and fearless conduct throughout the day, under circumstances which involved great danger to his life, was so striking that I consider him entitled to special distinction, and take pleasure in recommending him for the consideration his superior officers deem such conduct merits.

There is a young lieutenant of the Third Artillery whose enthusiasm and gallantry I happened to especially observe, whom I desire to mention, but as I do not know his name I will reserve his case for a future communication.

I have reserved for the end of this letter mention of the exceedingly gallant and courageous conduct of Prof. George F. Becker, United States geologist, because in accordance with his idea of his duty he insisted on accompanying me into this fight, and remained with the company, much of the time mounted, throughout the entire engagement. He was as cool and collected as if he were pursuing geological investigations in his study, encouraged the men behind whom he was standing, and rendered other valuable services which required him to pass mounted immediately in rear of the entire line. I am sorry that, not being a soldier, he can not receive the reward which his courage and gallantry entitled him to.

The view he took of his duty, referred to above, arose from the fact that for some time before this war began he volunteered to assist me in the information bureau, and the instincts of a courageous gentleman have prevented his abandonment of his self-imposed task of following me wherever I go, now that the expected war with the insurgents has come about and sometimes calls me, in the line of my duty, into dangerous situations.

In justice to him, however, I should add, that long prior to any certainty of hostilities he made me promise that if hostilities did occur I would permit him to accompany me wherever my duty called me. He has accompanied me, pursuant to his own desire, on every reconnoissance I have made, and frequently against my judgment as to what was best for him.

Very respectfully,

J. F. BELL,

Major of Engineers, U. S. Volunteers, in Charge Office of Military Information.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,
OFFICE OF MILITARY INFORMATION,
Manila, P. I., March 1, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, Washington, D. C.

SIR: I have the honor to report that during the past month I remained on duty in charge of the office of military information of the Eighth Army Corps, my duties remaining the same as have been previously indicated.

The following incidents connected with my duty are deemed worthy of special mention:

On February 4, at about 9.30 p. m., hostilities between the insurrectionist and American forces were suddenly and unexpectedly precipitated by an insurgent attack upon the outpost of the Nebraska regiment, in camp near Santa Mesa, a suburb of Manila. I immediately went to the scene of the conflict for the purpose of reporting the conditions to the commanding general, and remained there all night in telegraphic communication with him, leaving when the fight had ceased, about daylight.

On February 5 a general engagement took place all around the city of Manila between the insurgent and American troops. My duty took me to that portion of the line on which the Tenth Pennsylvania Regiment was operating, in the vicinity of Binondo cemetery, and I remained there in action with the Pennsylvania regiment until the insurgents were driven back and the line was halted at a position it was proposed to occupy until further orders. After the fight was over, at about 4.30 p. m., accompanied by a small patrol, I made a reconnoissance of Caloocan, a village to which the insurgents had retired after the conflict, returning with information of their position and strength to the commanding general of the Second Division which was holding the line in their front.

On February 6 a reconnoissance was made of a locality south of Caloocan along the railroad track, to which the insurgents had advanced the night before. The fact that they had retired from this position to Caloocan again was ascertained and reported to the commanding general of the First Brigade, Second Division. Securing a detail of men from the Twentieth Kansas Regiment, a second reconnoissance was made of Caloocan itself, in which the position and strength of the insurgents was

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again developed and reported to the commanding general of the division. On the same afternoon, the commanding general desiring further information as to the exact location of a trench which had been previously reported to him, another reconnoissance was made of the eastern side of Caloocan at his request, with a patrol of men from the First Montana Regiment. The information desired was obtained.

By February 9 further reconnoissance of Caloocan became desirable, and, with the assistants on duty in the office of military information, a reconnoissance was made before daylight, beginning at about 4 a. m. We got very close to the town, ascertained the changes which had taken place, and also developed the position of an outpost in a neck of forest situated due east of Caloocan about 1 mile. The information sought was obtained and duly reported. On the same afternoon a second reconnoissance was made with a view to more accurately locating the position of the troops to which the outpost in the neck of the forest belonged. This was also successful.

On February 10 a third reconnoissance of the insurgent forces in the forest was made, with a view to ascertaining their strength. We succeeded in determining that there was only one force, and not several separate ones, as had been thought possible. The same afternoon the advance upon Caloocan took place, and Company M of the First Montana Regiment was placed under my orders for special service. We performed the service required to the satisfaction of the commanding general.

On February 16 my duty took me to San Pedro Macati, and learning there that an insurgent force had been reported south of the Pasig River in the direction of Mandaloyan, I secured a strong patrol from the First California Regiment and went in search of the reported insurgents. The reconnoissance lasted the entire afternoon, but no insurgents were found, for, if ever there, they had departed during the night.

On February 19 I again went to San Pedro Macati for the purpose of locating the troops to which belonged certain insurgent patrols which had been annoying our outposts from the opposite bank of the Pasig in the vicinity of Mandaloyan. Taking a small patrol from the First Washington Regiment we found the hostile patrols and drove them out of the timber, but did not succeed in locating the force to which they belonged that day.

On February 20, returning to San Pedro Macati, 2 companies of the First Washington Regiment were placed under my orders for the purpose of a further and stronger reconnoissance on the opposite side of the river. We found the company of insurgents which had been supplying the patrols, defeated them in a sharp fight, and chased them about a mile and a half into the Nebraska line, which ran them across the San Mateo River. We then returned on the flank of an insurgent company which had taken up a position on the same side of the river as San Pedro Macati, but on the opposite side from us. This company had been annoying our outposts in front of San Pedro Macati for about a week, but after we had engaged them for about a half hour they were compelled to retire with heavy losses.

Very respectfully,

J. F. BELL,
Major of Engineers, in Charge.

[Inclosure 53.]

HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR-GENERAL,
Manila, P. I., February 25, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report:

It having been reported to the division commander about 8 a. m., February 23, that insurgents approaching from the rear had driven in to the Kansas headquarters at Caloocan church the outpost of a noncommissioned officer and 8 men stationed in the car shed on the road to Caloocan, and had seized the car shed and occupied it and the stone bridge on that road over the canal, the division commander directed me to take Company L, First Montana Infantry, and, proceeding with it by rail, to detain and reconnoiter the country from the Solis road, running west from Lico to the Caloocan road, to the vicinity of the positions occupied by the insurgents, with a view of developing the strength of the enemy and reporting the same.

Company L, as it reported at the train, consisted of 2 officers (First Lieut. W. J. Bradshaw and Second Lieut. E. S. French) and 46 enlisted men. I was also accompanied by an enlisted man of the Twentieth Kansas, who was a member of the outpost driven in, and who had been slightly wounded in the hand. Having arrived at the crossing of the railroad and the Solis road, I stopped the train and sent detachments to reconnoiter as far as Lico to the east and Caloocan road to the west.

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No signs of the enemy were seen east of the railroad. I accompanied the detachment reconnoitering to the west, and when the Caloocan road was reached a number of shots were fired at us from the direction of the bridge; but it being evident that no insurgents were in the immediate vicinity of the Solis road, I returned to the train and posted a detachment of a noncommissioned officer and 10 men in a good position at the crossing of the railroad and the Solis road, with instructions to send a patrol frequently as far as Caloocan road, and then proceeded with the rest of the company by train to a point slightly north of east of the stone bridge occupied by the insurgents.

Here Lieutenant French was left with a suitable guard for the train.

With Lieutenant Bradshaw and the remainder of the company I then proceeded cautiously to reconnoiter the country between the railroad and the Caloocan road. As we entered the timber skirting the series of dikes, ponds, and marshes intervening between us and the Caloocan road, the insurgents opened a hot fire from the timber south and from the dikes and the bridge southwest of us. Lieutenant Bradshaw with half of the company moved by the right flank across a bamboo footbridge, and, partially screened by a dike, engaged at short range the insurgents, who were similarly sheltered by dikes, 1 insurgent being killed and others severely wounded within 40 paces, and 1 of our men also wounded. I moved the remainder of the company in extended order through the timber in our front, and in face of a hot fire drove the insurgents from their shelter in the timber and from behind nipa huts across the dikes to the positions of the main body at the car shed and stone bridge. Having definitely ascertained that the insurgents held the latter positions with a strong force, I left the company occupying a sheltered position where they could observe the movements of the enemy, and according to my instructions returned to headquarters with the train and reported the situation to the division commander. This report having been transmitted to the corps commander and a reply having been received that several companies under command of Major Goodale, Twenty-third Infantry, would be immediately dispatched from town to drive out the insurgents, I was directed to return to the company and keep the enemy under observation until Major Goodale's battalion should dislodge them. I returned and having seen that the company was suitably posted, stationed myself with Lieutenant French near the left flank, in an advanced position, nearly due east of the bridge. Soon the near approach of Major Goodale's troops was evident, and when the insurgents began to flee and expose themselves fire was opened upon them from our left flank, enfilading them and preventing their escape across the dikes, while Lieutenant Bradshaw in their rear prevented their escaping by the Caloocan road.

At this juncture Lieutenant French, seeing a number of natives who were waving their hats and apparently making signs that they wished to surrender, stood up and exposing himself, calling them to come over to him and they would be safe, using some Spanish phrases as well as English so that he might be understood, and at the same time our men ceased firing. While Lieutenant French was still calling and making signs a shot, fired apparently from a hut near the group he was trying to save, struck him in the chest and falling to the ground he expired almost instantly. When killed he was about 20 yards to the left and in front of the company at a point where he had stationed a few men in the best position to observe the enemy. His body was carried to the train on an improvised litter and sent to the city.

Major Goodale's battalion having approached so that the company was liable to be exposed to the fire of our own troops, I withdrew the company to a sheltered position at the crossing of the railroad by the Solis road, and having stationed a detachment of 20 men at the junction of the Solis and Caloocan roads awaited the arrival of Major Goodale's advance, at the same time shutting the insurgents off from all avenue of escape by the Caloocan road and east of it.

Having effected a junction with Major Goodale's advance, I withdrew the company to its original position in the trenches as directed by the division commander. When the company was marching from the railroad station near division headquarters to the trenches an enlisted man was shot through the head by the insurgents from their position a thousand yards in front of our lines.

Lieutenant French throughout the day showed great coolness and bravery, and lost his life while attempting to save the lives of others.

Lieutenant Bradshaw and the entire company did their duty in a most creditable manner, and were under fire from about 9 a. m. till 4 p. m.

There is good reason to believe that several of the insurgents afterwards found dead were killed by the fire of this company, but only one is positively known to have been killed and one wounded. The dead man's gun was secured by the man who killed him.

Very respectfully,

JOHN S. MALLORY,
Major and Inspector-General, U. S. V.

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[Inclosure 54.]

IN CAMP NEAR MANILA, P. I., February 18, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the U. S. gunboat *Laguna de Bay*, covering the period during which I commanded her, from January 11 to February 16, 1899:

I went aboard the *Laguna de Bay* with a detachment of 2 noncommissioned officers and 27 privates of Battery G, Third Artillery, on January 11, 1899; a detachment of 1 officer, 2 noncommissioned officers, and 8 privates from the Utah Light Artillery; and an infantry detachment from the South Dakota regiment of 1 officer, 5 noncommissioned officers, and 20 privates.

From the 11th to the 29th of January I was engaged in getting together a competent force of engineers, firemen, and deck hands and in organizing the personnel. The armament of the gunboat consisted of two 3-inch naval rifles, two 1.65-inch Hotchkiss rifles, and four Gatling guns. The infantry detachment was armed with Springfield rifles.

The personnel consisted of 5 commissioned officers; engineers and deck force, 5 noncommissioned officers and 12 privates; cannoneers, 2 noncommissioned officers and 33 privates; infantry detachment, 5 noncommissioned officers and 20 privates; total, 5 commissioned officers, 12 noncommissioned officers, and 65 privates.

On January 27 the gunboat was turned over to me by Maj. C. A. Devol, quartermaster, and on January 29 I issued an order assuming command.

On the morning of February 5, hearing the firing at the front and having received no orders, I dropped down to Malacanan to communicate with the division commander. I was hailed by the department commander and told to remain near by and observe the country across the river in front of the palace. Very soon after receiving these orders Captain Sawtelle appeared on the bank of the river, hailed me, and gave me an order to go at once to the help of Colonel Stotsenburg. I told Captain Sawtelle to see General Otis and signal to me from the palace if I should start. He did this and I started at 7.30 a. m. I reached a point just below the San Juan Creek and opposite the Nebraska landing and opened fire at 8.40 a. m. on Santa Ana with one 3-inch and one 1.65-inch guns.

Receiving a request from Colonel Stotsenburg to bombard the monastery, I moved upstream a short distance and from this point I opened fire on both Santa Ana and the monastery, and afterwards on the church of San Juan del Monte. I also fired into the woods in my front with two Gatling guns and the rifles of the infantry detachment to keep down a light infantry fire from that direction.

At 10.40 I ceased firing, having heard from the commanding officer of the Nebraska troops that I could be of no more assistance on the north side of the river. On the south side I was satisfied that Santa Ana must have fallen into the hands of our troops by that time.

General Anderson and Colonel Stotsenburg are the best judges of the effect of my fire and of the assistance I rendered there.

Table of fire.

	Santa Ana.	San Juan del Monte.	Monastery.	Woods and Santa Ana.	Total.	Remarks.
Rangeyards..	1,100	2,000	1,200	100		
3 inch:						
No. 1, starboard	14		8		22	
No. 2, port.....		15	11		26	
1.65 inch:						
No. 1, starboard	38				38	
No. 2, port.....		18			18	
Aggregate	52	33	19		104	
Gatling gun				1,000		
Riflemen				250		
Aggregate					1,250	

Firing began at 8.40 and ended at 10.40 a. m.

On the 7th I went up the river to cooperate with the First Division. I met General Anderson at San Pedro and he told me that he had sufficient artillery. I said that I

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I was able to take advantage of every opportunity to push ahead as I supposed my main duty required in view of the state.

At 10 a. m. of February 4 I started up the river with Colonel Smith, First California Infantry, who was going to observe the surrender of Pasig. Just at a point below the Pasig Ferry, where there is a sharp turn in the river and a very swift current, the gunboat ran aground. I was helped off eventually by Captain Brannensreuther. The S. was pulled the boat up as far as Pasig, after having collided with a scow and caused some damage to the left wheel of the gunboat.

On the 5th I went into the lake and returned to Pasig.

On the 6th a gunboat was sent me who failed completely to steer the boat and was of no use. The gunboat arrived at the Narcissa landing at 2.53 p. m.

On the 10th I was ordered to San Pedro, where I met General Anderson, who told me to anchor below Pasig, adding that I would not be needed above that point. Anderson at that point might fully aware that an enterprising enemy could easily get a boat past the boat on the bank of the river and put a hole through my boiler and effectively disable the vessel.

On the morning of the 14th, as my orders only allowed me to go above San Pedro for business purposes, I dropped back to San Pedro, and kept myself in connection with General Smith, First California Infantry, commanding the river posts above this point. At 4.15 in the afternoon of the 14th, at Colonel Smith's request, I started up the river and made an attempt to pass the bend at Pasig landing, having received an urgent request from Lieutenant Colonel DeLoe to come to his aid. After running against rocks, and with slight damage to the right wheel, I succeeded in anchoring in a position from which I fired four shots, and the hostile fire ceased. I ordered Lieutenant Harting to take a Hotchkiss gun ashore, as the artillery which Lieutenant Colonel DeLoe had telegraphed for could not arrive for several hours. When the boat was posted off from the *Lepanto de Boy* she upset, throwing Lieutenant Harting and one man into the water. Lieutenant Harting was drowned. The other man succeeded in reaching the shore. The gun and carriage were lost, and the boat drifted down the river. Lieutenant Harting had entire charge of the loading of the boat, and gave the order to shove off, and I think the accident was caused by three of his crew becoming frightened and jumping from the boat onto the gunboat.

On the 15th I took part in the engagement between the First California Regiment and the insurgents. At 5 o'clock p. m., having received orders to anchor for the night at a point on the right of General MacArthur's line, I dropped down the river to that point. The afternoon of February 16 I was relieved by Captain Grant, Utah Artillery, and ordered to report to the commander of the Second Division in person.

Very respectfully,

B. H. RANDOLPH,
Captain, Third Artillery.

[Inclosure 55.]

HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION,
Caloocan, P. I., February 14, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of operations of the Volunteer Signal Corps under my command since the outbreak of hostilities, February 4, 1899:

Four outpost stations had been previously established north of the river—one at Kansas outpost, on the Malabon road; one at Montana outpost, on the Lico road; one at Colorado outpost, on the Balaic-Balaic road, and one at Nebraska camp, McLeod's farm. These were connected in with general city system of offices, as shown by the accompanying sketch map. It was over this system that the general alarm came Saturday night, February 4, 8.30.

In accordance with instructions, I took control of division telegraph system then, and proceeded to General MacArthur's headquarters with Lieut. F. H. Bailey, Volunteer Signal Corps, and 12 men of his squad, with two signal carts of telegraph material. Part of Lieutenant Gordon's squad proceeded to Brigadier-General Hale's residence and prepared to patrol wires in case of breakdown. Lieutenant Gordon placed 2 men at the light-house at mouth of river, ready to open communication with Navy by lantern or torch signals, and proceeded with Private Kirby to the Kansas blockhouse on the beach to mark the left of American lines with red light. When the firing reopened, about 9.30 p. m., as wires had been cut to Montana and Colorado outposts, these two sent up rockets in accordance with prearranged code.

A message was sent to Navy, advising them of the state of affairs. Lieutenant Bailey's men started out to patrol and repair lines toward the Colorado and Nebraska outposts, and I proceeded with General MacArthur's staff to the temporary field headquarters, at junction of Dalumbayan and Bilibid streets. As was afterwards learned, the Montana outpost had been driven into the cemetery. The operator carried his instruments and rockets with him under a heavy fire and reestablished a station, previously selected and prepared there, and sent up the rocket. The rockets were widely noted, and were the cause, it is said, of the Navy opening fire along the front of division. The line to the Montana outpost being down, Sergeant Alexander and 3 men of the Signal Corps with me started to repair. We found the line had been extensively destroyed by the Filipinos, and it was so dark that the repairs were not satisfactorily made before dawn.

Lieutenant Kilbourne, Volunteer Signal Corps, and a squad of 3 men from First Company, came in about 3 o'clock and rendered invaluable assistance in these repairs. Meantime, much messenger service was being performed by the Signal Corps, from offices still in operation, to keep the division commander informed of the condition of affairs. Sunday morning the system was again in operation. A field office was put in at General MacArthur's field headquarters Sunday morning, as there was fighting all along the front of the division that day and notable advances made by the right and center. The amount of business transacted was very great indeed, over 100 messages, involving lengthy and important orders, being sent and received at this one office. Sunday afternoon, when the advance of the center had carried our front to Chinese cemetery and Blockhouse No. 2, division headquarters were moved forward. The two wires constituting the Dalumbayan line were carried forward about $1\frac{1}{4}$ miles, partly by using old wires and poles and partly by construction of new line to Chinese hospital, where an office was established about 6 p. m. Some trouble was experienced that night with wires, due, no doubt, to hasty construction. A line was run Monday morning from Chinese hospital to Blockhouse No. 2 (about 1 mile), using the old telephone line, top wire of wire fence, and bare copper wire on ground, the buzzers being attached as receiving instruments. The buzzers were so difficult to adjust, due to hard field use, that success with them was only partial. They are too delicately made.

Monday forenoon I purchased from the electric-light company 4,000 meters of insulated wire and forwarded it by street car and carts to Lieutenant Bailey, with instructions to lay the wire by the roadside as rapidly as possible. This was done, and by noon an office was working at the Deposito, 4 miles out. At the same time a party consisting of Sergeants Paulson and Flannery and Corporal Nimmo, under my direction, laid an insulated wire along the roadside from the old Kansas outpost on the Malabon road about $1\frac{1}{4}$ miles out, where the Kansans had advanced their lines that morning. A field office was established here early in the afternoon at the headquarters of Brigadier-General Otis. The wire still gave some trouble. A vigorous search disclosed that it was due to poor connections on the loop line on Dalumbayan road; so Sergeant Alexander and his party were instructed to construct a line, laying insulated wire on the ground from division headquarters to connect it with Brigadier-General Otis's headquarters, and leave out Dalumbayan loop. Not sufficient insulated wire being available, about three-eighths of a mile of fine bar copper wire was laid and three-eighths of a mile of insulated wire. That night about 10 p. m. Sergeant Paulson and Private Brooks brought more wire across from General Otis, but there was still one-quarter of a mile of bare wire on the ground. The Dalumbayan circuit was cut out, and single wire around by General Otis put into use. To the surprise of all, the telegraph instruments worked well through the quarter mile of wet grass. Next morning the bar wire was replaced by insulated.

Tuesday, the 7th, Lieutenant Gordon was withdrawn from the blockhouse on the beach, where he had been since Saturday night, and sent to take charge of lines in direction of the captain of the port. He reported that on Sunday he had been joined by Private Young, who came up the beach to deliver messages to him under a heavy fire from insurgent sharpshooters at close range. Tuesday Lieutenant Bailey carried insulated-wire line on the ground to the pumping station, about 5 miles farther. Privates Young and Kirby reported for duty at division headquarters. The latter and Sergeant Alexander were put on duty to establish signaling with the Navy. Assisted by Sergeant Maxeiner, they succeeded in doing so from top of Loma Church (division headquarters)—flag signals by day and torch at night. Private Norton was withdrawn from light-house and reported at division headquarters. On same day, February 8, Lieutenant Gordon was instructed to run a wire direct from line leading up Malabon road to railroad station, there connecting with railroad wire. The line up the railroad was then to be used instead of the long stretch on the ground, etc., up toward Malabon. The change in circuits was made Wednesday evening, with only a few minutes' interruption of business.

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On Wednesday the 10th Lieutenant Bailey and his squad put up a galvanized pole line about 6 inches wide in the ground, thus making a more reliable line. The wire was suspended in the 10th and in the 11th the insulated wire was recovered in subsequent independent construction. Private Brooks, assisted by Private Wisman, made necessary changes and the 101 leg circuit from Malabanan to Loma Church was made into an independent open-circuit line, with instruments at Malabanan, Patero, Loma Church, and Loma Church. This line serves as an alternative means of communication in case of a breakdown on the western half of the system. Brigadier-General Otis's headquarters were removed from near Malabon road on Wednesday about half a mile east, and the office was changed accordingly, with Private West and Nance in charge. Private Young was sent to Malabanan, relieving Private M. Curtis's division headquarters. On Thursday circuits already laid were completed and made more secure. Thursday night the signaling to Navy from division house was interfered with by considerable sharpshooters' fire.

Friday, February 10, morning and early afternoon were occupied in preparing for the attack on Calocan. Lieutenant Rudd, First Company Volunteer Signal Corps, with Sergeants Watkins and Jones, Corporals Schoeneman and Ten Eyck, Privates Logan, Russell, Neal, and Banning, reported for duty about noon. Lieutenant Rudd and Corporal Crowder were ordered to report to Brigadier-General Otis to assist in keeping up communications, and Lieutenant Gordon, assisted by First-Class Sergeant Paulson, Corporals Ten Eyck and Schoeneman, and Privates Kirby, Russell, Banning, and Neal, were to follow up the firing line on the railroad as rapidly as possible, repair the telegraph line, and establish an office at Calocan. The plan was carried out, although considerable delay was caused by extensive destruction of telegraph line. Before advancing, the repair party had been subjected to a very heavy fire, several messages being sent and received at the temporary test station while the party was compelled to lie flat on the ground. Lieutenant Gordon, under my direction, established an office in front of Calocan station about 6 p. m., although a number of messages from the front had been transmitted at various test stations on the way up, when orderlies arrived with them. Possession was taken of Calocan station and a signal flag put up at 5.15 p. m. As the station was used as a temporary hospital for a number of badly wounded insurgent prisoners at the same time the battle was going on only a short distance in front, and the town was burning around us, it may be of interest to note what a typical battlefield telegraph office is like.

Learning that Brigadier-General Otis had taken the Higgins house, about one-third of a mile farther up the track, as his headquarters, the office was moved up there. By that time the darkness made it difficult to trace wires readily, and some trouble was experienced with the circuit, due to hasty construction.

Saturday, February 11, nearly all the telegraph material found in railroad office was moved to Higgins's house, and 30 more cells of battery were ordered from the city, with a view of making this a relay station in case of an advance.

Saturday and Sunday were spent in putting stations in better order and remedying faulty construction. Communication was opened with Navy from Calocan Church on Sunday; the signal party was withdrawn from Loma Church. Saturday afternoon General MacArthur moved his headquarters to Higgins's house, and Brigadier-General Otis having moved half a mile south, near the track, an office was put in there.

On Monday, February 13, Sergeant Paulson and a party put up the line from the railroad to Loma Church, which was laying upon the ground, upon poles.

Tuesday, February 14, communication with church at Calocan, and division headquarters was established by about one-third of a mile of circuit, consisting of fine copper wire; top wire of fence and old telephone line, so that messages could be sent quickly from division headquarters for the Navy. On this occasion very good work was obtained from the buzzers.

I am glad to state my unbounded admiration for the patriotic devotion and tireless work of the officers and men. Lieutenant Rudd has worked with such excellent judgment and zeal as to have made himself indispensable. Lieut. F. H. Bailey, although detached, has performed a surprisingly large amount of work in a short time. All worked so hard and faithfully that I find it difficult to specify any particular one. All were without sleep for the first two days and part of the time without opportunity to get rations. They cheerfully assumed the most exhausting labors, often amidst the greatest danger. Indeed, it has been difficult to keep them back from the points where danger was greatest. Deprived of the satisfaction which men on the firing line have of exchanging shot for shot, they have worked under fire at tasks requiring their undivided attention. When I name First-Class Sergeants Strachaner and Paulson; Sergeants Alexander, Morgan, and Byrne; Corporals Crowder and Mulcahey; Privates Brown, Gable, Kirby, Ives, and Maguire, as especially distin-

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guishing themselves, I would not detract from the praiseworthy work of the others. Sergeant Maxeiner and Privates Weir and Prendergast should be noticed for remaining at their instruments and duties at outposts, although under fire, in some cases for the whole day. Private Young's carrying a message under fire has already been noticed.

Although only for a limited time under my observation, I wish to speak of the intelligent manner with which Sergeant Gordon, of the First Company, Volunteer Signal Corps, handled business at trying times at the headquarters office. First-Class Sergeant Sloan and Corporals Schoeneman and Ten Eyck, First Company, have been doing most excellent work ever since reporting with Lieutenant Rudd.

Two small working parties constructed in the first four days about 14 miles of line. Offices were being continually changed, and it is gratifying to note that all these changes produced remarkably few breaks in a system having so many offices on it.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

EDGAR RUSSEL,
Captain, Volunteer Signal Corps.

[Inclosure 56.]

EIGHTEENTH COMPANY, VOLUNTEER SIGNAL CORPS,
Manila, P. I., March 17, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to report operations of the Eighteenth Company, Volunteer Signal Corps, subsequent to the taking of Caloocan, February 10, up to and including February 28, 1899.

After the establishment of the new position of the Second Division, the following telegraph stations were maintained, officers and men being stationed as shown: At Caloocan, Captain Russell, Lieutenants Gordon and Rudd, 7 men of Eighteenth Company and 4 men of First Company. This detachment kept with it carts, horses, and repair and construction material. At Brigadier-General Otis's field headquarters, 1 operator of Eighteenth Company and 1 operator detailed from Kansas regiment; Loma Church, 2 operators; city headquarters Kansas regiment, 2 operators of Kansas regiment; General MacArthur's city headquarters, 2 operators of First Company; General Hale's headquarters, 1 operator; Major-General Otis's headquarters, 1 operator First Company and 1 operator Eighteenth Company; Pennsylvania city headquarters, 1 operator of Pennsylvania regiment; Brigadier-General Otis's city headquarters, 2 operators and a repair party of 3 men; Colorado outpost (Blockhouse No. 5), 1 operator First Company; Deposito, 1 operator Eighteenth Company, 1 operator Nebraska regiment and a construction and repair party of 8 men under Lieut. F. H. Bailey, provided with a cart, tools, etc.; blockhouse near pumping station, 2 operators; pumping station, 2 operators. This makes a total of 3 officers and 30 men of Eighteenth Company, and 1 officer and 9 men of other organizations who were on duty with Second Division at 13 telegraph and repair stations. Four men of the First Company have been withdrawn since. The line of insulated wire on the ground from railroad to Loma Church was put on poles for greater security, February 13. A temporary line from Higgins's house to Caloocan Church was put up for use to assist in signaling on February 15.

On February 16, assisted by Sergeants Strachauer, Byrne, and Morgan, Privates Brooks and Gable, a line was run from Deposito to San Felipe Church, about 1½ miles, using in part the insurgent wire. Instruments used were two sounders and two open-circuit keys, one being an old Spanish key reconstructed for the occasion. The battery used was old Spanish open-circuit battery. To save necessity for a night operator, a switch and electric bell were put in at San Felipe to call up operator at night. Private Edgar was installed as operator.

On February 17 Lieutenant Bailey and party put up a line on lances about 1 mile long between Blockhouses Nos. 4 and 5 (South Dakota and Colorado regiments). Two old Spanish telephone sets were skillfully repaired by Private Brooks and installed in the blockhouses. Thus Blockhouse No. 4 was put in connection by telephone with the telegraph station.

On February 18 Lieutenant Bailey and party ran a line from the Deposito to powder magazine and Blockhouse No. 7, about 1½ miles long, using old insurgent wires for about half the distance. Three telephone sets were purchased from the Manila

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Telephone Company and installed by Private Brooks in Deposito, powder magazine, and Blockhouse No. 7, respectfully, thus putting last two points in communication with telegraph system. This makes seven points on the front of the division reached by telegraph and telephone, rendering messenger service unnecessary for greater distances than one-half mile. An alarm bell in connection with telegraph instruments at isolated stations where few messengers are to be sent, and yet which through exigencies of the service may have messages of great importance at night, is to be recommended, as the use of a call bell obviates the necessity for but one operator.

On February 17 Corporal Slocumb was sent to assist at Blockhouse No. 5, and Private Storey was placed at Malacanan to repair from that point. The office at Brigadier-General Otis's house was closed, and Corporal Speer was ordered to report to Lieutenant Bailey. On February 19 the office at Caloocan was changed from Higgins's house to the church. This change was made at night while the firing was going on, and a new office was established in ten minutes by running insulated wire from the railroad to the church.

On February 19 Admiral Dewey's courtesy made it possible to arrange a complete scheme of firing by aid of signals whereby points inshore, whether visible from the ship or not, could be reached by the guns of the navy when appropriate signals from shore were given. Caloocan Church tower had been successfully experimented with as a point for signaling to the navy. The system adopted required a good map and an angle-measuring instrument. In this case use was made of the sextant kindly loaned by the captain of the *Monadnock*. By observations from ship and church tower, and the angle signaled from ship, the position of the ship is accurately determined on the map, and a north and south line drawn through it. Having selected the point which it is desired to strike on shore, the scale of the map at once gives the range, and a small protractor gives the bearing from north and south line. Thus, complete firing directions, either by day or night, would be given by such a message as this from shore: "Thirty-eight degrees, 6,200 yards." This message was the one sent February 21, and the effect of the *Monadnock's* 10-inch shells on the village selected as the point, about 1 mile in front of the Kansas regiment, was terribly impressive. Three other shots, varying from 5,000 to 6,500 yards, were equally successful, thoroughly convincing all of the efficiency of this method of fire control.

Appended to this report is a copy of rule adopted for ships and signal stations on shore. The excellent service in signaling from Caloocan rendered by Sergeants Paulsen, Flannery, and Alexander, and Private Kirby is worthy of remark.

With the exception of minor changes in the personnel in some of the stations, no other changes have been made in the company. The lines have been kept in repair and prompt and faithful service has been done by the men whenever called upon.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

EDGAR RUSSEL,
Captain, Volunteer Signal Corps.

SIGNALS BETWEEN U. S. S. MONADNOCK AND GENERAL MACARTHUR.

Monadnock's call letter, "D."

A green light marks right of army line. A Very's green star will be fired and then repeated.

A red light marks the left of army line. A Very's red star will be fired and then repeated.

Monadnock will answer with same colored star as was fired.

Caloocan church is (February 19) the army signal station.

If the army wishes *Monadnock* to fire at any given point army will call "D" and will then signal the azimuth of the point from *Monadnock*. This signal will be repeated by *Monadnock*. After the azimuth signal has been made and repeated the range of the given point from the *Monadnock* will then be signaled to the *Monadnock* and repeated by her.

The azimuth will be signaled in degrees from the north toward east, and thence around through 360 degrees back to north. The range will be in yards. For instance, to indicate a point N. 60 E. and 6,000 yards from the *Monadnock*, the signal will be numeral 60 degrees, 6,000 yards.

Firing will not begin from the *Monadnock* until the army signals "Fire."

Firing from the *Monadnock* will cease when the army signals "Cease."

When the army wishes to signal that the *Monadnock's* guns will not be needed for some time army will signal "All over."

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[Inclosure 57.]

HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF QUARTERMASTER,
Manila, P. I., March 19, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Division Eighth Army Corps, Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report as chief quartermaster of the Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, relative to the work of my department since the outbreak of hostilities on the evening of February 4, 1899:

TRANSPORTATION.

It has been the policy to turn over all transportation to the absolute control of the quartermasters of the different organizations, and hence it was that when the hostilities began every organization knew how much transportation it had, and had it for immediate use. This transportation was amply sufficient for needs of the troops when in peaceful occupation of the city and trenches. However, when on Sunday morning, February 5, our troops moved forward, the ever-increasing length of line and necessity for hurrying ammunition and supplies to the firing line, and the desertion of a number of natives with vehicles, caused an increased demand for transportation, which demand was met by impressing suitable vehicles, carromatas, quiles, caratellas and bull carts. I ordered that in every case a receipt should be given for same, and this was generally obeyed, so that at present date nearly every vehicle and animal so seized has been returned to its owner and payment made according to a scale of prices fixed by a board of officers.

On Monday, February 6, I received from Maj. C. A. Devol, quartermaster, U. S. V., and in charge of the transportation division, a train of 119 buffalo carts, which were at once distributed to the different commands of the division, according to their necessities, and from time to time other calls have been made on Major Devol for buffalo carts and other transportation, which calls have always been filled without delay. Eight of the mules recently arrived from the United States have been turned over to Major Young, commanding the Utah Light Artillery, for draft purposes in hauling his guns, and Lieutenant Fleming's detachment of the Sixth Artillery, temporarily attached to this division, also has 8 mules for this purpose.

In connection with the supply of transportation there has, up to the present, not existed a single unfilled want, and to the credit of the regimental quartermasters and commissary officers may be pointed the fact that on Sunday evening, February 5, the men were all served their rations, and in some cases shelter tents and blankets where they lay on the fighting line, within an hour of the cessation of fire, and these men had advanced from the city carrying nothing but their arms and ammunition.

When Caloocan was taken, February 10, there was found at the car shed there 5 dismantled engines and about 50 passenger coaches, and over 100 freight and flat cars. An efficient train crew and corps of mechanics was organized, with Corporal Haisch, Twentieth Kansas Infantry, as chief engineer, which assembled four of the engines, and on February 12 a train service was established, running two trains from Caloocan to Manila, and three trains from Manila to Caloocan, daily, greatly simplifying the transport problem. The steam tramway was found to be in working order, and that was set in operation February 11, but soon it was found that the railroad supplied all needs, and the tram service was discontinued.

The almost universal good behavior of the Chinese drivers of the buffalo carts, when under fire, led to the recommendation of their employment for service as litter bearers, and, if the experiment succeeded, to hire them as transport coolies. Accordingly, on March 12, I received authority to hire 150, which were secured at \$20, Mexican currency, per month each, and a ration; and if this experiment does not fail, I believe the Chinese will solve the transport problem of an army operating in Luzon in either the wet or dry season. For an advance into hostile territory, I would strongly urge that 100 coolies per battalion be employed, in addition to the transportation now in the hands of the regiments, and moreover, that the Chinese coolies be brought under contract from Hongkong to this country, since, being strangers, the chance of their deserting will be greatly lessened, for they will fear to run away.

The proportion of coolies to soldiers employed by Japan in the war with China was 15,000 coolies to 24,000 men, but no other transportation was used.

FUEL, FORAGE, ETC.

The fuel and forage has been supplied the commands directly from the depots in the city and by means of regimental transportation. In regard to fuel, a large quan-

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tity of coal was found at the railroad yards at Caloocan and is being used by the troops near that point. This coal has been carefully measured as to amount, so that restitution to the Manila and Dagupan Railroad Company will be an easy matter, and the amount of coal used by our troops can readily be distinguished from that used by insurgents, who occupied the railroad yards for a long time previous to our taking Caloocan.

The supplying of forage is in the hands of Second Lieut. George W. Povey, Second Oregon Infantry, U. S. V., acting assistant quartermaster, whose duty it is to procure and supply it, under direction of the depot quartermaster, Maj. S. R. Jones, while forage for the American mules is all in the hands of Maj. C. A. Devol. This division of responsibility led to some confusion at first, which was so quickly rectified that no suffering to the animals resulted, although the same confusion might result from the same cause again.

WATER.

So soon as the line was established, February 11, I personally investigated the question of the water supply and found the commands supplied as follows:

First Nebraska Infantry, U. S. V., from Deposito and pumping station, city waterworks.

First Colorado Infantry, U. S. V., from living spring and nearest city hydrant.

First South Dakota Infantry, U. S. V., from their own battalion condensers, hauled by bull carts.

Tenth Pennsylvania Infantry, U. S. V., from well in Chinese hospital.

Third U. S. Artillery and part of First Montana Infantry, U. S. V., from stream intersecting their line of trenches.

First Montana Infantry, U. S. V., detachment of artillery, and Twentieth Kansas Infantry, U. S. V., from railroad water tanks and from city waterworks, hauled by railroad service.

The water, except from the South Dakota Infantry condensers, was ordered boiled before drinking, and no fault was found with the supply. However, to discontinue the use of well water for the Tenth Pennsylvania Infantry, three water carts were secured from Capt. Lea Febiger, Twenty-third Infantry, chief of the sanitary department, to haul water from the city waterworks, and to facilitate the hauling of water for other commands 188 empty wine casks were purchased and distributed where needed.

On February 25, 1899, I was notified by the chief surgeon of the division that the large condenser of the first reserve hospital was prepared to supply water for drinking and cooking purposes to the entire command, and water cans, wine casks, and the necessary transportation was at once furnished each command for this purpose, excepting the First Nebraska Regiment, which because of its distance from the condenser and the bountiful supply of water, this was not thought to be advisable. Shortly afterward Major Devol set up and began operating the second large condenser, very near the railroad terminus, this adding to the supply of water and reducing the amount of city hauling. The supply of water now is abundant and absolutely pure for the entire division. In case of an advance to another line of permanent occupation there are for this division seventeen condensers of an excellent pattern, devised by and built under direction of First Lieut. F. L. Burdick, quartermaster First South Dakota Infantry, each with a capacity of 20 gallons condensed water per hour, which can readily be transported and easily operated, and will insure the water supply.

I have made no effort to establish anything in the way of a division transportation train or supply depot, believing that the regiment is the proper unit of administration and supply when a central depot is near at hand; but I have endeavored to anticipate and fill promptly every demand for transportation and to supply or aid in the supplying of every other want which it is the duty of the Quartermaster's Department to meet. So soon as transportation or material is furnished it is at once turned over to the regimental quartermasters, who then become responsible for its use, care, and distribution, and to this policy of decentralization I believe is largely due the fact that the division moved so smoothly and all wants were met so quickly.

For the regimental quartermasters themselves I can not speak too highly, for it is by their efficient, hard, and conscientious work and intelligent foresight that this success has been accomplished.

Respectfully submitted.

C. G. SAWTELLE, Jr.,
Captain and Assistant Quartermaster, U. S. V., Chief Quartermaster.

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY. 509

[Inclosure No. 58.]

HDQRS. SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
OFFICE CHIEF COMMISSARY,
Manila, P. I., March 16, 1899.

COMMISSARY, — *Brigade, Second Division.*

SIR: Please send to this office before March 19 your report of work of the subsistence department in the — brigade during the operations of February 4-28. State facts as to prompt and continuous supply and regular rationing on the firing line, and methods of delivery to troops; also maintenance of travel-ration reserve. State as to supply of fresh vegetables and fresh beef to troops on the line; and, in short, what the troops get and how they get it.

It would be well also to give facts as to purchase of luxuries with a company savings, and with profits from bakeries and exchanges, and other facts within your knowledge, making clear the quality of service rendered to the Army by the subsistence department.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ROBERT H. FITZHUGH,
Major and Chief Commissary Subsistence, U. S. V.

HDQRS. SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
OFFICE OF CHIEF COMMISSARY,
Manila, P. I., March 20, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to forward herewith reports from brigade commissaries of the work of the subsistence department in the Second Division during the operations of February 4-28, and to add thereto a few details of the highly creditable service reported.

On the evening of February 5, after hard fighting, and a general advance all along the division line, the troops were given their supper promptly at the regular hour; and, during all of the subsequent movements, while the troops have been constantly confronting the enemy, either in line or in the trenches, the continuous supply of rations has been maintained without a break, and at all times a reserve of at least two days of travel ration has been kept on hand. On February 5 and 6 a portion of the troops received the "travel ration," being—

	Pounds.
Corned beef, canned.....	$\frac{3}{4}$
Hard bread.....	1
Baked beans, canned.....	$\frac{1}{2}$
Coffee.....	$1\frac{7}{8}$
Sugar.....	$2\frac{3}{4}$

But with that exception the issue has been as follows:

	Lbs.	Oz.
Fresh beef, 7 days in 10.....	1	0
Bacon, 2 days in 10.....	$\frac{3}{4}$	0
Salmon, 1 day in 10.....	1	0
Fresh bread, daily.....	1	2
Potatoes, daily (80 per cent).....	0	$12\frac{1}{2}$
Onions, daily (20 per cent).....	0	$3\frac{1}{2}$
(Or potatoes, 75 per cent; onions, 15 per cent; canned tomatoes, 10 per cent.)		
Coffee.....	0	$1\frac{7}{8}$
Sugar.....	0	$2\frac{3}{4}$

Vinegar, salt and pepper in authorized proportions. To which was added, on days of fresh beef issue, the option of 4 ounces more of fresh beef, or 2 ounces each of rice, dried fruits, and (when on hand) oatmeal.

To the above were added canned corned beef, ham, canned milk and cream, fruits, preserves, and a long list of delicacies sold by the subsistence department at cost, which were purchased by each organization with proceeds from savings of subsistence

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stores. An instance of what has been done in this way can be seen in the fact that the First Colorado Volunteers realized in February—

From savings of subsistence stores	\$277.66
Profits of regimental bakery	927.68
	<hr/> 1,205.34

Which sum, I am informed, was principally expended in increasing the ration.

The most notable features of the supply are the deliveries of fresh beef and vegetables. Refrigerated beef from Australia and the United States, which would be called excellent in any United States market, is delivered on the line frozen before 8 a. m., and officers and men assure me that it is perfectly good on the day following their receipt of it, although generally used as soon as received. Fresh potatoes from the United States are issued, equal in quality to any found in the markets of our own country.

The cooking and service of the ration is reported to be such as to give general and entire satisfaction. Men in the trenches receive the kind of meals usually given in quarters; and to advanced pickets at exposed points close to the enemy hot coffee and meals are carried.

The rations are delivered, according to location, by casco, cart, and rail; and due credit should be given for the great efficiency of the transportation. Much of the service of distribution has been necessarily rendered under fire; and the distributing points along the division front, including the reserve station and sales room established by Captain Bootes at Calocan have, at times, been practically on the firing line.

I have heard of but one case of the loss of a meal. The First Nebraska Volunteers, who had been closely engaged during the whole night of February 4, advanced upon the enemy's lines at daylight of the 5th, and, without stopping for breakfast, drove them beyond the Deposito by 10 a. m. The loss of that breakfast can not be fairly charged to the subsistence department.

The above facts need no comment. The officers and men to whose service such a result is due deserve the very highest praise.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ROBERT H. FITZHUGH,
Major and Chief Commissary Subsistence, U. S. V.,
Chief Commissary Second Division.

[Inclosure 59.]

OFFICE OF THE SUBSISTENCE SALES DEPOT,
26 CALLE ECHAGUE, QUIAPO,
Manila, Luzon Island, March 18, 1899.

CHIEF COMMISSARY,
Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: In compliance with your letter dated 16th instant, I have the honor to inform you that the regular garrison ration was issued to all the brigade and was supplied to regimental commissaries and by them to troops.

Travel rations were issued but for the first three days.

On February 8 brigade commissary instructed all regimental commissaries to hold two days' travel ration as a reserve and to be informed at once if less was on hand.

Organizations not having commissaries were attached to nearest regiment for rations.

The ration has been perfectly satisfactory; no complaints have come to notice, either against quality or method of supply.

With the exception of the travel ration, troops were rationed by Captain Krauthoff in charge of issues to command.

What was the exact composition and proportion of garrison ration I have not been informed.

I have made no inspection regarding the interior administration of the organizations' kitchens, it not being in my province as brigade commissary, and can give no information as to extras purchased by funds from various sources.

Very respectfully,

M. G. KRAYENBUHL,
Captain and Commissary of Subsistence, U. S. V.,
in charge of the Sales Depot, Brigade Commissary.

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[Inclosure 60.]

OFFICE OF THE COMMISSARY,
FIRST BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Caloocan, P. I., March 18, 1899.

Maj. R. H. FITZHUGH,
Chief Commissary Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: In reply to your letter of March 16 I have the honor to state that since February 4, 1899, the troops comprising this brigade have been rationed with the greatest dispatch, and at no time has any organization been forced to even wait for, much less miss, a meal. For the first day or two they had to subsist on the Regular Army travel rations, but with that exception they have been provided with the best of refrigerator beef, fresh vegetables, and fresh bread as part of the regular ration. On the occasion of every advance, the rations were not only delivered to the men on the firing line, but their meals were prepared and ready for them at meal hours. In addition to the regular rations each command of this brigade has a reserve of three days' emergency rations, always loaded on carts, which can always be moved forward at a moment's notice. And, in addition to the aforesaid, I have established at this point a sales depot where all the luxuries kept by the department may be purchased by officers and men; I also carry here about 3,000 travel rations, in case all other precautions that have been taken should fail.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. B. BOOTES,
*Captain and Commissary of Subsistence, U. S. V.,
Acting Brigade Commissary of Subsistence.*

[Inclosure 61.]

HDQRS. SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SURGEON,
Manila, P. I., February 21, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Second Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to respectfully submit the following report of the action and movements of the medical department of the Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, during the engagements in the suburbs of Manila and Caloocan, P. I., from the 4th to the 17th of February, 1899, inclusive:

Pursuant with verbal instructions from the the division commander, in anticipation of an engagement, six dressing and ambulance stations previously selected in protected locations, as follows: Commencing on our extreme right, first, near east terminus of the rope walk; second, behind elevation near Santa Mesa hill on direct road from Malacanan; third, behind wall of Balic Balic Church, near terminus of Calle San Roque; fourth, near carriage factory, near terminus of Calle Gastonbide; fifth, at Cementerio on Calle Cervantes, opposite hospital San Lazaro; sixth, near terminus of Calle Anton Rivera.

We were called into action February 4, 1899, 10 p. m. As there were only 8 ambulances for entire department, it was thought best to park those available for Second Division at temporary headquarters to answer calls, and this was done at Calle Bilibid in front of prison. The ambulances available were three in number and were protected by a guard of a sergeant and 8 men. One more was ordered to report to me by officer in charge of ambulances, but for some unknown reason did not appear. With this force and the additional assistance of one or more ambulances from first reserve hospital and several carriages or quilez impressed during February 5, 1899, the killed, 21 in number, and 73 wounded, all of the Second Division, Eighth Corps, were transported to the first reserve hospital without unnecessary delay, and the latter made as comfortable as possible under existing circumstances.

Owing to the rapid advance of our troops, the dressing stations noted were obliged to be changed. Those in the First Brigade were first moved to the red brick chapel at Chinese cemetery and afterwards to the Chinese church. Those of the Second Brigade were moved near Blockhouse No. 5, Blockhouse No. 4, Deposito, and near waterworks, where they still remain. During the time division headquarters were established at Chinese church 1 ambulance was detained and kept at that point attending emergency work.

February 10, 11 a. m., was instructed by division commander to prepare medical department for an anticipated engagement in vicinity of First Brigade. Procured 3

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ambulances, drivers, orderlies, litter bearers, and 5 quilez, with drivers, from Captain Keifer, officer in charge, and parked same in ravine about 200 yards in rear of center of intrenched line of the First Montana, the best shelter the topography of the location afforded. In the meantime, under direction of Maj. F. J. Adams, acting brigade surgeon First Brigade, a road had been prepared parallel with the rear of our intrenchments, crossing the Manila-Dagupan Railway line and connecting with the Manila-Malabon tramway in rear of Twentieth Kansas.

The infantry began the advance and the engagement commenced at 3.30 p. m. During the advance, from line of attack to Caloocan, 3 men were killed and 25 wounded, all of the latter being promptly dressed by their respective regimental medical officers, under fire, and rapidly removed to the ambulance station by the Hospital Corps litter bearers, who were in some instances assisted by men from the firing line, transported in the ambulances to the tramway, and taken from that point to the city on cars. As the troops were rapidly advancing beyond Caloocan, I established a dressing and ambulance station at the residence of a Mr. Higgins, on the north side of the town, and at once had ambulances forwarded to that point. Seven, wounded north of Caloocan before darkness stopped the advance, were brought to this station on litters and at once sent to the first reserve hospital at Manila in 2 ambulances. Before 11 p. m. all the injured in this battle, 32 in number, were attended to and made comfortable at the first reserve hospital, Manila, P. I., and before midnight a list of the killed and wounded, showing name, rank, and organization of each man, was forwarded to Headquarters Department of the Pacific.

From February 4 to 17, inclusive, reports of 32 killed and 144 wounded in Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, have been received at this office. The fact that, although many are severely wounded in one or more of their limbs, no amputation has been necessary, demonstrates the great value of the "first aid packet." In addition to attending to the wounded of our own troops, about 40 wounded Filipinos have been given aid and transportation to the hospital by the medical, hospital, and ambulance corps of this division. Their wounds not having received the primary service rendered our soldiers, are in nearly every case infected. In both engagements noted, and numerous skirmishes intervening, each of which assisted in increasing the casualty list, it gives me pleasure to report that the members of the Medical Department have certainly done their duty. The presence and service of the medical officers on the firing line, the careful and rapid handling of the injured by the litter and ambulance corps, and the magnificent results of the surgical attention, subsequent care and nursing at the first reserve hospital, all testify to the most efficient service in every branch.

That service in the Medical Department is not devoid of danger is shown by the fact that during the battle of Caloocan John A. Gibbons, private, Hospital Corps, and a brave lad, was shot and killed while assisting in carrying Capt. William L. Hill, First Montana Infantry, wounded, toward a place of safety.

Since the battle of Caloocan there has been regimental hospitals established for Twentieth Kansas at Caloocan Church, for First Montana at Caloocan railway station, for Third Artillery in camp near regimental lines, for Utah Battery near their battery headquarters, the Tenth Pennsylvania remaining as before in the Chinese church. As present situation is presumably temporary, no effort has been made to equip regular hospitals, but all cases are given emergency service and at once forwarded to first reserve hospital. Two ambulances are on emergency duty at temporary division headquarters in Caloocan and one at waterworks in Second Brigade.

Personnel of medical department on duty during this time was as follows: One brigade surgeon, 1 acting brigade surgeon, 14 regimental medical officers, 1 ambulance medical officer, 14 hospital stewards, 2 acting hospital stewards, 36 privates, and 4 ambulances with attendants.

I have the honor to remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

HENRY F. HOTT,
Major and Chief Surgeon.

[Inclosure 62.]

IN THE FIELD AT PASIG, February 12, 1899.

CHIEF SURGEON EIGHTH ARMY CORPS.

SIR: I have the honor to report that yesterday afternoon while Company F, Fourteenth Infantry, was on a scout south of this place, having gone as far as old Camp Dewey, they were returning to camp, the insurgents followed them up and opened fire upon them.

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On hearing the firing I accompanied the brigade commander to the front and on the firing line found two wounded men—

William H. Ranson, private, Company F, Fourteenth Infantry, superficial wound of left shoulder by Remington rifle. (Further examination shows this wound to have been due to a Mauser bullet.—Herbert W. Cardwell, major and chief surgeon, U. S. V.)

Beanhart Hensil, private, Company F, Fourteenth Infantry, shattered right elbow and wound of right side, possibly of kidney, by Mauser rifle.

I returned to this point and wired for the ambulance, sending all wounded to First Reserve Hospital last night. Last night the ambulance reported back to me and is now here.

After a sharp engagement of half an hour or so reinforcements arrived and one small gunboat. The insurgents then retreated to Paranaque.

So far we have had no further trouble, although it may be we will be directed to advance at any movement to capture Paranaque.

It is a noteworthy fact that almost every wound produced within this brigade has been produced by the Remington bullet. We have evidently but few Mauser rifles on this side of the river.

Very respectfully,

GEO. H. PENROSE,

Major and Brigade Surgeon, U. S. V.

[Inclosure 63.]

HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,
OFFICE OF MILITARY INFORMATION,
Manila, P. I., March 1, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

First Brigade, First Division, Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: I have the honor to report that, pursuant to the verbal instructions of the brigadier-general commanding, I proceeded at 1 p. m. on Monday, February 20, across the Pasig River to its north bank, opposite his headquarters at San Pedro Macati, with Companies M and K, First Regiment of Washington Volunteers, consisting of 121 men and 5 officers.

My instructions contemplated scouring the north bank of the river as far as the mouth of the San Mateo River for the purpose of finding and capturing or driving away certain insurgent troops whose patrols and sharpshooters had, from concealment on the north bank of the river, been annoying the troops stationed in the vicinity of brigade headquarters. I was also, after accomplishing this, to bring these two companies on the right flank of the force of insurgents which had taken up a position on the south bank of the Pasig River about halfway between Guadalupe and San Pedro Macati, from which they had been harassing our outposts for about a week.

Making such a disposition of our force as would best fulfill the necessities of security and information, we proceeded eastward, skirting the timber along the north bank of the Pasig. It was my purpose to move in a stealthy manner beyond any patrols that might then be in the timber and, cutting them off from retreat, capture them as we came back westward. Having arrived at a point (about a mile from San Pedro Macati) where the terrain was still rising to a greater height, in the angle formed by the Pasig and San Mateo rivers, and having discovered no insurgents up to this time, we were just making preparation to dispose our force for the purpose of clearing hostile patrols out of the timber on our return movement when the officer in command of a patrol left on the edge of the timber to protect our flank discovered some insurgents about one-third of a mile farther eastward, on higher ground, toward the San Mateo River. This was reported to me, and while making a personal examination the command was halted at the edge of the forest and left in concealment.

After a careful study of the terrain, it became apparent that a direct advance could not be made because of a deep gulch, with precipitous sides of stone, which stood between us and the insurgent position. It was impossible to approach their right flank in concealment and without making a wide detour through a deep valley. This method of advance had another objection, viz, that we should have driven them into the rough and wooded country near the junction of the San Mateo and Pasig rivers, where they might easily have escaped in bancas. Though the country was very rough on their left flank, it was rather heavily timbered and offered the best route of approach in concealment, and I thought a way could be seen of reaching still higher ground to their left and rear without discovery. This line of attack was decided upon and the flanking patrol was left where it then was, in good concealment behind a high point which possessed much natural strength and afforded a good view of the

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insurgent position. The lieutenant in command of this patrol was instructed to remain with a half dozen of his men in continuous view of the insurgents, keeping the rest under cover, and when he heard firing to move in such a way as to protect our left flank.

Carefully locating certain landmarks for our guidance, with the rest of the company properly disposed, we now proceeded, under good concealment, to gain the high ridge in their left rear I had selected with my glasses. About halfway there it was necessary to leave another detachment on a road which crossed our line of advance in order to guard our rear and line of retreat.

The remainder of the command still outnumbered any body of insurgents probably there, and advancing rapidly we gained the desired position without discovery by the insurgents, taking them completely by surprise. As soon as we opened fire some of them began to run, while others took cover and returned our fire. We continued to advance on them, however, and they were easily defeated, notwithstanding the fact that the reserve (Company K) did not get to the front quick enough to take any part in the fight. Their resistance lasted a few minutes only, certainly less than ten, after which we chased them about a mile and the fight was over. We had no casualties on our side, but found 2 dead insurgents and 3 badly wounded. The injuries of the latter were dressed by the doctor and they were brought back to the river for shipment to the hospital in Manila.

We estimated the insurgent force at from 40 to 50 men, and one of the wounded (who was a sergeant) told me they had 60 men, but a few were absent after food. Being in a hurry to get back on the flank of the insurgents who were on the south bank of the Pasig, lack of time prevented a thorough search for dead and wounded in the chaparral which filled the ravines near the field of action. Some natives were impressed for the purpose of transporting the wounded insurgents, and having detailed a sufficient number of men to assist them and furnish a guard they were started back to San Pedro Macati through the open country. The rest of the command was assembled and marched down the river through the brush to our remaining duty. I knew where the insurgents on the opposite side of the river were, for we had located them with a reconnoitering patrol the day before.

Proceeding in front with a small patrol, and the companies moving in parallel columns, I went to the edge of the river, and observing that they were in the same place we had previously seen them, Company M was posted on the north bank about 150 yards higher up the river than the position of the insurgents, with instructions to fire on them as they retreated. Company K was taken down the river to a point immediately opposite their flank, and we gradually worked our way to the water's edge, pouring in such a heavy fire upon them that they were compelled to shift their position. They stood their ground about twenty minutes, however (returning as hot a fire as I have yet seen). They then broke and began to run to the rear. The company first posted (M) had opened fire sooner than was expected and drew a hot return, which drove it away from the edge of the river. The other company (K) did much execution on them before they abandoned their position and while they were retreating.

In this part of our fight we lost 2 men killed, 1 from each company. Nine dead insurgents and 3 badly wounded were found on the field. We estimated the number of insurgents engaged in this fight as about 100.

Maj. G. F. Shiels, brigade surgeon, voluntarily sought and obtained permission to accompany this reconnoissance. Instead of following in the rear, the position assigned to doctors in a fight, he of his own accord accompanied me in the front and remained there throughout the afternoon. As it turned out, it was well that he did go with us, for 2 of the insurgents were badly wounded and needed the skillful attention they received. When the wounded were started back to the river he secured a gun and belt from one of the men who was assisting in transporting wounded and, in the subsequent fight at the river side, joined with the men and used the gun to good effect. He conducted himself in a courageous and soldierly manner throughout both engagements.

I was also voluntarily accompanied by Prof. George F. Becker, United States geologist, who had previously been with me in two more extensive engagements. His conduct throughout the afternoon was characterized, as it always is, by cool and courageous behavior. He was always in the front of the fight with the men and rendered valuable service by guiding Company K to a position at which I desired them to await my coming.

During the afternoon's work there were 2 men of the Washington regiment whose exceptionally cool and courageous conduct especially attracted my attention, viz, Corpls. Alexander Selig, of Company M, and Otto Haughtington, of Company K. One of them, Corporal Selig, accompanied me personally and the other came under

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my notice at the fight on the river's edge. Both performed their duty in an exceptionally efficient and fearless manner.

I have not the slightest doubt there were many others that did the same, but I regret that attention to the responsibilities of my position prevented my observing them.

Very respectfully,

J. F. BELL,
Major of Engineers, in Charge.

[Inclosure 64.]

HEADQUARTERS PROVOST-MARSHAL-GENERAL,
DEPARTMENT OF SANITATION,
Manila, P. I., February 21, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Headquarters Provost-Marshal-General.

SIR: I have the honor to report that the major portion of the suburb of Paco, beyond the estero of the same name, was burned last night. The fire broke out at 7.45 p. m. in two or three contiguous places just north of the quarters occupied by 2 companies of the Washington regiment on Calle Real. Owing to a rather high wind and the inflammable nature of the nipa houses, the flames rapidly spread to the west till the estero was reached. Most of the district thus burned was south of the Calle Real. By midnight it had about exhausted itself, when three fires broke out simultaneously about half a mile north of the Washington quarters. The fire spread rapidly to the south, and the north against the wind, evidently being assisted. By the efforts of the soldiers and bomberros the flames were prevented from sweeping south, and though the quarters caught fire once or twice no damage was done to them. By 3 o'clock a. m. the flames had worked well to the north, away from the city proper, and the danger was practically over.

On the breaking out of the first fire patrols from the Washingtons arrested 25 men suspected of starting them, 2 being dressed in women's clothes.

At first the bomberros were interfered with and prevented from crossing the Paco bridge by the crowds of soldiers (all armed) from different organizations, who had congregated there; no such trouble was experienced later in the evening.

The hand engine of the district is so weak that better results were obtained by using the direct pressure from the mains. All that could be done was to wet the nipa roofs of adjoining buildings to keep the flames from spreading, and they were thus prevented from crossing the estero into the heart of Paco. The second fire in the north was in a locality unsupplied with fire hydrants, so nothing could be done, the sparks spreading the flames with great rapidity from roof to roof.

The two companies of Washington troops, under Captain Otis, did great service with a few lengths of hose they had, and thoroughly patrolled the streets, undoubtedly preventing further incendiarism. Their quarters now stand in a little oasis of nipa huts. The steam engines in Santa Cruz and Intramures were not called out, as the orders have been that each division of the fire department must, by itself, look out entirely for its own district, as incendiary fires in the suburbs would most likely be for a decoy to get them away from their own more important sections.

In my opinion, the fires were undoubtedly of incendiary origin, started by the natives themselves. Most of the nipa houses had been abandoned as though in anticipation.

Our only means of communication between stations, the telephone, was utterly useless. The wire from Intramures to Santa Cruz was reported broken, and after midnight no response could be secured from the central office at Paco.

Very respectfully,

LEA FEBIGER,
Captain, Twenty-third Infantry, Chief Department of Sanitation.

[Inclosure 65.]

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., February 21, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Department of Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, Manila, P. I.

SIR: I respectfully inclose herewith a report of the acting inspector-general, First Division, Eighth Army Corps, referring to the fire that occurred last night.

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I concur in the opinion expressed that the fire referred to was incendiary.

Saturday night, February 18, our men were fired on from buildings in East Paco, and in 20 vacant houses lighted candles were left burning in such a way that upon burning down they would fire the houses. This was discovered in time. Captain Otis reports that last night fires were started in two different places, to the south of Calle Real, causing the first conflagration, and later in the night fires were started in two or more localities, north of the Calle Real, simultaneously.

Two Filipinos were taken in women's clothes, evidently incendiaries, and a number of other arrests were made.

The fires were started in unoccupied houses, but in occupied houses the natives had all their household effects packed and ready to move. In fact it is known that warnings were given.

I commend Captain Otis and his command for preserving order under very trying conditions.

I have given this matter a personal investigation.

Very respectfully,

THOMAS M. ANDERSON,
Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding Division.

[Inclosure 66.]

OFFICE ACTING INSPECTOR-GENERAL,
FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Manila, P. I., February 21, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Headquarters First Division, Eighth Army Corps, Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to report that this morning at 2 o'clock I visited East Paco to examine into the state of affairs there, the place being the scene of an extensive conflagration at the time. I found—

1. That the place was about destroyed by fire.

2. There were evidences that this was of incendiary origin. These evidences are, first, that the fire started at several widely separated places in East Paco at the same time; second, the houses burned (in case of the more substantial buildings, those without thatched roofs) caught fire from the interior, a circumstance that I was a witness to, conveying to my mind the belief that someone had gone into them, fired them, and then gone off.

3. At one place while our men were carefully looking out to preserve order amidst all this pandemonium I came across some civilians (two) and about half a dozen soldiers of the Washingtons, armed, in a boisterous and drunken debauch, into which evidently the soldiers were seduced by the two civilians. A more unseasonable time and place for such a disgraceful affair can not be imagined. Procuring a patrol of men from Captain Otis, Washington regiment, I returned to the scene of this saturnalia and arrested the whole party, civilians and all, turning them over to Captain Otis. When I returned to the theater of the debauch I found Lieutenant Gustin, Washingtons, there doing all he could to put a stop to it. I highly commend his conduct. I also commend in highest terms I am capable of using the conduct of Captain Otis. He has thoroughly studied his neighborhood and knows how to deal with it.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. E. BIRKHTIMER,
Captain, Third Artillery, Acting Inspector-General.

[Inclosure 67.]

CUARTEL DE ESPAÑA,
Manila, P. I., February 25, 1899.

ADJUTANT,

Second Regiment Oregon U. S. V.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the engagement in Tondo on the 23d day of February, 1899:

About 9.30 o'clock in the morning of that day I received verbal orders through Lieut. Col. G. O. Yoran, to take 2 companies of my battalion and proceed to Tondo for the purpose of capturing or driving out a body of insurgents, which had in some

manner passed our lines and established themselves in that neighborhood. Taking Companies E and M, I started from the Cuartel de España about 10 a. m. Company E, Capt. R. E. Davis, had 50 men, First Lieut. T. N. Dunbar being second in command. Company M, Capt. J. M. Poorman, had 43 men, Second Lieut. C. R. Platts also being with the company. The men carried 100 rounds of ammunition each, and one day's travel ration.

Near the Bridge of Spain Capt. J. E. McKelvey, of the Thirteenth Minnesota Regiment, reported to me, by order of General Hughes, to direct me to the proper district. We proceeded to the church in Tondo, headquarters of Company M, Thirteenth Minnesota, and halted. Insurgent sharpshooters were close by and were making things decidedly interesting. I ascended the tower of the church, and had a good view of the battlefield and the position of the insurgents, which was pointed out to me by First Lieut. L. D. Bruckart, Company M, Thirteenth Minnesota. At the church I was joined by Companies C and M of that regiment. Company C, Second Lieut. James F. Snow in command, had 35 men, and Company M, Captain McKelvey, had 45 men. First Lieutenant Bruckart was present with this company.

Advancing down the road to the north, as far as the first main cross road, I halted and formed a line of battle. Company E, Captain Davis, was given a position on the left, in line of skirmishers, with his left 50 yards from the water. Company M, Second Oregon, Captain Poorman, was placed in the center of the line, and Company C, Second Lieutenant Snow, Thirteenth Minnesota, on the right. Company M, Thirteenth Minnesota, Captain McKelvey, was held in reserve. This made a continuous line of skirmishers about one-quarter of a mile in length. Directly in front of us was a thick collection of huts scattered through the trees. The line was pierced in two places by the main streets leading toward Caloocan. On these streets our line was left blank because of the heavy fire down them maintained by the insurgents from their stone barricades erected a short distance ahead and behind which a good force of sharpshooters had been stationed.

The line having been formed, the bugle sounded "Forward" and the advance commenced. Firing began almost immediately and soon became very warm. The Mausers could be heard on all sides, and it was impossible to ascertain where the bullets came from, as smokeless powder was being used by the enemy. Our men became a little nervous under this flank fire, and we halted before we had proceeded more than 100 yards, the men taking refuge behind a stone wall. Seeing that nothing could be done until this flank fire by the sharpshooters had been stopped, and as it seemed to be coming from the native huts, I sent out orders to burn all the huts, and to advance again, slowly, burning the huts as we proceeded. The bugle again sounded "Forward" and the line moved on. As the houses on all sides of us began to go up in flames the position of the insurgent sharpshooters became untenable and they retreated, relieving our men from the flank fire. The different companies kept in touch with each other on the flanks in fine style and we advanced steadily. The firing again became very heavy all along the line, but the men exercised good judgment and kept under cover as much as possible while advancing. The insurgents, when driven from their houses, bore off toward the left flank, and many of them were shot down by our men. They were evidently making for the lagoon in front of Malabon, where, I afterwards ascertained, a good many of them escaped by wading and swimming.

As we neared the line of barricades across the streets, the fire became very hot, as the enemy was protected on each street by stone inclosures. The stone inclosure to the left of the street-car line and in front of Company M, Second Oregon, and Company C, Thirteenth Minnesota, was especially well defended. Here a hot fire was maintained until some of our men got up in a house which gave them a flank fire into the insurgents, and from which many of the enemy were killed, and resulting in the Filipinos being driven out of their stronghold. As they ran they were exposed to the fire of our men on the left, and many of them were killed on the outside. Around this inclosure and inside of it 30 dead insurgent were afterwards counted. On the other street the inclosure was obstinately defended by them, but the insurgents were driven out in good style by the left of Captain Poorman's line and the right of Captain Davis's. Inside of this inclosure were found 5 dead insurgents and 6 wounded, and many dead were scattered over the adjacent gardens. When we reached the first line of barricades, near the inclosures which we had captured, I halted and re-formed the line, where we rested a little while, keeping up in the meantime an incessant fire on the insurgents remaining in our front. At this time I sent back for more ammunition, as the supply had nearly run out. Companies C and M, Thirteenth Minnesota, each had 2,000 rounds in reserve in their quarters. This was brought up in carrometeras, and distributed to the men on the firing line. Word was sent to General Hughes with the request that more be forwarded.

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The hardest fighting was now over, although our work was not yet completed by any means. Company M, Thirteenth Minnesota, commanded by Captain McKelvey, was held in reserve, and although his men were not on the firing line, the company did good work escorting prisoners to the rear and as scouts sent out to the right and left to keep me informed as to the position of our line. A private of Company G, Thirteenth Minnesota, named Baker, was badly wounded at this point by a shot through the back of the neck, and Private M. Hilderbrandt, of Company E, Second Oregon, was shot in the finger, receiving a slight wound. One other private, Ira B. Smith of Company C, Thirteenth Minnesota, was slightly wounded in the breast. Under the shelter of the stone inclosure at these barricades, Dr. Ritchie, Thirteenth Minnesota and Hospital Steward Brosius, Second Oregon, did excellent work in caring for the wounded. Those able to be moved were transported to the rear. At this point many prisoners were captured and sent to the rear under guard.

While waiting there two companies of the Twenty-third Infantry arrived upon the scene, under command of Major Goodale. He being my senior, and desiring first of all hearty cooperation in the work before us, I offered him the command of the whole line, which he accepted. After a short rest the whole line again advanced, driving everything before it until we reached the depot of the Manila and Malibon tramway. Here we again halted and reformed the companies. At this point Captain McKelvey, in command of Company M, Thirteenth Minnesota, was obliged to return to the hospital. He had been on duty for forty-eight hours without rest, fighting fires, doing patrol work, etc., and was well nigh worn out. He had performed good work during the firing, and deserves credit for sticking to it as long as he did. First Lieutenant Bruckart took command in his stead. Here we received an abundant supply of ammunition.

Here I suggested to Major Goodale that Company E, Second Oregon, Captain Davis, be sent across the bridge to deploy in skirmish order through the timber to the right, to be joined on the left by other companies in skirmish order. Thus we would have a line before which we could drive the enemy. This was done, Captain Davis forming as designated and advancing toward Caloocan. Lieutenant Snow, Thirteenth Minnesota, formed with his company on the left. Major Goodale then advanced down the road with his companies of the Twenty-third, and I followed with Companies M of the Second Oregon and the Thirteenth Minnesota. After a short advance I crossed the slough to the right with my 2 companies and formed them in the brush in skirmish order to the left of Captain Davis's line. We then advanced through the woods in skirmish order, clearing up everything in front of us until we reached Caloocan, in the rear of Major-General MacArthur's quarters. On nearing Caloocan the center and right of my line on the crest of the ridge were exposed to the view of the insurgents beyond the line of Major-General MacArthur and were given two or three volleys. The Mauser bullets fell about thickly, but no one was hurt.

On reaching Caloocan the companies were re-formed, and I reported my arrival to General MacArthur. Having completed the work for which we were sent out, we returned to our quarters in the city.

Too much praise can not be given the officers and men of the Oregon and Minnesota regiments who took part in the engagement. Captain Davis on the left, Captain Poorman in the center, and Lieutenant Snow on the right held their companies in good control, kept their men advancing steadily, took advantage of every cover, and inflicted heavy loss upon the enemy, with very slight loss to ourselves. In my battalion not a man was killed, and only three were wounded; 1 in Company C, Thirteenth Minnesota; 1 in Company G, same regiment, and 1 in Company E, Second Oregon. Lieutenant Bruckart did excellent work with his company after he took command. My adjutant, Lieut. A. J. Brazee, in delivering orders to different parts of the line, did good work and showed good judgment, as did also Lieutenant Dunbar, of Company E, and Lieutenant Platts, of Company M.

It is not now definitely known how many of the insurgents were killed, but I am informed that a burial party sent out the next day to the neighborhood of the battlefield buried 113. We captured, I estimate, about 100 prisoners, and cleaned out the whole country we covered from the Tondo Church to General MacArthur's line. Our gunboats fired several shots, presumably at those insurgents who escaped across the lagoon on our left. All the men behaved admirably, and as it was their first experience under fire their coolness and determination was very marked, all of which it gives me great pleasure to testify to.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

PERCY WILLIS,
Major, Second Oregon U. S. Volunteer Infantry.

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REPORTS OF STAFF OFFICERS.

[Inclosure 68.]

OFFICE CHIEF ENGINEER,
Manila, P. I., March 31, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: In response to circular from headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps I have the honor to submit the following report of operations of my department during the month of February, 1899:

On the morning of February 5 I sent word to the division commanders that all calls for engineer tools and material would be promptly filled, requesting that the First Division call on the engineer company and the Second Division call through me on the warehouse at Binonda.

Prior to this I had sent a stock of tools and material from the main warehouse, together with 2 wagons for light and quick work, to be kept with the company. In addition 3 bull carts were kept at each place for use as needed, and orders were given to the warehouse to call on the transportation quartermaster for extra carts if needed, and to the company to seize any such to be found in case of emergency. For light quick work from the warehouse I called on Captain Kimball from time to time for light carts.

At the warehouse 2 men were kept night and day with directions to fill any order that should come direct to them from any commissioned officer. All orders for engineer material were filled promptly upon receipt of telegrams or other order.

In addition to furnishing this material reconnaissances were made immediately after the first two days' fighting and a map made showing the new lines and location of troops.

The company was employed under Capt. William G. Haan, assistant quartermaster U. S. V., who did excellent work in repairs and construction of bridges and roads, cleared the ground in front of General Owenshine's brigade, and attended to other engineering work, besides taking part as infantry in the operations of February 5 and making a reconnaissance on February 15.

The following is quoted from Captain Haan's report to me of the operations of the company under his command:

"The entire army was amply supplied with engineering and intrenching tools, so that wherever the line stopped it could be immediately intrenched. These tools were supplied from the depot of the chief engineer, where, under the direction of the chief engineer Eighth Army Corps, men of the company, with sufficient transportation, were in readiness to instantly supply all demands. The possession of two spring wagons and good ponies in this depot greatly facilitated the quick delivery of the lighter articles, while the heavier articles, such as bales of sand bags, shovels, and picks had to be hauled in bull carts.

"On February 15 I took the company out for a reconnaissance in force and became attached to part of the First Brigade, First Division, making a demonstration against Pateros, near Laguna de Bay. The company here developed a considerable force of insurgents and was under fire for about an hour and a half, our supports having withdrawn without our knowledge. The men behaved magnificently under fire and a terrible heat, 5 of them being partially overcome by the hot sun. The distance passed over this day was 27 miles of rather difficult ground and on a very hot day. The nature of the country was learned and the object of the reconnaissance fully accomplished.

"In this connection I wish specially to mention Private John Varney, jr., who volunteered to go out in the open field to recover a haversack belonging to another man of the company and which had been dropped. He was fired upon by about 10 insurgents from a distance of about 200 yards, and showed the greatest coolness and courage while under the heavy fire.

"Since hostilities began the company has repaired all roads and bridges, built new bridges where necessary, also a new road to center of First Division line, keeping the line supplied with all necessary engineer supplies, maps, etc.

"The conduct of the company while under my command has been most excellent, and their information and intelligence of such a high order that discipline is maintained and all work performed, not for fear of punishment for neglects nor from hope of reward, but from a high sense of duty well performed, such as one would expect rather from officers than enlisted men."

The part taken by the Engineer Company on February 5 has already been reported by Captain Haan through me.

Very respectfully,

CHAS. L. POTTER,
Lieutenant-Colonel, U. S. V., Chief En.

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[Inclosure 69.]

HDQS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
OFFICE OF CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER,
Ayuntamiento, Manila, P. I., March 30, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, Manila, P. I.

SIR: In accordance with your circular letter of March 29, I have the honor to report as follows relative to the operations of the Signal Corps during the month of February:

The situation at the beginning of the month was practically that of hostile armies in contact; our men chafing at the restraint, the insurgents believing us held back by fear alone, each eager to get at the other.

In anticipation of trouble a company of signalmen was assigned to each division of the army, the commanding officer of the First Company reporting to General Anderson with charge of lines south of the Pasig, and with instructions to maintain communications as troops advanced; the Eighteenth Company reporting to General MacArthur, with similar orders for the maintenance of communication north of the river. A train of 14 light wagons, each capable of carrying a field equipment of instruments, battery supplies, and a few miles of line had been purchased, and with this transportation, supplemented somewhat by such wagons and horses as could be procured from the quartermaster's department, the supply not only of line and battery material at the front, but of rations and other essentials, has been accomplished. The companies, acting independently, have attended to their own equipment, but the general supply has been delivered and controlled by the property officer, Lieut. William O. Bailey, specially designated for the purpose.

Several of our outposts, notably those of the Nebraska, Montana, Pennsylvania, and Colorado regiments, had been pushed so far to the front as to suggest trouble to wires in case of an attack. A few rockets were therefore placed at each and a code prearranged.

The positions assigned the various commands in case of action were such as to encompass the city with a line of battle, the flanks of which rested on the bay. At each flank a flag station was established for communication with the ships of the Navy anchored offshore in position to enfilade an attacking enemy.

Our relations with the Filipinos were so strained and their hostilities so apparent that on several occasions the call to arms had been sounded. At these times the rapid assembling of the army in position had the practical effect of developing shortcomings and perfecting preparations, so that when the outbreak actually occurred everything moved without friction and without mishap, save to the telegraph. Orders had been issued enjoining upon guards and patrols that tampering with telegraph lines be not permitted. In the darkness of night, however, the long stretches to advanced outposts, especially those through thickly settled native districts, were at the mercy of the hostile element, despite the most constant watchfulness, and as soon as firing began the exterior lines north of Pasig went down at once. It was most comforting, however, to see rockets almost immediately, announcing disrupted circuit, attack, and ability to withstand, from each of the threatened positions.

The signal company north of the river had been divided into detachments, each assigned to the care of a special outpost and the telegraph lines leading thereto from the general system within town. It was on this part of the system that the first attack was made. Capt. Edgar Russel, in command of the company, immediately sent Lieut. F. H. Bailey with his detachment, suitable transportation, and abundant material to the right of the division, and Lieut. C. H. Gordon with part of his men to the left and part to the mouth of the Pasig for communication with the Navy.

The Eighteenth Company having a greater length of line to manage and the first effect of the onslaught falling within its territory, assistance was sent from the First Company. The combined squads, working the greater part of the night, reestablished communications by daylight.

In the district south of the Pasig, the First Company, commanded by Lieut. Charles E. Kilbourne, jr., at the alarm took stations, one party under Lieut. E. E. Kelly at Malate Fort, for communication by wire through the general system and by flag with the Navy, a second at Blockhouse No. 11, under Lieut. George S. Gibbs, jr., and another at Singalong outpost, under First Class Sergt. Philip C. Knapp. At daybreak of the 5th the detachment sent to the aid of the Eighteenth Company by Lieutenant Kilbourne, who accompanied it, was returned to its post, and both signal companies soon had their work well in hand. Our troops almost immediately took the initiative, and, advancing in all directions, ran the battle line flush with the farthest outposts, and in many instances passing beyond the outer telegraph station, so that it became necessary to carry forward the wires. This part of the work was executed with celerity, and at all times, after the first disheartening breakdown, it

was possible for the different commanders to transmit and receive instructions with reasonable speed, and the increase in the use of the wire due to field operations may be judged from the fact that the number of messages handled on the day preceding the battle was 515, and on February 5 (the day of the action) was 1,120, since which time the use of the telegraph has steadily increased, the number of messages handled yesterday being 1,770, with a total of 30,534 for the month of February.

It is questioned if better opportunity ever offered for more effective use of the telegraph by an army than in the present instance. Operations thus far have been entirely on interior lines, the movement of troops simply entailing the rapid running forward of light lines. In the case of the Caloocan fight (an occasion on which an advance required the laying of considerable wire) a telegraph office set up at the extreme front was ready within a few minutes after the forward movement had ceased.

During the burning of the northern part of town and the invasion of Tondo on the 23d a field office was cut in the heart of the blazing district almost as soon as operations for expelling the insurgents had become effective.

Every command, depot, or outpost of the army can be reached from 29 different telegraph offices, with delay due only to occasional breaks, the great volume of business, and the necessity for precedence in order of importance.

To Capt. Edgar Russel is due the greatest credit for operations on the north, the front of the line of battle of which he was to keep himself and commanders informed being something over 10 miles in length. It is not unlikely that he personally finds most satisfaction in the rough, dangerous work performed by himself, officers, and men under the heavy fire of the 5th or during the advance on Caloocan; but it is probable that the commander whose division he served would award equal credit for the success of his service with the fleet, with the parties advancing to capture the waterworks, and for his general efficiency in anticipating needs and improvising means under the trying conditions of lack of men and suitable material for so great a field of operations.

So also with Lieut. Charles E. Kilbourne, jr., in charge of communications for Anderson's division. To his credit falls the performance of one of the most conspicuous and telling acts of that hot day, the 5th, when, under fire at short range of a body of insurgents ensconced in Paco church, and in the line of fire of our own infantry, he personally effected the repair of an important wire.

Lieut. F. H. Bailey's thoroughness and reliability were evinced in his extensive line work from Santa Mesa to the Deposito, and thence to the pumping station, and in his work in connecting up blockhouses and advanced points.

Lieut. Charles H. Gordon's excellent operations on the shore in maintaining communication with the Navy, though cut off with his party and under fire, off and on, for thirty-six hours, is another instance of devotion to duty and its intelligent performance.

Lieut. E. E. Kelly's work at Fort Malate and thence forward to Pasay are practically the counterpart of his achievements in the opposite direction at the capture of Manila.

The duties of Lieut. George S. Gibbs, jr., took him to the front with the left of Anderson's division, and he performed them under the fire encountered by King's brigade with such directness and judgment as to gain on the field the personal commendation of the brigade commander.

Four of the signal officers had long been prostrated by typhoid fever, and their convalescence had been exasperatingly slow. The strongest of these, Lieut. A. J. Rudd, reported for duty at once, but was not permitted immediately to take the field, though intrusted with charge of the central station. A chance to participate in the capture of Caloocan, however, set him up and made a well man of him immediately, and, being given the opportunity, he ran the wire to the front over the open line of railway under continuous fire from start to finish, and so beneficial has been the result of intense action that he has been continuously on duty ever since, most of the time at the immediate front.

Capt. E. A. McKenna, convalescing at the Corregidor Hospital, heard of the fighting at Manila and came at once, and, though still apparently unfit for duty, took command of his company on the 11th, and has added to his already exceedingly bright record by the most efficient service in engagements and advances that have fallen to the share of the First Division. He, too, has been made well.

Though it seemed hardly prudent that Capt. Philip J. Perkins should be allowed to leave the hospital so soon, he has not been content till assigned duties within his strength, and is now in the midst of organizing and equipping the new signal company recently authorized since the tremendous expansion of business has developed the inadequacy of the present force.

As to the men, no tax upon their endurance or resolution, however irksome, has interfered with the most vigorous performance of duty, and they respond to each new call with unabated zeal, expecting only a fair show and a fighting chance for distinc-

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tion. It is well nigh impossible to overestimate the hardships of their work and the faithfulness with which duties of the highest order intrusted to their execution are carried out. It has never been my lot to serve with more efficient, resourceful men.

The following have rendered especially conspicuous service:

Sergt. Thomas A. McKinstry, Corpls. William F. Schoeneman and Fred Shalda, and First-Class Private Tracy E. Inman, for repairing lines under heavy fire, and Sergt. Dan L. Hopkins, for similar work through a burning village; Corpl. Fred Gellerman, for carrying wounded from the field under fire; Sergts. Emmet R. Jones and William W. Howser, Corpl. Fritz M. Biebel, and First-Class Private Allen B. Forman, for maintaining signals with the navy from Fort Malate while compelled to stand on the ramparts under fire, Howser and Biebel also marking the advance of the line with flags during a charge; Sergts. Paul O. Paulson, David T. Flannery, and Arthur A. Alexander, and Private Allen Kirby, for excellence of their service in signaling under fire at Caloocan; Sergt. Augustus N. Maxeiner and First-Class Privates John K. Weir and Clarence J. Prendergast, for long and trying service under fire at outposts, and First-Class Private Herschell B. Young, for carrying an important dispatch to block-house in face of a heavy fire.

The order for the Iloilo command to make a landing was received the morning of the 11th. Information of the intention and an ultimatum were sent to the insurgents at 3.30 p. m., giving them time to withdraw or surrender. On the morning of the 12th, instead of withdrawing, as expected, they began throwing up intrenchments. A couple of warning shots from the *Petrel* brought a return fire, to which both the *Petrel* and *Boston* replied, directing everything against the fort. Immediately the town was set afire by the insurgents, and the flames spread rapidly over the south end. The detachment under Captain Tilly aboard the *Newport* then, in accordance with instructions, directed the disembarking of troops from the *Arizona* and *St. Paul* by signals, and also worked with the cruiser *Boston*, through which a tow of boats containing part of the Tennessee regiment was landed. A signal station was soon established within the fort, opening up communication with the ships and transports, and the telegraph put in operation out to the line of the burning buildings. The town was soon cleared of insurgents and the troops advanced to the Jaro and Molo bridges.

In the construction of telegraph lines through the burning district the men suffered greatly from the smoke and heat, and occasionally received a scattering fire. The signal party sent with the force to capture Jaro worked in the midst of a sharp action. Later the office of the captain of the port was put into communication with the Navy. The provost-marshal's office, Iloilo; the Eighteenth Infantry at Jaro, General Miller's headquarters at the junction of the Jaro and Molo roads, and the headquarters of the Tennessee regiment at Molo Bridge, were in telegraphic communication, the offices being operated day and night in consequence of the unsettled conditions.

On the 26th Lieutenant Cannon accompanied a reconnaissance of the First Tennessee through and beyond Molo, and northward, across the Iloilo River; a force of several hundred insurgents was met and put to flight; signals directing movements and positions of troops during the fray are reported to have materially assisted in operations.

Just before the outbreak it had become evident that the Cavite cable would not last much longer. The Manila reach, consisting of light insulated wire, had become so weak that just after the opening of hostilities, while buoying the joint, it gave way. The old cable was grappled and the new piece spliced on and laid with such expedition that the interruption of communication with Cavite was hardly noticeable. Much credit is due to Lieut. Edward E. Kelly for his management of the technical part of the work. The cable is laid sufficiently inshore to avoid the anchorage of heavy craft, but in sufficient depth to insure against probability of interference by insurgents.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. E. THOMPSON,

Chief Signal Officer and Lieutenant-Colonel, Volunteers.

[Inclosure 70.]

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH CORPS, U. S. A.,
OFFICE OF CHIEF QUARTERMASTER,
Ayuntamiento, Manila, P. I., April 1, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, Manila, P. I.

SIR: In response to circular letter from these headquarters, I have the honor to render the following report:

The means of transportation of this department are bull carts, ponies and carts, 81.

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horses and 119 mules from the United States which were received March 1, 1899. In addition, launches and cascos, or lighters, were available when troops could be supplied by water.

When hostilities broke out, on February 4, the command was fairly well supplied with ponies and light carts for ordinary use, and this department was able to secure all the bull carts needed. What was lacking in transportation was made up by impressment of the necessary conveyances. Rations and ammunition were forwarded to the troops at the front by bull carts, and, for quicker means, by ponies and light carts. A large number of ponies had been purchased, but a number were turned over to mount 2 troops of cavalry, and many were worn out rapidly by the hard work; glanders and other diseases caused many to be shot, and it became very difficult to maintain the work with the number on hand, and almost impossible to purchase any ponies. Under these circumstances the arrival of the horses and mules from the United States on the *Tacoma* proved timely and valuable. The prolonged and extended operations continued to make the supply of animals more and more difficult, and made dependence on this mode of transportation uncertain. Resort was had to the use of Chinamen as litter bearers and for other purposes, and the reports received regarding this mode of transportation are favorable, so far as I have heard.

Immediately upon the taking of San Pedro Macati and the movement of the troops up the river, supplies were forwarded by launch and cascos. As soon as Calocan was taken the railroad was promptly repaired and put in proper condition for service by the transportation quartermaster and was soon transporting troops and supplies to that part of the line. The railway service in the movement on Malolos was kept along with the advancing troops, and supplies for the same were carried chiefly by train on the railroad.

The efficiency of the transportation service of the Quartermaster's Department has been demonstrated in the fact that so far, in spite of great difficulties, all calls for immediate transportation have been met and the troops have been promptly supplied with rations, ammunition, forage, medical, and other supplies necessary for their health and comfort.

For detailed information attention is invited to reports herein of the transportation quartermaster and the chief quartermaster of the First Division. Report of chief quartermaster of the Second Division will be forwarded when received.

Very respectfully,

J. W. POPE,

Lieutenant-Colonel and Chief Quartermaster, U. S. V., Chief Quartermaster.

[Inclosure 71.]

OFFICE OF THE TRANSPORTATION QUARTERMASTER,
ASSISTANT TO THE CHIEF QUARTERMASTER, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Ayuntamiento, Manila, P. I., April 1, 1899.

CHIEF QUARTERMASTER

Department of Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, Manila, P. I.

SIR: In compliance with circular from headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, dated the 29th ultimo, calling for report of the method adopted for supplying the commands in the field during the month of February, I have the honor to submit the following:

Preparation looking to the prompt supply of transportation to troops in active service was well in hand when hostilities began, February 4 last. There had been supplied to each—

	Car- riages.	Quiltes.	Carts.	Riding horses.
Division	2	2	2	12
Brigade	1	1	1	13
Regiment		1	3	6
Independent organization		1	2	4
Division hospital	1	4	3	8
Reserve hospital		2	2	6
For contingencies	4	8	12	16

Pack trains for the hospital of 8 ponies; South Dakota, 25 ponies; Colorado, 24 ponies, had been organized. Contract was in effect for bull teams, which, however, the contractor was unable to carry out on account of the low rate of service, and it became necessary to hire in open market and impress a sufficiency of this kind of

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teams for the emergency of the first ten days. There were in daily ordinary service an average of 350 teams used to supply rations, water, and ammunition to troops on the firing line, and with troops in the field 400 bull teams used in various movements of troops from point to point.

During the month I purchased 234 horses, 38 sets of harness, 1 water wagon, and 31 carts, and issued 317 horses, 76 carts, and harness, 71 saddles, 14 carriages, 28 quilezes, and impressed 35 vehicles, most of which was sent to troops on the firing line.

On the 7th of the month I took charge of the abandoned Manila-Dagupan Railroad and a tramway line hence to Caloocan; repaired the tracks, organized train crews, etc., and operated the line in moving troops and supplies on to the firing line in that direction.

I had employed 7 steam launches and an average of 25 cascos and lorchas in daily service, loading and unloading troops and supplies from transports to and from United States and the adjacent islands, and sending supplies to troops in camp along the Pasig River and at Corregidor Island, etc.

Summary of transportation under my charge in service during the month of February is as follows: Carriages, 35; quilezes, 99; carts, 250; water wagons, 1; work animals, 355; pack animals, 57; riding animals, 500; bull teams, ordinary service, 350; bull teams with troops in field, 400.

Very respectfully,

C. A. DEVOL,
Major and Quartermaster, U. S. V.

[Inclosure 72.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF QUARTERMASTER,
Manila, P. I., March 30, 1899.

CHIEF QUARTERMASTER,

Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, Manila, P. I.

SIR: Replying to your telegram of the 29th instant, calling for report of the operations of the Quartermaster's Department, especially during active operations for supplying troops on the firing line, I have the honor to state that at first the troops used the transportation furnished them by the Department. As the lines advanced it was necessary to impress or seize vehicles of all kinds. February 5 the transportation quartermaster furnished 77 bull teams, which were distributed throughout the division, a few being retained at division and brigade headquarters for emergencies. An effort was made to supplement this by horse carts, but this was only partially successful on account of scarcity of carts.

With the transportation allotted—that seized, impressed, or captured—and that subsequently furnished by the Department, the troops kept themselves well supplied. Water transportation in the Pasig rendered good service in supplying those troops in and around San Pedro Macati and Santa Ana. The using of transportation secured from other than the Department led to inequalities in its distribution. One water cart was supplied for use of the First California; other organizations used barrels and carts for hauling water. The supply of bull carts was ample, but it should have been supplemented by more horse carts, at least one to a company.

Ammunition was distributed from this office throughout the division, a reserve supply having been obtained from the chief ordnance officer.

Very respectfully,

CHAR. C. WALCUTT, Jr.,
Captain and Assistant Quartermaster, U. S. V., Chief Quartermaster.

[Inclosure 73.]

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
OFFICE CHIEF COMMISSARY,
Manila, P. I., March 31, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, Manila, P. I.

SIR: In compliance with the provisions of circular letter from your office under date of March 29, 1899, I have the honor to submit the following report relative to the operations of the Subsistence Department at these headquarters during the months of February and March, 1899.

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY. 525

Prior to active operations in the field all troops were supplied with the garrison ration, issues being made to regiments by the issuing commissary for periods of ten days. The proportion of components for these periods was as follows:

	Days.
Fresh beef.....	7
Bacon.....	1
Salmon.....	1
Canned beef.....	1
Flour.....	9
Hard bread.....	1
Beans.....	10
Potatoes, 80 per cent.....	10
Onions, 20 per cent.....	10

In lieu of 4 ounces fresh beef, 2 ounces each rice and dried fruits (apples, peaches, and prunes) were issued on days when fresh beef was drawn. Remainder, usual ration.

On March 16 the issues were modified by adding one day's bacon and eliminating canned beef; by issuing ten days' flour and no hard bread, and in changing issues of vegetables as follows:

	Per cent.
Potatoes.....	75
Onions.....	15
Tomatoes.....	10

Mess pork and beef are no longer issued. About the same time oatmeal was added as one of the components to be issued in lieu of fresh beef. Fresh vegetables, brought from San Francisco, have been supplied daily to all the troops of this command.

On February 5 and 6, during active operations, travel rations were supplied to all organizations on the firing line. The forces had been rationed to include February 10, but the lines having advanced some distance from the city these supplies, being left in barracks, were not immediately available. The system of supplying the line on the days above mentioned was very simple. The location of each regiment being definitely known, and transportation being promptly furnished by the Quartermaster Department, travel rations were dispatched on bull carts, accompanied by a guard, who received explicit instructions as to the location of the organizations and to whom the supplies were to be delivered.

The garrison ration, including fresh beef and vegetables, was resumed February 7, after which date regimental commissaries attended to the details of supplying their commands.

For the first few days several organizations stationed near the city had the food prepared in barracks, loaded on wagons, and distributed to the firing line. Captain Krauthoff mentions this method of supplying as very satisfactory under the circumstances, and speaks of having seen "a company enjoying their Sunday dinner on February 5 within a few hundred yards of the insurgent trenches. The dinner consisted of roast beef, gravy, potatoes, fresh bread, coffee, and plum pudding."

On February 9 three days' travel rations were issued to regimental commissaries as a reserve which was to be used only in event of an emergency.

Sales depots on the firing line were established by Captain Krauthoff at Passay, by Captain Bootes at Calocan, and by Captain Handy at San Pedro Macati. The regular sales depots in Quiapo and Ermita were continued during the months of February and March.

During the advance of the Second Division on Malolos travel rations for three days were taken by the troops, the ration being transported by bull teams which were assigned to regiments. Later, supplies were forwarded by rail to the command, invoiced to brigade commissaries, who issued direct to regiments.

During the field operations it became necessary to establish a plant for roasting and grinding coffee, there being no facilities for such work in this city. This plant is under the supervision of Capt. C. du Pont Coudert, assistant to the chief commissary. A soldier and a few native laborers manage to roast and grind about 1,200 pounds of coffee daily, an adequate supply for all the troops in the field.

The commands at Cavite, Corregidor Island, Iloilo, Bacolod, and at Cebu are supplied with subsistence stores from the depot commissary in Binondo. Fresh beef for troops at Cavite is drawn direct from the cold-storage vessel, the *Duke of Sutherland*; that for troops at Corregidor Island is sent three times each week, being invoiced by the issuing commissary of the command to the commissary of the troops stationed on the island. Troops at Cebu are subsisted on native beef, which costs from 18 to 20 cents (Mexican) per pound. A limited quantity of native beef has been procured by the commissary at Bacolod, which has been supplemented from time to time by

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beef drawn from the *Indiana*, stationed at Iloilo as a cold-storage plant, and from which the troops at that point are supplied. The commissary at Iloilo reports it impracticable to obtain the native beef in sufficient quantity to supply the troops of the First Separate Brigade at that place.

The native police force of 200 men at Bacolod are given the "native" ration, the components of which are drawn from the depot commissary, Binondo, being procured by purchase from public civil funds.

The Filipino prisoners, coolie teamsters, and litter bearers are also issued the above ration.

The stores of rice captured from the insurgents during the advance of our lines on the 5th and 6th of February amounted to a little more than 50 tons, most of which is stored in the warehouses of the depot commissary in Binondo. No reports have as yet been received by this office as to the quantities of rice or other stores captured in the advance on Malolos.

In the past two months the duties of Major Anderson and Captain Krauthoff, depot and issuing commissary, respectively, have been unusually trying. The former received stores from eight transports, made shipments and transfers to the various posts and detachments in these islands, and furnished hospitals, organizations, and depots with enormous quantities of sales stores. The latter made issues to all the troops of the command, and at the same time performed his duties as commissary, First Brigade, First Division. The storehouses of both officers were open every day in the week, and arrangements were made to issue rations and other stores at night if they were required.

The quality of the ration issued during February and March has been excellent. The total quantity of stores returned by regiments to the issuing commissary as unfit for use amounted in value to only \$33.20.

During the period covered by this report the remaining Spanish prisoners of war have been subsisted, under the supervision of Captain Bootes, in the same manner as heretofore, which has always been satisfactory.

The subsistence department sustained an irreparable loss in the death of Capt. M. G. Krayenbuhl, commissary of subsistence, U. S. V., killed in action March 26.

The following officers and noncommissioned officers of the Subsistence Department are at present on duty with this command:

Col. D. L. Brainard, purchasing commissary, U. S. A., chief commissary.

Maj. R. H. Fitzhugh, chief commissary of subsistence, U. S. V., chief commissary Second Division.

Maj. W. H. Anderson, chief commissary of subsistence, U. S. V., chief commissary First Division, depot commissary, Binondo, P. I.

Capt. Daniel Van Voorhis, commissary of subsistence, U. S. V., First Separate Brigade depot commissary, Iloilo.

Capt. S. B. Bootes, commissary of subsistence, U. S. V., in charge of sales depot, Malolos, P. I.

Capt. S. M. Milliken, commissary of subsistence, U. S. V., commissary First Brigade, Second Division.

Capt. J. B. Handy, commissary of subsistence, U. S. V., commissary First Brigade, First Division, and in charge sales depot, San Pedro Macati.

Capt. C. du Pont Coudert, commissary of subsistence, U. S. V., assistant to the chief commissary, commissary Third Brigade, Second Division, and in charge sales depot, Ermita, P. I.

Capt. C. R. Krauthoff, commissary of subsistence, U. S. V., commissary Second Brigade, First Division, issuing commissary First and Second divisions, and in charge sales depot, Pasay.

Officers on duty as subsistence officers:

First Lieut. H. E. Ely, Twenty-second Infantry, commissary Third Brigade, First Division.

First Lieut. James Harkins, Tenth Pennsylvania Regiment Volunteer Infantry, commissary Second Brigade, Second Division.

First Lieut. H. C. Lane, Fifty-first Iowa Volunteer Infantry, depot commissary, Cavite.

Commissary Sergt. Patrick Lynch, with Captain Coudert.

Commissary Sergt. George P. Castle, with Captain Van Voorhis.

Commissary Sergt. C. F. B. Zimmerman, with Major Anderson.

Commissary Sergt. William Mansie, with depot commissary, Cavite.

Commissary Sergt. Garrett O'Reilly, with Major Anderson.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. L. BRAINARD,

Colonel, Purchasing Commissary, U. S. A., Chief Commissary.

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY. 527

[Inclosure 74.]

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
OFFICE CHIEF ORDNANCE OFFICER,
Manila, P. I., April 4, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps.

SIR: Pursuant to your instructions I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the ordnance department of the Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps during the month of February, 1899:

The operations of this department consisted chiefly in supplying the lines around Manila with ammunition during action since February 4 to February 28, 1899.

The quartermaster's department furnished, upon application, 40 bull teams and light horse carts, which were kept at the arsenal constantly for immediate use; this number was increased to as many as 60 upon necessity. A gang of 40 Chinamen was also kept at the arsenal day and over night, and subsisted near the arsenal by the Government.

Upon requisition and telegraphic request, note, or verbal application, ammunition was moved out to any part of the lines at a moment's notice under proper guard. Also quite a quantity of ammunition, arms, military stores, etc., that was captured from the insurgents was brought in.

Rapid-fire guns were placed upon the line by order of the commanding general. Some small arms were turned over to the Spaniards by order of proper authority. The interior operation of the department, aside from the receipt and issue of ordnance stores, consisted in the repair of equipments, rapid-fire and light artillery guns. The above report will apply to the operations in this department in the month of March, 1899.

Very respectfully,
JNO. R. MCGINNIS,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Ordnance Department, Chief Ordnance Officer.

[Inclosure 75.]

HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
CHIEF SURGEON'S OFFICE,
Manila, P. I., April 2, 1899.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Department Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, Manila, P. I.

SIR: I have the honor to render the following report of the operations of the medical department for March, 1899. The long list of engagements between our troops and the Filipinos continuing through the month resulted in the following casualties to our command:

Killed:	
Officers.....	6
Enlisted men	71
Died from wounds:	
Officers.....	2
Enlisted men	14
Wounded:	
Officers.....	18
Enlisted men	485
Total casualties for the month.....	596
Total casualties since outbreak	1, 029

The surgeons were supplied in the same liberal way that was done during February. First-aid packages and other dressings, medical and surgical chests, litters in large number, stimulants, beef extract, water, etc., were taken by hospital-corps men to the troops on the firing line.

The wounded received early assistance, as every effort was made to have a sufficient number of surgeons and hospital-corps men, at the front. A large number of coolies assisted in carrying the wounded to the ambulances, which were supplemented by horse litters and carromatas. The railroad was and is now used to bring in the wounded, box cars having been provided with cots. A surgeon with a detail of hospital-corps men are on duty with the wounded en route (by rail) to Manila. Upon

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arrival here the wounded are transferred to the hospital boat and taken to the hospital landing, thence quickly and safely removed to the hospital.

Our force has been much overworked, but nevertheless have met every emergency. Major Crosby has put up excellent tent wards, and the purveyor, Major Corbuser, has furnished abundant supplies of all kinds at short notice. Considering the work done and disadvantages we labor under, being so far from our base, I can safely say that the success in meeting all requirements thus far has been marvelous.

The Filipino wounded still receive the same kind attention they have in the past, no effort being spared to make them comfortable and give them every chance for recovery.

Number of Filipinos admitted to hospital during the month.....	85
Number died	8
Number transferred	22
Remaining in hospital under treatment	180

Very respectfully,

HENRY LIPPINCOTT,
Deputy Surgeon-General, U. S. A., Chief Surgeon.

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